Formulating Manipulable Argumentation with Intra-/Inter-Agent
  Preferences
  From marketing to politics, exploitation of incomplete information through
selective communication of arguments is ubiquitous. In this work, we focus on
development of an argumentation-theoretic model for manipulable multi-agent
argumentation, where each agent may transmit deceptive information to others
for tactical motives. In particular, we study characterisation of epistemic
states, and their roles in deception/honesty detection and (mis)trust-building.
To this end, we propose the use of intra-agent preferences to handle
deception/honesty detection and inter-agent preferences to determine which
agent(s) to believe in more. We show how deception/honesty in an argumentation
of an agent, if detected, would alter the agent's perceived trustworthiness,
and how that may affect their judgement as to which arguments should be
acceptable.
