Coping with the Limitations of Rational Inference in the Framework of
  Possibility Theory
  Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential
inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure
inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second
inference does not provide expected results either because it cannot produce
them, or even provide counter-intuitive conclusions. This state of facts is not
due to the principle of selecting a unique ordering of interpretations (which
can be encoded by one possibility distribution), but rather to the absence of
constraints expressing pieces of knowledge we have implicitly in mind. It is
advocated in this paper that constraints induced by independence information
can help finding the right ordering of interpretations. In particular,
independence constraints can be systematically assumed with respect to formulas
composed of literals which do not appear in the conditional knowledge base, or
for default rules with respect to situations which are "normal" according to
the other default rules in the base. The notion of independence which is used
can be easily expressed in the qualitative setting of possibility theory.
Moreover, when a counter-intuitive plausible conclusion of a set of defaults,
is in its rational closure, but not in its preferential closure, it is always
possible to repair the set of defaults so as to produce the desired conclusion.
