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From: amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Off the shelf cheap DES keyseach machine (Was: Re: Corporate acceptance of the wiretap chip)
Date: 20 Apr 1993 21:22:30 GMT
Organization: Department of Mathematics
Lines: 19
Message-ID: <1r1pimINNdjh@dns1.NMSU.Edu>
References: <1993Apr20.150531.2059@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> <1993Apr20.192105.11751@ulysses.att.com> <1r1otuINNdb2@dns1.NMSU.Edu>
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In article <1r1otuINNdb2@dns1.NMSU.Edu>
	amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes:

>	The 'plaintext' is digitized voice, and exists for a very short
>time, probably in a couple inches of copper, tops. It's flatly not
>available -- your bug in my office can hear my voice, and even digitize
>it, but it's going to get a different bitstream.

	I am an idiot. The plaintext that's relevant is the session key.
If you know that, you probably don't need a roomful of chips, do you?
If you were going to brute force something interesting, that'd be the
message stream, which is sort of approximately known by, say, a bug in
my office. Then your roomful of chips could get the session key. Which
I change every morning.

	Really, it's just a whole lot easier for the illicit wiretappers
to stick a bug in your phone.

	Andrew Molitor