http___en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Imre_Lakatos_3.xml
1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 11.1 12.1 12.2 13.1 14.1 15.1 16.1 17.1 18.1
Имре Лакатош Имре Лакатош (на унгарски: Lakatos Imre) е философ на науката, роден в Унгария, който е живял в Англия, един от представителите на постпозитивизма. Сред основните му приноси е концепцията за развитието на науката чрез т.нар. "научно-изследователска програма" (на английски: research programme): последователност от теории, които се развиват, с обща "научна метафизика". Съдържание Биография[редактиране | редактиране на кода] Роден е под името Аврум Липшиц в Дебрецен в еврейско семейство. По време на Втората световна война участва в антифашистката съпротива. Поради преследванията срещу евреите (майка му и баба му загиват в Освиенцим) е принуден да промени фамилията си на Молнар, а след това на Лакатош. Според някои източници приема пролетарската фамилия Лакатош (шлосер) след като започва работа в правителството на Унгарската народна република. След войната завършва аспирантура в Московския университет под ръководството на София Яновска. За кратко работи в Министерството на образованието на комунистическа Унгария. По това време попада под силното влияние на идеите на сънародниците си Дьорд Лукач, Дьорд Пойа и Шандор Карачон. По време на култа към личността 1950—1953 е репресиран като „ревизионист“ и пратен в затвора. По време на Унгарската революция от 1956 г. бяга на Запад през Австрия и от 1958 г. живее постоянно във Великобритания. От 1969 г. е професор в Лондонската школа по икономика и политически науки. Умира през 1974 г. на 51 години от инсулт. Методология на научно-изследователските програми[редактиране | редактиране на кода] Лакатош е автор на теорията и методологията на "научно-изследователските програми", в чиито рамки развива принципа на фалсифицируемост на Карл Попър до степен, наречена от него изтънчена фалсифицируемост. Теорията на Лакатош изучава движещите сили за развитието на науката, продължава и едновременно с това оспорва методологичната концепция на Попър и полемизира с теорията на Томас Кун. Своите идеи Лакатош e споделял и обсъждал с Паул Файерабенд[1] Лакатош описва науката като конкурентна борба на научно-изследователски програми, състоящи се от „твърдо ядро“ от априорно приети фундаментални допускания, които не могат да бъдат опровергани вътре в програмата и „предпазен пояс“ от спомагателни хипотези ad hoc, които могат да се видоизменят и приспособяват според контрапримерите на програмата. Еволюцията на конкретната програма става чрез видоизменение и уточнение на „предпазния пояс“, докато разрушаването на „твърдото ядро“ теоретично означава отмяна на програмата и замяната ѝ с друга конкурентна. Като главен критерий за научност на една програма Лакатош посочва прираста на фактически знания, свързан със силата ѝ на предсказване. Докато програмата дава прираст на знания, работата на учения в нейните рамки е „рационална“. Когато програмата загуби силата си на предсказване и започне да работи само чрез пояса от спомагателни хипотези, Лакатош препоръчва отказ от по-нататъшното ѝ развитие. Посочва се, че има отделни случаи, в които научно-изследователската програма успява да преживее вътрешната си криза и започва отново да дава научни резултати; така че придържането на учения към избраната програма дори и по време на криза също се признава за „рационално“. Библиография[редактиране | редактиране на кода] - Лакатош И., Доказателства и опровержения: Логика на математическото откритие, София : Наука и изкуство, 1983 (прев. от англ. Гаргов) - - ((en)) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, 1970 - съдържа пълно изложение на методологията на Лакатош Бележки[редактиране | редактиране на кода] - ↑ ((en)) Lakatos, I., and Feyerabend P., For and against Method: including Lakatos’s Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, ed. by Matteo Motterlini, Chicago University Press, (451 pp), 1999, ISBN 0-226-46774-0 Външни препратки[редактиране | редактиране на кода] - ((en)) за Имре Лакатош на сайта на Лондонската школа по икономика и политически науки - ((en)) Звукозаписи на лекции на Имре Лакатош по научен метод
1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1 10.1 11.1 12.1 13.1 14.1 15.1 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 18.1 18.2 19.1 19.2 19.3 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 21.1 21.2 22.1 22.2 23.1 24.1 25.1 25.2 26.1 27.1 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 28.5 28.6 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 30.1 30.2 30.3 31.1 31.2 32.1 32.2 32.3 33.1 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 34.5 35.1 36.1 36.2 36.3 37.1 37.2 37.3 37.4 37.5 37.6 37.7 38.1 38.2 38.3 39.1 39.2 39.3 40.1 40.2 40.3 41.1 41.2 41.3 42.1 42.2 42.3 42.4 43.1 43.2 44.1 44.2 44.3 44.4 44.5 45.1 46.1 46.2 47.1 47.2 47.3 48.1 49.1 50.1 51.1 51.2 52.1 52.2 52.3 53.1 54.1 55.1 55.2 56.1 56.2 56.3 56.4 56.5 56.6 56.7 56.8 56.9 56.10 57.1 57.2 57.3 57.4 57.5 57.6 57.7 58.1 59.1 59.2 60.1 60.2 61.1 62.1 63.1 63.2 64.1 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.5 65.1 66.1 67.1 68.1 69.1 70.1 71.1 71.2 71.3 71.4 71.5 71.6 71.7 72.1 73.1 74.1 74.2 75.1 76.1 77.1 77.2 78.1 79.1 79.2 79.3 79.4 79.5 79.6 79.7 80.1 81.1 82.1 82.2 82.3 83.1 83.2 83.3 84.1 84.2 85.1 85.2 86.1 87.1 88.1 89.1 89.2 90.1 91.1 92.1 93.1 94.1 94.2 94.3 96.1 96.2 96.3 96.4 97.1 98.1 98.2 98.3 99.1 100.1 101.1 102.1 102.2 103.1 104.1 104.2 104.3 105.1 105.2 106.1 106.2 107.1 107.2 108.1 108.2 108.3 109.1 110.1 110.2 111.1 112.1 113.1 114.1 115.1 115.2 115.3 115.4 116.1 116.2 116.3 117.1 117.2 118.1 118.2 118.3 118.4 119.1 119.2 119.3 120.1 121.1 122.1 123.1 124.1 125.1 126.1 127.1 128.1 128.2 129.1 130.1 131.1 132.1 133.1 134.1 135.1 136.1 137.1 138.1 139.1 140.1 141.1 142.1 143.1 144.1 145.1 146.1
Imre Lakatos Imre Lakatos (Hungarian: Lakatos Imre [ˈlɒkɒtoʃ ˈimrɛ]; November 9, 1922 – February 2, 1974) was a Hungarian philosopher of mathematics and science, known for his thesis of the fallibility of mathematics and its 'methodology of proofs and refutations' in its pre-axiomatic stages of development, and also for introducing the concept of the 'research programme' in his methodology of scientific research programmes. Contents - 1 Life - 2 Proofs and refutations, mathematics - 3 Research programmes - 4 Pseudoscience - 5 Historiographical research programmes - 6 Criticism - 7 See also - 8 Notes - 9 References - 10 Further reading - 11 External links Life[edit] Lakatos was born Imre (Avrum) Lipschitz to a Jewish family in Debrecen, Hungary in 1922. He received a degree in mathematics, physics, and philosophy from the University of Debrecen in 1944. He avoided Nazi persecution of Jews by changing his name to Imre Molnár. His mother and grandmother died in Auschwitz. He became an active communist during the Second World War. He changed his surname once again to Lakatos (Locksmith) in honor of Géza Lakatos. After the war, from 1947 he worked as a senior official in the Hungarian ministry of education. He also continued his education with a PhD at Debrecen University awarded in 1948, and also attended György Lukács's weekly Wednesday afternoon private seminars. He also studied at the Moscow State University under the supervision of Sofya Yanovskaya in 1949. When he returned, however, he found himself on the losing side of internal arguments within the Hungarian communist party and was imprisoned on charges of revisionism from 1950 to 1953. More of Lakatos' activities in Hungary after World War II have recently become known. After his release, Lakatos returned to academic life, doing mathematical research and translating George Pólya's How to Solve It into Hungarian. Still nominally a communist, his political views had shifted markedly and he was involved with at least one dissident student group in the lead-up to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. After the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in November 1956, Lakatos fled to Vienna, and later reached England. He received a doctorate in philosophy in 1961 from the University of Cambridge. The book Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, published after his death, is based on this work. Lakatos never obtained British Citizenship. In 1960 he was appointed to a position in the London School of Economics, where he wrote on the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science. The LSE philosophy of science department at that time included Karl Popper, Joseph Agassi and John Watkins. It was Agassi who first introduced Lakatos to Popper under the rubric of his applying a fallibilist methodology of conjectures and refutations to mathematics in his Cambridge PhD thesis. With co-editor Alan Musgrave, he edited the often cited Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, the Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965. Published in 1970, the 1965 Colloquium included well-known speakers delivering papers in response to Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". Lakatos remained at the London School of Economics until his sudden death in 1974 of a heart attack,[1] aged just 51. The Lakatos Award was set up by the school in his memory. In January 1971 he became editor of the internationally prestigious British Journal for the Philosophy of Science until his death in 1974,[2] after which it was then edited jointly for many years by his LSE colleagues John W. N. Watkins and John Worrall, Lakatos's ex-research assistant. His last LSE lectures in scientific method in Lent Term 1973 along with parts of his correspondence with his friend and critic Paul Feyerabend have been published in For and Against Method (ISBN 0-226-46774-0). Lakatos and his colleague Spiro Latsis organised an international conference devoted entirely to historical case studies in Lakatos's methodology of research programmes in physical sciences and economics, to be held in Greece in 1974, and which still went ahead following Lakatos's death in February 1974. These case studies in such as Einstein's relativity programme, Fresnel's wave theory of light and neoclassical economics, were published by Cambridge University Press in two separate volumes in 1976, one devoted to physical sciences and Lakatos's general programme for rewriting the history of science, with a concluding critique by his great friend Paul Feyerabend, and the other devoted to economics.[3] Proofs and refutations, mathematics[edit] Lakatos' philosophy of mathematics was inspired by both Hegel's and Marx' dialectic, by Karl Popper's theory of knowledge, and by the work of mathematician George Polya. The 1976 book Proofs and Refutations is based on the first three chapters of his four chapter 1961 doctoral thesis Essays in the logic of mathematical discovery. But its first chapter is Lakatos's own revision of its chapter 1 that was first published as Proofs and Refutations in four parts in 1963-4 in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. It is largely taken up by a fictional dialogue set in a mathematics class. The students are attempting to prove the formula for the Euler characteristic in algebraic topology, which is a theorem about the properties of polyhedra, namely that for all polyhedra the number of their (V)ertices minus the number of their (E)dges plus the number of their (F)aces is 2: (V – E + F = 2). The dialogue is meant to represent the actual series of attempted proofs which mathematicians historically offered for the conjecture, only to be repeatedly refuted by counterexamples. Often the students paraphrase famous mathematicians such as Cauchy, as noted in Lakatos's extensive footnotes. What Lakatos tried to establish was that no theorem of informal mathematics is final or perfect. This means that we should not think that a theorem is ultimately true, only that no counterexample has yet been found. Once a counterexample, i.e. an entity contradicting/not explained by the theorem is found, we adjust the theorem, possibly extending the domain of its validity. This is a continuous way our knowledge accumulates, through the logic and process of proofs and refutations. (If axioms are given for a branch of mathematics, however, Lakatos claimed that proofs from those axioms were tautological, i.e. logically true.)[citation needed] Lakatos proposed an account of mathematical knowledge based on the idea of heuristics. In Proofs and Refutations the concept of 'heuristic' was not well developed, although Lakatos gave several basic rules for finding proofs and counterexamples to conjectures. He thought that mathematical 'thought experiments' are a valid way to discover mathematical conjectures and proofs, and sometimes called his philosophy 'quasi-empiricism'. However, he also conceived of the mathematical community as carrying on a kind of dialectic to decide which mathematical proofs are valid and which are not. Therefore he fundamentally disagreed with the 'formalist' conception of proof which prevailed in Frege's and Russell's logicism, which defines proof simply in terms of formal validity. On its first publication as a paper in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science in 1963-4, Proofs and Refutations became highly influential on new work in the philosophy of mathematics, although few agreed with Lakatos' strong disapproval of formal proof. Before his death he had been planning to return to the philosophy of mathematics and apply his theory of research programmes to it. Lakatos, Worrall and Zahar use Poincaré (1893)[4] to answer one of the major problems perceived by critics, namely that the pattern of mathematical research depicted in Proofs and Refutations does not faithfully represent most of the actual activity of contemporary mathematicians.[5] Cauchy and uniform convergence[edit] In a 1966 text published as (Lakatos 1978), Lakatos re-examines the history of the calculus, with special regard to Augustin-Louis Cauchy and the concept of uniform convergence, in the light of non-standard analysis. Lakatos is concerned that historians of mathematics should not judge the evolution of mathematics in terms of currently fashionable theories. As an illustration, he examines Cauchy's proof that the sum of a series of continuous functions is itself continuous. Lakatos is critical of those who would see Cauchy's proof, with its failure to make explicit a suitable convergence hypothesis, merely as an inadequate approach to Weierstrassian analysis. Lakatos sees in such an approach a failure to realize that Cauchy's concept of the continuum differed from currently dominant views. Research programmes[edit] Lakatos's second major contribution to the philosophy of science was his model of the 'research programme', which he formulated in an attempt to resolve the perceived conflict between Popper's falsificationism and the revolutionary structure of science described by Kuhn. Popper's standard of falsificationism was widely taken to imply that a theory should be abandoned as soon as any evidence appears to challenge it, while Kuhn's descriptions of scientific activity were taken to imply that science was most constructive when it upheld a system of popular, or 'normal', theories, despite anomalies. Lakatos' model of the research programme aims to combine Popper's adherence to empirical validity with Kuhn's appreciation for conventional consistency. A Lakatosian research programme is based on a hard core of theoretical assumptions that cannot be abandoned or altered without abandoning the programme altogether. More modest and specific theories that are formulated in order to explain evidence that threatens the 'hard core' are termed auxiliary hypotheses. Auxiliary hypotheses are considered expendable by the adherents of the research programme - they may be altered or abandoned as empirical discoveries require in order to 'protect' the 'hard core'. Whereas Popper was generally read as hostile toward such ad hoc theoretical amendments, Lakatos argued that they can be progressive, i.e. productive, when they enhance the programme's explanatory and/or predictive power, and that they are at least permissible until some better system of theories is devised and the research programme is replaced entirely. The difference between a progressive and a degenerative research programme lies, for Lakatos, in whether the recent changes to its auxiliary hypotheses have achieved this greater explanatory/predictive power or whether they have been made simply out of the necessity of offering some response in the face of new and troublesome evidence. A degenerative research programme indicates that a new and more progressive system of theories should be sought to replace the currently prevailing one, but until such a system of theories can be conceived of and agreed upon, abandonment of the current one would only further weaken our explanatory power and was therefore unacceptable for Lakatos. Lakatos's primary example of a research programme that had been successful in its time and then progressively replaced is that founded by Isaac Newton, with his three laws of motion forming the 'hard core'. The Lakatosian research programme deliberately provides a framework within which research can be conducted on the basis of 'first principles' (the 'hard core') which are shared by those involved in the research programme and accepted for the purpose of that research without further proof or debate. In this regard, it is similar to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm. Lakatos sought to replace Kuhn's paradigm, guided by an irrational 'psychology of discovery', with a research programme no less coherent or consistent yet guided by Popper's objectively valid logic of discovery. Lakatos was following Pierre Duhem's idea that one can always protect a cherished theory (or part of one) from hostile evidence by redirecting the criticism toward other theories or parts thereof. (See Confirmation holism and Duhem-Quine thesis). This difficulty with falsificationism had been acknowledged by Popper. Popper's theory, Falsificationism, proposed that scientists put forward theories and that nature 'shouts NO' in the form of an inconsistent observation. According to Popper, it is irrational for scientists to maintain their theories in the face of Nature's rejection, as Kuhn had described them doing. For Lakatos, however, "It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather, we propose a maze of theories, and nature may shout INCONSISTENT".[6] The continued adherence to a programme's 'hard core', augmented with adaptable auxiliary hypotheses, reflects Lakatos's less strict standard of falsificationism. Lakatos saw himself as merely extending Popper's ideas, which changed over time and were interpreted by many in conflicting ways. He contrasted Popper, the "naive falsificationist" who demanded unconditional rejection of any theory in the face of any anomaly (an interpretation Lakatos saw as erroneous but that he nevertheless referred to often); Popper1, the more nuanced and conservatively interpreted philosopher; and Popper2, the "sophisticated methodological falsificationist" that Lakatos claims is the logical extension of the correctly interpreted ideas of Popper1 (and who is therefore essentially Lakatos himself). It is, therefore, very difficult to determine which ideas and arguments concerning the research programme should be credited to whom. While Lakatos dubbed his theory "sophisticated methodological falsificationism", it is not "methodological" in the strict sense of asserting universal methodological rules by which all scientific research must abide. Rather, it is methodological only in that theories are only abandoned according to a methodical progression from worse theories to better theories - a stipulation overlooked by what Lakatos terms "dogmatic falsificationism". Methodological assertions in the strict sense, pertaining to which methods are valid and which are invalid, are, themselves, contained within the research programmes that choose to adhere to them, and should be judged according to whether the research programmes that adhere to them prove progressive or degenerative. Lakatos divided these 'methodological rules' within a research programme into its 'negative heuristics', IE what research methods and approaches to avoid, and its 'positive heuristics', IE what research methods and approaches to prefer. Lakatos claimed that not all changes of the auxiliary hypotheses of a research programme (which he calls 'problem shifts') are equally productive or acceptable. He took the view that these 'problem shifts' should be evaluated not just by their ability to defend the 'hard core' by explaining apparent anomalies, but also by their ability to produce new facts, in the form of predictions or additional explanations.[7] Adjustments that accomplish nothing more than the maintenance of the 'hard core' mark the research programme as degenerative. Lakatos' model provides for the possibility of a research programme that is not only continued in the presence of troublesome anomalies but that remains progressive despite them. For Lakatos, it is essentially necessary to continue on with a theory that we basically know cannot be completely true, and it is even possible to make scientific progress in doing so, as long as we remain receptive to a better research programme that may eventually be conceived of. In this sense, it is, for Lakatos, an acknowledged misnomer to refer to 'falsification' or 'refutation', when it is not the truth or falsity of a theory that is solely determining whether we consider it 'falsified', but also the availability of a less false theory. A theory cannot be rightfully 'falsified', according to Lakatos, until it is superseded by a better (i.e. more progressive) research programme. This is what he says is happening in the historical periods Kuhn describes as revolutions and what makes them rational as opposed to mere leaps of faith or periods of deranged social psychology, as Kuhn argued. Pseudoscience[edit] According to the demarcation criterion of pseudoscience originally proposed by Lakatos, a theory is pseudoscientific if it fails to make any novel predictions of previously unknown phenomena, in contrast with scientific theories, which predict novel fact(s).[8] Progressive scientific theories are those which have their novel facts confirmed and degenerate scientific theories are those whose predictions of novel facts are refuted. As he put it: "A given fact is explained scientifically only if a new fact is predicted with it.... The idea of growth and the concept of empirical character are soldered into one." See pages 34–5 of The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 1978. Lakatos's own key examples of pseudoscience were Ptolemaic astronomy, Immanuel Velikovsky's planetary cosmogony, Freudian psychoanalysis, 20th century Soviet Marxism,[9] Lysenko's biology, Niels Bohr's Quantum Mechanics post-1924, astrology, psychiatry, sociology, neoclassical economics, and Darwin's theory. Darwin's theory[edit] In his 1973 LSE Scientific Method Lecture 1[10] he also claimed that "nobody to date has yet found a demarcation criterion according to which Darwin can be described as scientific". Almost 20 years after Lakatos's 1973 challenge to the scientificity of Darwin, in her 1991 The Ant and the Peacock, LSE lecturer and ex-colleague of Lakatos, Helena Cronin, attempted to establish that Darwinian theory was empirically scientific in respect of at least being supported by evidence of likeness in the diversity of life forms in the world, explained by descent with modification. She wrote that our usual idea of corroboration as requiring the successful prediction of novel facts... Darwinian theory was not strong on temporally novel predictions. ... however familiar the evidence and whatever role it played in the construction of the theory, it still confirms the theory.[11] The Milton Friedman neoclassical economics case study[edit] In August 1972, a case study of the methodology of neoclassical economics by Lakatos's London School of Economics colleague Spiro Latsis published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science found Milton Friedman's methodology to be 'pseudo-scientific' in terms of Lakatos's evaluative philosophy of science, according to which the demarcation between scientific and pseudo-scientific theories consists of their at least predicting testable empirical novel facts or not.[12] Latsis claimed that Friedman's instrumentalist methodology of neoclassical economics had never predicted any novel facts.[13] In defense, Friedman wrote a three-page letter to Latsis in December 1972, counter-claiming that the neoclassical monopoly competition model had in fact shown empirical progress by predicting phenomena not previously observed that were also subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence.[14] The example he gave was a prediction of Chamberlain's monopolistic competition model that "the standard explanation for the Standard Oil monopoly was wrong", which he said had been theoretically predicted by Aaron Director, his brother-in-law, and empirically confirmed by McGee[15]. Lakatos invited Friedman to submit a discussion note based on his December 1972 letter to Latsis for publication in a symposium on the issue of the scientific status or not of neoclassical economics,[16] but Friedman never took up the invitation. In 1996 Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein uncovered how Standard Oil used its dominant position in refining to sell refined oil at a monopoly price, and purchase crude at a monopoly price[17]. McGee's revisionist analysis has been heavily criticized, for reasons that demonstrate Lakatos' critique was accurate. Christopher Leslie showed McGee’s claim Standard Oil did not predatory price was false, and that McGee misread, misinterpreted, and ignored evidence[18]. Economists James Dalton and Louis Esposito reexamined the trial record, and found it “contains considerable evidence of predatory pricing. Simply stated, the Record does not support McGee‘s conclusion ...”[19] McGee's "falsification" of Standard’s predatory pricing accusation was based on it being “logically deficient.” Friedman's claim that McGee "empirically confirmed" Director's "theory" was wrong. McGee's test was logical, not empirical: Standard couldn’t have predatory priced, because it wasn’t logical from his economic perspective. Further, the fundamental test of Standard Oil's breakup was the result. Standard Oil would be worth well over $1 trillion today, three times larger than Exxon/Mobile. That would make it a virtual nation-state. Three years later, in 1976, Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics "for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy".[20] Friedman's own predictions of an accelerating rate of inflation due to attempts to use expansionary monetary policy in order to attain an unrealistic employment target, as described in his Nobel lecture[21] are cited by others as an example of a novel phenomenon successfully predicted by neoclassical economics.[22] This research ultimately led to a breakdown of the popular belief in economics in the mid-20th century that there was a long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Robert E. Lucas argued that the Friedman-Phelps model was "as clear cut an experimental distinction as macroeconomics is ever likely to see". Roger Backhouse argued that Friedman and Phelps had predicted novel facts that were corroborated by the events of the 1970s. Mark Blaug argued that Friedman's 1968 paper and its successful prediction of novel facts was itself proof that Friedman's monetarist neoclassical research programme was a progressive research programme.[23] But recent analysis throws the impact of money supply on 1970's inflation into question, on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, money supply is difficult to identify and foresee, as it is based on vast, disaggregated financial data. Something unperceived cannot be used in "rational decisions." Empirically, the 1970s oil shocks, output gap, and productivity deceleration are more statistically significant than money supply, in explaining the era's inflation[24]. Historiographical research programmes[edit] In his 1970 paper History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions[25] Lakatos proposed a dialectical historiographical meta-method for evaluating different theories of scientific method, namely by means of their comparative success in explaining the actual history of science and scientific revolutions on the one hand, whilst on the other providing a historiographical framework for rationally reconstructing the history of science as anything more than merely inconsequential rambling. The paper started with his now renowned dictum "Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind." However neither Lakatos himself nor his collaborators ever completed the first part of this dictum by showing that in any scientific revolution the great majority of the relevant scientific community converted just when Lakatos's criterion – one programme successfully predicting some novel facts whilst its competitor degenerated - was satisfied. Indeed for the historical case studies in his 1970 Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes he had openly admitted as much, commenting 'In this paper it is not my purpose to go on seriously to the second stage of comparing rational reconstructions with actual history for any lack of historicity.' Criticism[edit] Feyerabend[edit] Paul Feyerabend argued that Lakatos's methodology was not a methodology at all, but merely "words that sound like the elements of a methodology."[26] He argued that Lakatos's methodology was no different in practice from epistemological anarchism, Feyerabend's own position. He wrote in Science in a Free Society (after Lakatos's death) that: Lakatos realized and admitted that the existing standards of rationality, standards of logic included, were too restrictive and would have hindered science had they been applied with determination. He therefore permitted the scientist to violate them (he admits that science is not "rational" in the sense of these standards). However, he demanded that research programmes show certain features in the long run — they must be progressive.... I have argued that this demand no longer restricts scientific practice. Any development agrees with it.[27] Lakatos and Feyerabend planned to produce a joint work in which Lakatos would develop a rationalist description of science and Feyerabend would attack it.[citation needed] See also[edit] - Scientific Community Metaphor, an approach to programming influenced by Lakatos's work on research programmes. - List of Eastern Bloc defectors - Lakatos Award set up in memory of him Notes[edit] - ^ Donald Gillies. Imre Lakatos. Paul K. Feyerabend. On the Threshold of Science: For and Against Method, by Matteo Motterlini. The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. Vol. http://www.jstor.org/stable/687992 - ^ See Lakatos's 5 Jan 1971 letter to Paul Feyerabend p233-4 in Motterlini's 1999 For and Against Method - ^ These were respectively Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern Science 1800-1905 Colin Howson (Ed)and Method and Appraisal in Economics Spiro J. Latsis (Ed) - ^ Poincaré, H. (1893). "Sur la Généralisation d'un Théorème d'Euler relatif aux Polyèdres", Comptes Redus de Seances de l'Academie des Sciences, 117 p. 144, as cited in Lakatos, Worrall and Zahar, p. 162 - ^ Lakatos, Worrall and Zahar (1976), Proofs and Refutations ISBN 0-521-21078-X, pp. 106-126, note that Poincaré's formal proof (1899) "Complèment à l'Analysis Situs", Rediconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo, 13, pp. 285-343, rewrites Euler's conjecture into a tautology of vector algebra.[disambiguation needed] - ^ Lakatos, Musgrave ed. - ^ Theoretical progressiveness is if the new 'theory has more empirical content than the old. Empirical progressiveness is if some of this content is corroborated. - ^ See/hear Lakatos's 1973 Open University BBC Radio talk Science and Pseudoscience at his LSE website @ www.lse.ac.uk/lakatos - ^ Lakatos notably only condemned specifically Soviet Marxism as pseudoscientific, as opposed to Marxism in general. In fact at the very end of his very last LSE lectures on Scientific Method in 1973, he finished by posing the question of whether Trotsky's theoretical development of Marxism was scientific, and commented that "Nobody has ever undertaken a critical history of Marxism with the aid of better methodological and historiographical instruments. Nobody has ever tried to find an answer to questions like: were Trotsky's unorthodox predictions simply patching up a badly degenerating programme, or did they represent a creative development of Marx's programme? To answer similar questions, we would really need a detailed analysis which takes years of work. So I simply do not know the answer, even if I am very interested in it."[p109 Motterlini 1999] However, in his 1976 On the Critique of Scientific Reason Feyerabend claimed Vladimir Lenin's development of Marxism in his auxiliary theory of colonial exploitation had been 'Lakatos scientific' because it was "accompanied by a wealth of novel predictions (the arrival and structure of monopolies being one of them)." And he continued by claiming both Rosa Luxemburg's and Trotsky's developments of Marxism were close to what Lakatos regarded as scientific: "And whoever has read Rosa Luxemburg's reply to Bernstein's criticism of Marx or Trotsky's account of why the Russian Revolution took place in a backward country (cf also Lenin [1968], vol 19, pp99ff.) will see that Marxists are pretty close to what Lakatos would like any upstanding rationalist to do..." [See footnote 9, p315 of Howson (Ed) 1976] - ^ Published in For and Against Method: Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend Motterlini (Ed) University of Chicago Press 1999 - ^ Cronin, H., The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin to Today, Cambridge University Press, 1993. - ^ Situational Determinism in Economics S. J Latsis The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, p207-45. As Editor of the Journal Lakatos had been primarily responsible for its contents since August 1971. - ^ Lakatos's LSE colleague, the econometrician and now Labour parliamentary peer Baron Meghnad Desai, evaluated Marxian economics as a progressive scientific research programme in both his 1974 Marxian Economics and its 1979 second edition. But he did not identify any successfully predicted novel fact(s) that had rendered it progressive science. However, in 1976 Feyerabend claimed that contrary to John Worrall's 1975 repetition of Lakatos's claim that Marxism's auxiliary hypotheses to eliminate refuting instances were not content increasing, that in fact such as its theory of imperialism and colonial exploitation to explain the apparent refutation of its law of the falling rate of profit was "accompanied by a wealth of novel predictions (the arrival and structure of monopolies being one of them.)", and which Feyerabend apparently regarded as having been confirmed.(See p315 and its notes 8 & 9 of Feyerabend's On the Critique of Scientific Reason in Howson's 1976 Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences.) - ^ His 6 December 1972 letter is held in Folder 36 of Box 29 of the Hoover Institution Archives' Milton Friedman Papers at Stanford University, created by Friedman and his wife in 1992. This Folder also contains a two-page reply to Friedman's letter by Latsis dated 27 January 1973 - ^ Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. Case John S. McGee Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. - ^ Lakatos's 2 February 1973 letter of invitation is held in Folder 32 of Box 29. - ^ Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. - ^ Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil; Leslie, Christopher R. 85 S. Cal. - ^ Dalton, James A. and Esposito, Louis, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record. Research in Law and Economics, Vol. - ^ Nobel Prize Committee Press Release announcing Milton Friedman as the 1976 winner http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1976/press.html - ^ Friedman Lecture http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1976/friedman-lecture.pdf - ^ Brian Snowdon, Howard R. Vane Modern macroeconomics: its origins, development and current state Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005 p 182 - ^ Brian Snowdon, Howard R. Vane Modern macroeconomics: its origins, development and current state Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005 p 182 - ^ Assenmacher-Wesche, Katrin, and Stefan Gerlach. Understanding the link between money growth and inflation in the euro area. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2006. - Lakatos, Imre. History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. http://www.jstor.org/stable/495757 - ^ See How to Defend Society Against Science - ^ Paul Feyerabend (1978). Science in a Free Society. London: NLB. References[edit] - Oxford Dictionary of National Biography - Cronin, Helena (1991) The Ant and the Peacock Cambridge University Press - Howson, Colin, Ed. Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern Science 1800-1905 Cambridge University Press 1976 ISBN 0-521-21110-7 - Kampis, Kvaz & Stoltzner (eds) APPRAISING LAKATOS: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man Vienna Circle Institute Library, Kluwer 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0226 - Lakatos, Musgrave ed. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Proofs and Refutations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - Lakatos, I.: Cauchy and the continuum: the significance of nonstandard analysis for the history and philosophy of mathematics. Math. Intelligencer 1 (1978), no. 3, 151–161 (paper originally presented in 1966). - Lakatos, I., and Feyerabend P., For and against Method: including Lakatos’s Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, ed. by Matteo Motterlini, Chicago University Press, (451 pp), 1999, ISBN 0-226-46774-0 - Latsis, Spiro J. Ed. Method and Appraisal in Economics Cambridge University Press 1976 ISBN 0-521-21076-3 - Popper, K R, (1972), Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1972 (bibliographic summary, no text). - Zahar, Elie (1973) Why Einstein's programme superseded Lorentz's British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - Zahar, Elie (1988) Einstein's Revolution: A study in heuristic Open Court 1988 Further reading[edit] - Alex Bandy (2010). Chocolate and Chess. Unlocking Lakatos. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. - Brendan Larvor (1998). Lakatos: An Introduction. London: Routledge. - Jancis Long (1998). "Lakatos in Hungary", Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28, pp. 244–311. - John Kadvany (2001). Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason. Durham and London: Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-2659-0; author's web site: http://www.johnkadvany.com. - Teun Koetsier (1991). Lakatos' Philosophy of Mathematics: A Historical Approach. Amsterdam etc.: North Holland. - Szabó, Árpád The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics (Tr Ungar) Reidel & Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1978 ISBN 963-05-1416-8 External links[edit] - Science and Pseudoscience (including an MP3 audio file) – Lakatos' 1973 Open University BBC Radio talk on the subject - O'Connor, John J.; Robertson, Edmund F., "Imre Lakatos", MacTutor History of Mathematics archive, University of St Andrews. - Lakatos’s Hungarian intellectual background The Autumn 2006 MIT Press journal Perspectives on Science devoted to articles on this topic, with article abstracts. - Economic research programme - Official Russian page Archives[edit] - Imre Lakatos's papers are held at the London School of Economics. His personal library is also held at the School. - 1922 births - 1974 deaths - 20th-century Hungarian writers - 20th-century philosophers - Academics of the London School of Economics - Hungarian defectors - Hungarian philosophers - Hungarian mathematicians - Hungarian Jews - Hungarian refugees - Hungarian communists - Jewish philosophers - Moscow State University alumni - Philosophers of science - Philosophers of mathematics - Stateless people - University of Debrecen alumni - Critical rationalists