http___www.supremecourt.ie_supremecourt_sclibrary3.nsf_pagecurrent_DC60F4E1A2FF6ED980257315005A41AA_opendocument_l_ga_1.xml
1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 6.1 7.1 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 10.1 11.1 12.1 13.1 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 16.1 16.2 16.3 17.1 18.1 19.1 20.1 20.2 21.1 21.2 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 23.1 23.2 24.1 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.4 25.5 25.6 26.1 26.2 26.3 26.4 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 28.1 28.2 29.1 29.2 30.1 31.1 32.1 33.1 34.1 35.1 36.1 36.2 36.3 37.1 37.2 38.1 40.1 42.1 44.1 45.1 45.2 46.1 47.1 48.1 49.1 49.2 50.1 51.1 51.2 51.3 51.4 51.5 51.6 52.1 53.1 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.4 54.5 54.6 54.7 55.1 55.2 55.3 55.4 55.5 56.1 56.2 56.3 57.1 58.1 58.2 59.1 59.2 59.3 59.4 59.5 60.1 60.2 60.3 60.4 60.5 61.1 61.2 68.1 68.2 68.3 68.4 68.5 69.1 69.2 69.3 69.4 70.1 70.2 70.3 71.1 71.2 71.3 72.1 73.1 74.1 74.2 74.3 74.4 75.1 75.2 75.3 75.4 75.5 75.6 75.7 76.1 76.2 76.3 76.4 77.1 77.2 77.3 78.1 78.2 78.3 79.1 79.2 80.1 81.1 81.2 81.3 82.1 82.2 82.3 83.1 84.1 84.2 84.3 85.1 85.2 85.3 86.1 87.1 88.1 89.1 89.2 90.1 90.2 90.3 90.4 91.1 91.2 91.3 91.4 92.1 92.2 92.3 93.1 94.1 94.2 94.3 95.1 95.2 96.1 96.2 96.3 96.4 97.1 98.1 98.2 98.3 99.1 99.2 99.3 99.4 99.5 99.6 100.1 100.2 100.3 100.4 100.5 100.6 100.7 101.1 101.2 101.3 101.4 102.1 102.2 102.3 102.4 102.5 103.1 103.2 104.1 104.2 105.1 105.2 105.3 105.4 105.5 105.6 105.7 106.1 106.2 106.3 106.4 107.1 107.2 107.3 107.4 107.5 108.1 109.1 110.1 111.1
Supreme Court Constitution - Bill - Validity - National emergency - Powers of detention - Reference of bill to Supreme Court - Emergency Powers Bill, 1976 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Articles 26, 28. Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution provides that nothing in the Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate any "law enacted" by the national parliament which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of war or armed rebellion, and that the phrase "time of war" includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the national parliament shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State. On the 1st September, 1976, Dáil Éireann éireann and Seanad Éireann éireann each passed a resolution that "arising out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State." On the 16th September the Emergency Powers Bill, 1976, was passed by both Houses of the national parliament. The long title of the bill stated that it was an Act "for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of an armed conflict in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas has adopted a resolution on the first day of September, 1976, pursuant to sub-section 3 of section 3 of Article 28 of the Constitution." On the 24th September, 1976, the President of Ireland referred the bill to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 26 of the Constitution for a decision on the question as to whether the bill or any provision or provisions thereof was or were repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. In pronouncing its decision on the question so referred, it was Held by the Supreme Court, 1, that the President had power to refer the bill of 1976 to the Supreme Court. That when a bill is referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 26 of the Constitution the test of whether or not it is repugnant to the Constitution is to be applied as if the bill were an Act duly passed by the national parliament, signed by the President, and promulgated. Accordingly, once it has been established that the procedural requirements affecting a bill to which Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution applies have been satisfied, the provisions of that sub-section prevent any part of the Constitution being invoked to invalidate such bill. That the long title of the bill complied with the provisions of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. That there was a presumption that the facts stated in the resolution of each House of the national parliament were correct, and that such presumption had not been displaced. That, accordingly, no part of the bill of 1976 could be declared repugnant to the Constitution. Semble: In relation to the Act to be constituted when the bill of 1976 was signed by the President, the provisions of the Constitution may be invoked for all purposes other than the purpose of invalidating that Act or any part thereof. Reference of bill passed by the Oireachtas. The Emergency Powers Bill, 1976, was passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas on the 16th September, 1976. On the 24th September, 1976, the President of Ireland referred the bill to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions1 of Article 26, s. 1, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, for a decision on the question as to whether the bill, or any provision or provisions of the bill, was or were repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. The Supreme Court assigned solicitor and counsel to oppose the constitutionality of the bill. Originally, the provisions2 of sub-s. 3 of s. 3 of Article 28 of the Constitution of 1937 consisted of its first sentence with the exception of the phrase "in time of war or armed rebellion." Section 1 of the First Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1939, added "In this sub-section . of the State" to the first sentence. Section 1 of the Second Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1941, added "and 'time of war or armed rebellion' includes . ceased to exist" to "of the State" and inserted the phrase"in time of war or armed rebellion" in the first sentence. The Act of 1939 was signed by the President of Ireland on the 2nd September, 1939, which was the day after the German invasion of Poland and the day before the declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of war on Germany. The first and second amendments of the Constitution were enacted pursuant to Article 51, s. 1, of the Constitution which provided:—"Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 46 hereof, any of the provisions of this Constitution, except the provisions of the said Article 46 and this Article may, subject as hereinafter provided, be amended by the Oireachtas, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, within a period of three years after the date on which the first President shall have entered upon his office." The first President of Ireland (Dr. Douglas Hyde) entered upon his office on the 25th June, 1938. Section 3 of Article 51 provided that the provisions of ss. 1 and 2 thereof should cease to have the force of law immediately upon the expiration of the three-year period mentioned in s. 1 of Article 51 (25th June, 1941) and s. 4 provided that Article 51 should be omitted from every official text of the Constitution published after the expiration of that period. The bill of 1976, in its long title, was expressed to have been made"for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of an armed conflict in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas has adopted a resolution on the first day of September, In moving the relevant resolution in Dáil Éireann éireann on the 31st August, 1976, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) said:— "I move that Dáil Éireann éireann hereby resolves, pursuant to subsection 3 of section 3 of Article 28 of the Constitution, (a) that the national emergency created by the armed conflict referred to in the Resolutions, pursuant to the said Article, of Dáil Éireann éireann and Seanad Éireann éireann of the 2nd September, 1939, has ceased to exist, and (b) that, arising out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State. I believe the terms of this motion clearly indicate the Government's view of the gravity of the situation which led me to request you to summon a special meeting of the House to consider emergency measures for the purpose of securing the public safety. The measures which we deem to be necessary to meet the situation comprise the motion I have just moved and legislative proposals contained in the Emergency Powers Bill, 1976 and the Criminal Law Bill, 1976. Deputies will, no doubt, have refreshed their minds on the provision of the Constitution in question here. The provision means that if both Houses of the Oireachtas adopt the motions before them, any law subsequently enacted which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of the armed conflict referred to in the motion shall be protected from challenge on constitutional grounds so long as the emergency continues. There have been comments and headlines which suggested that the Oireachtas was to be asked to suspend the Constitution. Deputies will appreciate, I am sure, that this is not so. If it were true, the Constitution would have been suspended since 1939. The reality is that it has not been so suspended and will not be so suspended by adoption of the present resolution. The protection from constitutional challenge which would be afforded would extend solely to laws expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State. The Government's decision to introduce this motion and the Bills which have been circulated was taken following two events which issued, in a new and menacing fashion, a direct challenge to the authority of the institutions of State and to their ability to discharge the functions entrusted to them under the Constitution. I refer, firstly, to the explosions at the Special Criminal Court in Dublin on the 15th July last and secondly, to the murder of the late British Ambassador, Mr. Christopher Ewart-Biggs and of Miss Judith Cooke, Private Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary of the Northern Ireland Office, Mr. Brian Cubbon, and the attempted murder of Mr. Cubbon and the driver of the blown-up car, Mr. Brian O'Driscoll on the 21st July. The motion asks the House to resolve that the national emergency occasioned by the armed conflict referred to in the resolutions of Dáil Éireann éireann and Seanad Éireann éireann of the 2nd September, 1939, has ceased to exist. Those resolutions referred to the armed conflict then taking place in Europe, that is to say, the Second World War. The continued existence of the emergency declared in 1939 fell to be reviewed by the Government when it was considering the action to be taken in the current situation. The need to secure the public safety and to preserve the State at the present time arises from the armed conflict in Northern Ireland and not from the armed conflict in Europe, referred to in the 1939 resolutions. Furthermore, the existence of the 1939 resolutions results in an anomalous situation which it is desirable should be corrected. It is for these reasons that in the first part of the motion it is proposed to resolve that the national emergency declared by the 1939 resolutions has ceased to exist. In relation to the second part of the motion, the significance of the two outrages to which I have referred is that they represent the culmination of a long series of violent crimes, perpetrated within the State but related, directly or indirectly, to the situation in Northern Ireland. They relate directly in that in many instances the criminals involved were residents of that area or persons formerly resident there. They relate indirectly in that they are the result of a cult of violence rampant in parts of that jurisdiction. Taken together, these crimes add up to a serious danger to the public safety and to the preservation of the institutions of State. In one sense, the recent incidents raised the challenge to the State and to its organs to a new plane in that they were directed at the discharge of two functions fundamental to the government of the State. The murder of the British Ambassador struck at the conduct of our international relations while the explosion at Green Street struck directly at the administration of justice. The challenge thus posed called for an unequivocal response. This is given in the present motion and in the Bills before the House. The Government believe that the extent of violent crime by irregular subversive bodies and persons associated with such bodies, the new dimension added by the recent events and the further threat to the institutions of State implied by these events, constitute a national emergency affecting the vital interests of the State. We believe it was necessary to make clear our response as soon as possible after the recent outrages and that it could not await the date fixed for the normal resumption of the House. To do so would only serve to embolden those dedicated to the overthrow of the institutions of State . Section 2 of the bill provided:— "(1) A member of the Garda Síochána (on production of his identification card, if demanded, where he is not in uniform) may without warrant stop, search, question and arrest any person, or do any one or more of those things in respect of any person, if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Offences against the State Act, 1939, or an offence which is for the time being a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V of that Act, or if he suspects with reasonable cause that that person is carrying any document or other article or thing, or is in possession of information, relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence. (2) A member of the Garda Síochána (on production of his identification card, if demanded, where he is not in uniform) may, for the purpose of the exercise of any of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of this section, stop and search any vehicle or vessel which he suspects with reasonable cause to contain a person whom he is empowered by that subsection to arrest without warrant. (3) Whenever a person is arrested under this section, he may be removed to and kept in custody in a Garda station, prison, or other convenient place for a period of 48 hours from the time of his arrest and may, if a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent so directs, be kept in such custody for a further period not exceeding five days. (4) A person in custody under subsection (3) of this section may, at any time during such custody, be charged before the District Court or a special court established under Article 38.3.1 of the Constitution with an offence or be released by direction of a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent, and shall, if not so charged or released, be released at the expiration of the custody. (5) The powers conferred by section 30 of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, shall not be exercisable during a period when this section is in force." Section 1, sub-s. 1, of the bill provided that s. 2 should remain in force only for the twelve months following the passing of the Act, unless continued or again brought into force by an order under s. 1, sub-s. 2, of the bill. Section 1, sub-s. 2, provided:— "The Government may by order provide:— (a) at any time when section 2 of this Act is in force, that that section shall continue in force for a period not exceeding twelve months from the commencement of the order, (b) at any time when section 2 of this Act is in force, that that section shall cease to be in force on and from a date specified in the order, or (c) at any time when section 2 of this Act is not in force, that that section shall come into force again and remain in force for a period not exceeding twelve months from the commencement of the order." Section 1, sub-s. 3, provided:— "Every order made under this section shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made, and if a resolution annulling the order is passed by either such House within the next 21 days on which that House has sat after the order has been laid before it, the order shall be annulled accordingly, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder." Section 3 provided:— "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, whenever each of the Houses of the Oireachtas resolves that the national emergency resolved to exist by each such House on the first day of September, 1976, has ceased to exist, this Act shall, on and from the date of such first-mentioned resolution, expire." Pursuant to Article 26, s. 2, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution the Supreme Court on the 11th-13th October, 1976, heard arguments by the Attorney General and by counsel assigned by the Court to oppose the constitutionality of the bill. St. J. McCarthy S.C. and H. J. O'Flaherty S.C. (with them R. P. Humphries ) of counsel assigned by the Court:— While the Garda powers of detention are extended by the bill, the Garda powers of interrogation are, if anything, further limited by it. The rights of a suspect under the Judges' Rules are unaffected by the bill. [They referred to The People (Attorney General) v. Cummins 3; McCarrick v. Leavy 4 and R. v. Gargan (McGonigal J., Belfast City Commission—10th May, 1972)] If an arrested suspect stands on those rights, the whole The curtailment effected by this bill of one of the most fundamental personal rights—the right to liberty—is so extensive that it can be justified to this Court only if it can be shown to be essential for the proper administration of justice. A member of the Garda Síochána is empowered by s. 2 of the bill to arrest without warrant, to stop, search, question and to detain possibly for as much as a week not merely a person suspected of having committed an offence, but a person not believed by the Garda officer to be connected with such offence, except in so far as he is suspected of having information relating to its commission or intended commission. This is the first bill referred to the Court by the President under Article 26, s. 1, of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, which contains in its provisions reference to Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. But such immunity from invalidation as that sub-section provides is expressly restricted to"any law enacted by the Oireachtas." A bill passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas becomes a law only when signed by the President. [They referred to s. 3, sub-s. 1, of Article 13 and to s. 1, sub-ss. 1 and 2, of Article 15 of the Constitution] The presumption of constitutionality, declared by this Court to be applicable to bills referred to it pursuant to Article 26, s. 1, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution in The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975 6, cannot apply in the present case. [They also referred to McDonald v. Bord na gCon 7; East Donegal Co-operative v. The Attorney General 8] This presumption "springs from, and is necessitated by, that respect which one great organ of the State owes to another"—per O'Byrne J. in Buckley and Others (Sinn Féin) v. The Attorney General. The reference in the bill to Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, is of itself, an indication that the two Houses of the Oireachtas had seen no need to concern themselves whether the bill was constitutional or unconstitutional. [They referred to Article 15, s. 4, of the Constitution] Should the Court uphold the constitutionality of this bill, it would be returned to the President who would be bound to sign it (Article 26, s. 3, Once a person in custody under s. 2, sub-s. 3, of the bill had been duly released at the termination of the total seven-day period of custody authorised by the bill, there would be no way of ensuring that he might not be re-arrested and detained for a further seven days immediately upon such release. Persons detained in a prison are detained subject to certain statutory regulations and some protection exists for their constitutional rights, which include a right of reasonable access to their legal advisers: The State (McGowan) v. Frawley (Supreme Court: 12th December, 1975). They will be medically examined and so, where necessary, medically assisted, and their families will be able to ascertain their whereabouts on inquiry. Both Garda stations and prisons must keep records of persons detained, but there is no such requirement in s. 2, sub-s. 3, of the bill in relation to the "other convenient place" in which that sub-section authorises the detention of suspects; nor is there any indication either of the type of place meant by that phrase or any requirement that it need be "convenient" for anyone other than the Garda officers involved in the detention or interrogation of the suspect. The right of suspects to have reasonable access to their legal advisers is among the "personal rights" of the citizen which the State guarantees, but does not specify, in Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution. [They referred to Macauley v. Minister for Posts and Telegraphs 10; Ryan v. The Attorney General 11; The State (C.) v. Frawley 12; The State (Healy) v. Donoghue 13 and to Article 40, ss. 1 and 4, of the Constitution] The common law always envisaged that an arrested person must be brought with all reasonable speed before some authority with judicial powers; Dunne v. Clinton. 14 [They also referred to Molloy: Justice of the Peace (1890), p. 89, and to The Attorney General v. Burke 15] If it is ascertained that the suspicions on which the suspect was arrested were [They referred to Article 5, paras. 1(c) and 3, of the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, and to In re Ó Laighléis 17] That decision of the former Supreme Court is no longer binding on this Court even as a persuasive authority in as much as in the interval the people, by the enactment of the Third Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1972, following its submission to their decision by referendum, have by implication given the provisions of that Convention the force of law in this State: see Article 29, s. 4, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. It should be noted that Article 5 of that Convention only contemplates the arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having committed an offence—not of one reasonably suspected of having information (possibly quite innocently acquired) relating to the commission of an offence. [They referred to The Attorney General v. Sullivan 18] Before the Court can satisfy itself of the existence of a "time of war"within the extended meaning given to the phrase by the First Amendment of the Constitution, the Court must enquire, not merely whether each House of the Oireachtas has resolved that a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State and arising out of an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant, but also whether the specific armed conflict referred to in the resolution in fact exists. [They referred to Article 24, s. 1, of the Constitution] Even before the enactment of the Constitution of 1922, Irish courts assumed the jurisdiction to decide, as a question of fact, whether or not a state of war existed in a particular area: R. v. Allen 19; R. (Garde) v. Strickland. The terms of the resolution on which this bill is based do not correspond with its long title. The former refers to the existence of "a national emergency . affecting the vital interests of the State" which is expressed to arise "out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland;" the latter is expressed to be "An Act for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State"—a phrase which is properly applicable only to a "time of war" in which the State is a The President, in determining whether or not to sign the bill, is entitled to consider the entire of its provisions; he is not restricted by the apparent compliance by its long title with the provisions of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution—all the less so by reason of the fact that the constitutionality of a measure expressed to be in compliance with Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, is reviewable by this Court only prior to its signature by the President. The Attorney General and T. K. Liston S.C. (with them R. P. F. Johnson ) in support of the bill:— It is normal for the constitution of a democratic state to contain provisions enabling the legislature to pass measures in time of actual or impending national emergency, and preventing the provisions of that constitution from being invoked against such measures. The intention of the people, when enacting the Constitution of 1937, was that, in times of war or armed rebellion, the Oireachtas, if it thought it to be necessary, should have power to take steps which would otherwise be an infringement of the Constitution. That power was deliberately entrusted by the people not to the President, but to the Oireachtas, which consists of its own democratically elected representatives. A constitution is to be "liberally construed so as to carry into effect the intentions of the people as embodied therein"—per O'Byrne J. in Sullivan v. Robinson. 21The obvious intention of both Houses of the Oireachtas here was to ensure that the Constitution might not be invoked to invalidate this bill, and that intention would not have been formed if it had not been considered that, prima facie, this bill is repugnant to the Constitution. The Offences against the State Act, 1939, gave a Garda officer the power to arrest a person who is suspected of being involved in an offence covered by that Act—even a person suspected merely of having information related to such an offence—in terms virtually identical with those of s. 2, sub-s. 1, of this bill. [They referred to s. 30, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1939] That Act also provided for the detention of such a suspect, once arrested, in a "convenient place" other than a Garda station or a prison. [They referred to s. 30, sub-s. 3, of the Act of 1939] The only substantial difference between the present bill and the Act of 1939 is that the maximum permissible period of lawful detention thereunder has been extended from two days to seven. The only constitutional right detrimentally affected To interpret the word "Bill" in Article 26 of the Constitution literally would lead to an absurdity, in as much as a bill acquires legal effect, as an Act, only when signed by the President; while it is merely a bill it has no legal effect and is not capable of being repugnant to the Constitution. If the task of the Court under Article 26 of the Constitution is to consider the constitutionality of the bill, viewed as a law duly signed and promulgated, then it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court to consider whether the provisions of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution are applicable and, if they are, whether they have been complied with. If those provisions are applicable and have been complied with, then it is not open to the Court to consider the invalidation of such law. These provisions are applicable to three types of situation being(a) where the State itself is at war; (b) where an armed rebellion against its authority is taking place and (c) where an armed conflict is taking place in which the State is not a participant, but in respect of which each House of the Oireachtas has resolved that a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State. The last-named situation is the one which has arisen here. If the long title of the bill referred to a "time of war or armed rebellion" it could, at worst, invalidate the legislation and, at best, make it ambiguous in as much as its purpose was not made clear. Whether or not, at any given time, such a national emergency exists is a question which must, of necessity, be decided not by the Courts but by the Legislature on the advice of the Executive. The Executive ought not to be placed in the position of having to choose between risking an unfavourable decision from the Courts or disclosing confidential intelligence information made available to it, the disclosure of which could be supposed not to be in the national interest. This is all the more so as the Executive must, of necessity, act on testimony which has not been given on oath, and which frequently would not be properly admissible in court. Just as the Court must apply the presumption of constitutionality to a statute passed in the normal way by the Oireachtas, it must similarly presume that both Houses of the Oireachtas have acted in good faith and responsibly in believing that the provisions of a bill passed in this way were necessary to achieve the purpose set out in its long title, and in adopting the resolution referred to in that long title. There is no suggestion here either that no armed conflict exists in Northern Ireland or that the Houses of the Oireachtas acted mala fide in resolving that that conflict affected the vital interests of the State. St. J. McCarthy S.C. , in reply, referred to O'Brien v. Keogh. Cur. adv. vult. On the 13th October, 1976, O'Higgins C.J. stated in open court that the Court had considered the Article in question and the reference of the bill, and was in a position to state that its decision would be given on Friday, the 15th October, 1976. The decision of the Supreme Court (O'Higgins C.J., Walsh, Henchy, Griffin and Kenny JJ.) was pronounced by one of the judges of that court in accordance with the provisions23 of s. 2, sub-s. of Article 26 of the Constitution. The Facts On the 1st September, 1976, Dáil Éireann éireann resolved in the following terms:— "That Dáil Éireann éireann hereby resolves, pursuant to subsection 3 of section 3 of Article 28 of the Constitution . that, arising out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State." On the same day Seanad Éireann éireannpassed a resolution in identical terms. On the 16th September, 1976, the Emergency Powers Bill, 1976, was passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas. On the 24th September, 1976, the President of Ireland (pursuant to the provisions24 of Article 26 of the Constitution and after consultation with the Council of State) referred the bill to this Court for a decision on the question whether the bill or any provision or provisions thereof is or are repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, section 2, of the Constitution, this Court has considered this question and has heard arguments by the Attorney General and his counsel and by counsel assigned by this Court. The Law The Emergency Powers Bill, 1976, is a bill entitled:— "An Act for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State The latter sub-section of the Constitution reads as follows:— "Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate any law enacted by the Oireachtas which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of war or armed rebellion, or to nullify any act done or purporting to be done in time of war or armed rebellion in pursuance of any such law. In this sub-section 'time of war' includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State and 'time of war or armed rebellion' includes such time after the termination of any war, or of any such armed conflict as aforesaid, or of an armed rebellion, as may elapse until each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that the national emergency occasioned by such war, armed conflict, or armed rebellion has ceased to exist." This sub-section incorporates the First and Second Amendments of the Constitution. Sub-section 3, as originally enacted by the people, made no reference to an armed conflict and the sub-section ended with the words "in time of war or armed rebellion in pursuance of any such law." The First Amendment incorporated the reference to an armed conflict, and the portion of the sub-section as it now stands beginning with the words "In this sub-section"down to the words "the vital interests of the State" represents the total effect of the First Amendment. The rest of the sub-section as it now stands represents the whole25 of the Second Amendment of the Constitution. A resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas is not a condition precedent to the enactment by the Oireachtas of any law which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of war or armed rebellion. It is, however, a condition precedent to the enactment of any such law in a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant that such law must be expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in time of such armed conflict. This bill is expressed to be for that purpose. The resolutions26 upon which the bill As to the right of the President to refer the bill to this Court, it is clear that he has power to do so notwithstanding that the bill is one passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas by reference to the provisions of sub-s. 3 of s. 3 of Article 28. The power of the President to do so has not been questioned in these proceedings. The Submissions It has been submitted by counsel assigned by the Court that it should be decided that the provisions of the bill are repugnant to the Constitution, or to some of the provisions thereof, and that the President should be so advised by this Court. If the Court were to do so, the President would be obliged by Article 26, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution to decline to sign the bill, and so it would not become law. Essentially, the submissions made by counsel so assigned have been to the effect that the provisions27 of s. 2 of the bill are repugnant to the provisions28 of Article 40 of the Constitution, and that the long title of the bill is not in accordance with the provisions of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. The Attorney General asked the Court to deal with this reference on the basis that s. 2 of the bill would be repugnant if it were not saved by Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. As the matter has not been discussed further, the Court does not find it necessary to express an opinion on the question whether s. 2 of the bill or any part of it would be repugnant if it were not saved by Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. The extent to which the bill, if signed by the President and given While it is not necessary to embark upon an exploration of all the incidents or characteristics which may not accompany the arrest and custody of a person under that section, it is nevertheless desirable, in view of the submissions made to the Court, to state that the section is not to be read as an abnegation of the arrested person's rights (constitutional or otherwise) in respect of matters such as the right of communication, the right to have legal and medical assistance, and the right of access to the Courts. If the section were used in breach of such rights the High Court might grant an order for release under the provisions for habeas corpus contained in the Constitution. It is not necessary for the Court to attempt to give an exhaustive list of the matters which would render a detention under the section illegal or unconstitutional. It has been submitted by counsel assigned by the Court that the immunity granted to the type of legislation contemplated by Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution against invalidation by any provision of the Constitution applies only to a law which becomes so on being signed by the President. It is urged that Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, is not to be taken into account by this Court when considering the provisions of a bill referred to it under the provisions of Article 26. If Article 26 stood alone and could be construed without reference to Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution, that submission would be correct and this Court might have to advise the President that the bill would be repugnant to the Constitution because of the provisions of s. 2 of the bill. Every law enacted by the Oireachtas must initially have been a bill passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas and is, therefore, capable of being referred to this Court by the President—unless it is a bill of the kind expressly excluded by Article 26 from reference. The bills which may be referred include bills intended to be enactments in conformity with the provisions of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. If such a bill is not referred to this Court it must be signed by the President. Thereupon, it becomes a law enacted by the Oireachtas and has the immunity conferred upon it by the sub-section in question. The Constitution, therefore, contemplates that laws which would otherwise be invalid may be validly enacted provided they conform with the requirements of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. When a bill is validly referred to the Court under Article 26, the test of its repugnancy or invalidity is what its force and effect will be if and when it becomes law. Thus, in regard to a bill which is to take effect as law under Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, if it is shown to the Court that the preliminary and procedural requirements for the passing of the bill by both Houses of the Oireachtas have been complied with, it is ipso facto, because of the exemption granted by Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, incapable of being struck down on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. The next submission was that the long title, which is an essential part of the bill—because it is relied on as expressing the bill's purpose—fails to conform with the requirements of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, in that the purpose of the bill is not expressed to be for the preservation of the State"in time of war." This submission is based upon the provisions of the First Amendment of the Constitution, as incorporated in sub-s. 3, which provides that "time of war" includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that arising out of such armed conflict a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State. The argument is that, even though it is the existence of an armed conflict that is relied upon, nonetheless the expression "time of war" must be used because the latter includes the former. As against this, the Attorney General has submitted that in the sub-section, particularly as amended by the Second Amendment of the Constitution, it is indicated that a time of war, an armed rebellion, and an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant are to be regarded as separate and distinct events. He relies on the fact that the expression,"termination of any war, or of any such armed conflict as aforesaid, or of The Court is satisfied that the purpose of the bill, as expressed by reference to a time of an armed conflict instead of by reference to a time of war, complies with the requirements of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, while at the same time restricting the area of operation of the bill, in that the bill would not be applicable to a "time of war or armed rebellion," as distinct from "armed conflict," because it is not expressed to be for that purpose. The last matter to be considered is the question of the existence of the state of affairs necessary to permit the application of Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution. As pointed out earlier in this judgment, these are the matters or statements of fact which are contained in the resolutions of the two Houses of the Oireachtas. Submissions were made as to the extent, if any, to which the Court could examine the correctness of these statements. It was submitted by the Attorney General that there is a presumption that the facts stated in the resolutions are correct. The Court accepts the existence of that presumption and the corollary that the presumption should be acted upon unless and until it is displaced. In this case it has not been displaced. The Attorney General submitted the general proposition that when the resolutions referred to in Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, have been passed this Court has no jurisdiction to review the contents of them. When the consequences of this submission were pointed out to him he withdrew it as he said it did not arise in this case. The Court expressly reserves for future consideration the question whether the Courts have jurisdiction to review such resolutions. The Court has come to the conclusion that the different objections raised to the constitutionality of this bill fail. To summarise, the exemption provided by Article 28, s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution is the decisive factor in the consideration of any question of repugnancy. The bill's stated expression of its purpose accords with the requirements of the sub-section; and there is a presumption which has not been displaced that the facts stated in the resolutions are correct. For these reasons the Court decides that the bill is not repugnant in any respect to the Constitution or any provisions thereof and will so advise the President. The Court would like to express its appreciation of the assistance given to it by counsel and solicitors engaged in these proceedings. Solicitor instructing counsel assigned by the Court: Patrick C. Moore. Solicitor for the Attorney General: Chief State Solicitor. E.P. de B.
1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 11.1 11.2 12.1 13.1 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 15.1 16.1 17.1 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 19.1 20.1 21.1 21.2 22.1 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 24.1 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.4 26.1 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 27.6 27.7 27.8 27.9 27.10 27.11 28.1 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 30.1 31.1 31.2 31.3 31.4 31.5 31.6 31.7 32.1 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.1 36.1 36.2 36.3 36.4 37.1 37.2 37.3 37.4 37.5 38.1 39.1 39.2 39.3 39.4
An Córas Dlí An Córas Dlí agus an Scaradh Cumhachtaí Is é atá i mBunreacht na hÉireann ná dlí bunúsach an Stáit. D’achtaigh an pobal é de réir pobalbhreithe in Iúil, 1937 agus tháinig sé i ngníomh ar 29 Nollaig, 1937. Is é an Bunreacht an ceannbhrat faoina ndéantar ceart a riar agus faoina gcuirtear cearta dlíthiúla i bhfeidhm i gcúirteanna arna mbunú faoin dlí. Sna forálacha sainráite atá ann, aithnítear agus ráthaítear cosaint do chearta bunúsacha an duine. Sa Bhunreacht, a bhfuil 50 Airteagal ann, bunaítear institiúidí an Stáit agus leagtar amach na rialacha a rialaíonn an idirghníomhaíocht a bhíonn ann idir orgáin an Stáit agus idir an Stát agus an duine aonair, araon. Féadfaidh don phearsa aonair gairm le dúshlán a chur faoi bhunreachtúlacht dlíthe a ritheann an tOireachtas (an pharlaimint) agus le cúiteamh a lorg i gcás go sáraítear cearta bunreachtúla dá cuid. Faoi réir an Bhunreachta tá an córas dlí bunaithe ar thraidisiún an dlí coitinn. Faoi théarmaí Airteagal 6 den Bhunreacht is le muintir na hÉireann a dhílsíonn ceannasacht ach tá an Stát ceannasach go seachtrach i dtaobh a sheasaimh i gcúrsaí dlí idirnáisiúnta. Tá an Stát, Éire, freagrach os comhair na gCúirteanna as éagóracha a dhéantar i gcoinne pearsan aonair nó as sárú dá cuid cearta bunreachtúla nó dá cuid cearta dlíthiúla. Ní fhéadfar an Bunreacht a athrú ach amháin de réir reifrinn, a bhfuil foráil déanta dó in Airteagal 46. Bunreacht dátheangach Gné shuntasach amháin den Bhunreacht ná go bhfuil sé scríofa in dhá theanga. Foráiltear le hAirteagal 8 den Bhunreacht gurb í an Ghaeilge, mar an teanga náisiúnta, príomhtheanga oifigiúil an Stáit agus aithnítear an Béarla mar an dara teanga oifigiúil. Is é an téacs Gaeilge a bhíonn i réim más rud é go dtagann mí-ailíniú idir an dá leagan den Bhunreacht chun cinn. Deighilt na gCumhachtaí Foráiltear sa Bhunreacht go mbeidh deighilt cumhachtaí trípháirteach: an Reachtas, an Feidhmeannas agus na Breithiúna. Is é an Rialtas an t-orgán stáit a fheidhmíonn an chumhacht feidhmiúcháin rialtais, is iad an dá theach parlaiminte atá san Oireachtas (ar a bhfuil an tUachtarán ina cheannasaí teidealach air, i dteannta stádas bunreachtúil a bhfuil aige nó aici mar Cheann Stáit) a fheidhmíonn an chumhacht reachtach rialtais, agus is iad na cúirteanna arna mbunú faoi Airteagal 34 den Bhunreacht a fheidhmíonn an chumhacht bhreithiúnach rialtais. Áirithítear leis sin nach bhféadfar aon orgán amháin de chuid an Stáit cur isteach ar na feidhmeanna a shanntar don dá orgán stáit eile. In Airteagail 12 go 14, leagtar amach feidhmeanna Uachtarán na hÉireann, arb é an Ceann Stáit. Cumhachtaí searmanais go príomha a dhílsítear don Uachtarán cé go bhforáiltear go leor cumhachtaí discréideacha dó faoi théarmaí an Bhunreachta. D’ainneoin deighilt na gcumhachtaí feidhmíonn na Cúirteanna feidhm bhunreachtúil nuair a dhéanann siad bunreachtúlacht agus dlíthiúlacht ghníomhartha orgáin eile an Stáit a athbhreithniú. Is é atá san orgán breithiúnach rialtais ná na Cúirteanna sin a bhunaítear faoi Airteagal 34 den Bhunreacht iad, eadhon an Chúirt Uachtarach, an Chúirt Achomhairc agus an Ard-Chúirt. Foráiltear le hAirteagal 6 den Bhunreacht go n-eascraíonn na cumhachtaí rialtais uile, reachtach, feidhmiúcháin agus breithiúnach ón bpobal, agus leanann sé ar aghaidh chun rá gurb “leis na horgain Stáit a chuirtear ar bun leis an mBunreacht seo, agus leo sin amháin nó lena n-údarás, is féidir na cumhachtaí riala sin a oibriú.” Áirítear sa chumhacht bhreithiúnach rialtais atá ag na cúirteanna siúd an inniúlacht comhoiriúnacht den reachtaíocht leis an mBunreacht a athbhreithniú agus athbhreithniú breithiúnach a dhéanamh ar fho-reachtaíocht, ar chinntí nó ar ghníomhaí a dhéanann an Rialtas nó comhlachtaí an Stáit d’fhonn cinneadh a dhéanamh maidir lena ndlíthiúlacht agus lena gcomhoiriúnacht leis an mBunreacht, chomh maith le prionsabail a thagann ón mBunreacht, amhail próis chuí. (i) An Reachtas De réir mar a shainordaítear sa Bhunreacht, is é atá san Oireachtas ná parlaimint dhá-sheomrach agus Uachtarán na hÉireann. Is iad an dá theach san Oireachtas ná Seanad Éireann agus Dáil Éireann (seomra na dteachtaí). Cé go ndílsítear, de réir Airteagal 15 den Bhunreacht, an chumhacht reachtóireachta san Oireachtas amháin, tá teorainn leis an gcumhacht seo mar ní cheadaítear don Oireachtas reachtaíocht a théann in aghaidh théarmaí an Bhunreachta a achtú. Ar an gcaoi chéanna tá cosc ar reachtaíocht a chruthaíonn cion go cúlghabhálach nó a d'fhorálfadh do phionóis an bháis a ghearradh. Féadfar le reachtaíocht a thionscnamh i gceachtar den dá Theach, cé is moite Billí Airgid agus Billí do leasú an Bunreacht nach bhféadfar iad a thionscnamh ach i nDáil Éireann amháin. Téann Bille trí chéimeanna éagsúla sa dá Theach sula gcuirtear chuig Uachtarán na hÉireann é le síniú, agus leis sin déantar Acht Oireachtais den Bhille. (ii) An Feidhmeannas Is é an Feidhmeannas Rialtas na hÉireann agus foráiltear dó in Airteagal 28 den Bhunreacht, a shonraíonn nach mór nach mbeadh níos lú ná seachtar ball agus níos mó ná cúig bhall déag sa Rialtas agus áiríonn sé sin an Taoiseach arb é ceann an Fheidhmeannais é agus an duine atá díreach faoi, an Tánaiste. (iii) Na Breithiúna Foráiltear le hAirteagal 34 go 38 den Bhunreacht do chóras cúirteanna in Éirinn agus do chionta a thriail. Sonraíonn Airteagal 34 go soiléir 1. Is i gcúirteanna a bhunaítear le dlí agus ag breithiúna a cheaptar ar an modh atá leagtha amach sa Bhunreacht seo a riarfar ceart". Déantar foráil in Airteagal 35 do cheapachán agus thionacht bhreithiúna na hÉireann, agus faoi théarmaí an Airteagail beidh "gach breitheamh saor neamhspleách maidir lena fheidhmeanna breithimh a oibriú, gan de smacht air ach an Bunreacht seo agus an dlí." Faoi Airteagal 35.4.4 den Bhunreacht ní féidir baill den Chúirt Uachtarach ná den Ard-Chúirt a chur as oifig ach ag rún ag gach Teach an Oireachtais de bharr mí-iompair nó míthreorach a luaitear. Ar an gcaoi chéanna cosnaítear tionacht Breithiúna Cúirte Cuarda agus Cúirte Dúiche ag reacht. Ina theannta, faoi Alt 35.5.1 den Bhunreacht ní fhéadfar tuarastal breithimh a laghdú le linn dó nó di a bheith ina dtéarma oifige, ach amháin i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 35.5. Braitheann dlínse aon Bhreithimh ar dhlínse na cúirte a bhfuil sé nó sí i gceannas uirthi. Córas na gCúirteanna Sa Bhunreacht, leagtar amach struchtúr an chórais cúirteanna atá in Éirinn trí thabhairt ar bun go sainráite an Chúirt Uachtarach, cúirt achomhairc dheiridh sna hábhair uile a bhaineann leis an dlí bunreachtúil, sibhialta agus coiriúla, an Chúirt Achomhairc, sna hábhair a bhaineann leis an dlí bunreachtúil, sibhialta agus coiriúla, agus an Ard-Chúirt, cúirt céadchéime a bhfuil dlínse iomlán aici i ngach ceist, idir ceisteanna coiriúla agus sibhialta. Déantar foráil freisin in Airteagal 34.3.4 do chúirteanna le dlínse áitiúil agus teoranta a bhunú, ar a bunaíodh an Chúirt Chuarda agus an Chúirt Dúiche, a eagraítear ar bhonn réigiúnach iad, de réir reachta. (i) An Chúirt Dúiche Cúirt a bhfuil dlínse áitiúil agus teoranta aici atá sa Chúirt Dúiche, nach bhfuil ach údarás aici déileáil le ceisteanna áirithe a thagann chun cinn ina ceantar feidhmiúcháin. Bronntar cumhachtaí dlínse na Cúirte uirthi ag reacht agus mar sin, níl cead aici déileáil le haon cheisteanna a thagann taobh amuigh dá sainchuspóir reachtúil. I gceisteanna sibhialta, tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Dúiche déileáil le héilimh gur mó ná €15,000 an méid a éilítear iontu (agus gur mó ná €2,000 an méid a éilítear i gcásanna éilimh beaga) I gceisteanna dlí teaghlaigh, tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Dúiche i gceisteanna a bhaineann le cothabháil, caomhnóireacht leanaí nó rochtain orthu agus féadann sí orduithe a dhéanamh i dtaobh foréigin teaghlaigh. I gceisteanna coiriúla, cúirt dlínse achoimre atá sa Chúirt Dúiche agus déileálann sí le triail neamhghiúiré daoine a gearradh mionchionta orthu. Tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Dúiche le bannaí a bhronnadh sa chuid is mó de chásanna agus déileálann sé leis an gcúisí a chur ar aghaidh chun trialach i gcásanna lena mbaineann cionta coiriúla taobh amuigh dá dlínse, freisin. (ii) An Chúirt Chuarda Cúirt dlínse áitiúil agus teoranta atá sa Chúirt Chuarda freisin, agus tá dlínse achomhairc aici i ngach ceist a thagann chun cinn sa Chúirt Dúiche. Tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Chuarda i gceisteanna sibhialta ina sáraíonn an méid san éileamh thar theorainn dhlínse na Cúirte Dúiche ach gur mó ná €75,000 ann (agus gur mó ná €60,000 atá ann i gcásanna Díobhálacha Pearsanta) I gcúrsaí dlí teaghlaigh, féadann an Chúirt Chuarda, orduithe colscartha, idirscartha bhreithiúnaigh agus neamhnithe a bhronnadh chomh maith le haon orduithe coimhdeacha. I gcúrsaí coiriúla, tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Chuarda le plé le gach cion ach amháin iadsan a bhfuil dlínse ag an bPríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil orthu. Éisteann breitheamh a shuíonn le giúiré le trialacha coiriúla sa Chúirt Chuarda. (iii) An Ard-Chúirt/An Phríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil Tá dlínse iomlán ag an Ard-Chúirt i ngach ceist, idir ceisteanna sibhialta agus coiriúla. I gceisteanna sibhialta, níl aon uasteorainn ar líon na ndamáistí a fhéadann sí a bhronnadh. Nuair atá sí ag cleachtadh a dlínse choiriúil, tugtar an Phríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil ar an Ard-Chúirt, agus sa cháil seo, tá dlínse aici leis na cionta is troime a thriail, lena n-áirítear dúnmharú, dúnorgain, éigniú, tromionsaí gnéis, tréas, cindhíothú agus píoráideacht. Aistreofar trialacha coiriúla os comhair breithimh a shuíonn le giúiré. Uaireanta féadann Uachtarán na hArd-Chúirte treorú, in imthosca áirithe, go suífeadh beirt bhreithiúna nó níos mó sa Chúirt. Sna cúinsí sin, tugtar Ard-Chúirt rannach ar an Ard-Chúirt. Éisteann an Ard-Chúirt le hachomhairc freisin ón gCúirt Chuarda maidir le ceisteanna sibhialta. I dteanna lena dlínse i gcúrsaí sibhialta agus coiriúla, cleachtann an Ard-Chúirt freisin dlínse mhaoirseachta, i gcásanna Athbhreithnithe Bhreithiúnaigh, ina bhfuil an t-údarás aici bailíocht an dlí a shocrú agus í ag féachaint chuig forálacha an Bhunreachta. Rialaítear athbhreithniú breithiúnach ar aon dlí san Ard-Chúirt ag Airteagal 34 nó 50 den Bhunreacht, ag brath ar a shine agus atá an dlí imordaithe. Cuirtear dúshlán faoi dhlí a rith an tOireachtas ó achtaíodh an Bunreacht 1937, lena mbaineann toimhde na bunreachtúlachta, faoi Airteagal 34. Cuirtear dúshlán faoi dhlíthe a ritheadh sular achtaíodh Bunreacht 1937, nach mbaineann aon toimde bunreachtúlachta den sórt sin leo, faoi Airteagal 50. (iv) An Chúirt Choiriúil Speisialta Bunaíodh an Chúirt Choiriúil faoi théarmaí an Achta um Chionta in Aghaidh an Stáit, 1939 agus déileálann sí le dhá chatagóir cionta; iad siúd ar a dtugtar 'cionta sceidealaithe' agus iad siúd ar dearbhaigh an Stiúrthóir Ionchúisimh Poiblí ina dtaobh go raibh na gnáthchúirteanna neamhdhóthanach le riar éifeachtach an cheartais a bhaint amach. Suíonn an Chúirt Choiriúil Speisialta le triúir breitheamh agus níl aon ghiúiré inti. I gcónaí bíonn breitheamh Ard-Chúirte, Cúirte Chuarda agus Cúirte Dúiche inti. Feidhmíonn an Chúirt Choiriúil Speisialta faoi réir an Bhunreachta agus an ghnáthdhlí, agus is í an tréith idirdhealaitheach shubstaintiúil amháin a bhaineann léi ná nach mbíonn aon ghiúiré inti. (v) An Chúirt Achomhairc Níl aon bundlínse ag an gCúirt Achomhairc, toisc nach bhfuil inti ach dlínse achomhairc amháin. Suíonn an Chúirt i rannáin de thriúr breithiúna. Maidir le hábhair a bhaineann leis an dlí bunreachtúil agus leis an dlí sibhialta déantar achomhairc ón Ard-Chúirt a éisteacht agus cinneadh a dhéanamh orthu inti. In ábhair sa dlí coiriúil, déantar achomhairc a éisteacht ón gCúirt Chuarda, ón bPríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil agus ón gCúirt Choiriúil Speisialta inti agus, ina theannta sin, déantar iarratais chun daorbhreitheanna agus pianbhreitheanna a líomhnaítear gur de thoradh iomrall ceartais iad a athbhreithniú, a éisteacht agus cinneadh a dhéanamh orthu inti. Déantar achomhairc ó armchúirteanna a éisteacht agus cinneadh a dhéanamh orthu inti, freisin. Féadfar na hachomhairc a bheith i gcoinne cionta nó i gcoinne déine nó boige phianbhreithe. Féadfar déileáil le “cásaí sonraithe” ón gCúirt Chuarda agus ón Ard-Chúirt sa Chúirt Achomhairc freisin. (vi) An Chúirt Uachtarach Is í an Chúirt Uachtarach an chúirt achomhairc deiridh. Cliceáil anseo chun léaráid a fháil faoi Chóras na gCúirteanna. Cliceáil anseo chun léaráid a fháil ar struchtúr Chóras na gCúirteanna. Cearta Bunúsacha Tá cearta bunúsacha an tsaoránaigh ráthaithe in Airteagal 40 go 44 den Bhunreacht. In Airteagal 40 foráiltear go gcaithfear déileáil go comhionann le gach saoránach os comhair an dlí agus leagann sé oibleagáid ar an Stát cearta pearsanta an tsaoránaigh a chosaint. Mar thoradh ar an téarma "cearta pearsanta", mar a léirmhíníonn na cúirteanna é, aithnítear agus cosnaítear go leor ceart nach foráiltear go soiléir iad i dtéacs an Bhunreachta. Áirítear leis na cearta 'neamháirithe' seo an ceart chun sláine choirpe, an ceart pósadh agus beatha a shaothrú i measc cearta eile. Áiríonn na cearta 'áirithe' nó soiléire atá sa Bhunreacht an ceart chun saoirse tuairimíochta, saoirse tionóil agus saoirse comhlachais i measc ceart eile. In Airteagal 40 tá forálacha a rialaíonn an nós imeachta ar a dtugtar habeas corpus trína bhféadann pearsa aonair dúshlán a chur faoi dhlíthíocht a choinneála, freisin. Baineann Airteagal 41 agus 42 le cearta an Teaghlaigh agus le cearta Oideachais. Baineann Airteagal 43 le ceart an tsaoránaigh bheith ina úinéir ar mhaoin phríobháideach agus in Airteagal 44 ráthaítear an ceart adhradh reiligiúnach a chleachtadh go saor agus cuireann sé cosc ar bhronnadh ar aon chreideamh faoi leith ag an Stát. Cé go bhfuil na cearta seo cosanta ar bhonn bunreachtúla, níl aon cheann acu absalóideach agus féadfar teorainn a chur leo ar chúiseanna shlándáil an Stáit, chun an tsíocháin poiblí agus an t-ord poiblí a choimeád nó aon uair a n-iarrtar leis de réir mar is gá chun leasa an phobail. Dlí an Chomhphobail Eorpaigh Stát déach atá in Éirinn, foráiltear in Airteagal 29.6 den Bhunreacht go bhfeidhmíonn comhaontuithe idirnáisiúnta fórsa an dlí sa mhéid is a shocraítear san Oireachtas. Ciallaíonn sé sin nach mór conarthaí idirnáisiúnta a dtéitear isteach iontu a chuimsiú sa dlí intíre ag reachtaíocht sula bhfuil siad i bhfeidhm sa Stát (mar shampla cuireadh cuimsiú Choinbhinsiúin na Víne ar Dhíolúine Thaidhleoireachta agus Chonsalachta i bhfeidhm ag an Acht um Chaidreamh agus Díolúine Thaidhleoireachta 1967). Is í an eisceacht ón riail ghinearálta sin ná dlí an Chomhphobail Eorpaigh a dtugtar tús áite dó roimh dhlí intíre, faoi théarmaí Airteagal 29 den Bhunreacht. Ciallaíonn sé sin nach féidir aon dlí nó beart nach mór glacadh leis de bharr bhallraíocht na hÉireann den Aontas Eorpach, a dhéanamh neamhbhailí i bprionsabal ag aon fhoráil den Bhunreacht.