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Supreme Court Constitution - Bin - Validity - Extra-territorial legislation - Criminal offences committed in Northern Ireland - Trial within the State - Evidence taken on commission - Fair procedures - Reference of bill to Supreme Court - Offences against the State Act, 1939 (No. 13). ss. 35, 36, 47, 48 - Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Articles 2, 3, 38, 40. Section 2 of the bill of 1975 provided that where a person does in Northern Ireland an act that, if done in the State, would constitute an indictable offence specified in the schedule to the bill, he should be guilty of an offence and, on conviction on indictment, should be liable to the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had done the act in the State. The offences so specified included murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery and offences connected with the manufacture, the possession and the use of explosives. Section 3 of the bill provided that a person who is charged with or convicted of an offence under the law of Northern Ireland consisting of acts (whether done in the State or in Northern Ireland) which would constitute an offence in the State by virtue of s. 2, and who escapes from lawful custody in Northern Ireland should be guilty of an indictable offence. Section 11 of the bill provided that, for the purposes of the trial by the Special Criminal Court of an offence under s. 2 or s. 3 of the bill, the court of trial, at the request of the prosecution or the accused, should by order provide (unless satisfied that it was not in the interests of justice to do so) for the issue of a letter of request to the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland for the taking, in the presence of the members of the court making the order, of evidence in Northern Ireland by a judge from a witness specified in the order. Section 11 provided that the court making the order should inform the accused that he had a right to attend in the custody of the police of Northern Ireland at the taking of such evidence, that he had a right to be represented by solicitor and counsel on such occasion, and that he would be immune from legal process while in such custody in Northern Ireland. Section 11 provided that a statement of evidence of a witness taken in compliance with such letter of request and certified, by the judge who took it, to be a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken should, if all the members of the court of trial were present throughout the taking of the evidence, be admissible at the trial as evidence of any fact stated therein. Pursuant to Article 26, s. 1, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution, the President of Ireland referred the bill of 1975 to the Supreme Court for a decision on the question as to whether the bill or any specified provision or provisions of the bill was or were repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. In pronouncing its decision on the question so referred, it was Held by the Supreme Court, 1, that Ireland is a sovereign State (as was Saorstát Éireann éireann) and that its national parliament has full power to legislate with extraterritorial effect in accordance with the accepted principles of international law, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution which state that "the laws enacted by that parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann and the like extra-territorial effect." That, except where they are expressly prohibited by the Constitution, there is a presumption that the provisions of a bill so referred to the Supreme Court are In re Offences against the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940 [1940] I.R. 470; East Donegal Co-Operative v. The Attorney General [1970] I.R. 317considered. That the provisions of s. 11 of the bill did not prevent an accused from being furnished with a copy of the statement of evidence in accordance with the existing rights of a person charged with an indictable offence. That, although the bill did not contain any provisions conferring jurisdiction on the Special Criminal Court, the provisions of s. 11 of the bill contemplated trials in that court and, therefore, the Supreme Court would examine whether such trials would be unconstitutional. That the method of determining that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order adopted by the Offences against the State Act, 1939, was a constitutional method. In re MacCurtain [1941] I.R. 83 considered. That no part of the bill of 1975 was repugnant to Article 38, Article 40 or any other provision of the Constitution. Reference of bill passed by the Oireachtas. The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975, was passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas on the 3rd March, 1976. On the 10th March, 1976, the President of Ireland referred the bill to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, s. 1, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, for a decision on the question as to whether the bill, or any provision or provisions of the bill, was or were repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. The Supreme Court assigned solicitor and counsel to oppose the constitutionality of the bill. The sections of the bill which were primarily impugned were ss. 2, 3 and 11. Article 26, ss. 1-3, of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, which is expressed to be applicable to all bills passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas (with certain limited exceptions, none of which are relevant to the reference) provides as follows:— 1 The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, refer any Bill to which this Article applies to the Supreme Court for a decision on the question as to whether such Bill or any specified provision or provisions of such Bill is or are repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof. 2 Every such reference shall be made not later than the seventh day after the date on which such Bill shall have been presented by the Taoiseach to the President for his signature. 3 The President shall not sign any Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article pending the pronouncement of the decision of the Court. 1 The Supreme Court consisting of not less than five judges shall consider every question referred to it by the President under this Article for a decision, and, having heard arguments by or on behalf of the Attorney General and by counsel assigned by the Court, shall pronounce its decision on such question in open court as soon as may be, and in any case not later than sixty days after the date of such reference. 2 The decision of the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court shall, for the purposes of this Article, be the decision of the Court and shall be pronounced by such one of those judges as the Court shall direct, and no other opinion, whether assenting or dissenting, shall be pronounced nor shall the existence of any such other opinion be disclosed. 1 In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill . 3 In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced." Article 38, s. 1, of the Constitution provides that "No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law"; and s. 5 of that Article provides that "Save in the case of the trial of offences under section 2, section 3 or section 4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury." Section 3 of Article 38 provides:— "1 Special courts may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order. 2 The constitution, powers, jurisdiction and procedure of such special courts shall be prescribed by law." Article 40, s. 3, of the Constitution provides:— "1 The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 2 The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen." Sections 2 and 3 of the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975, provided as follows:— "2.—(1) Where a person does in Northern Ireland an act that, if done in the State, would constitute an offence specified in the Schedule, he shall be guilty of an offence and he shall be liable on conviction on indictment to the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had done the act in the State. (2) Where a person— (a) in the State or in Northern Ireland, aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence under subsection (1) orsection 3, or (b) in Northern Ireland, aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence specified in the Schedule, he shall be guilty of, and may be indicted, tried and punished for, the relevant principal offence, and the following provisions of this Act relating to the commission of any such principal offence shall apply accordingly. (3) Where a person— (a) in the State or in Northern Ireland, attempts, conspires or incites another person to commit an offence under subsection (1) or section 3, or (b) in Northern Ireland, attempts, conspires or incites another person to commit an offence specified in the Schedule, he shall be guilty of an offence and he shall be liable on conviction on indictment to a penalty not greater than the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had been convicted of the relevant principal offence. (4) Where a person has committed an offence under subsection (1) orsection 3 or attempted to commit any such offence, any other person who, in the State or in Northern Ireland, knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or attempt or of some other such offence or attempt, does without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution in the State or in Northern Ireland shall be guilty of an offence. (5) If, upon the trial on indictment of an offence under subsection (1)or section 3 or an attempt to commit any such offence, it is proved that the offence charged (or some other offence of which the accused might on that charge be found guilty) was committed, but the accused is found not guilty of it, the accused may be found guilty of any offence under subsection (4)of which it is proved that he is guilty in relation to the offence charged (or that other offence). (6) Where a person has committed an offence specified in the Schedule or attempted to commit any such offence, any other person who, in Northern Ireland, knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or attempt or of some other such offence or attempt, does without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution in the State or in Northern Ireland shall be guilty of an offence. (7) If, upon the trial on indictment of an offence specified in the Schedule or an attempt to commit any such offence, it is proved that the offence charged (or some other offence of which the accused might on that charge be found guilty) was committed, but the accused is found not guilty of it, the accused may be found guilty of any offence under subsection (6)of which it is proved that he is guilty in relation to the offence charged (or that other offence). (8) A person committing an offence under subsection (4) or (6) with intent to impede another person's apprehension or prosecution shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment according to the gravity of the offence that the other person has committed or attempted to commit, as follows: (a) in case that offence is murder, he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years; (b) in case it is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years; (c) in case it is not one included in paragraph (a) or (b) but is one for which a person (of full age and capacity and not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten years, he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; (d) in any other case, he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. (9) The enactments and rules of law as to when a person charged with an offence committed in the State may be convicted of another offence shall apply so as to enable a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)to be convicted of another offence, being an offence under that subsection, or of attempting to commit the offence charged or that other offence, and so as to enable a person charged with an offence under section 3 to be convicted of attempting to commit that offence. 3.—(1)(a) A person who, in Northern Ireland, is charged with or convicted of— (i) an offence under the law of Northern Ireland consisting of acts (whether done in the State or in Northern Ireland) that also constitute an offence specified in the Schedule or an offence under section 2, or (ii) an offence under the law of Northern Ireland corresponding to this section, and who escapes from any lawful custody in which he is held in Northern Ireland shall be guilty of an offence. (b) The reference in paragraph (a) to an offence specified in the Schedule includes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence there specified, attempting, conspiring or inciting another person to commit an offence there specified or an offence of doing without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of a person who has, and whom the person in question knows or believes to have, committed an offence there specified. (c) The reference in paragraph (a) to lawful custody is a reference to any lawful custody in which the person concerned is held, for the purpose of the proceedings in relation to the offence under the law of Northern Ireland referred to in paragraph (a), at any time between the bringing of a charge in relation to that offence and the conclusion of his trial (including any appeal or retrial) for that offence or in which he is held while serving a sentence imposed on his conviction for that offence. (2) A person who escapes from lawful custody while in Northern Ireland pursuant to an order under section 11 (2) shall be guilty of an offence. (3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years." Sections 4 to 10 effected various substantive amendments of the criminal law of the State. Section 4, in conjunction with s. 20, sub-s. 3, restated ss. 2 and 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1883, so as to make an explosion maliciously caused either in the State or outside the State an offence under s. 2 whether the alleged offender is an Irish citizen or not. Sections 5 to 9 had the effect of bringing the criminal law of the State in relation to robbery (s. 5), burglary (s. 6), aggravated burglary (s. 7), possession of a firearm or ammunition in suspicious circumstances (s. 8) and carrying a firearm with criminal intent (s. 9) into exact correspondence Section 11 of the bill provided:— "11.—(1) For the purposes of the trial by a special court established under Article 38.3.1 of the Constitution of an offence under section 2 or 3 or of any appeal in relation to the trial, the court of trial shall, at the request of the prosecution or the accused unless it is satisfied that it is not in the interests of justice to do so, and may of its own motion, and any appellate court may at such a request or of its own motion, by order provide for the issue of a letter of request to the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland for the taking, in the presence of the members of the court making the order, of evidence in Northern Ireland by a judge of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland from a witness specified in the order. (2) Where a court makes an order under this section, it shall inform the accused that— (a) he has a right to be present in the custody of the police of Northern Ireland at the taking of the evidence referred to in the order and if he exercises the right he will be delivered in custody into the custody of the police of Northern Ireland, (b) whether or not he is present at the taking of the evidence, he has a right to be represented by the counsel and solicitor (or the solicitor only) representing him in the court or by another counsel and solicitor (or by a solicitor only) entitled to practise in the State or entitled to practise in Northern Ireland, (c) he may, if not represented by counsel or a solicitor, himself question the witness giving the evidence, (d) while he is in custody in Northern Ireland for the purpose of the taking of the evidence, he will be immune from detention, and any kind of suit or legal process, in respect of any cause or matter, civil or criminal, arising before his arrival in Northern Ireland for the purpose aforesaid, and, if the accused indicates to the court that he wishes to be present at the taking of the evidence, the court shall make an order directing that the accused be delivered when and so often as may be necessary into the custody of the police of Northern Ireland. (3)(a) A statement of evidence of a witness taken in compliance with a letter of request under this section, and certified by the judge of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland who took it to be a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken, shall, if all the members of the court were present throughout the taking of the evidence, be admissible at the trial or appeal concerned as evidence of any fact stated therein of which evidence would be admissible at the trial or appeal. (b) A document purporting to be a certificate of a judge of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland and to be signed by him shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section, to be such a certificate and to be so signed unless the contrary is shown. (4) A person in whose case an order is made under subsection (2)— (a) shall be brought when and so often as may be necessary by the Garda Síochána to some convenient point of departure from the State and there delivered into the custody of the police of Northern Ireland and, if he is on bail, shall be taken into the custody of the Garda Síochána not more than 24 hours before the time of any such delivery and kept in such custody until that delivery is effected, and (b) shall, on his return to the State upon the conclusion or any adjournment of the taking of the evidence to which the order relates, be taken into the custody of the Garda Síochána, and— (i) if he is required pursuant to an order of any court to be kept in custody, be returned as soon as may be to that custody, and (ii) if he is on bail, be thereupon released. (5) An order under subsection (2) shall not operate to interrupt the currency of any sentence imposed in any other proceedings." Sections 12 and 13 contained provisions analogous with those of s. 11 for the taking of evidence in the State for a criminal trial in Northern Ireland. Section 14 provided that a person charged with an offence under ss. 2 or 3 might elect to stand his trial in Northern Ireland, and s. 15 provided that a person acquitted or convicted of an offence under the law of Northern Ireland might plead his acquittal or conviction as a bar to any proceedings in the State for any offence consisting of the acts that constituted the offence of which he has been so acquitted or convicted. Section 22, sub-s. 2—the final sub-section of the bill—provided for the coming into operation of the Act "on such day as the Minister for Justice may appoint by order." Pursuant to Article 26, s. 2, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution the Supreme Court on the 26th-30th April, 1976, heard arguments by the Attorney General and by counsel assigned by the Court to oppose the constitutionality of the bill. Condon S.C. and D. P. M. Barrington S.C. (with them H. J. O'Flaherty ) of counsel assigned by the Court:— The words "the State" are used in two separate senses in the Constitution of Ireland, 1937. On some occasions they are used to describe a juristic person enjoying certain rights and bound by certain duties; on other occasions they are used to describe the geographical area governed by the law of this juristic person. [They referred to the judgment of Murnaghan J. in Byrne v. Ireland 1] The same ambiguity appears in the bill where these words are used in the former sense in s. 21 and in the latter sense in ss. 2-4, 10-15, 18 and 20. This bill extends the criminal law of the State, as a juristic person, outside its geographical boundaries by treating occurrences which have taken place outside those boundaries as if they had taken place within those boundaries. The issues raised by this bill must be considered in the context of the history of the State as a juristic person, and this case is concerned with more than a straightforward question of the capacity of the State to legislate extra-territorially. [They referred to the Government of Ireland Act, 1920; Articles 11 and 12 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921; s. 2 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann éireann) Act, 1922; and Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland] While the precise extent of the legislative restrictions imposed by Article 3 of the Constitution on the parliament and government established thereby may not be easily determinable, they cannot be limited so as to permit legislation relating to an offence allegedly committed outside the geographical area of the State by a person resident outside that area. These restrictions were imposed deliberately because of the tensions existing (even at the time of the enactment of the Constitution) between the State and Northern Ireland; they were imposed pending either the re-integration of the national territory or the enactment of a new Constitution. Legislation giving effect to an international agreement as contemplated by Article 29, s. 6, of the Constitution would not be subject to the limitation imposed by Article 3 of the Constitution; but this bill is not legislation of that type. The provisions of Article 38, s. 3, of the Constitution and the Offences against the State Act, 1939 (which was passed in accordance with those provisions) do not envisage the establishment of special courts in the State where the breakdown in the administration of justice, and of public peace and order, is one occurring outside the geographical boundaries of the State. [They referred to the long title and ss. 35, 36, 45-48 of the Act of 1939; The special courts envisaged by this bill could be set up even where the ordinary courts of the State were admittedly fully adequate to secure the administration of justice within the State and the preservation of public peace and order there. The personal rights of the citizen mentioned in Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution include a right to have the entire procedure leading to a criminal trial—and not merely the trial itself—conducted in due course of law: In re Haughey .2 Section 11 of the bill deals with proceedings which are preliminary to a criminal trial. [They referred to Macauley v. Minister for Posts and Telegraphs 3 and to Ryan v. The Attorney General 4] The rights of an accused person under Articles 38 and 40 of the Constitution may be summarised as follows. (a) He must be informed of the charges brought against him. (b) Subject to certain limited exceptions, he is not merely entitled but obliged to be present throughout his trial and the preliminary examination, if such is held: Hopt v. Utah. 5 [They also referred to The People (Attorney General) v. Messitt 6] That obligation does not mean that he has to relinquish any other constitutional rights. [They referred to Meskell v. Córas Iompair Éireann 7; The State (O'Connor) v. Ó Caomhánaigh 8; The State (Howard) v. Donnelly 9] (c) Evidence should be given orally, except in certain well-established circumstances, and the accused has a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution once their evidence has been given: The People (Attorney General) v. Daly 10; The People (Attorney General) v. Galvin 11; In re Haughey2; The People (Attorney General) v. Taylor. 12 [They referred to Maher v. The Attorney General 13; The State (C.) v. Minister for Justice 14; Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions 15] (d) He has a right to give evidence and to call witnesses and to make submissions, either personally or through his solicitor or counsel. (e) He has a right to be tried with a degree of regularity sufficient to constitute the trial a trial in due course of law: The People (Attorney General) v. O'Brien 16; The Slate (O'Connor) v. Larkin. 17 Such regularity involves a substantial degree of continuity in the course of the trial: The People (Attorney General) v. McGlynn 18; The People (Attorney General) v. Jackson. 19 A trial in accordance with the provisions of the bill involves the taking of evidence in two jurisdictions and rules out the possibility of achieving substantial continuity in the process of trial. The control of the taking of evidence in Northern Ireland is vested in the Northern Ireland judge and he must base his decision about the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence in accordance with the law in force in Northern Ireland at the relevant time; that law does not bind him to respect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Ireland. Police officers and soldiers, whose evidence would be privileged in Northern Ireland but not in the State, would elect to give evidence in Northern Ireland and that would create the likelihood of such evidence being given in the absence of the accused, thereby weakening the effect of any cross-examination. The test of the constitutionality of a statute is whether it is possible that its operation will result in the denial of a right guaranteed by the Constitution: The State (Quinn) v. Ryan 20; McGee v. The Attorney General 21; O'Brien v. Keogh 22; In re McAllister.23 [They also referred to The People (Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan 24] The unconstitutional result does not have to be shown as being likely: McMahon v. The Attorney General. The Attorney General and R. J. O'Hanlon S.C. (with them J. D. Cooke )in support of the bill:— It is a well-recognised principle of international law that a State ought not to retain within its jurisdiction persons who are suspected of having committed offences outside its jurisdiction, without securing either their extradition to the foreign State where the offence was committed or their prosecution within the State. It is also an accepted principle of such law that a State is free to extend its legislation to cover acts done outside its territory provided that, as in this bill, the exercise of the jurisdiction takes place within the territory of the State. [They referred to O'Connell's International Law—2nd ed., pp. 601-3] The Oireachtas of Saorstát Éireann éireann had the full power of a sovereign State to legislate extra-territorially and could have done so whenever it was essential for the peace, order and good government of that State wherever The "national territory" mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, is the geographical unit for which it was the aspiration of the people that the Oireachtas would legislate eventually. The purpose and effect of Article 3 of the Constitution is to restrain the Oireachtas for the time being from legislating directly for that portion of the unit now known as Northern Ireland. It is a strained construction of the phrase "the like extra-territorial effect" to treat it as relating to the powers actually available to Saorstát Éireann éireann rather than those of which Saorstát Éireann éireann was entitled to avail. The former construction would render it impossible for the State to enter into international agreements which might require extra-territorial legislation. [They referred to Article 29, s. 3, of the Constitution; the Schedule to the Air Navigation and Transport Act, 1973; and British Coal Corporation v. The King 28] Another anomaly inherent in the former construction is that a United Kingdom statute which had been part of our law and had been continued by the Constitution could operate in Northern Ireland but a statute of the Oireachtas could not operate there. [They referred to ss. 13 and 68 of the Foyle Fisheries Act, 1952; s. 3 of the Geneva Convention Act, 1962; and s. 20 of the Exchange Control Act, 1954] The power to "schedule" offences is created by the Offences against the State Act, 1939, and the machinery for dealing with those offences is provided by ss. 45-47 of that Act as amended by s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1974. The offences dealt with by this bill can be brought before a special court only when scheduled by the Government or when the Director of Public Prosecutions certifies that the ordinary courts are inadequate, in his opinion, to secure the ordinary administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order. [They referred to The State (Bollard) v. The Special Criminal Court —judgment of Kenny J. delivered on 20th September, 1972] It is possible to envisage a situation in which a terrorist organisation carrying out its activities throughout Ireland could cause a breakdown in the judicial machinery of the State notwithstanding that many of the wrongful acts done by its members were done in Northern Ireland. This bill does not confer any new jurisdiction on a special court to try an offence arising from an act done outside the State; it merely provides The bill cannot be operated unless a court of the State can inform the accused that he has the rights mentioned in s. 11, sub-s. 2, and it cannot so inform him unless it is itself satisfied that the exercise of those rights can be guaranteed to him. The bill cannot be brought into operation until reciprocal legislation is in operation. [They referred to s. 5, sub-s. 1, and Schedule of the (English) Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1975] There is no difference in principle between the loss of liberty sustained by an accused person in the State who surrenders to his bail in order to exercise his right to confront witnesses in the State and an accused who surrenders himself into custody pursuant to s. 11, sub-s. 2, of the bill so as to be able to confront witnesses in Northern Ireland. While the legislature may not compel an accused person to surrender a constitutional right, it is under no obligation to prevent him doing so of his own volition. [They referred to Buckley and Others (Sinn Féin) v. The Attorney General 29; Maher v. The Attorney General 30; Murphy v. Corporation of Dublin 31 and In re McAllister 32] An accused person must have his liberty abridged in order to provide for the administration of justice. The right to bail is not an absolute one; it is a right to liberty in certain circumstances in order to prepare for a trial: see The People (Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan. This bill is the product of an international agreement between the British and the Irish Governments; it ought to be construed on the basis that each government entered into the agreement in good faith and will implement it in good faith. If gross delay or irregularity of procedure occurs in a particular case, the court may take steps to safeguard the accused. However, a legislative provision which incorporates fair procedures is not made unconstitutional solely because human error may cause an unfair procedure to be adopted in a particular case. The "statement of evidence" envisaged in s. 11, sub-s. 3(a), of the bill is admissible only if all the members of the court were present when it was being given; such statement could not be admitted in evidence unless the members of the court were satisfied that it was a fair representation of the evidence given. [They referred to the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to Snyder v. Massachusetts 34; Carlson v. Landon 35; Mattox v. United States 36; West v. Louisiana 37; Diaz v. United States 38] Condon S.C. , in reply:— The concept of bail is expressly recognised in the Constitution: see s. 4, sub-s. 3, of Article 40. The right to bail is distinct from the general right to personal liberty. A person who is in custody pursuant to s. 11, sub-s. 4, of the bill would be deprived of his right to bail and of his right to have recourse to the Courts during that custody. [He referred to The People (Attorney General) v. Doyle 39; The People (Attorney General) v. Ruttledge —Supreme Court, 16th May, 1947; and Carlson v. Landon 40] Cur. adv. vult. The decision of the Supreme Court (O'Higgins C.J., Finlay, Griffin, Kenny and Parke JJ.) was pronounced by one of the judges of that court in accordance with the provisions of s. 2, sub-s. 2, of Article 26 of the Constitution. This is a reference to this Court by the President of Ireland made on the 10th March, 1976, under Article 26 of the Constitution of the entire of the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975. The bill, which contains 22 sections and a schedule, has the title:— "An Act to extend the Criminal Law of the State to certain acts done in Northern Ireland, to provide for the admission of evidence obtained by the examination of witnesses in Northern Ireland at trials for offences in respect of those acts, to enable evidence to be obtained by the examination of witnesses in the State for trials in Northern Ireland for corresponding offences under the law of Northern Ireland in respect of acts done in the State, to reform the criminal law in other respects and to provide for related matters." Counsel have been assigned to argue that the bill is repugnant to the Constitution and have contended that ss. 2, 3 and 11 of it are. These are the heart of the bill. Part of the background to the bill is the intercommunal violence and killing in Northern Ireland which has had the result that some of those who have committed appalling crimes in Northern Ireland have come to, and now reside in, this State. Another part of the background is that, although there is an Extradition Act in force in the Republic of Ireland, international obligations required the Oireachtas to insert in that Act a provision that, Section 2 of the bill provides42 that when a person does in Northern Ireland an act which, if done in the State, would constitute an offence specified in the schedule to the bill, he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had done the act in the State. The schedule to the bill includes murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, false imprisonment, malicious damage, robbery, and offences in connection with explosives, firearms and the unlawful seizure of aircraft and vehicles. All the offences in the schedule are the type which subversive and terrorist organisations commit all over the world in the course of their campaigns. Section 2 goes on to provide that where a person in the State or Northern Ireland aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of such an offence or in Northern Ireland aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence specified in the schedule, he shall be guilty of and may be indicted, tried and punished for the offence. It also provides that any person who in the State or Northern Ireland attempts, conspires or incites another person to commit such an offence shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to be punished as if he had committed the offence itself. Section 3 of the bill provides that a person, who in Northern Ireland is charged with or convicted of an offence in Northern Ireland consisting of acts whether done in the State or in Northern Ireland which constitute an offence specified in the bill and who escapes from lawful custody in Northern Ireland, shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be punished on conviction on indictment. While the rules of court provide for the taking of evidence on commission in civil actions, this is not now possible in criminal trials. Section 11 makes provision for this in connection with trials in the Special Criminal Court established under Article 38, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution and so is a considerable change in our criminal law. So many matters in this section have been relied on by counsel assigned to argue that the bill is repugnant to the Constitution ("the opponents") that it is essential to set out the section In considering this bill, which has been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, the elected representatives of the people, the Court accepts the principles laid down by the former Supreme Court in In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Offences against the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940 44.that "where any particular law is not expressly prohibited and it is sought to establish that it is repugnant to the Constitution by reason of some implied prohibition or repugnancy, we are of opinion, as a matter of construction, that such repugnancy must be clearly established"—perSullivan C.J. at p. 478. This principle was accepted by the former Supreme Court in In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the School Attendance Bill, 1942 45 (per Sullivan C.J. at p. 344) and in In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Electoral (Amendment) Bill, 1961 46 (per Maguire C.J. at p. 178). It was submitted by the opponents that the same considerations should not be applied to a bill referred by the President under Article 26 as are applied in the case of an Act which has been duly passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas and signed and promulgated by the President because the President has referred the bill after consultation with the Council of State and because a question has been raised in relation to the constitutionality of such a bill or some provision thereof. The Court does not accept that any distinction should be drawn in relation to the presumption of constitutionality between an Act of the Oireachtas and a bill referred by the President under Article 26. II The first argument advanced by the opponents was that the bill is repugnant to the Constitution because Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution constitute a prohibition on the Oireachtas legislating in relation to matters occurring in Northern Ireland whether it is done with territorial or extra-territorial effect. They submitted that pending the re-integration of the national territory the Oireachtas was debarred from passing legislation which had extra-territorial effect in Northern Ireland. Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution are headed "The Nation" and read:— "Article 1. The Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right to choose its own form of Government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to develop its life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and traditions. Article 2. The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas. Article 3. Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann and the like extra-territorial effect." These three Articles are followed by eight Articles with the heading"The State" and they include Article 10, the first section of which reads:— All natural resources, including the air and all forms of potential energy, within the jurisdiction of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution and all royalties and franchises within that jurisdiction belong to the State subject to all estates and interests therein for the time being lawfully vested in any person or body." Articles 2 and 3 can be understood only if their background of law and political theory is appreciated. Before 1920, the imperial parliament at Westminster claimed the sole legislative power over the whole of Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act, 1920, made provision (s. 1, sub-s. 2) for a parliament of Northern Ireland with limited legislative jurisdiction over"the parliamentary counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone and the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry" and a parliament of Southern Ireland with limited legislative jurisdiction over the remaining part of the island of Ireland. Articles 11 and 12 of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland (which was signed on the 6th December, 1921) were given the force of law in the area now known as the Republic of Ireland by the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann éireann) Act, 1922. This Act Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as respects Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, remain of full force and effect . If before the expiration of the said month an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, (including those relating to the Council of Ireland) shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications." These Articles of Agreement were ratified by the imperial parliament on the 31st March, 1922. The Constitution of 1922 was enacted by Dáil Éireann éireann on the 25th October, 1922. Article 83 of it read:— The passing and adoption of this Constitution by the Constituent Assembly and the British Parliament shall be announced as soon as may be, and not later than the 6th day of December, Nineteen hundred and twenty-two, by Proclamation of His Majesty, and this Constitution shall come into operation on the issue of such Proclamation." The Constitution of 1922 was ratified by an Act of the imperial parliament on the 5th December, 1922, and on the 6th December, 1922, the proclamation mentioned in Article 83 was issued. On the 7th December, 1922, the parliament of Northern Ireland presented an address under Article 12 of the Articles of Agreement of 1921. The result was that the powers of the parliament and government of the Irish Free State no longer extended to Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, in so far as they related to Northern Ireland, continued to be of full force and effect. The Constitution of 1922 derived its authority not from the Act of the imperial parliament passed on the 5th December, 1922, or from the proclamation made on the 6th December, 1922, but from the Act of Dáil The Articles of Agreement of 1921 were amended by an agreement made on the 3rd December, 1925, between the British Government and the Governments of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland which was confirmed by the Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Act, 1925. The effect of this was that the Irish Free State recognised and confirmed that "the extent of Northern Ireland for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of the said Articles of Agreement shall be such as was fixed by sub-section (2) of section one of that Act." It was contended by the opponents that the Constitution is a legal document and must be read and construed having regard to this. If this means that the Court cannot have regard to the legislation in force at the date of the Constitution or to the historical background against which it was enacted in order to determine its meaning, the proposition is incorrect. The correct meaning of any constitutional document may be ascertained by construing it with regard to the historical circumstances in which it came into existence. It is true that the Constitution is a legal document, but it is a fundamental one which establishes the State and it expresses not only legal norms but basic doctrines of political and social theory. "Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic State" (Article 5) is a statement of political belief and of law. The directive principles of social policy in Article 45 are to be followed by the Oireachtas and their application is not cognisable by any court. These Articles show that the Constitution contains more than legal rules: it reflects, in part, aspirations and aims and expresses the political theories on which the people acted when they enacted the Constitution. One of the theories held in 1937 by a substantial number of citizens was that a nation, as distinct from a State, had rights; that the Irish people living in what is now called the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland together formed the Irish Nation; that a nation has a right to unity of territory in some form, be it as a unitary or federal state; and that the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, though legally binding, was a violation of that national right to unity which was superior to positive law. This national claim to unity exists not in the legal but in the political order and is one of the rights which are envisaged in Article 2; it is expressly saved by Article 3 which states the area to which the laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution apply. The effect of Article 3 is that, until the division of the island of Ireland is ended, the laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution are to apply to the same area and have the same extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann had. The area to which the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann applied was, having regard to the Articles of Agreement of 1921 and the Act of 1925, unquestionably the area now known as the Republic of Ireland. The laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution were to have the same extra-territorial effect as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann. This analysis of Article 3 gets considerable support from Article 10 for it states that all natural resources "within the jurisdiction of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution" belong to the State and there is a clear distinction drawn by the Constitution itself between the Nation and the State. If the saver contained in Article 3 were to be interpreted as entitling the parliament established by the Constitution to legislate at any time it so decided for the parliamentary counties and boroughs set out in sub-s. 2 of s. 1 of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, then the effect of Article 10 would be that it would apply to the natural resources of the national territory and would have been so expressed. Article 3 of the Constitution does not prohibit the Oireachtas legislating with extra-territorial effect in relation to Northern Ireland for so long as the division of the island of Ireland continues, if the parliament of Saorstát Éireann éireann had power to legislate with extra-territorial effect. The Court has no doubt that in 1937 Saorstát Éireann éireann had power to legislate with extra-territorial effect. This view was not contested by the opponents. The 1929 report of the conference on the operation of Dominion legislation noted that the question whether the Dominions had power to legislate with extra-territorial effect was "full of obscurity." However, there was the all important distinction that the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann éireannderived its authority, not from any Act of the imperial parliament but from an Act of the Dáil, while the constitutions of the other Dominions derived their authority from Acts of the imperial parliament. If there was any doubt about the position of the other Dominions it was dispelled by s. 3 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which declared and enacted that, the parliament of a dominion had full powers to make laws having extra-territorial operation. The Court is satisfied that Saorstát Éireann éireann had full power to legislate with extra-territorial effect from 1922. This was the view of FitzGibbon J. in R. (Alexander) v. Circuit Judge for Cork 48 and, therefore, the Statute of Westminster, 1931, should be regarded as declaratory of the law and not as making any change in it. It is established in international law by the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus Case 49 that every sovereign State has power to legislate with extra-territorial effect in the sense that it may enact that acts or omissions done outside its borders are criminal offences which may be successfully prosecuted within its borders—this is sometimes called the jurisdiction to prescribe—provided that the events, acts or persons to which its enactment applies bear upon the peace, order and good government of the legislating State: see O'Connell on International Law (2nd ed., vol. The Court has no doubt that the offences described in the schedule to the bill bear upon the peace, order and good government of the State, particularly as they are committed within the national territory. Therefore, the Court rejects the contention that Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution constitute a prohibition on the Oireachtas legislating with extra-territorial effect in relation to matters occurring in Northern Ireland so long as the island is divided. The bill is not repugnant to the Constitution on this ground. III It is submitted that the bill is repugnant to Article 38 of the Constitution. This submission is based on two connected but independent contentions. It is asserted that the bill confers jurisdiction upon the Special Criminal Court to try offences created by the bill and that this is repugnant to the Constitution either on the basis that no offence, the constituent acts of which are committed outside the State, could affect the administration of justice or the preservation of public peace and order within the State, or on the basis that, even if this is not universally correct, it is possible to envisage circumstances surrounding the commission of particular offences under the bill which would render them incapable of affecting the administration of justice or the preservation of public peace and order within the State. Article 38, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution provides:— "Special courts may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order." The law by which a special court has been established pursuant to In short, by virtue of these sections, the offences which may be tried by the Special Criminal Court at any time when it is established fall into two categories. The first is an offence of a particular class or kind or under a particular enactment declared by the Government to be a scheduled offence under s. 36 of the Act of 1939; and the second is an offence which is not scheduled but is one in respect of which the Director of Public Prosecutions (or, formerly, the Attorney General) has certified in the individual case that, in his opinion, the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order in relation to the trial of the person charged with such offence. By virtue of s. 37 of the Act of 1939 each of the acts of attempting, conspiring or inciting to commit, or aiding or abetting the commission of, a scheduled offence is itself a scheduled offence. No other offence can, under the law, come within the jurisdiction of and be triable by the Special Criminal Court. Therefore, it is clear that, even if this bill were enacted, it does not and cannot confer on the Special Criminal Court any jurisdiction to try any offence. Before any offence created by this bill could come within the jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court it would be necessary either for the Government to declare under s. 36 of the Act of 1939 such offence to be a scheduled offence or for the Director of Public Prosecutions, in the case of the trial of a particular person charged with such offence, to have issued the certificate already referred to. However, s. 11 of the bill clearly refers and, indeed, is solely referable to the trial of offences against the bill by a special court. This Court has an obligation to be alert in upholding constitutional rights and in discharge of that duty feels obliged to decide whether such trial would be unconstitutional if, upon the enactment of this bill, by action either of the Government or the Director of Public Prosecutions an offence created by the bill were tried by a special court. The pre-condition for the scheduling or certifying of any offences or offence is the opinion of the Government or the Director of Public Therefore, the Court must reject the contention that an offence against the criminal law of the State which consists of acts committed outside the State could not—by reason of that fact alone—be properly and constitutionally committed for trial by a special court. If it is possible to envisage a hypothetical case of a particular charge against a particular person in respect of an offence created by the bill of which it could not reasonably be said that the trial was one for which the ordinary courts are inadequate, then it is necessary to consider whether that fact alone and that single hypothetical case render the bill repugnant to Article 38 of the Constitution. The former Supreme Court in In re MacCurtain 50 and Mr. Justice Kenny in the High Court in The Attorney General v. Bollard , subsequently confirmed by this Court without a written judgment, decided that it was constitutional for the Oireachtas to have provided by the Act of 1939 that the question of the inadequacy of the ordinary courts should be decided by a proclamation and declaration of the Government or by a certificate of the Attorney General, whose function is now discharged by the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is not necessary in this case for the Court to express an opinion on the circumstances, if any, in which the Courts would be entitled to review any such proclamation, declaration or certificate and it does not do so. As has already been pointed out, the bill does not confer any jurisdiction upon a special court in relation to all or any of the offences created by the bill. The test of repugnancy to Article 38, therefore, must be not whether in a particular case an opinion that the ordinary courts were inadequate would be inappropriate, but rather whether it would be impossible to envisage any case of an offence against the bill in which that opinion, if formed, would be justified and appropriate. It is clear beyond controversy that, if a member of an organisation operating within the State and engaged (inter alia) in intimidating jurymen were tried here for an offence consisting IV It has been submitted that s. 11 of the bill conflicts with the Constitution either because in certain respects it permits the operation of unfair trial procedures or fails to provide for trial in due course of law, or in other respects fails to defend or to vindicate the personal rights of the citizen in accordance with Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution. In the first place it is submitted that fair trial procedures, and the specific requirement of Article 38, s. 1, of the Constitution which states that no person shall be tried on a criminal charge save in due course of law, are violated by the fact that the person accused can only be present at the taking of evidence on commission in Northern Ireland by submitting to conditions which, it is said, are unduly harsh and unreasonable. In this respect the section provides that, if the accused indicates that he wishes to be present, the court shall make an order directing that he be delivered into the custody of the police of Northern Ireland (sub-s. 2) and, for this purpose, he shall be brought to a convenient point of departure by the Garda Síochána and, if on bail, shall be taken into custody not more than 24 hours before such delivery (sub-s. These provisions, it is said, impose conditions on the exercise of a right which are so unreasonable as to frustrate such exercise because they involve the accused having to leave the security of the State for Northern Ireland, and to do so in the custody first of the Garda Síochána and then of the police of Northern Ireland. The provisions of Article 38, s. 1, of the Constitution, stating that no person shall be tried on a criminal charge save in due course of law, require fair and just treatment for the person so charged, having due regard to the rights of the State to prosecute for the offence charged and to ensure that the person so charged will stand his trial. The phrase "due course of law"requires a fair and just balance between the exercise of individual freedoms and the requirements of an ordered society. In this section we are concerned with a person charged with an offence under our law which consists of acts done in Northern Ireland. It cannot be doubted that the State, having created the offence by its law, has the obligation and the right to prosecute. Nor can it be doubted that the State has an equal right and obligation to ensure, in so far as it can, that the prosecution will reach a just and correct conclusion at the trial of the No question arises with regard to the accused's right to be present at and throughout his trial. This trial will take place within the State before a special court established under Article 38, s. 3, of the Constitution. What is in issue is his right to be present at the taking "for the purposes of the trial" of the evidence of a witness or witnesses in Northern Ireland. This involves the travelling to Northern Ireland of all the members of the court of trial, and the taking there of the evidence in their presence before a member of the High Court of Justice of Northern Ireland. In these circumstances, how are the rights of the accused observed? Obviously, if he is to be present he must leave the jurisdiction; it is equally obvious that this involves the danger that he may not return to stand his trial if he is not in custody while in Northern Ireland. The section expressly recognises his right to be present but stipulates that such right should be exercised in custody. In addition, under the provisions of sub-s. 2 he is, while in Northern Ireland for the purpose of the taking of such evidence, accorded an immunity from detention or any kind of suit or legal process in respect of any cause or matter, civil or criminal, arising before his arrival in Northern Ireland. The section also recognises his right not to be present, and in such circumstances ensures that he can nevertheless be represented by counsel and solicitor (or by solicitor alone). Does the fact that he can be present only whilst in custody frustrate the exercise of that right? If all the evidence for his trial were to be given at the trial, his freedom of movement would be restricted in any event because he would be in the custody of the court. That he should also be in custody when it is necessary for part of the evidence to be taken outside the State in his presence seems to be a reasonable compromise. Does the fact that, in order to exercise his right, he is obliged to go to Northern Ireland and put himself beyond the protection of the State constitute in itself too high a price to pay for the exercise of that right? It cannot be overlooked that he is to be in the custody and, therefore, under the protection of the police of Northern Ireland, and that he is guaranteed immunity from detention or legal process while so there. The Court is of the opinion that in this respect the provisions of this section do not offend the provisions of the Constitution and are not repugnant thereto in the manner submitted. It was also contended that the requirements of the section with regard to the accused being in custody if he wished to be present at the taking of evidence in Northern Ireland constituted a deprivation of his right of access to the Courts for the purpose of obtaining bail, and an interference with the jurisdiction of the Courts. What is termed a right to bail is not a constitutional right but a recognition by the Courts that a person presumed to be innocent shall not have his liberty interfered with unnecessarily pending his trial on a criminal charge. It is subject to the paramount requirement that he shall be available to stand his trial. In The People (Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan 51 Mr. Justice Walsh said at p. 513 of the report:— "From the earliest times it was appreciated that detention in custody pending trial could be a cause of great hardship and it is as true now as it was in ancient times that it is desirable to release on bail as large a number of accused persons as possible who may safely be released pending trial. From time to time necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases 'necessity' is the operative test." Here what is done is done pursuant to an order of the court. If such order is made on a wrong basis, it can be set aside by the High Court. In addition, the order can only be made at the request of the accused. Further, the requirements as to custody are obviously necessary, and no more than necessary, to secure that the accused while in Northern Ireland will receive proper protection and will be returned at the conclusion of the evidence to the jurisdiction of the State, there to be returned into such custody as had existed or to be released on bail, as the court may decide. In the opinion of the Court these provisions do not constitute either a denial of access to or an interference with the jurisdiction of the Courts. It was further argued that the provisions of s. 11, sub-s. 2(b), of the bill are defective in that they do not provide that, in the event of the accused electing not to be present at the taking of evidence in Northern Ireland, those representing him shall have the right to cross-examine the witness or witnesses whose evidence is being taken. An opportunity to cross-examine on behalf of the accused any witness called against him is fundamental to a trial in due course of law and the taking of evidence for production at such trial without such an opportunity would be contrary to the Constitution. Here, however, the right of representation by counsel It was also submitted that the section does not provide that a statement of the evidence intended to be given by the witness shall be given to the accused before such evidence is taken. It was urged that this involved an unfair trial procedure or was contrary to a trial in "due course of law"because the accused could be left in ignorance of the nature of evidence sought to be adduced against him. By virtue of s. 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, an accused person charged in the District Court with an indictable offence and not being tried summarily is entitled, as part of the preliminary examination, to a statement of the evidence to be given by each witness whom it is proposed to call at the trial. By virtue of the Special Criminal Court Rules, 1975, a person brought before the Special Criminal Court under s. 47 of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, and charged with an indictable offence is entitled to receive a list of the witnesses to be called and a statement of the evidence that is to be given by each of them. No person can be brought before the Special Criminal Court and tried on an indictable offence except after an order returning him for trial by a District Justice subsequent to a preliminary examination carried out under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, or pursuant to a direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions under s. 47 of the Act of 1939. Section 11 of the bill applies to the trial of an offence under s. 2 or s. 3 of the bill only. Every offence under either s. 2 or s. 3 of the bill is punishable only on conviction on indictment. Therefore, every trial to which s. 11 could have application must be the trial (as the law now is) of an indictable offence by the Special Criminal Court. In every such trial either by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, or the Special Criminal Court Rules, 1975, the accused is entitled to a statement of the evidence of each witness whom it is proposed or intended to call. The Court is satisfied that s. 11 of the bill must be interpreted as making a person whose evidence is to be taken on commission in Northern Ireland a witness whom it is intended or proposed to call at the trial. Such a person is referred to in the section as a witness; his evidence when so taken may, if certain conditions are fulfilled, be admitted as part of the proof at the trial, and he is to be examined for the purpose of the trial and subjected to cross-examination. In the view of the Court, it would be incorrect and, indeed, fanciful to hold, as has been submitted, that because such a person gives evidence for the purpose of the trial before a It is also to be noted that under the provisions of sub-s. 1 of s. 11 the court has to consider, in relation to the making of an order for the taking of evidence of a witness, the interests of justice, and it is precluded from doing so if it is not in the interests of justice to do so. It seems impossible to imagine the operation of the section without a full and adequate disclosure of the nature of the evidence being made beforehand to the accused. Without such, the court could scarcely consider the interests of justice and, without such, the accused could not properly decide whether he ought to be present or not. Therefore, without deciding whether there is a constitutional right to have prior notice of the evidence to be given, the Court is of opinion that the operation of the section requires the disclosure in an ample manner to the accused of the evidence sought to be taken and that, accordingly, this submission also fails. It was also submitted that the provisions of s. 11, sub-s. 3(a), of the bill are defective in that the sub-section only provides that "a statement of evidence of a witness" so taken shall be admissible and that this could fall far short of a full transcript of the questions asked, the answers given and of rulings on the admissibility of evidence and, therefore, could be inadequate. The Court notes, however, that such statement is to be certified as "a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken" by the judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland who took it and that its admissibility as evidence at the trial of the accused depends on such certificate being given. It is also to be borne in mind that the members of the court by whom the evidence, if admitted, is to be accepted or rejected must have been present for the entire of the proceedings before the Commissioner. The Court is satisfied that a statement of evidence, correctly certified to be a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken in the presence of the court, satisfies the requirements of justice. Objection was also taken to the section on the grounds that it did not extend to evidence of opinion from experts and that, accordingly, an accused person on trial here who wished to have the evidence of an expert taken in Northern Ireland as part of his defence would be hampered in his defence. This objection was based on the provisions of sub-s. 3(a) of s. 11 to the effect that the statement of the evidence so taken shall be admissible"as evidence of any fact stated therein." The Court is of the opinion that these words extend to the sworn testimony of an expert as to what his opinion is. A further objection was taken that the section provided only for the transmission of a statement of evidence and did not expressly extend to exhibits. This objection may be a relevant one for the consideration of the special court when deciding on the admissibility of such evidence or any part thereof, or the proof necessary of any exhibit. The Court does not regard this question as relevant to the constitutionality of the section. It is further contended that sub-s. 3(a) of s. 11, so far as it provides that a statement of evidence certified in accordance with the sub-section shall "be admissible," was mandatory and excluded the jurisdiction of the court to reject or not to accept such evidence. The Court is of opinion that this submission is not well-founded. The section merely provides that such a statement of evidence shall be capable of being admitted. It is for the court to decide whether in fact it will be admitted and, if admitted, whether to accept or reject such evidence. In the course of the arguments on the constitutionality of the procedure created by the section, the opponents of the bill invited the Court to have regard to the Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1975, being the British Act (extending to Northern Ireland) which is intended to operate in Northern Ireland at the same time as this bill operates within the State. Counsel directed the Court's attention to the provisions of this British Act providing in Northern Ireland for the taking of the evidence directed by an order made under s. 11 of the bill. Schedule 4, paragraph 2(4), of the British Act provides:— "The witness shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he were a witness in a trial on indictment for an offence under the law of Northern Ireland, and questions as to the exclusion of any evidence, or the withholding of any document or thing on the ground of public interest, shall be determined in accordance with the law of Northern Ireland." It was urged by counsel opposing the bill that this would mean that such evidence would be taken under laws with regard to the exclusion of evidence and the withholding of documents or things which might not accord with our laws and that, accordingly, the rights of the accused could be infringed. The presumption of constitutionality already referred to normally carries the implication that all proceedings, procedures, discretions and adjudications permitted under the legislation being examined were intended to and would be conducted in accordance with the principles of constitutional justice: see East Donegal Co-Operative v. The Attorney General. 52 The Court is not prepared to hold that such presumption can One final submission deserves particular attention. Sub-section 2 of s. 11 of the bill provides that, where a court makes an order for the taking of such evidence, it shall inform the accused that he has certain rights. These rights are specified in paragraphs (a) to (d) of the sub-section. It has been pointed out by counsel opposing the bill that the sub-section does not accord these rights but merely provides that the accused shall be informed that he has them. This is undoubtedly true, and probably arises from the fact that the sub-section contemplates rights to be enjoyed outside the jurisdiction and in accordance with the laws there in force. The Court does not consider this to be a sustainable objection to the bill. The Court thinks it proper to say, however, that if all these rights are not accorded in full to the accused it is the opinion of the Court that a statement of evidence taken in such circumstances would not be taken in compliance with the section and would on that ground not be admissible at his trial. The Court has examined the whole of the bill and is satisfied that neither the bill nor any provision or provisions thereof is or are repugnant to the Constitution, or to any provision thereof, and will advise the President accordingly. Solicitor instructing counsel assigned by the court: Ernest Keegan. Solicitor for the Attorney General: Chief State Solicitor. E.P. de B.
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An Córas Dlí An Córas Dlí agus an Scaradh Cumhachtaí Is é atá i mBunreacht na hÉireann ná dlí bunúsach an Stáit. D’achtaigh an pobal é de réir pobalbhreithe in Iúil, 1937 agus tháinig sé i ngníomh ar 29 Nollaig, 1937. Is é an Bunreacht an ceannbhrat faoina ndéantar ceart a riar agus faoina gcuirtear cearta dlíthiúla i bhfeidhm i gcúirteanna arna mbunú faoin dlí. Sna forálacha sainráite atá ann, aithnítear agus ráthaítear cosaint do chearta bunúsacha an duine. Sa Bhunreacht, a bhfuil 50 Airteagal ann, bunaítear institiúidí an Stáit agus leagtar amach na rialacha a rialaíonn an idirghníomhaíocht a bhíonn ann idir orgáin an Stáit agus idir an Stát agus an duine aonair, araon. Féadfaidh don phearsa aonair gairm le dúshlán a chur faoi bhunreachtúlacht dlíthe a ritheann an tOireachtas (an pharlaimint) agus le cúiteamh a lorg i gcás go sáraítear cearta bunreachtúla dá cuid. Faoi réir an Bhunreachta tá an córas dlí bunaithe ar thraidisiún an dlí coitinn. Faoi théarmaí Airteagal 6 den Bhunreacht is le muintir na hÉireann a dhílsíonn ceannasacht ach tá an Stát ceannasach go seachtrach i dtaobh a sheasaimh i gcúrsaí dlí idirnáisiúnta. Tá an Stát, Éire, freagrach os comhair na gCúirteanna as éagóracha a dhéantar i gcoinne pearsan aonair nó as sárú dá cuid cearta bunreachtúla nó dá cuid cearta dlíthiúla. Ní fhéadfar an Bunreacht a athrú ach amháin de réir reifrinn, a bhfuil foráil déanta dó in Airteagal 46. Bunreacht dátheangach Gné shuntasach amháin den Bhunreacht ná go bhfuil sé scríofa in dhá theanga. Foráiltear le hAirteagal 8 den Bhunreacht gurb í an Ghaeilge, mar an teanga náisiúnta, príomhtheanga oifigiúil an Stáit agus aithnítear an Béarla mar an dara teanga oifigiúil. Is é an téacs Gaeilge a bhíonn i réim más rud é go dtagann mí-ailíniú idir an dá leagan den Bhunreacht chun cinn. Deighilt na gCumhachtaí Foráiltear sa Bhunreacht go mbeidh deighilt cumhachtaí trípháirteach: an Reachtas, an Feidhmeannas agus na Breithiúna. Is é an Rialtas an t-orgán stáit a fheidhmíonn an chumhacht feidhmiúcháin rialtais, is iad an dá theach parlaiminte atá san Oireachtas (ar a bhfuil an tUachtarán ina cheannasaí teidealach air, i dteannta stádas bunreachtúil a bhfuil aige nó aici mar Cheann Stáit) a fheidhmíonn an chumhacht reachtach rialtais, agus is iad na cúirteanna arna mbunú faoi Airteagal 34 den Bhunreacht a fheidhmíonn an chumhacht bhreithiúnach rialtais. Áirithítear leis sin nach bhféadfar aon orgán amháin de chuid an Stáit cur isteach ar na feidhmeanna a shanntar don dá orgán stáit eile. In Airteagail 12 go 14, leagtar amach feidhmeanna Uachtarán na hÉireann, arb é an Ceann Stáit. Cumhachtaí searmanais go príomha a dhílsítear don Uachtarán cé go bhforáiltear go leor cumhachtaí discréideacha dó faoi théarmaí an Bhunreachta. D’ainneoin deighilt na gcumhachtaí feidhmíonn na Cúirteanna feidhm bhunreachtúil nuair a dhéanann siad bunreachtúlacht agus dlíthiúlacht ghníomhartha orgáin eile an Stáit a athbhreithniú. Is é atá san orgán breithiúnach rialtais ná na Cúirteanna sin a bhunaítear faoi Airteagal 34 den Bhunreacht iad, eadhon an Chúirt Uachtarach, an Chúirt Achomhairc agus an Ard-Chúirt. Foráiltear le hAirteagal 6 den Bhunreacht go n-eascraíonn na cumhachtaí rialtais uile, reachtach, feidhmiúcháin agus breithiúnach ón bpobal, agus leanann sé ar aghaidh chun rá gurb “leis na horgain Stáit a chuirtear ar bun leis an mBunreacht seo, agus leo sin amháin nó lena n-údarás, is féidir na cumhachtaí riala sin a oibriú.” Áirítear sa chumhacht bhreithiúnach rialtais atá ag na cúirteanna siúd an inniúlacht comhoiriúnacht den reachtaíocht leis an mBunreacht a athbhreithniú agus athbhreithniú breithiúnach a dhéanamh ar fho-reachtaíocht, ar chinntí nó ar ghníomhaí a dhéanann an Rialtas nó comhlachtaí an Stáit d’fhonn cinneadh a dhéanamh maidir lena ndlíthiúlacht agus lena gcomhoiriúnacht leis an mBunreacht, chomh maith le prionsabail a thagann ón mBunreacht, amhail próis chuí. (i) An Reachtas De réir mar a shainordaítear sa Bhunreacht, is é atá san Oireachtas ná parlaimint dhá-sheomrach agus Uachtarán na hÉireann. Is iad an dá theach san Oireachtas ná Seanad Éireann agus Dáil Éireann (seomra na dteachtaí). Cé go ndílsítear, de réir Airteagal 15 den Bhunreacht, an chumhacht reachtóireachta san Oireachtas amháin, tá teorainn leis an gcumhacht seo mar ní cheadaítear don Oireachtas reachtaíocht a théann in aghaidh théarmaí an Bhunreachta a achtú. Ar an gcaoi chéanna tá cosc ar reachtaíocht a chruthaíonn cion go cúlghabhálach nó a d'fhorálfadh do phionóis an bháis a ghearradh. Féadfar le reachtaíocht a thionscnamh i gceachtar den dá Theach, cé is moite Billí Airgid agus Billí do leasú an Bunreacht nach bhféadfar iad a thionscnamh ach i nDáil Éireann amháin. Téann Bille trí chéimeanna éagsúla sa dá Theach sula gcuirtear chuig Uachtarán na hÉireann é le síniú, agus leis sin déantar Acht Oireachtais den Bhille. (ii) An Feidhmeannas Is é an Feidhmeannas Rialtas na hÉireann agus foráiltear dó in Airteagal 28 den Bhunreacht, a shonraíonn nach mór nach mbeadh níos lú ná seachtar ball agus níos mó ná cúig bhall déag sa Rialtas agus áiríonn sé sin an Taoiseach arb é ceann an Fheidhmeannais é agus an duine atá díreach faoi, an Tánaiste. (iii) Na Breithiúna Foráiltear le hAirteagal 34 go 38 den Bhunreacht do chóras cúirteanna in Éirinn agus do chionta a thriail. Sonraíonn Airteagal 34 go soiléir 1. Is i gcúirteanna a bhunaítear le dlí agus ag breithiúna a cheaptar ar an modh atá leagtha amach sa Bhunreacht seo a riarfar ceart". Déantar foráil in Airteagal 35 do cheapachán agus thionacht bhreithiúna na hÉireann, agus faoi théarmaí an Airteagail beidh "gach breitheamh saor neamhspleách maidir lena fheidhmeanna breithimh a oibriú, gan de smacht air ach an Bunreacht seo agus an dlí." Faoi Airteagal 35.4.4 den Bhunreacht ní féidir baill den Chúirt Uachtarach ná den Ard-Chúirt a chur as oifig ach ag rún ag gach Teach an Oireachtais de bharr mí-iompair nó míthreorach a luaitear. Ar an gcaoi chéanna cosnaítear tionacht Breithiúna Cúirte Cuarda agus Cúirte Dúiche ag reacht. Ina theannta, faoi Alt 35.5.1 den Bhunreacht ní fhéadfar tuarastal breithimh a laghdú le linn dó nó di a bheith ina dtéarma oifige, ach amháin i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 35.5. Braitheann dlínse aon Bhreithimh ar dhlínse na cúirte a bhfuil sé nó sí i gceannas uirthi. Córas na gCúirteanna Sa Bhunreacht, leagtar amach struchtúr an chórais cúirteanna atá in Éirinn trí thabhairt ar bun go sainráite an Chúirt Uachtarach, cúirt achomhairc dheiridh sna hábhair uile a bhaineann leis an dlí bunreachtúil, sibhialta agus coiriúla, an Chúirt Achomhairc, sna hábhair a bhaineann leis an dlí bunreachtúil, sibhialta agus coiriúla, agus an Ard-Chúirt, cúirt céadchéime a bhfuil dlínse iomlán aici i ngach ceist, idir ceisteanna coiriúla agus sibhialta. Déantar foráil freisin in Airteagal 34.3.4 do chúirteanna le dlínse áitiúil agus teoranta a bhunú, ar a bunaíodh an Chúirt Chuarda agus an Chúirt Dúiche, a eagraítear ar bhonn réigiúnach iad, de réir reachta. (i) An Chúirt Dúiche Cúirt a bhfuil dlínse áitiúil agus teoranta aici atá sa Chúirt Dúiche, nach bhfuil ach údarás aici déileáil le ceisteanna áirithe a thagann chun cinn ina ceantar feidhmiúcháin. Bronntar cumhachtaí dlínse na Cúirte uirthi ag reacht agus mar sin, níl cead aici déileáil le haon cheisteanna a thagann taobh amuigh dá sainchuspóir reachtúil. I gceisteanna sibhialta, tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Dúiche déileáil le héilimh gur mó ná €15,000 an méid a éilítear iontu (agus gur mó ná €2,000 an méid a éilítear i gcásanna éilimh beaga) I gceisteanna dlí teaghlaigh, tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Dúiche i gceisteanna a bhaineann le cothabháil, caomhnóireacht leanaí nó rochtain orthu agus féadann sí orduithe a dhéanamh i dtaobh foréigin teaghlaigh. I gceisteanna coiriúla, cúirt dlínse achoimre atá sa Chúirt Dúiche agus déileálann sí le triail neamhghiúiré daoine a gearradh mionchionta orthu. Tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Dúiche le bannaí a bhronnadh sa chuid is mó de chásanna agus déileálann sé leis an gcúisí a chur ar aghaidh chun trialach i gcásanna lena mbaineann cionta coiriúla taobh amuigh dá dlínse, freisin. (ii) An Chúirt Chuarda Cúirt dlínse áitiúil agus teoranta atá sa Chúirt Chuarda freisin, agus tá dlínse achomhairc aici i ngach ceist a thagann chun cinn sa Chúirt Dúiche. Tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Chuarda i gceisteanna sibhialta ina sáraíonn an méid san éileamh thar theorainn dhlínse na Cúirte Dúiche ach gur mó ná €75,000 ann (agus gur mó ná €60,000 atá ann i gcásanna Díobhálacha Pearsanta) I gcúrsaí dlí teaghlaigh, féadann an Chúirt Chuarda, orduithe colscartha, idirscartha bhreithiúnaigh agus neamhnithe a bhronnadh chomh maith le haon orduithe coimhdeacha. I gcúrsaí coiriúla, tá dlínse ag an gCúirt Chuarda le plé le gach cion ach amháin iadsan a bhfuil dlínse ag an bPríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil orthu. Éisteann breitheamh a shuíonn le giúiré le trialacha coiriúla sa Chúirt Chuarda. (iii) An Ard-Chúirt/An Phríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil Tá dlínse iomlán ag an Ard-Chúirt i ngach ceist, idir ceisteanna sibhialta agus coiriúla. I gceisteanna sibhialta, níl aon uasteorainn ar líon na ndamáistí a fhéadann sí a bhronnadh. Nuair atá sí ag cleachtadh a dlínse choiriúil, tugtar an Phríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil ar an Ard-Chúirt, agus sa cháil seo, tá dlínse aici leis na cionta is troime a thriail, lena n-áirítear dúnmharú, dúnorgain, éigniú, tromionsaí gnéis, tréas, cindhíothú agus píoráideacht. Aistreofar trialacha coiriúla os comhair breithimh a shuíonn le giúiré. Uaireanta féadann Uachtarán na hArd-Chúirte treorú, in imthosca áirithe, go suífeadh beirt bhreithiúna nó níos mó sa Chúirt. Sna cúinsí sin, tugtar Ard-Chúirt rannach ar an Ard-Chúirt. Éisteann an Ard-Chúirt le hachomhairc freisin ón gCúirt Chuarda maidir le ceisteanna sibhialta. I dteanna lena dlínse i gcúrsaí sibhialta agus coiriúla, cleachtann an Ard-Chúirt freisin dlínse mhaoirseachta, i gcásanna Athbhreithnithe Bhreithiúnaigh, ina bhfuil an t-údarás aici bailíocht an dlí a shocrú agus í ag féachaint chuig forálacha an Bhunreachta. Rialaítear athbhreithniú breithiúnach ar aon dlí san Ard-Chúirt ag Airteagal 34 nó 50 den Bhunreacht, ag brath ar a shine agus atá an dlí imordaithe. Cuirtear dúshlán faoi dhlí a rith an tOireachtas ó achtaíodh an Bunreacht 1937, lena mbaineann toimhde na bunreachtúlachta, faoi Airteagal 34. Cuirtear dúshlán faoi dhlíthe a ritheadh sular achtaíodh Bunreacht 1937, nach mbaineann aon toimde bunreachtúlachta den sórt sin leo, faoi Airteagal 50. (iv) An Chúirt Choiriúil Speisialta Bunaíodh an Chúirt Choiriúil faoi théarmaí an Achta um Chionta in Aghaidh an Stáit, 1939 agus déileálann sí le dhá chatagóir cionta; iad siúd ar a dtugtar 'cionta sceidealaithe' agus iad siúd ar dearbhaigh an Stiúrthóir Ionchúisimh Poiblí ina dtaobh go raibh na gnáthchúirteanna neamhdhóthanach le riar éifeachtach an cheartais a bhaint amach. Suíonn an Chúirt Choiriúil Speisialta le triúir breitheamh agus níl aon ghiúiré inti. I gcónaí bíonn breitheamh Ard-Chúirte, Cúirte Chuarda agus Cúirte Dúiche inti. Feidhmíonn an Chúirt Choiriúil Speisialta faoi réir an Bhunreachta agus an ghnáthdhlí, agus is í an tréith idirdhealaitheach shubstaintiúil amháin a bhaineann léi ná nach mbíonn aon ghiúiré inti. (v) An Chúirt Achomhairc Níl aon bundlínse ag an gCúirt Achomhairc, toisc nach bhfuil inti ach dlínse achomhairc amháin. Suíonn an Chúirt i rannáin de thriúr breithiúna. Maidir le hábhair a bhaineann leis an dlí bunreachtúil agus leis an dlí sibhialta déantar achomhairc ón Ard-Chúirt a éisteacht agus cinneadh a dhéanamh orthu inti. In ábhair sa dlí coiriúil, déantar achomhairc a éisteacht ón gCúirt Chuarda, ón bPríomh-Chúirt Choiriúil agus ón gCúirt Choiriúil Speisialta inti agus, ina theannta sin, déantar iarratais chun daorbhreitheanna agus pianbhreitheanna a líomhnaítear gur de thoradh iomrall ceartais iad a athbhreithniú, a éisteacht agus cinneadh a dhéanamh orthu inti. Déantar achomhairc ó armchúirteanna a éisteacht agus cinneadh a dhéanamh orthu inti, freisin. Féadfar na hachomhairc a bheith i gcoinne cionta nó i gcoinne déine nó boige phianbhreithe. Féadfar déileáil le “cásaí sonraithe” ón gCúirt Chuarda agus ón Ard-Chúirt sa Chúirt Achomhairc freisin. (vi) An Chúirt Uachtarach Is í an Chúirt Uachtarach an chúirt achomhairc deiridh. Cliceáil anseo chun léaráid a fháil faoi Chóras na gCúirteanna. Cliceáil anseo chun léaráid a fháil ar struchtúr Chóras na gCúirteanna. Cearta Bunúsacha Tá cearta bunúsacha an tsaoránaigh ráthaithe in Airteagal 40 go 44 den Bhunreacht. In Airteagal 40 foráiltear go gcaithfear déileáil go comhionann le gach saoránach os comhair an dlí agus leagann sé oibleagáid ar an Stát cearta pearsanta an tsaoránaigh a chosaint. Mar thoradh ar an téarma "cearta pearsanta", mar a léirmhíníonn na cúirteanna é, aithnítear agus cosnaítear go leor ceart nach foráiltear go soiléir iad i dtéacs an Bhunreachta. Áirítear leis na cearta 'neamháirithe' seo an ceart chun sláine choirpe, an ceart pósadh agus beatha a shaothrú i measc cearta eile. Áiríonn na cearta 'áirithe' nó soiléire atá sa Bhunreacht an ceart chun saoirse tuairimíochta, saoirse tionóil agus saoirse comhlachais i measc ceart eile. In Airteagal 40 tá forálacha a rialaíonn an nós imeachta ar a dtugtar habeas corpus trína bhféadann pearsa aonair dúshlán a chur faoi dhlíthíocht a choinneála, freisin. Baineann Airteagal 41 agus 42 le cearta an Teaghlaigh agus le cearta Oideachais. Baineann Airteagal 43 le ceart an tsaoránaigh bheith ina úinéir ar mhaoin phríobháideach agus in Airteagal 44 ráthaítear an ceart adhradh reiligiúnach a chleachtadh go saor agus cuireann sé cosc ar bhronnadh ar aon chreideamh faoi leith ag an Stát. Cé go bhfuil na cearta seo cosanta ar bhonn bunreachtúla, níl aon cheann acu absalóideach agus féadfar teorainn a chur leo ar chúiseanna shlándáil an Stáit, chun an tsíocháin poiblí agus an t-ord poiblí a choimeád nó aon uair a n-iarrtar leis de réir mar is gá chun leasa an phobail. Dlí an Chomhphobail Eorpaigh Stát déach atá in Éirinn, foráiltear in Airteagal 29.6 den Bhunreacht go bhfeidhmíonn comhaontuithe idirnáisiúnta fórsa an dlí sa mhéid is a shocraítear san Oireachtas. Ciallaíonn sé sin nach mór conarthaí idirnáisiúnta a dtéitear isteach iontu a chuimsiú sa dlí intíre ag reachtaíocht sula bhfuil siad i bhfeidhm sa Stát (mar shampla cuireadh cuimsiú Choinbhinsiúin na Víne ar Dhíolúine Thaidhleoireachta agus Chonsalachta i bhfeidhm ag an Acht um Chaidreamh agus Díolúine Thaidhleoireachta 1967). Is í an eisceacht ón riail ghinearálta sin ná dlí an Chomhphobail Eorpaigh a dtugtar tús áite dó roimh dhlí intíre, faoi théarmaí Airteagal 29 den Bhunreacht. Ciallaíonn sé sin nach féidir aon dlí nó beart nach mór glacadh leis de bharr bhallraíocht na hÉireann den Aontas Eorpach, a dhéanamh neamhbhailí i bprionsabal ag aon fhoráil den Bhunreacht.