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Marx/Engels Internet Archive Theses On Feuerbach Written: by Marx in the Spring of 1845, but slightly edited by Engels; First Published: As an appendix to Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy in 1888; Source: Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume One, p. 13 – 15; Publisher: Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1969; Translated: W. Lough from the German; Transcription/Markup: Zodiac/Brian Baggins; Copyleft: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 1995, 1999, 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of the Creative Commons ShareAlike License; Proofread: by Andy Blunden February 2005. The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity. II The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. III The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. IV Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis. The latter must, therefore, in itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice. Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity. VI Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled: - To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual. - Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals. VII Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a particular form of society. VIII All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. IX The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of civil society. The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity. XI The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
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Napisano: proleće 1845. Izvor: Prvi put izdato: Online verzija: Pobunjeni um 1999-2002 / Marksistička internet arhiva (marxists.org) 2002 Transkripcija/HTML: Pobunjeni um Glavni je nedostatak svega dosadašnjeg materijalizma (uključujući i Feuerbachov), što predmet, stvarnost, osjetilnost shvaća samo u obliku objekta ili opažanja a ne kao osjetilnu ljudsku djelatnost, praksu, ne subjektivno. Stoga je djelatnu stranu, nasuprot materijalizmu, apstraktno izveo idealizam, koji naravno ne zna za stvarnu, osjetilnu delatnost kao takvu. Feuerbach želi osjetilne objekte koji su zaista različiti od objekata misli; ali samu ljudsku djelatnost on ne shvaća kao predmetnu djelatnost. Zato on u "Suštini kršćanstva" samo teorijski odnos razmatra kao pravi ljudski odnos, dok praksu shvaća i fiksira samo u njenom prljavo judejskom pojavnom obliku. Stoga on ne shvaća značenje "revolucionarne", "praktičko-kritičke" djelatnosti. Pitanje da li je ljudskom mišljenju svojstvena predmetna istina, nije pitanje teorije, nego je praktičko pitanje. Čovjek mora u praksi dokazati istinu, tj. stvarnost i moć, ovostranost svoga mišljenja. Spor o stvarnosti ili nestvarnosti mišljenja - koje je izolirano od prakse - čisto je skolastičko pitanje. Materijalističko učenje o mijenjanju okolnosti i odgoju zaboravlja da ljudi mijenjaju okolnosti i da sam odgajatelj mora biti odgajan. Stoga ono mora dijeliti društvo na dva dijela - od kojih je jedan iznad društva. Podudarnost mijenjanja okolnosti i ljudske dijelatnosti ili samopromjene može se shvatiti i racionalno razumeti samo kao revolucionarna praksa. Feuerbach polazi od činjenice religioznog samootuđenja, udvostručavanja svijeta u religijski i svjetovni svijet. Njegov rad sastoji se u tome da religijski svijet svede na njegovu svetovnu osnovu. A što se svjetovna osnova udaljuje od same sebe i fiksira sebi samostalno carstvo u oblacima, može se objasniti samo iz podvojenosti te svjetovne osnove koja sama sebi protivrječi. Dakle, treba je razumjeti u njoj samoj i njenoj protivrječnosti, te praktički revolucionizirati. Dakle, pošto je npr. otkriveno da je zemaljska porodica tajna svete porodice, mora se prva teorijski i praktički uništiti. Feuerbach, nezadovoljan apstraktnim mišljenjem, želi opažanje; međutim on ne shvaća osjetilnost kao praktičku ljudsku - osjetilnu djelatnost. Feuerbach svodi religijsku suštinu na ljudsku suštinu. Ali ljudska suština nije apstraktum koji je svojstven pojedinačnom individuumu. U stvarnosti ona je sveukupnost društvenih odnosa. Feuerbach, koji se ne upušta u kritiku te stvarne suštine, primoran je stoga: 1. apstrahirati od historijskog toka i fiksirati religiozne osjećaje za sebe i pretpostaviti apstraktni - izolirani - ljudski individuum; 2. suština se stoga može shvatiti samo kao "rod", kao unutrašnja, nijema općenitost koja te mnoge individuume prirodno povezuje. Stoga Feuerbach ne vidi da je samo "religiozno osjećanje" društveni proizvod i da apstraktni individuum kojega on analizira pripada određenom obliku društva. Sav društveni život u suštini je praktički. Sve misterije koje teoriju navode na misticizam, nalaze svoje racionalno rješenje u ljudskoj praksi i u shvaćanju te prakse. Najviše do čega dolazi promatrački materijalizam, tj. materijalizam koji osjetilnost ne shvaća kao praktičku djelatnost, jest opažanje pojedinih individuuma i građanskog društva. Stajalište je starog materijalizma građansko društvo, stajalište novoga je ljudsko društvo ili društveno čovječanstvo. Filozofi su svijet samo različito interpretirali, radi se o tome da ga se izmijeni.