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to him with interest. When we are attached to objects for use by private interests, linked to some function or gain that they represent, the aesthetic judgment is not your space. This play of imagination is hard - try to imagine something that we admire and we have no interest! - But for Kant, fundamental as well as their ideas about moral interests misrepresent the ethical quality of our actions (this means that an action is morally praiseworthy only when it is disinterested), interested in the aesthetic judgment precludes free access the object. This object - object of beauty or aesthetic - guard with the promise of a treat, a pleasure that is not only sensual, physical, like the pleasure of eating too much, for example. Not even an intellectual pleasure of reading a good book. That pleasure which is shared, is based on "... universal communication capability of the mood in the representation given that as a subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must lie as the foundation of it and as a consequence have the pleasure in the object It is a pleasure result of a mental activity, in sensitive relationship with an object, which I am free, ie no practical interests and which do not come back to understand it intellectually. This pleasure, although it is also subjective communed by society. It is a pleasure in common, complacency. This judgment of beauty, besides being selfless, is not represented by a concept (rational, intellectual). "The beautiful is what pleases universally without a concept" says Kant. As this feeling is not tied to a judgment of knowledge he also has no concept that expresses you. The judgment of taste, arising from feeling beautiful can not suffer the pressures of systematization and theorization of reason. They misrepresent and make us deviate from the pleasure that is characteristic of sensitivity, not intelligence. This unanimity of the judgment of taste is not, therefore, an agreement of thought or a theoretical debate about beauty, but for a judgment of taste, that is, the feeling that when you give, can intuit that any other would have the Similarly. The aesthetic feeling is as common to all, can be shared and communed with humanity. Must be from a sensible pleasure, selfless and without rational concept that will serve as explanation. This universality is not the result, therefore, of thought. It is felt. She is not in logic, where everyone would or could reach consensus through long exposures or argumentative statements, but on the intuition that the same feeling I get before a work, any other would also. This universality is the subjectivity, but without falling into any subjectivity, that is, this subjectivity is not limited to individual tastes, private, but a feeling that, when it happens, it is assumed that everyone would.
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mu s kamatama. Kad smo se u prilogu predmeta za korištenje od strane privatnih interesa, povezani s nekom funkcijom ili dobitak koji oni predstavljaju, estetska presuda nije tvoj prostor. Ova igra je teško mašte - pokušajte zamisliti nešto da mi se dive, a mi nemamo interes! - Ali za Kanta, temeljno i njihove ideje o moralnim interesima pogrešno etičku kvalitetu naših akcija (to znači da je moralno djelovanje hvale se samo kada je nezainteresirano), zainteresirani u estetskom presude onemogućava slobodan pristup objekta. Ovaj objekt - objekt ili estetske ljepote - stražar s obećanjem gozba, užitak koji je ne samo senzualno, fizički, kao i na zadovoljstvo jede previše, na primjer. Nije ni intelektualno zadovoljstvo čitati dobru knjigu. To je zadovoljstvo što se dijeli, temelji se na "... univerzalne komunikacijske sposobnosti raspoloženi u zastupanju s obzirom da je kao subjektivno stanje presude okusa, mora biti kao temelj za nju, a kao posljedicu imati zadovoljstvo u objektu Zadovoljstvo mi je rezultat mentalne aktivnosti, u osjetljivom odnosu s objektom, koji sam slobodan, tj. nema praktične interese i koja ne vratiti ga razumijem intelektualno. To zadovoljstvo, iako je isto tako subjektivno razgovarao društva. To je zadovoljstvo u zajedničkom, samodopadnosti. Ova presuda od ljepote, osim što nesebično, ne zastupa koncept (racionalna, intelektualna). "Lijepo je ono što se svidi univerzalno bez koncepta" kaže Kant. Kako taj osjećaj nije vezan za presude znanja on nema pojma da vam izražava. Presuda od ukusa, koja proizlazi iz osjećaja lijepo ne može trpjeti pritiske i sistematizaciji theorization razuma. Oni pogrešno i čine nas odstupaju od užitka koji je obilježje osjetljivosti, a ne inteligencije. Ovaj jednoglasno presude okus nije, dakle, sporazum misli ili teoretska rasprava o ljepoti, ali za prosudbu ukusa, odnosno, osjećaj da kada bi, može naslutiti da je bilo koji drugi bi Isto tako. Estetski osjećaj je kao zajedničko svima, mogu se dijeliti i ugovori s čovječanstvom. Mora biti na razuman zadovoljstva, nesebično i bez racionalne koncept koji će poslužiti kao objašnjenje. Ova univerzalnost nije rezultat, dakle, misli. Ona se osjeća. Ona nije u logici, gdje bi svatko mogao postići konsenzus i kroz duge izloženosti ili argumentativnih izjavama, ali na intuiciju da je isti osjećaj sam dobiti prije posla, bilo koji drugi bi se također. Ova univerzalnost je subjektivitet, ali bez padanja u bilo subjektivnosti, koji je, to je subjektivnost nije ograničen na pojedinačne ukuse, privatne, ali osjećaj da, kad se to dogodi, pretpostavlja se da bi svi.