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sation. In this sense the images that make up the thought perceptions are "weak" because its intensity is not the same as printing. This is an extremely bold thesis. She denies much of the philosophical tradition that built concepts based on theories about the superiority of reason and universal judgments. As explained by Pliny J. Smith: Two arguments are offered in favor of the thesis that the prints are causes of ideas. The first begins in the Treaty with the review of the correspondence between simple ideas and impressions, and invokes the constant conjunction between them. As can not be imputed to chance this connection that remains constant in an infinite number of cases, the existence of a causal relationship is manifest and it only remains to determine what causes what. The second argument proceeds by way round, from the absence of impressions when you have a defective sense organs that prevents them from working. In blind or deaf, is not merely the absence of printing, as well as the corresponding idea. Thus, it is shown that no printing, there is no idea and, with the printing, the idea has corresponding ". Of Distinction between Knowledge and Probability David Hume distinguishes knowledge and probability. In understanding the "relations of ideas are dependent on their own ideas." For this relationship needs to change is an idea to change Hume gives the example of equality between the sum of the interior angles of a triangle and two right angles. While the idea of a triangle does not change, this equality is always checked. On the other hand, there is what Hume of probability , whose relationships are not the same knowledge. Probability is a concept that comes to relationships in fact, not reason. Unlike knowledge, which implies contradiction deny the relationship, the relationship is likely to deny a possibility. For Hume there are three relationships in probability: the identity, the situations in time and place, and causality. Regarding causation, Hume says it is a reasoning based on connections of cause and effect observed in the experiment. According to Hume, when we say that the fact that A caused B and there is no experience to sustain the relationship, it is arbitrary reasoning. In this sense, Hume criticizes those who resort to reason to clarify the origin of the idea of causality and thus believe that the relations of cause and effect may constitute objects of genuine knowledge. The reasoning of cause and effect is, in short, probable reasoning, whose foundation is only given in experience.
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nitarna. U tom smislu su slike koje čine misaone predodžbe su "slaba" jer je intenzitet nije isti kao i tisak. To je iznimno hrabar teza. Ona niječe velik dio filozofske tradicije koja je izgrađena na temelju pojmovi teorije o superiornosti razuma i univerzalnih presude. Kao što je objašnjeno od strane Plinija J. Smith: Dva argumenti se nudi u prilog tezi da su otisci su uzroci ideja. Prva počinje u Ugovoru s pregledom prepiske između jednostavnih ideja i impresija, a poziva se na stalnu spoj između njih. (...) Dok se ne mogu pripisati slučajno vezi da ostaje konstanta u beskonačnim brojem slučajeva, postojanje uzročne veze je očito i to samo ostaje utvrditi što uzrokuje što. (...) Drugi argument primici po obrnuto, od izostanka dojmova Kada imate neispravne osjetilnih organa koji ih sprečava da rade. U slijep ili gluh, nije samo odsutnost tisak, kao i odgovarajuća ideja. (...) Dakle, to je pokazala da nema ispisa, ne postoji ideja i, uz tisak, ideja ima odgovara ". razlikovanja između znanja i vjerojatnost David Hume razlikuje znanje i vjerojatnost. Znanje "odnosi ideje su ovisni o svojim idejama." Za taj odnos treba promijeniti je ideja za promjenu Hume navodi primjer jednakosti između zbroja unutarnjih kutova trokuta i dvije pod pravim kutom. Iako ideja o trokutu ne mijenja, ta jednakost uvijek provjeravaju. S druge strane, postoji vjerojatnost da Hume poziva, čiji odnosi nisu isto znanje. Vjerojatnost je koncept koji je riječ o vezama, u stvari, a ne razum. Za razliku od znanja, što podrazumijeva kontradikcije zanijekati odnos, odnos je vjerojatno da će uskratiti mogućnost. Za Hume postoje tri odnosa u vjerojatnosti: identitet, situacije u vremenu i prostoru, i uzročnost. Što se tiče uzročnosti, Hume kaže da je zaključivanje na temelju povezanosti uzroka i posljedice promatrana u eksperimentu. Prema Hume, kada kažemo da je činjenica da je uzrokovana B i nema iskustva održati odnos, to je proizvoljna obrazloženje. U tom smislu, Hume kritizira one koji pribjegavaju razlog razjasniti porijeklo ideje o uzročnosti i stoga vjerujem da su odnosi uzroka i posljedice mogu činiti objekte istinskog znanja. Obrazloženje uzroka i posljedice, u kratkom obrazloženju, vjerojatno, čiji temelj je samo dano u iskustvu.