<p>How kerberos key distribution protocol prevents replay attack ?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2011-04-25T00:41:04.467Z
http://users.tkk.fi/u/autikkan/kerberos/AIWSC03_kerberos_replay_attacks.pdf ?
Jukka Suomela
CC BY-SA 3.0
2011-04-25T20:11:41.467Z
should this be closed ? I don't know enough about the underlying topic to figure if it's out of scope or not.
Suresh Venkat
CC BY-SA 3.0
2011-04-26T02:30:44.717Z
(Possible places to consider from reposting it if it gets closed here are: Math.SE and Security.SE)
Kaveh
CC BY-SA 3.0
2011-04-29T13:52:13.303Z
In principle: By including a time-stamp in the initial encrypted message and requiring that the first response includes that time-stamp incremented by one (verifying that the client was able to decrypt the message). This assumes that clocks are kept fairly well synchronised, which is not valid for modern globally distributed systems.
Dave Clarke
<cr.crypto-security><cryptographic-attack>
How kerberos key distribution protocol prevents replay attack ?
Siddharth
# How kerberos key distribution protocol prevents replay attack ?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2011-04-24)

How kerberos key distribution protocol prevents replay attack ?

**Tags:** cr.crypto-security, cryptographic-attack

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: http://users.tkk.fi/u/autikkan/kerberos/AIWSC03_kerberos_replay_attacks.pdf ?  
> **username_2**: should this be closed ? I don't know enough about the underlying topic to figure if it's out of scope or not.  
> **username_3**: (Possible places to consider from reposting it if it gets closed here are: Math.SE and Security.SE)  
> **username_4**: In principle: By including a time-stamp in the initial encrypted message and requiring that the first response includes that time-stamp incremented by one (verifying that the client was able to decrypt the message). This assumes that clocks are kept fairly well synchronised, which is not valid for modern globally distributed systems.  

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## 0 answers

