<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Carruthers_(philosopher)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Peter Carruthers</a>  argues <a href="http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/The%20Fragmentation%20of%20Reasoning.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(2014)</a> that system 1 doesn't quite overlap with unconscious thinking:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>I shall argue that there is, indeed, a real, scientifically valid, distinction between a set of
  intuitive, unconsciously operating reasoning systems, on the one hand, and a reflective system
  whose operations are partly conscious, on the other. But I shall argue that this division fails to
  line up with many of the other properties generally associated with Systems 1 and 2. In
  particular, some intuitive systems can be slow, some can be controlled, and some can approach
  the highest normative standards; so the moniker «quick and dirty» is certainly inappropriate
  when applied to intuitive reasoning as such.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>And <a href="http://cms.unige.ch/fapse/EmotionLab/pdf/Coppin%20(2014).%20BBS.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Jonathan Evans (2014)</a>, a dual-process theorist but also strong critic of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconscious_thought_theory" rel="nofollow noreferrer">UTT</a>, writes:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>It is true
  that the distinction between conscious and nonconscious processing
  has been emphasised by some social psychologists (e.g.,
  Wilson 2002), but it is emphatically not the foundation for contemporary
  dual-process theories of reasoning and decision
  making. As a dual-process theorist, I have argued, in common
  with others, that the conscious/unconscious decision cannot be
  the basis for the dual-process distinction because it is too vague
  and fails to define the key central properties of dual processing
  (Evans &amp; Stanovich 2013). I should also point out that in spite
  of defending the validity of much of the research that N&amp;S criticise
  here, I have in common with them critiqued unconscious
  thinking theory and other strong assertions of the powers of intuition
  (see Evans 2010, Ch. 4). This is because dual-process theory
  confines powers of reflective reasoning – and with it the ability to
  deal with novel and difficult problems – to Type 2 processing.
  The case for dual process is in fact based not on the conscious/
  unconscious distinction but on the claim that there are two forms
  of cognitive processing which have distinctive properties and
  which reflect the operation of distinct cognitive and neural
  systems. Most of these properties are merely typical correlates,
  and few are defining features (Evans &amp; Stanovich 2013). I agree
  with Stanovich that Type 2 processing is distinguished both by
  its cognitive resources (central working memory, correlation
  with measures of cognitive capacity) and by its ability to engage
  in cognitive decoupling and hypothetical thinking. The apparent
  link of dual-process theory with consciousness comes only from
  the fact that some of the items attended in working memory are
  available to verbal report. But using broader definitions of consciousness,
  I have argued in detail that both Type 1 and Type 2
  thinking have aspects that are conscious as well as unconscious
  (Evans 2010, Ch. 7).
  In conclusion, not only do I reject the authors’ presumption of
  conscious decision making, which I believe to be shakily founded
  on folk psychology, but I also contest their implication that the
  conscious/unconscious distinction is the basis for contemporary
  theories of dual processing in higher cognition.</p>
</blockquote>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-29T02:41:51.510Z
2018-09-29T02:47:43.283Z
2018-09-29T02:47:43.283Z
got trolled too much this week
<p>Another classic distinction was given by Bargh in 1997 that helps show muddling (lack of clear overlap) between the dual-systems concept and how the unconscious is defined by psychologists: </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Unconscious cognition is more likely to be one or more: outside awareness, not intended, relatively fast, and difficult to control.</p>
  
  <p><a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1994-97751-001" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1994-97751-001</a></p>
</blockquote>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-10-03T15:18:30.667Z
2018-10-04T08:04:36.850Z
2018-10-04T08:04:36.850Z
Cameron Brick
<p>Research <a href="https://bigthink.com/errors-we-live-by/kahnemans-mind-clarifying-biases" rel="nofollow noreferrer">says</a> there is system 1 and 2 thinking. </p>

<p>My question is how is system and and 2 thinking related to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconscious_mind" rel="nofollow noreferrer">unconcious mind</a>?
Can we say for example system 1 thinking is unconcious mind?</p>

<cognitive-psychology><unconscious><thought><analysis><intuition>
System 1 and 2 thinking and unconcious
dave
# System 1 and 2 thinking and unconcious

(Asked by: username_0 on 2018-09-28)

Research [says](https://bigthink.com/errors-we-live-by/kahnemans-mind-clarifying-biases) there is system 1 and 2 thinking.

My question is how is system and and 2 thinking related to [unconcious mind](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconscious_mind)?
Can we say for example system 1 thinking is unconcious mind?

**Tags:** cognitive-psychology, unconscious, thought, analysis, intuition


---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2018-09-29. Score: 2

[Peter Carruthers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Carruthers_(philosopher)) argues [(2014)](http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/The%20Fragmentation%20of%20Reasoning.pdf) that system 1 doesn't quite overlap with unconscious thinking:

> I shall argue that there is, indeed, a real, scientifically valid, distinction between a set of
> intuitive, unconsciously operating reasoning systems, on the one hand, and a reflective system
> whose operations are partly conscious, on the other. But I shall argue that this division fails to
> line up with many of the other properties generally associated with Systems 1 and 2. In
> particular, some intuitive systems can be slow, some can be controlled, and some can approach
> the highest normative standards; so the moniker «quick and dirty» is certainly inappropriate
> when applied to intuitive reasoning as such.

And [Jonathan Evans (2014)](http://cms.unige.ch/fapse/EmotionLab/pdf/Coppin%20(2014).%20BBS.pdf), a dual-process theorist but also strong critic of [UTT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconscious_thought_theory), writes:

> It is true
> that the distinction between conscious and nonconscious processing
> has been emphasised by some social psychologists (e.g.,
> Wilson 2002), but it is emphatically not the foundation for contemporary
> dual-process theories of reasoning and decision
> making. As a dual-process theorist, I have argued, in common
> with others, that the conscious/unconscious decision cannot be
> the basis for the dual-process distinction because it is too vague
> and fails to define the key central properties of dual processing
> (Evans & Stanovich 2013). I should also point out that in spite
> of defending the validity of much of the research that N&S criticise
> here, I have in common with them critiqued unconscious
> thinking theory and other strong assertions of the powers of intuition
> (see Evans 2010, Ch. 4). This is because dual-process theory
> confines powers of reflective reasoning – and with it the ability to
> deal with novel and difficult problems – to Type 2 processing.
> The case for dual process is in fact based not on the conscious/
> unconscious distinction but on the claim that there are two forms
> of cognitive processing which have distinctive properties and
> which reflect the operation of distinct cognitive and neural
> systems. Most of these properties are merely typical correlates,
> and few are defining features (Evans & Stanovich 2013). I agree
> with Stanovich that Type 2 processing is distinguished both by
> its cognitive resources (central working memory, correlation
> with measures of cognitive capacity) and by its ability to engage
> in cognitive decoupling and hypothetical thinking. The apparent
> link of dual-process theory with consciousness comes only from
> the fact that some of the items attended in working memory are
> available to verbal report. But using broader definitions of consciousness,
> I have argued in detail that both Type 1 and Type 2
> thinking have aspects that are conscious as well as unconscious
> (Evans 2010, Ch. 7).
> In conclusion, not only do I reject the authors’ presumption of
> conscious decision making, which I believe to be shakily founded
> on folk psychology, but I also contest their implication that the
> conscious/unconscious distinction is the basis for contemporary
> theories of dual processing in higher cognition.


---

### Answer by username_2 on 2018-10-03. Score: 1

Another classic distinction was given by Bargh in 1997 that helps show muddling (lack of clear overlap) between the dual-systems concept and how the unconscious is defined by psychologists:

> Unconscious cognition is more likely to be one or more: outside awareness, not intended, relatively fast, and difficult to control.
>
> <http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1994-97751-001>


---

