<p>I suspect that the reason he considers it unmotivated is that he would like to see a theory that can explain the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness" rel="nofollow noreferrer">hard problem(s) of consciousness</a>.  In that final paragraph where he argues that the theory is unmotivated, he points out that (in his opinion) IIT seems to do nothing to explain why there is something <em>it is like</em> to be conscious from a subjective viewpoint (i.e., <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia" rel="nofollow noreferrer">qualia</a>).</p>

<p>My two cents is that I can see Searle's point; it is not clear how IIT would explain these aspects even if it is otherwise completely successful.  On the other hand, calling it "unmotivated" seems a bit unfair; perhaps it would still be useful for other purposes, for example judging whether patients in a hospital are (likely to be) conscious.  A more reasonable claim would be that it is not well motivated by trying to resolve the hard problems of consciousness, but may be well motivated by other goals.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-08-19T14:08:24.180Z
2018-08-19T14:08:24.180Z
present
<p>I'm trying to understand <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/03/07/can-photodiode-be-conscious/">Searle's reply to Tononi and Koch's objections</a> to Searle's characterization of their Intergrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness.</p>

<p>Although I do understand why IIT is problematic, both from <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;url=http://virgil.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/searle.pdf&amp;ved=0ahUKEwi2wvboo9PNAhVP92MKHVS5BI8QFggbMAA&amp;usg=AFQjCNEc0X7oXzOJ5BcDV1LkxJcgUEI-GA&amp;sig2=R9kGgMSHa8KX-n1kiVRjVA">Searle's original review</a> and from <a href="http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/thagard.two-theories.consc&amp;cog.2014.pdf">Thagard's alternative proposal</a>, I don't understand his reply.</p>

<p>Specifically, what does Searle mean by IIT being "unmotivated"? </p>

<consciousness><philosophy-of-mind><theory-of-mind>
Why is IIT "unmotivated"?
Seanny123
# Why is IIT "unmotivated"?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2016-07-01)

I'm trying to understand [Searle's reply to Tononi and Koch's objections](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/03/07/can-photodiode-be-conscious/) to Searle's characterization of their Intergrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness.

Although I do understand why IIT is problematic, both from [Searle's original review](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://virgil.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/searle.pdf&ved=0ahUKEwi2wvboo9PNAhVP92MKHVS5BI8QFggbMAA&usg=AFQjCNEc0X7oXzOJ5BcDV1LkxJcgUEI-GA&sig2=R9kGgMSHa8KX-n1kiVRjVA) and from [Thagard's alternative proposal](http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/thagard.two-theories.consc&cog.2014.pdf), I don't understand his reply.

Specifically, what does Searle mean by IIT being "unmotivated"?

**Tags:** consciousness, philosophy-of-mind, theory-of-mind


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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2018-08-19. Score: 2 | Accepted answer

I suspect that the reason he considers it unmotivated is that he would like to see a theory that can explain the [hard problem(s) of consciousness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness). In that final paragraph where he argues that the theory is unmotivated, he points out that (in his opinion) IIT seems to do nothing to explain why there is something *it is like* to be conscious from a subjective viewpoint (i.e., [qualia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia)).

My two cents is that I can see Searle's point; it is not clear how IIT would explain these aspects even if it is otherwise completely successful. On the other hand, calling it "unmotivated" seems a bit unfair; perhaps it would still be useful for other purposes, for example judging whether patients in a hospital are (likely to be) conscious. A more reasonable claim would be that it is not well motivated by trying to resolve the hard problems of consciousness, but may be well motivated by other goals.


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