<p>This is partially an aspect of the binding problem.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Sensory information arrives in parallel as a variety of heterogeneous hints, (shapes, colors, motions, smells and sounds) encoded in partly modular systems. Typically many objects are present at once. The result is an urgent case of what has been labelled the binding problem. We must collect the hints, bind them into the right spatial and temporal bundles, and then interpret them to specify their real world origins. (2003, 97)</p>
</blockquote>

<p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/attention/">http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/attention/</a></p>

<p>The bottom line is that our senses are integrated and some of our most important senses (smell, sight, hearing) all have their organs located very close together.  <a href="http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/352/1360/1411.short">Spatial perception is (at least partially) stored in the parietal lobes.</a> The parietal lobes integrate information from somatosensors like muscle spindles to relay the body's position in space as well as the eyes (and ears), which help form a perspective of the environment.</p>

<p>You might also consider Tononi's framework for consciousness: <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19098144">integrated information theory</a> which presumes:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>(i) the quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements; (ii) the quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex. Integrated information (Phi) is defined as the amount of information generated by a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts. Qualia space (Q) is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships among its elements generated by causal mechanisms (connections). Together, the set of informational relationships within a complex constitute a shape in Q that completely and univocally specifies a particular experience.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>I think the deeper question we need answered before we get to your specific question is "how does a subjective experience arise from matter in the first place?".  Other than that, your question is no different than "why did that rock not get this rock's blemish?".  It was mostly likely just a matter of chance in initial conditions.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-30T01:11:31.900Z
Thank you - I agree with your remark that the question is fundamentally about subjective experience arising from matter. I have edited the title accordingly.
w128
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-29T23:57:56.877Z
2014-08-30T00:07:21.513Z
2014-08-30T00:07:21.513Z
Keegan Keplinger
<blockquote>
  <p>what has always puzzled me is the neurobiological basis that gives
  rise to the phenomenon that we associate our bodies with ourselves –
  i.e., why does my brain think of my physical body as "me" and make me
  care for it? In other words, why is me me at this particular point in
  time and not some other body living e.g. centuries ago? Why do I not
  associate "me" with multiple bodies living at the same time, or have
  identity at all?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Because your brain is connected, via nerves, to your body, in both directions, sensory and motor. Every time your body's sensory apparati sense something, only your brain is alerted to this, and no other. Every time your brain activates its motor centers, it observes only your body moving as a result, and no other. And it constantly receives reinforcement of this tight mapping every waking moment of your life.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>What is the process that
  "picks" precisely my brain and my body to become "me" – why have I not
  sensed reality from the viewpoint of e.g. Albert Einstein or Brad
  Pitt?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Because your brain is not wired to the bodies of those people. If it were, you would. You would see through their eyes, like in <em>Being John Malkovich</em>. </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>I wonder if any empirical answers to such questions can be given, or
  at least if these questions have been reformulated to a set of more
  well-defined questions in the light of modern neuroscience.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>People have reported that their sense of the extent of their bodies can change depending on if they are using tools. The tips of the tools can seem to be part of them.  For example:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Neurophysiological evidence indicates that after repeatedly using a
  tool, changes in the body representation (of humans and trained
  monkeys) occur, and over time the tool is perceived as if being an
  integral part of the body. The phenomenon describing the extension of
  the body representation to include non-corporeal objects in the
  peripersonal space, such as tools or prosthetic devices, has been
  extensively reported in the literature
    (PDF of "Adaptive Body Schema for Robotic Tool-Use" found <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cota_Nabeshima/publication/220671553_Adaptive_body_schema_for_robotic_tool-use/links/09e415108684204ab1000000">here</a>.)</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The point is, one's body schema is flexible based on the nature of the inputs the brain receives. The map is plastic. But it also may shed light on your question, since it suggests that correlation of brain activity and body function is what gives rise to the matching between your body consciousness and your particular body.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>UPDATE: A better way to form this question would be: if two bodies
  come to exist at the same time, and consciousness is an emergent,
  materialistic phenomenon of the body, why do I experience the
  emergence of consciousness in one specific body (i.e. the one I call
  my own) and not in another?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Because consciousness of the body is not divorced from facts about the body; it is conscious <em>of</em> some body schema, and that requires "facts" in the cortex that register <em>your</em> body as the one it is conscious about.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-30T04:49:35.833Z
2014-08-30T04:49:35.833Z
Chelonian
<p>Forgive me for lacking rigor, but if what I know is correct, it is established that consciousness and other higher functions characteristic of humans are a consequence of our cortex, specifically neocortex. However, what has always puzzled me is the neurobiological basis that gives rise to the phenomenon that we associate our bodies with ourselves – i.e., why does my brain think of my physical body as "me" and make me care for it? In other words, why is me me at this particular point in time and not some other body living e.g. centuries ago? Why do I not associate "me" with multiple bodies living at the same time, or have identity at all? </p>

<p>A naive, materialist answer would perhaps be that given our nervous system etc., "me" is only a sort of an illusion created by the brain which acts as a kind of "least thinkable unit" that has no neural connections to other physical bodies. Still, <strong>what is the process that "picks" precisely my brain and my body to become "me"</strong> – why have I not sensed reality from the viewpoint of e.g. Albert Einstein or Brad Pitt?</p>

<p>I wonder if any empirical answers to such questions can be given, or at least if these questions have been reformulated to a set of more well-defined questions in the light of modern neuroscience.</p>

<hr>

<p><strong>UPDATE:</strong>
A better way to form this question would be: if two bodies come to exist at the same time, and consciousness is an emergent, materialistic phenomenon of the body, why do I experience the emergence of consciousness in one specific body (i.e. the one I call my own) and not in another?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-24T21:27:39.583Z
Surely it counts for something that my body now is the only one over which I have direct control and the only one from which I receive direct perceptual input. Why would you sense reality from the viewpoint of Einstein given the acknowledged physical disconnection? *How* would you?
Nick Stauner
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-24T21:35:23.410Z
You wouldn't, but how does a disconnect between Einstein and me even arise? Why is "I" an attribute of this volume of matter that is my body and not his? Suppose both of us would be born at exactly the same time (i.e. two bodies consisting of atoms, molecules etc. spawning at the same moment) - now why will one set of matter see the world as Einstein and the other set as me? That is to say, how is consciousness "assigned" to a specific body, if this is even the correct way to put it?
w128
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-24T21:41:15.097Z
Seems more straightforward to consider consciousness an emergent property of a body rather than a separate entity that is assigned to a body. The latter theory necessitates a lot of unscientific assumptions, whereas there's relatively little that needs assuming without evidence in the monist, materialist theory.
Nick Stauner
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-26T16:15:08.780Z
@NickStauner agreed, but the question still stands - why do I experience this emergence within some specific body?
w128
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-26T16:32:35.043Z
That's how emergence works: the property emerges as a new characteristic or function of a complex, organized system that is otherwise composed of simpler parts. I may not have a more satisfying answer than this, personally (that's partly why I'm just commenting)...I don't see how consciousness could emerge anywhere other than within the system upon which it depends.
Nick Stauner
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-26T17:17:26.943Z
I know, I understand the concept - but still, both systems (bodies) are subject to the same principles of emergence, so I could (I'm speculating, obviously) just as easily end up identifying with the other body, not with the one I actually do, if you consider both systems equal in physical terms. I'm interested in the nature of this distinction, i.e. why I experience reality from the viewpoint of one emergence instead of the other, if it could just as easily be the other way around...
w128
CC BY-SA 3.0
2014-08-26T17:34:04.423Z
They're really not *equal* though. Experiences are always different, to say nothing of innate individual differences. Each system's consciousness only has access to one set of experiences, one perspective. Were that different (e.g., if we ever manage to transmute consciousness into more directly shareable forms, as via brain-to-brain interfacing), I could imagine individual consciousnesses feeling a lot less rooted in specific bodies. At present, out-of-body experiences are rare and poorly understood, and any subset in which one inhabits another's body must be much more so.
Nick Stauner
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-10-08T19:05:37.080Z
The brain conditions consciousness but does not magically create it based on an arbitrary level of complexity. The "real" universe is all made of the same stuff wave/particles/qualia. Electric circuits firing in the brain create a binding for that temporary firing. Parts of the higher brain that are connected by chemical synapses don't bind in this manner which is why we aren't consciously aware of all the details of our subconscious when it generates a decision. The old-school portions of the brain didn't/don't have synaptic chemical junctions because they are too slow for these core reaction
user4163
<neuroscience><perception><consciousness><philosophy-of-mind>
How does subjective experience arise from matter?
w128
# How does subjective experience arise from matter?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2014-08-24)

Forgive me for lacking rigor, but if what I know is correct, it is established that consciousness and other higher functions characteristic of humans are a consequence of our cortex, specifically neocortex. However, what has always puzzled me is the neurobiological basis that gives rise to the phenomenon that we associate our bodies with ourselves – i.e., why does my brain think of my physical body as "me" and make me care for it? In other words, why is me me at this particular point in time and not some other body living e.g. centuries ago? Why do I not associate "me" with multiple bodies living at the same time, or have identity at all?

A naive, materialist answer would perhaps be that given our nervous system etc., "me" is only a sort of an illusion created by the brain which acts as a kind of "least thinkable unit" that has no neural connections to other physical bodies. Still, **what is the process that "picks" precisely my brain and my body to become "me"** – why have I not sensed reality from the viewpoint of e.g. Albert Einstein or Brad Pitt?

I wonder if any empirical answers to such questions can be given, or at least if these questions have been reformulated to a set of more well-defined questions in the light of modern neuroscience.

---

**UPDATE:**
A better way to form this question would be: if two bodies come to exist at the same time, and consciousness is an emergent, materialistic phenomenon of the body, why do I experience the emergence of consciousness in one specific body (i.e. the one I call my own) and not in another?

**Tags:** neuroscience, perception, consciousness, philosophy-of-mind

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Surely it counts for something that my body now is the only one over which I have direct control and the only one from which I receive direct perceptual input. Why would you sense reality from the viewpoint of Einstein given the acknowledged physical disconnection? *How* would you?  
> **username_0**: You wouldn't, but how does a disconnect between Einstein and me even arise? Why is "I" an attribute of this volume of matter that is my body and not his? Suppose both of us would be born at exactly the same time (i.e. two bodies consisting of atoms, molecules etc. spawning at the same moment) - now why will one set of matter see the world as Einstein and the other set as me? That is to say, how is consciousness "assigned" to a specific body, if this is even the correct way to put it?  
> **username_1**: Seems more straightforward to consider consciousness an emergent property of a body rather than a separate entity that is assigned to a body. The latter theory necessitates a lot of unscientific assumptions, whereas there's relatively little that needs assuming without evidence in the monist, materialist theory.  
> **username_0**: @NickStauner agreed, but the question still stands - why do I experience this emergence within some specific body?  
> **username_1**: That's how emergence works: the property emerges as a new characteristic or function of a complex, organized system that is otherwise composed of simpler parts. I may not have a more satisfying answer than this, personally (that's partly why I'm just commenting)...I don't see how consciousness could emerge anywhere other than within the system upon which it depends.  
> **username_0**: I know, I understand the concept - but still, both systems (bodies) are subject to the same principles of emergence, so I could (I'm speculating, obviously) just as easily end up identifying with the other body, not with the one I actually do, if you consider both systems equal in physical terms. I'm interested in the nature of this distinction, i.e. why I experience reality from the viewpoint of one emergence instead of the other, if it could just as easily be the other way around...  
> **username_1**: They're really not *equal* though. Experiences are always different, to say nothing of innate individual differences. Each system's consciousness only has access to one set of experiences, one perspective. Were that different (e.g., if we ever manage to transmute consciousness into more directly shareable forms, as via brain-to-brain interfacing), I could imagine individual consciousnesses feeling a lot less rooted in specific bodies. At present, out-of-body experiences are rare and poorly understood, and any subset in which one inhabits another's body must be much more so.  
> **username_2**: The brain conditions consciousness but does not magically create it based on an arbitrary level of complexity. The "real" universe is all made of the same stuff wave/particles/qualia. Electric circuits firing in the brain create a binding for that temporary firing. Parts of the higher brain that are connected by chemical synapses don't bind in this manner which is why we aren't consciously aware of all the details of our subconscious when it generates a decision. The old-school portions of the brain didn't/don't have synaptic chemical junctions because they are too slow for these core reaction  

---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_3 on 2014-08-29. Score: 7

This is partially an aspect of the binding problem.

> Sensory information arrives in parallel as a variety of heterogeneous hints, (shapes, colors, motions, smells and sounds) encoded in partly modular systems. Typically many objects are present at once. The result is an urgent case of what has been labelled the binding problem. We must collect the hints, bind them into the right spatial and temporal bundles, and then interpret them to specify their real world origins. (2003, 97)

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/attention/>

The bottom line is that our senses are integrated and some of our most important senses (smell, sight, hearing) all have their organs located very close together. [Spatial perception is (at least partially) stored in the parietal lobes.](http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/352/1360/1411.short) The parietal lobes integrate information from somatosensors like muscle spindles to relay the body's position in space as well as the eyes (and ears), which help form a perspective of the environment.

You might also consider Tononi's framework for consciousness: [integrated information theory](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19098144) which presumes:

> (i) the quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements; (ii) the quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex. Integrated information (Phi) is defined as the amount of information generated by a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts. Qualia space (Q) is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships among its elements generated by causal mechanisms (connections). Together, the set of informational relationships within a complex constitute a shape in Q that completely and univocally specifies a particular experience.

I think the deeper question we need answered before we get to your specific question is "how does a subjective experience arise from matter in the first place?". Other than that, your question is no different than "why did that rock not get this rock's blemish?". It was mostly likely just a matter of chance in initial conditions.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Thank you - I agree with your remark that the question is fundamentally about subjective experience arising from matter. I have edited the title accordingly.  

---

### Answer by username_4 on 2014-08-30. Score: 6

> what has always puzzled me is the neurobiological basis that gives
> rise to the phenomenon that we associate our bodies with ourselves –
> i.e., why does my brain think of my physical body as "me" and make me
> care for it? In other words, why is me me at this particular point in
> time and not some other body living e.g. centuries ago? Why do I not
> associate "me" with multiple bodies living at the same time, or have
> identity at all?

Because your brain is connected, via nerves, to your body, in both directions, sensory and motor. Every time your body's sensory apparati sense something, only your brain is alerted to this, and no other. Every time your brain activates its motor centers, it observes only your body moving as a result, and no other. And it constantly receives reinforcement of this tight mapping every waking moment of your life.

> What is the process that
> "picks" precisely my brain and my body to become "me" – why have I not
> sensed reality from the viewpoint of e.g. Albert Einstein or Brad
> Pitt?

Because your brain is not wired to the bodies of those people. If it were, you would. You would see through their eyes, like in *Being John Malkovich*.

> I wonder if any empirical answers to such questions can be given, or
> at least if these questions have been reformulated to a set of more
> well-defined questions in the light of modern neuroscience.

People have reported that their sense of the extent of their bodies can change depending on if they are using tools. The tips of the tools can seem to be part of them. For example:

> Neurophysiological evidence indicates that after repeatedly using a
> tool, changes in the body representation (of humans and trained
> monkeys) occur, and over time the tool is perceived as if being an
> integral part of the body. The phenomenon describing the extension of
> the body representation to include non-corporeal objects in the
> peripersonal space, such as tools or prosthetic devices, has been
> extensively reported in the literature
> (PDF of "Adaptive Body Schema for Robotic Tool-Use" found [here](http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cota_Nabeshima/publication/220671553_Adaptive_body_schema_for_robotic_tool-use/links/09e415108684204ab1000000).)

The point is, one's body schema is flexible based on the nature of the inputs the brain receives. The map is plastic. But it also may shed light on your question, since it suggests that correlation of brain activity and body function is what gives rise to the matching between your body consciousness and your particular body.

> UPDATE: A better way to form this question would be: if two bodies
> come to exist at the same time, and consciousness is an emergent,
> materialistic phenomenon of the body, why do I experience the
> emergence of consciousness in one specific body (i.e. the one I call
> my own) and not in another?

Because consciousness of the body is not divorced from facts about the body; it is conscious *of* some body schema, and that requires "facts" in the cortex that register *your* body as the one it is conscious about.


---

