<p>From p. 207 of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geoffrey_Miller_(psychologist)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Geoffrey Miller</a> (2001). The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Anchor Books. ISBN 0-385-49517-X</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In our research on mate search strategies, colleague Peter
  Todd and I found that a rule we call "Try a Dozen" performs as
  well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem" rel="nofollow noreferrer">37 percent rule</a> under a wide range of conditions. Try
  a Dozen is simple: interview a dozen possible mates, remember
  the best of them, and then pick the very next prospect who is
  even more attractive. You do not have to estimate the total
  number of potential mates you will encounter in your
  reproductive lifetime; you only have to bet that you will meet at
  least fifty or so. Humans seem to follow something like the Try a
  Dozen rule: we get to know a number of opposite-sex friends
  during adolescence, fall in love at least once, remember that
  loved one very clearly, and tend to marry the next person who
  seems even more attractive. Each individual is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satisficing" rel="nofollow noreferrer">"satisficing"</a>-
  looking for someone who is pretty good and good enough, rather
  than the absolute best they could possibly find. But at the
  evolutionary level, these satisficing rules impose sexual selection
  that is almost as strong as the most complicated, perfectionist
  decision strategy.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>I also turned up a 1998 review by Miller and Todd <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/95822/mate-choice-turns-cognitive.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">"Mate Choice Turn Cognitive"</a>, which does get to mating strategies in its final pages, best summarized by:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p><a href="https://i.sstatic.net/bpBxi.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.sstatic.net/bpBxi.png" alt="enter image description here"></a></p>
  
  <p>By sampling a much smaller number of
  prospects initially, say a dozen, one can actually attain a
  higher expected mate value than the 37% rule delivers (although
  a lower chance of finding the very highest-valued
  prospect), with much lower search costs and a much lower
  risk of being stuck with a low-value mate[64,65] (Fig. 3).<br>
  More importantly, the ‘secretary problem’ ignores the
  problem that a prospect you desire may reject you. This
  mutual choice constraint makes the search much harder[64,65].
  Game-theory models of ‘two-sided matching’ address these
  complexities[61] directly, and propose various search strategies
  which guarantee that a population reaches a ‘stable matching’:
  a pairwise assortment of individuals where no individual
  would prefer to be mated with someone else who would also
  prefer to be mated with them. However, two-sided matching
  models typically assume strict monogamy (no ‘extra-pair
  copulations’), complete information and exhaustive preferences:
  everyone has complete, consistent, transitive
  preferences across all possible prospects that they encounter.</p>
  
  <ul>
  <li><ol start="61">
  <li>Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M.A.O. (1990) Two-sided Matching: a Study
  in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press</li>
  </ol></li>
  <li><ol start="64">
  <li>Todd, P.M. (1997) Searching for the next best mate, in Simulating
  Social Phenomena (Conte, R., Hegselmann, R. and Terna, P., eds),
  pp. 419–436, Springer-Verlag</li>
  </ol></li>
  <li><ol start="65">
  <li>Todd, P.M. and Miller, G.F. Heuristics for mate search, in Simple
  Heuristics that Make us Smart (Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M. and the ABC
  Research Group), Oxford University Press (in press)</li>
  </ol></li>
  </ul>
</blockquote>

<p>So yeah, the problem is not that simple (as optimal stopping) if one considers mating a game (in the sense of game theory). I haven't yet looked at the latter line of research... but it's a whole book. The idea seems centered on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem" rel="nofollow noreferrer">stable marriage problem</a>. An optimal algorithm also involves a number of rounds, with rejection and "maybe" answers; from Wikipedia:</p>

<blockquote>
  <ul>
  <li>In the first round, first a) each unengaged man proposes to the woman he prefers most, and then b) each woman replies "maybe" to her suitor she most prefers and "no" to all other suitors. She is then provisionally "engaged" to the suitor she most prefers so far, and that suitor is likewise provisionally engaged to her.  </li>
  <li>In each subsequent round, first a) each unengaged man proposes to the most-preferred woman to whom he has not yet proposed (regardless of whether the woman is already engaged), and then b) each woman replies "maybe" if she is currently not engaged or if she prefers this guy over her current provisional partner (in this case, she rejects her current provisional partner who becomes unengaged). The provisional nature of engagements preserves the right of an already-engaged woman to "trade up" (and, in the process, to "jilt" her until-then partner).</li>
  <li>This process is repeated until everyone is engaged.</li>
  </ul>
</blockquote>

<p>So, Miller and Todd cleary don't think this stable marriage problem is too relevant for reality. Unfortunately, by the time of their review (which is now two decades old), there's wasn't much else proposed that was taking into account the mutual-choice aspect of mating and the "satisficing" nature of human choice in general (that Miller and Todd favor).</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T01:25:33.107Z
That's interesting. I mean the evidence is anecdotal. But it seems a plausible.  I'm not sure it explains how some get these dozen dates in the first place. Some people might struggle. It seems this is more from a male point of view. As in the man will marry the prettiest woman (that he has not been rejected by) that is more attractive than his highschool girlfriend.
zooby
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T01:27:04.370Z
@zooby: Looking more closely at Miller's Wikipedia page, some of his research appears controversial (never mind some of his less than scientific remarks). So keep that in mind. Also I found [a review](https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/95822/mate-choice-turns-cognitive.pdf) by Miller and Todd floaring around, probably has more details, but I'm not sure that's the primary research alluded to.
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T01:31:31.813Z
Also on the Secretary problem page the 1/e law looks interesting. Assuming a girl must marry before the age of 30 and starts looking at 18. The 1/e law says she shouldn't marry before the age of about 23. Interesting maths.
zooby
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T01:12:15.420Z
2018-07-22T02:07:14.023Z
2018-07-22T02:07:14.023Z
got trolled too much this week
<p>In theory, a female who is above average should reject most advances because she can afford to wait until they are approached by a male of high value. Whereas a female of low attractiveness cannot afford to reject most advances.</p>
<p>But how does a female gauge her own attractiveness in the first place?</p>
<p>What would make sense is that in the first few years of adult life a female should simply reject all advances. A process of simply collecting statistical data on her own attractiveness.</p>
<p>Then females who are approached at a low level during this period would become more easily approachable whereas females who are approached at a high level would become more stand-offish.</p>
<p>Does any of this correspond to reality?</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T00:41:37.100Z
The theory you propose (regarding rejecting some offers) actually exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem, but I haven't heard of anyone applying it to mating. Ok since according to that page it's also called "marriage problem", some probably did apply it but insofar I'm unfamiliar with that... and the wiki page doesn't get into who applied it to marriage/mating. The only reference there that mentions mating/marriage is Miller, Geoffrey F. (2001). The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Anchor Books. ISBN 0-385-49517-X.
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T01:05:47.677Z
n.b.: pages 206-208 in the book.
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-22T01:18:26.967Z
Yes, I seem to recall the example. I think it may apply somewhat. Since if a person reject all advances, say in the first year and then only accepts advances more attractive than that sample, this would correspond to the expected behaviour. It makes logical sense, but I wonder how it corresponds to reality? I mean gradually becoming less choosy with age combined with building a picture of relative self-worth.
zooby
<sexuality>
How does a female measure her own attractiveness?
zooby
# How does a female measure her own attractiveness?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2018-07-21)

In theory, a female who is above average should reject most advances because she can afford to wait until they are approached by a male of high value. Whereas a female of low attractiveness cannot afford to reject most advances.

But how does a female gauge her own attractiveness in the first place?

What would make sense is that in the first few years of adult life a female should simply reject all advances. A process of simply collecting statistical data on her own attractiveness.

Then females who are approached at a low level during this period would become more easily approachable whereas females who are approached at a high level would become more stand-offish.

Does any of this correspond to reality?

**Tags:** sexuality

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: The theory you propose (regarding rejecting some offers) actually exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem, but I haven't heard of anyone applying it to mating. Ok since according to that page it's also called "marriage problem", some probably did apply it but insofar I'm unfamiliar with that... and the wiki page doesn't get into who applied it to marriage/mating. The only reference there that mentions mating/marriage is Miller, Geoffrey F. (2001). The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Anchor Books. ISBN 0-385-49517-X.  
> **username_1**: n.b.: pages 206-208 in the book.  
> **username_0**: Yes, I seem to recall the example. I think it may apply somewhat. Since if a person reject all advances, say in the first year and then only accepts advances more attractive than that sample, this would correspond to the expected behaviour. It makes logical sense, but I wonder how it corresponds to reality? I mean gradually becoming less choosy with age combined with building a picture of relative self-worth.  

---

## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2018-07-22. Score: 4

From p. 207 of [Geoffrey Miller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geoffrey_Miller_(psychologist)) (2001). The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Anchor Books. ISBN 0-385-49517-X

> In our research on mate search strategies, colleague Peter
> Todd and I found that a rule we call "Try a Dozen" performs as
> well as the [37 percent rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem) under a wide range of conditions. Try
> a Dozen is simple: interview a dozen possible mates, remember
> the best of them, and then pick the very next prospect who is
> even more attractive. You do not have to estimate the total
> number of potential mates you will encounter in your
> reproductive lifetime; you only have to bet that you will meet at
> least fifty or so. Humans seem to follow something like the Try a
> Dozen rule: we get to know a number of opposite-sex friends
> during adolescence, fall in love at least once, remember that
> loved one very clearly, and tend to marry the next person who
> seems even more attractive. Each individual is ["satisficing"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satisficing)-
> looking for someone who is pretty good and good enough, rather
> than the absolute best they could possibly find. But at the
> evolutionary level, these satisficing rules impose sexual selection
> that is almost as strong as the most complicated, perfectionist
> decision strategy.

I also turned up a 1998 review by Miller and Todd ["Mate Choice Turn Cognitive"](https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/95822/mate-choice-turns-cognitive.pdf), which does get to mating strategies in its final pages, best summarized by:

> [![enter image description here](https://i.sstatic.net/bpBxi.png)](https://i.sstatic.net/bpBxi.png)
>
> By sampling a much smaller number of
> prospects initially, say a dozen, one can actually attain a
> higher expected mate value than the 37% rule delivers (although
> a lower chance of finding the very highest-valued
> prospect), with much lower search costs and a much lower
> risk of being stuck with a low-value mate[64,65] (Fig. 3).  
> More importantly, the ‘secretary problem’ ignores the
> problem that a prospect you desire may reject you. This
> mutual choice constraint makes the search much harder[64,65].
> Game-theory models of ‘two-sided matching’ address these
> complexities[61] directly, and propose various search strategies
> which guarantee that a population reaches a ‘stable matching’:
> a pairwise assortment of individuals where no individual
> would prefer to be mated with someone else who would also
> prefer to be mated with them. However, two-sided matching
> models typically assume strict monogamy (no ‘extra-pair
> copulations’), complete information and exhaustive preferences:
> everyone has complete, consistent, transitive
> preferences across all possible prospects that they encounter.
>
> * 61. Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M.A.O. (1990) Two-sided Matching: a Study
>       in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press
> * 64. Todd, P.M. (1997) Searching for the next best mate, in Simulating
>       Social Phenomena (Conte, R., Hegselmann, R. and Terna, P., eds),
>       pp. 419–436, Springer-Verlag
> * 65. Todd, P.M. and Miller, G.F. Heuristics for mate search, in Simple
>       Heuristics that Make us Smart (Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M. and the ABC
>       Research Group), Oxford University Press (in press)

So yeah, the problem is not that simple (as optimal stopping) if one considers mating a game (in the sense of game theory). I haven't yet looked at the latter line of research... but it's a whole book. The idea seems centered on the [stable marriage problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem). An optimal algorithm also involves a number of rounds, with rejection and "maybe" answers; from Wikipedia:

> * In the first round, first a) each unengaged man proposes to the woman he prefers most, and then b) each woman replies "maybe" to her suitor she most prefers and "no" to all other suitors. She is then provisionally "engaged" to the suitor she most prefers so far, and that suitor is likewise provisionally engaged to her.
> * In each subsequent round, first a) each unengaged man proposes to the most-preferred woman to whom he has not yet proposed (regardless of whether the woman is already engaged), and then b) each woman replies "maybe" if she is currently not engaged or if she prefers this guy over her current provisional partner (in this case, she rejects her current provisional partner who becomes unengaged). The provisional nature of engagements preserves the right of an already-engaged woman to "trade up" (and, in the process, to "jilt" her until-then partner).
> * This process is repeated until everyone is engaged.

So, Miller and Todd cleary don't think this stable marriage problem is too relevant for reality. Unfortunately, by the time of their review (which is now two decades old), there's wasn't much else proposed that was taking into account the mutual-choice aspect of mating and the "satisficing" nature of human choice in general (that Miller and Todd favor).

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: That's interesting. I mean the evidence is anecdotal. But it seems a plausible.  I'm not sure it explains how some get these dozen dates in the first place. Some people might struggle. It seems this is more from a male point of view. As in the man will marry the prettiest woman (that he has not been rejected by) that is more attractive than his highschool girlfriend.  
> **username_1**: @username_0: Looking more closely at Miller's Wikipedia page, some of his research appears controversial (never mind some of his less than scientific remarks). So keep that in mind. Also I found [a review](https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/95822/mate-choice-turns-cognitive.pdf) by Miller and Todd floaring around, probably has more details, but I'm not sure that's the primary research alluded to.  
> **username_0**: Also on the Secretary problem page the 1/e law looks interesting. Assuming a girl must marry before the age of 30 and starts looking at 18. The 1/e law says she shouldn't marry before the age of about 23. Interesting maths.  

---

