<p>This is hardly settled science, but <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4310722/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">one hypothesis</a> with some empirical support is that </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Visual mental imagery and perception share similar cortical representations (Cichy et al., 2012; Kosslyn, 2005; Pylyshyn, 2003). It has been proposed that, <strong>while brain forward connections convey information from the outside world, backward connections might have a dominant role during the forming of mental images in the absence of external bottom-up inputs</strong> (Ganis and Schendan, 2008; Ishai et al., 2000; Kalkstein et al., 2011; Kosslyn, 2005).</p>
</blockquote>

<p>For more theoretical speculation on the neural basis of qualia you could read <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2017.00022" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Orpwood (2017)</a>, although by his own admittance, his ideas (at least in the past) were not terribly clearly presented. He does discuss a theoretical example of olfactory qualia. (I'm mentioning this because you said in the comments that you want to go beyond visual ones.)</p>

<p>Also note that some neuroscientists <a href="https://thecentralsulcus.wordpress.com/2014/02/04/philosophers-corner-the-role-of-qualia-in-neuroscience/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">think</a> the problem of qualia is ill-posed, in that it is intrinsically dualist:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Typically, qualia are defined by four characteristics. Qualia are private, meaning they cannot be known unless they are experienced through the first-person perspective. Qualia are intrinsic, which indicates that they are self-sufficient and independent of other items in experience. Qualia are also ineffable, signifying that the experience of qualia cannot be sufficiently conveyed through words alone. Finally, qualia are immediately accessible through consciousness, which means that knowledge of qualia is direct and certain, as opposed to knowledge of the physical world, which is indirect and logically deduced.  [...]</p>
  
  <p>This definition, unfortunately, leads us down a murky path towards dualism, a philosophical position which asserts that there are two kinds of real substances: the physical substance out of which the universe is composed, and the non-physical substance out of which the mind is composed. </p>
</blockquote>

<p>Since you <a href="https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/20606/is-there-any-theory-explaining-differences-in-word-concept-understanding-among-d">asked</a> in the past about the private conceptions of word meanings (as a barrier to common sense), that kinda has the same problem.</p>

<p>If we just stick to qualia as brain processes/representation, regarding pain-related words, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0199658" rel="nofollow noreferrer">for example</a></p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Language is more than a mere medium when it comes to share our pain experiences. In fact, it has been shown that processing pain-related words is associated with enhanced activation of part of the neural circuitry underlying physical pain experiences. [citing four references in support]</p>
  
  <ul>
  <li><p>Richter M, Eck J, Straube T, Miltner WH, Weiss T. Do words hurt? Brain activation during the processing of pain-related words. Pain. 2010 Feb;148(2):198–205. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19846255" rel="nofollow noreferrer">pmid:19846255</a></p></li>
  <li><p>Richter M, Schroeter C, Puensch T, Straube T, Hecht H, Ritter A, et al. Pain-related and negative semantic priming enhances perceived pain 
  intensity. Pain Res Manag. 2014 Mar-Apr;19(2):69–74. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24716197" rel="nofollow noreferrer">pmid:24716197</a></p></li>
  <li><p>Gu X, Han S. Neural substrates underlying evaluation of pain in actions depicted in words. Behav Brain Res. 2007 Aug 6;181:218–23. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17512615" rel="nofollow noreferrer">pmid:17512615</a></p></li>
  <li><p>Osaka N, Osaka M, Morishita M, Kondo H, Fukuyama H. A word expressing affective pain activates the anterior cingulate cortex in the human brain: an fMRI study. Behav Brain Res. 2004 Aug 12;153:123–127. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15219713" rel="nofollow noreferrer">pmid:15219713</a></p></li>
  </ul>
</blockquote>

<p>I think this is somewhat analogous to the issue of V1 involvement in visual imagery.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:14:52.830Z
Note, I asked about imagery in general, I can imagine a smell of strawberry jam. Probably, this is beyond visual imagery. Maybe it involves Aristotelian common sense (which is a part of the brain under presupposition of materialism - a position held in science), which distinguishes between sounds and tastes, and visions, and so on.
rus9384
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:26:22.380Z
@rus9384; although I'm unaware of empirical evidence for this, I can imagine that imagining smells might involve a similar reversal but using the olfactory areas. Anyway, you bringing up common sense here kind indicates that you don't have a simple/single in question in mind. The latter issue is more closely related to another question of yours that was closed here: https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/20606/is-there-any-theory-explaining-differences-in-word-concept-understanding-among-d
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:36:45.587Z
Damn, SE needs a notification for closed questions. In either way, it's not simple, but it's single. Imagining words? Hm, sounds strange. But still, there must be a difference when I imagine red and when I imagine blue. So, presumably it is in visual cortex. But then what prevents my visual cortex from producing a new color?
rus9384
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:38:22.023Z
Regarding words, [for example](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0199658) "it has been shown that processing pain-related words is associated with enhanced activation of part of the neural circuitry underlying physical pain experiences".
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:46:15.350Z
In that question I meant how do people learn what is the meaning of words. And even more, why is the result of that learning differs in different individuals.
rus9384
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:49:44.103Z
If you want to read criticism of Aristole's conception of imagination see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/suppl4.html
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T19:42:39.370Z
The purpose of this is exactly to think that qualia are physical. That there are physical differences when I think of blue versus when I think of red. Then we could see of there are physical differences between different individuals when they try to imagine the same thing. I would not go beyond the scope of that, because everything further is very likely to be untestable.
rus9384
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T18:06:28.820Z
2018-09-23T19:57:26.713Z
2018-09-23T19:57:26.713Z
got trolled too much this week
<p>After reading a bit about qualia and hard problem of consiousness, I came up to theoretical solution. The reason why we have this problem is because we can imagine. We can imagine an object visible to us as red being green, for example. Green fire. Even if we never saw it in the reality.</p>

<p>But how do we imagine? How do those images have properties named by people as qualia? I can imagine a blue cube or a red cube, or a red sphere, and visual periphery is not involved here, I can do it with closed eyes.</p>

<p>What parts of our brain are responsible for imagination? How does the brain "give" qualia (form, color, smell, etc.) to images? What differs in my brain when I imagine a red cube from when I imagine a blue cube? And are qualia stored in our memory?</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-23T17:27:42.433Z
Related: https://psychology.stackexchange.com/q/18666/7001
Arnon Weinberg
<neuroscience><memory><philosophy-of-mind><qualia>
How do we imagine? How do images have qualia?
rus9384
# How do we imagine? How do images have qualia?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2018-09-23)

After reading a bit about qualia and hard problem of consiousness, I came up to theoretical solution. The reason why we have this problem is because we can imagine. We can imagine an object visible to us as red being green, for example. Green fire. Even if we never saw it in the reality.

But how do we imagine? How do those images have properties named by people as qualia? I can imagine a blue cube or a red cube, or a red sphere, and visual periphery is not involved here, I can do it with closed eyes.

What parts of our brain are responsible for imagination? How does the brain "give" qualia (form, color, smell, etc.) to images? What differs in my brain when I imagine a red cube from when I imagine a blue cube? And are qualia stored in our memory?

**Tags:** neuroscience, memory, philosophy-of-mind, qualia

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Related: https://psychology.stackexchange.com/q/18666/7001  

---

## 1 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2018-09-23. Score: 3

This is hardly settled science, but [one hypothesis](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4310722/) with some empirical support is that

> Visual mental imagery and perception share similar cortical representations (Cichy et al., 2012; Kosslyn, 2005; Pylyshyn, 2003). It has been proposed that, **while brain forward connections convey information from the outside world, backward connections might have a dominant role during the forming of mental images in the absence of external bottom-up inputs** (Ganis and Schendan, 2008; Ishai et al., 2000; Kalkstein et al., 2011; Kosslyn, 2005).

For more theoretical speculation on the neural basis of qualia you could read [Orpwood (2017)](https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2017.00022), although by his own admittance, his ideas (at least in the past) were not terribly clearly presented. He does discuss a theoretical example of olfactory qualia. (I'm mentioning this because you said in the comments that you want to go beyond visual ones.)

Also note that some neuroscientists [think](https://thecentralsulcus.wordpress.com/2014/02/04/philosophers-corner-the-role-of-qualia-in-neuroscience/) the problem of qualia is ill-posed, in that it is intrinsically dualist:

> Typically, qualia are defined by four characteristics. Qualia are private, meaning they cannot be known unless they are experienced through the first-person perspective. Qualia are intrinsic, which indicates that they are self-sufficient and independent of other items in experience. Qualia are also ineffable, signifying that the experience of qualia cannot be sufficiently conveyed through words alone. Finally, qualia are immediately accessible through consciousness, which means that knowledge of qualia is direct and certain, as opposed to knowledge of the physical world, which is indirect and logically deduced. [...]
>
> This definition, unfortunately, leads us down a murky path towards dualism, a philosophical position which asserts that there are two kinds of real substances: the physical substance out of which the universe is composed, and the non-physical substance out of which the mind is composed.

Since you [asked](https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/20606/is-there-any-theory-explaining-differences-in-word-concept-understanding-among-d) in the past about the private conceptions of word meanings (as a barrier to common sense), that kinda has the same problem.

If we just stick to qualia as brain processes/representation, regarding pain-related words, [for example](https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0199658)

> Language is more than a mere medium when it comes to share our pain experiences. In fact, it has been shown that processing pain-related words is associated with enhanced activation of part of the neural circuitry underlying physical pain experiences. [citing four references in support]
>
> * Richter M, Eck J, Straube T, Miltner WH, Weiss T. Do words hurt? Brain activation during the processing of pain-related words. Pain. 2010 Feb;148(2):198–205. [pmid:19846255](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19846255)
> * Richter M, Schroeter C, Puensch T, Straube T, Hecht H, Ritter A, et al. Pain-related and negative semantic priming enhances perceived pain
>   intensity. Pain Res Manag. 2014 Mar-Apr;19(2):69–74. [pmid:24716197](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24716197)
> * Gu X, Han S. Neural substrates underlying evaluation of pain in actions depicted in words. Behav Brain Res. 2007 Aug 6;181:218–23. [pmid:17512615](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17512615)
> * Osaka N, Osaka M, Morishita M, Kondo H, Fukuyama H. A word expressing affective pain activates the anterior cingulate cortex in the human brain: an fMRI study. Behav Brain Res. 2004 Aug 12;153:123–127. [pmid:15219713](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15219713)

I think this is somewhat analogous to the issue of V1 involvement in visual imagery.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Note, I asked about imagery in general, I can imagine a smell of strawberry jam. Probably, this is beyond visual imagery. Maybe it involves Aristotelian common sense (which is a part of the brain under presupposition of materialism - a position held in science), which distinguishes between sounds and tastes, and visions, and so on.  
> **username_2**: @username_0; although I'm unaware of empirical evidence for this, I can imagine that imagining smells might involve a similar reversal but using the olfactory areas. Anyway, you bringing up common sense here kind indicates that you don't have a simple/single in question in mind. The latter issue is more closely related to another question of yours that was closed here: https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/20606/is-there-any-theory-explaining-differences-in-word-concept-understanding-among-d  
> **username_0**: Damn, SE needs a notification for closed questions. In either way, it's not simple, but it's single. Imagining words? Hm, sounds strange. But still, there must be a difference when I imagine red and when I imagine blue. So, presumably it is in visual cortex. But then what prevents my visual cortex from producing a new color?  
> **username_2**: Regarding words, [for example](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0199658) "it has been shown that processing pain-related words is associated with enhanced activation of part of the neural circuitry underlying physical pain experiences".  
> **username_0**: In that question I meant how do people learn what is the meaning of words. And even more, why is the result of that learning differs in different individuals.  
> **username_2**: If you want to read criticism of Aristole's conception of imagination see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/suppl4.html  
> **username_0**: The purpose of this is exactly to think that qualia are physical. That there are physical differences when I think of blue versus when I think of red. Then we could see of there are physical differences between different individuals when they try to imagine the same thing. I would not go beyond the scope of that, because everything further is very likely to be untestable.  

---

