<p>From what I remember from this field, there's a long-standing debate on whether heuristics are &quot;irrational&quot;/&quot;suboptimal&quot; between D. Kahneman and G. Gigerenzer. The Gigerenzer's point of view has been well put in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerd_Gigerenzer" rel="nofollow noreferrer">wiki</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Gigerenzer argues that heuristics are not irrational or always second-best to optimization, as the accuracy-effort trade-off view assumes, in which heuristics are seen as short-cuts that trade less effort for less accuracy. In contrast, his and associated researchers' studies have identified situations in which &quot;less is more&quot;, that is, where heuristics make more accurate decisions with less effort. This contradicts the traditional view that more information is always better or at least can never hurt if it is free. Less-is-more effects have been shown experimentally, analytically, and by computer simulations</p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to this view, people are not &quot;cognitive misers&quot; - they are just smart.
See this chapter, for some introduction (you can find it online through <a href="https://scholar.google.ru/scholar?cluster=12839413198512892145&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=0,5&amp;as_vis=1" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Google Scholar</a>):</p>
<p>Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Tools of Bounded Rationality. In Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp. 62–88). doi:10.1002/9780470752937.ch4</p>
<p>PS. I haven't followed the debate for some time, so maybe now Kahneman and Gigerenzer have changed their view or came to some agreement.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2018-01-06T13:10:46.523Z
The war was surely going on as of 2014: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/jun/01/nudge-economics-freakonomics-daniel-kahneman-debunked
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 3.0
2018-01-06T13:18:11.420Z
Which is even covered here: https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/8225/what-differences-of-opinion-led-to-the-kahneman-gigerenzer-feud
got trolled too much this week
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-07-02T10:33:14.440Z
2015-07-02T13:55:01.510Z
2020-06-17T09:55:31.633Z
Andrey Chetverikov
<p>In addition to @UmerVakil's great answer that general preference for system 1 thinking is often associated with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_miser" rel="nofollow">mental effort minimization</a>, I'd like to add that the more modern view is that people switch back and forth (sometimes called "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivated_tactician" rel="nofollow">motivated tactician</a>") for a variety of possible reasons, so the idea that people might learn to be cognitively "lazy" is not really the prevailing view.  Additionally, I think that Kahneman's comment may be more focused on reasons for individual differences in thinking styles rather than general preference.</p>

<p>System 1 and 2 are part of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_process_theory" rel="nofollow">dual process theory</a>, which is actually a conglomerate of subtly different theories with some commonalities (a great review <a href="http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629" rel="nofollow">here</a>).  As each individual theory has its own approach and measurement tools, this question is probably far too broad to adequately cover here, but a couple of interesting examples might suffice.</p>

<p>Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) is one example of a dual-process theory where significant research has been done on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive-Experiential_Self-Theory#Individual_Difference_in_Thinking_Styles" rel="nofollow">individual differences in thinking styles</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Indeed, reliable individual differences in preference for thinking
  styles consistently emerge from studies that use these assessments.
  What's more, individual differences in preference for a particular
  thinking style, as assessed by the REI, has been associated with a
  number of meaningful life outcomes. A preference for rational thought
  shows a number of beneficial associations. Increased academic
  achievement (GRE scores and grade-point average), self-esteem,
  openness to experience, and conscientiousness and decreased levels of
  depression and state-trait anxiety have all been associated with Need
  for Cognition. Higher levels of Faith in Intuition have more
  mixed results. Creativity, spontaneity, emotional expression,
  agreeableness, extroversion, and positive interpersonal relationships
  have all been associated with a preference for experiential
  processing. However, it has also been linked with authoritarianism,
  superstitious beliefs, and stereotypical thinking. Sex and age
  differences in thinking styles have also been found.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>As you asked about a learning component to such preferences, I should mention that studies that compare these particular thinking styles typically prompt subjects to switch back and forth as needed by the experiment by ... asking them.  The simplicity of this method belies a learning component.  A few years ago, a couple of <a href="http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-critical-thinkers-lose-faith-god/" rel="nofollow">highly publicized studies</a> demonstrated how even more subtle prompting (using words, imagery,and even different fonts!) can have an effect on system 1 and 2 thinking preferences - the researchers were able to temporarily affect religious belief by prompting analytical thinking.  It is theorized that perhaps culture plays an important role in thinking style preference: Religious people may prefer a heuristic thinking style that is more socially acceptable (less likely to result in conflict), while disbelievers have a preference for critical thinking and are less concerned with social acceptance.  Establishing cause-and-effect is a challenge, so these types of studies are important in demonstrating the role of prompting in the environment in affecting thinking preference.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-07-02T04:09:16.647Z
Very interesting.  I think your post perhaps supports my impression that Kahneman's theory is lacking some refinement.  But I still have to finish reading it, so we'll see!
mrt
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-07-01T20:19:03.457Z
2015-07-01T20:19:03.457Z
Arnon Weinberg
<p>Yes, if I understood your question correctly, there is a great deal of research in Social Psychology about humans being "cognitive misers". In layman's terms, it means that humans find mental effort aversive and hence tend to rely on heuristics, categories or mental shortcuts while making judgements or while making decisions.</p>

<p>The theory comes within the domain of Social Cognition, and it was first introduced by social psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor. It challenges the assumption in traditional economics that holds consumers as rational decision makers, and as a consequence this theory has been <a href="http://soco.uni-koeln.de/docs/Crusius_van_Horen_Mussweiler_2012_JEP.pdf" rel="nofollow">influential in behavioral economics</a>. Kahneman and Tversky's work on documenting human biases can be understood simply as an extension of human's inherent limitations in cognitive processing.</p>

<p>This theory is very useful in political science, where voter decisions are studied. Furthermore, it also explains social phenomenon such as stereotyping.</p>

<p><strong>Sources:</strong>  </p>

<p>Fiske, S.T., &amp; Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0070211914.</p>

<p>Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases". Science 185 (4157): 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124. PMID 17835457.</p>

<p>Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., &amp; Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energy-saving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 37–47. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.66.1.37</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-07-02T15:57:16.417Z
Another relevant paper: [Shah & Oppenheimer (2008) "Heuristic Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction Framework"](http://web.princeton.edu/sites/opplab/papers/hme.pdf)
Jeff
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-07-01T15:18:43.567Z
2015-07-02T19:27:32.817Z
2015-07-02T19:27:32.817Z
Vakalate
<p>I was reading Danny K's recent book for fun (<em>Thinking Fast and Slow</em>, 2011), and he suggests briefly that some people's reliance on their intuitions (i.e., "System 1") might sometimes indicate a sort of aversion to cognitive effort (i.e., "System 2").  </p>

<p>For example, if you give a participant "Joe" a tricky problem that has an intuitive but false answer, Joe might not think too hard about the question, so he'll just give his (false) intuition.  In this case, Joe does not attempt elaborative processing or sustained cognitive effort (i.e., engaging System 2) because he has learned that this can be unpleasant and/or tiring.  Thus he relies on his intuition and gets the question wrong.</p>

<p>While there are probably many alternative explanations for Joe's behavior, it seems that aversion to mental effort could be one.  Is there any research exploring this idea? Or any research that frames it in another way (e.g., something to do with affective forecasting, learning, self-regulation)? Or am I totally making this up?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-07-01T15:10:26.243Z
This is not aversion but lack of training.
Andrewski
<cognitive-psychology>
Research on aversion to cognitive effort?
mrt
# Research on aversion to cognitive effort?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2015-07-01)

I was reading Danny K's recent book for fun (*Thinking Fast and Slow*, 2011), and he suggests briefly that some people's reliance on their intuitions (i.e., "System 1") might sometimes indicate a sort of aversion to cognitive effort (i.e., "System 2").

For example, if you give a participant "Joe" a tricky problem that has an intuitive but false answer, Joe might not think too hard about the question, so he'll just give his (false) intuition. In this case, Joe does not attempt elaborative processing or sustained cognitive effort (i.e., engaging System 2) because he has learned that this can be unpleasant and/or tiring. Thus he relies on his intuition and gets the question wrong.

While there are probably many alternative explanations for Joe's behavior, it seems that aversion to mental effort could be one. Is there any research exploring this idea? Or any research that frames it in another way (e.g., something to do with affective forecasting, learning, self-regulation)? Or am I totally making this up?

**Tags:** cognitive-psychology

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: This is not aversion but lack of training.  

---

## 3 answers

### Answer by username_5 on 2015-07-01. Score: 9 | Accepted answer

Yes, if I understood your question correctly, there is a great deal of research in Social Psychology about humans being "cognitive misers". In layman's terms, it means that humans find mental effort aversive and hence tend to rely on heuristics, categories or mental shortcuts while making judgements or while making decisions.

The theory comes within the domain of Social Cognition, and it was first introduced by social psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor. It challenges the assumption in traditional economics that holds consumers as rational decision makers, and as a consequence this theory has been [influential in behavioral economics](http://soco.uni-koeln.de/docs/Crusius_van_Horen_Mussweiler_2012_JEP.pdf). Kahneman and Tversky's work on documenting human biases can be understood simply as an extension of human's inherent limitations in cognitive processing.

This theory is very useful in political science, where voter decisions are studied. Furthermore, it also explains social phenomenon such as stereotyping.

**Sources:**

Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0070211914.

Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases". Science 185 (4157): 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124. PMID 17835457.

Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energy-saving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 37–47. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.66.1.37

> **Comments:**
> **username_6**: Another relevant paper: [Shah & Oppenheimer (2008) "Heuristic Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction Framework"](http://web.princeton.edu/sites/opplab/papers/hme.pdf)  

---

### Answer by username_2 on 2015-07-02. Score: 5

From what I remember from this field, there's a long-standing debate on whether heuristics are "irrational"/"suboptimal" between D. Kahneman and G. Gigerenzer. The Gigerenzer's point of view has been well put in the [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerd_Gigerenzer):

> Gigerenzer argues that heuristics are not irrational or always second-best to optimization, as the accuracy-effort trade-off view assumes, in which heuristics are seen as short-cuts that trade less effort for less accuracy. In contrast, his and associated researchers' studies have identified situations in which "less is more", that is, where heuristics make more accurate decisions with less effort. This contradicts the traditional view that more information is always better or at least can never hurt if it is free. Less-is-more effects have been shown experimentally, analytically, and by computer simulations

According to this view, people are not "cognitive misers" - they are just smart.
See this chapter, for some introduction (you can find it online through [Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.ru/scholar?cluster=12839413198512892145&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_vis=1)):

Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Tools of Bounded Rationality. In Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp. 62–88). doi:10.1002/9780470752937.ch4

PS. I haven't followed the debate for some time, so maybe now Kahneman and Gigerenzer have changed their view or came to some agreement.

> **Comments:**
> **username_3**: The war was surely going on as of 2014: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/jun/01/nudge-economics-freakonomics-daniel-kahneman-debunked  
> **username_3**: Which is even covered here: https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/8225/what-differences-of-opinion-led-to-the-kahneman-gigerenzer-feud  

---

### Answer by username_4 on 2015-07-01. Score: 4

In addition to @UmerVakil's great answer that general preference for system 1 thinking is often associated with [mental effort minimization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_miser), I'd like to add that the more modern view is that people switch back and forth (sometimes called "[motivated tactician](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivated_tactician)") for a variety of possible reasons, so the idea that people might learn to be cognitively "lazy" is not really the prevailing view. Additionally, I think that Kahneman's comment may be more focused on reasons for individual differences in thinking styles rather than general preference.

System 1 and 2 are part of [dual process theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_process_theory), which is actually a conglomerate of subtly different theories with some commonalities (a great review [here](http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629)). As each individual theory has its own approach and measurement tools, this question is probably far too broad to adequately cover here, but a couple of interesting examples might suffice.

Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) is one example of a dual-process theory where significant research has been done on [individual differences in thinking styles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive-Experiential_Self-Theory#Individual_Difference_in_Thinking_Styles):

> Indeed, reliable individual differences in preference for thinking
> styles consistently emerge from studies that use these assessments.
> What's more, individual differences in preference for a particular
> thinking style, as assessed by the REI, has been associated with a
> number of meaningful life outcomes. A preference for rational thought
> shows a number of beneficial associations. Increased academic
> achievement (GRE scores and grade-point average), self-esteem,
> openness to experience, and conscientiousness and decreased levels of
> depression and state-trait anxiety have all been associated with Need
> for Cognition. Higher levels of Faith in Intuition have more
> mixed results. Creativity, spontaneity, emotional expression,
> agreeableness, extroversion, and positive interpersonal relationships
> have all been associated with a preference for experiential
> processing. However, it has also been linked with authoritarianism,
> superstitious beliefs, and stereotypical thinking. Sex and age
> differences in thinking styles have also been found.

As you asked about a learning component to such preferences, I should mention that studies that compare these particular thinking styles typically prompt subjects to switch back and forth as needed by the experiment by ... asking them. The simplicity of this method belies a learning component. A few years ago, a couple of [highly publicized studies](http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-critical-thinkers-lose-faith-god/) demonstrated how even more subtle prompting (using words, imagery,and even different fonts!) can have an effect on system 1 and 2 thinking preferences - the researchers were able to temporarily affect religious belief by prompting analytical thinking. It is theorized that perhaps culture plays an important role in thinking style preference: Religious people may prefer a heuristic thinking style that is more socially acceptable (less likely to result in conflict), while disbelievers have a preference for critical thinking and are less concerned with social acceptance. Establishing cause-and-effect is a challenge, so these types of studies are important in demonstrating the role of prompting in the environment in affecting thinking preference.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Very interesting.  I think your post perhaps supports my impression that Kahneman's theory is lacking some refinement.  But I still have to finish reading it, so we'll see!  

---

