<p>At some level, it's true that psychology reduces to biology and chemistry. If it didn't, then the widely-accepted view of physicialism/materialism would be wrong. But just because psychology can (in theory) be reduced to biochemistry, reductionism may not be the most productive way to approach the problem, for a couple of reasons:</p>

<ol>
<li><p>The causes of psychological phenomena are likely to require such complex interactions at the level of biochemistry, that by the time you get around to explaining these interactions you're basically back at the level of describing the problem in terms of psychological constructs. Imagine trying to describe something like earthquakes using only concepts from quantum physics. It's theoretically possible, but not productive.</p></li>
<li><p>Psychological phenomena may have multiple ways of being instantiated. This is called multiple realizability. The key insight here is that two people may have thought processes that are very similar at a psychological level, but might be instantiated in different ways at a neural level. In such a case, the most productive way to describe the phenomena would probably be at the psychological level, since this is where the commonalities exist. </p></li>
</ol>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-14T05:03:46.833Z
Can an 'ongoing' set of psychological states that are 'self-repeating' in some way , or are cyclic actively 're-wire' a so-called 'hardwired' set of 'set-up' cognitive behaviors ?
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-15T07:00:22.573Z
Why is it widely accepted that the physicalism/ materialism model is correct concerning the mind-brain? If human behavior was just reducible to biology and chemistry then all celibrated psychological theories are just so much hot air.
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-15T16:36:48.267Z
The point of my answer was to show that even though psychology could reduce to biochemistry, it's probably not productive to try and characterize psychological phenomena just in terms of biochemisty. Psychology is describing very complex interactions at the biochemical level, and it is a more productive scientific endeavor to try and describe the system in terms of psychological principles than in terms of biochemistry. Psychological theories are still very useful because they describe important aspects of a physical system.
Josh
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-15T16:37:21.233Z
As for why materialism is generally accepted as correct, this question has some useful answers: [http://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/1498/is-there-evidence-that-brain-and-mind-are-separate](http://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/1498/is-there-evidence-that-brain-and-mind-are-separate).
Josh
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-15T16:43:56.513Z
But how can the mind and brain be separate if all human behavior is reducible to biology and chemicals there is no mind at all. We are just biochemical 'mechanisms'.
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-15T16:51:47.107Z
The psychological behavior described above is emergent complexes of behavior some of which may not be reducible to only chemical reactions. I don't think chemical reaction which obey the laws of physics and are somewhat predictable can account for erratic choices in a person's behavior. If robots where complex enough they could be capable of complicated interactions and a 'robot psychiatrist could make complex theories about their behavior.
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-15T17:46:51.733Z
The mind and brain are not generally believed to be separate. Your robot example is great illustration of why it is useful to have multiple levels of analysis. The robot's behavior could be reduced to electro-mechanical interactions, but given a complex enough system, it might also be useful to talk about the behavior at a more psychological level.
Josh
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-04-27T13:18:30.117Z
What then is a psychological principle? Is it just an emergent 'label' for a whole set of complex interacting biochemical principles? If someone is told about a psychological idea about how to manage some behavioral symptoms or processes one want's to 'control' is the idea just a set of words that are supposed to cause all sorts of biochemical changes and processes that might help manage the problem? So at the 'level' of ideas and words these are just 'placeholders' for the underlying  biochemical interactions and management.
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-04-27T14:55:26.063Z
@201044 In the sense that "engineering" is just a placeholder for the underlying quantum mechanical interactions and management of "bridge" systems.
Christian Hummeluhr
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-04-28T21:12:15.347Z
So as an 'emergent' information 'placeholder' these placeholders have no actual 'content' themselves. Only the underlying biochemical reactions can represent any information content that is being 'manipulated' or managed. So ,again all the 'verbal context' of psychology has no meaning except for the represented biochemical reactions and processes 'being carried out' in the 'brain'.
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-03T13:32:55.503Z
Could't a 'psychiatrist' instead of saying to a patient ' you have to manage these levels of delusions and paranoia at certain situations ' , he might say you should take 'such-and-such' a chemical mixture in pill form to cause an increase in certain biochemicals or neuro-transmitters in your brain that will dampen certain emergent behaviour that is 'labelled' dellusions and paranoia.
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-04T07:38:57.373Z
It's a common sentiment that psychotherapy takes years of visits yet certain pills can take affect almost immediately. So other than reporting how one is responding to the medicine what's the point of all the 'psychological talk'?
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-04T13:48:42.527Z
One point of my answer was to emphasize that psychological descriptions are still useful, *despite* the possibility of reductionism. As for mental health applications: we know relatively very little about the connection between biochemistry and thought, so it's not surprising that we can't every psychological disorder by prescribing a pill. It may also be that we never will be able to do this for some psychological disorders, given the enormous (and currently mysterious) complexity of the biochemistry that results in thought.
Josh
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-05T16:44:10.467Z
'we know relitively little about the connection between biochemistry and thought ..' so could it be we are not just biochemical interaction processing mechanisms ; that we can change certain biochemical process by the 'content' of our thinking. We can indirectly rewrite certain biochemical 'algorithms' by the content of one's thoughts?
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-05T16:59:15.057Z
If we accept that thoughts are biochemical interactions at some level of description, then your situation is basicaly asking if we can change biochemical processes with other biochemical processes. This comment thread is not the right forum to have an extended conversation though. Feel free to stop by chat, or post a new question.
Josh
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-13T03:44:51.443Z
BUT what if thought processes are not just 'other biochemical processes' at 'some level of description? Thought processes not only involve  underlying chemical processes , when one manipulates and manages 'ideas' ; but the variability of thought processes and how they can be combined and recombined involve analysis of patterns and 'meta-patterns' with such ever changing complexity that I don't think just biochemical interactions could handle this..
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-02-15T03:37:14.143Z
'Biochemical interaction processing mechanisms' sounds a lot like biochemical automatons where any 'motive' for some type of behaviour is irrelevant and is just actions and reactions of biochemical events. And the only way to 'regulate' such activity is with chemicals.  Talking about supposed emergent operational control ability using ones mind is useless..
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-02-21T08:38:47.287Z
Can certain thoughts occur that 'call for' certain biochemical activity that is not presently being 'required' by just-previous occurring and 'related' or 'physiologically connected' biochemical activity? If so this would imply one's emergent level of biochemical control can actually control some of the on-going biochemical reactions in a way that is not primarily 'ordered' by the laws of physics and chemistry. Note , this would not violate any laws of physics ; the thought 'ordering certain actions , these actions would still follow normal physics laws..
201044
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-10T02:38:11.920Z
2015-02-10T02:38:11.920Z
Josh
<p>Are all psychological problems only biochemical in nature or do some 'mental' components ( that is some form of conceptual 'conditioning' caused directly or indirectly or 'subconsciously' by the person involved), does this effect the development of an 'abnormal' behavioral pattern. If the 'mind-brain' is really just a 'biochemical' behavioral algorithm management mechanism then this would imply all 'mental' disorders are just biochemical mismanagement problems. So are all psychological problems only biochemical problems?</p>

<cognitive-psychology><abnormal-psychology><philosophy-of-mind>
Are all psychological problems only biochemical in nature?
201044
# Are all psychological problems only biochemical in nature?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2015-02-08)

Are all psychological problems only biochemical in nature or do some 'mental' components ( that is some form of conceptual 'conditioning' caused directly or indirectly or 'subconsciously' by the person involved), does this effect the development of an 'abnormal' behavioral pattern. If the 'mind-brain' is really just a 'biochemical' behavioral algorithm management mechanism then this would imply all 'mental' disorders are just biochemical mismanagement problems. So are all psychological problems only biochemical problems?

**Tags:** cognitive-psychology, abnormal-psychology, philosophy-of-mind


---

## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2015-02-10. Score: 7 | Accepted answer

At some level, it's true that psychology reduces to biology and chemistry. If it didn't, then the widely-accepted view of physicialism/materialism would be wrong. But just because psychology can (in theory) be reduced to biochemistry, reductionism may not be the most productive way to approach the problem, for a couple of reasons:

1. The causes of psychological phenomena are likely to require such complex interactions at the level of biochemistry, that by the time you get around to explaining these interactions you're basically back at the level of describing the problem in terms of psychological constructs. Imagine trying to describe something like earthquakes using only concepts from quantum physics. It's theoretically possible, but not productive.
2. Psychological phenomena may have multiple ways of being instantiated. This is called multiple realizability. The key insight here is that two people may have thought processes that are very similar at a psychological level, but might be instantiated in different ways at a neural level. In such a case, the most productive way to describe the phenomena would probably be at the psychological level, since this is where the commonalities exist.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Can an 'ongoing' set of psychological states that are 'self-repeating' in some way , or are cyclic actively 're-wire' a so-called 'hardwired' set of 'set-up' cognitive behaviors ?  
> **username_0**: Why is it widely accepted that the physicalism/ materialism model is correct concerning the mind-brain? If human behavior was just reducible to biology and chemistry then all celibrated psychological theories are just so much hot air.  
> **username_1**: The point of my answer was to show that even though psychology could reduce to biochemistry, it's probably not productive to try and characterize psychological phenomena just in terms of biochemisty. Psychology is describing very complex interactions at the biochemical level, and it is a more productive scientific endeavor to try and describe the system in terms of psychological principles than in terms of biochemistry. Psychological theories are still very useful because they describe important aspects of a physical system.  
> **username_1**: As for why materialism is generally accepted as correct, this question has some useful answers: [http://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/1498/is-there-evidence-that-brain-and-mind-are-separate](http://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/1498/is-there-evidence-that-brain-and-mind-are-separate).  
> **username_0**: But how can the mind and brain be separate if all human behavior is reducible to biology and chemicals there is no mind at all. We are just biochemical 'mechanisms'.  
> **username_0**: The psychological behavior described above is emergent complexes of behavior some of which may not be reducible to only chemical reactions. I don't think chemical reaction which obey the laws of physics and are somewhat predictable can account for erratic choices in a person's behavior. If robots where complex enough they could be capable of complicated interactions and a 'robot psychiatrist could make complex theories about their behavior.  
> **username_1**: The mind and brain are not generally believed to be separate. Your robot example is great illustration of why it is useful to have multiple levels of analysis. The robot's behavior could be reduced to electro-mechanical interactions, but given a complex enough system, it might also be useful to talk about the behavior at a more psychological level.  
> **username_0**: What then is a psychological principle? Is it just an emergent 'label' for a whole set of complex interacting biochemical principles? If someone is told about a psychological idea about how to manage some behavioral symptoms or processes one want's to 'control' is the idea just a set of words that are supposed to cause all sorts of biochemical changes and processes that might help manage the problem? So at the 'level' of ideas and words these are just 'placeholders' for the underlying  biochemical interactions and management.  
> **username_2**: @username_0 In the sense that "engineering" is just a placeholder for the underlying quantum mechanical interactions and management of "bridge" systems.  
> **username_0**: So as an 'emergent' information 'placeholder' these placeholders have no actual 'content' themselves. Only the underlying biochemical reactions can represent any information content that is being 'manipulated' or managed. So ,again all the 'verbal context' of psychology has no meaning except for the represented biochemical reactions and processes 'being carried out' in the 'brain'.  
> **username_0**: Could't a 'psychiatrist' instead of saying to a patient ' you have to manage these levels of delusions and paranoia at certain situations ' , he might say you should take 'such-and-such' a chemical mixture in pill form to cause an increase in certain biochemicals or neuro-transmitters in your brain that will dampen certain emergent behaviour that is 'labelled' dellusions and paranoia.  
> **username_0**: It's a common sentiment that psychotherapy takes years of visits yet certain pills can take affect almost immediately. So other than reporting how one is responding to the medicine what's the point of all the 'psychological talk'?  
> **username_1**: One point of my answer was to emphasize that psychological descriptions are still useful, *despite* the possibility of reductionism. As for mental health applications: we know relatively very little about the connection between biochemistry and thought, so it's not surprising that we can't every psychological disorder by prescribing a pill. It may also be that we never will be able to do this for some psychological disorders, given the enormous (and currently mysterious) complexity of the biochemistry that results in thought.  
> **username_0**: 'we know relitively little about the connection between biochemistry and thought ..' so could it be we are not just biochemical interaction processing mechanisms ; that we can change certain biochemical process by the 'content' of our thinking. We can indirectly rewrite certain biochemical 'algorithms' by the content of one's thoughts?  
> **username_1**: If we accept that thoughts are biochemical interactions at some level of description, then your situation is basicaly asking if we can change biochemical processes with other biochemical processes. This comment thread is not the right forum to have an extended conversation though. Feel free to stop by chat, or post a new question.  
> **username_0**: BUT what if thought processes are not just 'other biochemical processes' at 'some level of description? Thought processes not only involve  underlying chemical processes , when one manipulates and manages 'ideas' ; but the variability of thought processes and how they can be combined and recombined involve analysis of patterns and 'meta-patterns' with such ever changing complexity that I don't think just biochemical interactions could handle this..  
> **username_0**: 'Biochemical interaction processing mechanisms' sounds a lot like biochemical automatons where any 'motive' for some type of behaviour is irrelevant and is just actions and reactions of biochemical events. And the only way to 'regulate' such activity is with chemicals.  Talking about supposed emergent operational control ability using ones mind is useless..  
> **username_0**: Can certain thoughts occur that 'call for' certain biochemical activity that is not presently being 'required' by just-previous occurring and 'related' or 'physiologically connected' biochemical activity? If so this would imply one's emergent level of biochemical control can actually control some of the on-going biochemical reactions in a way that is not primarily 'ordered' by the laws of physics and chemistry. Note , this would not violate any laws of physics ; the thought 'ordering certain actions , these actions would still follow normal physics laws..  

---

