<p>Popular philosopher <em>Frederich Wilhelm Nietzsche</em> hypothesized and theorized that there are two core <strong>languages</strong> of moralities, rather than 'morality'. These languages are the master morality, and the slave morality. One is based on the competitive expansion of willing energy and exploitation of weaker, vulnerable men, and the other is an inversion that relies on routinely compassion and benevolence. Neither of these languages are superior than each other, but that is not the point I'm trying to discuss.</p>
<p>The topic I am questioning is: <strong>Has any modern neuroscientific analysis refuted or supported that humans who <em>[exploit weaker, vulnerable members of their own species]</em> formulate <em>'moral'</em> circuits <em>centered around such exploitation?</em></strong> Is master morality really a morality neuroscientifically? If past documents of ancient societies can reveal <em>ethical</em> codes of virtue based upon values that are now deemed a <em>vice</em> in modern civilization, does this reflect neuroscience to begin with?</p>
<p>Note that beyond a paper from 1995 which attempts to use experiments to attack Nietzsche's critique of altruism, which isn't exactly professionally laid out, I haven't seen any real scientific documents that confirms or debunks Nietzsche's understanding of human behavior. Nietzsche as a figure worthy of scientific valuation seems to be left alone, and science is not usually in the philosopher's scope due to it's 'ascetic' properties, but I would still like to know if any attempts have been done.</p>
<p>Additionally, to describe Nietzsche in modern science would require a reconsideration of his works. For example, his metaphorical comparison of master morality with lions, eagles, etc. attribute antisocial behavior in humans to the behavior of the typical predatory animal. This is a bit of a misnomer, since those animals predate on members of a species <em>different</em> from their own, whereas antisocial behavior relates to <em>intra-species predation</em>, something that is much more difficult to analyze and comprehend, and even then, most cases of describing antisocials as &quot;intra-species predators&quot; seem to be more emotional than biological.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-09-01T15:29:09.230Z
It's unclear to me how one would detect a *moral* circuit neuroscientifically besides by label. That is, nothing measured from the brain is going to give you morality; you might measure something and say "oh, the things that influence this circuit fall in a group of things we call 'morality'" but not vice-versa.
Bryan Krause
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-09-02T02:31:49.560Z
I'm also rather confused about what this question is about...  If Nietzsche hypothesized about *languages* then why would this be evaluated by looking for *circuits*?  Also, what are circuits?  Do you mean like [neural circuits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_circuit)?  I don't think so, because these would never be "moral".  Maybe references to the original text outlining the theory in question would help...
Arnon Weinberg
<cognitive-psychology><cognitive-neuroscience><abnormal-psychology><philosophy-of-mind><moral-psychology>
Has neuroscience yet proved that antisocial humans think in terms of anything resembling moral circuitry when targeting their victims?
Jackson
# Has neuroscience yet proved that antisocial humans think in terms of anything resembling moral circuitry when targeting their victims?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2022-09-01)

Popular philosopher *Frederich Wilhelm Nietzsche* hypothesized and theorized that there are two core **languages** of moralities, rather than 'morality'. These languages are the master morality, and the slave morality. One is based on the competitive expansion of willing energy and exploitation of weaker, vulnerable men, and the other is an inversion that relies on routinely compassion and benevolence. Neither of these languages are superior than each other, but that is not the point I'm trying to discuss.

The topic I am questioning is: **Has any modern neuroscientific analysis refuted or supported that humans who *[exploit weaker, vulnerable members of their own species]* formulate *'moral'* circuits *centered around such exploitation?*** Is master morality really a morality neuroscientifically? If past documents of ancient societies can reveal *ethical* codes of virtue based upon values that are now deemed a *vice* in modern civilization, does this reflect neuroscience to begin with?

Note that beyond a paper from 1995 which attempts to use experiments to attack Nietzsche's critique of altruism, which isn't exactly professionally laid out, I haven't seen any real scientific documents that confirms or debunks Nietzsche's understanding of human behavior. Nietzsche as a figure worthy of scientific valuation seems to be left alone, and science is not usually in the philosopher's scope due to it's 'ascetic' properties, but I would still like to know if any attempts have been done.

Additionally, to describe Nietzsche in modern science would require a reconsideration of his works. For example, his metaphorical comparison of master morality with lions, eagles, etc. attribute antisocial behavior in humans to the behavior of the typical predatory animal. This is a bit of a misnomer, since those animals predate on members of a species *different* from their own, whereas antisocial behavior relates to *intra-species predation*, something that is much more difficult to analyze and comprehend, and even then, most cases of describing antisocials as "intra-species predators" seem to be more emotional than biological.

**Tags:** cognitive-psychology, cognitive-neuroscience, abnormal-psychology, philosophy-of-mind, moral-psychology

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: It's unclear to me how one would detect a *moral* circuit neuroscientifically besides by label. That is, nothing measured from the brain is going to give you morality; you might measure something and say "oh, the things that influence this circuit fall in a group of things we call 'morality'" but not vice-versa.  
> **username_2**: I'm also rather confused about what this question is about...  If Nietzsche hypothesized about *languages* then why would this be evaluated by looking for *circuits*?  Also, what are circuits?  Do you mean like [neural circuits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_circuit)?  I don't think so, because these would never be "moral".  Maybe references to the original text outlining the theory in question would help...  

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## 0 answers

