<p>With regards to the answer posted by @sandygautman in the question <a href="https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/2047/do-feelings-have-a-purpose">Do feelings have a purpose</a>:</p>

<p>Let me first state that I don't have a problem with either the question nor the answer; I'm only looking for some clarification.  </p>

<p>From the answer:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>If fear circuit is activated, the organism exhibits a flight-fight-freeze response. Conscious feeling of fear may or may not be involved, but physiological changes like activation of sympathetic system happens. If the unconscious fear circuit is OK to keep us out of harm's way (predators) <strong>why do we also need to feel fearful</strong>? A related meta question is, if a zombie behaving like me, but having no qualia, can and will succeed similar to me, why have consciousness?</p>
  
  <p>I'll address the questions, but first let me solidify the claim that unconscious processes are sufficient for most adaptive regulations. Consider your example of heat/cold as thermo-regulation of body temperature...<strong>but do you really need to 'feel' heat/cold for that</strong>. Consider when you are sound asleep- you still unconsciously cover with blanket or throw away blanket depending on how sweaty/ cold you are- you dont need to consciously register that. <strong>So thermo-regulation, like other adaptive actions of affects, can happen in absence of accompanying felt feelings</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(emphasis mine)</p>

<p><strong>What evidence do we have for a separation between the processing of a stimulus and the experience of a stimulus?</strong>
  That is, what evidence is there to indicate that what we experience is NOT the body processing the stimulus?<br>
For example, what evidence is there that the experience of cold when jumping into a lake is different than the body processing the temperature difference (and processing related tasks such as thermo-regulation, etc)?</p>

<p>My assumption has been that the only difference between 'feeling' something or not 'feeling' something has been attention; that doesn't mean the 'feeling' isn't there, but that it is literally not being processed by the conscious/attentive part of the brain.    That is, instead of saying   </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>So thermo-regulation, like other adaptive actions of affects, can happen in absence of accompanying felt feelings</p>
</blockquote>

<p>it would be more correct to say:  </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>So thermo-regulation, like other adaptive actions of affects, can happen in absence of <em>consciousness of or attention to the thermo-regulation process</em> </p>
</blockquote>

<hr>

<p>I'm concerned that this question is unclear, but I have to leave my computer for a while, so please let me know if you have any confusion and I will attempt to clarify.</p>

<hr>

<p>Related: <a href="https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/2048/how-are-qualia-localized-in-consciousness">How are qualia localized in consciousness?</a></p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-01-06T08:09:40.650Z
Certainly many processes happen in the brain that are not consciously perceived, but there's little evidence to suggest conscious perception can happen without neural correlates.  There's certainly a lack of information about particular correlates, but this doesn't prove the negative.  Unfortunately... you can never prove a negative.  All you can do is demonstrate a lack of evidence over and over again.  Instead, we generally find evidence if we dig deep enough.
Keegan Keplinger
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-01-06T16:36:59.843Z
Yeah, I realized I was asking someone to prove a negative not long after posting.  On the other hand, I see so much hoopla about 'qualia', when the most fitting explanation that I can put together is that they're artifacts of scope (from a psychology or philosophy that has little basis in neuroscience).
BenCole
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-01T07:45:57.560Z
@BenCole Can you clarify what would constitute evidence for a separation between the processing of a stimulus and the experience of a stimulus? It's not clear how this would be distinguished in the literature. It seems to me that experience and processing are not different phenomena, but different levels of analysis.
Christian Hummeluhr
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-02T00:13:51.333Z
@ChristianHummeluhr This is my understanding as well. The question was more asking to provide evidence to the contrary; which, as Xurtio noted above, is a non-starter.
BenCole
<consciousness>
Evidence that qualia are not the same as physical processes?
BenCole
# Evidence that qualia are not the same as physical processes?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2013-01-04)

With regards to the answer posted by @sandygautman in the question [Do feelings have a purpose](https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/2047/do-feelings-have-a-purpose):

Let me first state that I don't have a problem with either the question nor the answer; I'm only looking for some clarification.

From the answer:

> If fear circuit is activated, the organism exhibits a flight-fight-freeze response. Conscious feeling of fear may or may not be involved, but physiological changes like activation of sympathetic system happens. If the unconscious fear circuit is OK to keep us out of harm's way (predators) **why do we also need to feel fearful**? A related meta question is, if a zombie behaving like me, but having no qualia, can and will succeed similar to me, why have consciousness?
>
> I'll address the questions, but first let me solidify the claim that unconscious processes are sufficient for most adaptive regulations. Consider your example of heat/cold as thermo-regulation of body temperature...**but do you really need to 'feel' heat/cold for that**. Consider when you are sound asleep- you still unconsciously cover with blanket or throw away blanket depending on how sweaty/ cold you are- you dont need to consciously register that. **So thermo-regulation, like other adaptive actions of affects, can happen in absence of accompanying felt feelings**.

(emphasis mine)

**What evidence do we have for a separation between the processing of a stimulus and the experience of a stimulus?**
That is, what evidence is there to indicate that what we experience is NOT the body processing the stimulus?  
For example, what evidence is there that the experience of cold when jumping into a lake is different than the body processing the temperature difference (and processing related tasks such as thermo-regulation, etc)?

My assumption has been that the only difference between 'feeling' something or not 'feeling' something has been attention; that doesn't mean the 'feeling' isn't there, but that it is literally not being processed by the conscious/attentive part of the brain. That is, instead of saying

> So thermo-regulation, like other adaptive actions of affects, can happen in absence of accompanying felt feelings

it would be more correct to say:

> So thermo-regulation, like other adaptive actions of affects, can happen in absence of *consciousness of or attention to the thermo-regulation process*

---

I'm concerned that this question is unclear, but I have to leave my computer for a while, so please let me know if you have any confusion and I will attempt to clarify.

---

Related: [How are qualia localized in consciousness?](https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/questions/2048/how-are-qualia-localized-in-consciousness)

**Tags:** consciousness

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Certainly many processes happen in the brain that are not consciously perceived, but there's little evidence to suggest conscious perception can happen without neural correlates.  There's certainly a lack of information about particular correlates, but this doesn't prove the negative.  Unfortunately... you can never prove a negative.  All you can do is demonstrate a lack of evidence over and over again.  Instead, we generally find evidence if we dig deep enough.  
> **username_0**: Yeah, I realized I was asking someone to prove a negative not long after posting.  On the other hand, I see so much hoopla about 'qualia', when the most fitting explanation that I can put together is that they're artifacts of scope (from a psychology or philosophy that has little basis in neuroscience).  
> **username_2**: @username_0 Can you clarify what would constitute evidence for a separation between the processing of a stimulus and the experience of a stimulus? It's not clear how this would be distinguished in the literature. It seems to me that experience and processing are not different phenomena, but different levels of analysis.  
> **username_0**: @ChristianHummeluhr This is my understanding as well. The question was more asking to provide evidence to the contrary; which, as Xurtio noted above, is a non-starter.  

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## 0 answers

