<p>The question seems to ask for reviews; well, a Google Scholar search on... </p>

<blockquote>
  <p><strong>one-shot + game + review</strong>  </p>
</blockquote>

<p>...yields:</p>

<ul>
<li>Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811177?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(Alessina, 1988)</a>  </li>
<li>Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221706007806" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(Nagarajan &amp; Sošić, 2008)</a></li>
<li>Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580905001668" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(Hagen &amp; Hammerstein, 2006)</a></li>
<li>Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519311003171" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(Archettia &amp; Scheuring, 2012)</a></li>
</ul>

<p>...among a host of other hits (65k+), so enough out there!</p>

<p>The <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580905001668" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Hagen &amp; Hammerstein (2006)</a> provides a critical review that seems to be matching your 'bonus' question (you're going to upvote my answer twice? :-)</p>

<p><sub><strong>References</strong><br>
<strong>-</strong> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811177?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Alessina, <em>American Econom Rev</em> (1988); <strong>78</strong>(4): 796-805</a><br>
<strong>-</strong> <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519311003171" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Archettia &amp; Scheuring, <em>J Theor Biol</em> (2012); <strong>299</strong> (2012); 9-20</a><br>
<strong>-</strong> <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580905001668" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Hagen &amp; Hammerstein, <em>Theor Pop Biol</em> (2006); <strong>69</strong>(3): 339-48</a><br>
<strong>-</strong> <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221706007806" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Nagarajan &amp; Sošić, <em>Eur J Operat Res</em> (2008); <strong>187</strong>(3): 719-45</a></sub></p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-07-05T09:39:24.803Z
2018-07-05T13:03:55.973Z
2018-07-05T13:03:55.973Z
AliceD
<h3>Background</h3>
<p>A <strong>one-shot game</strong> is one where two participants have some set of actions <span class="math-container">$\{1, ... , n\}$</span>, they make their decision on which option to take (without knowing the decision of their partner, or in sequence depending on game). Based on the action <span class="math-container">$i$</span> of the first player and <span class="math-container">$j$</span> of the second player, they receive some reward (or punishment) <span class="math-container">$G(i,j)$</span>. The participants never play again, and are made aware of this before the interaction happens. There is no communication allowed between the participants except making their action choice.</p>
<p>The game is <strong>perfect information</strong> if the participants are made aware of all possible outcomes of the game ahead of time (they are shown and explained the payoff matrix <span class="math-container">$G$</span> at least implicitly). The final result depends solely on the mutual decision of the players. From the perspective of the participant, there is no hidden state or chance apart in the action of the opponent.</p>
<h3>Question</h3>
<p>Game theory makes predictions on how rational players will behave in such settings. The fun part of psychology is that <strong>humans often don't follow these predictions</strong>. They cooperate more than they should in Prisoner's dillema (PD), <a href="https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/q/251/29">violate the sure-thing principle</a> in turn-based PD (Shafir &amp; Tversky, 1992), reject unfair offers in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game" rel="noreferrer">ultimatum game</a> (Guth et al., 1982), vary across cultures in their propensity to punish in public goods games (Herrmann, et al. 2008), and many other things that game theory doesn't predict.</p>
<p>The experimental literature is vast and divided between anthropology, economics, psychology, and law (just sampling from my own library). <strong>Is there a reliable current or canonical survey/summary/meta-analysis of well-controlled laboratory based experiments of human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games?</strong></p>
<h3>Notes</h3>
<ul>
<li><p>I prefer artificial well-controlled experiments with a large number of participants over natural or in-the-field experiments.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The previous point means that I am alright with data just from WEIRD participants, <a href="http://egtheory.wordpress.com/2013/03/17/cultural-fairness/" rel="noreferrer">even for games where cultural variation is known to be significant</a>. However, discussions of known cross-cultural effects is welcome.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Bonus if the summary looks at many different games in very similar experimental setting, and shows games where there is both agreement and disagreement from game-theoretic predictions.</p>
</li>
<li><p>I am not interested in papers about a single experiments, unless you want to provide a detailed survey of many such papers, their results, and methodology in your answer.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3>References</h3>
<p>Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., &amp; Schwarze, B. (1982) <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0167268182900117" rel="noreferrer">An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining</a>. <em>Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization</em> 3(4): 367-388.</p>
<p>Herrmann, B., Thoni, C., &amp; Gachter, S. (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. <em>Science</em> 319(5868): 1362-1367.</p>
<p>Shafir, E., &amp; Tversky, A. (1992). Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice. <em>Cognitive Psychology</em> 24:449-474.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-06-01T05:59:50.440Z
What's your question? The biggest problem with the participants in game theory is the lack of trust that's created by unequal positions. For participants to go through with their role/play, there must be trust among the players or there's more to lose than the situation they're in now. Too often ppl assume that a participant in a game isn't participating in other games simultaneously. That's where predicting outcome relies heavily on intel.
Den Activist
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-06-01T11:46:51.770Z
I do not think a well-controlled laboratory experiment was ever deemed necessary. The level of abstraction game theory implies makes laboratory social or sociological experiments futile if at all possible. The best route of testing this are real-life experiments made by companies who applied these theories and are financially successful, like, most probably, Amazon for example. Now, finding out which concepts and calculations were applied where is something else. Some may guess based on data available, but they will definitely not make the answers available without compensation. My two cents.
OMan
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-06-01T21:14:32.633Z
Thank you for the feedback @OMan, I am not asking about game theory in general, but in particular about surveys on one-shot perfect-information games. These are not particularly relevant to Amazon or corporations. Studies on one-shot perfect information games definitely exist, as I am aware of a number of them and reference a few in the question itself. What I am looking for is if there is a single survey or meta-analysis that has brought all (or much) of this work together (since it is distributed over many fields and thus difficult to track on your own).
Artem Kaznatcheev
<reference-request><experimental-psychology><rationality><game-theory><meta-analysis>
Human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games
Artem Kaznatcheev
# Human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games

(Asked by: username_0 on 2012-08-16)

### Background

A **one-shot game** is one where two participants have some set of actions $\{1, ... , n\}$, they make their decision on which option to take (without knowing the decision of their partner, or in sequence depending on game). Based on the action $i$ of the first player and $j$ of the second player, they receive some reward (or punishment) $G(i,j)$. The participants never play again, and are made aware of this before the interaction happens. There is no communication allowed between the participants except making their action choice.

The game is **perfect information** if the participants are made aware of all possible outcomes of the game ahead of time (they are shown and explained the payoff matrix $G$ at least implicitly). The final result depends solely on the mutual decision of the players. From the perspective of the participant, there is no hidden state or chance apart in the action of the opponent.

### Question

Game theory makes predictions on how rational players will behave in such settings. The fun part of psychology is that **humans often don't follow these predictions**. They cooperate more than they should in Prisoner's dillema (PD), [violate the sure-thing principle](https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/q/251/29) in turn-based PD (Shafir & Tversky, 1992), reject unfair offers in [ultimatum game](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game) (Guth et al., 1982), vary across cultures in their propensity to punish in public goods games (Herrmann, et al. 2008), and many other things that game theory doesn't predict.

The experimental literature is vast and divided between anthropology, economics, psychology, and law (just sampling from my own library). **Is there a reliable current or canonical survey/summary/meta-analysis of well-controlled laboratory based experiments of human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games?**

### Notes

* I prefer artificial well-controlled experiments with a large number of participants over natural or in-the-field experiments.
* The previous point means that I am alright with data just from WEIRD participants, [even for games where cultural variation is known to be significant](http://egtheory.wordpress.com/2013/03/17/cultural-fairness/). However, discussions of known cross-cultural effects is welcome.
* Bonus if the summary looks at many different games in very similar experimental setting, and shows games where there is both agreement and disagreement from game-theoretic predictions.
* I am not interested in papers about a single experiments, unless you want to provide a detailed survey of many such papers, their results, and methodology in your answer.

### References

Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) [An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0167268182900117). *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 3(4): 367-388.

Herrmann, B., Thoni, C., & Gachter, S. (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. *Science* 319(5868): 1362-1367.

Shafir, E., & Tversky, A. (1992). Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice. *Cognitive Psychology* 24:449-474.

**Tags:** reference-request, experimental-psychology, rationality, game-theory, meta-analysis

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: What's your question? The biggest problem with the participants in game theory is the lack of trust that's created by unequal positions. For participants to go through with their role/play, there must be trust among the players or there's more to lose than the situation they're in now. Too often ppl assume that a participant in a game isn't participating in other games simultaneously. That's where predicting outcome relies heavily on intel.  
> **username_2**: I do not think a well-controlled laboratory experiment was ever deemed necessary. The level of abstraction game theory implies makes laboratory social or sociological experiments futile if at all possible. The best route of testing this are real-life experiments made by companies who applied these theories and are financially successful, like, most probably, Amazon for example. Now, finding out which concepts and calculations were applied where is something else. Some may guess based on data available, but they will definitely not make the answers available without compensation. My two cents.  
> **username_0**: Thank you for the feedback @username_2, I am not asking about game theory in general, but in particular about surveys on one-shot perfect-information games. These are not particularly relevant to Amazon or corporations. Studies on one-shot perfect information games definitely exist, as I am aware of a number of them and reference a few in the question itself. What I am looking for is if there is a single survey or meta-analysis that has brought all (or much) of this work together (since it is distributed over many fields and thus difficult to track on your own).  

---

## 1 answers

### Answer by username_3 on 2018-07-05. Score: 1

The question seems to ask for reviews; well, a Google Scholar search on...

> **one-shot + game + review**

...yields:

* Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters [(Alessina, 1988)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811177?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)
* Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions [(Nagarajan & Sošić, 2008)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221706007806)
* Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games [(Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580905001668)
* Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment [(Archettia & Scheuring, 2012)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519311003171)

...among a host of other hits (65k+), so enough out there!

The [Hagen & Hammerstein (2006)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580905001668) provides a critical review that seems to be matching your 'bonus' question (you're going to upvote my answer twice? :-)

**References**  
**-** [Alessina, *American Econom Rev* (1988); **78**(4): 796-805](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811177?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)  
**-** [Archettia & Scheuring, *J Theor Biol* (2012); **299** (2012); 9-20](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519311003171)  
**-** [Hagen & Hammerstein, *Theor Pop Biol* (2006); **69**(3): 339-48](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580905001668)  
**-** [Nagarajan & Sošić, *Eur J Operat Res* (2008); **187**(3): 719-45](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221706007806)


---

