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Tweet With an early start into the digital technologies, Kodak was able to create industry leading technologies and digital cameras Polaroid strategy of its competition. It took another ten years before the digital cameras became the largest segment of the camera market.
Total sales of digital cameras surpassed those of analog cameras for the first time in In hindsight, Kodak had had over twenty years to respond to an existential threat.
Given the extraordinary time Kodak had, and the massive and decisive action it took, we would expect Kodak to have easily handled this major technological change in its industry.
Unfortunately, the reality was something else. ByKodak was only one of five large players in the digital camera arena and was losing money. Its market share in digital cameras was less than 25 percent, and within the next few years it continuously lost market share and profits.
This failure was not due to a difficulty in technological transition, or to getting blindsided by a disruptive innovation, or to the speed of the change. Rather, a kind of gridlock gripped Kodak. Digital cameras threatened to decrease profitability by eliminating the Polaroid strategy and photofinishing services on the one hand, and by increasing competition from consumer electronics firms on the other.
Resistance within the firm made Kodak slow in the marketplace.
Slow commercialization in a fast moving technology can be a death knell to a business. During one of my interviews with an ex-Kodak manager, I also discovered that it was not just passive resistance of the company that ensured that Kodak had a slow and ineffective commercialization.
The trouble at Kodak was not just the difficulties in effective commercialization, but also the mindset within the organization. The dominant logic within Kodak was that the only way to make money is through sale of consumables. As a result, many managers at the company wanted to sell as much film as possible, and that subverted their decisions in commercializing the digital technologies.
Choosing deliberately not to embrace the digital technology was akin to choosing the gun to play Russian roulette; there was a chance that digital cameras may never take off, but then there was a chance that if they did take off, Kodak would not survive.
Initially, the firm chose to delay making the choice and many parts of the organization wanted to choose the gun. This hesitation, this delay, is what caused Kodak to fall from its industry dominant position to chapter 11 bankruptcy. Polaroid, the name synonymous with instant photography, controlled percent of the instant photography market and around 10 percent of the total American camera market.
It had always been a technology company and its success was due to this technological sophistication. At the time when Kodak was mastering digital technologies, Polaroid was also exploring the digital horizon. In fact, Polaroid had developed one of the best digital cameras.
But as it approached the commercialization stage, Polaroid also faced an internal pressure that prevented it from commercializing outstanding products. Upon realizing that digital photography would destroy profits, a senior manager at Polaroid asked, "Why should we accept a 38 percent margin?
I can get 70 percent in film". Polaroid filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in When faced with the dark side of innovation, Kodak and Polaroid behaved alike. When people with differing personalities behave alike in some situations, social psychologists use this evidence to show that the context is more powerful in determining behavior than personality is.
The reaction of the two leading photographic companies to digital technology points to the power of the context here -- the power of the dark side of innovation. Ankush Chopra Photo Credit: Ankush Chopra is an innovation expert with nearly two decades of experience in leading and enabling transformations across the globe, including projects within Citibank and Proctor and Gamble.
His research focuses on issues such as overcoming challenges of innovation and transforming business and organizations. Chopra has a Ph.Polaroid. Family Imaging Market Don’t do anything that someone else can do.
Don’t undertake a project unless it is manifestly important and nearly impossible.5/5(1). So it is unsurprising that Polaroid wants to work its way back into the cultural zeitgeist through a digital and social media strategy.
Aside from the nostalgia play, the brand’s strategy today. The original Polaroid Corporation was founded in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by Edwin Land in Described by The Boston Globe as a "juggernaut of innovation", in many respects Polaroid was the Apple of its time with a "leader in Edwin Land, a scientist who guided the company as the founding CEO for four decades".
The Polaroid instant film is the only type that can be used with the camera, so the pricing method used by Polaroid is the best strategy for maximizing profit.
When researching price we found that the price of the camera and film does not vary much among stores, however, the price of film costs almost as much as the camera. The original Polaroid Corporation was founded in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by Edwin Land in Described by The Boston Globe as a "juggernaut of innovation", in many respects Polaroid was the Apple of its time with a "leader in Edwin Land, a scientist who guided the company as the founding CEO for four decades".
Polaroid and Polaroid Originals to further integrate business units and strategy under newly-established Polaroid BV: with Oskar Smolokowski, former CEO of Polaroid Originals, at the helm.