Khalil, Elias (2007): Emotions and International Conflicts: Sociological, Evolutionary and Rational Views.
In March 2005, riots erupted in South Korea against Japan for claiming sovereignty over some rocky uninhabited islets (0.23 km2). Five weeks earlier, riots did not erupt in South Korea when North Korea proved that it has nuclear weapons. How can we explain moral outrage in one case, when the expected net benefit is probably negative, but not in the other, when the expected net benefit is very large? This paper constructs answers using three possible approaches: sociological, evolutionary game, and standard rationality. It shows the limits of each approach and, hence, concludes with a call for a new way to think about emotions and rationality.
Hirshleifer, Jack. “On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises.” In John Dupré (ed.) The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 307-326.
Jung, Walter B. Nation Building: The Geopolitical History of Korea. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998.
Kang, Hildi. Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910-1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Khalil, Elias L. “Respect, Admiration, Aggrandizement: Adam Smith as Economic Psychologist.” Journal of Economic Psychology, September 1996, 17:5, pp. 555-577.
________. “Symbolic Products: Prestige, Pride and Identity Goods.” Theory and Decision, August 2000, 49:1, pp. 53-77.
________. “The Context Problematic, Behavioral Economics and the Transactional View: An Introduction to `John Dewey and Economic Theory’.” Journal of Economic Methodology, June 2003a, 10:2, pp. 107-130.
________. “Why does Trustworthiness Pay? Three Answers: An Introduction.” In Elias L. Khalil (ed.) Trust. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003b, pp. xiii-xxxii.
________. “Origin of Sin: A Two-Moment Theory of Integrity, Fairness and Other Internal Constraints.” A working paper, 2006a.
________. “Moral Outrage.” Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Monash University, No 07/06, 2006b.
Kihl, Young Whan and Hong Nack Kim (eds.). North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
Kim, Youn-Suk, Ippei Yamazawa, Woo-Hee Park (eds.). Economics of the Triad: Conflict and Cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Korea. Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 1997.
Koo, Kim Young. A Pursuit of Truth in the Dokdo Island Issue: Letters to a Young Japanese Man, 3rd ed. Seoul: International Cultural Exchange Association, 2005.
Kotch, John Barry. “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula.” Korea and World Affairs, Summer 2006, 30:2, pp. 165-184.
Kreps, D.M., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Theory, 1982, 27, pp. 245-252.
Kydd, Adrew H. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Lebow, Richard Ned. “Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations,” International Affairs, May 2006, 82, pp. 539-66.
Mailath, George J. and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Maynard Smith, John. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Mercer, Jonathan. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Nelson, John. “Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine.” Journal of Asian Studies, May 2003, 62:2, pp. 445-467.
O'Neill, Barry. Honor, Symbols, and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
Press, Daryl G. “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s.” International Security, Winter 2004/05, 29:3, pp. 136-169.
________. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell University Press, 2005.
Rapoport, A. and A.M. Chammah. “The Game of Chicken.” American Behavioral Scientist, 1966, 10, pp. 10-14.
Rabin, Matthew. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory." American Economic Review, December 1993, 83:5, pp. 1281-1302.
Sartori, Anne E. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Sen, Amartya K. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1977, 6:4, pp. 317-344.
________. "Internal Consistency of Choice." Econometrica, May 1993, 61:3, pp. 495-521.
Shin, Gi-Wook. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
Song-wu, Park. “Current EEZ Line Was Badly Chosen.” The Korean Times, April 20 2006.
Stigler, George J. and Gary S. Becker. "DE Gustibus Non Est Disputandum." American Economic Review, March 1977, 67:1, pp. 76-90.
Sugden, Robert. “The Opportunity Criterion: Consumer Sovereignty without the Assumption of Coherent Preferences.” American Economic Review, September 2004, 94:4, pp. 1014-1033.
Thaler, Richard H. “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1988, 2:4, pp. 195-206.
Williamson, Oliver. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, September 1983, 73, pp. 519-540.
Zeeman, Christopher. “Evolution and Catastrophe Theory.” In Janine Bourriau (ed.) Understanding Catastrophe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 83-101.