A Q&A Session with Attorney Scott Heiser
NFL quarterback Michael Vick, who served 18 months in prison after a felony conviction in 2007 for his widely publicized involvement in dogfighting—including shooting, electrocuting, and hanging dogs who did not perform well in the ring—recently stated publicly that he wants to own a dog and believes it would be good for his rehabilitation process. His federal sentence included a three-year ban on the possession of a dog.In this Q&A session, attorney Scott Heiser, director of the Animal Legal Defense Fund’s Criminal Justice Program, answers some questions and provides some clarification relating to the current debate about whether Michael Vick should be allowed to own a pet dog.
Q: When are judges allowed to impose an animal ownership ban on convicted abusers?
A: Many states require a trial judge to expressly impose a ban on possessing animals (PDF) as part of a sentence for animal cruelty or fighting. For example, in Virginia, the home state of Mr. Vick’s criminal enterprise “Bad Newz Kennels,” as part of a dogfighting sentence the court is now required to ban an offender from possessing or owning companion animals or fighting birds. It is significant to note that in March 2008, in the wake of the Vick case, the Virginia Legislative Assembly chose to amend the law to make an animal possession ban a mandatory rather than discretionary part of a trial judge’s dogfighting sentence. See Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6571(D) (2010) (as amended March 2008, cc. 543).
Divesting all state trial judges of the authority to balance the risks a dogfighter presents to the community in deciding to impose a post-conviction possession ban is a substantial change in the law. It is a sound policy choice predicated on the common sense notion that those who exploit vulnerable victims should not be allowed further access to the offender’s preferred pool of victims.
Q: Is there such a thing as a lifetime ban for convicted abusers?
A: Court ordered long-term or lifetime possession bans are hard (if not impossible) to enforce—it is a jurisdictional issue. This area of the law can prove a bit confusing. However, as a general rule, a trial judge only has jurisdiction over a sentenced defendant during the life of the case, and in most mid- to low-level felonies that is between three to ten years. Once the clock has run out, the court no longer has the authority to haul an offender back in on a probation violation—it loses jurisdiction. This begs the question: how is it that one can be subject to a long-term or lifetime ban on anything? The answer is simple: make the possession of the item (or the regulation of undesired conduct) a new criminal offense.
Think “ex-con in possession of a firearm.” It is the prior felony conviction that provides the foundation for a new criminal offense when a felon acquires a gun. Moreover, it is this new criminal offense that allows the duration of the gun possession ban to outlast the duration of trial court’s jurisdiction to supervise the offender in the underlying felony case. The same is true for those states with long-term animal possession bans. For example, in Oregon, a first conviction for dogfighting triggers application of Or. Rev. Stat. 167.332 and a 15-year ban on possessing animals. Any convicted dogfighter who is caught in possession of a domestic animal during that timeframe commits a new criminal offense. This de facto possession ban is a product of the underlying dogfighting conviction and applies by operation of law in cases where the sentencing court’s maximum jurisdictional duration in the dogfighting case is only six years after conviction. See Or. Rev. Stat. 137.010(4), 167.332 and 167.365.
Some trial courts have imposed a lifetime animal possession ban, but the enforceability of these orders, while highly suspect, is a direct function of the court’s jurisdictional authority to hold a person in contempt for violating an order contained in a criminal judgment that has otherwise lapsed—it gets a bit complicated here. Nevertheless, a few states have enacted ostensible permanent post-conviction animal possession bans for repeat offenders. See Wash. Rev. Stat. § 16.52.200(3) (permanent ban authorized for repeat offenders); NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 374(5)(c) (court may impose possession ban “for a period of time which the court deems reasonable”); 510 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/3.04(c) (same). The State of Maine, as part of its battery of civil remedies enacted to supplement its animal cruelty code, includes an option for the court to impose a permanent ban, which would be enforceable by contempt. ME Rev. Stat, title 7, § 4016(1)(C). Contrast these examples with Pennsylvania, where the post-conviction possession ban on animals is expressly limited to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment applicable to the underlying offense.
Mr. Vick’s federal sentence contains a three-year possession ban. Should it have been permanent? We at ALDF certainly think so, but we have to recognize the jurisdictional limits inherent in our justice system. However, under no circumstances should anyone who has engaged in criminal conduct similar to that of Mr. Vick’s enjoy a premature waiver of an animal possession ban. It is just not worth the risk.
A: In addition to firearms and animal possession bans, other examples of where a defendant’s conduct can be regulated long after the term of probation or post-prison supervision has expired include the denial of driving privileges for habitual traffic offenders and the requirement that sex offenders register their addresses with local law enforcement. However, in these cases, as with firearms cases (and in some states, animals), there is generally a separate statutory provision requiring offender compliance that outlives the lifespan of the judgment entered on the underlying offense. These statutes are the cleanest path to create easily enforceable long-term (or lifetime) requirements that offenders abstain from conduct or otherwise comply with an apparent judicial edict, avoiding all issues related to the viability of the court’s order over time.
Q: What are the legal rationales for ownership bans for convicted abusers like Michael Vick?
A: Animal abusers pose a very real risk to the community. The seminal study on this issue dates back to work started in 1975 and sustained over more than 20-years (i.e., 1975–1996). In what has proven to be one of the key findings from this long-term study, the Massachusetts SPCA and Northeastern University concluded that those who abuse animals are five times more likely to abuse humans. It is no great leap in logic to draw the conclusion that if an animal abuser is five times more likely to escalate to human victims, then such an offender posses an even greater risk of re-victimizing the same silent population he has already preyed upon. In Mr. Vick’s case, such an obvious conclusion is even more compelling when one considers that Mr. Vick engaged in a sustained six-year criminal enterprise dedicated to profiting from gambling on the outcome of dogfights while using the most cruel and barbaric methods imaginable to manage his “kennel” and maximize his profits. The ongoing nature of his conduct remains serious cause for concern and understandably contributes to the enduring distrust of his repeated public assertions of remorse and reformation. Some additional yet basic risk factors one should consider in assessing Mr. Vick’s case and the continuing threat convicted abusers present to society include:
- The vulnerability of his victims;
- The large number of his victims;
- The number of victimizing incidents;
- The severity of the injury and methods used to kill;
- The duration of the abuse;
- The degree of pre-planning or premeditation;
- The existence of other criminal conduct at the scene of the animal abuse (e.g., drugs, gun law violations, gambling);
- The fact that this offender served as an instigator of criminal acts involving multiple other perpetrators; and
- The offender’s history of positive interactions with the victim animal(s) prior to the abuse.
In light of these factors, it is difficult to discern how Mr. Vick’s supporters could reasonably believe that he should be allowed to exercise control over another dog. The Animal Legal Defense Fund strongly disagrees with that view and recommends the longest possible ban on ownership be maintained. Whether his supporters are truly concerned about animal welfare or just too invested in Mr. Vick’s “comeback” to give a damn about the fate of the next dog who comes under Mr. Vick’s control—you will have to decide for yourself.