We think that, when it was decided to undertake an important military
expedition to the Gallipoli Peninsula, sufficient consideration
was not given to the measures necessary to carry out such an expedition
with success. We have already pointed out in paragraph 15 that it
had been apparent in February, 1915, that serious military operations
might be necessary. Under these circumstances we think that the
conditions of a military attack on the Peninsula should have been
studied and a general plan prepared by the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, Sir James Wolfe Murray, special attention being paid
to the probable effect of naval gun fire in support of the troops;
and that it was the duty of the Secretary of State for War to ensure
that this was done.
think that the difficulties of the operations were much underestimated.
At the outset all decisions were taken and all provisions based
on the assumption that, if a landing were effected, the resistance
would be slight and the advance rapid. We can see no sufficient
ground for this assumption. The short naval bombardment in November,
1914, had given the Turks warning of a possible attack, and the
naval operations in February and March of 1915 led naturally to
a great strengthening of the Turkish defences. The Turks were known
to be led by German officers, and there was no reason to think that
they would not fight well, especially in defensive positions. These
facts had been reported by Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton.
We think that the position, which in fact, existed after the first
attacks in April and the early days of May should have been regarded
from the outset as possible and the requisite means of meeting it
considered. This would have made it necessary to examine and decide
whether the demands of such extended operations could be met consistently
with our obligations in other theatres of war. In fact those obligations
made it impossible in May, June and July to supply the forces with
the necessary drafts, gun ammunition, high explosives and other
modern appliances of war.
We are of the opinion that, with the resources then available, success
in the Dardanelles, if possible, was only possible upon condition
that the Government concentrated their efforts upon the enterprise
and limited their expenditure of men and material in the Western
theatre of war. This condition was never fulfilled.
After the failure of the attacks which followed the first landing
there was undue delay deciding upon the course to be pursued in
the future. Sir Ian Hamilton's appreciation was forwarded on May
17th, 1915. It was not considered by the War Council or the Cabinet
until June 7th. The reconstruction of the Government which took
place at this most critical period was the main cause of the delay.
As a consequence the despatch of the reinforcements asked for by
Sir Ian Hamilton in his appreciation was postponed for six weeks.
We think that the plan of attack from Anzac and Suvla in the beginning
of August was open to criticism. The country over which the attack
had to be made was very difficult, especially at Anzac. In order
to obtain if possible the element of surprise, the main advance
of the Anzac force up the north-western spurs of Sari Bahr was undertaken
at night, the risk of misdirection and failure being much increased
thereby. The plan, however, was decided upon after a consideration
of other plans, and with the concurrence of the commander of the
Anzac Corps, who had been in command since the first landing.
7. The operations at Suvla were a severe trial for the force consisting
of troops who had never been under fire, but we think that after
taking into consideration and making every allowance for the difficulties
of the attack and the inexperience of the troops, the attack was
not pressed as it should have been at Suvla on the 7th and 8th August,
and we attribute this in a great measure to a want of determination
and competence in the Divisional Commander and one of his Brigadiers.
The leading of the 11th Division and the attached battalions of
the 10th Division, which constituted the main body of the attack,
was not satisfactory. As explained in paragraphs 108 and 109, the
orders given by General Hammersley were confused and the work of
his staff defective. Major-General Hammersley's health had in the
past been such that it was dangerous to select him for a divisional
command in the field, although he seemed to have recovered. We think
that the defects that we have mentioned in his leading probably
arose from this cause. General Sitwell, the senior Brigade Commander,
did not, in our opinion, show sufficient energy and decision.
8. Sir Frederick Stopford was hampered by the want of effective
leading above referred to, and the inexperience of his troops, but
we do not think he took sufficient means to inform himself of the
progress of operations. On August 7th, when he became aware that
the troops had not advanced as rapidly as had been intended, we
think that he should have asked for some explanation from General
Hammersley. In that case he would have been informed of the difference
which had arisen between General Sitwell and General Hill, and of
General Sitwell's lack of vigour and energy in leading. We think
that at this point his intervention was needed. We
think that he and his staff were partly responsible for the failure
to supply the troops with water on August 7th and 8th. Our detailed
conclusions on the water supply will be found below.
endorse Sir Ian Hamilton's condemnation of the orders given by Sir
Frederick Stopford on the morning of August 8th, 1915, whether the
account of them given in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch or that in
Sir Frederick Stopford's report to him be accepted. According to
the evidence of Sir Bryan Mahon and General Hammersley they were
not deterred from advancing by those orders.
evening of August 8th we think that Sir Frederick Stopford's difficulties
were increased by the intervention of Sir Ian Hamilton. Sir Ian
Hamilton seems to have considered Sir Frederick Stopford lacking
in energy in the operations between August 9th and August 15th.
As this opinion is based more upon general conduct than upon any
specific acts or omissions, we are not in a position to pronounce
upon it. We realise, however, that importance attaches to the impressions
of a Commander-in-Chief on such a subject.
As regards Sir Ian Hamilton it is inevitable that the capabilities
of a commander in war should be judged by the results he achieves,
even though, if these results are disappointing, his failure may
be due to causes for which he is only partially responsible.
1915, Sir Ian Hamilton succeeded in landing his troops at the places
which he had chosen: but the operations that were intended immediately
to follow the landing were abruptly checked owing to a miscalculation
of the strength of the Turkish defences and the fighting qualities
of the Turkish troops. This rebuff should have convinced Sir Ian
Hamilton that the Turkish entrenchments were skilfully disposed
and well armed, and that naval gun fire was ineffective against
trenches and entanglements of the modern type. We doubt, however,
whether the failure of the operations sufficiently impressed Sir
Ian Hamilton and the military authorities at home with the serious
nature of the opposition likely to be encountered.
May, June, and July severe fighting took place, but its results
were not commensurate with the efforts made and the losses incurred.
July a plan of combined operations was elaborated, which was carried
into effect early in August. Sir Ian Hamilton was confident of success,
but was again baffled by the obstinacy of the Turkish resistance.
Moreover, the failure of night advances in a difficult and unexplored
country, which formed part of the plan, led to heavy casualties
and temporarily disorganised the forces employed.
Ian Hamilton was relieved of his command on October 15th.
Sir Ian Hamilton's personal gallantry and energy, his sanguine disposition,
and his determination to win at all costs. We recognise also that
the task entrusted to him was one of extreme difficulty, the more
so as the authorities at home at first misconceived the nature and
duration of the operations, and afterwards were slow to realise
that to drive the Turks out of their entrenchments and occupy the
heights commanding the Straits was a formidable and hazardous enterprise
which demanded a concentration of force and effort. It must further
be borne in mind that Lord Kitchener, whom Sir Ian Hamilton appears
to have regarded as a Commander-in-Chief rather than as a Secretary
of State, pressed upon him the paramount importance, if it were
by any means possible, of carrying out the task assigned to him.
from time to time Sir Ian Hamilton represented the need of drafts,
reinforcements, guns and munitions, which the Government found it
impossible to supply, he was nevertheless always ready to renew
the struggle with the resources at his disposal, and to the last
was confident of success. For this it would be hard to blame him;
but viewing the Expedition in the light of events it would, in our
opinion, have been well had he examined the situation as disclosed
by the first landings in a more critical spirit, impartially weighed
the probabilities of success and failure, having regard to the resources
in men and material which could be placed at his disposal, and submitted
to the Secretary of State for War a comprehensive statement of the
arguments for and against a continuance of the operations.
10.The failure at Anzac was due mainly to the difficulties of the
country and the strength of the enemy. The failure at Suvla also
prevented any pressure being put upon the Turkish force in that
direction, and success at Suvla might have lessened the resistance
11.We think that after the attacks ending on August 9th had failed,
the operations contemplated could not have been successfully carried
out without large reinforcements. The fighting after General de
Lisle replaced Sir Frederick Stopford was really of a defensive
12.We think that after the advice of Sir Charles Monro had been
confirmed by Lord Kitchener the decision to evacuate should have
been taken at once. We recognise, however, that the question of
evacuation was connected with other questions of high policy which
do not appear to us to come within the scope of our enquiry.
13. We think that the decision to evacuate when taken was right.
14. We think that the operations were hampered throughout by the
failure to supply sufficient artillery and munitions, and to keep
the original formations up to strength by the provision of adequate
drafts as well as reinforcements. In our opinion this was not owing
to any neglect on the part of the Heads of Departments charged with
such provision, but to the demands proving much larger than was
expected when the operations were undertaken and to demands which
had to be met in other theatres of war.
other hand, a considerable amount of artillery was available in
Egypt and at Mudros for the Suvla operations, but it was not utilised.
15. Many minor frontal attacks were made without adequate artillery
preparation, which produced little or no material advantage. Evidence
was given that these attacks entailed an unnecessary loss of life.
Without a more intimate knowledge of the locality and conditions
than it is possible to obtain, we cannot express an opinion as to
whether it was right to undertake such attacks. We think that the
evidence disproves the allegation made before us that useless attacks
were made because of the neglect on the part of superior Commanders
and Staff Officers to visit and inspect the trenches and positions.
There was full co-operation between the Navy and Army and the two
services worked well and harmoniously together.