Under a civil settlement with the Department of Justice, El Paso Behavioral Healthcare, formerly University Behavioral Health of El Paso, LLC ("UBH"), has been ordered to pay over three-quarters of a million dollars to resolve allegations that it made improper payments to a doctor in exchange for patient referrals, and submitted false claims to Medicare.
The allegations focused on the Medicare claims of several patients from a physician whose office received payments above fair market value, or payments for services that were not rendered pursuant to a physician services agreement which also provided for the improper referral of the physician's patients to UBH for Medicare-reimbursed services.
Federal law, including the Anti-Kickback Act and the Stark Law, seeks to ensure that services reimbursable by federal healthcare programs are paid at fair market value and based on the best interests of patients rather than the personal financial interests of referring physicians.
Periodic review of physician agreements should be a key component of any effective compliance program. In addition to the potential criminal sanctions that may be imposed for anti-kickback violations, Medicare claims arising from such improper financial relationships may result in substantial additional false claims liability. Healthcare facilities which discover Medicare overpayments through an effective compliance program can limit their liability through self-reporting. Read more here.
On January 13, 2017, CMS published its final rule revising the conditions of participation (CoPs) that home health agencies (HHAs) must meet to participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs. The final rule implements the proposed rules published in the Federal Register October 9, 2014 (79 FR 61164), and becomes effective July 13 2017.
Among its many changes, the final rule redefines terms and establishes new standards for the content of comprehensive patient assessments, care planning, coordination of services, quality of care, quality of assessments and performance improvement (QAPI), skilled professional services, home health aid services, and clinical record keeping. The rule also makes changes to personnel requirements including limiting who can be an HHA administrator. To review the final rule in its entirety, click here.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) announced this Holiday season that it is increasing the monetary value of gifts falling under the nominal value exception to Medicare's Civil Money Penalty Law. Under section 1128A(a)(5) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §1320a-7(a)], a person who offers or transfers to a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary any remuneration that the person knows or should know is likely to influence the beneficiary's selection of a particular provider, practitioner, or supplier of Medicare or Medicaid payable items or services may be liable for civil monetary penalties (CMPs) of up to $10,000 for each wrongful act. "Remuneration" includes waivers of copayments and deductible amounts (or any part thereof) and transfers of items or services for other than fair market value.
However, as the OIG explained in its December 7, 2016 "Policy Statement Regarding Gifts of Nominal Value to Medicare and Medicaid Beneficiaries," Congress intended to permit inexpensive gifts of nominal value. The OIG has previously interpreted "inexpensive" and "nominal value" to mean a retail value of no more than $10 per item or $50 in the aggregate per patient on an annual basis, noting that it would periodically review these limits and adjust them according to inflation, if appropriate.
The OIG now believes that the figures from 2000 should be adjusted. Thus, as of December 7, 2016, the OIG has modified its interpretation of "nominal value" to mean having a retail value of no more than $15 per item or $75 in the aggregate per patient on an annual basis. The items may not be in the form of cash or cash equivalents. If a gift has a value at or below these thresholds, then the gift need not fit into an exception to section 1128A(a)(5). Happy Holidays from the OIG.
 See section 1128A(i)(6) of the Act.
 See, e.g., 65 FR 24400, 24411 (Apr. 26, 2000).
The Yates memo is a memorandum written by Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General for the U.S. Dept. of Justice, dated September 9, 2015.
By far the most scary and daunting item discussed within the Yates memo is the DOJ's interest in indicting individuals within corporations as well as the corporate entities itself, i.e., the executives…the management. Individual accountability.
To be eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the DOJ all relevant facts about individuals involved in corporate misconduct.
Since its dissemination, a few points have been clarified that were otherwise in question.
About a month after its publication, U.S. Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell emphasized the Yates memo's requirement that corporations must disclose all relevant facts regarding misconduct to receive cooperation credit. Caldwell went so far to say that companies must affirmatively seek relevant facts regarding misconduct.
For example, Hospital X is accused of Medicare fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) in the amount of $15 million. The Yates memo dictates that management at the hospital proactively investigate the allegations and report its findings to the federal government. The memo mandates that the hospital "show all its cards" and turn itself in prior to making any defense.
The problem here is that FWA is such a subjective determination.
What if a hospital bills Medicare for inplantable cardioverter defibrillator, or ICD, for patients that had coronary bypass surgery or angioplasty within 90 days or a heart attack within 40 days? What if the heart attack was never documented? What if the heart attack was so minor that it lasted under 100 milliseconds?
The Medicare National Coverage Determinations are so esoteric that your average Medicare auditor could very well cite a hospital for billing for an ICD even when the patient's heart attack lasted under 100 milliseconds.
Yet, according to the Yates memo, the hospital is required to present all relevant facts before any defense. What if the hospital's billing person is over zealous in detecting mis-billings? The hospital could very well have a legal defense as to why the alleged mis-billing is actually compliant. What about a company's right to seek counsel and defend itself? The Yates memo may require the company to turn over attorney-client privilege.
The second point that has been clarified since the Yates' memo's publication came from Yates herself.
Yates remarks that there will be a presumption that the company has access to identify culpable individuals unless they can make an affirmative showing that the company does not have access to it or are legally prohibited from producing it.
Why should this matter? It's only a memo, right?
Since its publication, the DOJ codified it into the revised U.S. Attorneys' Manual, including the two clarifying remarks. Since its inception, the heads of companies have been targeted.
A case was brought against David Bostwick, the founder, owner and chief executive officer of Bostwick Laboratories for allegedly provided incentives to treating physicians in exchange for referrals of patients who would then be subjected to these tests.
When the pharmaceutical company Warner Chilcott was investigated for health care fraud prosecutors also went after W. Carl Reichel, the former president, for his alleged involvement in the company's kickback scheme.
Prior to the Yates' memo, it was uncommon for health care fraud investigations to involve criminal charges or civil resolutions against individual executives. But executives of health care companies accused of fraud, waste, and abuse should be very wary given this apparent new focus of law enforcement.