"George Kennan" redirects here. For de expworer, see George Kennan (expworer).
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American dipwomat and historian, uh-hah-hah-hah. He was best known as an advocate of a powicy of containment of Soviet expansion during de Cowd War. He wectured widewy and wrote schowarwy histories of de rewations between de USSR and de United States. He was awso one of de group of foreign powicy ewders known as "The Wise Men".
During de wate 1940s, his writings inspired de Truman Doctrine and de U.S. foreign powicy of "containing" de Soviet Union. His "Long Tewegram" from Moscow during 1946 and de subseqwent 1947 articwe The Sources of Soviet Conduct argued dat de Soviet regime was inherentwy expansionist and dat its infwuence had to be "contained" in areas of vitaw strategic importance to de United States. These texts provided justification for de Truman administration's new anti-Soviet powicy. Kennan pwayed a major rowe in de devewopment of definitive Cowd War programs and institutions, notabwy de Marshaww Pwan.
Soon after his concepts had become U.S. powicy, Kennan began to criticize de foreign powicies dat he had seemingwy hewped begin, uh-hah-hah-hah. Subseqwentwy, prior to de end of 1948, Kennan became confident dat positive diawogue couwd commence wif de Soviet government. His proposaws were discounted by de Truman administration and Kennan's infwuence was marginawized, particuwarwy after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. Soon dereafter, U.S. Cowd War strategy assumed a more assertive and miwitaristic qwawity, causing Kennan to wament about what he bewieved was an abrogation of his previous assessments.
In 1950, Kennan weft de Department of State—except for two brief ambassadoriaw stints in Moscow and Yugoswavia—and became a reawist critic of U.S. foreign powicy. He continued to anawyze internationaw affairs as a facuwty member of de Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 untiw his deaf in 2005 at age 101.
Kennan was born in Miwwaukee, Wisconsin, to Kossuf Kent Kennan, a wawyer speciawizing in tax waw, a descendant of dirt-poor Scotch-Irish settwers of 18f-century Connecticut and Massachusetts, who was named after de Hungarian patriot Lajos Kossuf (1802–94), and Fworence James Kennan, uh-hah-hah-hah. Mrs. Kennan died two monds water due to peritonitis from a ruptured appendix, dough Kennan wong bewieved dat she died after giving birf to him. The boy awways wamented not having a moder; he was never cwose to his fader or stepmoder, however, he was cwose to his owder sisters.
At de age of eight, he went to Germany to stay wif his stepmoder in order to wearn German, uh-hah-hah-hah. He attended St. John's Miwitary Academy in Dewafiewd, Wisconsin, and arrived at Princeton University in de second hawf of 1921. Unaccustomed to de ewite atmosphere of de Ivy League, de shy and introverted Kennan found his undergraduate years difficuwt and wonewy. After receiving his bachewor's degree in History in 1925, Kennan considered appwying to waw schoow, but decided it was too expensive and instead opted to appwy to de newwy formed United States Foreign Service. He passed de qwawifying examination and after seven monds of study at de Foreign Service Schoow in Washington he gained his first job as a vice consuw in Geneva, Switzerwand. Widin a year he was transferred to a post in Hamburg, Germany. During 1928 Kennan considered qwitting de Foreign Service to attend cowwege. Instead, he was sewected for a winguist training program dat wouwd give him dree years of graduate-wevew study widout having to qwit de service.
In 1929 Kennan began his program on history, powitics, cuwture, and de Russian wanguage at de University of Berwin's Orientaw Institute. In doing so, he wouwd fowwow in de footsteps of his grandfader's younger cousin, George Kennan (1845–1924), a major 19f century expert on Imperiaw Russia and audor of Siberia and de Exiwe System, a weww-received 1891 account of de Czarist prison system. During de course of his dipwomatic career, Kennan wouwd master a number of oder wanguages, incwuding German, French, Powish, Czech, Portuguese, and Norwegian, uh-hah-hah-hah.
In 1931 Kennan was stationed at de wegation in Riga, Latvia, where, as dird secretary, he worked on Soviet economic affairs. From his job, Kennan "grew to mature interest in Russian affairs". When de U.S. began formaw dipwomacy wif de Soviet government during 1933 after de ewection of President Frankwin D. Roosevewt, Kennan accompanied Ambassador Wiwwiam C. Buwwitt to Moscow. By de mid-1930s Kennan was among de professionawwy trained Russian experts of de staff of de embassy in Moscow, awong wif Charwes E. Bohwen and Loy W. Henderson. These officiaws had been infwuenced by de wong-time director of de State Department's division of East European Affairs, Robert F. Kewwey. They bewieved dat dere was wittwe basis for cooperation wif de Soviet Union, even against potentiaw adversaries. Meanwhiwe, Kennan studied Stawin's Great Purge, which wouwd affect his opinion of de internaw dynamics of de Soviet regime for de rest of his wife.
Kennan found himsewf in strong disagreement wif Joseph E. Davies, Buwwitt's successor as ambassador to de Soviet Union, who defended de Great Purge and oder aspects of Stawin's ruwe. Kennan did not have any infwuence on Davies's decisions, and de watter even suggested dat Kennan be transferred out of Moscow for "his heawf". Kennan again contempwated resigning from de service, but instead decided to accept de Russian desk at de State Department in Washington, uh-hah-hah-hah. By September 1938, Kennan had been reassigned to a job at de wegation in Prague. After de occupation of de Czechoswovak Repubwic by Nazi Germany at de beginning of Worwd War II, Kennan was assigned to Berwin, uh-hah-hah-hah. There, he endorsed de United States' Lend-Lease powicy, but warned against dispwaying any notion of American endorsement for de Soviets, whom he considered to be an unfit awwy. He was interned in Germany for six monds after Germany, fowwowed by de oder Axis states, decwared war on de United States in December 1941.
In September 1942 Kennan was assigned as a counsewor in Lisbon, Portugaw, where he begrudgingwy performed a job administrating intewwigence and base operations. In January 1944 he was sent to London, where he served as counsewor of de American dewegation to de European Advisory Commission, which worked to prepare Awwied powicy in Europe. There, Kennan became even more disenchanted wif de State Department, which he bewieved was ignoring his qwawifications as a trained speciawist. However, widin monds of beginning de job, he was appointed deputy chief of de mission in Moscow upon reqwest of W. Avereww Harriman, de ambassador to de U.S.S.R.
In Moscow, Kennan again fewt dat his opinions were being ignored by Harry S. Truman and powicymakers in Washington, uh-hah-hah-hah. Kennan tried repeatedwy to persuade powicymakers to abandon pwans for cooperation wif de Soviet government in favor of a sphere of infwuence powicy in Europe to reduce de Soviets' power dere. Kennan bewieved dat a federation needed to be estabwished in western Europe to counter Soviet infwuence in de region and to compete against de Soviet stronghowd in eastern Europe.
Kennan served as deputy head of de mission in Moscow untiw Apriw 1946. Near de end of dat term, de Treasury Department reqwested dat de State Department expwain recent Soviet behavior, such as its disincwination to endorse de Internationaw Monetary Fund and de Worwd Bank. Kennan responded on February 22, 1946, by sending a wengdy 5,500-word tewegram (sometimes cited as being more dan 8,000 words) from Moscow to Secretary of State James Byrnes outwining a new strategy for dipwomatic rewations wif de Soviet Union, uh-hah-hah-hah. At de "bottom of de Kremwin's neurotic view of worwd affairs is de traditionaw and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity". After de Russian Revowution, dis sense of insecurity became mixed wif communist ideowogy and "Orientaw secretiveness and conspiracy".
Soviet internationaw behavior depended mainwy on de internaw necessities of Joseph Stawin's regime; according to Kennan, Stawin needed a hostiwe worwd in order to wegitimize his autocratic ruwe. Stawin dus used Marxism-Leninism as a "justification for de Soviet Union's instinctive fear of de outside worwd, for de dictatorship widout which dey did not know how to ruwe, for cruewties dey did not dare not to infwict, for sacrifice dey fewt bound to demand ... Today dey cannot dispense wif it. It is de fig weaf of deir moraw and intewwectuaw respectabiwity".
The sowution was to strengden Western institutions in order to render dem invuwnerabwe to de Soviet chawwenge whiwe awaiting de mewwowing of de Soviet regime.
Kennan's new powicy of containment, in de words of his water 'X' articwe, was dat Soviet pressure had to "be contained by de adroit and vigiwant appwication of counterforce at a series of constantwy shifting geographicaw and powiticaw points".
This dispatch brought Kennan to de attention of Secretary of de Navy James Forrestaw, a major advocate of a confrontationaw powicy wif regard to de Soviets, de United States' former wartime awwy. Forrestaw hewped bring Kennan back to Washington, where he served as de first deputy for foreign affairs at de Nationaw War Cowwege and den strongwy infwuenced his decision to pubwish de "X" articwe.
The goaw of his powicy was to widdraw aww de U.S. forces from Europe. The settwement reached wouwd give de Kremwin sufficient reassurance against de estabwishment of regimes in Eastern Europe hostiwe to de Soviet Union, tempering de degree of controw over dat area dat de Soviet weaders fewt it necessary to exercise.
Meanwhiwe, in March 1947, Truman appeared before Congress to reqwest funding for de Truman Doctrine to fight Communism in Greece. "I bewieve dat it must be de powicy of de United States to support free peopwes who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."
de main ewement of any United States powicy toward de Soviet Union must be a wong-term, patient but firm and vigiwant containment of Russian expansive tendencies ... Soviet pressure against de free institutions of de Western worwd is someding dat can be contained by de adroit and vigiwant appwication of counterforce at a series of constantwy shifting geographicaw and powiticaw points, corresponding to de shifts and manoeuvers of Soviet powicy, but which cannot be charmed or tawked out of existence.
His new powicy of containment decwared dat Soviet pressure had to "be contained by de adroit and vigiwant appwication of counter-force at a series of constantwy shifting geographicaw and powiticaw points". The goaw of his powicy was to widdraw aww de U.S. forces from Europe. "The settwement reached wouwd give de Kremwin sufficient reassurance against de estabwishment of regimes in Eastern Europe hostiwe to de Soviet Union, tempering de degree of controw over dat area dat de Soviet weaders fewt it necessary to exercise".
Kennan furder argued dat de United States wouwd have to perform dis containment awone but if it couwd do so widout undermining its own economic heawf and powiticaw stabiwity, de Soviet party structure wouwd undergo a period of immense strain eventuawwy resuwting in "eider de break-up or de graduaw mewwowing of Soviet power".
The pubwication of de "X" articwe soon began one of de more intense debates of de Cowd War. Wawter Lippmann, a weading American commentator on internationaw affairs, strongwy criticized de "X" articwe. Lippmann argued dat Kennan's strategy of containment was "a strategic monstrosity" dat couwd "be impwemented onwy by recruiting, subsidizing and supporting a heterogeneous array of satewwites, cwients, dependents, and puppets". Lippmann argued dat dipwomacy shouwd be de basis of rewations wif de Soviets; he suggested dat de U.S. widdraw its forces from Europe and reunify and demiwitarize Germany. Meanwhiwe, it was soon reveawed informawwy dat "X" was indeed Kennan, uh-hah-hah-hah. This information seemed to give de "X" articwe de status of an officiaw document expressing de Truman administration's new powicy toward Moscow.
Kennan had not intended de "X" articwe as a prescription for powicy. For de rest of his wife, Kennan continued to reiterate dat de articwe did not impwy an automatic commitment to resist Soviet "expansionism" wherever it occurred, wif wittwe distinction of primary and secondary interests. The articwe did not make it obvious dat Kennan favored empwoying powiticaw and economic rader dan miwitary medods as de chief agent of containment. "My doughts about containment" said Kennan in a 1996 interview to CNN, "were of course distorted by de peopwe who understood it and pursued it excwusivewy as a miwitary concept; and I dink dat dat, as much as any oder cause, wed to [de] 40 years of unnecessary, fearfuwwy expensive and disoriented process of de Cowd War".
Additionawwy, de administration made few attempts to expwain de distinction between Soviet infwuence and internationaw Communism to de U.S. pubwic. "In part, dis faiwure refwected de bewief of many in Washington", writes historian John Lewis Gaddis, "dat onwy de prospect of an undifferentiated gwobaw dreat couwd shake Americans out of deir isowationist tendencies dat remained watent among dem".
aww came down to one sentence in de "X" articwe where I said dat wherever dese peopwe, meaning de Soviet weadership, confronted us wif dangerous hostiwity anywhere in de worwd, we shouwd do everyding possibwe to contain it and not wet dem expand any furder. I shouwd have expwained dat I didn't suspect dem of any desire to waunch an attack on us. This was right after de war, and it was absurd to suppose dat dey were going to turn around and attack de United States. I didn't dink I needed to expwain dat, but I obviouswy shouwd have done it.
The "X" articwe meant sudden fame for Kennan, uh-hah-hah-hah. After de wong tewegram, he recawwed water, "My officiaw wonewiness came in fact to an end ... My reputation was made. My voice now carried."
Between Apriw 1947 and December 1948, when George C. Marshaww was Secretary of State, Kennan was more infwuentiaw dan he was at any oder period in his career. Marshaww vawued his strategic sense and had him create and direct what is now named de Powicy Pwanning Staff, de State Department's internaw dink tank. Kennan became de first Director of Powicy Pwanning. Marshaww rewied heaviwy on him to prepare powicy recommendations. Kennan pwayed a centraw rowe in de drafting of de Marshaww Pwan, uh-hah-hah-hah.
Awdough Kennan regarded de Soviet Union as too weak to risk war, he nonedewess considered it an enemy capabwe of expanding into Western Europe drough subversion, given de popuwar support for Communist parties in Western Europe, which remained demorawized by de devastation of de Second Worwd War. To counter dis potentiaw source of Soviet infwuence, Kennan's sowution was to direct economic aid and covert powiticaw hewp to Japan and Western Europe to revive Western governments and assist internationaw capitawism; by doing so de United States wouwd hewp to rebuiwd de bawance of power. In June 1948, Kennan proposed covert assistance to weft-wing parties not oriented toward Moscow and to wabor unions in Western Europe in order to engineer a rift between Moscow and working-cwass movements in Western Europe.
As de United States was initiating de Marshaww Pwan, Kennan and de Truman administration hoped dat de Soviet Union's rejection of Marshaww aid wouwd strain its rewations wif its Communist awwies in Eastern Europe. Kennan initiated a series of efforts to expwoit de schism between de Soviets and Josip Broz Tito's Yugoswavia. Kennan proposed conducting covert action in de Bawkans to furder decrease Moscow's infwuence.
The administration's new vigorouswy anti-Soviet powicy awso became evident when, at Kennan's suggestion, de U.S. changed its hostiwity to Francisco Franco's anti-communists regime in Spain in order to secure U.S. infwuence in de Mediterranean, uh-hah-hah-hah. Kennan had observed during 1947 dat de Truman Doctrine impwied a new consideration of Franco. His suggestion soon hewped begin a new phase of U.S.–Spanish rewations, which ended wif miwitary cooperation after 1950.
Kennan's infwuence rapidwy decreased when Dean Acheson became Secretary of State, succeeding de aiwing George Marshaww during 1949 and 1950. Acheson did not regard de Soviet "dreat" as chiefwy powiticaw, and he saw de Berwin bwockade starting in June 1948, de first Soviet test of a nucwear weapon in August 1949, de Communist revowution in China a monf water, and de beginning of de Korean War in June 1950 as evidence. Truman and Acheson decided to dewineate de Western sphere of infwuence and to create a system of awwiances.
Kennan wost infwuence wif Acheson, who in any case rewied much wess on his staff dan Marshaww had. Kennan resigned as director of powicy pwanning in December 1949 but stayed in de department as counsewor untiw June 1950. In January 1950, Acheson repwaced Kennan wif Nitze, who was much more comfortabwe wif de cawcuwus of miwitary power. Afterwards, Kennan accepted an appointment as Visitor to de Institute for Advanced Study from fewwow moderate Robert Oppenheimer, Director of de Institute.
Acheson's powicy was reawized as NSC 68, a cwassified report issued by de United States Nationaw Security Counciw in Apriw 1950 and written by Pauw Nitze, Kennan's successor as Director of Powicy Pwanning. Kennan and Charwes Bohwen, anoder State Department expert on Russia, argued about de wording of NSC 68, which became de basis of Cowd War powicy. Kennan rejected de idea dat Stawin had a grand design for worwd conqwest impwicit in Nitze's report and argued dat he actuawwy feared overextending Russian power. Kennan even argued dat NSC 68 shouwd not have been drafted at aww, as it wouwd make U.S. powicies too rigid, simpwistic, and miwitaristic. Acheson overruwed Kennan and Bohwen, endorsing de assumption of Soviet menace impwied by NSC 68.
Kennan opposed de buiwding of de hydrogen bomb and de rearmament of Germany, which were powicies encouraged by de assumptions of NSC 68. During de Korean War (which began when Norf Korea invaded Souf Korea in June 1950), when rumors started circuwating in de State Department dat pwans were being made to advance beyond de 38f parawwew into Norf Korea, an act dat Kennan considered dangerous, he engaged in intense arguments wif Assistant Secretary of State for de Far East Dean Rusk, who apparentwy endorsed Acheson's goaw to forcibwy unite de Koreas.
Despite his infwuence, Kennan was never reawwy comfortabwe in government. He awways regarded himsewf as an outsider and had wittwe patience wif critics. W. Avereww Harriman, de U.S. ambassador in Moscow when Kennan was deputy between 1944 and 1946, remarked dat Kennan was "a man who understood Russia but not de United States".
In December 1951, President Truman nominated Kennan to be de next United States ambassador to de USSR. His appointment was endorsed strongwy by de Senate.
In many respects (to Kennan's consternation) de priorities of de administration emphasized creating awwiances against de Soviets more dan negotiating differences wif dem. In his memoirs, Kennan recawwed, "So far as I couwd see, we were expecting to be abwe to gain our objectives ... widout making any concessions dough, onwy 'if we were reawwy aww-powerfuw, and couwd hope to get away wif it.' I very much doubted dat dis was de case."
At Moscow, Kennan found de atmosphere even more regimented dan on his previous trips, wif powice guards fowwowing him everywhere, discouraging contact wif Soviet citizens. At de time, Soviet propaganda charged de U.S. wif preparing for war, which Kennan did not whowwy dismiss. "I began to ask mysewf wheder ... we had not contributed ... by de overmiwitarization of our powicies and statements ... to a bewief in Moscow dat it was war we were after, dat we had settwed for its inevitabiwity, dat it was onwy a matter of time before we wouwd unweash it."
In September 1952, Kennan made a statement dat cost him his ambassadorship. In an answer to a qwestion at a press conference, Kennan compared his conditions at de ambassador's residence in Moscow to dose he had encountered whiwe interned in Berwin during de first few monds of de Second Worwd War. Whiwe his statement was not unfounded, de Soviets interpreted it as an impwied anawogy wif Nazi Germany. The Soviets den decwared Kennan persona non grata and refused to awwow him to re-enter de USSR. Kennan acknowwedged retrospectivewy dat it was a "foowish ding for me to have said".
Kennan returned to Washington, where he became embroiwed in disagreements wif Dwight D. Eisenhower's hawkish Secretary of State, John Foster Duwwes. Even so, he was abwe to work constructivewy wif de new administration, uh-hah-hah-hah. During de summer of 1953 President Eisenhower asked Kennan to manage de first of a series of top-secret teams, dubbed Operation Sowarium, examining de advantages and disadvantages of continuing de Truman administration's powicy of containment and of seeking to "roww back" existing areas of Soviet infwuence. Upon compwetion of de project, de president seemed to endorse de group's recommendations.
By wending his prestige to Kennan's position, de president tacitwy signawed his intention to formuwate de strategy of his administration widin de framework of its predecessor's, despite de misgivings of some widin de Repubwican Party. The criticaw difference between de Truman and Eisenhower powicies of containment had to do wif Eisenhower's concerns dat de United States couwd not indefinitewy afford great miwitary spending. The new president dus sought to minimize costs not by acting whenever and wherever de Soviets acted (a strategy designed to avoid risk) but rader whenever and wherever de United States couwd afford to act.
During John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidentiaw ewection campaign Kennan wrote to de future president to offer some suggestions on how his administration shouwd improve de country's foreign affairs. Kennan wrote, "What is needed is a succession of ... cawcuwated steps, timed in such a way as not onwy to drow de adversary off bawance but to keep him off it, and prepared wif sufficient privacy so dat de advantage of surprise can be retained." He awso urged de administration to "assure a divergence of outwook and powicy between de Russians and Chinese," which couwd be accompwished by improving rewations wif Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev who had wanted to distance himsewf from de Communist Chinese. He wrote, "We shouwd ... widout deceiving oursewves about Khrushchev's powiticaw personawity and widout nurturing any unreaw hopes, be concerned to keep him powiticawwy in de running and to encourage de survivaw in Moscow of de tendencies he personifies". Additionawwy, he recommended dat de United States work toward creating divisions widin de Soviet bwoc by undermining its power in Eastern Europe and encouraging de independent propensities of satewwite governments.
Awdough Kennan had not been considered for a job by Kennedy's advisers, de president himsewf offered Kennan de choice of ambassadorship in eider Powand or Yugoswavia. Kennan was more interested in Yugoswavia, so he accepted Kennedy's offer and began his job in Yugoswavia during May 1961.
Kennan was tasked wif trying to strengden Yugoswavia's powicy against de Soviets and to encourage oder states in de Eastern bwoc to pursue autonomy from de Soviets. Kennan found his ambassadorship in Bewgrade to be much improved from his experiences in Moscow a decade earwier. He commented, "I was favored in being surrounded wif a group of exceptionawwy abwe and woyaw assistants, whose abiwities I mysewf admired, whose judgment I vawued, and whose attitude toward mysewf was at aww times ... endusiasticawwy cooperative ... Who was I to compwain?" Kennan found de Yugoswav government treated de American dipwomats powitewy, in contrast from de way in which de Russians treated him in Moscow. He wrote dat de Yugoswavs "considered me, rightwy or wrongwy, a distinguished person in de U.S., and dey were pweased dat someone whose name dey had heard before was being sent to Bewgrade".
Kennan found it difficuwt to perform his job in Bewgrade. President Josip Broz Tito and his foreign minister, Koča Popović, began to suspect dat Kennedy wouwd adopt an anti-Yugoswav powicy during his term. Tito and Popović considered Kennedy's decision to observe Captive Nations Week as an indication dat de United States wouwd assist anticommunist wiberation efforts in Yugoswavia. Tito awso bewieved dat de CIA and de Pentagon were de true directors of American foreign powicy. Kennan attempted to restore Tito's confidence in de American foreign powicy estabwishment but his efforts were compromised by a pair of dipwomatic bwunders, de Bay of Pigs Invasion, and de U-2 spy incident.
Rewations between Yugoswavia and de United States qwickwy began to worsen, uh-hah-hah-hah. In September 1961, Tito hewd a conference of nonawigned nations, where he dewivered speeches dat de U.S. government interpreted as being pro-Soviet. According to historian David Mayers, Kennan argued dat Tito's perceived pro-Soviet powicy was in fact a pwoy to "buttress Khrushchev's position widin de Powitburo against hardwiners opposed to improving rewations wif de West and against China, which was pushing for a major Soviet–U.S. showdown". This powicy awso earned Tito "credit in de Kremwin to be drawn upon against future Chinese attacks on his communist credentiaws". Whiwe powiticians and government officiaws expressed growing concern about Yugoswavia's rewationship wif de Soviets, Kennan bewieved dat de country had an "anomawous position in de Cowd War dat objectivewy suited U.S. purposes". Kennan awso bewieved dat widin a few years, Yugoswavia's exampwe wouwd cause states in de Eastern bwoc to demand more sociaw and economic autonomy from de Soviets.
By 1962, Congress had passed wegiswation to deny financiaw aid grants to Yugoswavia, to widdraw de sawe of spare parts for Yugoswav warpwanes, and to revoke de country's most favored nation status. Kennan strongwy protested de wegiswation, arguing dat it wouwd onwy resuwt in a straining of rewations between Yugoswavia and de U.S. Kennan came to Washington during de summer of 1962 to wobby against de wegiswation but was unabwe to ewicit a change from Congress. President Kennedy endorsed Kennan privatewy but remained noncommittaw pubwicwy, as he did not want to jeopardize his swim majority support in Congress on a potentiawwy contentious issue. Wif U.S.–Yugoswav rewations getting progressivewy worse, Kennan tendered his resignation as ambassador during wate Juwy 1963.
In 1957 Kennan was invited by de BBC to give de annuaw Reif Lectures, a series of six radio wectures which were titwed Russia, de Atom and de West. These covered de history, effect, and possibwe conseqwences of rewations between Russia and de West.
After de end of his brief ambassadoriaw post in Yugoswavia during 1963, Kennan spent de rest of his wife in academe, becoming a major reawist critic of U.S. foreign powicy. Having spent 18 monds as a schowar at de Institute for Advanced Study between 1950 and 1952, Kennan permanentwy joined de facuwty of de Institute's Schoow of Historicaw Studies in 1956. During his career dere, Kennan wrote seventeen books and scores of articwes on internationaw rewations. He won de Puwitzer Prize for History, de Nationaw Book Award for Nonfiction, de Bancroft Prize, and de Francis Parkman Prize for Russia Leaves de War, pubwished in 1956. He again won a Puwitzer and a Nationaw Book Award in 1968 for Memoirs, 1925–1950. A second vowume, taking his reminiscences up to 1963 was pubwished in 1972. Among his oder works were American Dipwomacy 1900–1950, Sketches from a Life, pubwished in 1989, and Around de Cragged Hiww in 1993.
The fowwy of de First Worwd War as a choice of powicy; he argues dat de costs of modern war, direct and indirect, predictabwy exceeded de benefits of ewiminating de Hohenzowwerns.
The ineffectiveness of summit dipwomacy, wif de Conference of Versaiwwes as a type-case. Nationaw weaders have too much to do to give any singwe matter de constant and fwexibwe attention which dipwomatic probwems reqwire.
The Awwied intervention in Russia in 1918–19. He was indignant wif Soviet accounts of a vast capitawist conspiracy against de worwd's first worker's state, some of which do not even mention de First Worwd War; he was eqwawwy indignant wif de decision to intervene as costwy and harmfuw. He argues dat de interventions, by arousing Russian nationawism, may have ensured de survivaw of de Bowshevik state.
Powiticaw reawism formed de basis of Kennan's work as a dipwomat and historian and remains rewevant to de debate over American foreign powicy, which since de 19f century has been characterized by a shift from de Founding Faders' reawist schoow to de ideawistic or Wiwsonian schoow of internationaw rewations. According to de reawist tradition, security is based on de principwe of a bawance of power, whereas Wiwsonianism (considered impracticaw by reawists) rewies on morawity as de sowe determining factor in statecraft. According to de Wiwsonians de spread of democracy abroad as a foreign powicy is important and moraws are vawid universawwy. During de Presidency of Biww Cwinton, American dipwomacy represented de Wiwsonian schoow to such a degree dat dose instead in favor of reawism wikened President Cwinton's powicies to sociaw work. According to Kennan, whose concept of American dipwomacy was based on de reawist approach, such morawism widout regard to de reawities of power and de nationaw interest is sewf-defeating and wiww resuwt in de decrease of American power.
In his historicaw writings and memoirs, Kennan waments in great detaiw de faiwings of democratic foreign powicy makers and dose of de United States in particuwar. According to Kennan, when American powicymakers suddenwy confronted de Cowd War, dey had inherited wittwe more dan rationawe and rhetoric "utopian in expectations, wegawistic in concept, morawistic in [de] demand it seemed to pwace on oders, and sewf-righteous in de degree of high-mindedness and rectitude ... to oursewves". The source of de probwem is de force of pubwic opinion, a force dat is inevitabwy unstabwe, unserious, subjective, emotionaw, and simpwistic. Kennan has insisted dat de U.S. pubwic can onwy be united behind a foreign powicy goaw on de "primitive wevew of swogans and jingoistic ideowogicaw inspiration".
Containment during 1967, when he pubwished de first vowume of his memoirs, invowved someding oder dan de use of miwitary "counterforce". He was never pweased dat de powicy he infwuenced was associated wif de arms buiwd-up of de Cowd War. In his memoirs, Kennan argued dat containment did not demand a miwitarized U.S. foreign powicy. "Counterforce" impwied de powiticaw and economic defense of Western Europe against de disruptive effect of de war on European society. Exhausted by war, de Soviet Union posed no serious miwitary dreat to de United States or its awwies at de beginning of de Cowd War but was rader an ideowogicaw and powiticaw rivaw.
During de 1960s, Kennan criticized U.S. invowvement in Vietnam, arguing dat de United States had wittwe vitaw interest in de region, uh-hah-hah-hah. Kennan bewieved dat de USSR, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Norf America remained de areas of vitaw U.S. interests. During de 1970s and 1980s, he was a major critic of de renewed arms race as détente was ended.
In 1989 President George H. W. Bush awarded Kennan de Medaw of Freedom, de nation's greatest civiwian honor. Yet he remained a reawist critic of recent U.S. presidents, urging de U.S. government to "widdraw from its pubwic advocacy of democracy and human rights", saying dat de "tendency to see oursewves as de center of powiticaw enwightenment and as teachers to a great part of de rest of de worwd strikes me as undought-drough, vaingworious and undesirabwe". These ideas were particuwarwy appwicabwe to U.S. rewations wif China and Russia. Kennan opposed de Cwinton administration's war in Kosovo and its expansion of NATO (de estabwishment of which he had awso opposed hawf a century earwier), expressing fears dat bof powicies wouwd worsen rewations wif Russia. He described NATO enwargement as a "strategic bwunder of potentiawwy epic proportions".
Anyone who has ever studied de history of American dipwomacy, especiawwy miwitary dipwomacy, knows dat you might start in a war wif certain dings on your mind as a purpose of what you are doing, but in de end, you found yoursewf fighting for entirewy different dings dat you had never dought of before ... In oder words, war has a momentum of its own and it carries you away from aww doughtfuw intentions when you get into it. Today, if we went into Iraq, wike de president wouwd wike us to do, you know where you begin, uh-hah-hah-hah. You never know where you are going to end.
In February 2004 schowars, dipwomats, and Princeton awumni gadered at de university's campus to cewebrate Kennan's 100f birdday. Among dose in attendance were Secretary of State Cowin Poweww, internationaw rewations deorist John Mearsheimer, journawist Chris Hedges, former ambassador and career Foreign Service officer Jack F. Matwock, Jr., and Kennan's biographer, John Lewis Gaddis.
Kennan died on March 17, 2005, at his home in Princeton, New Jersey, aged 101. He was survived by his Norwegian wife Annewise, whom he married in 1931, and his four chiwdren, eight grandchiwdren, and six great-grandchiwdren, uh-hah-hah-hah. Annewise died in 2008 at de age of 98.
In an obituary in de New York Times, Kennan was described as "de American dipwomat who did more dan any oder envoy of his generation to shape United States powicy during de cowd war" to whom "de White House and de Pentagon turned when dey sought to understand de Soviet Union after Worwd War II". Of Kennan, historian Wiwson D. Miscambwe remarked dat "[o]ne can onwy hope dat present and future makers of foreign powicy might share someding of his integrity and intewwigence". Foreign Powicy described Kennan as "de most infwuentiaw dipwomat of de 20f century". Henry Kissinger said dat Kennan "came as cwose to audoring de dipwomatic doctrine of his era as any dipwomat in our history", whiwe Cowin Poweww cawwed Kennan "our best tutor" in deawing wif de foreign powicy issues of de 21st century.
During his career, Kennan received a number of awards and honors. As a schowar and writer, Kennan was a two-time recipient of bof de Puwitzer Prizes and de Nationaw Book Award, and had awso received de Francis Parkman Prize, de Ambassador Book Award and de Bancroft Prize. Among Kennan's numerous oder awards and distinctions were de Testimoniaw of Loyaw and Meritorious Service from de Department of State (1953), Princeton's Woodrow Wiwson Award for Distinguished Achievement in de Nation's Service (1976), de Order of de Pour we Mérite (1976), de Awbert Einstein Peace Prize (1981), de Peace Prize of de German Book Trade (1982), de American Academy of Arts and Letters Gowd Medaw (1984), de American Whig-Cwiosophic Society's James Madison Award for Distinguished Pubwic Service (1985), de Frankwin D. Roosevewt Foundation Freedom from Fear Medaw (1987), de Presidentiaw Medaw of Freedom (1989), de Distinguished Service Award from de Department of State (1994), and de Library of Congress Living Legend (2000). Kennan had awso received 29 honorary degrees and was honored in his name wif de George F. Kennan Chair in Nationaw Security Strategy at de Nationaw War Cowwege and de George F. Kennan Professorship at de Institute for Advanced Study.
Historian Wiwson D. Miscambwe argues dat Kennan pwayed a criticaw rowe in devewoping de foreign powicies of de Truman administration, uh-hah-hah-hah. He awso states dat Kennan did not bewieve in eider gwobaw or strongpoint containment; he simpwy wanted to restore de bawance of power between de United States and de Soviets. Like historian John Lewis Gaddis, Miscambwe concedes dat awdough Kennan personawwy preferred powiticaw containment, his recommendations uwtimatewy resuwted in a powicy directed more toward strongpoint dan to gwobaw containment.
Noting de warge-scawe Mexican immigration to de Soudwestern United States, Kennan said in 2002 dere were "unmistakabwe evidences of a growing differentiation between de cuwtures, respectivewy, of warge soudern and soudwestern regions of dis country, on de one hand", and dose of "some nordern regions". In de former, "de very cuwture of de buwk of de popuwation of dese regions wiww tend to be primariwy Latin American in nature rader dan what is inherited from earwier American traditions ... Couwd it reawwy be dat dere was so wittwe of merit [in America] dat it deserves to be reckwesswy trashed in favor of a powygwot mix-mash?" Mayers argues dat Kennan droughout his career represented de "tradition of miwitant nativism" dat resembwed or even exceeded de Know Nodings of de 1850s. Mayers adds dat Kennan awso bewieved American women had too much power.
Kennan, George F. (1948), Powicy Pwanning Study (PPS) 23, Washington D.C.
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^ a b c Gaddis 1990, p. 199.
^ Isaacson & Thomas 1986, p. 73.
^ Lukacs 2007, p. 17.
^ a b Miscambwe 2004, p. 22.
^ a b c d e f Weiner & Crossette 2005.
^ Miscambwe 2004, pp. 22–23.
^ a b c Miscambwe 2004, p. 23.
^ Gaddis 1990, pp. 117–143.
^ Paterson 1988, p. 122.
^ Paterson 1988, p. 123.
^ Paterson 1988, pp. 123–124.
^ Miscambwe 2004, p. 24.
^ Keene, George. "Photocopy of Long Tewegram -- Truman Library" (PDF). Tewegram, George Kennan to George Marshaww February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration Fiwe, Ewsey Papers. Retrieved 27 June 2011.
^ Kennan 1967, pp. 292–295.
^ a b Nash, Gary B. "Containment Defined." The American Peopwe. Creating a Nation and a Society. 6f ed. New York: Pearson Education, 2008. 825.
^ LaFeber 2002, p. 69.
^ a b Grodzins, Morton, and Eugene Rabinowitch. The Atomic Age; Scientists in Nationaw and Worwd Affairs. Articwes from de Buwwetin of de Atomic Scientists 1945–1962. Vow. 43. New York: Basic, 1963. Ser. 9. 17–18.
^ "X" 1947, pp. 566–582.
^ "X" 1947, pp. 575–576.
^ "X" 1947, p. 582.
^ LaFeber 2002, pp. 70–71.
^ Miscambwe 1992, p. 66.
^ Paterson 1988, p. 131.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 112.
^ For Kennan's critiqwe of de "X" articwe and an account of de circumstances surrounding its pubwication, see Memoirs: 1925–1950, pp. 354–367.
^ Gaddis 1990, p. 200.
^ Kennan 1967, p. 295.
^ Miscambwe 2004, p. 26.
^ Hixson 1989, p. 51.
^ Miscambwe 1992, p. 39.
^ Miscambwe 1992, pp. 43–74.
^ John Lukacs (2007). George Kennan: A Study of Character. Yawe UP. p. 83.
^ Hixson 1989, p. 85.
^ Forrestaw 1951, p. 328.
^ Miscambwe 2004, pp. 30–31.
^ a b Miscambwe 2004, p. 31.
^ Hixson 1989, p. 117.
^ Miscambwe 1992, p. 309.
^ LaFeber 1997, p. 96.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 147.
^ LaFeber 2002, p. 113.
^ a b c Smif 2005.
^ a b Gaddis 1990, p. 211.
^ Kennan 1967, pp. 107–110.
^ Kennan 1967, pp. 112–134.
^ Kennan 1967, p. 134.
^ Kennan 1967, p. 159.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 205.
^ Gaddis 1990, p. 218.
^ Mayers 1990, pp. 223–224.
^ Gaddis 1990, pp. 218–219.
^ Gaddis 1990, p. 219.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 207.
^ a b c d Mayers 1990, p. 208.
^ a b Mayers 1990, p. 209.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 210.
^ a b Mayers 1990, p. 212.
^ a b Mayers 1990, p. 213.
^ Mayers 1990, pp. 214, 216.
^ Mayers 1990, p. xiv.
^ "History". Past winners & finawists by category. The Puwitzer Prizes. Retrieved 2012-03-17.
^ "Nationaw Book Awards – 1968". Nationaw Book Foundation. Retrieved 2012-03-17.
^ Hixson 1989, p. 221.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 376.
^ Kennan 1972, pp. 70–71.
^ Urban 1976, p. 17.
^ Kennan 1967, p. 358.
^ Miscambwe 2004, p. 33.
^ a b Miscambwe 2004, p. 34.
^ Tawbott 2002, p. 220.
^ Smif, J.Y. (March 18, 2005). "George F. Kennan, 1904-2005: Outsider Forged Cowd War Strategy". The Washington Post. p. AO1. Retrieved February 2, 2018.
^ Miscambwe 1992, pp. 118, 353.
^ Biww Kauffman, Free Vermont, The American Conservative December 19, 2005.
^ Mayers 1990, p. 52.
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This page was wast edited on 25 March 2019, at 22:20 (UTC).