One thing that's bothering me about gun blogging, is that I spend more time reading gun blogs to find things to post bout than I spend reading some of my other favorite blogs. So I will highlight them from time to time.
Yet the fault does not lie — at least fundamentally — with individual politicians. The world is in the middle of an epochal transition, a transition with various names. It has been known as a Clash of Civilizations; a shift from the Nation State to the Market State; the showdown between McWorld and the New Caliphate or the end times in advance of the Hidden Imam. But whatever the nomenclature, this epoch constitutes a challenge for which no Western leader as yet has clear answers. Not to the question of what to do with Europe's burgeoning Muslim communities; nor to the deadly rivalry between Sunni and Shi'a across the Middle East; nor to the challenge of radical Islam the world over. Webb is right to expect "sound judgment, clear thinking, concern for our welfare" and guarantees of safety from President Bush. But what better satisfaction can he obtain from Pelosi, Obama, Murtha or Hillary Clinton, who may not only not know the answer, they may not even understand the question. Is there no balm in Gilead? None. But that doesn't mean we can't start to invent some. Both Iraq and 9/11 are examples of challenges posed by the new epoch that won't go away. And they will not go away until freedom, at least as expressed as the absence the mental tyranny embodied by the toxic ideology embodied by radical theocracies, is widespread over the earth. Robert Mayer is right. And so is James Webb. Strategy and operational competence are meaningless without each other. A thumbs up for freedom. And two thumbs up for attaining freedom through learned competence.
Although Muckian's examples are drawn from Iraq, they might as well have been drawn from the Islamic insurgency in the Philippines. Here if anywhere, the assumption that terrorists are operating according to some strict Bolshevik discipline is wildly misplaced. An individual Muslim terrorist might have multiple associations with one or all of several organizations — the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group or the Jemaah Islamiyah. And be able to run from one to the other. Counterterrorism tactics which assume the enemy is pursuing the organizationally disciplined "People's War" model may result in irrelevant "divide and rule" counterinsurgency schemes. For example, the Philippine government is attempting to negotiate a political settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, designating them a "peace partner", providing their personnel with certain immunities and promoted "confidence building" measures among them. It's a classic attempt to win over the "moderate" rebels and isolate the "radicals". But the weakness of that approach was illustrated when it became known that the Jemaah Islamiyah had been training its cadres inside Moro Islamic Liberation Front areas. Because the insurgency was based on "narrative" rather than Bolshevik discipline the terrorists could move between organizational boundaries which were really only meaningful to the counter-insurgent. The Western policeman may stop pursuit at an organizational or international border, but a terrorist driven by narrative will walk right through it.
Great stuff. But Great stuff is the standard on this blog rather than the exception. I highly encourage everyone to make The Belmont Club a regular stop, because this stuff is 100x better thought out and more informative than any policy wonk you'll read in the paper or any dullard talking head you'll see on CNN or Fox.