PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. AMADOR SEGOBRE y QUIJANO,* Defendant and Appellant.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00882 which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated October 30, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Crim. Case No. 97-13850 finding appellant Amador Segobre y Quijano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a butcher knife, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Roberto Crescini3 with the said butcher knife on the chest, thereby [inflicting] upon the latter stab wound which directly caused his death.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, Lester C. Villafaña, the eyewitness; and Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, the medico-legal expert who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused AMADOR SEGOBRE is hereby found guilty of Murder beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Roberto Crescini in the amount of P50,000.
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, however, cannot be appreciated in the instant case, as there was no proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time had passed before the killing was carried out. Nonetheless, the qualifying circumstance of treachery suffices to qualify the offense to murder.
On February 8, 2006, this Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. The parties, however, separately manifested that they are no longer filing supplemental briefs as they have fully argued their respective positions in their briefs before the Court of Appeals.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
Appellant avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the trial court relied on the weakness of his defenses of alibi and denial. Appellant also avers that, assuming for the sake of argument that he was guilty of stabbing the victim, the court still erred in convicting him of murder as the prosecution failed to prove the presence of treachery and evident premeditation.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, stresses that appellant was positively identified as the malefactor by Villafaña who witnessed the incident from a distance of only 5' meters. It adds that appellant's testimonies were inconsistent. His defense of denial and alibi could not prevail over his positive identification by the eyewitness to the incident. The OSG also maintains that treachery attended the killing of Crescini as appellant employed means which rendered Crescini unable to resist appellant's attack.
We shall now rule on the issues raised by appellant.
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence to Villafaña's testimony identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Villafaña's straightforward and candid narration of the incident was regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict appellant. Moreover, no evil motive had been imputed against Villafaña for testifying against appellant. Where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
In this case, Crescini was on a bicycle and making a turn from Sumulong Highway to Crisostomo Street when appellant blocked his way without warning and suddenly stabbed him. At that time, Crescini had both his hands on the handlebars such that he could not resist any sudden attack. This is the essence of treachery - the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part.17 Treachery exists even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.18 Hence, in this case, we agree that treachery was present in the commission of the crime.
But as to the circumstance of evident premeditation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that this circumstance could not be appreciated in connection with the killing of Crescini, contrary to the finding of the trial court. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.19 None of these requisites have been shown from the facts of this case. The records do not show the time and date when appellant resolved to commit the crime. Absent this first requisite, the lapse of time as stated in the third requisite cannot be proved.20 The second element cannot likewise be proved, absent any showing that appellant performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination of killing Crescini.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00882 finding appellant Amador Segobre y Quijano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is AFFIRMED. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Roberto Crescini, P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
* Also referred to as "Mang Ador" in other parts of the records.
1 Rollo, pp. 3-11. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Vicente Q. Roxas concurring.
2 CA rollo, pp. 15-18. Penned by Executive Judge Mauricio M. Rivera.
3 Also referred to as "Mang Berting" in other parts of the records.
5 TSN, August 29, 1997, pp. 3-8.
6 TSN, November 6, 1997, pp. 7-8.
7 TSN, October 21, 1999, pp. 3-14; TSN, October 10, 2000, pp. 3-7; TSN, March 20, 2001, pp. 2-9.
9 G.R. NOS. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
12 CA rollo, p. 35.
13 People v. Ciron, Jr., G.R. No. 139409, March 18, 2002, 379 SCRA 376, 382.
14 People v. Hillado, G.R. No. 122838, May 24, 1999, 307 SCRA 535, 549.
16 People v. Bermas, G.R. NOS. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, 309 SCRA 741, 778.
18 People v. Dadivo, G.R. No. 143765, July 30, 2002, 385 SCRA 449, 455.
19 People v. Ciron, Jr., supra note 13, at 384.
20 Rabor v. People, G.R. No. 140344, August 18, 2000, 338 SCRA 381, 389.
21 People v. Escote, G.R. No. 151834, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 345, 352-353.
22 G.R. No. 133814, July 17, 2001, 361 SCRA 274.
23 People v. Escote, supra at 353.