Philosophy of Mind > Metaphysics of Mind > Functionalism > Functionalism, Misc
Functionalism, Misc
Causal Role Functionalism (79)
Machine Functionalism (42)
Functionalist Theories of Consciousness (292 | 142)
Functionalism and Qualia (208)
Dennett's Functionalism (138)
Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content (367)
Ad Astra Fellow in Philosophy: Lecturer/Assistant Professor
Asst, Assoc or Full Professor, Philosophy
Klemens von Klemperer Post-Doctoral Fellow
Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle.Justin D'Ambrosio - forthcoming - Noûs.details
Ramsification is a well-known method of defining theoretical terms that figures centrally in a wide range of debates in metaphysics. Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs sometimes fails to preserve truth, and other times fails to preserve grammaticality. On the surface, Ramsification and Prior's puzzle appear to have little to do with each other. But Prior's (...) puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily appreciated, and Ramsification requires a solution to the generalized form of Prior's puzzle. Without such a solution, a wide range of theories will either fail to imply their Ramsey sentences, or have Ramsey sentences that are ill-formed. As a consequence, definitions of theoretical terms given using the Ramsey sentence will be either incorrect or nonsensical. I present a partial solution to the puzzle that requires making use of a neo-Davidsonian language for scientific theorizing, but the would-be Ramsifier still faces serious challenges. (shrink)
Causal Role Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind
Functionalism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Intensional Transitive Verbs in Philosophy of Language
Propositions and That-Clauses in Philosophy of Language
Quantification and Ontology in Philosophy of Language
Quantifiers, Misc in Philosophy of Language
Ramsey Sentences in General Philosophy of Science
Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language
The Science of Belief: A Progress Report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.details
The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...) and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our under- standing of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. (shrink)
Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind
Levels of Analysis in Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Psychology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Propositional Attitudes, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Social Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories.Coninx Sabrina - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.details
According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although (...) imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of both sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either. (shrink)
Action Theory, Misc in Philosophy of Action
Intentionality, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Pain and Pain Experience in Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Finding Space in a Nonspatial World.David J. Chalmers - 2021 - In Christian Wüthrich, Baptiste Le Bihan & Nick Huggett (eds.), Philosophy Beyond Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
Emergence in Physical Science in Philosophy of Physical Science
Metaphysics of Spacetime, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science
The Explanatory Gap in Philosophy of Mind
`Hard' and `Easy' Problems in Philosophy of Mind
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...) developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution. (shrink)
Desire and Motivation in Philosophy of Mind
Moral Noncognitivism in Meta-Ethics
Theories of Desire, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2020 - Trans/Form/Ação 43 (3):143-166.details
The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers' original paper, 'The Extended Mind', this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...) maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf's criticism that information registered in Otto's notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition. (shrink)
Extended Cognition, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Externalism and Cognitive Science, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Externalism and Psychological Explanation in Philosophy of Mind
Objections to Extended Cognition in Philosophy of Mind
The Extended Mind Thesis in Philosophy of Mind
Two theories of group agency.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1901-1918.details
Two theories dominate the current debate on group agency: functionalism, as endorsed by Bryce Huebner and Brian Epstein, and interpretivism, as defended by Deborah Tollefsen, and Christian List and Philip Pettit. In this paper, I will give a new argument to favour functionalism over interpretivism. I discuss a class of cases which the former, but not the latter, can accommodate. Two features characterise this class: First, distinct groups coincide, that is numerically distinct groups share all their members at all time. (...) Second, we have access to the inner mechanisms of the groups agents, because members know what they have decided on. I construct a counterexample with these features allowing me to reject interpretivism about group agency in favour of functionalism. (shrink)
Social Groups in Social and Political Philosophy
Varieties of Cognitive Integration.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs (4):867-890.details
Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent's cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in (...) both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat. (shrink)
Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology
On Ordered Pluralism.Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):305-11.details
This paper examines Miranda Fricker's method of paradigm-based explanation and in particular its promise of yielding an ordered pluralism. Fricker's starting point is a schism between two conceptions of forgiveness, Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness. In the light of a hypothesis about the basic point of forgiveness, she reveals the unity underlying the initially baffling plurality and brings order into it, presenting a paradigmatic form of forgiveness as explanatorily basic and other forms as derivative. The resulting picture, she claims, (...) is an 'explanatorily satisfying ordered pluralism.' But what is this ordered pluralism and how does Fricker's method deliver it? And to what extent can this strategy be generalised to other conceptual practices? By making explicit and critically examining the conception of ordered pluralism implicit in Fricker's procedure, I assess the promise that her approach holds as a way of resolving stand-offs between warring conceptions of ideas or practices more widely. I argue that it holds great promise in this respect, but that if we are to avoid reproducing just the schismatic debates that the pluralism of paradigm-based explanation is supposed to overcome at the level of what is to be regarded as a paradigm case, we need to take seriously the thought that what counts as a paradigm is partly determined by our purposes in giving a paradigm-based explanation. (shrink)
Forgiveness in Normative Ethics
Functional Explanation in General Philosophy of Science
Functional Explanation in Social Science in Philosophy of Social Science
Functions in Philosophy of Biology
Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):1-20.details
In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive—as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the (...) former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles. (shrink)
Mental Actions in Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro's View.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.details
This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro's The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors' framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about (...) multiple realization, I also think there are some questions that have yet to be answered. (shrink)
Mind-Brain Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind
Multiple Realizability in General Philosophy of Science
Towards a Pluralist Theory of Singular Thought.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3947-3974.details
This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem has it is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which (...) we do not or cannot bear any special epistemic relation. The paper focuses on a specific instance of the scope problem by addressing the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. Various possible solutions to the scope problem within the dominant framework are assessed and rejected. The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem. (shrink)
Abstract Objects in Metaphysics
De Re Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Mind
Thought and Thinking, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
The Swapping Constraint.Henry Schiller - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622.details
Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same (...) computational state. (shrink)
Computationalism in Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Implementing Computations in Philosophy of Computing and Information
Charles T. Wolfe. Materialism: A Historico-Philosophical Introduction. Dordrecht: Springer, 2016. Pp. Ix+134. $54.99.Noga Arikha - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2):386-391.details
Aristotle: Philosophy of Mind, Misc in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Biological Sciences in Natural Sciences
Physicalism in Metaphysics
Reductionism in General Philosophy of Science
Unity of Science in General Philosophy of Science
Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.details
It is argued that although George Bealer's influential 'Self-Consciousness argument' refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of 'pain' to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...) refutation. I focus particularly on one such theory, which takes concepts to be event types that are individuated by their psychological roles, which has the resources of responding to each of the more specific worries Bealer expresses. (shrink)
Conscious Thought in Philosophy of Mind
Functionalism and Self-Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
Responsibility and Vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.details
My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some (...) to abandon the control-based account of responsibility and replace it with an alternative account. It leads others to deny the intuition that agents are responsible in these troublesome cases. After outlining the account of moral responsibility I have in mind, I look at some of the arguments made against the viability of this theory. I show that there are conceptual resources for salvaging the control account, focusing in particular on the nature of vigilance. I also argue that there is empirical data that supports the control account so conceived. (shrink)
Control and Responsibility in Meta-Ethics
Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action
Physicalism and Neo-Lockeanism About Persons.Joungbin Lim - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1229-1240.details
The central objection to neo-Lockeanism about persons is the too many thinkers problem: NLP ends up with an absurd multiplication of thinkers. Sydney Shoemaker attempts to solve this problem by arguing that the person and the animal do not share all of the same physical properties. This, according to him, leads to the idea that mental properties are realized in the person's physical properties only. The project of this paper is to reject Shoemaker's physicalist solution to the too many thinkers (...) problem. I first argue that his physicalism fails to explain why two physically indistinguishable objects differ in their persistence conditions and physical properties. I then argue that Shoemaker illicitly treats the case of the person and the case of the animal differently, first in regard to cerebral function and its relation to mental properties, and second in regard to brainstem function and its relation to biological properties. This shows that Shoemaker's solution actually undermines his entire argument. (shrink)
Locke: Persons in 17th/18th Century Philosophy
Physicalism about the Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Psychological Theories of Personal Identity in Metaphysics
Embodied Functionalism and Inner Complexity: Simon's 21st-Century Mind.Robert D. Rupert - 2016 - In R. Frantz and L. Marsh (ed.), Minds, Models, and Milieux: Commemorating the Centennial of the Birth of Herbert Simon. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 7–33.details
This chapter argues that Simon anticipated what has emerged as the consensus view about human cognition: embodied functionalism. According to embodied functionalism, cognitive processes appear at a distinctively cognitive level; types of cognitive processes (such as proving a theorem) are not identical to kinds of neural processes, because the former can take various physical forms in various individual thinkers. Nevertheless, the distinctive characteristics of such processes — their causal structures — are determined by fine-grained properties shared by various, often especially (...) bodily related, physical processes that realize them. Simon's apparently anti-embodiment views are surveyed and are shown to be consistent with his many claims that lend themselves to an embodied interpretation and that, to a significant extent, helped to lay the groundwork for an embodied cognitive science. (shrink)
Computation and Representation, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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Realization and Multiple Realization, Chicken and Egg.Thomas W. Polger - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):862-877.details
A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain (...) the proper way to understand the relation between realization and multiple realization. (shrink)
Explanation in Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
From Aristotle's Teleology to Darwin's Genealogy: The Stamp of Inutility, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 (Pdf: Contents, Introduction).Marco Solinas - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.details
Starting with Aristotle and moving on to Darwin, Marco Solinas outlines the basic steps from the birth, establishment and later rebirth of the traditional view of living beings, and its overturning by evolutionary revolution. The classic framework devised by Aristotle was still dominant in the 17th Century world of Galileo, Harvey and Ray, and remained hegemonic until the time of Lamarck and Cuvier in the 19th Century. Darwin's breakthrough thus takes on the dimensions of an abandonment of the traditional finalistic (...) theory. It was a transition exemplified in the morphological analysis of useless parts, such as the sightless eyes of moles, already discussed by Aristotle, which Darwin used as a crowbar to unhinge the systematic recourse to final causes. With many excerpts, a chronological sequence and an analytical approach, this book follows the course of the two conceptions that have shaped the destiny of life sciences in western culture. (shrink)
11/12th Century Philosophy, Misc in Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
13th/14th Century Philosophy, Misc in Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
19th Century British Philosophy, Misc in 19th Century Philosophy
Adaptationism in Philosophy of Biology
Anti-Darwinist Approaches, Misc in Philosophy of Biology
Aristotelian Commentators, Misc in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle: Biology in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle: Causation in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle: Chance in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle: Cosmology in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle: Matter and Elements in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Causation in Biology in Philosophy of Biology
Complexity in Biology in Philosophy of Biology
Consequentialism and Teleology in Normative Ethics
Darwinism in Philosophy of Biology
Epistemology of Evolution in Philosophy of Biology
Evolution and Creationism in Philosophy of Biology
Evolutionary Progress in Philosophy of Biology
Exaptation in Philosophy of Biology
Explanation in Biology in Philosophy of Biology
Fitness in Philosophy of Biology
Francis Bacon in 17th/18th Century Philosophy
History of Biology in Philosophy of Biology
History of Physics in Philosophy of Physical Science
History of Science, Misc in General Philosophy of Science
Intelligent Design in Philosophy of Biology
Life in Philosophy of Biology
Medieval Metaphysics in Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
Punctuated Equilibrium in Philosophy of Biology
Robert Boyle in 17th/18th Century Philosophy
Speciation in Philosophy of Biology
Teleology in Philosophy of Biology
Teleology and Function, Misc in Philosophy of Biology
The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types (...) of agent are possible. (shrink)
Degrees of Belief in Philosophy of Probability
The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.details
Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
O Livre-Arbítrio em John R. Searle: Uma Contraposição do Naturalismo Biológico ao Fisicalismo e ao Funcionalismo.Daniel P. Nunes - 2014 - Dissertation, UNIVERSIDADE DE CAXIAS DO SULdetails
This dissertation aims to examine whether John Searle's biological naturalism is a more viable alternative to current physicalist and functionalist positions in dealing with the issue of free will. Thus, my strategy is to identify the assumptions of these lines of thought and their philosophical consequences. In order to accomplish this goal the concept of intrinsic intentionality is taken as a guide. I begin by defining what is meant by free will and go on to broadly characterize physicalist and functionalist (...) positions in philosophy of mind. Then, I go on to show how the question of free will arises and can be crucial to such currents of thought. Subsequently, I summarize the biological naturalist position (especially regarding the ontology of consciousness and the question of intentionality) and oppose it to physicalism and functionalism in order to examine the possibility of free will. In this opposition, each theory is decomposed into its main tenets so that they can be critically analyzed. In this analysis, it appears that free will does not seem to find any room in the scenario presented by physicalism and functionalism. It is argued that Searlean biological naturalism is able to explain – better than the other two positions – how free action can be motivated by something that is external to the mental state which is itself performing the action. I then evaluate the ethical implications of these findings, articulating the issues of intrinsic intentionality, free will, strong artificial intelligence in order to conclude that current machines cannot be assigned moral responsibility, since they are not capable of intrinsic intentionality. Then, I argue for the evolutionary origin of intentionality and therefore morality. Finally, I argue that neuroscience does not eliminate moral responsibility since it does not prove that free will is an illusion, i.e., that this branch of science does not contradict John Searle's biological naturalism. (shrink)
Free Will in Philosophy of Action
Functionalism and Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
Naturalizing Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind
Searle's Biological Naturalism in Philosophy of Mind
The Functionalist's Body.Robert D. Rupert - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (2):258-268.details
Interview with professor Robert D Rupert.
Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up?Michael J. Raven - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):57-75.details
My aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability (...) to explain cases in which it is plausibly indeterminate whether something is in pain. The Mixed Theory, whether or not it is ultimately correct, at least deserves renewed attention. (shrink)
Other Psychophysical Relations, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Normative Functionalism.Chauncey Maher - 2012 - Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.details
Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content in Philosophy of Mind
The Nature of Contents, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Wilfrid Sellars in 20th Century Philosophy
Normative Functionalism in the Pittsburgh School.Patrick J. Reider - 2012 - Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.details
Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell (whom Maher aptly calls the "Pittsburgh School") have tremendous influence on the current shape of the analytic tradition. Despite their differing views on philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology, their shared application of 'normative functionalism' highlights important similarities in their approaches to the aforementioned disciplines. Normative functionalism interprets the ability to form judgments, possess concepts, rationally defend or be critical of judgments, and consequently act as an agent, as largely guided (...) by one's responsiveness to norms. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I argue that the Pittsburgh School's normative functionalism has germinated from the seed of Sellars' 'psychological nominalism' and cannot be separated from it. Second, no philosophical question or approach can be free of competing claims as to the manner in which human beings think, communicate, act, and know. As a result, normative functionalism (insofar as it is a natural extension of psychological nominalism) is relevant to many philosophical disciplines, because it opposes nearly all the traditional views concerning how the human intellect comes into being and functionally operates. (shrink)
Naturalism and Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind
Plantinga, Sosa, and the Swampman.Jim Slagle - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (4):687-700.details
Psychophysical Reductionism Without Type Identities.Justin Tiehen - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):223-236.details
Nonreductive physicalists have a causal exclusion problem. Given certain theses all physicalists accept, including psychophysical supervenience and the causal closure of the physical realm, it is difficult to see how irreducible mental phenomena could make a causal difference to the world. The upshot, according to those who push the problem, is that we must embrace reductive physicalism. Only then is mental causation saved. -/- Grant the argument, at least provisionally. Here our focus is the conditional question: What form should one's (...) reductionism take if it is motivated in part by the exclusion problem? Must one be a type identity theorist, or are alternative reductive views available, as Jaegwon Kim has suggested more than once? (shrink)
Eliminative Materialism in Philosophy of Mind
Psychophysical Reduction, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Token Identity in Metaphysics
Pains, Pills and Properties - Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction.Raphael van Riel - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.details
Dispositional and Categorical Properties in Metaphysics
Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):103-124.details
Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind
Superfunctionalizing the Mind. [REVIEW]Saray Ayala - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1).details
Against A Posteriori Functionalism.Marc A. Moffett - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.details
There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, "What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?" The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...) very multiple-realizability intuitions that motivate functionalism in the first place. For, according to those intuitions, it is possible for a being to experience pain, have beliefs, etcetera, and yet not only to be of a different species, but to have an entirely different material constitution from human beings. (shrink)
Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization.Kevin Morris - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.details
Realization can be roughly understood as a kind of role-playing, a relationship between a property that plays a role and a property characterized by that role. This rough sketch previously received only moderate elaboration; recently, however, several substantive theories of realization have been proposed. But are there any general constraints on a theory of realization? What is a theory of realization supposed to accomplish? I first argue that a view of realization is viable, in part, to the extent that physical (...) realization under that view explains or accounts for why instances of realized properties are necessitated by how things are physically in a modally strong sense. In this sense, I claim that physical realization should explain physical supervenience. I then call into question two alternative desiderata and raise a challenge for attempts to explicate realization in terms of isomorphism or analogy. Finally, I explain how a causal-functional account of realization, as well as less demanding accounts, can meet the preferred desideratum. (shrink)
Supervenience and Physicalism in Metaphysics
Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.details
Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
Folk Concepts and Folk Intuitions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Pluralism about Truth in Philosophy of Language
Theories of Concepts, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language
Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language
Triviality Arguments Against Functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.details
"Triviality arguments" against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the "autonomy" of functional description.
Mechanisms and Functional Brain Areas.Gregory Johnson - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):255-271.details
Explanations of how psychological capacities are carried out often invoke functional brain areas. I argue that such explanations cannot succeed. Psychological capacities are carried out by identifiable entities and their activities in the brain, but functional brain areas are not the relevant entities. I proceed by assuming that if functional brain areas did carry out psychological capacities, then these brain areas could be included in descriptions of mechanisms. And if functional brain areas participate in mechanisms, then they must engage in (...) activities. A number of ways in which we might understand the claim that functional brain areas engage in activities are examined. None are successful, and so one conclusion is that functional brain areas do not participate in mechanisms. Consequently, they are not the entities that carry out psychological capacities. (shrink)
Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras.Kevin Morris - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.details
In his recent article 'Consciousness and Reduction', Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws. Introduction Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws Marras on Functional Reduction (...) The Logical Space of 'Bridge Law' Views of Reduction [RP] as an Account of Realization Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Theory Reduction in General Philosophy of Science
Adaptive Control Loops as an Intermediate Mind-Brain Reduction Basis.J. Oelle Prou St - 2009 - In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos Verlag. pp. 191.details
Evolution of Cognition, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Mechanistic Explanation in General Philosophy of Science
The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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Reduction in Real Life.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.details
The main message of the paper is that there is a disconnect between what many philosophers of mind think of as the scientific practice of reductive or reductionist explanation, and what the most relevant scientific work is actually like. I will sketch what I see as a better view, drawing on various ideas in recent philosophy of science. I then import these ideas into the philosophy of mind, to see what difference they make.1 At the end of the paper I (...) address a possible objection: the familiar package of ideas I reject in the philosophy of science should not be lightly discarded, because other popular views on fundamental issues depend on positions that I want to reject. I reply that those apparently attractive further ideas are not worth holding onto. (shrink)
Reduction in Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Theories and Models, Misc in General Philosophy of Science
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Romeo, René, and the Reasons Why: What Explanation Is.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):61-84.details
Psychological Explanation in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Reasons and Causes in Philosophy of Action
Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.details
Concerns about 'mental causation' are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
Dualism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub‐Types.Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.details
The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, (...) a conservative theory reduction is in principle possible, despite multiple realization. We link this account with Nagelian reduction, as well as with Kim's functional reduction. (shrink)
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CHAPTER 6. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2007 - In Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 149-174.details
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind.Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.) - 2007 - Wiley-Blackwell.details
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental (...) content, and the nature of consciousness. (shrink)
Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics
Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content in Philosophy of Mind
Emergence in Metaphysics
Mental States and Processes in Philosophy of Mind
Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind, General Works in Philosophy of Mind
Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism?Brian P. McLaughlin - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.details
Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
Epiphenomenalism in Philosophy of Mind
In Defence of Functionalism.Jing Zhu - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):95-99.details
Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited.Murat Aydede - 2005 - In Gurol Irzik & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.details
I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims plague content-based (...) psychologies. So STM can't be any better than the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) in its prospects for forming the foundations of a scientifically respectable psychology, whether or not RTM has the problems that Stich claims it does. (shrink)
AI without Representation? in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The Language of Thought in Philosophy of Mind
Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective.Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.details
Colors, Functions, Realizers, and Roles.Jonathan Cohen - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):117-140.details
You may speak of a chain, or if you please, a net. An analogy is of little aid. Each cause brings about future events. Without each the future would not be the same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But that is not what we mean by the word. Nor on the other hand do we mean sole cause. There is no such thing.
Theories of Color, Misc in Philosophy of Mind