Category: Tracking and Reporting
What the MLC Can Learn from Orphan Works
As you may be aware, The MLC recently received $424 million as payment of the "inception to date" unmatched mechanical royalties held at a number of streaming platforms, sometimes called the "black box." Why do we have a black box at all? For the same reason you have "pending and unmatched" at record companies–somebody decided to exploit the recording without clearing the song.
Streaming services will, no doubt, try to blame the labels for this missing data, but that dog don't hunt. First, the streaming service has an independent obligation to obtain a license and therefore to know who they are licensing from. Just because the labels do, too, doesn't diminish the service's obligation. It must also be said that for years, services did not accept delivery of publishing metadata even if a label wanted to give it to them. So that helps explain how we get to $424 million. Although the money was paid around mid-February, it's clearly grown because The MLC is to hold the funds in an interest bearing account. Although The MLC has yet to disclose the current balance. Maybe someday.
This payment is, rough justice, a quid pro quo for the new "reach back" safe harbor that the drafters of Title I came up with that denies songwriters the right to sue for statutory damages if a platform complies with their rules including paying this money. That's correct–songwriters gave up a valuable right to get paid with their own money.
The MLC has not released details about these funds as yet, but one would expect that the vast majority of the unmatched would be for accounting periods prior to the enactment of Title I of the Music Modernization Act (Oct. 11, 2018). One reason that expectation would be justified is that Title I requires services to try hard(er) to match song royalties with song owners. The statute states "…a digital music provider shall engage in good-faith, commercially reasonable efforts to identify and locate each copyright owner of such musical work (or share thereof)" as a condition of being granted the safe harbor.
The statute then goes on to list some examples of "good faith commercially reasonable efforts". This search, or lack thereof, is at the heart of Eight Mile Style and Martin Affiliated's lawsuit against Spotify and the Harry Fox Agency. (As the amended complaint states, "Nowhere does the MMA limitation of liability section suggest that it lets a DMP off the hook for copyright infringement liability for matched works where the DMP simply committed copyright infringement. The same should also be true where the DMP had the information, or the means, to match, but simply ignored all remedies and requirements and committed copyright infringement instead. Spotify does not therefore meet the requirements for the liability limitations of the MMA with respect to Eight Mile for this reason alone.")
The MMA language is similar to "reasonably diligent search" obligations for orphan works, which are typically works of copyright where the owner cannot be identified by the user after trying to find them. This may be the only aspect of orphan works practice that is relevant to the black box under MMA. Since considerable effort has been put into coming up with what constitutes a proper search particularly in Europe it might be a good idea to review those standards.
We may be able to learn somethng about what we expect the services to have already done before transferring the matching problem to the MLC and what we can expect the MLC to do now that they have the hot potato. The MMA provides non-exclusive examples of what would comprise a good search, so it is relevant what other best practices may be out there.
Establishing reference points for what constitutes "good faith commercially reasonable efforts" under MMA is important to answer the threshold question: Is the $424 million payment really all there is? How did the services arrive at this number? While we are impressed by the size of the payment, that's exactly the reason why we should inquire further about how it was arrived at, what periods it is for and whether any deductions were made. Otherwise it's a bit like buying the proverbial pig in the proverbial poke.
One method lawmakers have arrived at for determining reasonableness is whether the work could be identified by consulting readily available databases identified by experts (or common sense). For example, if a songwriter has all their metadata correct with the PROs, it's going to be a bit hard to stomach that either the service or the MLC can't find them.
Fortunately, we have the Memorandum of Understanding from the European Digital Libraries initiative which brought together a number of working groups to develop best practices to search for different copyright categories of orphan works. The Music/Sound Working Group was represented by Véronique Desbrosses of GESAC and Shira Perlmutter, then of IFPI and now Register of Copyrights (head of the U.S. Copyright Office). The Music/Sound Working Group established these reasonable search guidelines:
DUE DILIGENCE GUIDELINES
The [Music/Sound] Working Group further discussed what constituted appropriate due diligence in dealing with the interests of the groups represented at the table—i.e., what a responsible [user] should, and does, do to find the relevant right holders. We agreed that at least the following searches should be undertaken:
1. Check credits and other information appearing on the work's packaging (including names, titles, date and place of recording) and follow up through those leads to find additional right holders (e.g., contacting a record [company] to find the performers).
2. Check the databases/membership lists of relevant associations or institutions representing the relevant category of right holder (including collecting societies, unions, and membership or trade associations). In the area of music/sound, such resources are extensive although not always exhaustive.
3. Utilise public search engines to locate right holders by following up on whatever names and facts are available.
4. Review online copyright registration lists maintained by government agencies, such as the U.S. Copyright Office.
Perhaps when the MLC audits the inception to date payments we'll have some idea of whether the services complied with these simple guidelines.
By Chris Castlein Best Practices in Search, Music Modernization Act, The MLC, Tracking and Reporting April 12, 2021 April 17, 2021 1,026 WordsLeave a comment
The Economics of Recoupment Forgiveness
Can Forgiveness Be Compulsory?
There is a drumbeat starting in some quarters, particularly in the UK, for the government to inject itself into private contracts and cause a forgiveness of unrecouped balances in artist agreements after a date certain–as if by magic. Adopting such a law would focus Government action to essentially cause a compulsory "sale" by the government of the amount of every artist's unrecouped balance due to the passing of time for what is arguably a private benefit.
Writing off the unrecouped balance for the artist's private benefit would essentially cause the transfer to the artist of the value of the unrecouped balance to be measured at zero–which raises a question as to the other side of the double-entry if the government also allows a financial accounting write off for the record company investor but values that risk capital at zero. Government action of this type raises Constitutional questions in the U.S., and I suspect will also raise those same types of questions in any jurisdiction where the common law obtains. We'll come back to this. It also raises questions as to why anyone would risk the investment in new artists' recordings if the time frame for recovery of that risk capital is foreshortened. We'll come back to this, too.
What's Wrong with Being Unrecouped?
Remember—being unrecouped is not a "debt" or a "loan". It's just a prepayment of royalties by contract that is conditioned on certain events happening before it is ever "repaid." There is no guarantee that the prepaid royalties will ever be earned.
One of the all-time great artist managers told me once that if his artist was recouped under the artist's record deal, the manager was not doing his job. The whole point was to be as unrecouped as humanly possible at all times. Why? Because it was free money money bet that may never be called. Plus he would do his best to make the label or publisher bet too high and he was never going to let them bet too low.
Another great artist manager who was representing a new artist who went on to do well before breaking up said that once he realized he was never going to be recouped with the record company it was a wonderfully liberating experience. He'd talk them into loads of recoupable off-contract payments like tour support, promotion and marketing that made his band successful and that he didn't share with the label. Tour support is only 50% recoupable? How much will you spend if it's 100% recoupable?
Get the idea? We're starting to hear some rumblings about a statutory cutoff for recoupment of a term of years. First of all, I would bet such a rule in the U.S. if applied retroactively would be unconstitutional taking in violation of due process under the 5th Amendment. Regardless, whichever country adopts such a rule will in short order find themselves with either no record companies or with vastly different deal points in artist recording agreements subject to their national law. (See the "$50,000 a year" controversy from 1994 over California Civ. Code §3423 when California-based labels were contemplating leaving the State. We're way beyond runaway production now.)
Record Company as Banker
Let's imagine two scenarios: One is an unsigned artist trying to finance a recording, the other is a catalog artist with an inactive royalty account. They each illustrate different issues regarding recoupment.
Imagine you went to a bank to finance your recordings. You told the banker I do some livestreams, here's my Venmo account statements and I have all this Spotify data on my 200,000 streams that made me $500 but cost me $10,000 in marketing. Most importantly of all, your assistant thinks I am really cool, if you catch my drift.
I want to make a better record and I think I could get some gigs if clubs ever reopen. My songs are really cool. I need you to lend me $50,000 to make my record and another $50,000 to market it. (Probably way more.) I don't want a maturity date on the loan, I don't want events of default (meaning it is "non recourse"), you can't charge me interest, I don't want to make payments, but you can recoup the principal from the earnings I make for licensing or selling copies of the recordings you pay for. I'll market those recordings unless my band breaks up which you have no control over. As I recoup the principal, I'll pay you in current dollars for the historical unrecouped balance. I keep all the publishing, merch and live. And oh, if you want you can own the recordings, but understand that I will be doing everything I can to try to get you (or guilt you or force you) to give me the recordings back regardless of whether you have recouped your "loan" which isn't a loan at all.
Deal?
Catalog Fairness
Then consider a catalog artist. The catalog artist was signed 25 years ago to a term recording artist agreement with $500,000 per LP on a three firm agreement that didn't pan out. After tour support, promotion, additional advances to cover income tax payments, the artist got dropped from their label and broke up with a $1,000,000 unrecouped balance. In the intervening years, the artists went on to individual careers as songwriters and film composers, but none of those subsequent earnings were recoupable as they got dropped and were under separate contracts. Another thing that happened in the intervening years was the label went from selling CDs at a $10 wholesale price through their wholly owned branch distribution system to selling streams at $0.003 each through a third party platform with probably triple the marketing costs.
The old recordings eventually dwindled below 1,500 CD units a year for a few years, and in 2005 the label cut them out, but continued to service their digital accounts with the recordings as deep and ever deeper catalog. After a few sync placements, earnings reached zero for a couple years and the royalty account was archived, i.e., taken off line. Streaming happened and now the recordings are making about $100 a year until one track got onto a Spotify "Gen Z Afternoon Safe Space Tummy Rub" playlist and scored 1,000,000 streams or about $600 give or take. When the royalty account was archived, it had an unrecouped balance of $800,000 in 1995 dollars. So the $600 gets accrued in case the catalog ever earns enough to justify the cost of reactivating the account—which means the artist doesn't get paid for the recordings because they are unrecouped but they also don't get a statement because they've had an earnings drought. Like most per-stream payments, it would cost more to account for the $600 on a statement than the royalties payable.
Bear in mind that adjusted for inflation—and we'll come back to that—the $800,000 in 1995 dollars would be worth $1,366,866.14 today. But because the record company does not charge either overhead, interest, or any inflation charge, the historical $800,000 from 1995 is paid off in ever-inflated current dollars.
As the artist managers said, the artists long ago got the benefit of getting essentially a no-risk lifetime royalty pre-payment (it's not really correct to call it a "loan" when there's no recourse, maturity date, payments, interest rate or repayment schedule) and long ago spent the money on a variety of business and personal expenses. Which potentially enhanced their careers so they could get that film work later down the line. Or more simply, a bird in the hand.
Do You Really Want Monkey Points?
If you want to see what would happen if this apple cart were rocked, take a good look at a good corollary, the "net profits" definition in the film business, or what Eddy Murphy famously called "monkey points." Without getting into the gory details, studios will typically play a game with gross receipts that involves exclusions, deductions, subdistributor receipts, advances, ancillary rights, income from physical properties (from memorabilia like Dorothy's slippers), distribution fees, distribution and marketing expenses, deferments, gross participation, negative costs, interest on the negative cost, overbudget deductions, overhead on negative cost and marketing costs (and interest on overhead)…shall I go on? And then there's the accounting.
The movie industry also has a concept called "turnaround". Turnaround happens when Studio A decides (usually for commercial reasons) it is not going forward with a script that it has developed and offers it to other studios for a price that allows it to recover some or all of its development costs usually with an override royalty. Sometimes it works out well–after a very long time, the project may become "ET." Would artists prefer getting dropped or having their contracts put into turnaround?
The point is that while it may sound good to make unrecouped balances vanish after a date certain, people who say that seem to think that all the other deal terms will stay constant or even improve for the artists after that substantial risk shifting. I seriously doubt that, just like I doubt that venture capitalists who fund the startups that bag on record companies would give up their 2 or 3x liquidation preference, full ratchet anti-dilution protection, registration rights or co-sale agreements.
Should 5% Appear Too Small
But did the unrecouped balance actually vanish? Not really. The value was transferred to the artist in the form of forgiveness of an obligation for the artist's private benefit, however contingent. That value may be measured in an amount greater than the historic unrecouped balance. Is this value transfer a separate taxable event? Must the artist declare the forgiveness as income? Can the record company write off the value transferred as a loss? If not, why not? I can't think of a good reason. If anything, valuing the "taking" in current dollars would only correct the valuation issue and could amplify the tax liability of the transfer.
As you can see, wiping out unrecouped balances sounds easy until you think about it. It is actually a rather complex transaction which immediately raises another question as to when it stops. Why just signed artists? Why not all artists? Songwriters? Profit participants in motion pictures or television? Authors? All of this will be taken into account.
King John and the Barons: Don't Tread On Me
Setting aside the tax implication, were such government action to take the form of a law to be enacted in the United States, it would prohibit a fundamental right previously enjoyed under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (one of the Amendments known as the "Bill of Rights"). The "takings" clause of the 5th Amendment states "…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." In fact, such government action would implicate the fundamental rights expressed in the 5th Amendment and applied against the states in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. The 5th Amendment derives from Section 39 of Magna Carta, the seminal constitutional documents in the United Kingdom (dating from 1215 for those reading along at home) and was central to the thinking of Coke, Blackstone and Locke who were central to the thinking of the Founders.
In the U.S., such a law would likely be given a once over and strictly scrutinized by the courts (including The Court) to determine if taking unrecouped balances from a select group of artists, i.e., those signed to record companies, is the only way to get at a compelling government interest in promoting culture even though the taking would be pretty obviously for the private benefit of the artists concerned and only benefiting the public in a very attenuated manner. In other words, will treating a select group of pretty elite artists (at a minimum those signed vs. those unsigned) satisfy the strict scrutiny standard applied to a government taking of private property with no compensation. (This distinction also smacks of a due process violation which is a whole other rabbit hole.) I suspect the government loses the strict scrutiny microbial scrub and will be required to compensate the record company for the taking at the fair market value of the unrecouped balances.
Because I think this is pretty clearly a total regulatory taking that is a per se violation of the 5th Amendment, I suspect that a court (or the Supreme Court) would be inclined to hold the law invalid on Constitutional grounds and simply stop any enforcement.
Failing that strict scrutiny standard, a court could ask if the zeroing of unrecouped balances with no compensation is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. I still think that the taking would fail in this case as there a many other ways for the government to promote culture and even to encourage labels to voluntarily wipe out the unrecouped balances at some point such as through a quid pro quo of favorable tax treatment, changing the accounting rules or offsets of one kind or another on the sale of a catalog.
Running for the Exits
If anything, I think that government acting to cut off the ability to recoup at a date certain with no compensation (which sure sounds like an unconstitutional taking in the US) would necessarily make labels start thinking about compensating for that taking by moving out of those territories where it is given effect (or at least not signing artists from those countries). Such moves might make artists start thinking about moving to where they could get signed.
Or worse yet, it would make labels re-think their financial terms and re-recording restrictions. Overhead charges and interest on recording costs would be two changes I would expect to see almost immediately. And that would be a poor trade off.
Iterative Government Choices
The choice that artists make is whether to sign up to an investor like a record company who wants a long-term recoupment relationship against pre-paid royalties. If you don't like a place, don't go there and if you don't like the deal, don't sign.
Any government that contemplates taking unrecouped balances must necessarily also contemplate offering artists grants to make up the shortfall due to signing contractions. This could include for example the host of grant funding sources available in Canada such as FACTOR and the many provincial music grants. And those grants should not come from the black box thank you very much.
On the other hand, I do see a lot of fairness in requiring on-demand services to pay featured and nonfeatured artists a kind of equitable remuneration like webcasters and satellite radio do, which is paid through on a nonrecoupment basis directly to the artists in the US. While they may criticize the system that produced the recordings that have made them rich beyond the wildest dreams of artists, songwriters or music executives (except the ones the services hire away), that doesn't mean that they shouldn't pay over to creators some of the valuation transfer that made Daniel Ek a multibillionaire while artists get less than ½¢ per stream.
So the takeaways here are:
Wiping out unrecouped balances with no compensation is likely illegal.
Creating a meaningful and attractive tax incentive for record companies to wipe out an unrecouped balance conditioned on that benefit being passed through to artists is worth exploring. (Why wait 15 years to give that effect?) This may be particularly attractive in a time of rising taxable income at labels.
Requiring the services to pay a royalty in the nature of equitable remuneration on a nonrecoupment basis is a way to grow the pie and get some relief to both featured and nonfeatured artists. This new stream is also worth exploring.
By Chris Castlein Digital Services: Amazon, Digital Services: Apple Music, Digital Services: Facebook, Digital Services: Google, Digital Services: Pandora, Digital Services: Snapchat, Digital Services: Spotify, Digital Services: Startups, Digital Services: Twitch.tv, Digital Services: Twitter, Digital Services: YouTube, Equitable Remuneration, Investors, Performance Right, Startups, Streaming vs Physical, Tracking and Reporting, Value Gap November 29, 2020 December 1, 2020 2,611 WordsLeave a comment
Who Owns The MLC Database of Songs?
If you've been following the evolution of the "aircraft carrier" revision of the U.S. Copyright Act styled the "Music Modernization Act," you will remember that America now has a blanket license for the mechanical reproduction of songs (or will have as of 1/1/21). The "MMA" comes in three parts (or as I say three and one-half):
Title I which establishes the blanket license, a willing-buyer willing-seller standard for mechanical royalty rate setting, the Mechanical Licensing Collective (called the "MLC"), the all-important safe harbor for Big Tech's massive infringement of songs, and authorized the creation of the "musical works database" which is the subject of this post;
Title I-1/2 which gives certain small benefits to ASCAP and BMI;
Title II which provides meaningful relief and largely fixes the pre-72 loophole that the Turtles sued over (formerly the CLASSICS Act); and
Title III which gives producers a statutory basis for SoundExchange royalties, another truly meaningful change.
I supported Title II and Title III, but I have lots of bones to pick with Title I, not the least of which has to do with the musical works database. A lot of my issues have to do with what I perceive as sloppy drafting and a mad rush to "get a bill" at all costs which has led to a strong need to "fix" a lot of "glitches" in Title I itself (such as the failure to dovetail the major change in the compulsory mechanical from a per-song basis to a blanket basis. This in turn has an affect on other copyright provisions such as the termination right for songwriters which is now having to get solved–maybe–through the caulking of regulations to cover sloppy workmanship. (Caulk cracks.)
For those of us who sweep up behind the elephants in the circus of life, I fear that the musical works database of other people's things is an 11th Century solution to a 21st Century problem–a list of things that will be very difficult to get right and even more difficult to keep right, not unlike William the Conqueror's Domesday Book. Static lists of dynamic things necessarily are out of date the moment they are fixed. We are going to discuss Title I musical works database today from a very simple threshold question: Who owns it?
Spoiler alert: The public owns it. This is logical, but like so many things in the drafting of Title I, the drafting is glitchy, which is what you call it if you're in a good mood. I apocryphally attribute the term "glitch" when applied to massive Internet data breaches to the Fathers of the Internet who not only failed to take care that the herd was protected but also created a never ending series of data breaches. That, in turn, birthed the entire Internet security industry–you know, "glitch" protection. (Looking at you, Vint Cerf.)
When you consider that the most valuable asset of the MLC is going to be the song database, and this database of other people's things must be created by the efforts of potentially hundreds of thousands of songwriters given no choice in the matter, ownership matters. It would be a bit much for the U.S. Congress to require all this only to enrich one U.S. corporation controlled by the U.S. publishers by leveraging a compulsory license to create a very valuable private asset. Particularly one paid for by other people that might then get taken and given to a replacement MLC. (There's that "taken" word again.) That's typically not what they do.
Let's also remember that on paper, the MLC does not pay a penny for the cost of its operations, including the creation of the database. The entire cost of the MLC's operations is borne by the users of the blanket license through an organization called the Digital Licensee Coordinator. (If you're thinking what's with these names, I know, I know. Forget it, Jake, it's Washington.)
This database ownership issue has been raised a couple times, and no one has answered it. I made it part of a recent comment I filed with the Copyright Office in the current rule making for regulations implementing Title I. Maybe they'll get around to answering the question this time. After a while, you have to wonder why they have not.
A side note demonstrating both that ownership matters and that The MLC is thinking about ownership: a service mark registration for "The MLC". (A service mark is a kind of trademark.) There is a difference between "the MLC" and "The MLC". That's because "the MLC" is the organization envisioned by the Congress that has to be redesignated (think "re-approved") by the Copyright Office every five years. On the other hand, "The MLC" refers to "The MLC, Inc." which is the corporation created by the super popular proponents of Title I who were designated the first MLC and who style themselves "The MLC" using the definite article. But if I told you that there was a difference between "the MLC" and "The MLC" would you find that confusing?
The clear implication of the definite article seems to be that they don't envision any future in which they will not be the MLC, i.e., will not be redesignated. They also probably don't envision a future where a different corporation would be designated the MLC and The MLC would be looking for something to do. Maybe they know something we don't, but there it is.
This also raises some interesting trademark questions should The MLC seek to prevent a successor from trading under the name "MLC", enough to stop The MLC from claiming a proprietary interest in the statutory description. That mark is arguably descriptive and probably should be denied. In fact it's so descriptive it actually asserts a private intellectual property interest in the statutory language that describes the organization created by statute. Sort of like asserting a trademark in "TVA" or "ICC" or "FOIA".
Let's be clear about who owns the Congressional database. As you will see, the musical works database does not belong to the MLC or The MLC and if there is any confusion about that, the Copyright Office should clear it up right away (which would save having to go to other avenues to do the same thing). There really isn't a practical alternative to the Copyright Office jurisdiction. Congress gave the Copyright Office broad regulatory powers over the MLC (and, therefore, The MLC).
The public "musical works database" that Congress envisioned in Title I of the Music Modernization Act is largely a crowdsourced asset. Congress has asked the world's songwriters or copyright owners to spend considerable time preparing their catalogs in whatever format The MLC and the DLC determine is good for The MLC (with the Office's blessing through regulations). There inevitably will be quality control and accuracy review costs invested by the world's songwriters and copyright owners in making sure that their catalogs are correctly reflected in the musical works database. "Copyright owners" may also include sound recording copyright owners asked to contribute their ISRCs or other data that they, too, have invested considerable expense in creating and maintaining.
Unfortunately, the transaction cost to the songwriter and copyright owner for participation in The MLC and crowdsourcing Congress's database is an unfunded mandate at the moment. From a commercial perspective, the dynamic evolution of data is a potentially limitless expense, yet we have both this unfunded mandate which will spike in the early years but continue on a rolling basis essentially forever. Yet the MLC's administrative assessment appears to be capped at a fixed increase by a settlement agreement. Again, a "glitch." Still, MLC executives seem positively giddy about their prospects with all the relief of someone who got tapped for lifetime employment with a pension (no doubt) while the songwriters these leaders are to serve are having the fight of their lives.
Yet, it seems clear that at the time of passing Title I, Congress had no intention of using a public law to create a private asset. Neither was their intention to use the law to leverage the creation of an asset for private ownership by whoever the head of the U.S. Copyright Office designated to be the MLC, regardless of how "popular" they might have been.
The creation of the musical works database is replete with hidden costs paid or incurred by songwriters and copyright owners. Neither the Congress nor the Copyright Royalty Judges were asked to directly address these hidden costs of creating the musical works database. (The Copyright Royalty Judges (or "CRJs") are relevant because they approve the DLC's financial contribution to the MLC through the "Administrative Assessment." The assessment is intended to cover the "collective total costs" which includes broad categories of cost items related to the database.) And as usual, these costs appear to have gone straight over the heads of the Congressional Budget Office in their mandated assessment of the costs of Title I.
Even so, the MMA Conference Report from Congress addresses the cost issue head on:
The [Congress] rejects statements that copyright owners benefit from paying for the costs of collectives to administer compulsory licenses in lieu of a free market. Therefore, the legislation directs that licensees should bear the reasonable costs of establishing and operating the new mechanical licensing collective. This transfer of costs is not unlimited, however, since it is strongly cabined by the term ''reasonable.''[1]
It will be impossible for the "new mechanical licensing collective" to fulfill its statutory duties or build the complete musical works database to which the United States aspires without songwriters and copyright owners around the world doing the intensive and costly spade work to prepare their data to be exported to The MLC.[2] It is clear that the reasonable costs of preparing and exporting that data should be borne by The MLC[3] as part of the "Administrative Assessment."[4] This material cost clearly is covered by the definition of "collective total costs"[5] and so was, or should have been, included in the current Administrative Assessment,[6] unless the intention was to cover The MLC's side of these costs and force songwriters and copyright owners to eat their side of the same transaction. If that is the case, it would be helpful for the Copyright Office to clarify that intention in the name of transparency through their broad regulatory authority.
If there is another drafting glitch there, it is worth noting that the CRJs clearly contemplated revisiting the Administrative Assessment on their own motion for good cause.[7] If there were ever good cause, the staggering cost of registering potentially millions of songs would be it.[8]
It should be clear that no one's intention was for the services to pay to create the musical works database and for the songwriters and copyright owners to labor to export their data to make the musical works database complete, only to have The MLC claim ownership of the musical works database, particularly if The MLC were not redesignated as the MLC following the five-year review by the Copyright Office. That unhappy "take my ball and go home" arbitrage event is foreseeable and would entirely cut against the "continuity" contemplated by Congress.[9]
It is critical that the Copyright Office clarify in regulations that neither The MLC nor any other MLC owns the musical works database. In fact, the MMA clearly states that "if a new entity is designated as the mechanical licensing collective, [the Office shall] adopt regulations to govern the transfer of licenses, funds, records, data, and administrative responsibilities from the existing mechanical licensing collective to the new entity."[10] Since The MLC will have to transfer the musical works database and the other statutory materials to the new MLC if they fail to be redesignated, there should be no misconceptions that The MLC "owns" the database and could withhold all or part of it.[11] Because The MLC is just An MLC.
It should also be made clear that any MLC or DLC vendor does not obtain an ownership interest in any copy of all or part of the musical works database they may obtain for any reason.
This should be an easy ask of the Copyright Office. Watch this space to find out if it is.
[1] Report and Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1551 by the Chairmen and Ranking Members of Senate and House Judiciary Committees, at 1 (2018) at 2 (emphasis added).
[2] This effort is referred to as "Play Your Part™" a business process trademarked by The MLC available at https://themlc.com/preparing-2021.
[3] I would point out that the way The MLC should work—and in the end probably will end up functioning as a practical matter–is that The MLC needs to be able to handle however songwriters ingest their data. Instead, it appears that The MLC is trying to dictate to all the songwriters in the world how they should assemble their song data before they register with The MLC. If The MLC wants to shift that burden, they should expect to pay for it. Otherwise, this is exactly backwards.
[4] 17 U.S.C. §115 (d)(7)(D). The Administrative Assessment is what makes the MLC different from other PROs or CMOs where members bear their own cost of participation. The Administrative Assessment is to cover the entire cost of creating the musical works database, not just The MLC's startup or overhead costs. If nothing else, another way to treat these out of pocket costs is as a contribution to the operating costs of The MLC by songwriters and copyright owners that should be offset against future Administrative Assessments.
[5] 17 U.S.C. § 115 (e)(6).
[6] Order Granting Participants' Joint Motion to Adopt Proposed Regulations, In re Determination and Allocation of Initial Administrative Assessment to Fund Mechanical Licensing Collective (U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges Docket No. 19-CRB-0009-AA (Dec. 12, 2019)).
[7] The CRJs included this footnote in their ruling on the administrative assessment (emphasis added): "The Judges have been advised by their staff that some members of the public sent emails to the Copyright Royalty Board seeking to comment on the proposed settlement agreement. Neither the Copyright Act, nor the regulations adopted thereunder, provide for submission or consideration of comments on a proposed settlement by non-participants in an administrative assessment proceeding. Consequently, as a matter of law, the Judges could not, and did not, consider these ex parte communications in deciding whether to approve the proposed settlement. Additionally, the Judges' non-consideration of these ex parte communications does not: (i) imply any opinion by the Judges as to the substantive merits of any statements contained in such communications; or (ii) reflect any inability of the Judges to question, [on their own motion without a filing from a participant] whether good cause exists to adopt a settlement and to then utilize all express or reasonably implied statutory authority granted to them to make a determination as to the existence…of good cause [to reject the settlement now or in the future]." Order Granting Participants' Joint Motion to Adopt Proposed Regulations, In re Determination and Allocation of Initial Administrative Assessment to Fund Mechanical Licensing Collective (U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges Docket No. 19-CRB-0009-AA (Dec. 12, 2019) n.1 (emphasis added)).
[8] There is a simple solution to determining these costs to songwriters and copyright owners. The Copyright Office could designate several metadata companies who could compete to handle the various steps of creating and exporting metadata to The MLC, such as in the CWR format, for example North Music Group and Crunch Digital have such tools. To avoid picking winners and losers and to preserve competition, the Office could alternatively establish a benchmark of quality control or some other criteria for becoming an approved company. The costs charged would likely vary depending on the size of the catalog, but The MLC need only pay the invoice of these companies which would be included in the Administrative Assessment. Obviously, the entity performing such work should be independent of The MLC, the DLC or any of its members, or any of their respective vendors. This would, of course, introduce the concept of competition into the monopoly which may interest no one but might benefit everyone.
[9] See H. Rep. 115-651 (115th Cong. 2nd Sess. April 25, 2018) at 6 (hereafter "House Report"); S. Rep. 115-339 (115th Cong. 2ndSess. Sept. 17, 2018) at 5 (together with identical language, hereafter "legislative history") ("Although there is no guarantee of a continued designation by the collective, the Committee believes that continuity in the collective would be beneficial to copyright owners so long as the entity previously chosen to be the collective has regularly demonstrated its efficient and fair administration of the collective in a manner that respects varying interests and concerns. In contrast, evidence of fraud, waste, or abuse, including the failure to follow the relevant regulations adopted by the Copyright Office, over the prior five years should raise serious concerns within the Copyright Office as to whether that same entity has the administrative capabilities necessary to perform the required functions of the collective.")
[10] 17 U.S.C. § 115 (d)(3)(B)(ii)(A)(II).
[11] It seems that if an incumbent MLC that was not redesignated and continued to operate, it would almost unavoidably compete with the newly designated MLC but with a substantial leg up. I realize there have been some statements made about The MLC taking on work beyond the blanket license, such as voluntary licenses. That additional work might require additional investment, or a sharing of the total collective costs by third parties. I have not addressed that allocation as I for one would like to see The MLC stick to their knitting and succeed at the job they are obligated to do, and, frankly, paid to do, before worrying about expanding into profitable roles for the non-profit corporation. It does seem that if The MLC is not redesignated, there would not be much for them to do once they transfer the public's assets to the new MLC.
By Chris Castlein Library of Congress, Mass NOI Filings, Music Modernization Act, Tracking and Reporting June 19, 2020 June 28, 2020 2,976 Words1 Comment
Strategic Licensing: @CrunchDigital "Sandbox" Offers Music-Tech Startups a Customized Licensing and Reporting Solution
I always impress on music tech startups that their licensing strategy roadmap is just as important as their product development roadmap. Both are interdependent and neither should get too far out ahead of the other. This is almost always met with resistance and a recitation of the popular cant that "copyright is broken", music has a "market failure" or some similar incantation of a Potter-esque invisibility cloak–the end result being a satisfaction of the dopamine induced desire to rush to market.
Not only does that cloak not exist, invoking it does not help you protect your business from devastating claims downstream. You're not starting your company to pray for failure so no one finds you and decides if you're worth suing.
But–you know you have a functioning market when the market itself produces a privately funded entrepreneurial solution to a market misallocation. Crunch Digital is just that solution–and a solution that could solve through bespoke direct licensing the inefficient cycle of litigation that has become necessary to at least try to force the market back on the rails, especially for songwriters.
As Billboard reported last week:
Crunch Digital, which helps technology companies handle accounting and payments for the music they use, today announced that it's launching Crunch Digital Sandbox, a platform that will expedite for app developers the process of licensing music from big labels and publishers. The idea isn't to negotiate the kinds of complicated contracts needed by big online music distributors — just to quickly create what Crunch Digital founder Keith Bernstein calls "an experimental license" so they can prove their concepts.
Crunch will not license music itself. Rather, it will bring together startups with rightsholders that are participating in the Sandbox program, including BMG Rights Management. "Sandbox strikes the perfect balance, allowing startups to properly license music while ensuring that songwriters are fairly compensated," says Keith Hauprich, BMG general counsel and senior vp business and legal affairs, North America. "This new model squarely addresses a long-standing concern of the industry."
The problem that most music tech startups have with getting started is almost always the licensing piece followed closely by their accounting obligations. I often hear complaints of high transaction costs of music licensing that inhibits innovation. I have just as frequently seen music-tech startups completely underestimate the complexity of royalty accounting for both songs and sound recordings, especially songs. And unless you are trying to create the black box, that's bad.
Some startups just ignore the licensing and wait to get sued. This is unfair to those who seek to do it right, and creates the false impression that licenses cannot be obtained, and that the industry is litigious and a bad investment. That perception is not good for anyone and almost guarantees that innovation will be smothered.
Once a startup launches at scale without all licenses, the startup has created an unfixable problem and potentially endless litigation in a room of mirrors. By "without all licenses", I don't necessarily mean that the service has no licenses, just that it has no licenses for a significant number of works, such as songs. There is a tendency at tech companies to view low earning songs as not being entitled to fair treatment, or at least not as worthy of fairness as the hits. They often learn the hard way that users don't get to call that moral hazard and that the law protects all songs, even if the songs happen to be a small percentage of a particular service's revenue.
Tracking down all those songs creates a problem that is a cross between the stone of Sisyphus and the labors of Hercules. Crunch's Sandbox service helps startups solve that complex problem.
Crucially, the rights owners participating in the Sandbox appear to be offering a wide variety of works and not just a handful of lesser known songs and recordings. The Sandbox could allow startups to launch their business in a safe environment without spending undue resources on licensing and reporting–instead, focusing on their product which I would suggest is what they should be doing.
And the Sandbox brings this equilibrium without any public money, amendment to the Copyright Act or loophole seeking behavior. If successful, the Sandbox will help startups get launched properly, keep startups from reinventing the wheel on royalty reporting, avoid litigation and get artists and songwriters paid.
I'm pleased that Keith Bernstein of Crunch Digital will be on a panel I am moderating at SXSW next March (2018) "Getting to Beta Without Getting Beat Up".
By Chris Castlein Digital Services: Crunch Digital Sandbox, Digital Services: Startups, Tracking and Reporting December 5, 2017 December 6, 2017 759 WordsLeave a comment
Must Read by @adamleealter: Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of Keeping Us Hooked
Remember when Senator Ron Wyden (D-Google Data Center) asked the Big Tobacco CEOs whether they thought nicotine was addictive? In one of the more dramatic moments in the Senate's history, each of the CEOs denied that nicotine was addictive.
And then it turned out that Big Tobacco had been scientifically engineering tobacco to make it as addictive as possible. Oops. If you haven't seen The Insider you really should, as you will better understand the problem with corporations profiting from stimulating addictive behavior. And that is the real problem–it's not that one thing or another is more or less addictive. It is that corporations know that their product is addictive and they try to make it even more addictive than it already is. They conduct secret research and make secret product modifications to enhance its addictiveness for one reason and one reason only–to make money off of human misery.
And then they tell us "Don't be evil."
Dr. Adam Alter's new book suggests that the same type of Senate hearing could well be held on another type of addiction–addiction to smartphones, social media and the Internet. And wouldn't it be great if Senator Wyden could reprise his Big Tobacco performance from so many years ago, except this time with Eric Schmidt, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey and many, many more.
In Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of Keeping Us Hooked, Professor Alter, a professor of psychology and marketing at NYU, documents the rise of behavioral addiction and how Big Tech designs its products to leverage these addictions for profit.
If you doubt the behavioral addiction to social media and your smartphone, try this experiment. Try only using your phone for phone calls for 36 hours. Just check your email on your computer. No email, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google on your phone for 36 hours. Sleep with your phone in another room, and don't touch it until after breakfast. See how you react.
Do you really think that Big Tech hasn't studied these issues? Do you really think that this study of addiction is qualitatively or morally different than Big Tobacco's use of various chemicals to increase the addictive attributes of nicotine? As Dr. Alter demonstrates, behavioral addictions are just as real–and profitable–as substance addictions.
And don't forget that Big Tech studies us, their users, in real time and continually. When the study sample is the size of all the billions of users of monopoly platforms like Google and Facebook, that data is very, very predictive. For example, Facebook data lord Adam Kramer (more about him shortly) said in an interview that Facebook's large user base was one of the reasons he joined Facebook:
Q: Why did you join Facebook?
A: Facebook data constitutes the largest field study in the history of the world. Being able to ask–and answer–questions about the world in general is very, very exciting to me. At Facebook, my research is also immediately useful: When I discover something, we can use this to make improvements to the product. In an academic position, I would have to have a paper accepted, wait for publication, and then hope someone with the means to usefully implement my work takes notice. At Facebook, I just message someone on the right team and my research has an impact within weeks if not days.
Q: What are some of the interesting questions you've answered since you've been here?
A: Do emotions spread contagiously? What do the words we choose have to say about how we are and who we are?
A 2014 study commissioned by Facebook "Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks" written by Adam D. I. Kramer of Facebook's "Core Data Science Team" and two academics from Cornell further demonstrates the power of Facebook's data set.
The study concluded:
Emotional states can be transferred to others via emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions without their awareness. Emotional contagion is well established in laboratory experiments, with people transferring positive and negative emotions to others….
In an experiment with people who use Facebook, we test whether emotional contagion occurs outside of in-person interaction between individuals by reducing the amount of emotional content in the News Feed. When positive expressions were reduced, people produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts; when negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pattern occurred.
These results indicate that emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks. This work also suggests that, in contrast to prevailing assumptions, in-person interaction and nonverbal cues are not strictly necessary for emotional contagion, and that the observation of others' positive experiences constitutes a positive experience for people.
If Facebook is studying something as sophisticated as "emotional contagion through social networks" in a study that we know about, what do you think they are studying that we do not know about? Is it more or less likely that these huge companies are creating studies like the Brown & Williamson tobacco study on adding addictive agents like ammonia and coumarin to cigarettes, or Ford's infamous "Pinto memo" analyzing the cost/benefit fixing the Pinto's exploding gas tank?
Dr. Alter devotes the first few chapters of Irresistable to the history and scientific foundations of the study of addiction. You may find this exposition a bit dry, but stick with it. The background is well applied in his detailed discussion of Big Tech's dependence on addiction.
Alter lays out some of the most important issues of our time that affect both adults and children indiscriminantly. In one of the first books of its kind, Dr. Alter arms us with the knowledge to combat this attack on our sensibilities.
It is important to note that when Steve Jobs introduced the iPad, he forbade his own children from using it. If anyone knew what he was doing and what the risks were, it would have been Steve Jobs. He probably forbade them from smoking, too. My bet is that it was for the same reasons.
As Dr. Alter noted in a recent Business Insider video:
There's a school in Silicon Valley that doesn't allow the use of any tech. It's called the Waldorf School and it's fascinating because the school has no computers, no iPads, no iPhones. They try to minimize tech altogether and so people enjoy a lot of time face-to-face, they go outside a lot. What's interesting about this school is 75% of the students there are the children of Silicon Valley tech execs, which is striking. These are people who, publicly, will expound on the wonders of the products they're producing and at the same time they decided in all their wisdom that their kids didn't belong in a school that used that same tech.
By Chris Castlein Pop Culture, Tracking and Reporting October 16, 2017 1,148 WordsLeave a comment
@KRSfow: Future of What Podcast on the Transparency in Music Licensing and Ownership Act
Episode #94: Recently, a bill was introduced by Republican congressman Jim Sensenbrenner which calls for the creation of a comprehensive database of compositions and recordings. The "Transparency in Music Licensing and Ownership Act" claims to make things easier for coffee shops, bars and restaurants who want to license music to play in their establishments. To many in the music industry, the bill seems like a wolf in sheep's clothing with the potential cause big problems. On this episode we dig deep into the bill with Future of Music Coalition's Kevin Erickson and attorney Chris Castle.
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By Editor Charliein Mass NOI Filings, Tracking and Reporting September 17, 2017 147 WordsLeave a comment
The Transparency in Music Licensing and Ownership Act: The Domesday Book Meets A Unicorn
Americans are freedom loving people and nothing says freedom like getting away with it.
Long Long Time, written by Guy Forsyth
Longtime PRO opponent Rep. Sensenbrenner introduced a bill entitled "The Transparency in Music Licensing and Ownership Act", a piece of work that is Dickensian in its cruelty, bringing a whole new meaning to either "newspeak" or "draconian," take your pick. It's rare that the Congress can accomplish the hat trick of an interference with private contracts, an unconstitutional taking and an international trade treaty violation all in one bill. But I guess practice makes perfect. And since the MIC Coalition gave the bill a rousing cheer followed by a heaping serving of astroturf, we should not be surprised. (Read the bill here.)
While this legislation currently applies only to songs and sound recordings, other creators should not feel that they've dodged a bullet. I hear that the House Judiciary Committee staff is planning on closing the loop and making all copyright categories subject to the same "register or lose it" approach favored by Lessig, Samuelson and their fellow travelers. If you thought that we are in an era of the triumph of property rights, that must be a different Congress you're thinking of.
The bill perpetuates the myth of the "global rights database" that no one who understands the complexities believes will ever be created. It sounds logical, right? We have county recorders for real estate, the DMV for cars, why not a database for music?
That is an 11th century idea being welded onto a 21st century problem, the Domesday Book meets a unicorn. The problem isn't knowing who owns a particular work which evidently is either what they believe or want you to believe.
The problem is that the users don't want to seek permission or beg forgiveness, either. They want to get away with it. This bill demonstrates that unassailable fact in colors bold as the Google logo.
Think about it–by the time you finish reading this post, 1000 songs will be written and 500 songs will be recorded somewhere out there in the world. Or more. (Not to mention photographs taken, paintings painted, chapters written and so on.)
Do you think that songwriters around the world are thinking, now I know what lets do, let's rush to go register that new song in the U.S. Copyright Office–in the database, the registration section, the recordation section? Otherwise, I'll never be able to afford the lawyer to sue Spotify if they don't pay me. I don't think they're thinking that at all and are about to fall into the MIC Association's trap for the unwary. Why the MIC Coalition? We'll come back to them.
MIC Coalition Members
In a nutshell, the bill requires the extraordinarily heavy burden of requiring all songwriters and recording artists (or their publishers or labels)–all, as in the entire world seeking to sue in the U.S., not just the US writers–to register numerous fields of data in a yet to be created database if they plan on suing for statutory damages:
[I]n an action brought under this title for infringement of the exclusive right to perform publicly, reproduce, or distribute a nondramatic musical work or sound recording, the remedies available to a copyright owner [ANY copyright owner] that has failed to provide or maintain the information [required] shall be limited to…(A) an order requiring the infringer to pay to the copyright owner actual damages for the public performance, reproduction, or distribution of the infringed work; and…(B) injunctive relief to prevent or restrain any infringement alleged in the civil action.
That means if you haven't undertaken the formality of registering in this new database, then the user has no exposure to statutory damages and will not have to pay the victorious songwriter or artists attorneys' fees. And this new safe harbor applies apparently even if that songwriter or artist has filed a copyright registration under existing law.
There is nothing in the bill that actually requires the protected class to actually look up anything in this new database, or actually be in compliance with existing statutory licenses (such as the webcasting or simulcasting licenses).
So who is in the new protected class entitled to the Nanny State's protection from those collusive and pesky songwriters and artists? Let's look at the victimology of the "ENTITLEMENT" paragraph.
Well, actually, there's no "ENTITLEMENT" paragraph for the entitled, it's actually called "APPLICABILITY" (see "newspeak", WAR IS PEACE, etc.). The connected class includes five different categories of cronies.
First, the defined term "An establishment" gets the new even safer harbor. "Establishment" is a defined term in the Copyright Act (in Sec. 101 for those reading along at home):
An "establishment" is a store, shop, or any similar place of business open to the general public for the primary purpose of selling goods or services in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is nonresidential is used for that purpose, and in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly.
Like the members of this organization, the National Retail Federation:
Then another defined term "A food service or drinking establishment". Kind of like these people:
That is, the National Restaurant Association, the American Hotel and Lodging Association (aka those who put their kids through college thanks to SXSW) and their suppliers, the American Beer, Wine and Spirits Retailers.
Next, "A terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission". I guess that would include the National Association of Broadcasters, iHeart, Salem and Cox (which of course raises the question of whether this entitlement also applies to Cox's Internet group), kind of like these people:
Don't forget "An entity operating under one of the statutory licenses described in section 112, 114 [webcasting and simulcasting], or 115 [mechanical licenses]." Note–not that the statutory license applies to the particular song or sound recording in the way it is used that is the subject of the lawsuit, just that the entity is operating some part of its business under one of those licenses regardless of whether the service that is the subject of the lawsuit operates under one of these licenses or not. (Pandora's on-demand service compared to webcasting, for example, could be out of compliance with its sound recording licenses but claim the safe harbor because it is "operating under" one or more of the statutory webcasting license in the radio service or the statutory mechanical licenses for songs.)
It appears that would include these people:
and don't forget these people who are DiMA members and need the government's protection from songwriters and artists:
And then I guess you could throw the Consumer Technology Association and CCIA in there, too.
So I think that's everyone, right?
Last but not least there's this group as "belt and suspenders":
An entity performing publicly, reproducing, or distributing musical works or sound recordings in good faith as demonstrated by evidence such as [i.e., but not limited to] a license agreement in good standing with a performing rights society or other entity authorized to license the use of musical works or sound recordings.
Note: The license need not be for the musical works or sound recordings for which the "entity" is being sued, just any license for any musical works or sound recordings.
There are loopholes in the bill that you could drive a fleet of Street View cars through, so you have to assume that the loopholes will be hacked given who is involved. Don't let anyone tell you "oh that's just legislative language, we can fix that." The whole thing has to be voted down.
Let's call this bill what it is: Crony capitalism, the triumph of the connected class. The Domesday Book writ large.
It's some of the biggest companies in the world deciding that they don't want to hear from songwriters or artists anymore.
So shut up and sing.
By Chris Castlein Consent Decrees for Songwriters, Digital Services: Amazon, Digital Services: Apple Music, Digital Services: Google, Digital Services: Pandora, Digital Services: Spotify, Digital Services: YouTube, Library of Congress, Mass NOI Filings, Performance Right, Tracking and Reporting July 23, 2017 July 23, 2017 1,328 Words1 Comment
Spotify's "Fake Artist" Issue and Other Problems at Scale
Spotify just can't seem to catch a break in the artist community. A story broke on Vulture evidently based on a Music Business Worldwide post alleging (and I'm paraphrasing) that (1) Spotify commissions artists to cover hits of the day and (2) there's a lot of sketchy material on Spotify that trades on confusing misspellings, "tributes" and other ways of tricking users into listening to at least 30 seconds of a recording. Which means that Spotify isn't that different than the rest of the Internet. (Thank you DARPA, the people who gave you the Internet. And Agent Orange. The real one.)
Spotify of course has issued a denial that I find to be Nixonian in its parsing. Let's not go crazy on this, but here's the first part, according to Billboard:
"We do not and have never created 'fake' artists and put them on Spotify playlists. Categorically untrue, full stop," a Spotify spokesperson wrote in an email.
Nobody said Spotify "creates" "'fake artists,'" and the accusation was that the fake artists were on the service AND on some playlists, not just playlists. The allegation is that Spotify commissions recordings.
"We pay royalties — sound and publishing — for all tracks on Spotify, and for everything we playlist. [If Spotify commissioned the fake tracks, they would also "pay royalties".] We do not own rights, we're not a label, all our music is licensed from rightsholders and we pay them — we don't pay ourselves."
Notice the switch to "rights holders" which would include either publishing or sound recordings. If Spotify commissioned fake artists they would not need to "own rights" and they could easily have "licensed" the fake artists recordings. Cover songs would require an…ahem…NOI for the compulsory license. And the commission payment could go to the artist as a buyout so Spotify would "pay them". If the object was to increase traffic for their ad supported service, commissioning recordings would both increase traffic AND reduce the prorata share of advertising revenue by making the denominator larger for everyone with a revenue share during that accounting period. I don't want to go too far down that rabbit hole, but there are some odd loose ends.
Leave the holes in Spotify's denial to the side. The core problem identified by the Vulture post is the same for Spotify as it is for Google, YouTube, Facebook, all the other Internet companies that require "scale" to succeed, and which are, one way or another, hell bent on being monopolists. The second part of Spotify's denial in Billboard could apply to this lack of monitoring:
"As we grow there will always be people who try to game the system. We have a team in place to constantly monitor the service to flag any activity that could be seen as fraudulent or misleading to our users."
Maybe that "team" could have a role in "monitoring the service" for tracks before the recordings get on the service rather than after. Noah built the Ark before the rain.
It must be said that it sounds a bit implausible that Spotify would commission this type of recording to avoid paying artist royalties on the fake tracks. Such an affirmative act would require a commercially tortured logic because the royalty offset on those specific tracks would be so tiny that the cost of the commissioned recordings would have to be very, very low. One guy with Garageband in Mom's basement kind of low. How much the prorata revenue share would be reduced is hard to know from the outside.
But even if Spotify doesn't hire studio musicians to perform "fake hits", it appears that they are allowing a lot of sketchy recordings onto the service. One might ask how those recordings get there in the first place. I would bet that the explanation is pretty much that nobody bothers to check before the recordings are posted (or "ingested" in the vernacular, if you can stand that word).
So while there is a major difference in degree of harm, there isn't a great deal of difference between what seems to be happening on Spotify with sketchy recordings and the links to illegal materials that the Canadian Supreme Court just blocked on Google Search, promoting the sale of illegal drugs for which Google paid a $500,000,000 fine and narrowly avoided prison, ISIS recruiting for which Google lost a chunk of market cap (at least for a while), human trafficking on Craig's List and fake news on Facebook. Each of these services operate at scale and they seem to have the same problem: No one is minding the store and there are no or poorly enforced standards and practices that are only enforced after the harm has occurred.
The other trait that all these companies have in common to one degree or another is that they are all at least dominant if not monopolies in their markets.
Remember–on May 12, 2014, Spotify's director of economics Will Page gave a presentation at the Music Biz Conference in Nashville. As reported by Billboard, Will Page gave the audience a good deal of evidence of Spotify's domination of the online music market:
Spotify claims to have represented one out of every ten dollars record labels earned in the first quarter….Page's claim shows the speed at which subscription services are gaining share of the U.S. market. According to IFPI data, all subscription services accounted for 10.2 percent of U.S. recorded music revenue in 2014. If Spotify had a 10-percent share in the first quarter, it's safe to say the overall subscription share is well above the 10.2 percent registered last year.
Much of Page's presentation seemed aimed at Spotify skeptics in the audience. While explaining how streaming "is no longer an outlier in the business," Page noted Spotify has launched in 32 of the 37 countries where streaming is the primary digital source of revenue. Page also pointed out that Spotify is half of the $1.5 billion global subscription streaming market. In the U.S. market, Spotify made up approximately 90 percent of last year's growth in subscription revenue, according to Page.
These numbers suggest that while Spotify may have a significant share of overall U.S. recorded music revenue, Spotify is clearly dominant if not a monopoly in the global subscription market with its now 100 million plus users and probably is at least dominant if not a monopoly in the U.S. music subscription market.
So how does Apple address these problems? If you consult the iTunes Style Guide, you'll see that iTunes expressly prohibits the use of search terms or keywords in track title metadata (like "Rock Pop Indie Rock") or an artist name (like "Aerosmith Draw the Line). Audio files have to match track titles on each album delivered. "All track titles performed by the same artist on an album must be unique, except for different versions of the same track that are differentiated by Parental Advisory tags." And most importantly, perhaps, "the name of the original artist must not be displayed in any artist field on the track level or the album level." Why these rules? One reason might be that Tunecore has encouraged their users for years to use covers as a way of getting noticed in searches on music services (with suitable admonishments to not "trick" fans).
Let's face it–there's only one way to keep your service clean. Don't let the bad stuff on in the first place. You may think that it should be self evident that allowing sketchy recordings, ISIS videos or human trafficking on your service is a bad thing. You may think that it should be self evident that allowing someone to change a letter in an artist's name to trade on their reputation is a bad thing–not that different from typo squatting. You may think that it is self evident that promoting the sale of illegal drugs is a bad thing. And you may think that anyone who wants to engage in commerce with the legitimate commercial community, much less the artist community, wouldn't allow these travesties into their business.
But you would be wrong. Probably because you don't worship at the alter of the great god Scale.
By Chris Castlein Digital Services: Google, Digital Services: Spotify, Digital Services: YouTube, DMCA Abuse, I Respect Music, Mass NOI Filings, Tracking and Reporting July 9, 2017 1,367 WordsLeave a comment
The Core Flaw of Blockchain
The truth about blockchain is that at its core, it requires its regime to be enforced on rights owners in order to scale–and that is its essential flaw.
Call me a blockchain skeptic. I agree with many of the conclusions reached by Alan Graham in his MusicTechPolicy interview, but I also think that at its core, blockchain as currently contemplated fails as an industry-wide rights registry. Since I understand that its essential purpose is to be a reliable rights registry, it seems obvious to me that blockchain has limited application at best.
I spent a good deal of time helping some very smart people build an independent rights registry around 2005 and have thought about these issues for a long time. (All the major labels and many indies participated in that registry.)
Based on that experience, I believe that the core value proposition of a rights registry is that it be easy to use; that the information in it be objectively verified and only changed with a proper showing of authority; that it be capable of making or directing the making of royalty payments (which means holding necessary tax information); and that it can be easily and timely updated with information for new releases. I believe all these elements are essential and that blockchain accomplishes none of them well and some of them not at all.
A quote from Benji Rogers in MusicAlly lays out the core problem very effectively. (Benji Rogers is a promoter of the blockchain technology and his own company Dot Blockchain–I think I have all the capitalizations in the right place, but forgive me if it's actually dOt bLK.ch..n or something like that.) Here's his quotation (which I doubt that he viewed as a criticism of his product):
"Blockchains force action… If I were to make a statement about a work that I own in a blockchain, and I were to send it to you…you have three choices: yes it's correct and I agree, no it's not correct, or ignore it, which means it's correct."
"What blockchain may bring to the table is something you cannot ignore, because ignoring it is the same as accepting what's there in the table is truth… A blockchain-based system at scale could force people to work with it, in a way that exposes them to decentralisation and transparency, arguably whether they like it or not." (emphasis in original)
In other words, organizing the world's information whether the world likes it or not. Sound familiar?
It is one thing if blockchain is a voluntary regime that artists and users can decide to participate in–and submit themselves to forced "decentralization and transparency" as Mr. Rogers articulates so well. But it is entirely another thing altogether if blockchain is enforced by law.
I would not rule out that it is ultimately the goal of the blockchain investors to force songwriters and artists to submit to the blockchain as a matter of law. This is certainly a familiar refrain if you have followed the various meltdowns over the desire of online retailers and search companies to force songwriters and artists to submit to their exploitation. We have heard these ideas frequently over the years whether it is even safer harbors, orphan works or massive numbers of unauditable address unknown NOIs under the US compulsory mechanical license.
If you doubt that could happen, realize that two unmovable government agencies are currently allowing millions of songs to be exploited with unverified and dubious authority–the U.S. Copyright Office with mass NOIs and the Department of Justice with 100% licensing. What's to stop them taking the next step?
One person's forced "decentralization and transparency" is another's eminent domain. So when you hear about blockchain, imagine if the blockchain bubble had the awesome power of the sovereign forcing someone else's interpretation of truth on creators.
Especially when the time it takes to correct someone else's interpretation of the truth as Mr. Rogers suggests their job would become will be even more uncompensated time for another free ride that will probably end the same way that DMCA notices do for the vast majority of independent artists.
They just give up because resistance really is futile.
By Chris Castlein Blockchain, Mass NOI Filings, Performance Right, Tracking and Reporting, Uncategorized June 8, 2017 701 Words1 Comment
Will Digital Aggregators Lead the Industry on Transparency with Spotify and Others?
The Music Managers Forum UK have criticized the "secrecy" arounds Spotify's deals with major labels. According to Complete Music Update:
The UK's Music Managers Forum yesterday welcomed the news that Spotify had reached a new deal with Universal Music. However, the trade body criticised the continued secrecy that surrounds the deals made between the major record companies and the streaming services. This secrecy means that artists signed to or distributed by those labels are not allowed to know the specifics of how their music is being monetised.
The same criticism could equally be made of non-statutory, statutory, or direct agreements by digital aggregators like CD Baby, Tunecore, LyricFind, Pledge Music, the Orchard and Loudr, each of which offer varying degrees of transparency of their own books, much less the deals they've made with digital services on behalf of the artists, songwriters, labels and music publishers appointing them as agents for relicense of music. (Loudr, for example, has recently started participating in the most obscure licensing process of all, the mass NOI registrations with the Copyright Office. Read more about that on another series of MTS posts or my recent article in an American Bar Association journal. At least with mass NOIs, songwriters know what their royalty is–zero.)
Mass NOI Filings by PK Interactive on behalf of Loudr
It is probably fair to say that there is no disclosure of the actual terms of the direct licenses between these aggregators and the services concerned. It may also be possible that no one has ever asked the aggregators for the terms of their deals.
That's a real head scratcher because arguably those aggregators have an even greater obligation to disclose these terms given they cater to many artists, songwriters, music publishers and labels who are unlikely to have the means–even if they have the right–to conduct a royalty examination of any of these companies. However big a problem anyone has with major labels, every major label artist and major publisher songwriter takes their "audit" rights for granted.
It would be very simple for aggregators to disclose the terms of their deals or to at least summarize them so that artists or songwriters who are considering who to sign with could compare payouts. It's fine to tell people what their royalty split, flat fee, or distribution fee might be, but the assumption is that the revenue stream being shared is identical from one aggregator to another.
Also remember that it is common for music services to pay "nonrecoupable" payments to labels–just like it was for record clubs. This comes in the form of "breakage" or "technology payments" or other ways to keep the money from being called a royalty. We know this very likely happens with major labels although the amounts are not disclosed–hence the MMF UK's beef. We have no way of knowing if it happens with digital aggregators or even what the basic terms of the deals are, which makes it difficult to conduct a desktop audit (the precursor to a full-blown field audit), much less an exhaustive royalty examination.
So let's not limit the transparency concern to just the major labels. The digital aggregators could easily lead the way forward by posting the terms of their deals with digital services. Unless of course the problem lies as much with the digital services as it does with the labels.
By Chris Castlein Digital Services: Amazon, Digital Services: Apple Music, Digital Services: Google, Digital Services: Pandora, Digital Services: Spotify, Digital Services: YouTube, I Respect Music, Tracking and Reporting May 25, 2017 May 25, 2017 567 Words2 Comments