I have often been interpreted as retrospectively attacking great writers and thinkers like Jane Austen and Karl Marx because some of their ideas seem politically incorrect by the standards of our time. That is a stupid notion which, I just have to say categorically, is not true of anything I have either written or said. On the contrary, I am always trying to understand figures from the past whom I admire, even as I point out how bound they were by the perspectives of their own cultural moment as far as their views of other cultures and peoples were concerned. The special point I then try to make is that it is imperative to read them as intrinsically worthwhile for today's non European or non-Western reader, who is often either happy to dismiss them altogether as dehumanizing or insufficiently aware of the colonized people (as Chinua Achebe does with Conrad's portrayal of Africa), or reads them, in a way, "above" the historical circumstances of which they were so much a part.
My approach tries to see them in their context as accurately as possible, but then - because they are extraordinary writers and thinkers whose work has enabled other, alternative work and readings based on developments of which they could not have been aware–I see them contrapuntally, that is, as figures whose writing travels across temporal, cultural and ideological boundaries in unforeseen ways to emerge as part of a new ensemble along with later history and subsequent art. So, for instance, rather than leaving Conrad's compelling portrait of Leopold's Congo in an archive labelled as the dead-end rubbish bin of racist thinking, it seems to me far more interesting to read Conrad's late-nineteenth-century work as - in all sorts of unforeseen proleptic ways - suggesting and provoking not only the tragic distortions in the Congo's subsequent history but also the echoing answers in African writing that reuse Conrad's journey motif as a topos to present the discoveries and recognitions of postcolonial dynamics, a great part of them the deliberate antitheses of Conrad's work...The interesting result is not only that Salih and Naipaul depend so vitally on their reading of Conrad, but that Conrad's writing is further actualized and animated by emphases and inflections that he was obviously unaware of, but that his writing permits.
Thus later history reopens and challenges what seems to have been the finality of an earlier figure of thought, bringing it into contact with cultural, political and epistemological formations undreamed of by–albeit affiliated by historical circumstances with–its author. Every writer is, of course, a reader of her or his predecessors as well, but what I want to underline is that the often surprising dynamics of human history can–as Borges' fable of Pierre Menard and the Quixote so wittily argues–dramatize the latencies in a prior figure or form that suddenly illuminate the present. The horribly attenuated and oppressed black porters and savages that Conrad portrays in terms that Achebe finds so objectionable not only contain within them the frozen essence that condemns them to the servitude and punishment Conrad sees as their present fate, but also point prophetically towards a whole series of implied developments that their later history discloses despite, over and above, and also paradoxically because of, the radical severity and awful solitude of Conrad's essentializing vision.
The quoted passage is a digression, an apologia really, from the main argument of Said's lecture; this lecture is primarily about the nature of personal and political identity (as represented by Freud in Moses and Monotheism (recall) and the success of Zionism). Said's analysis in the passage quoted here presupposes a distinction between inert or sterile texts and fertile or forceful work. This is a qualitative difference which Said attributes to the capacity of the ("extraordinary") minds of the authors of these text. That is, Said comes close to embracing a cult of genius. And if it is not genius, it is definitely a form of elevated admiration.
This (the near embrace of the cult of genius) surprised me because it would have been open to Said to claim that the fertility of some works may be an accident a product of path dependency such that later writers keep returning to such texts is itself what makes them fertile. There is a hint of (as Said notes) final or circular causation in my proposed alternative (which is compatible with the thought that the authors of fertile texts are themselves distinctive in various ways), but it may be preferable to the idea that (say) Conrad's extra-ordinariness resides, in part, in something rather reductive: his 'uncompromising Eurocentric vision' which, simultaneously and paradoxically, brushes up unstintingly against historical constraints.
It's not wholly reductive because a key feature of such genius is the capacity to make the reader feel the tension of what is intolerably there and a need to escape from it. That is, to put the reader in a state of performative contradiction.
Regular readers know that I think Said is wrong in thinking that earlier writers cannot anticipate the later, fertile uses of their works. With other historicists, Said traps, even entombs authors in their own historical context, and yet gives their texts an otherwise magical ability to travel across temporal, cultural and ideological boundaries. Said repeatedly, even neurotically, asserts the epistemic limitation of an author in his/her historical moment: 'could not have been aware;'' "unforeseen;" "obviously unaware;" "undreamed of" (etc, including surprising dynamics). By contrast I think one can deliberately write in a way such that one permits later uses even if one cannot know all the features of such creative re-animations. That is, while radical uncertainty is a reality, sending a signal, means knowing it could be picked up in the surrounding noise. For a reader of Freud there is, or should be, nothing mysterious in deliberately provoking a reaction in an unknown or symbolic other.
Let me close with two observations: first, Said assumes a shared, bourgeois humanistic world of readers -- us, generation after generation -- that itself instantiates a kind of infinite mode ("whole series"), or his secular faith. We are the custodians of the fertile texts in virtue of our passing it on to those who, through creative, even contrary responses, will revive and animate them.
Second, Said presents himself, in part, as an exemplar to the 'non European or non-Western reader' who can find (recall, by contrast, Lorde) the utility in the tools of the master's house. One may well wonder whether all non Europeans are non Western,* but let's leave that aside. The more important point is that while presenting himself as such an exemplar he is doing so to very European intended and implied audiences (first, abortively in Vienna, then actually in Hampstead).** And oddly he tells them, in the last sentence of the work, that they/we almost don't need Said in order to understand non Europeans, because they/we have Freud, if only we/they knew how to read him and accept (with Said as our informant) that Freud's analysis of unresolved senses of identity+ can be applied quite generally.
Trump is Right: Europe needs to Spend More on Defense, now that NATO is finished.
This was greeted with shocked silence. It had seemed unthinkable: a US president threatening to pull out of a military alliance that the US has regarded as a cornerstone of its military strategy for 69 years.
But just as alarming was the apparent ultimatum. European leaders who have so far failed to reach Nato's 2% defence spending target are talking about achieving this years from now, not by January.--Ewen MacAskill reporting in The Guardian.
One of the peculiarities of the United States Constitution is that in order to get a foreign treaty ratified the American President requires a bipartisan/consensus style "two thirds" majority of the "Senate;" but the President is, it seems, barely constrained to pull out or renege on these very same treaties (unless s/he needs money -- and so approval from Congress -- to do so) [for some history see here]. In a process driven US executive, such a decision would not be taken quickly (given the reputational risks of coming to seem an unreliable partner), although it has happened in the past with and without Senate consent.
In President Trump a distaste for international law and international organization combines with a zero-sum understanding of international affairs (recall my posts [here; here; and here]) and a highly personalized interpretation of the nature of the executive branch. For Trump, executive power just is the will of the President. As it happens this will is least constrained when withdrawing from international commitments and treaties. As an aside, I believe Trump actually focuses on areas where he can act with little constraint in order to project (an image of) power and, thereby, to act as de facto sovereign. The idea of an imperial presidency precedes Trump, of course, but that's a different creature (from Trump's more personalist conception of the presidency); the whole point of empire -- as the Romans taught us -- is its intertwining with bureaucracy and rule-following.
It's possible that the Unites States will tire of such personification of rule or that vested interests and voters will find a way to bring it back under control, but both US allies and enemies should assume this is unlikely in the foreseeable future.* What is most puzzling is that European states have not yet responded by accelerating plans to create an independent defense capability. For right now, they are/act as powerless US protectorates while Russia, Turkey, and increasingly the US threaten vital economic, territorial, and political interests. Currently they allow themselves to be consumed by an ersatz immigration crisis while -- like ostriches with their heads in the sand [recall]-- they ignore the acute dangers to their way of life--the US's reshaping of the Transatlantic international economic order and the undermining of the rules-based system that supports it, is an existential threat to the trade-dependent states of the EU.
While the EU member states will probably never be capable of threatening US hegemony (or scaring China or India in the future), it should be possible, if there were a will, to create sufficient deterring power in relatively short amount of time even without the participation of the UK. Such a deterrence could be focused on France (which already has nuclear weapons) and Germany (which has riches and the capacity to build up nuclear power quickly).+ President Trump seems to have asked for 4% of GDP defense spending of his NATO allies in order to boost US arms sales. The foreseeable, perhaps intended consequence is the destruction of trust that provided the glue of Pax Americana. What remains is raw power capable of exacting tributes.
Doubling defense spending is the least preferable policy expense for Europe's voters and politicians today. It is reckless that European politicians are not making the case for this (recall here). Even so, if we want to maintain our standard of living and way of life it will be required. The Europeans should sincerely promise President Trump to rise to his spending demands in order to be in a position to call any American President's bluff.
For some countries (Singapore, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc.), dependency on US power may well be unavoidable given their strategic challenges. But European dependency on US power is an artifact of the cold war; while there is no historical justice, this dependency was fully deserved after Europe's self-inflicted implosion (1914-1945). Three generations of penance is sufficient time.
I first became aware that something was amiss with Professor Yitzhak Melamed due to the shocking pictures he posted on his Facebook page. For the back-story to quoted comments, see his Facebook update (here); or the reproduction at Leitterreports.
Professor Yitzhak Melamed (Hopkins) is my scholarly contemporaray, we have collaborated together on conferences and edited volumes. We have overlapping academic and intellectual interests (primarily Spinoza and his reception), but also write about the state of Zionism today. We disagree on a lot of philosophical and political matters, but there is considerable mutual respect (I hope). At one point, I hoped we would become colleagues at Syracuse. I have written testimonials to support his application to become an American citizen. Also, I have had the honor to celebrate a memorable Passover-seder at his home once. I consider him my friend, and I hope he recovers from his physical wounds quickly and that his spirit remains stout (go read his report). I state these matters here so that the readers understand that I am not pretending to be impartial.
I wish to discuss three themes: European antisemitism; western European responses to it; and European police brutality.
He was, it seems, initially attacked by an anti-Semitic German, a self-described Palestinian, because he was wearing a yarmulke. Sadly, antisemitic, even physical (and sometimes deadly) hostility toward Jews by the growing Muslim population in Europe is not unusual anymore. Sometimes the hostility is explicitly motivated by anger at Israel, but not always.
This is well publicized by now, and has become part of the European populist and radical right's talking points to channel general hostility to fellow Islamic citizens. They have invented an idea for this: 'imported antisemitism' (as if genocidal antisemitism never existed in Europe). It has also become part (recall) of a by-now-standard Israeli narrative that there is no future for European Jewry in Europe. This point deserves more reflection because rather than trying to protect European Jews in situ, Israel de facto tells us not just that our interests are not taken to be Israel's interests, but that some day, Israel is willing to abandon us if we are foolish enough to stay.
Less well publicized in the English speaking world is that non-Muslim antisemitism and violence is still actually larger than the Muslim kind (especially if we include eastern Europe, which has almost no Muslim citizens.). The non-Muslim anti-Semitic right is on the rise, especially in Germany and Austria; it's in power in Hungary and arguably in Poland. (In Italy and many central European countries, a virulent hostility is directed toward Roma.) There is also an anti-semitic radical European left (which often mixes criticism of Zionism with antisemitic tropes), but while it includes a considerable number of intellectuals--it's for the moment more of a fringe phenomenon (in part due to the collapse of left-wing politics in much of Europe). The EU's unwillingness to defend the values in virtue of which it was founded is worth noting, but a topic for another day.
European governments have done little to address the underlying issues and have arguably made it worse in two ways. First, widely shared anti-Islamic prejudices (sometimes exploited by animal rights, women's rights, and children's rights activists) -- which are by now a relentless feature of public media -- are being turned into (judicially approved) legislation that are making it more difficult for Islamic women to appear in public and for Muslims to practice ritual slaughter and circumcision. It is especially notable that the many high minded public intellectuals and ethicists who defend the various anti-Islamic campaigns fail to reflect on the two-fold obvious effects: the increased subordination and lack of recognition (recall) of Muslims in Europe and the often accidental harming of a Jewish way of life.
Second, policing and prosecution of low level violence against Jews (and low-level violence against recent immigrants) has been a low priority. That Prof. Melamed had to wait for more than 20 minutes for any (and colossally incompetent and misdirected) police protection in the otherwise sleepy town of Bonn is not an aberration. In my home town, Amsterdam, the police (and juridical) response toward foreseeable vandalism against a kosher restaurant can be best described as lacking in diligence. A cynic can be forgiven for thinking that authorities do not mind some hostility toward Jewish targets and subsequent mistrust of Muslim citizens.
Third, in the European political imagination, police brutality is something associated with American TV series or coverage of Black Lives Matter. One reason for this is that Western European police tend to use non-lethal force generally and are, on the whole, much better trained than their over-armed American counterparts. So, it is rare for people to die as a consequence of police activity. But it does not mean that it never happens (in Holland two police officers were recently convicted for 'disproportional violence' that led to the death of Mitch Henriquez).
In fact, I would not be surprised that one reason for the alienation felt by young Muslim men in Europe is the below-the-public-opinion-radar relentless ethnic profiling toward them. My reason for thinking this is connected to European drug policies: tourists often note that in many European cities drug possession is, if not de facto decriminalized, a low priority for police & prosecutors. By contrast, drug trafficking is policed. By allowing huge effective demand to develop while policing supply, the European law enforcement is complicit in turning kids into criminals.
As Professor Melamed experienced, when police are brutal they will claim that the suspect resisted arrest. (Let's stipulate for the sake of argument that's not infrequently the case.) Judges, prosecutors, and public opinion will give officers the benefit of the doubt;* it's rare that their account will be challenged by a witness who will find credibility in the legal or public eye--this is why Professor Melamed's public statements are so important.
On the "more insidious" Defenders of Israel.
But there's another type that's more insidious. I'm referring to those right-thinking mealy-mouths who are "critical" of Israel's actions on the Gaza frontier. They may "disagree" with the current leaders of the Jewish state. Perhaps they might "oppose" the occupation and the settlements, and "support" the idea of Palestinian statehood. But the one thing they will not question is the shibboleth that Israel only acts in "self-defense." From this unquestioned premise, they arrive at the cowardly and trite conclusion: it's a complicated situation. At which point, they're only a Palestinian stone's throw away from having a politics that's maybe kinder, but no less lethal, than a hardened Likudnik's.
Apply the slightest scrutiny to Israel's vaunted "self-defense" claim, and the whole jig falls apart. Again, consider the image of a military superpower facing down civilian protestors, armed at most with rocks and tires, and ask yourself: who poses an immediate threat to whom? Ask this to an apologist of Israel, and something predictable will happen. Invariably they will say, "But what about Hamas?," with breathless reference to their "genocidal charter." This is a thought-terminating and frivolous cliché.
It's not unreasonable to assume that Hamas—which is a political party, a civil administration and a social-religious movement, in addition to a militia—would be present in a mass demonstration. What is unreasonable is the idea that all, or even most, a majority or a plurality of Palestinian demonstrators are members of Hamas. And even of those who are, that they are active militants engaged in armed hostilities; still less, that they all swear by a charter written in 1988, and are presently enacting its provisions to a tee. More to the point, that they are even capable or credible as threats; and lastly and the least, that any of this is grounds for summary execution.
To draw that odious conclusion, you would have to think of Palestinians as a fanatical horde, stripped of all humanity and independent will, thrilling to the exhortations of religious manifestos and on the cusp of genocidal murder. You would have to believe, consciously or not, that the only thing that keeps the Palestinians from unbridled savagery is their continued subjugation, or anyway segregation. (A complicated situation, after all.) In any other context, we would recognize such thinking as the product of a lurid and extreme and toxic ideology, the sort of desperate slander you expect from bloodthirsty dictators. But this is what now passes for a "nuanced" and "moderate" opinion.
"Security" is one of those magical words that lets you do whatever you want to do, and means whatever you want it to mean. In the present case, it has the exact opposite meaning from its common sense. For one, the "defensive" paradigm is wrong from the start. Israel is an Occupying Power, having ruled over an unwilling population for 50 years of military dictatorship. The majority of Gaza's residents are stateless refugees, ethnically cleansed from what is now the state of Israel; several generations have grown up in subjugation and exile. Israel, in plainer terms, is the aggressor—in a long, protracted state of aggression. The only thing it is defending is its continuing aggression. The irony should not be lost on anyone: if Israel were genuinely concerned with "public safety" in a strict sense, it would know that if you end the subjugation of Palestinians, you remove the whole raison d'être of Palestinian resistance.
"Security" has political content, in other words. "Security" means securing Israel's territorial expansion, its regional dominance, and ultimately its ethnic identity as a country purged of its original inhabitants.
In a televised interview, prime minister Yitzhak Shamir once admitted that Israel went to war with Lebanon in 1982 because there was "a terrible danger…not so much a military one as a political one." This is as good a statement of Israel's security concerns as any. Israel knows that its ambitions and its obstacles are political in nature, that its woes stem from the fact that the Gaza protestors' demands (which are, in fact, their basic human rights) are politically anathema to the Jewish state. And they're anathema, because the return of Arab refugees to their homeland would undermine the very project of Zionism, of a Jewish ethno-state.
Shooting bullets into a demonstration is indefensible. The previous sentence is true even if all the dead and wounded are (as I think not) armed, Hamas militants sworn (let's stipulate) to destroy Israel and whose deaths may be part of a cult of martyrdom. Nobody deserves to die just because they hold a weapon which you think one day will be pointed at you. Basic and minimal humanity requires us to mourn the loss of life. Instead many apologists for Israel end up blaming the victims either directly (because they are bad people) or indirectly because, as Shmuel Rosner grotesquely suggests in the New York Times,* they fail to march against nor have dislodged Hamas from power. It is grotesque because while justifying the ongoing suffering of the Palestinian Gazans, Rosner never confronts the fact that for quite a while now, Israeli policy is in clear collusion with all Palestinian extremists to systematically undermine any non-violent Palestinian voices or movements from ever emerging. As far back as 2009, non-violent protests -- in the West Bank -- routinely are met with rather harsh responses. Israel's collective punishment of the Gazans only breeds hatred and despair.
You might think from the previous paragraph I think Zionism is illegitimate. But I have defended the legitimacy of Zionism at the height of a Gaza war. My defense of Zionism is rooted in the failures of internationalist liberalism, which has proven itself impotent to prevent the revival of racialized nationalism (which is historically antisemitic in lots of places) and closed borders (which trap minorities). Zionism is a second best solution for the world we have inherited. Anybody who looks at the liberal world today with its embrace of deportations, its fondness for walls and farming out of immigration policy to dictatorial regimes, and its callous regard for the plight of refugees anywhere, recognizes that ongoing relevance of Zionism, which guarantees a home to Jews from everywhere.
Equally my criticisms of Zionism are not moral, but strategic: i) its failure to establish permanent borders for the state of Israel; (ii) to settle what kind of political entity Israel should be so that it can end its near-permanent war-footing and occupation of hostile populations; (iii) (the perception of) Israel's dependence on America's political and military support, which ties Israel to America's strategic interests and electoral politics, while (iv) allowing a split between the interests of Zionism and American Jewry to develop. In addition, (v) Israel, and too many of its purported friends, fail to provide Palestinians with positive incentives to come to peace with Israel. Israel's actions are desperately short of confidence inspiring measures that show it is willing to think of life after war. Because the war has become so asymmetric,+ Israel's political order is dangerously complacent about the status quo.
I am one of those insidious defenders of Israel, who does not merely think that Israel's current policies are a strategic mistake, but recognizes the historical injustice done to Palestinian refugees seventy years ago. I think they deserve genuine compensation for their losses and continued suffering. (I should add that I think the Jews who had to leave North Africa and Persia/Iran also deserve compensation.) The founding of Israel involved war crimes.++ But it does not follow that the refugees must be allowed to return to their historic homelands or that, thereby, Zionism is bankrupt ideology. My reasoning is not ad hoc; for example, the Greeks of Alexandria have no right to return to Egypt nor the Turks of Thessaloniki have a right to return to Greece. (The list is much longer, of course.) Nor does my family have a right to the property in Berlin we lost to the Nazis.** Von Manalastas is writing his critique of the insidious in Ithaca; I know upstate NY a bit. It's full of native lands, whose true heirs have not been compensated (let alone the slave labor that enriched, say, the endowments of the Ivies).
It's not that Von Manalastas is wrong that much defense of Israel is nauseating propaganda which blames victims and dehumanizes the Palestinians; it often merely repeats cliches that cannot withstand much intellectual scrutiny. If you want "peace and quiet" from Gaza, why constantly strengthen the hands of Hamas and rejectionists? You don't create indifference if you starve and impoverish folk. Such defenses turn those with a moral sensibility (recall) away from the Zionist project (this is a tactical mistake) and leaves as its only supporters the (large number, alas) Islamophobes and Christians who see Israel as a necessary step toward bringing about the apocalypse. While my own defense of Zionism (not Israeli policy) is not rooted in morality, Zionism deserves to be evaluated by its fruits, including the moral ones: this is a mixed bag with amazing successes and genuine injustices.
By contrast, too many critics of Israel fall into Von Manalastas's position which slides from criticism of Israel's policies into de-legitimizing any defense of Israel at all. He is right that appeals to 'security' get abused; this is a fact familiar not just from Israeli policy, but from much of the so-called 'war on terror' in lots of places. The human rights problem engendered by it are familiar enough for those who do not wish to be ignorant. But the underlying strategic problem does not get emphasized sufficiently: by focusing exclusively on security rejectionists on all sides are offered a full-proof veto-power over any attempts to end a conflict.
Let me close with a final observation: Von Manalastas is confident that people like me are on the wrong side of history. His stance is little different from too many Israeli intellectuals, who, drunk with power, are indifferent to criticisms, and think folk like me represent a historical aberration. My modest reminder is that history has a tendency to disappoint.
Israel is a sovereign nation with the right, like every other sovereign nation, to determine its own capital. Acknowledging this is a fact is a necessary condition for achieving peace.--President Trump (6 December 2017) quoting from the full transcript in The New York Times.
Trump is (rightfully) such a toxic figure to many and his relationship to democratic norms so tenuous that it is almost impossible to have a fair-minded discussion of any of his public utterances, especially on a topic (America's role in the Middle East) that is not just already deeply polarizing, but often an occasion for continuing a propaganda war. But whatever the wisdom and motives of this decision, it is a fact that merely repeating the tired formula's and policies of the recent few decades will not advance the cause of peace "between Israel and the Palestinians." It is important that he used 'Palestinians' and not the more evasive 'Arabs'--there is also unfinished business of lack of peace between Israel and most of its neighboring countries--; Trump here recognizes explicitly the centrality of the Palestinians to any solution. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no genuine peace process between the parties principled involved nor currently an obvious path to a two-state solution (the outlines of which known for several decades now).
I hedge my bets in the previous sentence because a genuine peace process would have to be conducted in secret for a while. But because the Palestinian movement is so divided right now (even granting that this has been Israeli strategic policy for decades) and a majority of Israelis see no reason at all to contemplate the compromises any final settlement would require (and cheap land/housing is entrenching a good chunk of its voters on the territory of any would-be-Palestinian state), it would really be miraculous if a peace process can be salvaged somewhere right now.
As an aside, Trump's speech also makes clear that his decision was driven in large part by domestic considerations. And, in fact, it's been notable how adroit Trump has been in rewarding his most influential supporters; this suggests that the veneer of incompetence that hangs over his Administration should be balanced with recognition of his capacity to deliver benefits to allies when he so chooses.
Of course, it's also possible that deviating from the status quo will make matters worse, and this helps explain the risk adverseness of US Policy during the last few decades and many other participants. But while I firmly believe that things can always get worse, it's hard to see how things could be worse than the status quo: Egypt is under violent dictatorship and sliding into a civil war in Sinai; Syria, Yemen, and Libya are in ruins (and Yemen getting worse); Saudi Arabia is led by reckless gamblers. Iraq is in nth year of civil war. Conditions in Gaza are awful because of the Israeli blockade and Hamas's one-party rule (judging by worldbank numbers Gaza has just recovered from the 2014 fighting but with massive unemployment it stands to reason that whatever growth there has been has lined the pockets of few). Conditions in the Westbank are also no reason for cheer to any humane bystander (again due to strategic Israeli obstacles and lack of state capacity by the Palestinians).
By unilaterally decoupling a major American political decision concerning Israel and the Palestinians from the non-existent peace process, Trump also removed Israel's de facto veto power over many American actions. That is, the strategic interests that Trump served here are fundamentally American; Trump untied America's hands vis a vis Israel. A future Administration may well decide that "recognition of reality" also entails recognizing a Palestinian state in Gaza, and perhaps another in the West Bank (or some other formula), regardless of Israel's views on the matter.** If the 'right thing to do' can decide matters, then Palestinian cries for justice may will move the heart of future Presidents.
Regular readers know that I think Zionist policy is in a strategic predicament. I have done a series of posts in which I highlight the strategic failures of Zionism: i) its failure to establish permanent borders for the state of Israel; (ii) to settle what kind of political entity Israel should be so that it can end its near-permanent war-footing and occupation of hostile populations; (iii) (the perception of) Israel's dependence on America's political and military support, which ties Israel to America's strategic interests and shifting electoral politics; (iv) the split between the interests of Zionism and the majority of American Jewry. Trump's decision does not help develop routes out of this predicament. On the contrary, it has arguably entrenched the third and fourth of these in ways that undermine bi-partisan support for Israel.
Strategic predicaments can last a long time, and tactical victories are still tactical victories. Israel's tactical advantage has never been better in its history. I hope I am wrong, but the inability to turn this advantage into a permanent settlement will come back to bite us.
There are a growing number of Jewish students who are supporting the movement. Increasingly these students are being castigated as self-hating Jews or who have been brainwashed by anti-Semitic groups. Externally, adults seek to "protect" "vulnerable" students from this kind of activism.
I understand this motivation and sometimes feel it. But targeting students in this way is counterproductive.
I continue to teach undergraduates at Washington University in St. Louis--one class on Jewish Political Thought and another on Zionism. I recognize that some students have been attracted to the BDS movement because of their love of Israel, and their repugnance of what they see as its unjust treatment of Palestinians.
These students are not hateful anti-Semites. They are pursuing what they believe justice requires through the means of civil disobedience that has been the hallmark of social justice campaigns based on core values of the Jewish prophetic tradition.
I strongly disagree with them on this issue. I believe they are mistaken in their approach. And I believe that they do not recognize that many BDS supporters not in fact seeking peaceful solutions to the conflict. There is a problem when those rallying against the only Jewish state wear anti-Israel and anti-Semitic t-shirts fabricated in countries whose violations of civil, human and political rights are shameful.
When Jewish communal institutions condemn students or make them out to be "brainwashed" they are insulting the intelligence of students and their ability to think for themselves.
When we keep student voices out of our communal institutions because of their views, we are not protecting them, we are not shielding the innocent from harm and we are not advancing our cause. We are alienating our next generation. We are using our fear to marginalize ourselves from the very real and important concerns that they have. BDS is not the answer. But that does not mean that their concerns are without merit.
The opposite of ignorance is education.
...We will continue to support the creation of broad educational opportunities to understand the conflict and the motivations of those who are supporting the BDS. And we stand ready to partner with our student organizations who want to provide an open and educational opportunity to understand the full dynamics of the conflict and why we believe BDS is a truly harmful movement.
We will continue to fight those in the BDS movement who are animated by dangerous anti-Semitism and seek to perpetrate evil, sometimes through intimidation and bullying. But must do so in a manner that does not also alienate a next generation of our own community who, because of their identity with Israel, are seeking to advocate for social justice there.--Andrew Rehfeld on Facebook.
Rehfeld is a political theorist I have known since graduate school, and our scholarly interests have considerable overlap. Since 2012, he is also the president and chief executive officer of Jewish Federation of St. Louis. He gained national prominence for his public role in responding to the vandalism of a Jewish cemetery. I was pleased to see his post on Facebook. Andrew has many wise words about the current, counterproductive and self-defeating (pro-zionist) strategy aiming to discredit the BDS campaign. And I am pleased he addresses this issue. Over the last year he is increasingly becoming a voice to be reckoned with in charting American Jewish self-understanding today.
I would like to add a few thoughts to his. But because a post like this may also be read by folks who are not my regular readers, let me just say something about my views. I defend the legitimacy of Zionism (even at the height of the Gaza war) because I take Zionism as a response to the failures of liberalism to deliver on its aims (e.g., free movement of people, protection of minorities, dignity of all etc.). So, while I am a liberal and a Zionist, I am not a liberal Zionist. I have done a series of posts in which I highlight the strategic failures of Zionism: i) its failure to establish permanent borders for the state of Israel; (ii) to settle what kind of political entity Israel should be so that it can end its near-permanent war-footing and occupation of hostile populations; (iii) (the perception of) Israel's dependence on America's political and military support, which ties Israel to America's strategic interests and electoral politics. In addition, I have become increasingly aware of (iv) the split between the interests of Zionism and American Jewry. I have written quite a number of essay about others who also struggle to chart the wisest Zionist course in today, and so hopefully you will check them out before you jump to conclusions about my views. Okay, so much for today's stage-setting.
In so far as their is a dedicated response to the BDS campaign (see Israel on Campus Coalition), it is deliberately polarizing. Andrew has highlighted the ways in which Jewish students with a strong sense of justice and reservations about Israeli politics are treated with contempt or condescension. As a leader of a Jewish community he correctly discerns that such a response is 'alienating' to the 'next generation' of would be members and future leaders of the Jewish community. This polarizing strategy will, thereby, lead American Jewry into a cul-de-sac depriving itself from future talent and leadership.
Andrew does not mention the impact on non-Jewish students, who may well come to believe that there are no arguments available to the Zionist side, and may well come to think that all Zionists support all the current unjust treatments of Palestinians;* that Zionism today is fearful of an open debate and lacks the intellectual resources to meet present challenges.
This last paragraph may seem worded to strong. But we should not overlook that pro-Zionists have supported a campaign of criminalizing support for BDS. If that were to succeed we would be in astounding position that burning an American flag and marching as a Nazi are protected speech, but calling for a boycott and divestment of Israel are not. Such a campaign of criminalizing support for BDS is not just illiberal, but also profoundly alienating to many with no intrinsic interest in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and so self-defeating over the medium term.
So, the current strategy to tackle BDS is fundamentally anti-intellectual, does not generate dialogue, mutual understanding, or true education. This is why it's good that a genuine educator like Andrew speaks about these issues.
Above, I mentioned that the current response to BDS is polarizing. This plays, in fact, into the hands of the activist core of BDS which needs a drip of news and incidents to keep mobilizing overstretched young people to take an interest in what is otherwise a distant conflict. Such polarization energizes BDS and its would be supporters.
I used to think that polarization was caused by Jews, who based on historical experience, believe that any sign of weakness, or lack of projection of strength, is setting oneself up for cycles of victimization. In addition, polarization serves those who do not wish to have Israeli policies toward Palestinians and Arab-Israelis second-guessed and questioned on American campuses. Maybe that's all what's going on. The campaign against Steven Salaita (for my view) revealed that fierce critics of Israel have to fear for their jobs, and that's profoundly illiberal and inimical to intellectual life.
But I have increasingly come to feel that polarization also plays into the hands of those Zionists that think American Jewry's future is not Stateside. I worry that quite a few people (academics, donors, etc.) who encourage and support a polarized, illiberal response to BDS are fine with such an outcome. It is notable that if I am right (recall iv) about Israel's reliance on America's strategic interests and electoral politics then this is a disastrous long-term policy for Zionism.