Sentence of Oct 25, 1990 (Madras) (dolus)
[English version: Studia canonica 26 (1992) 235-243]
1. After maintaining a regular relationship for three years, Sugeetha M and Mark N were married in Madras on July 11, 1987. SM, the Petitioner, was then twenty years old, the Respondent twenty two. Quite a number of details surrounding the wedding are obscure.
Although she had been pursuing her high school studies in a Catholic convent school in Salem, the Petitioner was a Hindu by religion. The day previous to the wedding, the Respondent travelled to Salem and (at the Petitioner's request, he says; against her better judgment, she claims) brought her to Madras where the next day the Parish priest, Rev. A., baptized and confirmed her and blessed the marriage between them. The parents of both, who had hitherto known nothing of the wedding, now intervened. After some disagreement, the Respondent, after just a week of conjugal life together, brought the Petitioner back to her parents house in Salem, so that she could complete her studies. Almost immediately after this, she (apparently yielding to her parents' wishes) said that she wanted to break their union. After this the parties did not see each other again. On August 4, she wrote to the Archbishop of Madras, accusing her marriage of nullity, but without specifying any grounds.
2. The procedural history of the case is also rather obscure. In the Acts which were originally received in the Rota, a Sentence or "Conclusion" appears, given by a single judge under the date of Feb. 10, 1988, according to which the marriage is declared null on the grounds of the invalidity of the Baptism received by the Petitioner, and therefore of an absence of any dispensation from the impediment of disparity of cult. The Court itself appealed to the Rota against its own decision. Our "Turnus", on the basis of the Acts as then received, having taken note of many doubtful aspects of the process, decreed on July 20 1988 that the aforementioned "Conclusion of the Judicial Vicar" could not be confirmed and that the case should be admitted to second instance examination.
Later however, when the full Acts were requested and received from Madras, it appeared that a Judgment of a three-judge Court was actually given on February 12, 1988, declaring the marriage null on the grounds of fraud perpetrated on the Petitioner... This Madras Sentence begins by noting: "Caput Nullitatis huius matrimonii: a) Deceit...; b) Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872...; b) Validity of Petitioner's baptism is doubtful". Having set forth their doubts about the validity of the Baptism, and noting that the marriage was invalid under Indian civil law, the Judges conclude: "we... declare this marriage null and void resting on Can. 1098".
3. In view of the impossibility of clarifying the matter further, our mind is that we must today pronounce on this latter Sentence, replying to the doubt concorded in this Apostolic Tribunal on September 27 1990: "Has the nullity of the marriage been established: 1) on grounds of error fraudulently perpetrated on the Petitioner in accordance with can. 1098; 2) and, if the answer is negative - in a subordinate fashion and as in first instance - , on grounds of a lack of discretion of judgment in the Petitioner (the faculty of examining the case on this latter grounds also was granted by the Dean of the Rota, on Jan. 25, 1990, in accordance with the apostolic faculties he enjoys).
4. Re deceit or fraud ("dolus"). Consent to marriage is that act by which each partner gives his or her conjugal "self" to the other (see a Romana Sentence of Nov. 5, 1987, coram the present Ponens, n. 2). If one does not truly give one's conjugal self, then one is not truly consenting to marriage. This happens in the case of simulation, where one contractant excludes marriage itself or some essential aspect of it from his or her consent, which is thus not conjugal consent (c. 1101, § 2). It can also happen in the case of the person who, while intending to accept the essential elements and properties of matrimony, offers a conjugal self which does not correspond to reality, being falsified as a result of some deliberate deceit. This is the case contemplated by c. 1098. "A person contracts invalidly who enters marriage deceived by fraud, perpetrated to obtain consent, concerning some quality of the other party which of its very nature can seriously disturb the partnership of conjugal life".
5. The "ratio nullitatis", in the case of this canon, can be explained in different ways. It can be placed in the violation of the strict right - possessed by each of the partners to the married covenant, in virtue of the equal dignity they share - that the other makes the conjugal gift in truth and in fact. In such an analysis (which carries much logical weight), the violation of this right places the person deceived in a position where his consent is fraudulently directed to an object fundamentally different to the one he thought he was choosing; and so the freedom and authenticity of his consent is vitiated.
Thus we are told, in a sentence coram Serrano, that the main reason why deceit invalidates is that it perturbs "the very substance of consent, emptying it not only of the true mutual gift and acceptance of the spouses by means of an adequate intentional image of each other, but also of the truth that corresponds to consent so that it be really such"<<substantiam ipsissimam consensus, illum exuans non modo de vera utriusque coniugis ad invicem traditione et acceptatione per adaequatam alteriusutriusque imaginem intentionalem, sed etiam de veritate quae ipsimet consensui competit ut talis sit" (Sent. Umuahiaen. June 2, 1989, n. 8.>>.
6. But one could place the origin of the nullity in a defect of consent not primarily of the party deceived, but mainly of the other party: whether he is in fact the actual deceiver or whether the deceit about some quality of his has been perpetrated by someone else.
In either case, one can say that he offers an apparent conjugal self which however is substantially different to his real self. The object of his consent therefore is vitiated; and so his consent fails, causing the invalidity of the consent of the other party as well. In this analysis, therefore, the "ratio invaliditatis" lies in the inadequate and vitiated consent of the person possessing the quality deceitfully concealed.
7. Reticence. As should of course be evident, it is the concealment not of any quality whatsoever, but of one which is essential to the conjugal self-gift, that vitiates consent. The "se tradere" of marital consent does not - cannot - require a gift to the other of every single aspect of one's life and person; it essentially requires the gift of the conjugable aspects (see a Romana Sentence of Apr. 11, 1988, coram the present Ponens, n. 8ss).
One can certainly maintain that the ideal relationship between spouses is one of total mutual openness, although some marriage counsellors would question whether this is so in every single situation. One cannot however absolutize the spousal right to knowledge of one's partner, nor the mutual obligation of self-revelation. These rights and obligations can only be logically related to what is essential to the conjugal self-gift, not to what is simply accidental to, or "perfective" of, that gift.
Common sense tells us that not every reticence about oneself necessarily violates the other's right to spousal knowledge or one's own obligation of self-revelation. At one stage in the work of the Commission drafting the new Code, the concept of "dolus" was extended, so that the schema read "... who enters marriage deceived by fraud, even if perpetrated through reticence..."<<qui dolo, etiam per reticentiam patrato, deceptus...>>. This was dropped in the very last session, apparently from a feeling that simple reticence is not sufficient grounds on which to invoke nullity: "Because reticence corresponds to a personal right, and no one is bound to betray himself"<<Quia reticentia pertinet ad ius personae et nemo tenetur tradere semetipsum>>, as one of the Consultors put it<<Acta Originalia, fol. 22; cfr. Jusdado, M.A.: El Dolo en el Matrimonio Canónico, Bosch, Barcelona 1988, p. 205.>>.
8. Scope. The fraud in question must have been "perpetrated in order to obtain consent". It must therefore be clearly proved that the motive behind the deceit was precisely the eliciting of marriage consent. Deceit about some quality practiced for another motive - human respect, for instance, or pride - does not invalidate.
9. Gravity. This is the most important and difficult aspect to the question, especially as a triple consideration is called for: gravity of the deceit practiced; gravity of the quality that causes harm; and gravity of the harm actually caused to the conjugal consortium. As regards the latter two, one particularly needs to examine whether the gravity in each case is to be evaluated according to objective or subjective criteria.
10. A) Gravity of the deceit. There is no requirement that the deceit must be grave. If a person is quite naïve, perhaps very slight guile will be enough to deceive him or her; but the rights of ingenuous persons are also to be protected under the canon. It is not the deceit, but the concealed quality, or more concretely its potential for disturbance on married life, that must be grave. In other words, it is not the gravity of the deceit, but the gravity of its consequences, that matters.
Now, while the deceit does not have to be grave, nevertheless it must be real. While it is true that c. 1098 is intended to protect the rights of naïve persons also, it is equally true that if a person pleads to having been deceived by some passing or jesting remark, this can give some grounds to doubt the reality of the deception, and certainly calls for stricter proof of it.
11. B) Gravity of the quality. While jurisprudence and doctrine are still weighing the implications of the canon, there would already seem to be a fairly clear consensus that it only applies where there has been concealment of a quality of some objective importance. The phrase, present in the very first redaction of the canon in 1968 - "some important quality of the other party"<<alterius partis qualitate magni momenti (Acta origin. fol. 14: Jusdado, op. cit., p. 199).>> - was not maintained, no doubt because it was considered superfluous. One can in fact see no grounds in justice why deceit about an unimportant quality, whatever the apparent effects it produces on married life, can invalidate consent.
12. It would seem further that the Legislator, by the inclusion of the words "of its very nature", has specifically excluded any subjective interpretation of the importance of the quality. It must be a quality which according to some objective criterion (and there seems to be none other than common estimation, confirmed by jurisprudence), is both important in itself and capable, if the object of deceit, of seriously disturbing conjugal life: e.g. some gravely infectious disease, being pregnant by a third party, membership of the Catholic Church, etc.
13. It is true that the canon does not specifically say that the threat, represented by the concealed bad quality, must relate to the essential aspects of the married "consortium". But this again is becoming fairly common doctrine. To maintain otherwise would be to open the way to the nullity of every marriage where one party could claim to have been deceived about any quality of the other that, however trivial in itself, he or she found seriously disturbing to married life: and we would have nullities because the party could prove that the other deceitfully kept back the fact that he or she hiccupped, or was such an inveterate snorer as to interfere with the other spouse's sleep, etc...
14. Therefore ordinary and universal traits like mere vanity or selfishness, or such mild and relative defects as laziness or lack of sense of humour, cannot be invalidating qualities under the canon. The canon makes this clear with its deliberate words, "of its very nature can seriously disturb". These words can only be interpreted in the sense that a quality is not relevant under the canon unless it involves an objectively grave defect which of itself tends to seriously disturb the "consortium" of conjugal life. Minor defects, even if one of the parties finds them annoying, cannot be said of their nature to carry the potential for the serious disturbance of married life. If they become the occasion for difficulties in the married "consortium", then it is due more to the nature of the party disturbed - due, that is, to over-irritability, etc. - than to the nature of the defect in itself.
15. Confirmation of this view can be drawn from the one concrete example of invalidating deceit to which the Code makes specific reference: that of sterility. Canon 1084, § 3 states: "Sterility neither prohibits nor invalidates marriage, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1098". Marriage is of its nature ordered to the procreation of children (c. 1055), and the vast majority of persons marry in the hope of having offspring. Therefore to deceive another about a condition of sterility is to deliberately mislead him or her about a quality that lies at the heart of the married relationship.
16. C) Gravity of the disturbance. The disturbance to the conjugal "consortium" must be serious. A disturbance, however grave, to accidental aspects of married life is clearly not material. The disturbance, to be relevant under c. 1098, must affect the married "consortium" substantially, i.e. in relation to its essence, properties or ends. There are aspects to conjugal life that may be subjectively important to one or other of the spouses, yet marriage is not invalidated even if something that will inevitably affect them is deceitfully concealed. Opinions about social or political matters, etc., are usually quite a significant source of married harmony or discord. Yet (unless one moves over into the strained hypothesis of an explicit condition), who would maintain that deceit about such opinions can nullify the marriage, as for instance in the case where one of the parties is an earnest ecologist, while the other conceals the fact that he regards ecology as a fool's game; and later in married life his or her real views gravely disturb the home atmosphere?
17. It would therefore seem that an objective criterion must prevail in measuring the seriousness of the disturbance. The alternative is to let the difficulty - and the validity of the marriage - depend on the mood or patience of one or other of the spouses. One does not take from this principle in noting the following: while the disturbance caused must be grave in itself, there is no doubt that its gravity is notably intensified if it has been concealed by the other contracting party (and not by a third party). Few things after all can be more disruptive of the conjugal relationship than the consciousness of having been deliberately deceived, by one's chosen partner, in a matter of objective importance to married life.
As is evident, this is not a derogation of the principle that the disturbance is to gauged objectively rather than subjectively. In the case given, the added seriousness of the disturbance is rooted not in any mere subjective appreciation, but in the objective fact that the deceit has been practiced precisely by one's partner.
18. What should be said of the suggestion that it is enough if the disturbing quality refers not to marriage as such, but just to the concrete marriage in question? This would subject the matter to a criterion of "relative compatibility", and does not seem acceptable, for much the same reasons that the criterion of "relative incapacity", for determining nullity under c. 1095, § 3, is not acceptable.
19. It seems clearly contrary to natural rights that a person should be required to live married life with another by whom he or she has been deliberately deceived about a quality vitally related to that married life itself. The violation of natural justice, however, is not so clear if the deception has been perpetrated by a third party. Therefore, while the wording of the canon certainly seems to allow for invalidity of consent in this latter case also, one should logically require even more stringent proof in such cases of the objective gravity of the defect, as well as of the seriousness of the disturbance, and the essentiality of the aspect of conjugal life disturbed.
20. The question has been raised<<Jusdado, op. cit., p. 272; cf. U. Navarrete, "Schema iuris recogniti..." Periodica, 1974, 637-639>> whether the presence of a quality that of its nature seriously disturbs the "consortium", should not nullify consent, even if no deceit was involved. The answer is negative because, in the Legislator's mind, it is clearly the element of deceit more even than the importance of the quality that renders consent null. Mere sterility - which is a grave defect - does not invalidate, nor does simple error about sterility. Deceitfully concealed sterility does invalidate. The canon, it must be remembered, is not mainly about qualities that disturb conjugal life (which are legion), but about the effect on consent of deceit about such qualities. As the Secretariat of the Commission replied to Cardinal König<<see Jusdado, op. cit., p. 231>>, it is not just error about a quality, but particularly deceit about it, that tends to perturb the conjugal "consortium". There is no violation of personal rights in the fact that the other party turns out to have some bad quality. There is a violation, however, if matrimonial consent has been elicited from a person precisely by the deceitful concealment of such a quality.
21. Proof. It obviously must be proved that the quality alleged to have been fraudulently concealed was present at the time of the marriage, even though logically it was discovered later. A quality that develops later - e.g. a condition of alcoholism - is not relevant.
While there will be little difficulty in accepting that certain qualities - a homosexual condition, being infected with AIDS, etc. - are gravely disturbing to the conjugal "consortium", judges will no doubt differ as to the objective parameters by which other qualities are to be classified as grave. However that may be, where there is call for strictness is in the proof of the deceit; for, we repeat, it is not mainly the disturbing effect of the quality but its deceitful concealment that provides the "ratio invalidans".
22. One could note in passing how fraud or deceit relates to simulation. There is deceit in simulation too; towards the other party, or at least towards society. In simulation, the words by which the conjugal gift is expressed do not correspond to what the simulator actually intends. In deceit, the gift promised does not correspond to what the deceiver actually gives.
23. If a quality is a stable way of being that in some way defines or delineates a subject's personality, it cannot legitimately be confused with a "motive". A person may be deceived about the motive for which another married him (people's motives for marrying are not always disinterested, and yet their marriage can be perfectly valid); but that does not amount to deception about a quality.
It may of course be possible to establish a link between a motive and a permanent quality; but the mere proof of the motive does not suffice to prove the existence of the quality. One cannot with judicial certainty infer the existence of the latter from the proof of the former.
24. Regarding lack of discretion. For this grounds, and in the present case, it is sufficient to note that for a person to be incapable of contracting marriage under c. 1095, 2, he or she must suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment; and that this lack must concern the essential matrimonial rights and duties. A lack of discretion about something else than marriage, or about non-essential aspects of marriage, is not to the point.
25. In a case so full of obscure points, one thing seems clear: the Petitioner merits very little credibility. We feel that the Acts prove beyond any doubt that she lied about her feelings for the Respondent, and also both about her flight from her parents' house and about the circumstances of the wedding; and we have considerable doubts about her story of her baptism.
26. She claims she responded very moderately to his pretensions of love: that she wished to break their relationship, and continued with it only due to pressure from him and his sisters; and was finally pressed or deceived into running away with him, and into the actual marriage ceremony.
She tell us they met through his sister, when she was 17 years old and still studying. Since they lived in different cities, she kept in contact with the Respondent by frequent correspondence. She states: "Twice a month on average we wrote each other. In his letters practically always there were expressions of love and affection. In a few letters of mine, I had written as his girl friend. Yet subsequently I wrote to him that I would like to break our acquaintance. He on his side did not reply to such letters".
She further says that after receiving advice from her parents she determined to break with him, but he and his two sisters exercised pressure to keep the relationship going. "they successfully impressed upon me that Mark was in real love with me and it was impossible for him to break up with me. They also made me believe that after the receipt of my letter, Mark took to heavy drinking and smoking and was not at all caring for himself. This really grieved me and I continued my correspondence with him as I did not want to ruin a person... Subsequent to this, my parents came to know about my affair with Mark and admonished me... I then fully realized that our marriage would not work out and I wrote to Mark asking him to break up with me. He replied to me... that he could not break up with me and that he would end his life if he could not marry me".
His sister increased pressure, insisting on the danger of suicide: "Following this, his sister... came to my college to abuse me for having written such a letter to Mark. She told me that he would surely end his life if I did not marry him and in such an event I would be solely responsible and I would have to live the rest of my life with the guilt of having ruined a person and his family". She says she yielded only to extent of asking him to come to Salem, simply so as to convince him that marriage would not work: "Therefore, I wrote to Mark to come to Salem with his sister Marina, with whom I was closer, with the hope of explaining and convincing him that our marriage would not work out and he did not have to take any drastic steps on account of this. Mark with his sister Marina and her husband came to Salem on July 10, 1987 and met me in my college when I tried to explain to him my views on the marriage. He did not accept my views and to my surprise Marina supported him and made me believe that Mark would end his life if I refused to go with him to Madras and marry him".
She in the end yielded to the pressure they continued to place on her: "They also said that they had already made arrangements for the wedding at Madras and insisted that I leave with them then. He also threatened me that if I did not go with him, he would commit suicide right in Salem itself. Thus under mental and physical duress I left for Madras with him... The same day evening at about 7 o'clock they took me to St. Lazarus church along with a few other friends unknown to me"... The Parish priest, Rev. A. "asked us to fill the appropriate forms and choose a day not earlier than a month from that day, when he would most willingly solemnize the marriage and bless us. Beverly then tried to persuade him to marry us immediately. Fr. A. refused and asked us to come and visit him the next day to discuss the matter. The following morning they took me to St. Lazarus church again along with Mr. Jeganathan... In the church I was asked to wait outside while Jeganathan and Mark went inside to talk to the Father. Finally Fr. A. reluctantly agreed to solemnize the wedding..."
27. Her letters however, which take up 38 pages of the Acts, give the lie to this. The Petitioner's Advocate claims that, beyond the phrase, "I love you...", scarcely anything else is to be found in the letters. But this is not so. There are passionate passages in her letters in which she urges him to marry her: "I love you so much and I have my whole life on you... If you love me and really want me to be your wife then you'll just have to do something real fast... I'm madly in love with you and I'm just dying to be your wifie... The reason I want you to work fast is b'coz I don't want to upset my father doubly... I'm over 18 so I don't see any problem where age is concerned. If we are willing to marry each other, I think it will be against the law for anyone to object. Marky, we have the law and God on our side. What more could we want? I love you so much, darling... I'm really waiting and waiting for the day that I'll become yours forever".
28. The existence of a pre-arranged plan between them is evident from her letters: "do you want my birth certificate or just a bona fide certificate stating my date of birth?"... "Marky, did you tell anyone about our plan?"... "I hope your people won't object to this, I really love you too much to give you up"... "One thing I'm sure about is the fact that after about 6 months or a year my parents will definitely cool down. Keeping this in mind I'm willing to go through anything. I love you darling and I just can't afford to lose you. You wanted me to write to your dad. Well I have added a note to him in this, keep it with you and if it's O.K. give it to him... If we go to the register office I don't think anybody can object"... "Come to Salem on Thursday night. We will leave on Friday morning. Please come by car and not by bike as you said co'z we'll definitely get caught. Bring Marina and Philip with you..."
29. Her letter to the Respondent's father, pleading for permission to marry, is also quite clear about her plan to leave her parents. "I think you know that I love Mark very much... and I don't think I will be happy if I marry anybody else... My parents will not agree to this and I'm sure about that. But... they will cool down and accept us after a year or two... I haven't come to this decision without thinking. I have spent days and nights thinking about this and I have finally come to this conclusion. Even if I leave my parents and marry Mark, they are definitely going to take me back happily soon".
30. In her second deposition, she admits "There were love letters. We corresponded as lovers", but then she says she has none of his letters. Given the nature of her letters, that she should claim to have kept none of his stretches her credibility even further.
31. It is true that she denies that the love letters he exhibited are hers; although she lamely admits: "the writing seems to be mine". Her father suggests that the Respondent's sister, as such a good friend of Sugeetha, could have forged them. They do not press this point.
32. If we now turn to the question of her Baptism, we also find it hard to believe her claim that it was imposed on her against her will. "As we were going to church on the next morning, they asked me whether I would like to be a christian. I replied that I am a staunch Hindu and I do not see any reason for becoming a christian. I will not give up my religion. They told me, "You must do it. Only then you can get married". I was baptised on the 11th morning at Guidance church by Fr. A. Nobody asked me whether I know anything on christianity. I had no instruction whatsoever". Asked, "Did Fr. A. ask you whether you want to be a christian?", she replied, "No".
With the possible exception of one rather obscure remark - "What is that name you chose for me?" - , there is nothing in the Petitioner's letters sent to the Respondent before the wedding which would point to a positive desire on her part to be baptized. But, apart from her own uncorroborated and contradicted claim, there is nothing to show that she was opposed either. What evidence there is is rather that she freely accepted her Baptism without any sign of reluctance or being forced. She was well acquainted with the Catholic Faith having been educated in a Catholic school. A. Jeganathan, who acted as sponsor at her Baptism, affirmed: "She herself told Fr. A. that she was prepared to become a Catholic". Asked, "Did Fr. A. question Sugeetha as to her free consent to become a Catholic, to be baptized and her knowledge of religion?", he answers, "He asked her as well as me about this. Both of us answered «Yes»". Asked further, "During the baptismal ceremony did Sugeetha answer the various questions or [did] you as sponsor answer?", he replies, "She answered all the questions together with me". It is true that part of Fr. A.s evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Questioned about the Petitioner's desire to receive Baptism, he says: "I did not ask her any question on religion nor her wish to be baptized. Others asked me to baptize her. She did not ask for it". However he also testifies: "She said she knew the catechism and that she studied in Cluny Convent".
33. The impression is that she had no great urge to become a Catholic, but was willing to do so as a means to the marriage she so strongly desired. Fr. A. was certainly imprudent in his actions; but it is hard to conceive he would have baptized her if she had shown the least sign of unwillingness.
The doubt deriving from the possible invalidity of the Baptism administered to the Petitioner has not been formally proposed at this level. Nevertheless, it was the grounds on which the so-called "Conclusion of the Judicial Vicar" was based; further, as we have noticed, without being clearly proposed as a doubt, it is mentioned in the appealed Sentence. But it is not enough to entertain some doubts about the possible invalidity of the Petitioner's Baptism; one has to have attained moral certainty about it. Otherwise one cannot conclude to the nullity of the marriage on these grounds.
35. Regarding deceit: The Judges come to an Affirmative decision on the grounds of deceit. But the deceit they have in mind is not clearly proved; nor do they show how it would be deceit in the precise sense in which it is contemplated in c. 1098.
They simply assume - without any reasoned argument weighing the conflicting elements in the Acts - that "this marriage was arranged by Mark and his sister by trapping the Petitioner just to inherit money and property".
Any argument that the Respondent's family favored the marriage because of her wealth could only be based on certain post-wedding facts which are by no means conclusive: e.g. that within the single week of conjugal life, his family had taken her jewels and pawned some; had asked for money, and had her agree to open a bank account. The Respondent admits they had possession of her jewels, and returned them when the police came for them.
36. The presence of some pre-marriage mercenary interest is not proved. Even if it were, it would not amount to proof of deceit as contemplated in c. 1098. As we noted in the Law section, the quality contemplated by c. 1098 cannot be confused with a possible motive for marrying.
37. Regarding lack of due discretion: She shows immature reactions both before and after the marriage. But they are not out of keeping with her age. There may have been a failure to take the baptismal commitment seriously, treating it mainly as a means to attain the end of marrying Respondent. But such superficiality proves no grave lack of discretion about marriage itself or about its essential obligations; rather the opposite; it shows a more free and intent decision to marry. The same must be said for the well thought out plan and detailed instructions in her letters about "escaping" from Salem, in order to get married. While she had come of age, she was fully conscious of going against her parents' wishes. This may show a lack of filial piety, but it also shows that she knew own mind, and is certainly no proof of grave lack of discretion for marriage.
that is, the nullity of the marriage has not been proved, in the case before the Court, on any of the grounds brought forward.
Given in the Tribunal of the Roman Rota, October 25, 1990.