W. D. Ross's Moral Theory
Ross's criticisms of consequentialist moral theories:
- ethical egoism (the moral theory that says that
an action is right if and only if it is in the long-term interests of the
person who performs it):
A "great part of duty" consists
in respecting the rights and serving the interests
of others "whatever the cost to ourselves may be."
- hedonistic utilitarianism:
Pleasure is not the only thing that we recognize
as being intrinsically good; we
recognize other things--e.g., "the possession of a good character,"
"an intelligent understanding
of the world"--as also having intrinsic value.
- ideal utilitarianism (the moral theory that says
that an action is right if and only if the net amount of intrinsic value
it brings into the world is at least as great as that that any other possible
action in the situation would bring into the world):
"[P]roductivity of maximum good is
not what makes all right actions
right. . . ."
Why does Ross think that producing maximum intrinsic
goodness is not always what makes actions right?
- Common sense tells us in some situations that an action
(e.g., keeping a promise) is right, not because of its consequences, but
because of what has happened in the past (e.g., the making of the promise).
- Common sense also tells us in some situations that we
have more than one duty and that one duty (e.g., relieving distress) may
be "more of a duty" than another duty (e.g., fulfilling a promise).
- In a situation in which two alternative actions producing
equal net amounts of intrinsic goodness differ only in that one would fulfill
a promise and the other would not, one's moral obligation would be to perform
the action that would fulfill the promise.
What should we look for in a moral theory, according
- A moral theory should "fit the facts" (even
if this means that the theory becomes less simple).
- The "facts" that a moral theory should "fit"
are "the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people."
- In case there are inconsistencies among "the moral
convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people," we should keep
those that "stand better the test of reflection" and discard
Elements of Ross's Moral Theory:
- A variety of relations among individuals are morally
significant--including potential benefactor-potential beneficiary, promiser-promisee,
creditor-debtor, wife-husband, child-parent, friend-friend, fellow countryman-fellow
countryman, and others.
- Each of these relations is the foundation of what Ross
calls a "prima facie duty."
- A prima facie duty (also called "conditional
duty") is a "characteristic . . . which an act has, in virtue
of being of a certain kind . . . , of being an act which would be a duty
proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally
- A prima facie duty is fundamentally different
from "a duty proper or actual duty." (By "duty proper,"
Ross means what we have been referring to as "moral obligation.")
- Whenever I have to make a moral decision in a situation
in which more than one prima facie duty applies, I must "study
the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it
is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent
than any other. . . ." The prima facie duty I judge to
be "more incumbent than any other" in the situation is probably
my "duty proper" or actual moral obligation.
- There are a few general "rules of thumb" to
follow in judging which prima facie duties are "more incumbent"
than others in various situations--e.g., nonmaleficence is generally more
incumbent than beneficence. (See below.) However, there is
no ranking among the prima facie duties that applies to every situation.
Each situation must be judged separately.
- We apprehend our prima facie duties in much the
same way that we apprehend the axioms of mathematics or geometry: we do
so by reflecting on "the self-evident prima facie rightness
of an individual act of a particular type."
- "The moral order expressed in [the principles of
prima facie duties] is just as much part of the fundamental nature
of the universe . . . as is the . . . structure expressed in the axioms
of geometry or arithmetic."
Ross's (incomplete) list of prima facie duties:
- Duties stemming from one's own previous actions:
1. fidelity - duty to fulfill (explicit
and implicit) promises/agreements into which
one has entered
2. reparation - duty to make up for wrongful
acts previously done to others
- Duties stemming from the previous actions of others:
3. gratitude - duty to repay others for
past favors done for oneself
- Duties stemming from the (possibility of) a mismatch
between persons' pleasure or happiness and their "merit":
4. justice - duty to prevent or correct
such a mismatch
- Duties stemming from the possibility of improving the
conditions of others with respect to virtue, intelligence, or pleasure:
5. beneficence - duty to improve the conditions
of others in these respects
- Duties stemming from the possibility of improving one's
own condition with respect to virtue or intelligence:
6. self-improvement - duty to improve one's
own condition in these respects
- Special duty to be distinguished from the duty of beneficence:
7. nonmaleficence - duty not to injure
Possible objections to Ross's theory (considered by
1. Ross's list of prima facie duties is unsystematic
and follows no logical principle.
- Ross's reply - The list is not claimed to be complete;
it is claimed only to be accurate as far as it goes.
2. Ross's moral theory provides no
principle for determining what our actual moral obligations
are in particular situations.
- Ross's reply - There is no reason to assume that the
basic reasons why we have the moral obligations that we have are the same
in every situation.
3. Ross's moral theory assumes, without
adequate justification, that the list of prima
facie duties we recognize, is accurate and is not in need of critical
- Ross's reply -
a) In recognizing something as a prima facie duty, we are apprehending
what is self-evident--i.e., that to be an action
of a certain kind (e.g.,
promise-keeping) is morally significant.
b) The only "data" for a moral theory that are available to us
are the moral convictions we arrive at
via serious thought and reflection.
c) To overturn our basic moral convictions just because they conflicted
with some moral theory would be like
people's "repudiating their actual experience
of beauty" because they conflicted with some theory