Military Leadership in the Gödöllő Campaign
In the study of the events of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, it is indispensable to highlight the role of the art of war, that is the author deems it necessary that contemporary military-technical considerations be represented according to their importance in the description, and especially in the assessment, of particular operations and battles. As it is obvious that military leaders of opposing forces tried to live up to contemporary regulations and the spirit of the art of warfare. Accordingly, the paper describes the most important principles of strategic leadership in the middle of the 19th century and their application in one of the most successful operations by the Hungarian army. It is an unconcealed aim of the paper to assess the activity of the leaders of the Hungarian army between April 1 and 6, 1849 from a technical point of view, instead of a political, emotional or any other one.
The operations at Gödöllo were the first part of the so called spring campaign in which the main Hungarian army took the initiative and, in two battles as well as at the battle of Isaszeg, defeated the imperial army. Yet, the goals were only partially reached as the army led by General Windisch-Grätz avoided the decisive engagement. The ensuing operational circumstances placed the Hungarian side in a favourable situation to carry on with the campaign and pursue its political and military goals. These results were attributable to the smooth cooperation between Lajos Kossuth and General Artúr Görgei on the one hand and the higher commanders of the army on the other. These leaders could successfully make use of the army the soldiers of which had a strong desire to win.
The Theory and Practice of Mechanized Warfare: Blitzkrieg
A technical novelty in World War II brought quick victories for the Germans during the Polish and French campaigns. The deployment of armoured fighting vehicles, used in large numbers and in new formations, led to resounding successes and lower casualty count. This was absolutely in line with the German interests as they planned to avoid a two-front war by quickly defeating enemies one after the other. According to even Western analysts, the cooperation of the German arms and the service troops was a revolutionary development. The initial military successes, quick advances and invasions became operational and military breakthroughs and brought success for the Germans. The paper surveys the principles of deployment, the theoretical basics as well as the course of the French campaign and provides an assessment from the British military theorists Liddell, Hart and Fuller.
The Theory and Practice of Blockade in Naval Warfare
Blockade is one of the most ancient and most successfully utilized tool of naval warfare. It was first used in the age of the Greek and Carthaginian colonizers, and was already often mentioned in the sources of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC). It is, however, still a widely used and internationally recognized tool of warfare. The paper discusses the naval blockade with a comprehensive approach (definition, recognition by international law, usage, technological barriers, means of protection and geopolitical considerations), supplementing the theoretical parts with ample historical explanations.
The Royal Hungarian Army through its Plans Against Romania and Yugoslavia
The paper describes the most important stages in the development of the Royal Hungarian Army between 1920 and 1941. It deals in detail with the organizational changes, describing how the mixed brigade was reorganized into army corps as well as the attempts to create a modern army in line with the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Trianon. The author highlights the lack of agreement between theory and practice in the development of the army, and discusses the problems responsible for this.
In the second part, the Hungarian operational plans of 1940 and 1941 against Romania and Yugoslavia are discussed. Describing the plans for making use of the three Hungarian field armies, the author provides a military assessment of the ensuing Hungarian-Romanian situation. In the end, the campaign in the Southern territories of Hungary are discussed from the viewpoint of the Royal Hungarian Army.
Radius of Action and the Hungarian Land
One of the important questions of 16th and 17th-century Hungarian military history is how deeply Turkish forces of the age could penetrate into the country. After studying the issue, Géza Perjés came up with his widely disputed radius of action theory. And even though the debate it generated decades ago was about a geographically determined phenomenon of military history, geographical considerations were missing from the arguments at the time. The paper focuses on these issues by describing first the spread of the geographical element in military affairs and military historiography and then by explaining why Géza Perjés could not use geographical arguments in the debate. Then, drawing on Clausewitz's military theory, it proves the geographic determination of the Turkish invasion, and concludes that the radius of action of the Turkish army in the 16th and 17th centuries was bordering right on Buda and the inner axis of defence formed by the mountains.
Hungarian–Slovak Relations in 1939–1941 as Reflected in Diplomatic Records
Initially, the leaders of Slovakia tried to make their citizens cherish the illusion that their country could stay neutral, like Switzerland, in the neighbourhood of Germany, Hungary and Poland. The reality, however, was different. Right after its creation, Slovakia lost its independence. On March 23, 1939, it signed a treaty of defence (the Schutzvertrag) with the German Empire, which guaranteed the country's independence for 25 years. In return, Slovakia committed itself to handle matters of foreign policy and the organization of its armed forces in close cooperation with the German government and army. Besides, according to the treaty, the Germans were given the opportunity to gradually gain control over the economic life of the Slovak state and even to intervene in its internal affairs. From the very beginning, the Slovak Republic was a puppet of German power politics, its independence was subject to the interests of German foreign policy. Throughout the war, this dependence did leave its mark on the relations of Hungary and Slovakia.
The diplomatic relations of Slovakia and Hungary between 1939 and 1941 were dominated from the start by four main problems: the status of Upper Hungary, the problems of the minorities living there, reciprocity, and courting the favour of the Germans at the expense of the other. The reciprocity principle became a determinant element in the relations of the two states. This gave birth to grievances on both sides, which were nursed until the end of the war and impeded the process of reconciliation between the two states as well as the possibility of a common action against the Germans when the appropriate moment came. It is the important events of this period that I made an attempt to describe using Hungarian, Slovak and German archival sources.
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