This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by William Herbert Page. Also available from Amazon: Commercial Contracts: A Practical Guide to Deals, Contracts, Agreements and Promises.
An actual or threatened strike against one with whom the employes or labor unions have no dispute because he does business with another with whom they have a dispute, in order to induce the employer against whom they strike to put some kind of pressure upon such other person to compel him to yield to the demands of the labor union, is sometimes known as a sympathetic strike. The sympathetic strike is, in its nature, closely allied to the boycott, and it is frequently employed as an effective means of enforcing a boycott. In many jurisdictions it is said to be illegal and unjustifiable.1 If A, who conducts a retail business, employs B, a boycott of A's business, by a labor union, X, in order to compel A to coerce B into paying his back dues to X or else to discharge B, is unjustifiable.2 If the officers of a labor union, X, combine to compel B to discharge A as a means of compelling A to pay a debt which he owes to X, such officers are liable in damages to A;3 and if the labor union approves of such acts and takes advantage thereof, such labor union is also liable.4 In other jurisdictions, strikes for the purpose of compelling an employer to quit dealing with persons from whom he purchases articles, has been held to be legal.5
5 George J. Grant Const. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 13(5 -Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 1055 denying reargu-ment, 136 Minn. 167, 161. N. W. 520].
6 Mapstrich v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390, 31 Am. Rep. 415, 2 N. W. 739.
7 See Sec. 2437 et seq.
1 Pickett v. Walsh, 102 Mass. 572, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 6 I . R. A. (N.S.) 1067, 78 N. E. 753; Now England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, L. R. A. 1916C, 986, 105 N. E. 885; Harvey . Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, L. R. A. 1917E, 389, 115 N. E. 304; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 128 Am. St. Rep. 492, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 607, 114 S. W. 997. "This brings us to the legality of the strike by the union bricklayers and masons employed by the L. P. Soule & Son Company on other buildings, because that corporation was doing work on a building on which work was being done by pointers employed, not by the L. P. Soule & Son Company, but by the owners of the building.
"That strike has an element in it like that in a sympathetic strike, in a boycott, and in a blacklisting, namely: It is a refusal to work for A, with whom the strikers have no dispute, because A works for B, with whom the strikers have a dispute, for the purpose of forcing A to force B to yield to the strikers' demands. In the case at bar the strike on the L. P. Soule & Son Company was a strike on that contractor to force it to force the owner of the Ford building to give the work of pointing to the defendant unions. That passes beyond a case of competition where the owner of the Ford building is left to choose between the two competitors. Such a strike is, in effect, compelling the L. P. Soule & Son Company to join in a boycott on the owner of the Ford building. It is a combination by the union to obtain a decision in their favor by forcing third persons, who have no interest in the dispute, to force the employer to decide the dispute in their (the defendant unions') favor. Such a strike is not a justifiable interference with the right of the plaintiffs to pursue their calling as they think best. In our opinion organized labor's right of coercion and compulsion is limited to strikes on persons with whom the organization has a trade dispute; or, to put it in another way, we are of opinion that a strike on A, with whom the striker has no trade dispute, to compel A to force B to yield to the striker's demands, is an unjustifiable interference with the right of A to pursue his calling as he thinks best. Only two cases to the contrary have come to our attention, namely: Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis (Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Northwestern Lumbermen's Asso.), 54 Minn. 233, 21 L. R. A. 337. 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, 56 N. W. 1119, and Marx & H. Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 56 L. R. A. 951, 90 Am. St. Rep. 440, 67 S. W. 391. The first of these two cases was overruled on this point in Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 63 L. R. A. 753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477, 97 N. W. 663, 1118. The conclusion to which we have come is sup-ported by My Maryland Lodge No. 186 of Machinists v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 68 L. R. A. 752, 59 Atl. 721; Gray v. Building Trades Council, supra; Pur-ington v. Hinchliff. 219 111. 159, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 824, 109 Am. St. Rep. 322. 76 N. E. 47; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 42 L. R. A. 407, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421, 77 N. W. 13; Crump v. Com., 84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, 6 S. E. 620; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 3 Am. St. Rep. 23, 8 Atl. 890; Purvis v. Local No. 500, U. B. of C. & J., 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl. 585; Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 49 L. R. A. 475, 80 Am. St. Rep. 17, 81 N. W. 1003; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881; Temperton v. Russell [18931, 1 Q. B. 715; Taft, J., in Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 19
L. R. A. 387. 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522. 54 Fed. 730; Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor. 139 Fed. 71; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 28 C. C. A. 99, 49 U. S. App. 709, 83 Fed. 912; Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 12 L. R. A. 193, 45 Fed. 135. It is settled in this commonwealth by a long line of cases-that a defendant is liable for an intentional and uninstifiable interference with the pursuit on the part of the plaintiff of his calling, whether it be of labor or business. Walker v.
Vonin. 107 Mass. 555: Carew v.
Rutherford. 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 287; Vegelahn v. Guntner. 167 Mara. 92, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 43, 44 N. E. 1077: Plant v. Woods. 176 Mass. 492, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Ren. 330, 57 N. E. 1011 - Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 64 L. R. A. 260. 102 Am. St. Rep. 341, 69 N. E. 1085." Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572. 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1067. 78 N. E. 753.
2 Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, L. R. A. 1917E, 389. 115 N. E. 304.