Before 1785 the United States under the Articles of Confederation had few concerns about attacks from the Barbary Coast pirates. In that year, Spain and Algiers signed a truce, which meant that Spanish ships would no longer patrol the Strait of Gibraltar to keep the Barbary corsairs trapped in the Mediterranean Sea. One consequence of this was an increase in piracy in the Atlantic Ocean, and on 25 July 1785 Algerian pirates captured the Maria off the coast of Portugal, taking its crew as hostages. On 30 July in nearby waters other pirates overtook the Dauphin, captained by Richard O’Bryen. Each American ship had a crew of twenty-one. O’Bryen soon became the spokesman for the hostages, and he periodically appealed to his government for subsistence money and funds to redeem the captives.
As minister to France under the Articles, Thomas Jefferson assumed the task of pursuing peace with the Dey of Algiers. However, he preferred war as the only sure way to thwart piracy, as opposed to the tribute system favored by European nations. Jefferson feared the United States, as a new nation, would be setting a bad precedent if it paid a higher ransom than did Europeans–finding American hostages to be uniquely valuable, the pirates might attack American shipping with more fervency than ever. Yet Jefferson even refused to reimburse well-meaning Spanish diplomats who had paid to keep the Americans alive and in prison, which prevented their sale as “infidel” slaves by their Algerian captors to other Muslims in North Africa. The only attempt made to free the captives and achieve a peace failed because the American diplomat sent by Jefferson was not authorized to meet the Dey’s high ransom demands. As the United States changed its form of government and George Washington’s first administration began, O’Bryen and his comrades got lost in the shuffle. Many died in a plague that swept through Algiers in 1787-1788, and some died of other diseases soon thereafter. By 1792 only ten of O’Bryen’s crew were left alive.
Since 1786 Portugal had played Spain’s former role as guardian of the Strait of Gibraltar, thus keeping the corsairs out of the Atlantic. The Portuguese naval presence also kept the Algerian pirates confined to their ports, which enabled American ships to enter the Mediterranean after the signing of a U.S.-Moroccan peace treaty in 1786. But when Washington learned that Portugal was engaged in negotiations with Algiers, he realized that peace between those two nations would endanger American shipping even in the Atlantic. The Washington administration thus turned its attention toward Algiers, which had a new Dey, Hassan Bashaw, whom O’Bryen claimed was more reasonable than the last.
The first of Washington’s diplomatic maneuvers with Algiers came in 1792 but failed even in providing subsistence relief for the captives. However, that same year Congress allocated funds to be used not only to redeem the hostages, but also to establish a lasting peace. After delays caused by the deaths of tis first two negotiators, John Paul Jones and Thomas Barclay, the United States signed a treaty with Algiers in 1795. Besides agreeing to pay an immediate $642,500 to ransom the captives, the United States also promised to provide Algiers with $21,600 worth of naval stores annually to protect American ships from piracy.
Soon negotiations with other Barbary states began, and a peace treaty, negotiated by the now free Richard O’Bryen in his capacity as the new U.S. consul to Algiers, was signed with Tripoli. Several years later Tripoli decided that it was strong enough to demand new concessions and more money. Jefferson, now commander-in-chief, chose war over continuing the policy of tribute, and waged a successful war against the Basher of Tripoli.
Richard B. Parker. Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004.
Michael L. S. Kitzen. Tripoli and the United States at War: A History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785-1805. Jefferson, N.C., and London: MacFarland & Company, Inc., 1993.
- Mathew Irwin to George Washington, 9 July 1789
- Richard O’Bryen to George Washington, 8 January 1792
- Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 26 October 1792
- David Humphreys to George Washington, 23 January 1793
- George Washington to the Dey of Algiers, 21 March 1793
- David Humphreys to George Washington, 4 April 1793
- David Humphreys to George Washington, 5 May 1793
- Richard O’Bryen to George Washington, 5 November 1793
- The Avalon Project – A collection of treaties with the Barbary Powers, 1786-1836.
- How Did the United States Defeat the Barbary Pirates? – A History News Network article.
- National Museum of the Royal Navy
- Barbary Coast Map by Guillaume Del’Isle, 1707