November is when we traditionally remember our war dead, and this month looks like being the worst of the year for British fatalities in Afghanistan: five soldiers have so far been killed in Helmand. And yet, amid the tragic loss of life, things are going well in this once troubled region. Indeed, politicians and military dignitaries travel from Kabul to marvel at the political progress and examine the province’s “model” Afghan army brigade.
But some of the biggest changes are in the rural economy. Lined up along the roads of the provincial capital Lashkar Gah are fleets of new imported Massey Ferguson tractors waiting to be bought by wealthy farmers. Farming is on the cusp of a boom. The ploughs are churning the fertile fields fed by an inexhaustible supply of water, allowing the crops to flourish under the unrelenting sun. With political stability offered by Nato and Afghan forces, Helmand’s 180,000 farmers are able to sow pomegranates and carrots rather than opium poppies.
Moreover, stability means the roads can be upgraded, cutting journeys to market from two hours to 20 minutes, and helping to spread ideas about how to increase production. Instead of throwing carrot seeds across the fields, farmers now make neat heaped rows of earths. The result? A jerub (half an acre) that once produced four tons of carrots now yields eight tons. The same is true of grape production – mainly used for raisins – where crops will increase by 70 per cent once farmers use trellising rather than allowing the fruit to mature on the ground, prey to mould and insects. Such advances are turning the population away from the Taliban and enticing them into the Afghan government’s camp. Stability means fertility and that leads to profit. After 30 years of conflict, that argument has a powerful appeal.
Two years ago or more, the Army sought to give the impression that all its operations were conducted jointly with Afghan troops. In reality, the latter comprised just a few sullen soldiers tagging along at the back of a patrol. But, again, things are different now. The Afghans power ahead on military operations, taking greater risks and more casualties. The Afghan local police force – previously viewed as potentially another armed militia – has gradually taken shape. Young, jobless men are given a little training and ordered to guard their area against the Taliban. Not only does this deny the insurgents recruits, but it also reassures the population with an “armed Neighbourhood Watch”. The British have also been adept at fostering good relations. Brig Patrick Sanders, the commander in Helmand, invited his opposite number, Brig-Gen Sheren Shah, and the chief of police, Gen Hakim Angar, to his Wiltshire home to meet his family. Hospitality is important in Afghan society and the gesture cemented a key relationship.
But for all this progress, uncertainty hangs over Helmand – an unease reminiscent of 1989, when Soviet forces suddenly withdrew, taking everything with them bar the rope used to hang the puppet president left behind. Those who had thrown in their lot with the Russians were left seriously exposed. Now, for the first time in all the years that I have been visiting Afghanistan, memories of 1989 are once more being invoked as Nato begins the countdown to its withdrawal at the end of 2014.
“The Afghans have to realise that we are leaving and need to get a grip on themselves,” one officer told me. “They are like a person who can walk but has become too used to having the crutch.” The phrases now in vogue include “weaning the Afghans off Nato” and “not creating a dependency culture.” A political adviser shared the sentiments. “They know it’s coming, and they know they have got to start to get ready for it.” The US Marine Corps, responsible for much of the stability in Helmand, is planning to drop to as low as 6,000 troops within the next 10 months. Soon after, Britain is expected to start reducing its force of almost 10,000.
With a presidential election approaching, Barack Obama will want the fillip provided by a dramatic cut in the 100,000-strong US force beyond the 33,000 earmarked for exit next September.
All this talk of withdrawal leaves the Afghan leadership feeling nervous, notwithstanding US promises to leave behind sufficient firepower to back up local forces.
“If British and American forces leave, this will have a negative effect on security. It will be 1989 again,” Gen Sheren Shah told me. Capt Khaidar Mohammad was more direct. “How do I feel about ISAF leaving? If they leave, then the Taliban will still dominate and the people will say God defeated them and the Taliban will come to England and make explosions.”
In America, there is an intense debate between the White House and the Pentagon over how quickly troops should depart and what they should leave behind. Many in the military look back at the sacrifices in Iraq and wonder what there is to show for their efforts. They don’t want to ask the same question about Afghanistan and are loath to throw away their gains to help President Obama’s re-election.
So, what will be Nato’s legacy? The police, on whom security will largely depend, are not the most trustworthy bunch. One police station had to be disbanded after officers robbed and murdered the owner of a new Shogun car carrying £1,500 in cash. At another station I visited with an Army officer, the reception from the commander was cordial at best. “He’s probably in the pay of the Taliban,” the officer quietly told me. “We just don’t tell him much at a tactical level.”
But for all that, the Army can leave Helmand with its head held high. When it has been given the right number of troops and helicopters it has been able to do the job. It has learnt much about modern counter insurgency – using the soft power of governance, local consent and finding out what the population really want.
Furthermore, the British soldier has been shown to be as doughty and dependable as ever – though the danger now is for standards to slip when the end is in sight. “Two years of good work could be lost by a few indiscriminate live rounds,” said Major Rob Hadderwick, of the Black Watch, in the now tamed Nad-e-Ali south area. “The question soldiers have to ask is 'what’s in the background’. They have to understand whether the death of one Taliban is worth the damage to security and is too high a cost. People also hear a firefight and lose their faith in security and their belief that the government of Afghanistan is providing stability.” The gunners have even stopped firing 105mm illumination rounds because the noise upsets the locals at night.
But in central Helmand, where the Taliban is still strong in pockets, fighting can be intense. One platoon from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment saw 21 contacts with the enemy in 27 days. Death and serious injury remain an occupational hazard. There is also the question of what happens to the Army. By 2015, it will have been on operations for a dozen years with little time to think of much else. One soldier in five will return home to jobs that no longer exist. Others will find allowances have been cut and pensions weakened. So, has it been worthwhile?
It is too early to tell. True, the experience of battle has left the Army functioning as well as at any time in the past 60 years. But will it make a lasting difference to Afghanistan after the foreign troops have gone? The fear is that long after they have re-entered civilian life, veterans of this conflict will be left wondering what it was all for.