The following snapshots of Nukefix screens show how the computer program Nukefix can provide answers to difficult questions about the probability of a nuclear use and how to abolish or reduce nuclear weapon risks.
The Screen Snapshots Are Divided Into Two Pages:
Screen Snapshots on This Page.
|In 66.6% of cases a nuclear first use would tend to result from an accidental use.|
|In 22.6% of cases a nuclear first use would tend to result from a decision-making miscalculation in a willfully initiated attack, i.e., the aggressor lost the war.|
|In 10.8% of cases a nuclear first use would tend to result from a willfully initiated and deliberately effective attack in which the attacking nation achieved its military objective, i.e., the aggressor won the war.|
With an expected 2,369,886 deaths per year, if 89.2% of the incidents were caused by miscalculation or accident, then, on average, as many as 2,114,675 deaths per year could readily be attributable to nuclear weapon accident or miscalculation [2,114,675 = 89.2% x 2,369,886].
There are obviously all sorts of variants in the kind of conditions that one can develop by changing the values shown on the main screen. But the central point is that it is difficult, with nine nuclear weapon nations, to construct plausible scenarios of long-term nuclear peace where the influence of miscalculation and accident is acceptably low, when there is a predominant reliance on nuclear deterrence [calculations shown on the deterrence page in Nukefix].
The main screen has numerous capabilities. The following are shots of some of the messages that will appear. And, if you want to supress automatic prompts you can easily do so by pressing the "S" (Suspend) key.
One of the features available is the "Base Case" comparison. Note that the Main Screen shown earlier indicated the longevity of nuclear peace when each nation was sufficiently peaceful that it would have a propensity to initiate a nuclear use, on average, only once in 295 years (the Composite Reluctance Level).
We can also see the advantage if, on average, each nation were to become sufficiently peaceful that it would not tend to initiate a nuclear use but once in 500 years. By having employed the "Base Case" comparison feature, we see that the bottom center blue window on the screen shows that at the median there would tend to be 15.8 years more of nuclear peace than at the previous 295 RL.
Thus, using the "Base Case Comparison" we can get some idea of how great a change in the longevity of nuclear peace we can reasonably expect if features of the nuclear weapons system change.
As a practical matter it is useful to note that when running the program, clicking on the graph is all that is required to reposition the graph line to pass through the point that you click on. Thus, it is quite easy to see what reliability goals nations must meet if they are to sustain nuclear peace at designated probability levels for designated periods of time.
Although there is a lot of discussion about proliferation and nonproliferation, too frequently the consequences of proliferation are so vaguely stated that we have very little idea how much influence the addition or reduction of, say, four nations would have on the longevity of nuclear peace.
The "P" (proliferation) command provides the following screen.
For simplicity's sake, if we assume that the only feature that changes is the number of nations, and that each nation is effectively equally peaceful with a proclivity to initiate one nuclear use, on average, once every 295 years (as it was in the first screen snapshot), then we can see, using the "Base Case Comparison" in the above that:
|13 nations would tend to deliver 7 fewer years of nuclear peace at the median than 9 nations would.|
|And 5 nations would tend to deliver 18.2 years more peace than 9 nations would.|
This example is of interest because during the Cold War there were approximately an average 5 nuclear weapon nations. Now there are about 9. If there were further proliferation, there could be as many as 13. With this, we have the beginnings of "Past, Present, and Future" analysis. The program also offers other ways to analyze proliferation, but this screen gives us a good starting point.
On the initial Main Screen the upper four small windows showed the "average" values for all nations. If we want to see what a specific nation would have to deliver then we just click on the name of the nation, in this case China, then the upper four windows are bordered in blue. And, the upper windows display the specific subcomponent values China would have to maintain to support its 450 RL. You will see that these values are higher than they were in the first Main Screen, where it was only necessary to support a 295 RL, instead of the 450 RL required by China.
Though China might not deliver the precise subcomponents shown, we would know that that it would have to deliver some combination that would ultimately produce a 450 RL and we can experiment with different values to see the ranges of performances that would need to be met.
By changing subcomponent values for China, we can also see how much a specific value in a single nation (say, deterrence, since that is such a popular topic) would influence median years of nuclear peace world wide. This feature is especially useful for analyzing policies that are geared to a specific nations.
In terms of public health, the lethality of a disease can be measured in annual deaths per 100,000 population. By making comparisons between death rates for different public health risks, we can get a sense of the relative severity of the risks that a population as a whole would face.
For example, AIDS and Heart Diseases are measured in deaths per 100,000 per year. We can also compare nuclear weapon risks to other known health risks by using the deaths per 100,000 per year method, as is done in the following graph, which is activated by the "D" (Death) command.
The curve represents the average risk during the median years to occurrence for attacks of specific sizes and for worldwide levels of peacefulness (Composite Reluctance Level). The mouse arrow at the graph line points to the 295 RL that we have discussed. If the shown number of deaths worldwide would occur, because of nuclear attacks, then nuclear weapons would present a worldwide risk at least as great as AIDS, and in the recipient nation the national death rate would be much higher.
The present graph line spells out the minimum requirements placed on nations, if nuclear weapons are to present a worldwide risk no greater than AIDS.
By clicking on the graph, when running the Nukefix program, the graph line is automatically repositioned at the point where you click. Thus, it can illustrate comparisons with other diseases also.
It is well to note that since 1914, "small" wars (those less than a million deaths) have been responsible for only 12% of war deaths, civilian and military. It is the Mega-Death wars that have caused fully 88% of war deaths [Forecast and Solution, p. 127]. For this reason, reducing the effects of large wars, especially nuclear wars, is apt to yield great public health benefit. Prior to WWI only two Mega-Death wars had occurred -- a civil war in China in the middle 1800s and Genghis Khan's destruction in the 1200s. Mega-Death wars are a creature of the 20th century.
Bernard Lown has observed: "Few societies are more susceptible to the malevolent consequences of a nuclear detonation than rich, urbanized, highly developed, industrial countries."
This is true for reasons that few suspect.
For example, a 3+ psi (pounds per square inch static overpressure) destruction indicates that total deaths would be approximately equal to 56% of the average population in the 3+ psi area. Wood-framed buildings would receive heavy destruction, even at the outermost 3 psi limits. Destruction would become more intense as one approached ground zero.
It is widely known that a single primitive 20 Kt nuclear weapon (approximately the size used at Nagasaki) would produce 8.04 square miles of 3+ psi destruction (when the altitude of the blast is set to maximize 3.5+ psi destruction.).
From this we can easily calculate that detonating eight individual 20 Kt weapons would produce 64 square miles of 3+ psi destruction [64.3=8x8.04]. This is the same area of 3+ psi destruction that would occur upon detonating one 475 Kt thermonuclear weapon.
On this basis, we are able to know that, at the absolute minimum, eight individual low-tech 20 Kt nuclear weapons are capable of producing a level a level of destruction equal to a large thermonuclear weapon (475 Kt).
Now let's consider the potential consequences of SIMULTANEOUSLY DETONATING a pattern of eight nuclear weapons. I have not seen simultaneous nuclear air bursts discussed, or even hinted at, in the open literature, but too many of their effects are too obvious to ignore them.
As you would be able to experiment with when running Nukefix [using the "See" button in the "M" command as shown below], when eight low-tech 20 Kt nuclear weapons are detonated simultaneously in an encirclement pattern (5 mile radius, 4.3 miles between zero points in a circle) in a high population density urban area, at least as much destruction would tend to be produced as with a single one megaton thermonuclear weapon. The reason for this is firestorms and the interaction of blast forces.
A one megaton weapon would cause 105 square miles of 3+ psi destruction. With firestorms, the 20 Kt encirclement pattern can readily envelope 105 square miles in total destruction, leaving no escape for the inhabitants. At a population density of 12,000 per square mile the 20 Kt encirclement pattern might well produce 53% more deaths than a single one megaton weapon, which is to say, approximately 1,082,884 deaths with 20 Kt encirclement versus approximately 708,426 deaths with a one-megaton blast.
A widespread shortcoming in the available literature is that it fails to indicate the consequences of multiple nuclear weapon detonations, most particularly SIMULTANEOUS detonations in encirclement patterns.
By activating the "M" (Multiple Blasts) command you can see these consequences. For example, the capabilities of France are shown below.
When running Nukefix, the following screen [in this case for France with a 160 Kt average weapon size] would appear after clicking on the "See" shown above. The "Color Heat" button on that screen is ONE OF THE MOST USEFUL IN THE PROGRAM. It illustrates the thermal energy that would be sufficient to ignite items at points which are in line of sight of the contributing weapons in a SIMULTANEOUS DETONATION.
The Legend indicates the areas in which the following can be ignited: Leaves [dry beech leaves, 4-6 Cal/cm sq], Shades [cotton muslin green window shades, 8 oz/sq yd, 7-13 Cal/cm sq], Rubber [black rubber construction material, 10-20 Cal/cm sq], and Shirt [Khaki colored cotton shirt, 3 oz/sq yd, 14-21 Cal/cm sq] [See: Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 287-289. The thermal flux, Cal/cm sq, in this paragraph indicates the ignition range required by weapons from 35 kilotons to 1.4 megatons].
The flash from the initial simultaneous blast would be sufficient to ignite these respective items. Not all such items will be ignited because at least some fires will be blown out by the blast wave. However, others will not, and these will tend to spread. At Hiroshima (12.5 Kt), the approximate area characterized here by rubber was involved in a firestorm.
Note that, in the Nukefix program, whatever pattern you select will be applied to the "encirclement number of weapons (EncWep)," when you access the "War-Room Plans" page. That section of the program scans and sorts the population densities for the entire world, so that you can see how many weapons are required to destroy specified areas of different countries.
For example, it takes only 354 to 800 Russian warheads to destroy every city and town in the United States that has a population density in excess of 1,000 people per square mile (urban and metropolitan USA, 36.3% of the U.S. population, 94 million people) ["War-Room Plans" in Nukefix]. Thus, it's not difficult to see that the highly-publicized, much-applauded, and the yet-to-be-ratified START II treaty levels of 3,000 to 3,500 intercontinental warheads mounted on missiles or aircraft by the year 2007 (roughly a decade from now) offer little protection. Only 10% of these numbers of weapons hitting cities would produce unprecedentedly appalling destruction. Moreover, the number of warheads now existing are far higher.
Although the high-tech aspects of the physics of a single weapon usually receive greatest attention, the physics involved in a confluence of blast forces and thermal energy from multiple weapons simultaneously detonating can be made to present far greater destruction in an urban environment than can single thermonuclear weapons of the sizes that currently predominate.
If eight 20 Kt nuclear weapons were detonated SIMULTANEOUSLY in an encirclement pattern over a city, it is likely that they would produce at least as much destruction as a one megaton nuclear blast. And, they definitely could produce the equivalent of 475 Kt of destruction, even if they were not simultaneously detonated.
Fully 87% of the thermonuclear weapons in the U.S. strategic arsenal are smaller than 475 Kt, and a small percentage are as large as one megaton. Approximately 58% of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons are about 500-550 Kt in size. Thus, we can see that small nations, or even highly advanced terrorist groups, could have the potential to produce vast thermonuclear levels of destruction (equivalent to 475 Kt to one megaton) when attacking cities.
It further means that many thousands of "tactical" nuclear weapons in superpower arsenals can similarly be used to create levels of destruction formerly attributed only to "strategic" nuclear weapons. And, "strategic" warheads can be made to be even more deadly via simultaneous detonations.
You can readily see the magnitude of destruction produced by nuclear weapons of all sizes, including those used in simultaneous detonations in encirclement patterns. To do so, in the "M" command, click on the "See" button.
The myth perpetuated throughout the nuclear era that thermonuclear levels of destruction in cities are available only to advanced, rich nuclear powers is a fraud.
THE "RADIUS" BUTTON
By clicking on the "Radius" button in Nukefix, a graph like the following will appear showing psi radius for weapons of a wide variety of sizes. By RIGHT clicking on the graph line, the coordinates are shown on the screen so that you can get good data for weapons of a wide variety of sizes. By LEFT clicking on the arrows, other graphs are shown.
One of the greatest problems for the non-expert, who may be seriously interested in the nuclear weapons problem, is to figure out what number of nuclear weapons will targeters allocate to destroy cities. We can determine quite a lot without having to enter their war-planning rooms.
The following screen snapshot is taken from the "War-Room Plans" page in Nukefix. The particular example shown illustrates the number of 550 kt warheads Russia would need to destroy the indicated population centers.
The initiating nation, in this instance Russia, can be selected in the "M" (Multiple Blasts) command. Substantially any nation that had the same encirclement profile and size of warheads (550 kt) would produce an identical outcome.
"EncWep" refers to the number of warheads required to subject the total area under consideration to the same degree of destruction caused by the encirclement pattern, in this case, when the zero point distance is set at 15.6 miles as can be set up in the "M" command under the "See" button.
"MaxWep" refers to the maximum number of warheads required to subject the total area under consideration to 3 psi+ destruction. This is the same single warhead targeting used in the "M" command.
The particular page shown here indicates the outcome for Britain and China, if 550 kt warheads were detonated in the indicated regions.
For example, it would take approximately 35 to 78.3 warheads (550 kt) to destroy every population center in Britain with a population density of 1,500, or more, per square mile. We can also see that 22.1 million people (39.2% of the British population) live in this area.
And, in China it would require approximately 1,292 to 2,887 warheads to destroy every region with a population density of 1,500, or more, per square mile (510 million people, 40% of the Chinese population reside in the area).
In Nukefix, you can readily make similar estimates for numerous other nations. Each page is sorted according to population density for all nuclear weapon nations and many non-nuclear nations. The attacking nation and its weapon configuration can be setup in the "M" (Multiple Blasts) command. So this, and similar pages in the "War-Room Plans" section, will change according to the data you enter. By this method you can make reasonable first approximations for each nuclear weapon nation without having to go through tedious calculations.
Table Headings, An Explanation:
The "Regions" heading refers to the number of reporting regions.
"Dense" refers to minimum population densities for the area under consideration. It is expressed here in density per square mile but can be expressed in kilometers if you mate that selection in the "M" command.
"AvgDen" refers to the average density for the indicated region and for all more heavily populated regions.
"Pop" refers to the population in the region under consideration and all more heavily populated regions. It is stated in millions.
"%Pop" refers to the percent of the nations total population which reside in the indicated region and all more heavily populated regions.
"area" refers to the area in the indicated region and all more heavily populated regions. It is expressed in square miles, or square kilometer,s based on your selection in the "M" command. It is expressed in miles in this example.
There are numerous factors that must be considered before we know what size attack is sufficient to provoke a serious enough climate change that it could be classified as a nuclear winter/autumn, some of which are dealt with on the "Nuclear Winter/Autumn" page in Nukefix.
Cutting to the chase: There are various gradations of nuclear winter that probably can be associated with initiating attacks of specific sizes. For example, an aggressor attack producing 100+ million direct deaths might well be sufficient to provoke a nuclear winter/autumn of a designated level of severity. Or, alternatively, one might find that an aggressor attack of 200+ million would be needed.
In the following Nukefix graph you can enter whatever attack size you are interested in. And, in the upcoming "U" (Ultimate) command, you can define the underlying probabilities for the entire range of attack sizes for each nuclear weapon nation.
On Nukefix's "Nuclear Winter/Autumn" page, we see aggressor attacks of 100+ million direct deaths (not counting retaliation, etc.) would tend to occur within approximately a median 115 years, given the conditions at startup. While this may seem to be a long time, an attack of this size can readily occur earlier, as can be seen in the upcoming graph. For example, as the graph shows, there would be, with startup data, roughly a one in five chance (20%) of a nuclear attack producing 100+ million deaths within 37 years. And, at the upper end of the graph, we find a 95% probability of an event of this scale within the next 500 years. When running Nukefix, you can also see the expected outcome when the number of superpower nuclear warheads are reduced.
There are numerous nuclear nations. And there are numerous attacks of different sizes that each of these nations can deliver. For each size attack there is also a different probability of its ever actually being initiated. In some nations the range of attack sizes may go from less than a million deaths to conceivably more than a billion deaths in the most extreme cases.
In order to account for outcomes, which go from the probable to the highly improbable, this program introduces the concept of Reluctance Level (RL) Curves for each nation. This allows you to get answers you have not had access to before. In the "U" (Ultimate) command, you can readily set each nation's RLs throughout the range.
RL Curves offer the two ingredients necessary to determine the expected risk of death posed by each nation: 1) probability of occurrence (RL), and 2) severity of occurrence (i.e., scale of death).
The RL Curves, further, offer the ability to make reasonable estimates for a wide range of occurrences, because probability (RL) in the upcoming graphs is defined in terms of a nation initiating the stated size attack, OR ANY ATTACK OF A LARGER SIZE. Thus, one does not have to consider each size attack individually. A few broad groupings are all that is required to make a good estimate of risk.
For example, in Nukefix when we access the "U" (Ultimate) command we can get the following reluctance level curve for France, which shows that France under the shown conditions would produce, over the long term, a risk of inflicting 97,041 deaths per year in attacks that it would have a probability of initiating. It is also possible to explore other outcomes by simply clicking on the graph to change the shape of the curve. However, in the real world nations would have to meet those reliabilities. And I point out that France is already represented as being very peaceful.
In Nukefix, clicking on the "DPY Method" button would produce the upcoming graph, which illustrates how one can determine death rate.
But it well to first consider the matter in prose. Indeed, without performing the math, the method is intuitively obvious. Consider that each point on the curve represents the probability of a stated size attack and all larger attacks. Given two adjacent points on the curve, if the smaller of the two probabilities is subtracted from the larger, all that remains is the probability associated with the smaller size attack. When this is done for each point on the curve, then all probabilities of occurrence have been identified, and, as indicated, computation of expected death per year is quite easy.
The math can be performed in the following manner: The "expected deaths per year" caused by the aggressor/initiator's attack (DPY) are determined by multiplying each incremental probability (the difference in probability at adjacent points on the curve) by the corresponding level of death indicated on the x-axis, and adding the sum of these values to the high-end RL probability multiplied times its corresponding level of death. Simply stated, the method accounts for all probability levels and all sizes of attack for all nations -- which, incidentally, come to 2,945 different cases. It can fully explain the total probability attributed to an individual nation, and axiomaticly conforms to mathematical expectation (i.e., multiplying probability times the severity of the event).
By using these techniques, it is possible to know the average risk of death when given specific RL curves. In these cases, as seen in the "DPY Method" graph, probabilities are the inverse of the RLs in question.
The DPY graph gives a practical demonstration of how the method works, but since each adjacent point on the curve cannot be graphically represented easily, a range with a "weighted" average size attack is shown (even though actual computation was performed for each point on the curve). The expected deaths per year within the range considered also applies to the RL curve.
In Nukefix the Reluctance Level Curves for the individual nations are presented, then the Composite Aggressor/Initiator Reluctance Level Curve is shown.
The RL curves for the individual nuclear weapon nations combine to produce the Composite Aggressor/Initiator RL Curve. This curve represents the average proclivities for a single nuclear weapon nation to initiate attacks of the stated size or larger.
If each of 9 equally capable nuclear weapon nations were to possess these proclivities, they would present the same total level of risk (2,369,886 DPY) as the present 9 nuclear weapon nations.
By looking at the above curve one can clearly see the levels of restraint required at each level during the period under consideration, even if deterrence "works." For example, at startup with 9 nations by RIGHT clicking on the curve to get its values, one can see that the curve passes through the following coordinates: 13,000 RL, 500+ million deaths; 5,000 RL, 329+ million deaths; 2,175 RL, 200+ million deaths; 1,500 RL, 100+ million deaths; 500 RL, 6.7+ million deaths; 320 RL 1+ million deaths.
If an advocate of deterrence had seen such a curve, he or she might well have been tempted to comment, "See deterrence works. Look at the very high levels of restraint that each nation, on average, is presenting. Don't you see that this curve supports the respected political scientist Kenneth Waltz's statements in 1988 and 1993 that, 'the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero [Forecast & Solution, p. 13].'"
Yet, in sharp contrast to such optimism, the curve reflects a public health menace that, over the long term, would tend to produce 2,369,886 deaths per year. Indeed, if so-called deterrence were to contain risk of death to low levels, of say, roughly 23,699 deaths per year, its RL values would, on average, need to be fully 100 times higher, as can be seen in the same graph by setting Composite RL on the main screen to 29,500 at startup [23,699=2,369,886/100; 29,500=295*100].
The Composite RL Curve provides a sound theoretical approach that systematically accounts for probability and severity of occurrence in wars. The curve provides an alternative to idiosyncratic analyses that often focus on one war (or type of war) at a time, but which do little to explain the likelihood of, the consequences of, or the methods for preventing future wars.
Previous sections of Nukefix have provided ways to assess the average deaths per year (DPY) created by nuclear weapon nations. The upcoming worksheet makes it possible to evaluate how that risk would tend to be distributed among individual nations.
Specifically, if you are a citizen of the United States (or any other nuclear power), you can easily assess the public health risk that nuclear weapons pose for you.
In the upper section of the worksheet, the highlighted percentage figures indicate the percent of DPY received by each nation. The values shown at startup are arbitrary. By clicking on them, you can easily change them, according to your own assessment.
The vertically positioned nations at the top of the worksheet refer to the initiating nations that developed the risk. Each column, for the particular initiating nation, reflects how the percentages of risk are distributed among nations. These percentages sum to 100%, and the user can readily change them.
The rows show the nations receiving the risk. The red horizontal lines are intended to make the rows easier to read. The red lines do not imply groupings of nations. The nations are alphabetically listed.
At the bottom section of the worksheet the "DPY Delivered", "DPY Received", and "Deaths per 100,000 received" are shown. The "DPYs Delivered" are substantially the same as are indicated in the "U" command graphs, except that in the worksheet 10 nuclear weapon nations are always shown (not 9 nations as at startup, or a fewer nations as the user can select on the main screen).
The "DPYs Received" result from the "DPYs Delivered" for each nuclear nation being multiplied by the percentage figures at the top of the worksheet and the results summed.
Risk for "Deaths per 100,000" are calculated based on the population of the recipient nation and its "DPY Received." Since the category "non-nuclear" nation can refer to several different nations of various population sizes, no "Deaths per 100,000" are shown for this category. Nation-X substantially refers to Iran.
In the worksheet in the "Deaths per 100,000" column you will see a comparable public health risk, such as "Heart Disease at 287" deaths per 100,000 population listed. Sometimes this text (for example, "Total Worldwide War Deaths for WWI and WWII combined at 66.8") is cropped short, where space did not permit its full listing. But these public health risks can be found fully-listed via the "D" (Death) command in Nukefix.
The "U" command graphs for the RL Curves showed the expected deaths per year (DPY) that each nuclear weapon nation would produce under the illustrated conditions. Those DPYs would ultimately be received by other nations. This is explicitly shown. At the bottom of the worksheet, Total "DPY Delivered" equals total "DPY Received."
"HIT BY RISK" WORKSHEET #1, WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES: We can also tell a great deal about the relative risk of nuclear weapons deaths to which the U.S. is now exposed in the post-Cold War era. For example, the worksheet at startup shows the U.S. having approximately a 246 death rate per 100,000 (a rate between Cancer at 206 and Heart Disease at 287).
In 1945 the United States experienced its highest death rate from war during any 50 year period in its history (WWI and WWII). Its war deaths then averaged 6.8 deaths per 100,000 [F&S, p. 129]. The risk to the U.S. of nuclear weapons deaths from initiating attacks alone, at a 246 rate, is fully 36 TIMES GREATER THAN THE U.S. WAR-TIME CONDITIONS DURING THE WWI/WWII PERIOD [36.1=246/6.8]. Yet, this high risk is occurring in a post-Cold War era that is ostensibly viewed by most of the public as being substantially peaceful.
In the management of nations, the precise difficulty is that a risk level, such as Cancer or Heart Disease, which we are accustomed to in our own lives, becomes unacceptably catastrophic when we allow the same level of risk to occur in the nuclear weapons problem. While we cannot know with precision when the event will occur, if the United States were to experience a 682,937 "DPY Received," as suggested in the worksheet at startup, then at 20, 40, or 60 year intervals, it would be perfectly logical for it to experience nuclear attacks causing respectively 13.6, 27.3, or 40.9 million deaths at these intervals [20, 40, and 60 multiplied by 682,937].
We can also view the net effect of the nuclear weapons system for each particular nation in the case presented. For example, in the screen snapshot we see the United States delivering 555,372 deaths per year on average, yet receiving 638,937 deaths per year. The net disadvantage for the United States in this case would be 83,565 deaths per year 83,565= 638,937 - 555,372. The risk received was greater than the risk developed.
At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis 37 years ago Russia had approximately 481 strategic nuclear warheads.
START II proposes 3,000 to 3,500 deliverable strategic warheads. START III proposes 2,000 to 2,500.
"Hit By Risk" Worksheet #2 shows expected outcomes, other things being equal, at limits from 10,700 to 50 warheads per nation. At each level of warhead limits, estimated risk of death worldwide, and for an individual nation (which you can select), are shown in terms of deaths per year (DPY) and average deaths per 100,000 population. When considering low levels of nuclear warheads, keep in mind that a single Trident submarine has 192 warheads (24 missiles, 8 warheads per missile).
For attacks of 100+ and 200+ million deaths, estimated median years to occurrence and years within which there would be a one in five chance of occurrence (20%) are shown in worksheet #2.
At startup conditions, with 10 nations, we see that, so long as warhead limits are at 2,000 or higher, risk of death caused by nuclear weapons tends to be in excess of approximately 150 deaths per 100,000 for the United States. And, worldwide it tends to be in excess of approximately 26.1 deaths per 100,000 population annually.
Moreover, worldwide, at the 2,000 level, there would tend to be a one in five chance of a nuclear attack of 100+ million deaths occurring within 44.5 years. Not until warheads get to very low levels, such as 50 per nation on the worksheet is the risk of 100+ million death attacks substantially eliminated. Attacks of 200+ million deaths become very unlikely in the near term once warheads reach a 250 limit.
You can explore numerous other scenarios. Those that typically are most beneficial, not only reduce the number of warheads, but also reduce probability (RL) on the main screen, or in the RL Curves in the "U" command. You can also change percentages for DPY distribution on worksheet #1 to reflect your personal assessment of real-world conditions.
With startup conditions and 10 nations selected, the citizens of the nuclear superpowers, Russia and the United States, receive approximately 5.4 to 6.1 times the risk of aggressor-caused death by comparison to the average person on earth [5.4=217/40.4; 6.1=246/40.4]. At a worldwide death rate of 40.4 per 100,000 annually, aggressor-caused nuclear weapon deaths (not counting retaliation and secondary deaths) would be substantially identical to the worldwide risk posed by all sides in the WWII era at 40.3 deaths per 100,000.
Based on startup data, we see in worksheet #2 that, other things being equal, dramatic reductions in risk of death do not usually tend to occur until nations drop to very low levels of warheads. There are two key reasons for this.
First, nuclear warheads, even at low levels, have phenomenal death dealing properties. Second, the average lethality of individual warheads increases as number of warheads are reduced, because, on average, warheads are targeted on higher density populations. The marginal deaths at the periphery are substantially removed.
This increased lethality as warheads are reduced is evident when one considers the second worksheet in the "T" (Treaty) command, the "War-Room Plans", or Tsipis' study of a "small" 239 warhead attack on the United States (Nukefix, page 3).
At a 10,700 warhead limit the U.S. would tend to experience a 245 nuclear weapons death rate per 100,000 (a rate between Cancer at 206 and Heart Disease at 287).
Based on startup conditions in worksheet #2, it appears that it would be fraudulent to proclaim START II levels at 3,500 intercontinental warheads mounted on missiles or aircraft by the year 2007, are sufficient to dramatically reduce risk of nuclear weapon deaths. Under Nukefix's baseline conditions with 10 nations selected, the "Hit By Risk" pages shows that a 3,500 warhead limit (by comparison to a 10,700 limit) only reduce the risk of nuclear weapons death by about 23% for the United States.
This reduction would leave the U.S. with a long-term average 522,699 aggressor-caused direct nuclear weapon deaths and an average nuclear weapon death rate of 188 annually per 100,000 population. Thus, START II could readily present the U.S. with a risk of nuclear weapons deaths that would be fully 91% as great as the risk of death by Cancer [91%=188 nuclear rate/ 206 Cancer rate.]
However, the shock impact for nuclear attack is far more adverse than Cancer deaths because in the nuclear case the 522,699 deaths per year are expressed infrequently at intervals of, for example, 20, 40, or 60 years respectively producing 10.5, 20.9, 31.4 million deaths at each event [10.5, 20.9, 31.4 million = 20, 40, or 60 times 522,699]. Moreover, at a START II limit of 3,500 warheads, there would also remain a one in five chance worldwide of an attack of greater than 100 million deaths within 40.2 years.
A contribution, unique to Nukefix versions 2.02 and later, is that the program makes it possible in the post-Cold War era for the user to assess and reduce the risk that would be RECEIVED from aggressor-caused nuclear attacks worldwide, by comparison to known public health risks (such as Heart Disease, Cancer, etc.). In a nub, the logic used in Nukefix can be followed quite precisely, as shown in the following.
The risk produced is established by evaluating destructive capabilities of warheads, using Nukefix's "M" (Multiple Blasts) command. The results from that section of the program can be validated using a publicly available computer program prepared for Director Defense Nuclear Agency (We.zip) available through The High Energy Weapons Archive. Then in the "War-Room Plans", extensive worldwide population densities for nations where the warheads would potentially be delivered is used to assess the maximum size attacks that individual nations would be capable of producing.
For the superpowers, the annual probability of initiating maximum size attacks is represented as being minuscule. But having established an expected maximum size attack, the user (using Nukefix's "U" command) can define the probability for all size attacks, from the smallest to the largest, that each nation could potentially carry out. The Reluctance Curves that are established in this fashion show the estimated restraint each nation would exercise before initiating nuclear attacks of the different available sizes.
The "U" (Ultimate) command uses each size attack, and its associated probability, for each nation to compute the long-term expected deaths per year produced by that nation. The program then sums these figures to get worldwide risk. Expressing long-term nuclear weapons risk in terms of deaths per year serves to illustrate the expected public health risk, as is done with Cancer, Heart Disease, et cetera. It also provides a single currency by which the risk presented by "small" and "large" nuclear powers can be compared. The user can either accept the baseline case presented in Nukefix at startup, or alter the component values to preference via mouse clicks and simple entries. At this point in the program the risk produce is established.
On the "Hit By Risk" page, the user in worksheets #1 and #2 can see the degree to which individual nations would tend to RECEIVE that risk. The "Hit By Risk" worksheet #1 shows a grid of percentages for the ten nations producing the risk and the same ten (plus a category for non-nuclear nations) receiving the risk. By identifying potential adversaries for each nation and assigning a percent of its produced risk that would be received in each potentially adversarial nation, the user can find the risk RECEIVED for each nation.
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