Capstone Essay Contest Winner—Marine
On the night of 6 April 2017, President Donald Trump ordered a Navy Tomahawk cruise missile attack on the Syrian Air Force airfield from which the Syrians had launched a chemical attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun.1 Fifty-nine of these missiles destroyed targets at the airbase, including approximately 20 Syrian aircraft. The President did not, however, order the storming of the airbase by a Marine Expeditionary Unit and likely never will exercise such an option in the crises that the United States potentially faces today.
Amphibious warfare is being made irrelevant by new and sophisticated technologies many nations and non-state entities are acquiring and by the changing character of war. The Marines must adapt and refine their identity through training and funding if they are to retain the title as the U.S. premier fighting force.
In World War II, the Marine Corps repeatedly demonstrated it was a force that adapted and innovated to defeat the immediate challenge, especially in the Pacific theater. The island-hopping campaign presented to the Marines the challenge of raiding and defeating enemy-held island defenses. Amphibious assault, the method of delivering Marines by small craft from ships to shore, provided a bloody but effective means to win battles in places such as Iwo Jima and Guadalcanal. With these successes, the Marine Corps was anointed as the valiant and noble amphibious assault force. This force would muscle its way on to shores and secure enemy positions. The capability was validated after World War II in the battle for Inchon. A successful amphibious landing helped take back Seoul in South Korea in 1950.2
The character of war has changed in the 21st century. Because of increasing strike capabilities, such as guided missiles, drone strikes, and very powerful close-air support, frontal amphibious assaults are now vulnerable. Nearly every state in the world and many non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and criminal organizations, have access to sophisticated weapons. Marines in battle groupings make easy targets for missile strikes. Besides missiles, various other technologies can be employed to wipe out battle formations and amphibious assaults.3
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the balance of power shifted around the world. Power vacuums formed in various overpopulated, impoverished, and frustrated communities. Tribal leaders took back areas formerly controlled by outside parties or large governments. Criminal organizations in the overpopulated and impoverished areas led to increased drug and weapons trades. These factors, combined with rising radicalization, such as Salafi jihadism, created powerful insurgencies. In the 21st century, war has begun to characterize itself as insurgency versus counter-insurgency.
An insurgency is an armed group that is not identified with a government or state but still seeks to advance its own political will. It is largely supported by a regional population to bring change to a current regime. These movements often are motivated by people who are willing to die for their causes while hiding within the region’s population. For these traits, insurgencies are complicated adversaries for the Marine Corps to face. With the current state of chaos in Syria and the rest of the Middle East and the increasing momentum of Boko Haram and al-Shabaab in Africa, insurgencies have demonstrated that they will not disappear anytime soon.
Although the Marine Corps appears reluctant to embrace this counter-insurgency mission, the Corps’ true roots are in irregular warfare, not amphibious assaults. As noted in the Marine Corps Gazette, “Continental Marines conducted offensive and defensive combat operations, protected Navy officers from mutiny, served as snipers in naval battle, and conducted amphibious raids and other operations short of war.”4 In the Barbary Wars, the Marines’ adapted to capture adversary’s vessels. Just as the Marines adapted in World War II to amphibious warfare, so must the Corps today adapt to take on counter-insurgency operations.
Moving forward, the Marines must learn the hard lessons from dealing with insurgencies over the past 20 years and apply them to strategic goals to deploy Marines trained in counter-insurgency warfare. The Marines have learned many of the intricacies and difficulties of fighting an insurgency—e.g., knowing how to influence and make friends with the local population; employing the tactics of the insurgents; understanding extremist’s ideologies and motivations; and becoming experts in urban combat. Of all the challenges, learning how to engage local populations to have them want to be U.S. allies will reap the greatest rewards. The Marines must develop the tactics and procedures to help commanders build trust with local populations.
A lasting impact and strong relationship only will develop if a commander and his Marines work with a population and its leaders over time to create a bond of trust. To achieve this bond the Marines Corps will need to extend deployments past the regular six to nine months. Quicker rotations will leave tribal leaders frustrated and tired of starting anew with an inexperienced commander and fresh Marines.
To make this all work also will require funds to develop schooling on counter-insurgency warfare. Officers and enlisted Marines on the front lines must go through these schools, which must offer a demanding curriculum on subjects such as winning support of a local population; influencing leaders; understanding radical ideologies and motivations; and combating insurgents. While funding for these schools likely will be hard to find within the Marine Corps’ current budget, a solution could be to divert allocations earmarked for amphibious warfare to counter-insurgency instead.
To succeed in future wars, the Marine Corps must train to defeat an adversary with a new counter-insurgency capability and identity.