Right-to-Hunt Amendments in U.S. State Constitutions
by Brian Duignan
In this year’s midterm elections in the U.S., voters in four states—Arizona, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee—considered referenda that would amend their state constitutions to create a right of residents to hunt and trap wild animals. Although the Arizona initiative, Proposition 109, was narrowly defeated, the others passed by large margins.The votes brought to 13 the number of states that have incorporated such “right to hunt” provisions into their constitutions; all but one of them were adopted since 1996.* Two other state constitutions, those of California and Rhode Island, recognize a right to fish but not a right to hunt.
The post-1996 amendments are the direct result of successful campaigns by animal-rights organizations in some states to ban the hunting of some nonthreatened species and the use of certain hunting methods, particularly trapping. Pro-hunting groups believe that the animal rights movement has created political support for further sharp restrictions on their pastime, and they fear that eventually hunting will be banned altogether in some jurisdictions. Their worries are supported by demographic trends that have contributed to a steep decline in the number of hunters in the country in the last several decades. (A widely cited report by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service found that there were only 12.5 million hunters in the United States in 2006, down from 15.3 million in 1995 and 44 million in 1970.) The point of creating a right to hunt in state constitutions (which are considerably easier to amend than the federal constitution) is to prevent future majorities of voters, misled into thinking that hunting is cruel or unnecessary, from imposing any meaningful limits on hunters’ activities.
Some animal-rights organizations (and even some hunters) have dismissed the amendments as empty symbolism or as trivial constitutional clutter, noting that hunting is legal in all 50 states and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. As Michael Markarian, president of the Humane Society (HSUS) Legislative Fund, told the Christian Science Monitor in February 2010, “We haven’t opposed these measures. We don’t really view them as having much of an impact.” Others are more cautious, however, arguing that the amendments could be used to challenge existing hunting laws and regulations, including endangered-species protections, and to undermine scientific wildlife and habitat management. A broader concern is that they will ultimately prevent state authorities from making wildlife policy in the public interest rather than solely in the interest of hunters.
Most pro-hunting organizations openly acknowledge that there is no serious political threat to hunting in any state. But they insist that the amendments are necessary as a kind of insurance against the awful power of animal rights and anti-hunting groups. One prominent right-to-hunt supporter in Oklahoma, quoted in a 2009 article published in the Tennessee Law Review (Jeffrey Urmson, “The Game is Afoot: Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee Constitution,” 77:57), put the matter this way:
[State constitutionalization] is a pre-emptive strike … making it more difficult for any nutty animal rights activist or anti-hunting organization to target Oklahoma … [A]ny attempt to ban … hunting … would require amending the constitution. So if state lawmakers were to go insane and wanted to eliminate deer hunting, for example, it couldn’t be done without a vote of the people.
The National Rifle Association (NRA), by far the richest and most powerful pro-hunting organization in the country, agrees. “The threat may not be imminent in states like Oklahoma, but the future is far from certain,” it declares. “It is critical to adopt constitutional safeguards before urbanization and other demographic shifts in the state change things for the worse.”
Content and language
The content and even the language of the amendments adopted since 1996 are remarkably similar. All but one of the amendments (that of Montana) specify that the right to hunt, fish, and trap shall be subject to regulation or restriction by law. Alabama’s “Sportsperson’s Bill of Rights,” for example, declares that “All persons shall have the right to hunt and fish in this state in accordance with law and regulations.” The amendments of Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin expressly provide that such laws and regulations must be “reasonable.” Those of Arkansas, Louisiana, and South Carolina provide that any restrictions on hunting, fishing, or trapping must promote “sound wildlife management” or serve to “protect, conserve and replenish the natural resources of the state.” The Georgia, Minnesota, and North Dakota amendments impose a positive duty upon state authorities to manage wildlife for the purpose of enabling citizens to exercise their right to hunt, fish, and trap. A few of the amendments adopted since 2004 (Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee) specify that hunters may use “traditional” means and methods; two of these (Arkansas and Oklahoma) also declare that hunting, fishing, and trapping are to be “preferred” as methods of managing or controlling nonthreatened species.
These similarities are not a coincidence. The amendments adopted since 2003 are based in part on model language drafted by the NRA and circulated in state legislatures throughout the country. (The NRA proudly declares that the “model Right to Hunt and Fish constitutional language … has become the standard from which to negotiate with legislators and game and fish professionals.”)
The model language was designed to improve upon right-to-hunt amendments adopted in 1996—2000 in a number of ways. For example, because the earlier provisions did not characterize the laws or regulations to which hunting would be subject, it remained possible (in theory if not in practice) for state and local authorities to adopt severe restrictions or even outright bans on hunting while still technically respecting the right to hunt. As the NRA explains,
The existing amendments generally state that the citizens have a right to hunt and fish “pursuant to laws and regulations.” Unfortunately, these amendments provide HSUS and the other radical animal “rights” groups with far too much latitude to ban much of what hunters do today. … Because laws and regulations can be changed to say just about anything, these amendments are like James Madison drafting the Second Amendment to declare, “… The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed … unless Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton think it’s a good idea to ban firearms.”
As Urmson notes, the model’s specific requirement that restrictions on hunting be “reasonable” means that no restriction can be adopted unless it is reasonable with respect to the imperative of preserving hunting and fishing—a standard that would preclude outright hunting bans and call into question other common restrictions, including prohibitions on the hunting of nonthreatened species (e.g., doves and mountain lions). The “reasonable” standard, as the NRA describes it, is specifically intended to ensure that “science, not politics and emotion, is the driving force behind regulations … [and] that hunting regulations … [be] determined at the state level in order to preempt local hunting bans.”
Also “emotion-inspired,” in the NRA’s view, are prohibitions on allegedly cruel hunting methods, including the bow and arrow, leg-hold traps, and the use of dogs to chase and corner hunted animals. Accordingly, the language adopted in the Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee amendments expressly permits hunters to use such “traditional” means and methods.
The NRA was also concerned about efforts in some jurisdictions to introduce nonlethal means of wildlife population control, including the use of “dangerous and expensive” immunocontraceptive schemes. The widespread adoption of such practices would necessarily deprive citizens of significant opportunities to exercise their right to hunt; moreover, the premise on which nonlethal population control is based—that alternative methods are needlessly cruel, or that it is better, other things equal, to reduce animal births than to increase animal deaths—were it to be generally accepted, might lead the public to question the legitimacy of hunting in other contexts. Hence the model language adopted in the Arkansas and Oklahoma amendments requiring the state to prefer public hunting, fishing, and trapping as methods of managing nonthreatened species.
“Tradition” and other fallacies
The NRA and other pro-hunting organizations contend that hunting, fishing, and trapping deserve to be recognized as constitutional rights because they are a valued cultural tradition or a valued part of the American heritage. (Not surprisingly, this justification has found its way into the wording of many of the state amendments. Louisiana’s amendment, for example, declares that “The freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife, including all aquatic life, traditionally taken by hunters, trappers and anglers, is a valued natural heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people.”) Such arguments have been sufficient to convince voters in states in which hunting is already popular, but they have had little effect elsewhere. This is, of course, to be expected, given the influence of the animal rights movement and the fact that people living in urban and suburban areas tend to choose hobbies that do not involve the use of lethal weapons.
But apart from these considerations, there is another, obvious reason why many people are unimpressed by the NRA’s arguments: nothing follows from them. To say of a social practice that it is a cultural tradition, even a valued tradition, does not show that it is worth keeping, much less that it should be recognized as a constitutional right. If it did, pogroms in eastern Europe should have been worth keeping before the end of World War II, lynching in the United States should have been worth keeping in the Jim Crow era, and female genital mutilation in parts of Africa should be worth keeping now. Examples are easy to multiply. Obviously, whether a tradition is worth keeping may depend on the moral values it serves or fails to serve; and moral values and principles can, and fortunately do, become more sophisticated and sensitive as people become better educated, as they interact with people of other regions, countries, or cultures, and as they are afforded the opportunity to reflect on the implications of their moral views.
(Setting aside the fallacy on which the argument rests, it is also worth noting that present-day hunting arguably does not constitute an authentic cultural tradition, given that it is now done for fun or entertainment [“recreation”] rather than subsistence and that it involves the use of high-powered weapons and high-tech gadgetry that could not have been imagined by hunters in the early years of the country’s existence.)
Other typical pro-hunting arguments, though not enshrined in state constitutions, are similarly fallacious or specious. For example, the NRA thinks that hunting is justified because the fees that hunters pay for their licenses help to support state conservation and wildlife-management programs—as if it were impossible to conceive of any other source of funding for these services, and as if benefiting some animals justified any harm one wished to do to others.
Right-to-hunt amendments are blatant attempts to perpetuate a cruel pastime against the wishes and values of future democratic majorities. It is to be hoped that voters in future state referenda will be strongly influenced by the animal rights movement and their own consciences, not only to reject right-to-hunt amendments but to approve measures to curb the crueler aspects of hunting and to improve the lives of wild animals everywhere.
*The 13 states are: Alabama (1996), Arkansas (2010), Georgia (2006), Louisiana (2004), Minnesota (1998), Montana (2004), North Dakota (2000), Oklahoma (2008), South Carolina (2010), Tennessee (2010), Vermont (1777), Virginia (2000), and Wisconsin (2003).