Certain elements of Gordon Brown’s proposed constitutional reforms have received extensive discussion — in particular the abolitions of the royal prerogative in respect of war and in respect of the ratification of international treaties. However, the two most important elements did not even merit a mention in the BBC’s coverage: the power to request the dissolution of Parliament and the power over recall of Parliament. To be fair to Gordon Brown his speech on the matter gave these elements due prominence, but subsequent discussion has been almost absent.
These proposals have been spun as "returning power to Parliament" — as if it were the royal prerogative, rather than the excessive use of whipping and guillotines, announcement of key measures in newspapers rather than Parliament, the majority of legislation passing through European institutions and UK regulators and for which MPs are rubber-stampers at best, and so on were the true complaint of those regretting Parliament’s loss of status. But be that as it may, I wish to focus on these measures as they are, rather than to dismiss them as a cosmetic distraction. For though their intention might be cosmetic, their effect would be profound. In particular, removing the power of the monarch to request the dissolution of Parliament and the power over recall of Parliament would eliminate two of the key elements of the constitutional monarchy, leaving only the power to appoint ministers and the power to withhold assent to legislation (as well as some limited role in resolving constitutional crises — though without the power to dissolve Parliament, the monarch’s ability to force such as resolution would be limited).
The power to dissolve Parliament, in particular, is among the most important roles. It is a key feature of the Monarch’s ability to resolve constitutional crises and to test whether public opinion is truly on the side of the government if the government’s actions are objectionable. It is also a natural adjunct to the power to withhold assent and the power to appoint ministers — presumably, except in the most trivial of cases, if the monarch refused to appoint the ministers proposed by the majority party in the Commons or to grant assent to its legislation, this would not be sustainable for long unless Parliament were dissolved and the voters changed the majority Party. Otherwise refusal of assent would create of necessity constitutional gridlock or force the resignation of the monarch (thereby preventing the Monarch from fulfilling its role as a check-and-balance). Given that these other powers could not effectively be exercised without the dissolution of Parliament, this would reduce the constitutional protection offered by the Monarchy to the most trivial of cases. In effect, we are talking about the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy.
As well as being among the Monarch’s key powers, the power to dissolve the legislature is also among those most regularly and recently exercised by our Monarchy. For example, twice in the twentieth century there were constitutional crises in Australia that led to the dissolution of legislatures (in 1932 and 1975). In Britain our Constitutional Monarchy has protected us so effectively for so long, that we have all but forgotten what it does.
Does this matter? Aren’t I just being some, perhaps slightly amusing, romantic reactionary — talking as if a Constitutional Monarchy were a good thing? Who is going to believe that in our day and age? Obviously no-one is talking about abolishing the monarchy, as such. We will still have someone wearing robes on important occasions. There will still be various relatives that can compete with former pop stars and actors on the B-list celebrity circuit. The monarch will still serve as a tourist attraction and as a focus for national sentiment and identity. Isn’t all this other stuff just silly and irrelevant?
No. The Constitutional Monarchy is a key element in our form of ordered liberal state. The monarch provides an organic means to resolve constitutional crises, and so is more flexible than a written constitutional, and hence order is maintained with less prescription — the ordered liberal solution. The Constitutional Monarch provides a device to reject the elected tyrant — no Hitler or Mugabe here. The Constitutional Monarch ought also to be the fount of law — and as such must appoint judges (another royal prerogative Brown intends to remove).
The problem with our Constitutional Monarchy is not that it has let us down. Rather, because it has been so successful, it has become lazy and underestimated. We do not need to abolish the Constitutional Monarchy, retaining a merely ritual monarchy instead. Rather, what is needed is a period of constitutional activism on the part of the monarch. Thus, for example, to be sure, the Prime Minister should not appoint judges, nor appoint those that appoint them. This should be the sole and undelegated prerogative of the Monarch. I suggest that a Conservative policy should be an undertaking that we will have a post of appointer-of-judges (“Lord Chancellor”, or whatever new name is preferred) for which we will forbear from recommending a name.
An activist Constitutional Monarchy may be difficult to reconcile with the British monarch’s ill-deserved reputation as a "hereditary" monarch — it is manifestly nothing of the kind, and as recently as the previous monarch we did not have the hereditary heir. Ours is a selected monarchy. So let us make that more naked, more explicit. On the death of our Queen, let us have the Upper House of Parliament select a new Monarch — perhaps the hereditary heir at the time; perhaps not. An explicitly selected Monarchy would show that our commitment is the correct one: to the institution of the Constitutional Monarchy, and not a sentimental attachment to any particular family’s "right to rule".