|The Fall of Fort Eben Emael:
Harbinger of Blitzkrieg
by James Lee Laughridge
On May 10th 1940, near a small town in Belgium, the war in the west was nearly
decided. Fort Eben Emael, the world's largest and most impressive fortress was
neutralized forever in a spectacular surprise attack by a small contingent of
German Special Forces. The battle demonstrated to the world that earlier German
military accomplishments were not a fluke and showed the Belgians the fallacy
of their strict policy of neutrality. Was it superior German tactics and
weaponry, or Belgian deficiencies which resulted in the fall of Europe's most
impressive fortress and the opening of Western Europe to German domination for
the next five years?
The village of Eben Emael was an unlikely participant in history until
completion of the Albert Canal in May of 1930. The extension allowed the
waterway an outlet from the Meuse River through Belgium, thus avoiding a path
through Dutch territory (Dunstan 12). The Belgians who had suffered much in the
opening of the Great War were resolved not to have a repeat of the Schlieffen
Plan of 1914 (Dunstan 4-8). Geographically, Belgium was the logical starting
point of any future German and French hostilities. Belgium determination to
hold the line against any future aggressors prompted the construction of
massive fortifications similar in structure to the largest fortifications of
the Maginot Line (Kaufman and Jurga 106-107). The juncture between the Albert
Canal and the Meuse River near the village of Eben Emael resulted in an
excellent site for such a fortification (Mrazek 25-27). The fortress became
operational in 1935, with work continuing on through 1940 (Dunstan 16).
Fort Eben Emael was situated at the edge of the Albert Canal water line
adjacent to Mount Saint Peter. The fortress was shaped like a diamond and
extended over nine hundred meters from North to South and was seven hundred
meters wide (Ellis 25). The top of the fortress extended forty meters above the
surrounding countryside. From this vantage point the fort could observe any
activity for miles in every direction (Ellis 25). This location ideally suited
the fortress in its' primary roles of protecting local bridges and providing
fire support to neighboring forces (Saunders 17).
Eben Emael was constructed as part of the Position Fortifee de Liege 2,
a system of mutually supporting artillery fortifications (Dunstan 10). The
defensive systems were divided into groups one and two. Group one was situated
along the Belgian frontlines and would bear the initial brunt of any
conventional attack. The forts of group two were positioned further from the
border with Germany and were responsible for providing fire support to the
neighboring forts of both groups (Saunders 23). This idea was contrary to the
French idea of a thin continuous line of strong, defensive fortifications as
exemplified by the Maginot Line. However, the Belgian theories were closer to
the French model of static defense than the German model. The Germans,
particularly with their Siegfried line, believed in a defense in depth.
Fortifications were built that were mutually supporting and of increasing
strength. The German plan drew attacking forces into open "killing fields"
between smaller and more numerous fortifications (Short 21-25).
The armaments of Fort Eben Emael were divided into two batteries, 1st
'Offensive Battery', and 2nd 'Defensive Battery' (Saunders 25). Each battery
was commanded by a different officer and served very different roles. The
second of these batteries was concerned with the defense of the fortress
itself. The steep sides of the Albert Canal combined with a water filled
anti-tank ditch, barbed wire entanglements, obstacles, and heavily armed
blockhouses to protect the fortress from all ground approaches. The heavily
armored blockhouses had interlocking fields of fire and were located around the
entire perimeter of the fort including at the base of the canal. Each
blockhouse mounted at least one anti-tank gun, multiple machine guns, and
searchlights. All blockhouses were manned by a complement of around twenty men
(Dunstan 23). The roof defenses included several anti-aircraft machine gun
positions (MICA), twenty infantry foxholes, and two armored triple machine gun
casemates. The turret mounted twin 75mm howitzers and triple 75mm howitzer
casemates could also direct fire canister rounds against attacking infantry if
necessary. Six diesel generators, an extensive filtered ventilation system, and
ample food and ammunition supplies combined with these armaments to ensure that
the fort could continue to fight through any attempted assault (Mrazek 28-30).
The first, 'Offensive Battery', was concerned with the various offensive roles
of the fort (Saunders 25). The primary armaments of the Fort, were the twin
120mm howitzers of 'cupola 120'(Saunders 16). These guns were of sufficient
caliber as to reach the border, but not so large as to compromise Belgium's
image as a neutral nation (Greatest Raids: The Fall of Fort Eben Emael). Twelve
75mm howitzers protected the nearby bridges and fired in support of nearby
forces. Armored observation domes, or "cupolas", were fitted atop many
of the structures and served the purpose of identifying targets within the
immediate vicinity as well as surrounding countryside (Dunstan 30). However,
even though outfitted with these observation "cupolas", most firing
would be directed by coordinates called in by higher commanders outside of the
fortress (Greatest Raids: The Fall of Fort Eben Emael).
Every part of the fort was designed to withstand all types of conventional
munitions then imaginable. The gun turrets had armor plate at least a half
meter thick, while the concrete casemates and blockhouses were at least 2.75m
thick. Armored plates covered bullet proof windows on the observation domes.
Heavy sets of steel doors, beams, and sandbags could be utilized to shut off
portions of the fort should they be compromised. Deception was used to great
effect, as three dummy "cupolas" were installed to make Eben Emael
appear even more menacing. A garrison of up to twelve hundred men served the
fortress. These attributes resulted in Eben Emael being, "…regarded by both the
Allies and the Germans as the most impregnable fortification in Europe,
stronger than anything the French had built in the Maginot Line, or the Germans
in the West Wall" (Mrazek 25).
The Allies had correctly predicted that the Germans would attack around the
Maginot Line and through Belgium. They were prepared to engage the Germans as
they violated Belgium neutrality. The Allies believed that the Germans would be
held up long enough by Belgian fortifications to allow British and French
forces to rush to their defense. This was the 'Allied Plan D' (Deighton 90-94).
The strategy of the Belgians was to slow the German advance while falling back
to the line even with Eben Emael. The Belgians thought they would only have to
hold for a short time before help would arrive from other nations.
This was exactly what Adolf Hitler wanted. He and his staff envisioned a plan
to draw the Allies into Belgium and then thrust through the Ardennes Forest
around the Maginot Line towards the Channel (Orlow 207-208). This was the
famous 'Fall Sichelschitt' or Plan Sickle (Veranov 103-104).
Developed primarily by Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein and Major General
Heinz Guderian, the plan was to split the allied forces and make the French
vacate the Maginot Line, or be left behind to sit in it (Messenger 61). For
this plan to work it was imperative that the Germans capture the major bridges
over the Meuse River and to do this the Germans had to knock out the major
fortification covering these bridges, Fort Eben Emael (Lucas 35-37).
Hitler's vision of the assault on Fort Eben Emael involved a series of military
firsts. In October of 1939, he summoned Lieutenant General Kurt Student,
commander of the world's first operational airborne division, the 7th Flieger
Division, to the Reich Chancellery (Ailsby 46). Hitler's question of Student
was whether a German glider could land on the roof of the fortress Eben Emael.
Student returned twenty four hours later and replied that it was possible to
land twelve gliders on the roof of Eben Emael, but his concern was how twelve
squads of lightly armed glidermen would be able to neutralize the guns. Hitler
then revealed the existence of a new weapon which was capable of penetrating
even the heaviest of armor plating. Hitler ordered Student to capture Ft. Eben
Emael(Dank 22-24). Thus, the first operational airborne division would attack
the world's most impregnable fortress, with a new weapon, and deployed in
gliders for the first time in history.
Student began organizing the assault forces and gathering pilots immediately
(Ailsby 46-47). Forbidden by the Versailles Treaty to have an Air Force, the
Germans had trained many pilots in un-powered flight which was not banned.
Therefore, Germany had many expert glider pilots from which to cull assault
pilots from (Mrazek 40-42). The development of small ten to twelve man combat
gliders progressed into the 'DFS 230' design. The DFS 230 glider could be towed
by a single bomber or transport aircraft. Landing by glider solved the problem
of how to deliver a concentration of troops, to a pinpoint location, ready to
fight, and with all of the necessary gear to mount an effective assault (Mrazek
Training began in earnest. Student's assault groups practiced assaulting Czech
fortifications in the Sudetenland which resembled the target fortifications
(Ellis 24-25). The men trained with objects of a similar size and weight as the
new secret weapon. None of the men had witnessed the effects of the weapon and
the secret explosive remained untried in combat until the mission was executed
in May of 1940 (Dunstan 35-36). Student and his men maintained the utmost
secrecy. The assault group was frequently moved and did not wear any
identifiable insignia. The men were under threat of death if they spoke
anything of their purpose (Dunstan 36-37). The Assault force trained
constantly. Little did they know that their mission would be to attack the
World's most formidable fortress?
The secret weapon Hitler revealed to Student was the 'Hohlladung' or
hollow charge explosive. The shaped or hollow charge explosive worked on a
principle called the 'Munroe effect' (Dunstan 35). Named after an American,
Charled Edward Munroe, the hollow charge explosive was discovered in 1888 and
subsequently improved by a German named Egon Neumann (Dunstan 35). The device
worked by concentrating the destructive forces of the blast into a small area
under the hollow portion of the device. A thin sheet of metal within the device
was liquefied and forced like a stream of lava through up to a half meter of
armor plating. However, the device did not need to penetrate the armor plating
fully to be effective, as the resultant shockwave would create splinters of
metal and concrete which maimed or killed the defenders (Dunstan 35).
The Germans created two variants for use against Eben Emael, the 25kg and 50kg
'Hohlladungwaffe' (Saunders 74- 76). The latter was a two piece
design that was carried and assembled by a team of four (Whiting 32). This
tremendous weapon when employed by the Germans against Eben Emael resulted in
the disablement of nine fortifications within the first ten minutes of battle
(Whiting 32). One by one the Belgian positions had been knocked out until
virtually the entire garrison present was trapped underground (Whiting 32-33).
From the German perspective, the assault went fantastically. With the element
of surprise, the German 'pioneer', or combat engineers, stormed the
rooftop of the fortress and disabled virtually all of the offensive
capabilities of the fortress in the first few moments (Whiting 32). The German
'pioneers' were elite infantry first and engineers second. They had
been hand picked for this task. It was through their superior training,
tactics, and with their spectacular new weapon, the 'Hohlladungwaffe',
that they were able to 'pluck out the eyes' of Eben Emael (Greatest Raids: The
Fall of Eben Emael). No longer with a view of the attackers, most of the
garrison cowered within the bowels of the fortress until finally capitulating
the next day.
The Belgians sat in the most modern and impressive fortification that the World
had ever seen. Engineered to resist all attackers, the Fort at Eben Emael was
the one defensive position that the Belgians were supposed to hold, or so they
thought. Many deficiencies contributed to her downfall and ultimate Belgian
For example, garrison duty was a rather unglamorous position for officers and
enlisted as well. Life in the fortress was dull and dreary. Morale suffered due
to repeated alerts and poor leadership. Good leaders were required to keep the
Fort in top form. However, because the best officers and men were sent to the
Field Artillery, the inexperienced and reservists were generally assigned to
garrison duty (Saunders 23-27).
Other deficiencies in personnel are demonstrated by the fact that the fort had
no infantry billeted in the garrison. This was contrary to previous Belgian
doctrine from the Great War. This proved a serious flaw during the attack as
all of the fighting men of Eben Emael were artillerymen, untrained in infantry
tactics (Saunders 23-27). Infantry from the surrounding countryside were tasked
with coming to the aid of the Fort once under attack. Many of the fighting men
of the Fort were billeted in houses up to four miles away. A large number of
the garrison were caught outside of the fortress and were not participants in
the battle (Greatest Raids: The Fall of Eben Emael).
Many technical problems occurred during the battle which adversely impacted the
defense of the Fort. These included: firing pins missing from guns, ammunition
lifts and hoists not operating, periscopes not installed, guns not cleaned and
ready to fire, among others (Greatest Raids: The Fall of Fort Eben Emael).
Perhaps the greatest of the deficiencies were the poor Command and Control
systems that the Belgians had to operate under. The Belgians at the Fort were
not encouraged to act upon their own initiative. This was contrary to German
military doctrine that encouraged men to act upon their own initiative based on
the situation presented them. Therefore, when the gliders began landing the
artillerymen were waiting around for orders to fire, with the ammunition still
in their crates. While the Germans mounted their impressive attack in the
absence of their commanding officer, the garrison commander, Major Jottrand,
did not even have the authority to fire the main guns in defense of the Fort.
Belgian Command and Control doctrine stated that for the guns to fire, fire
missions had to be called in from commanders outside of the Fort (Greatest
Raids: The Fall of Fort Eben Emael). Thus, the Germans quickly demolished their
objectives with minimal losses. The 'MICA' position, which was
designed to interdict attacking aircraft, only got off fifty rounds before
being silenced (Dunstan 38).
To his credit, the Major attempted to follow standard operating procedures in a
time of battle. He believed there was some time before any forces were to cross
the border into Belgium, so he sent many of the garrison from their posts to
dismantle the administrative buildings outside. This action left most of the
defenses undermanned and left one of the main 'cupolas' empty. The
Major also ordered the one bridge blown that he was responsible for before the
Germans could take it. Despite all of his efforts and the heroic efforts of
many of his men, the Major would be the one primarily held responsible by the
Belgians for the loss of the Fort.
The Major, was a victim of unimaginative commanders who had little vision.
Belgian defensive strategy still held the belief in the static defenses of the
Great War (Kaufman and Jurga 106-107). The unconventional weapons and tactics
deployed by the Germans caught them completely by surprise. The strict policy
of neutrality prevented the Fort's guns to fire against German troops massing
in Holland and also ensured that the 120mm guns were the largest caliber to be
mounted at the Fort. Their lack of longer range prevented any pre-emptive
strikes, even if called for (Kaufman and Jurga 106-107).
What did this all mean? To the Germans, the assault was a tremendous success,
exceeding every expectation. The assault group had taken a force over ten times
their number garrisoned in the world's strongest fortress in a day with minimal
losses (Dunstan 56). Just as Hitler expected, this resulted in the execution of
'Allied Plan D' (Dunstan 33). Allied forces were drawn northward to defend
Belgium, and the main armored thrust of the German forces easily pushed through
the Ardennes and to the coast, causing the fall of France in just forty two
days (Dunstan 33). To the Belgians the fall of Eben Emael meant the end of the
war for them.
In conclusion, the brilliant glider assault of Eben Emael was a harbinger
of blitzkrieg for Western Europe. Belgium's strict policy
of neutrality resulted in her military's failure for the second time in twenty
five years. While many deficiencies of the famed Belgian fortification and its'
forces contributed to her demise. The superior training, unconventional tactics
and weaponry of the Germans can not be underestimated. These tactics, training,
and weaponry combined with the element of complete surprise, and were the
primary reasons for the phenomenal successes that day.
Show Footnotes and
Ailsby, Christopher. Hitler's Sky Warriors: German Paratroopers in Action
1939-1945. Dulles: Brassey's Inc., 2000. 25-47.
Dank, Milton. The Glider Gang: An Eyewitness History of World War II Glider
Combat. Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1977.
Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Denmark
. 1979. Edison: Castle Books, 2000. 200-204.
Dunstan, Simon. Fort Eben Emael: The Key to Hitler's Victory in the West
. Fortress. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005.
Ellis, Chris. 7th Fliefer Division: Student's Fallschirmjager Elite.
Spearhead. Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing, 2002. 18-50.
Greatest Raids: Fall of Fort Eben Emael. DVD. The History Channel,
Kaufman, J.E. and Jurga, Robert M. Fortress Europe: European Fortifications of
World War II. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002. 99-125.
Lucas, James. The Storming Eagles: German Airborne Forces in World War II
. 1988. London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2001. 35-64.
Messenger, Charles. The Second World War in the West. Cassell History
of Warfare. 1999. Ed. John Keegan. London: Cassell & Co., 2001. 57-77.
Mrazek, James E. The Fall of Eben Emael: Prelude to Dunkirk. 1970.
Novato: Presidio, 1999.
Saunders, Tim. Fort Eben Emael. Battleground Europe. South Yorkshire:
Pen & Sword Military, 2005.
Short, Neil. Germany's West Wall: The Siegfried Line. Fortress. Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2004.
Veranov, Michael. The Third Reich at War. 1997. Bath: Paragon, 2002.
Whiting, Charles. Hunters from the Sky: The German Parachute Corps 1940-1945
. 1974. New York: Ballantine Books, 1985.
Copyright © 2006 James Lee Laughridge
Written by James Lee Laughridge. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact James Lee Laughridge at:
About the author:
James Lee Laughridge is married with two toddlers. He attends school full time at the University of Alabama at Birmingham while also working full time as an Optical General Manager.
He has a BA degree in History and currently is pursuing a BS degree in Biology. He would like to practice
medicine in the Army or Army Reserves. He enjoys History -- particularly military history. He is military brat and has traveled and lived in several foreign countries including Japan, South Korea, Turkey,
Egypt, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, England, West Germany (FRG), Thailand, Vatican City, Mexico...others. Primary hobby is finding time to spend with his wife and two children.
Published online: 12/16/2006.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.