Advanced Design, Fabrication, and Testing
Pacific Crane and Rigging Company received a NASA contract, worth $8.3
million, to install ground equipment at Kennedy Space Center's Saturn V
facility, Launch Complex 39. On the following day, the Army Corps of
Engineers awarded a $2,179,000 contract to R. E. Carlson Corporation,
St. Petersburg, Fla., to modify Launch Complex 34 to handle the Saturn
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 48, 52.
The Apollo-Saturn Crew Safety Panel decided on a number of emergency
detection system (EDS) and abort procedures for the early Apollo
After hearing the results of several supporting studies, the Panel
further agreed that Saturn IB flights would be automatically aborted if
the vehicle's roll rate reached 20 degrees per second; if two engines
should fail during the first 30 seconds of flight, the Saturn IB must be
capable of aborting automatically, and the Saturn V must have the same
capability for the first 60 seconds of flight; and, finally, the Panel
stated that during the Saturn V's initial stages, automatic abort might
be required if even one engine shut down.
- If any of the three redundant automatic abort circuits so indicated,
the launch vehicle would not be released.
- The EDS would be flight-tested on the SA-201 and SA-202 missions.
- Unmanned Apollo flights should be aborted from the ground only under
the most severe conditions.
- Liftoff permitted automatic abort without manual backup.
- To ensure a successful abort, a redundant mode of EDS-commanded
engine shutdown was mandatory.
"Summary of Proceedings, Apollo-Saturn Crew Safety Panel Meeting
No. 11, 2-3 February, 1965," February 4, 1965.
ASPO established radiation reliability goals for Apollo. These figures
would be used to coordinate the radiation program, to define the
allowable dosages, and to determine the effect of radiation on mission
success. The crew safety goal (defined as the probability of a crewman's
not suffering permanent injury or worse, nor his being incapacitated and
thus no longer able to perform his duties) was set at 0.99999. The major
hazard of a radiation environment, it was felt, was not the chance of
fatal doses. It was, rather, the possibility of acute radiation sickness
during the mission. The second reliability goal, that for success of the
mission (the probability that the mission would not be aborted because
of radiation environment), was placed at 0.98.
These values, ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea emphasized, were based on the
8.3-day reference mission and on emergency dose limits previously set
forth. They were not to be included in overall reliability goals for the
spacecraft, nor were they to be met by weight increases or equipment
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Assistant Director for E. and D.,
"Apollo Radiation Reliability Goals," February 3, 1965.
A device to maintain the spacecraft in a constant attitude was added to
the LEM's primary attitude control system (ACS). The feature brought
with it some undesirable handling characteristics, however: it would
cause the vehicle to land long. Although this overshoot could be
corrected by the pilot, and therefore was not dangerous operationally,
it would require closer attention during final approach. The attitude
hold, therefore, hardly eased the pilot's control task, which was,
after all, its primary function. Instead of moving the device to the
backup ACS (the abort section), the Engineering Simulation Branch of
MSC's Guidance and Control Division recommended that the system be
modified so that, if desired, the pilot could disengage the hold
Memorandum, Clarke T. Hackler, MSC, to Chief, Guidance and Control
Division, "Evaluation of LEM modified (zero overshoot) rate
command-attitude hold control mode," February 4, 1965.
After considering possible impacts, MSC directed North American to
implement real-time commands to the up-data link equipment on command
modules 012 and 014.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 4-ll, 1965."
MSC questioned the necessity of using highly purified (and expensive)
fuel-cell-type oxygen to maintain the cabin atmosphere during manned
ground testing of the spacecraft. The Center, therefore, undertook a
study of the resultant impurities and effect on crew habitability of
using a commercial grade of aviation oxygen.
Ibid.; memorandum, Robert E. Smylie, MSC, to Chief,
Environmental Physiology Branch, "Breathing oxygen for Apollo
Command Module ground testing in Airframe 008," March 15, 1965.
SM 001's service propulsion engine was static-fired for 10 sec at White
Sands. The firing was the first in a program to verify the mission
profiles for later flight tests of the module. (SM 001 was the first
major piece of flight-weight Apollo hardware.)
MSC News Release 65-18, February 5, 1965; TWX, M. L. Raines, WSMR, to
NASA Headquarters, MSC, MSFC, and ASPO Field Test Office, Cape Kennedy,
Fla., "Airframe 001 First Firing," February 6, 1965.
MSC deleted the requirement for a rendezvous radar in the CSM.
MSC, "Minutes, Configuration Control Board Meeting No. 5,"
February 8, 1965.
MSC, North American, and Grumman reviewed the results of Langley
Research Center's LEM-active docking simulation. While the overhead mode
of docking had been found to be acceptable, two items still caused some
concern: (1) propellant consumption could exceed supply; and (2) angular
rates at contact had occasionally exceeded specifications. Phase B
(Grumman's portion) of the docking simulations, scheduled to begin in
about two weeks, would further investigate these problems. Langley
researchers also had evaluated several sighting aids for the LEM and
recommended a projected image collimated (parallel in lines of
direction) reticle as most practicable. Accordingly, on March 9, MSC
directed Grumman to incorporate this type of sighting device into the
design of their spacecraft.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Results of LEM active docking simulation at
Langley Research Center," March 9, 1965.
Development tests recently completed by AiResearch on the water
evaporator control system for the space suit heat exchanger disclosed
its inadequacy because of its slow response time. To solve this problem,
AiResearch and North American proposed an alternate control system
approach similar to the glycol evaporator scheme used elsewhere in the
environmental control system. This alternate design, which was tested
and appeared a more desirable approach, would be incorporated on
airframes 008 and 012 through Block II spacecraft. No schedule impact
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 4-11, 1965";
memorandum, Frank E. Samonski, Jr., MSC, to Chief, Test Division,
"A14-033 requirements for Airframe 008 testing," February 8,
NASA invited 113 scientists and 23 national space organizations to a
conference at MSC to brief them on the Gemini and Apollo missions. As a
result of the conference, NASA hoped to receive proposals for biomedical
experiments to be performed in Gemini and Apollo spacecraft.
MSC News Release 65-21, "Foreign Scientists Invited to Conference
on Apollo Experiments," February 8, 1965.
North American completed the first ground test model of the S-II stage
of the Saturn V.
Space Business Daily, February 9, 1965, p. 195.
ASPO and the MSC Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division (IESD)
formulated a program for electromagnetic compatibility testing of
hardware aboard the CSM and LEM. The equipment would be mounted in
spacecraft mockups, which would then be placed in the Center's anechoic
chamber. In these tests, scheduled to begin about the first of
September, IESD was to evaluate the compatibility of the spacecraft in
docked and near-docked configurations, and of Block I spacecraft with
the launch vehicle. The division was also to recommend testing
procedures for the launch complex.
Memorandum, R. S. Sawyer, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering Division,
"Test Philosophy for CSM/ LEM Electromagnetic Compatibility Test
to be performed in the Anechoic Chamber Test Facility at MSC,"
February 10, 1965.
ASPO evaluated Grumman's proposal for an "all battery" system
for the LEM descent stage. ASPO was aiming at a 35-hour lunar stay for
the least weight; savings were realized by lessening battery
capacities, by making the water tanks smaller, and by reducing some of
the spacecraft's structural requirements.
Letter, Thomas J. Kelly, GAEC, to MSC, Attn: W. F. Rector III,
"Submittal of Additional Information Relative to the Lem
'All-Battery' Study," February 10, 1965, with enclosures.
A drop test at EI Centro, Calif., demonstrated the ability of the
drogue parachutes to sustain the ultimate disreefed load that would be
imposed upon them during reentry. (For the current CM weight, that
maximum load would be 7,711 kg [17,000 lbs] per parachute.) Preliminary
data indicated that the two drogues had withstood loads of 8,803 and
8,165 kg (19,600 and 18,000 lbs). One of the drogues emerged unscathed;
the other suffered only minor damage near the pocket of the reefing
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-35, pp. 3-4;
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 11-18,
MSC modified its bubble helmet design to fit on an International Latex
"state-of-the-art" space suit. A mockup of the helmet was
used in don doff tests. Mean donning time was 4.2 sec; doff time
averaged 1.47 sec. Further tests would be performed when a prototype
helmet was completed (expected by February 26).
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 11-18, 1965."
Hamilton Standard, the extravehicular mobility unit contractor,
completed a two-week wearing test of the Apollo liquid-cooled
undergarment. Investigators found that the garment could be worn for
the entire lunar mission without any serious discomfort.
To make room for a rendezvous study, MSC was forced to end,
prematurely, its simulations of employing the LEM as a backup for the
service propulsion system. Nonetheless, the LEM was evaluated in both
manual and automatic operation. Although some sizable attitude changes
were required, investigators found no serious problems with either
steering accuracy or dynamic stability.
North American selected the Ordnance Division of General Precision Link
Group to supply the panel thrusters for the spacecraft lunar adapter.
Evaluations of the three-foot probes on the LEM landing gear showed
that the task of shutting off the engine prior to actual touchdown was
even more difficult than controlling the vehicle's rate of descent.
During simulated landings, about 70 percent of the time the spacecraft
was less than 0.3 m (1 ft) high when shutdown came; on 20 percent of
the runs, the engine was still burning at touchdown. Some change,
either in switch location or in procedure, thus appeared necessary to
shorten the delay between contact light and engine cutoff (an average
of 0.7 sec).
MSC relayed to NASA Headquarters North American's cost estimates for
airlocks on the Apollo CM:
(The unit costs presumed two flight items for Block I and 12 for Block
|Blocks I & II||$1,050,000||$111,000|
During late February and early March, North American completed a
conceptual design study of an airlock for the Block I CMs. Designers
found that such a device could be incorporated into the side access
hatch. A substitute cover for the inner hatch and a panel to replace
the window on the outer hatch would have to be developed, but these
modifications would not interfere with the basic design of the
TWX, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to NASA Headquarters, Attn: Samuel C.
Phillips, February 12, 1965; "Apollo Monthly Progress
Report," SID 62-300-35, pp. 17-18.
MSC's Systems Engineering Division (SED) requested support from the
Structures and Mechanics Division in determining the existence or
extent of corrosion in the coolant loops of the SM electrical power
subsystem (EPS) and the CM and LEM environmental control subsystems
(ECS), resulting from the use of water glycol as coolant fluid.
Informal contact had been made with W. R. Downs of the Structures and
Mechanics Division and he had been given copies of contractor reports
and correspondence between MSC, North American, and MIT pertaining to
the problem. The contractors had conflicting positions regarding the
extent and seriousness of glycol corrosion.
SED requested that a study be initiated to:
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Structures and Mechanics
Division, "Water/glycol Corrosion," signed Harry W. Byington,
February 12, 1965.
- determine the existence or extent of corrosion in the EPS and ECS
coolant loops; and
- make recommendations regarding alternate materials, inhibitors, or
fluids, and other tests or remedial actions if it were determined that a
A study by General Electric affirmed the necessity for the steerable
S-band antenna for communications between the spacecraft and the ground
at lunar distances. Communications margins were so small that, at those
distances, any degradation of equipment would seriously affect the
spacecraft's contact with earth.
Letter, E. J. Merrick, GE, to William A. Lee, "S-Band
Communications Requirements Study," February 15, 1965, with
enclosure: "CSM-LEM Directional Communications Antenna
Relationship to Communications Margins and Mission
Crew Systems Division (CSD) informed the Astronaut Office that the
requirements submitted by Astronaut Michael Collins on February 5 had
been included in the Block II suit program plans. Those requirements
for astronaut training suits were:
CSD requested the Astronaut Office to provide the type and schedule of
training programs in which suit use was anticipated, stating:
"This information will be of value in assessing suit support
requirements and the type of suit interface information to be gained
from astronaut participation in these programs."
|Suit Quantity||Type||Date Available|
|6||A-5H||December 1965 (or sooner if possible)|
Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Assistant Director for Flight
Crew Operations, Attn: D. K. Slayton, "Apollo Block II training
suits," signed E. L. Hays, February 16, 1965.
In the first of a series of manufacturing review meetings at Bethpage,
N.Y., it was learned that Grumman's tooling program was behind schedule
(caused primarily by engineering changes). Tool manufacturing might
recoup much of the lost time, but this process was highly vulnerable to
further design changes. Completion of tooling for the ascent stage of
LTA-3 was now set for late April, a production delay of about two
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "LEM
Manufacture Review Meetings Minutes," March 3, 1965, with
enclosure: "Minutes, LEM Manufacturing Review Meeting, February
In a memorandum to ASPO, Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director,
inquired about realigning the schedules of contractors to meet revised
delivery and launch timetables for Apollo. Phillips tentatively set
forth deliveries of six spacecraft (CSM/LEMs) during 1967 and eight
during each succeeding year; he outlined eight manned launches per year
also, starting in 1969.
Memorandum, Samuel C. Phillips, NASA, to MSFC, MSC, and KSC, Attn:
Directors, "Apollo Delivery and Launch Schedules," February
16, 1965, with enclosures.
A Saturn I vehicle SA-9 launched a multiple payload into a high 744 by
496 km (462 by 308 mi) earth orbit. The rocket carried a boilerplate
(BP) CSM (BP-16) and, fitted inside the SM, the Pegasus I
meteoroid detection satellite. This was the eighth successful Saturn
flight in a row, and the first to carry an active payload. BP-16's
launch escape tower was jettisoned following second-stage S-IV
ignition. After attaining orbit, the spacecraft were separated from the
S-IV. Thereupon the Pegasus I's panels were deployed and
were ready to perform their task, i.e., registering meteoroid impact
and relaying the information to the ground.
NASA News Release 65-38, "Saturn I to Launch Pegasus
Meteoroid," February 15, 1965; TWX, E. R. Mathews, KSC, to NASA
Headquarters, MSFC, MSC, and MSFC Resident Manager, Sacramento,
California, subject: "CLN SA-9 Apollo Flash Report No. 2,"
February 18, 1965; Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp.
NASA awarded an $8,879,832 fixed-price contract to the Univac Division
of Sperry Rand Corporation for digital data processors for the Apollo
project. Univac also would assist in modifying extant computer programs
to meet Apollo requirements.
NASA News Release 65-50, "NASA Buys Univac Data Processing for
Moon Project," February 16, 1965.
MSC announced a realignment of specialty areas for the 13 astronauts
not assigned to forthcoming Gemini missions (GT 3 through 5) or to
strictly administrative positions:
MSC News Release 65-27, February 16, 1965.
- Operations and Training
- Edwin E. Aldrin, branch chief - mission planning
Charles A. Bassett - operations handbooks, training, and simulators
Alan L. Bean - recovery systems
Michael Collins - pressure suits and extravehicular activity
David R. Scott - mission planning and guidance and navigation
Clifton C. Williams - range operations, deep space instrumentation, and
- Project Apollo
- Richard F. Gordon, branch chief - overall astronaut activities in
Apollo area and liaison for CSM development
Donn F. Eisele - CSM and LEM
William A. Anders - environmental control system and radiation and
Eugene A. Cernan - boosters, spacecraft propulsion, and the Agena stage
Roger B. Chaffee - communications, flight controls, and docking
R. Walter Cunningham - electrical and sequential systems and non-flight
Russell L. Schweickart - in-flight experiments and future programs.
February 16-March 15
The CM's waste management system demonstrated its feasibility under
zero-g conditions during flights from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.
The system successfully contained both solid and liquid wastes and did
not leak even when filled to capacity.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-35, p. 7.
The U.S. Navy Air Crew Equipment Laboratory began testing the Gemini
Block I Apollo space suit in a wide range of environmental temperatures
to determine the comfort and physiological responses of the wearer. The
program, delayed because of difficulties with humidity control, was to
be completed in three to four weeks.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 11-18, 1965."
Ranger VIII, a lunar probe carrying six television
cameras, was launched from Cape Kennedy by an Atlas- Agena B vehicle.
The spacecraft's trajectory was nearly perfect; only minor midcourse
corrections were required to place the craft squarely in the target
area, in the Sea of Tranquillity.
Cameras in Ranger VIII were turned on 23 minutes before
impact, and the spacecraft transmitted pictures back to earth until it
struck the surface and was destroyed. The flight's product would be
intensively studied by a panel of noted lunar scientists, among them
Gerard P. Kuiper and Ewen A. Whitaker of the University of Arizona and
Harold C. Urey of the University of California.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 73-74, 84-85.
MSC directed North American to delete the rendezvous radar from Block
II CSMs. On those spacecraft North American instead would install LEM
rendezvous radar transponders. Grumman, in turn, was ordered to halt
its work on the CSM rendezvous radar (both in-house and at RCA) as well
as all support efforts. At the same time, however, the company was
directed to incorporate a tracking light on the LEM (compatible with
the CSM telescope sextant) and to modify the spacecraft's VHF equipment
to permit range extraction in the CSM. (See February 8 and March
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract NAS 9-150, CCA to Cover Removal of Rendezvous Radar
Installation on CSM (MSN 150-508)," February 16, 1965; letter,
Yschek, to NAA, S&ID, "Contract Change Authorization No.
303," February 17, 1965; letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA,
S&ID, "Contract Change Authorization No. 303, Revision
1," March 11, 1965; letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn:
R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, Item 3, Contractor
Responsibilities, Rendezvous Radar and Transponder," March 8,
1965, with enclosure.
North American proposed an idea for increasing the CM's land landing
capability. This could be done, the company asserted, by raising the
water impact limits (thus exceeding normal tolerances) and stiffening
the shock struts. Presently, the spacecraft was incapable of a land
landing within established requirements (i.e., in a 46-km [25-nm] wind).
While even approximate figures were not available, the maximum wind
velocity in which the CM could land - without exceeding crew tolerances
- was probably between 19 and 28 km (10 and 15 nm) per hr. (No precise
data on land and water landings would be available until after the drop
tests of boilerplate 28 late in the year.)
Personnel of the ASPO Crew Integration Branch, however, were
pessimistic about the North American scheme. They doubted that shock
attenuation could be readily increased, nor did they see as likely any
relaxation of crew tolerances. Further, the probability of a land
landing introduced tighter constraints on wind conditions at the launch
site. As they viewed it, the only feasible way to improve the
spacecraft's ground capability was through some mechanism that would
further absorb the landing impact.
Memorandum, Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Command Module land impact capability," February
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea clarified the manned unmanned capabilities
required of Block I CSM spacecraft to ensure that end-item
specifications appropriately reflect those capabilities.
CSMs 017 and 020 would fly unmanned entry tests on the Saturn V and
need not be capable of manned missions. CSMs 012 and 014 were to be
delivered to KSC for manned orbital missions on the Saturn IB but must
be capable of being modified to fly unmanned missions.
The planning for CSM 012 should be such that the mission type could be
selected 5½ months prior to the scheduled launch of the 204
mission, yet not delay the launch.
Memorandum, Shea, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering Division,
"Block I CSM Mission Capabilities," February 17, 1965.
LEM Test Article 2 was shipped to Marshall Space Flight Center to
undergo a series of Saturn booster vibration tests.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 25," LPR-10-41, March 10, 1965,
MSC's Crew Systems Division decreed that the extravehicular mobility
unit (EMU) would employ a single garment for both thermal and meteoroid
protection. By an earlier decision, the penetration probability
requirement had been lowered from 0.9999 to 0.999. This change, along
with the use of newer, more efficient materials, promised a substantial
lightening of the garment (hopefully down to about 7.7 kg [17 lbs],
excluding visors, gloves, and boots). The division also deleted the
requirement for a separate meteoroid visor, because the thermal and
glare visors provided ample protection against meteoroids as well.
Tests by Ling-Temco-Vought confirmed the need for thermal protection
over the pressure suit during extravehicular transfer by the LEM
Memorandum, Robert E. Smylie, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) thermal anti
meteoroid protection," February 18, 1965.
Because of the CM's recent weight growth, the launch escape system
(LES) was incapable of lifting the spacecraft the
"specification" distance away from the booster. The
performance required of the LES was being studied further;
investigators were especially concerned with the heat and blast effects
of an exploding booster, and possible deleterious effects upon the
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 18-25, 1965."
NASA selected Philco's Aeronutronic Division to design a penetrometer
for possible use in the Apollo program. Impacting on the moon, the
device would measure the firmness and bearing strength of the surface.
Used in conjunction with an orbiting spacecraft, the system could
provide scientific information about areas of the moon that were
inaccessible by any other means. Langley Research Center would
negotiate and manage the contract, estimated to be worth $1 million.
NASA News Release 65-59, "NASA to Negotiate With Philco for Study
of Moon Penetrometer," February 19, 1965; Astronautics and
Aeronautics, 1965, p. 82.
To eliminate interference between the S-IVB stage and the instrument
unit, MSC directed North American to modify the deployment angle of the
adapter panels. Originally designed to rotate 170 degrees, the panels
should open but 45 degrees (60 degrees during abort), where they were to
be secured while the CSM docked with and extracted the LEM.
But at this smaller angle, the panels now blocked the CM's four flush-
mounted omnidirectional antennas, used during near-earth phases of the
mission. While turning around and docking, the astronauts thus had to
communicate with the ground via the steerable high gain antenna. For
Block II spacecraft, therefore, MSC concurrently ordered North American
to broaden the S-band equipment's capability to permit it to operate
within 4,630 km (2,500 nm) of earth.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division, "Contract Change Authorization No. 304," February
19, 1965; letter, Yschek to NAA, S&ID, "Contract Change
Authorization No. 305," February 19, 1965.
NASA awarded a fixed-price contract (worth l.5 million) to IBM to
design a backup guidance and navigation computer for the Apollo CM.
MSC, "Quarterly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, for the Period Ending April 30,
1965," p. 24.
William F. Rector III, MSC's LEM Project Officer, reported at an ASPO
Manager's Staff Meeting that the expected firing date for the
heavyweight ascent (HA) rig #3 at WSTF had been slipped from March 18,
1965, until April 13. Grumman personnel at White Sands said the slip
was necessary because
Memorandum, Rector to Distr., "First Firing of HA-3,"
February 23, 1965.
- a propellant loading control assembly to be mounted on the rig could
not be used in the planned location because it was not accessible for
checkout and would require two weeks for refabrication of certain
pipelines and further checkout;
- checkout of various wiring between the HA-3 rig and the facilities
did not occur on schedule and two weeks would be required to complete
the task; and
- adequate interfacing between the fluid and gaseous ground support
equipment (GSE) and various facility pipes was not maintained with many
pieces of GSE putting out higher pressure than the facility pipes design
MSC and North American conducted Part 2 of the mockup review of the CM's
forward compartment and lower equipment bay. (Part 1 was accomplished
January 14-15. This staged procedure was in line with the contractor's
proposal for a progressive review program leading up to the Critical
Design Review scheduled for July 19-23.) Except for minor changes, the
design was acceptable.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-33, p. 24; MSC,
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 25-March 4,
NASA awarded a $2,740,000 fixed-price contract to the Collins Radio
Company for S-band telemetry equipment. Collins would install the
equipment at three antenna facilities that supported Apollo lunar
missions (at Goldstone, Calif.; Canberra, Australia; and Madrid, Spain).
NASA News Release 65-63, "Collins to Make S-Band Systems for Three
85-Foot Apollo Antennas," February 24, 1965; Space Business
Daily, February 26, 1965, p. 286.
MSC's Procurement and Contracts Division notified ASPO that John B.
Alldredge had been assigned as the Contracting Officer for Contract NAS
9-150 (the North American contract), replacing Henry P. Yschek.
Memorandum, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to Distr., "Notification of new
Contracting Officer for C&SM Contract NAS 9-150," sgd. W. R.
Kelly, February 24, 1965.
MSC and the David Clark Company reached an agreement on a contract for
Apollo Block I space suits. The first suits, expected by July 1, would
go to North American for testing.
Memorandum, Matthew I. Radnofsky, MSC, to Gemini and Flight Support
Procurement, Attn: Arc F. Lee, "Contract NAS 9-3642, Apollo Block
I Suit, David Clark Company," February 25, 1965.
KSC supplemented Chrysler Corporation's contract for support services
for the Saturn I and IB launch programs. Effective through June 30,
1968, the agreement would cost NASA $41 million plus an award fee.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 94.
Using a mockup Apollo CM, MSC Crew Systems Division tested the time in
which an astronaut could don and doff the Block I pressure garment
assembly while at various stations inside the spacecraft. The two
subjects' average donning times were nine min 33 sec and 10 min; mean
doffing times were four min five sec and five min 23 sec.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, February 25-March 4,
February 25-March 4
To determine thermal and vacuum effects on the CM's parachutes, MSC
Structures and Mechanics Division tested nylon samples in a vacuum
under varying temperature conditions. After two weeks of exposure to
this spacelike environment, the samples exhibited only a 16 percent
loss of strength (as against a design allowable of 25 percent).
February 25-March 4
DeHavilland completed deployment tests of the CM's pop-up recovery
February 25-March 4
On the basis of in-house tests, Grumman recommended a scheme for
exterior lighting on the LEM. The design copied standard aeronautical
practice (i.e., red, port; green, starboard; and amber, underside).
White lights marked the spacecraft, both fore and aft; to distinguish
between the two white lights, the aft one contained a flasher.
Ibid.; "Monthly Progress Report No. 25,"
LPR-10-41, p. 22.
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea named William A. Lee as an assistant
program manager. Lee, who previously headed the Operations Planning
Division (which had been absorbed into Owen E. Maynard's Systems
Engineering Division), now assumed responsibility for Apollo Operations
(both the flight-test program and the lunar mission). Lee thus joined
Harry L. Reynolds, also an assistant manager, who was assigned to the
LEM's development. Deputy Manager Robert O. Piland continued overseeing
the CSM's development and, along with Shea, overall program
MSC News Release 65- 34, February 26, 1965.
Louis Walter, Goddard Space Flight Center geochemist, reported that his
research with tektites indicated the lunar surface may be sandlike.
Waiter had discovered the presence of coesite in tektites, believed to
be particles of the moon sent into space when meteorites impact the
lunar surface. Coesite, also found at known meteorite craters, is a
form of silicon dioxide - a major constituent of sand - produced under
high pressure. "If we accept the lunar origin of tektites,"
Walter said, "this would prove or indicate that the parent
material on the moon is something like the welded tuft that we find in
Yellowstone Park, Iceland, New Zealand, and elsewhere." Welded
tuft was said to have some of the qualities of beach sand.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 96.
During the Month
Because of a change in the size of the entry corridor, North American
technicians sought to determine whether they might relax the
requirements for pointing accuracy of the stabilization and control
system at transearth injection. They could not. To ensure a delta-V
reserve, the accuracy requirement must remain unchanged.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-35, p. 8.
During the Month
Grumman reported three major problems with the LEM:
"Monthly Progress Report No. 25," LPR-10-41, p. 3.
- To enable the manufacturer to complete the design of the aft
equipment bay, NASA must define the ground support equipment that would
be supported by the LEM adapter platforms.
- Space Technology Laboratories' difficulties with the descent engine
injector (the combustion instability in the variable-thrust engine)
- The need for a lightweight thrust chamber for the descent engine,
one that would still meet the new duty cycle.