|The Aerial Defense of the
Netherlands East Indies and the United States Army Air Force in the Defense of
by Michael Gough
Japan and the United States emerged as world powers at the beginning of the
20th Century, and soon challenged European Powers' dominance in Asia and the
Pacific. Japan's challenge was aimed at displacing European powers and
inserting itself as a colonial master. The United States was content to check
further European and Japanese expansion and to solidify its control of the
Philippines and other Pacific possessions. Forty years later, Japan captured
the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies, and Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Australia, the United States and those four powers combined could do little to
Japan and the United States Step onto the World Stage
In 1895, after victories over the Chinese navy and army, Japan made Korea
"independent" and took possession of Formosa (now Taiwan), some other islands,
and Manchuria's Liaotung Peninsula. Additionally, Japan forced China to open
treaty ports under the generous terms previously reserved to Western powers,
and secured indemnities for the costs it incurred during the war. Bowing to
Western pressures, Japan did not occupy the Liaotung Peninsula in Southern
Three years later in 1898, Russia prevailed upon China to grant it a lease to
Port Arthur at the south end of the peninsula and quickly expanded its control
to the entire peninsula. Japan responded with a surprise attack on Port Arthur
in 1904, followed with a siege. Elsewhere, Japan occupied Korea, fought bloody
land battles against the Russians in Manchuria, and finally triumphed over the
Russian Navy at the Battle of Tsushima. In the ensuring Treaty of Portsmouth,
mediated by President Theodore Roosevelt, Japanese control over Korea was
recognized, Japan took possession of Port Arthur and a railroad on the Liaotung
Peninsula, and the Russians agreed to leave Manchuria.
In a five-month span, April to August 1898, the United States defeated the
Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay and the Spanish colonial army in
Cuba. In the resulting treaty of Paris, the United States took possession of
the former Spanish colonies of Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam, and the Carolina and
The world was a different place. Japan, an Asian country that had emerged from
feudalism a half century earlier, had defeated mighty Russia. Huge and rich,
the United States had bested a long-time European power and taken possession of
islands in the Caribbean and the far-off Pacific.
Two years after the Treaty of Portsmouth, in December 1907, President Roosevelt
sent 16 battleships – "The Great White Fleet" – on a round-the-world tour.
Although the ships carried friendly greetings and tightly disciplined sailors,
some U.S. citizens worried that the voyage might provoke a war with Japan
because of tensions associated with Japan's displeasure with American
mistreatment of Japanese immigrants. Years after the event, Roosevelt wrote
that Japan had been the target of the demonstration of might. He had become
"uncomfortably conscious of a very, very slight undertone of veiled truculence.
[I]t was time for a showdown." The voyage worked. When the fleet steamed
into Tokyo Bay in October 1908, thousands of school children greeted it singing
the "Star Spangled Banner." Tensions between the United States and Japan
evaporated (for a while).
Both countries grew stronger during World War I. The U.S. raised a huge army,
which, by numbers and abundance of weapons and supplies, sealed the defeat of
the Central Powers of Germany, Austria, and Turkey. It sold a lot of war
supplies, ending the war with the Allies deeply in its debt.
Japan earned money from the sale of war material, and, siding with the Allies,
occupied and took control of island territories in the Pacific that had
belonged to Germany. World War I increased Japan's gold reserves, but it did
nothing to increase its supply of food and raw materials that were increasingly
inadequate for its growing population and burgeoning industries.
In 1917, T. Takekoshi wrote about a possible solution to those problems, "It is
therefore necessary for Japan to look to such places as Java and Sumatra as
sources of rice supply," and "she has to look to the islands of the South
Pacific for her supplies of rubber." Mr. Takekoshi did not mention oil in
his article. He did, however, reassure his readers that conquest was not the
only way for Japan to obtain the desirable islands. Japan was in position to
buy the lands from their colonial masters with the money it had acquired during
World War I. I do not know how seriously Japan pursued the purchase of the
islands, but the islands were clearly desirable real estate.
The Netherlands East Indies
Java, Bali, and Sumatra, islands with romantic-sounding names, were part of the
Dutch or Netherlands East Indies (NEI), a string of islands stretching from
Malaysia to Australia. Following overthrow of Netherlands' control in 1949,
those islands became the nation of Indonesia (see map 1).
||Map 1 Modern-day Indonesia
In the 1930s, the NEI was "one of the richest colonies in the world" because
of oil reserves. By then, Japan, fighting wars in Manchuria and China, saw the
U.S. reneging on its role as a reliable provider of oil because of its
opposition to Japanese expansion. Capturing the NEI was an alternative to
depending on the United States for oil.
In 1941, the NEI, islands far away from the home country, were the major land
area controlled by Holland. The home country had been lost to the Germans in
1940, and Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch government had fled to England. Except
for the skeleton government in England, the NEI was the Netherlands after that
In 1940, NEI leaders, expecting a Japanese attack, entered into negotiations
with Great Britain and the United States to work out defense plans and to try
to buy weapons. Plans were developed, but Britain, pressed in Europe by Germany
and worried about Japanese designs on Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, had no
weapons to sell; neither did the United States only beginning to manufacture
In 1940, the NEI population was composed of 70,000,000 indigenous people, about
3,000,000 non-indigenous, non-Dutch people (mostly Chinese), and 300,000 Dutch.
The name of the best known of the islands, Java, was sometimes applied to the
whole island chain, and the capital, on the island of Java, was Batavia (now
Jakarta). The bulk of the NEI Army, totaling 40,000 Dutch troops and 100,000
native troops (or "levies," in some commentaries) was located on Java.
The NEI was the plum for Japan's advances into the South Pacific.
||Without regular shipments from the
Netherlands East Indies the Japanese military would quickly exhaust the
nation's limited stocks of petroleum products, and the war effort, as well as
the domestic economy, would grind to a halt. From the Japanese perspective
access to these fields was essential if Japan was to continue its policy of
nationalistic expansion. Without Dutch oil, Japan would have little option but
to halt its aggressive plans, accept defeat in China and accede to Western
The author of the chapter "Loss of the Netherlands East Indies" in Army
Air Forces in World War II described the NEI as "the fabulously
wealthy Netherlands East Indies."
The ABDACOM Area
Shortly after Japanese attacks on U.S. and British territories on December 7,
1941, the United States (America), Great Britain (Britain), the NEI (Dutch),
and Australia – the ABDA Command countries – planned for the joint defense of
the "Malay Barrier" or "East Indies Barrier." The Barrier, a barrier because of
Singapore's "impregnable" defenses and the difficulties presented by the
succession of sea-borne landings necessary to seize the NEI, stretched from
Burma (now called "Myanmar" by its rulers), along the Malay Peninsula and
through Singapore, across the NEI (Sumatra, Java, Timor, and other islands) to
Northern Australia (see map 2). British General Sir Archibald Wavell, who had
held the bag for the defeat of British forces in North Africa in 1940, was
taken from his position as Commander in Chief of British Forces in India, and
appointed Commander of ABDACOM on December 29, 1941. U.S. General George H.
Brett was appointed Deputy Commander, and U.S. General Lewis Brereton was
placed in command of the air forces.
The ABDA Area
From Watson, p. 369
The distances in ABDACOM region are immense – about 3400 miles in the more
important north to south axis and 3100 east to west. Primitive conditions were
the norm. The Malay Barrier region, and especially the NEI, had few towns of
any consequence, a handful of cities, and few airfields.
(The Philippines, while formally part of ABDA, were practically under the
one-man command of General Douglas MacArthur. By the end of 1941, U.S. military
planners had abandoned hope of reinforcing U.S. forces in the Philippines,
leaving them to certain defeat.)
In many people's minds, the war in the Pacific was fought along east to west
axes as first the Japanese advanced eastward and later, as U.S. forces began to
wrest control of the war, battles moved from east to west. In reality, much of
the war was fought along north-south axes. The Japanese invaded the Philippines
from Formosa and moved southward from Indochina and Formosa to attack the NEI
(see map 3). For the U.S., the long slog back to the Philippines was a south to
north movement originating in Australia.
Japanese Attacks on ABDACOM
Source: Wikipedia, available at
The Short, Unhappy Life of ABDACOM
The future of ABDACOM and the Malay Barrier was short and bleak. The Japanese
required six months and a day – from the initial Japanese landings on the
Malaya Peninsula on December 8, 1941, to the surrender of the last American
forces in the Philippines on June 9, 1942 – to conquer the ABDACOM area, except
Australia (see table 1).
Table 1. The Short, Unhappy Life of ABDACOM
-Dec. 8, 1941 Initial Japanese attacks on airfields in the Philippines and
Singapore. Initial Japanese landings on Malay Peninsula.
-Dec. 10, 1941 Japanese aircraft sink HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse.
Initial landing of Japanese forces on the north coast of the island of
-Dec. 12, 1941 Japanese forces drive British defenders onto Hong Kong Island.
Japanese landing on southern Luzon.
-Dec. 16, 1941 Japanese forces land on Sarawak (the northern part of island
shared with Borneo).
-Dec. 19, 1941 Japanese forces land on Hong Kong Island.
-Dec. 20, 1941 Japanese forces land at Davao, on the south coast of the Island
of Mindanao, the Philippines.
-Dec. 22, 1941 Japanese forces land at Lingayen Gulf, western Luzon, with a
straight shot to Manila, the capital.
-Dec. 23, 1941 Dutch flying boats attack Davao.
-Dec. 25, 1941 Hong Kong surrenders to Japanese. Japanese land on southern
Sarawak. Japanese occupy Jolo, a small island between Mindanao and Sarawak.
-Dec. 27, 1941 General MacArthur makes Manila an open city.
-Dec. 29, 1941 ABDACOM established, with British General Archibald Wavell,
-Jan. 1, 1942 US withdraws from rest of Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula.
-Jan. 4, 1942 Japanese airforces attack Rabaul, New Britain.
-Jan. 7, 1942 Japanese air raid on Ceram, an island off the west coast of New
Guinea and north of Timor.
-Jan. 8, 1942 Japanese invade northern Borneo.
-Jan. 10, 1942 Japanese invade north-east Borneo.
-Jan. 11, 1942 Japanese invade north-east tip of Celebes at Menado.
-Jan. 12, 1942 Major Japanese daylight airraid on Singapore.
-Jan. 20, 1942 Japanese carrier airplanes attack Rabaul.
-Jan. 22, 1942 Japanese carrier airplanes attack Port Moresby, southern New
Guinea. Japanese land forces invade Rabaul.
-Jan. 23, 1942 Japanese land on southeastern Celebes.
-Jan. 24, 1942 Japanese invade Balifpapan, Borneo. First U.S. pursuits, P-40s,
arrive in Java.
-Jan. 26, 1942 Japanese aircraft attack Timor and Amboina, a small island to
the south of Timor. U.S. retreats on Bataan Peninsula.
-Jan. 27, 1942 RAF Hurricanes fly from HMS Indomitable to
-Jan. 29, 1942 Japanese invade Pontianak, Borneo, on west coast, just south of
the current border with Malaysia.
-Jan. 30, 1942 Japan invades Ceram.
-Jan. 31, 1942 British abandon Malaya and retreat to Singapore.
-Feb. 3, 1942 Japanese aircraft inflict heavy losses on Dutch fighters
stationed in eastern Java.
-Feb. 4, 1942 British fighters reach Java in crates on surface vessels.
Japanese aircraft attack Allied Navy force and damage two U.S. cruisers.
-Feb. 5, 1942 Major Japanese air attack on eastern Java.
-Feb. 6, 1942 Major Japanese air attack on southern Sumatra.
-Feb. 7, 1942 Another major attack on southern Sumatra.
-Feb. 8, 1942 Japanese forces invade Singapore Island. Japanese forces invade
at Macassar on southwestern Celebes. Japanese forces invade southern New
-Feb. 9, 1942 Japanese occupy Celebes. Japanese aircraft raid western Java.
-Feb. 10, 1942 Japanese complete occupation of Borneo.
-Feb. 13, 1942 Singapore evacuation begins. Invasion fleet off shores of
-Feb. 14, 1942 Japanese paratroopers land near British airfield P.1 near
-Feb. 15, 1942 Singapore surrenders.
-Feb. 16, 1942 Evacuation of Sumatra begins. Relief convoy from Darwin, headed
for Timor, turned back when all transport ships damaged by Japanese bombers.
-Feb. 18, 1942 Japanese air attacks on eastern Java.
-Feb. 19, 1942 Japanese air attacks on western Java. Japanese carrier planes
devastate port at Darwin. Employing paratroopers and landings across beaches,
Japanese invade Bali and Timor.
-Feb. 20, 1942 U.S. aircraft carrier Lexington, in route to attack
Rabaul, repulses Japanese airraids but turns away from attack on Rabaul.
Japanese land on Timor, sever ferry route of P-40s from Australia to NEI.
-Feb. 23, 1942 In Washington, Combined Chiefs make decision for last-ditch
defense of Java, with no withdrawal of forces from the island. [This decision
was not final.]
-Feb. 25, 1942 General Wavell leaves command post in Java, cedes command to
Dutch who are now the principle obstacle to Japanese.
-Feb. 27, 1942 Allied naval force attempts to turn back Japanese invasion fleet
headed for Java. Allies suffer devastating losses of five cruisers and six
destroyers in Battle of Java Sea. USS Langley, a seaplane tender made from the
first obsolete U.S. carrier sunk by Japanese planes while ferrying 32 P-40s to
Java. Many P-40 pilots and groundcrew lost when rescue vessels sunk.
-Feb. 28, 1942 In night-time Battle of Sunda Straight, an Australian and a U.S.
cruiser – Perth and Houston – are sunk. Japanese lose 4
transports, probably to torpedoes fired by Japanese destroyers at Allied
-Mar. 1, 1942 Japanese launch two-pronged invasion of Java from Borneo and
Indo-China. USAAF, RAF, and Dutch Air Force make last operational flight from
Java to attack invasion fleets. Japanese locate so-far hidden U.S. fighter
airfield, strafe all surviving P-40s.
-Mar. 2, 1942 Surviving USAAF personnel are flown from Jogjarkata to Broome,
Australia, on overloaded B-17s and LB-30s.
-Mar. 3, 1942 Japanese air attack on Dutch, Australian, and American flying
boats at Broome, Australia, destroys most of those planes and kills scores of
civilians in process of being evacuated. Japanese shoot down LB-30 loaded with
survivors from Java, killing 20 USAAF personnel.
-Mar. 8, 1942 Java surrenders.
-Mar. 12, 1942 Japanese from Singapore capture Medan in northern Sumatra.
-Apr. 9, 1942 U.S. and Philippine Army forces surrender on Bataan Peninsula,
Luzon, the Philippines.
-Jun. 9, 1942 Last U.S.-Phillipino force in Philippines, at Samar, surrenders.
Source: Edited and abridged from Shores, C. and B. Cull with Y Izawa. 1993.
Bloody Shambles. Volume 2. The Defense of Sumatra to the Fall of Burma.
[London: Grub Street, 1993] @ pp. 13-16. With additional material from Watson
and other sources. Actions over and at New Britain and New Guinea are not
discussed in this article.
Engagements that were exclusively sea battles or air-sea battles are shown in
Japanese forces landed on the Malay Peninsula on the first day of the war, and,
eight days later, on December 16, invaded the northern part of Borneo (now a
part of Malaysia, see map 1). Outflanking the American and Philippino defenders
on the Island of Luzon, Japan landed at the important port of Davao on the
southern coast of Mindanao, the major southern Philippine island on December
20. Five days later, the Japanese captured and occupied Jolo, a small island
between Mindanao and Borneo. Although the Japanese had not captured the
Philippines' most important island and its capital, possession of Davao and
Jolo gave it bases for air and naval advances against the NEI to the south.
Japanese forces that had sailed from Cam Rahn Bay in French-Indo China (present
day Vietnam), joined Japanese units already of Borneo on January 1, and more
Japanese troops landed during January and early February. Japan controlled
Borneo on February 10..
Japanese forces landed on the northeast corner of Celebes, an island of four
peninsulas and three bays, on January 11. About two weeks later, on the 24th,
they landed at the important port of Makassar on the southeast peninsula,
completing their conquest of the island.
The 228th Infantry Regiment, sailing from Davao, captured the island of Ceran
on January 31. Almost a month after completing its conquest of Celebes, Japan
sent a seaborne invasion fleet to Timor, cutting the P-40 ferry route from
Austalia on February 20. A day earlier, on February 19, Bali fell to the
Dutch troops, primarily "native levies," and British troops, primarily RAF and
RAAF ground and air crews, fought tenaciously at some places, but the Japanese
– employing paratroops and armor – pushed them aside. Although small, Japanese
forces often outnumbered the defenders. And, if known to the other defenders,
the fate of "native levies" who had defended a bridge near Makassar on Celebes,
would have sapped their moral. The Borneo defenders killed and wounded a few
Japanese before they were captured. The Japanese forced the captured troops to
remove the puttees wound around their legs, separated the captured troops into
groups of three or four, tied the groups together with the puttees, and threw
them from the bridge to drown.. Similarly, RAF personnel who had
escaped capture on Sumatra reported that Japanese troops did not extend the
conventions of European warfare to their enemies. Japanese soldiers sometimes
killed captured British soldiers, whether wounded or unwounded.
Borneo, Celebes, Ceram, Timor, and Bali fell with little opposition. The
defenses of Sumatra and Java were more determined, relying on the allied
airpower stationed on and moved to those islands.
Two airfields, known as P.1 and P.2 to the British, were the critical points in
the defense of Sumatra. Sited at a civilian airfield, north of the
refinery town of Palembang, P. 1 was to become the base for Allied fighters on
Sumatra. Most Sumatra-based bombers flew from P.2, located south of Palembang.
In addition to these two airfields in Sumatra's oil refinery region, other,
smaller, less developed fields were located in the inhospitable northern parts
of the island.
By December 28, Japanese forces had moved sufficiently south along the Malay
Peninsula to come abreast of Sumatra's major targets. From then on, Japanese
bombers, generally escorted by fighters, made frequent attacks on P.1 and P.2.
In December and January, reinforcements – Lockheed Hudsons from England and
Bristol Blenheims from North Africa – flew into Sumatra. The England-based
flights flew to Egypt and from there both Blenheims and Hudsons followed the
same general course across Africa, down the Indian subcontinent, across Burma,
and along the Malay Peninsula to P.2. Pioneer airmen had "proved" these routes
only a few years earlier in the early and mid-1930s, and flying the routes
required skill and patience and surely tested the mettle of service pilots and
navigators hastily trained at the beginning of the war. RAF Squadrons Numbers
84 and 221 took off with 24 Blenheims each destined for Singapore. Only 18 of
84 Squadron and 17 of 221 reached Sumatra, some reaching Sumatra only in late
January. Seven of 18 Hudsons of No.59 Squadron that left England in early
January arrived in Sumatra. Some of the missing bombers crashed in the
Mediterranean, some in Africa, some in Burma, and some on landing in Sumatra.
Before the war, U.S. planners had counted on reinforcing the NEI and Australia
by ferry flights that crossed the South Atlantic from South America to Africa,
then followed a route similar to the RAF's. During January, at least 5
LB-30s and 16 B-17Es made the flight. The fall of the Malay Barrier, of
course, ended those ferry flights.
On January 27 and 28, 48 Hurricanes flew from HMS Indomitable and,
guided by Blenheims, made 200-mile flights to P.1. The Hurricanes lacked the
latest radio and navigation equipment, serious deficiencies for aircraft to be
operated over oceans and jungles by pilots fresh out of advanced flight school.
Over the next week, additional, even less-experienced, Hurricane pilots arrived
by sea. The British fighters were the only fighters in Sumatra by the end of
January, after the Dutch withdrew all their serviceable airplanes to Java to
participate in the defense of that island.
On February 5, Number 232 and 258 Squadrons had 33 Hurricanes, a dozen more
than at the end of January, and a few unserviceable Buffalos. Heavy
Japanese attacks on February 6, 7, and 8, reduced the number of Hurricanes to
20. Fifteen were serviceable and ready to take to the air, on February 14, as
the Japanese invasion fleet approached Sumatra.
The situation with bombers was better, at least in numbers. On February 14,
there were 35 Blenheims, many unserviceable, and 20 Hudsons at P.2.
The airmen on Sumatra were by-standers to the horrific losses suffered in the
evacuation of Singapore that began on February 13. Japanese aircraft, ships,
and submarines sank over 70 steamers and smaller ships, and somewhere between
2,000 and 5,000 civilians and military personnel perished.
The Loss of P.1.
RAF and RAAF bombers and fighters took off from P.1 and P.2 on the morning of
February 14 to attack the Japanese fleet, including a reported aircraft
carrier, off the coast of Sumatra. While Hurricanes waited for a flight of
Blenheims to arrive, unescorted Hudsons attacked the fleet. Mitsubishi
Zeros mauled the Hudsons – five Hudsons in one flight of six were shot
down, and others met the same fate. When they arrived, the Hurricane-escorted
Blenheims dropped their bombs from 8,000 feet and sank at least one transport.
While the RAF and RAAF aircraft were returning to their bases, a formation of
18 Mitsubishi Ki 21 (Sally)bombers dropped anti-personnel fragmentation
bombs on P.1. Immediately behind them, Ki 56 transports (Topsy), license-built
Lockheed 14s, dropped 180 paratroopers between P.1 and the town of Pelembang
and 90 more near some oil refineries. The license built Ki 56s, easily mistaken
for RAF and RAAF's Lockheed Hudsons, added to the confusion of aircraft
The only British Army troops on Sumatra were antiaircraft gunners who manned
Befors positions around P.1 and P.2. The ones at P.1 fired at the descending
Japanese paratroopers as did some of the Hurricanes and bombers that returned
to P.1 while the attack was underway, but the decision was soon made to abandon
P.1. British airmen and groundcrew avoided or fought through roadblocks thrown
up by the Japanese between P.1 and Palembang, and escaped by road or rail to
the port of Oesthaven on the south coast of Sumatra.
On the next day, Japanese barges departed from the invasion fleet to take
soldiers upriver to Palembang. Hudsons, Blenheims, and Hurricanes from P.2 and
Java attacked the barges, causing heavy causalities, and delaying the link-up
between the Japanese paratroopers and the seaborne troops by 36 hours.
The Loss of P.2.
A violent electric storm during the night of February 14/15 disrupted
communications with P.2, and on the 15th, commanders made the decision to
evacuate all the aircraft to Java. That decision was subsequently criticized
because P.2 was not under an immediate threat, but the flights to Java began on
the 14th and continued the next day. Also on the 15th, Hudsons that had earlier
flown to Java were stripped of operational equipment and returned to P.2 to
evacuate RAF and RAAF personnel.
The End in Sumatra.
Three days of concentrated air attacks – February 6, 7, and 8 – and a two-day
invasion – February 14 and 15 – chased the Allies from Sumatra, underlining
lessons already learned over Great Britain, France, and North Africa.
Unescorted bombers were easy meat for fighters. Adequate warning of approaching
enemy aircraft was necessary to get defending fighters high enough and in
position to attack. Inadequate antiaircraft defenses had to be strengthened.
Less obvious at the time, despite claims of many ships destroyed or damaged by
medium and high-altitude level bombers, such attacks were largely futile, and
almost certain to fail against ships that were underway. Perhaps the most
convincing demonstration of the impotence of level bombers against moving ships
were the 93 Japanese level-bomber attacks on HMS Exeter and her escorts. Near
misses caused light damage to two destroyers, and Exeter had some
splinter holes. Nothing more.
The fighting over and on Sumatra confirmed the brutality of the Japanese way of
war. Japanese after-action reports from Sumatra made reference to shooting
parachuting British pilots and aircrew. The brutal, no quarter asked, no
quarter given nature of the war in the Pacific had been established.
The End in Java, the End of ABDACOM.
Japan's aerial assault on Java kicked into high gear at the first of February
1942. A month later, Japanese troops landed on the island; a week after that,
the island surrendered. With that victory, Japan completed its conquest of the
Aerial Defense Forces in Java
The RAF and the Dutch Air Force (DAF) that had fought the Japanese from the
first day of war in Singapore, continued their fight from Java. The USAAF
joined the defense of the NEI in Java.
Dutch Air Force. On November 30, 1941, the Dutch Air Force
(DAF) in the NEI had 120 fighters. There were 72 Brewster B-339s
(essentially export versions of Brewster "Buffalos"), 24 Curtiss Hawk 75As
(export versions of the USAAF P-36), and 24 Curtiss-Wright CW-21B ("Demons,"
single seat, single-engine, low-wing monoplanes with no armor, little armament
and very fast climb). The DAF's 116 bombers were export versions of
Martin B-9s (called "Glenn Martins"). The NEI Air Force had more fighters
(120 compared to 97) and more bombers (116 compared to 50) than the United
States Far East Air Force (FEAF) in the Philippines in December 1941, but
its equipment was more obsolete. The USAFF history summed it up, "In January
1942 its [the Dutch Air Force's] approximately 150 planes were all of ancient
In early February, when surviving Allied aircraft were being concentrated in
Java, the DAF had 34 Brewster B-339s for the defense of Western Java and 22
Glenn Martins for attack missions. In the eastern Java, the DAF had eight
Curtiss Hawks and 13 Curtiss-Wright 21Bs.
In addition, some 20 Consolidated PBYs, "Catalinas" of the DAF, RAF, and USN
were in Java. They and a miscellany of European flying boats were under DAF
William Green provides some detail of losses during the Japanese onslaught.
A squadron of NEI-based Buffalos was sent to aid the British in Malaya on
January 12, 1942, and five survived to be evacuated to Sumatra, where they
joined 20 other Buffalos. Four of these fighters survived the ensuing battles
with the Japanese in Sumatra and Java. Of the 17 Curtiss Wright CW-21s that
were operational when Japan opened attacks on their bases on February 3, 1942,
five remained two days later. Whatever the exact numbers and the bravery of
their pilots, the Dutch Air Force fighters and bombers were no match for the
RAF. The RAF based its forces in Western Java, which was not
heavily attacked until the Japanese had completed converting bases on Sumatra
to their use. It consolidated badly shot up units that had been evacuated from
Singapore and the fighting in Sumatra and knit together two fighter squadrons,
Numbers 242 and 605, from remnants of the RAF evacuated from Singapore and
Sumatra. The squadrons were equipped with Hurricanes that had survived earlier
fighting and new ones that arrived in crates at Jakarta on February 4 and 5,
but there were only enough Hurricanes to equip one squadron. Plans were made to
equip Number 605 Squadron with P-40Es. Most of the handful of RAF Buffalos that
had escaped from Singapore were destroyed on the ground in Japanese attacks.
Importantly, the RAF had rescued two radar sets from Singapore that were sited
at Batavia (Jakarta) that provided sufficiently early warning of approaching
Japanese aircraft to allow fighters to climb to interception altitude and
bombers to get off the ground. The airfields had few defenses although wooden
dummy guns were erected on at least one field in an attempt to fool the
Japanese. (I found no reference in Bloody Shambles about any success
in that effort).
For attack aircraft, the RAF had about two dozen Bristol Blenheims (few
operational) and about the same number of Lockheed Hudsons (about eight
serviceable). There were also some nearly useless aircraft, two Ablacores and
13 Vildebeests, near Jakarta. These aircraft, along with DAF Glenn Martins,
continued offensive operations. For instance, on February 16, 17, and 19, RAF
and DAF bombers attacked targets on Sumatra.
Fifty volunteers from Number 605 RAF squadron undertook an unusual mission for
airmen on February 18. They boarded a corvette, sailed to Oosthaven, Sumatra,
landed and spent 12 hours loading ammunition and other badly needed material on
the corvette for transport to Java.
USAAF. The USAAF committed four types of aircraft to the
defense of the NEI: Boeing B-17s, Consolidated LB-30s, Curtiss P-40Es, and
Douglas A-24s (near equivalentes to the USN's Douglas SBDs). Some of the B-17s
(Cs and Ds) were veterans of the Philippine debacle, flown to Java from
Australia. Others (all Es) and the LB-30s were factory-fresh, ferried across
the Atlantic and flown along the course used by British aircraft to reach the
NEI. When that route was closed because of the Japanese conquest of Burma and
Singapore, others were ferried across the Pacific to Australia and then to
Java. The P-40s and A-24s were shipped by sea to Australia, erected there,
and then flown to the NEI
USAAF Bombers in Java
Three groups of USAAF bombers fought in the NEI: (1) The 27st Bombardment Group
(Light), consisting of some pilots and aircrew who had reached the Philippines
before the Japanese attack and had been evacuated to Australia plus other
pilots, aircrew, and groundcrew and 55 dive bombers that reached Australia on
December 22, (2) the remnants of the 19th Bomb Group (Heavy) from the
Philippines, and (3) the 7th Bomb Group (Heavy) from the United States. To a
major extent these aircraft would be employed on anti-shipping strikes as the
Japanese moved toward the conquest of Java.
In the hands of USN pilots, the Douglas SBD is reputed to have sunk more ships
than any other airplane. The Army had less success with its version of the
plane, the A-24. To the extent that different standards of training contributed
to the relative success rates of USN and USAAF dive-bombers, the comments of
Sheppard and Gilmore may be informative:
||Quite a few of the Naval pilots
[it's impossible to tell from the context what Navy pilots are referred to, but
it may have been those stationed at the Port of Sourabaya in northeast Java and
near the USAAF airfields on Java] were very experienced dive bombing pilots and
eager to aid the Army Air Forces in the use and instruction concerning the A-24
dive bombers which were being assembled in Australia at the time. These highly
skilled personnel offered their services to the Army through Naval authorities,
but were turned down by high authorities in both services.
On February 9, three A-24s took off with from Darwin with a flight of P-40Es of
the 3rd PS (Prov). Only one A-24 reached Java. In what was probably the last
ferry flight by single-engined planes, 11 A-24s left Darwin on February 11. One
crashed on the way to Java. The others were based at a new airfield at
Modjokerto, about 100 miles west of Malang (see map 4).
Civilians near Modjokerto provided the U.S. airmen with "good baths, good food,
good whiskey, good beds." The aircrews and the two mechanics at the
airfield cannibalized one A-24 for spare parts, and a week later, the seven
remaining planes were flown to Malang to be equipped with Dutch bomb shackles
and bombs. On February 19, the planes were ready for attacks on the Japanese
fleets covering the invasion of Bali.
Those plans were interrupted by heavy Japanese attacks, and only two A-24s made
attacks. Their crews reported hits on a cruiser and a transport ship at Bali,
and reports from subsequent PBY reconnaissance flights indicated that the ships
had been sunk. (Japanese records, examined after the war, failed to confirm the
Java and Its Airfields, January – February, 1942
from Watson, p. 373
On February 20, escorted by 16 P-40s, seven A-24s joined B-17s in attacks on
the Japanese fleet. Diving from 12,000 feet to 2,000 to 4,000 feet to release
their bombs, the divebomber crews reported hits on a cruiser and other ships.
Two A-24s were lost.
Watson wrote that the USAAF evaluated the A-24 as a promising weapon:
In reality, the AAF did not pursue the development or employment of dive
bombers, and they essentially disappeared from its inventory.
||Though the A-24 had been
inadequately tested, it gave promise of effective use against shipping targets.
Its principal weaknesses, a short range and insufficient armament, would
require the establishment of good advance bases and provision of strong pursuit
In the 1930s, the U.S. Army had argued that anti-shipping attacks by B-17s
would protect the mainland United States from enemy ships. In an unexpected
test of that contention, Boeing B-17s and Consolidated B-24s (in the LB-30
version) attacked Japanese shipping during the defense of the NEI. Few hits
were scored. Extenuating circumstances contributed to the failures. The number
of bombers was smaller than pre-war doctrine wanted. Without dozens of bombers
flying in close formation and bombing together, a ship's captain could maneuver
his ship to evade the bombs dropped by a single aircraft (or a few). Even
stationary ships proved to be difficult targets; "precision bombing" wasn't so
precise as advertised in the 1930s. In addition, many bombs were too light to
cause significant damage, especially to warships.
Fourteen B-17Cs and Ds of the 19th Bomb Group (BG) escaped from the Philippines
to Australia, many evacuating high-ranking officers and/or groundcrew. By
January 1, 10 of the 14 – all that were operational – had moved to Java, where
they were based at an airfield five miles from Malang (map 4). Colonel Eugene
Eubank, who had commanded the group at Clark Field, remained in command.
The advanced flying group the 7th BG arrived in Hawaii during the Japanese
attack on December 7. While those aircraft and crews were given various
assignments in Hawaii, on the West Coast, in Australia, and Java, the group's
groundcrew arrived on transport ships in Australia on December 22. Eventually
the group was based in India, but some of its aircraft and crews flew in the
defense of the NEI.
Four LB-30s and six B-17s of the 7th BG arrived in Java on January 15; all the
LB-30s and four of the B-17s had come by the South Atlantic ferry route; the
other two B-17s had flown across the Pacific. Two weeks later 15 B-17Es and
four LB-30s arrived in Java, all but three coming by the South Atlantic route,
and the 7th BG was stationed at a new base at Jogjakarta, 150 miles west of
The U.S. Air Force Association Magazine characterized the bomb groups:
||The 19th Bomb Group [in B-17Cs and
Ds] had seen combat in the Philippines. Not so the crews of 7th Bomb Group's
B-17Es and LB-30s (a lightly armed version of the B-24, built for the RAF) that
began arriving from the States on Jan. 10. One LB-30 pilot had only a 20-minute
briefing on the plane. before taking off from MacDill Field in Florida, and
many crewmen of both B-17s and LB-30s had never before flown in a four-engine
Over the next month and a half, the heavy bombers attacked targets on the Malay
Peninsula, the Philippines, and the NEI. Bad weather and enemy opposition
caused losses of aircraft and crew, aborted missions, and sinking morale. On
February 17, General Brereton visited USAAF bomber operations in Java. Writing
about it later, he wrote:
||Combat replacement crews did not
exist…. Fatigue and combat weariness had worn men to their last ounce of
resistance. Pilots returned from attacks crying with rage and frustration when
a crew member was killed or when weather or mechanical failure prevent
successful completion of the mission. A flight commander, a fine leader,
committed suicide. Boys were on the verge of mental and physical collapse.
Even allowing for what may be some hyperbole, the general's quote reflects a
fighting force at the end of its tether.
Some bombing missions ended in disaster for the USAAF. On February 8, nine
B-17s took off to attack Kendari on the Celebes, where the JNAF based most of
its medium bombers. Nine Japanese Zeros chanced upon the bomber formation when
it was halfway to the target, attacked head-on, and shot down six of the
bombers. The bomber crews claimed they shot down five of the attacking
fighters, but only two Zeros were hit, and both returned to their bases.
Watson comments on the mission:
||... the enemy planes had shown
superior qualities. Moreover, the top turret of the B-17 had been unable to
cope with head-on attacks. The .30-cal. machine gun in the nose had lacked
sufficient range, and the bottom turret had failed to prevent attacks from
below on vulnerable bomb bay tanks. Such lessons of experience would prove of
great value to the AAF in later days of the war, but there was little comfort
for those who provided the experience.
As shown for the entries of February 9 to 18 and for the 12th and 13th on Table 2,
some missions that did not turn back had little to report. In addition to
the frustration of bad-weather flying, mechanical problems, and determined
defenses, the U.S. bomber crews were often exhausted from being ordered to take
off and cruise in circles to avoid expected Japanese attacks on their bases.
Most U.S. bomber operations were flown with about a half dozen aircraft, some
with only a single aircraft able to reach and bomb the target, mostly against
shipping. Watson summarizes the bombers' actions as 60 missions consisting of
over 300 sorties, in which bomber crews claimed to have sunk one destroyer,
eight transports, and two unidentified ships and to have shot down 23 Japanese
aircraft. Their own losses were six bombers in combat, six in accidents, and 26
destroyed on the ground. The losses on the ground underlined the necessity of
providing airfield defense for bomber operations.
Table 2 lists
several missions that Watson does not mention in his writing; I found
information about those missions in Shores, Cull and Izawa. In a footnote,
||Early reports of claims were quite
unreliable, particularly as they concerned shipping. It should be pointed out
that from December 1941 through 5 March 1942, in both the Philippines and the
NEI, JANAC [a post-war joint USA-USN committee to ascertain combat results]
credits all army aircraft (U.S., British, Dutch, Australian) with no more than
three minesweepers, four passenger or cargo vessels, and one "converted
salvage" vessel sunk, and a part in sinking two other cargo vessels.
To my mind, there is little difference between the number of claims mentioned
by Watson – one destroyer, eight transports, and two unidentified ships – and
the number post-war analysis credited to "all army aircraft." I realize that
the numbers are not directly comparable, Watson discusses claims by USAAF
personnel, and the post-war analysis includes ships credited to the DAF, RAAF,
and RAF, but the discrepancy is small. He apparently ignored some truly
"unreliable claims," such as those shown in the last two entries on
table 2 that are reported in Shores, Cull, and Izawa
discuss. In the absence of more information, I assume that Watson made some
decisions of his own about which claims were reliable enough to be included in
the history he wrote.
Click here for Table 2
The section about pursuit operations in the chapter "Loss of the Netherlands
East Indies" in the Air Force History is titled "The Problem of Pursuit
Reinforcement." Unavoidable problems accompanied the shipping of crated
pursuits across the Pacific to Southern Australia, having them erected there by
untrained and inexperienced men, flying them to Northern Australia and then up
the island chain from Darwin to Java.
||Inventories and manifests for
shipments made were at times imperfectly drawn; a unit and its equipment might
arrive separately… inexperienced and untrained personnel; ground crews of the
7th Group, a heavy bomber unit, erected 138 P-40's between 23 December and 4
Prestone, necessary for P-40 cooling systems, was in short supply and had to be
shipped from the US; pursuit pilots from the US were woefully trained, and
||veteran pilots evacuated from the
Philippines took over the task of whipping them into shape through an
improvised training program that was marked by a high rate of accident."
The veteran pursuit pilots estimated that the newly arrived pilots needed at
least three months' additional training. Those who flew up to Java received a
few days' training.
There was no expectation that the meager forces in the NEI, including the USAAF
contingent, could hold the islands against Japan. On January 21, General Louis
Brereton, commander of the USAAF in Australia, told his assembled pursuit
||You are a task force and are going
to Java to delay the Japanese in their offensive movement. Do your best and
when the time comes we'll see that you get out.
Evacuation of USAAF Pursuit Pilots from the Philippines
The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base,
Montgomery, AL, has a collection of "personal papers" and "personal
narratives," some written by officers who served in the Pacific during the
opening stages of World War II. Among them are recollections of pursuit pilots
who flew in the Philippines, were evacuated to Australia, and, subsequently,
flew in defense of the NEI. Those who survived to write or dictate their
"narratives" were the lucky ones. Many pursuit pilots in the Philippines and
essentially all USAAF groundcrew were organized into infantry units and would
participate in the doomed defense of Bataan.
Evacuation from the Philippine Islands was hit and miss. In their narrative
history, W.A. Sheppard and E.B. Gilmore, both lieutenants in December 1941,
relate that six pilots reported for evacuation as ordered on December 28, only
to learn that higher ranking officers had taken their airplane. Three days
later, seven pilots boarded a twin-engined Philippine Airlines Beechcraft 18 to
begin the island-hopping flight to Australia. Leaving Bataan at 3:00 PM, the
Beechraft "hedge-hopped" to Del Monte Field on Mindanao. At 4:00 AM on New
Year's Day, the Philippine Airline pilot, Captain Louis J. Connelly, took off
from Del Monte, and he and Lt. Gilmore traded off flying on instruments, in
"very poor" weather, aided by "very poor" maps, and headed for Tarakan on the
Island of Borneo. Arriving over the Borneo coast in "light rain and haze" under
a 1,000-foot ceiling, "…just by chance … a clearing was spotted by one of the
pilots …. that was the airfield." Barricades were strewn across the airfield,
and the men on the Beechcraft were unsure about the nationality of the soldiers
on it. The barricades were pulled aside, and "Dutch native troops" greeted the
plane when it landed.
The half dozen or so DAF Buffalos that had been stationed at Tarakan had been
shot down, the Japanese were bombing the field daily, and the field was muddy
and in very poor condition. On takeoff from Tarakan, Captain Connelly
||gave the airplane full throttle….
The airplane accelerated very slowly, and it looked as if it would not get off
the ground. A fence loomed in front of the aircraft, but the experience of an
old airlines pilot saved the day. In one operation, he pulled up the wheels and
put down full flaps. The airplane leaped over the fence and almost settled to
the ground, but finally caught and eventually was safely air-borne.
Stopping for fuel at Balikpapan, also on Boreno, the pilots had lunch, then
took off, headed for Macassar on the Island of Celebes. At Macassar, the
Beechcraft skidded on the mud and ended up in a hole without damage. Next
morning, Captain Connelly piloted the surprisingly undamaged Beechcraft to
Koepang, on the Island of Timor. That afternoon, he completed the trip, landing
at Darwin, on the north coast of Australia. "Too much credit cannot be given
Captain Connelly for his excellent navigation." The Army pilots were flown to
Brisbane, on the south coast of Australia, in a B-24 on the next day. The
flight of the seven pilots and Captain Connelly involved the risks of long
over-water flights in bad weather, with poor maps, the limited instruments
available in 1941, and the dangers of operating from mud-slick airfields.
Still, they began with an undamaged aircraft.
Three days after Captain Connolly's flight, another evacuation began with an
airplane that under usual conditions would have been considered unsafe. The
Beechcraft that was to evacuate eight USAAF pilots from Bataan to Australia had
been bombed and strafed and had over 130 bullet holes in it. The damaged
leading edge of the left wing had been replaced by "a piece of sheet tin
roofing material." Later in the war, then-Lt. George E. Kiser described the
damage to the Beechcraft more dramatically. "We wired a wing back on the plane
with baling wire."
On landing at Del Monte, Mindanao, the first stop on the flight, the right
wheel brake barely worked, the left didn't work at all, and the tailwheel could
not be locked. The officers on the Beechcraft and enlisted men from the 7th
Bomb Group, stationed at Del Monte, worked throughout the night, but barely
improved the brakes. They successfully rigged a hose and funnel arrangement
from inside the cabin to a wing gas tank and loaded ten five-gallon cans of gas
into the cabin to assure enough fuel to reach Taraken, Borneo.
With "nothing by which to navigate except a small map of the entire Pacific
Ocean," they took off before dawn to avoid Japanese strafers, climbed into
an overcast at 400 feet, and flew on instruments for an hour before breaking
into clear skies over the ocean. The weather turned bad – ceiling 200 feet and
visibility one-half mile – but they found the airport as the last five-gallon
can of gas was poured into the funnel.
Despite having only one magneto on one engine, they took off in the
afternoon for Balikpapan. Poor visibility forced them to fly at about 100 feet
above the shore, and about half way to Balikpapan, oil pressure fell to zero on
one engine. The engine survived and adding oil at Balikpapan restored it to
Next morning, January 5, 1942, they took off for Banjermasin, on New Guinea,
where they landed and re-fueled. There, the battered Beechcraft gave out. One
engine would not start, and attempts to repair it failed. Through Dutch
channels, they contacted the U.S. Navy at Sourabaya, and the Navy dispatched a
PBY to pick up the pilots. From Sourabaya, a B-17 flew seven of the eight
pilots to Darwin.
The 17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional)
The 49 veteran pilots that arrived in Australia from the Philippines were
joined by pilots newly arrived from the United States, most of them "just out
of flying school." Crated P-40Es had begun to arrive in Brisbane, and
Captain Frederick Hoffman, who had been evacuated from the Philippines, was
placed in charge of assembling the pursuits, which he accomplished with
officers and men from a bomb group who had never worked on pursuits before.
Neither personnel nor equipment was organized into squadrons when arriving in
Australia. To provide that organization, the Army authorized five provisional
squadrons, the 3d, 13th, 17th, 20th, and 33d. The 17th, which played the major
role in defending the NEI, was activated on January 10, 1942, under the command
of Captain (soon to be Major) Charles A. "Bud" Sprague.
Major Sprague led the 17th Pursuit on the first flight to reinforce Java on
January 16. They made five intermediate stops on the 2,000-mile overland flight
from Brisbane, in south Australia to Darwin in the north, and waited for the
expected orders to send them back to the Philippines. Because "the Japanese had
taken a couple of little islands on which the party was supposed to have landed
in order to return to the Philippines," the squadron was ordered to Java.
Thirteen pilots who had fought in the Philippines and four fresh from flight
school in the States set off for Java. The trip was largely over water: 540
miles across the Timor Sea to Koepang, 250 miles to Waingapoe on Soemba Island,
and finally 500 miles to Soerabaja on Java (see map 1). Thirteen of the
seventeen pursuits completed the 3300-mile journey, and on January 30, the
squadron moved to its permanent base at Blimbing (sometimes called "Ngoro" and
see map 4).
The field had two 4,000-foot smooth sod runways, and sod taxiways led into
jungle around the field where the pursuits could be camouflaged and hidden from
aerial observation. Sheppard and Gilmore describe them as forming a "T." "For
fast take-off eight aircraft were stationed at the bottom of the "T", with the
remaining aircraft on the left side of the cross piece."
The airfield was so carefully camouflaged that an experienced Dutch pilot had
to guide the P-40s to their new base. To keep its location secret, upon
takeoff, the pursuit pilots hedge-hopped to a town about 15 miles away before
forming up and climbing to altitude. Landings were accomplished in the same
way; approaches were made at low altitude, and the pilots "popped up" only long
enough to lower their wheels before landing.
Sheppard and Gilmore comment, "The Dutch [in nearby areas] were very courteous
and there was nothing that they wouldn't do for their allies. Meals, for
instance cost nothing." Kiser, another 17 PS (Prov.) pilot, reported:
||The Dutch assisted us in every way
possible, furnishing guards on the field, food and medicine. Living conditions
were not too bad. We had nice quarters, the food was not good but sufficient
and altogether everything was as good as could be expected considering the
supply situation at this stage of the war.
Perhaps because of less than optimal nutrition, many pilots had boils.
By February 11th, at least five flights of P-40s had set out to fly to Java.
P-40s had not been designed for over-water operations, had limited navigation
equipment, and were flown, for the most part, by inexperienced pilots.
Australian airlines aircraft or USAAF LB-30s, which sometimes carried mechanics
to service the pursuits at intermediate stops, usually accompanied the pursuits
to provide navigational assistance. Some P-40s made uneventful flights, but
only four of 22 pursuits of the 20th PS (Prov.) made it to Java. The squadron
set off for Java in two flights. Nine of 13 P-40s of the first flight were lost
to weather or enemy action, and all nine of the second flight crashed at Timor
when attempting to land in a rainstorm. Upon arrival in Java, the survivors, as
all pursuits that reached Java, were incorporated into the 17th PS.
The largest loss of P-40s and pilots occurred in a sea-borne reinforcement
effort. On February 22, the USS Langley, the USN's first aircraft
carrier now converted to a seaplane tender and the SS Sea Witch hauled
anchor at Fremantle, Australia.
Japanese bombers sank the Langley, with its deckload of 32 assembled
P-40s on February 27. Most of the airmen on board the Langley survived
the attack uninjured, but they were lost when the tanker USS Pecos and
a destroyer carrying survivors were sunk. Four pilots, on another destroyer,
The Sea Witch delivered 27 crated P-40s and seven Douglas DB-7As (near
equivalents of the USAAF A-20s) intended for the DAF to Tjilatjap on southern
Java. Although Dutch Navy personnel, working feverishly, assembled the bombers,
no progress was made on the pursuits. Still-crated pursuits, they were pushed
into the harbor to prevent their capture.
At one point, Watson estimates that 34 of 58 P-40s successfully made the
flight to Java. His other summary estimate, "Of some 120 pursuit aircraft
forwarded from Australia during January and February, only thirty-six reached
their destination" must have included the P-40s lost from the Langley and
Sea Witch. It agrees better with Sheppard and Gilmore's estimate
that over 100 P-40s set out for Java and that the maximum number ready for
operations was about 30. Whatever the number, there were too few P-40s (and
other Allied fighters) to stop or seriously hinder the Japanese.
Sheppard and Gilmore's comments on the training status of P-40s pilots makes it
no surprise that losses were heavy:
||By the first of February 1942
there were about 30 airplanes [P-40s] and about 45 pilots in Java.
Three-fourths of the pilots were just graduated from flying school and had
never flown a pursuit ship until they landed in Australia. About three hours of
transition were given them and they started up toward Java. The first time they
ever fired a machine gun was at a Japanese aircraft. In 30 or 40 hours of
combat flying, however, they grew very proficient in flying ability. A few of
them were killed. Almost every time it was a case of not looking around.
Sheppard and Gilmore do not comment on what proportion of the new pilots
survived "30 or 40 hours of combat flying."
Lessons were learned, however. Sheppard and Gilmore, reporting on combat over
Java, said that two lessons were learned in the first fight of the 17th PS
||First, it is very foolish to
attack Jap fighters without superior altitude unless it is necessary. Second,
when Jap fighters are operating in pairs, if you attack the leader, always be
on the watch for his wing man. The wing man will try and get on your tail after
he has broken from formation.
Watson writes that the combats in the NEI had provided important information
about the P-40 and its principal opponent, the Zero and the Zero pilot:
||The P-40 had given a good account
of itself – it could outdive the Japanese fighters, was faster in level flight,
and was better armored. But the enemy plane seemed to have more range, could
outclimb the P-40, and was more maneuverable. For the American pilot to risk a
dogfight was to flirt with suicide. Indeed, by no means least among the lessons
learned was a new respect for the foe.
How successful were U.S. pursuit pilots? There are several estimates of the
number of U.S. victories. Sheppard and Gilmore state, "during our stay in Java
the United States Navy and the Dutch authorities gave us credit for shooting
down 71 Japanese aircraft, at a loss of 11 pilots." Kiser summarizes, "At
all times we were out-numbered at the least 10 to 1, but still we managed to
get official credit for an excess of sixty-five victories with only a loss of
about nine (9) pilots." Another member of the 17th wrote that there is no
reliable source for the number of victories. "There was no means set up for
confirmations of our kills." Shores, Cull, and Izawa provide what appears
to be an official number. "This was … the unit's 47th – and last – victory
claim in the East Indies." They do not, however, identify the organization
to which the claim was made. Watson cites still another number:
||Against a numerically superior and
skillful enemy, the pursuit pilots shot down Japanese planes in excess perhaps
of their own total numbers – claims were made for thirty-eight kills – but the
battle ended with the American unit having lost literally all of its
The 17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional) was disbanded on its arrival in
Australia on March 5, 1942. Its pilots were assigned to new pursuit groups
arriving from the United States. Kiser wrote:
||I am convinced that each man,
though he may serve in numerous other squadrons in tis war, will always feel
that the 17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional) came closer to up-holding the true
traditions of the AAF than any other group of fighting men.
The Aerial Defense of Java
The RAF and DAF, based in western Java, defended the port and shipping at
Tjilatjap on the south coast. The USAAF – the 17th PS (Prov.) based at Blimbing
– defended the port at Soerbaja on the northeast coast. The Japanese began
serious attacks on Java on February 3.
On that date, 17 Zeros from Borne, escorted by a two-seat, single-engine
Mitsubishi C5M (Babs) to provide navigation assistance and observation
of results, attacked an airfield near Sourabaya, destroying an airborne B-18,
strafing aircraft on the ground, and claiming a Buffalo shot down. The next day
marked the beginning of significant attacks on Allied airfields on Java. Three
flights of Mitsubishi G3M (Nells) totaling 72 bombers and 44 Zeros (along with
3 C5Ms) attacked various airfields on Java. At the end of the day, 16 Allied
fighters had been shot down or crash landed as a result of combat damage; three
flying boats and two B-17s had been shot down, 10 (or 13) flying boats and
floatplanes had been destroyed on the water, and at least four B-17s had been
destroyed on the ground.
The next day, February 4, a mixed force of Japanese bombers – Mitsubishi G3Ms
(Nells) and G4Ms (Betties) – attacked the cruisers USS Houston and Marblehead.
Both ships were hit but remained afloat and escaped to Tjilatjap on Java.
Only four CW-21Bs and two Curtiss Hawks were in the air when 48 Zeros and three
C5Ms appeared over Java on February 5. Two of the CW-21Bs and both Hawks were
shot down, without inflicting a loss on the Japanese. None of six B-17s
attacked as they formed up for a mission to Balikpapan on Borneo was shot down,
but one was damaged. Malfunctioning top turrets caused the B-17s to turn back
from their mission.
Japanese attacks continued through February, destroying DAF and USAAF aircraft
on the ground and in the air. Remarkably perhaps, the Japanese did not locate
the USAAF's main pursuit field at Blimberg.
The NEI branch of KLM had been the only airline to purchase Douglas DC-5
transport planes (two-engine, high-wing, 16-22-passenger, short-haul aircraft).
Of the four it purchased, one was strafed and destroyed on February 9. (The
other three DC-5s survived. The Japanese captured one, camouflaged it and flew
it in Japanese markings; two were flown to Australia where they were used
during the war; one, evidently, was smuggled to Israel in 1948, where it may
have served in the Israeli Air Force.) As Japanese bombing intensified and
more planes were destroyed, KLM officials decided to evacuate all their
aircraft capable of making the flight to Australia. In all, 14 Lockheed 14w,
DC-3s and 5s left. Other commercial aircraft were put to the torch to prevent
their use capture.
Bad weather and the time necessary for the Japanese to consolidate their
positions on Sumatra resulted in a partial lull in air action over Java in
early February. On the 17th, P-40Es carried out an offensive operation. Armed
with Dutch 20-kilogram bombs, eight pursuits attacked shipping in the Moesi
Delta near Palembang on Sumatra. Eight Nakajima Ki 27 fighters (Nates) engaged
the P-40s over the target. All the pursuits returned to their base, and their
pilots claimed four Japanese aircraft destroyed and three as probables.
According to Japanese records, one Ki 27 was shot down, its pilot parachuting
to safety. Japanese pilots claimed three P-40s shot down.
Eight DAF Buffalos engaged 19 Nakajima Ki 43s (Oscars) and 5 Kawasaki Ki 48
(Lily) light bombers attacking RAF and DAF installations in western Java on the
19th. The Dutch pilots claimed two "Zeros" shot down; four of the Brewsters
were destroyed, another damaged. The Japanese destroyed four Hudsons on the
ground. Later the same day, Ki 43s and Ki 48s attacked other fields in western
Java destroying a Hudson and B-17 on the ground and a B-17 in the air. The
Japanese lost one aircraft.
February 19th represented the beginning of the end for the Allied forces in
Java. On that day, a bad day for Allied air forces the Japanese invaded Bali.
Zeros shot down 7 P-40s, for the loss of one Japanese fighter, and, over all of
Java, the Allies lost 15 pursuits and fighters. Strafing Zeros destroyed three
B-17s and badly damaged two more. The invasion of Bali shut down the ferry
route from Australia, confirming decisions already made:
||it had been apparent to the Allied
command since the fall of Singapore that, barring some unexpected development,
the Indies were lost…. On 18 February, General Brett advised the War Department
that from his point of view the one chance of overcoming the odds against the
Allies was to launch an offensive through Burma and China. At the same time, he
advised that we should build up strength in Australia.
General Wavell predicted that his command, ABDACOM, would survive only for two
more weeks. Two days later, on the 20th, he revised the estimate downward to
one week. And five days later, on February 25, he shut down his headquarters,
passing command of the British forces in Java to the Dutch.
From the 19th on, Japanese aircraft shot Allied aircraft out of the sky and
strafed them to destruction. At times, outnumbered RAF Hurricanes, USAAF P-40s,
and even DAF Buffalos were flown to victory over Japanese aircraft, but they
were from the beginning, and their capacity to resist the Japanese decreased
daily. The confusion of combat resulted in spurious victory claims on both
sides. For instance, on the 23rd, P-40 pilots claimed six Japanese bombers and
fighters shot down. Japanese records do not mention any loss. Zero pilots
claimed shooting down three P-40s; none was lost.
On February 20, A-24s escorted by P-40s, attacked the Bali invasion fleet. The
dive-bomber crews reported hits on three ships, including a cruiser. From
post-war records, Shores, Cull, and Izawa confirm that a transport was badly
damaged. The 17th PS (Prov.) suffered the loss of its commanding office, Major
Sprague, in fighting above the invasion fleet, and two other P-40s were
destroyed. The death of Major Sprague was a major loss:
||The morale of the squadron was
very high…. in no small part due to the fine leadership of Major Sprague. Major
Sprague was one of the most eager pilots we have ever know [sic]. He would
always listen to suggestions by the pilots. His experience in fighter type
aircraft was somewhat limited, because he had held a staff job from the time he
was graduated from flying school. However, his outstanding personality was a
driving force in the 17th Pursuit Squadron. … with enlisted men, whether they
were staff sergeants or buck privates … the man who worked the hardest would
get the promotion and the man who wouldn't would get busted… the 17th Pursuit
Squadron was the hardest working outfit we have ever seen.
It was all the USAAF could do to send a half-dozen A-24s and a dozen P-40s to
fight off the huge Japanese fleet; the Japanese had far more resources.
Following the aerial combat, Zeros strafed the U.S. airfield at Singosari,
destroying three B-17s and seriously damaging two more. Each loss of an
aircraft was a blow to the USAAF, impossible to replace. The Japanese attacked
the NEI with adequate reserves; their losses were easily replaced.
And so it went. Every day saw the DAF, the RAF, and the USAAF launch aircraft
against the Japanese, who, in turn, hit Allied air fields on almost a daily
basis. Each day the Allies grew weaker in comparison to their enemy.
Allied commands and command structures began to change. On February 21,
||Major General George H Brett,
Deputy Commanding General American-British-Dutch-Australian Forces Command
(ABDACOM) informs the War Department of his decision to evacuate the 5th Air
Force and other US troops from Java.
On February 23, General Brereton left his post as Deputy Air Commander,
ABDACOM, to devote full time to his duties in the USAAF. In recounting the
decision that led up to his departure, he wrote:
||I felt it necessary to request
General Wavell to relieve me of my duties. The morale of my own air force was
low and my presence was required with it. I was criticized by General Wavell
and General Brett for what appeared to them to be a somewhat unwarranted and
He also acknowledged differences between Air Marshall Sir Richard Peirse, the
ranking RAF officer, and himself. In Brereton's mind, discussions of those
differences embarrassed Peirse, and Brereton did not want that to continue.
With Brereton's departure, Lt. Col. Eugene Eubank was made commander of the
USAAF in Java, and the next day, "heavy bomber units began departing Java."
In western Java, the RAF disbanded its last Hudson squadron and passed its
aircraft to Number 1 Squadron, RAAF. Two days later, on the 22nd, Zeros from
Bali strafed the RAAF airfields, destroying six Hudsons and seriously damaging
three more. The same day, Zeros destroyed two B-17s and seriously damaged two
more on the ground.
When, on the 23rd, Brereton flew to Ceylon on his way to his new post in India,
he took Captain Grant Mahoney, who had taken command of the 17th PS (Prov.)
with him. Lt. Gerry McCallum was made commander of the squadron.
In the air, RAF Hurricane units had learned to combat Zeros by securing an
altitude advantage, diving down, zooming away or back to altitude, and never
dogfighting. On February 25, five Hurricanes at 33,000 feet dived on 24 Ki
43s (Oscars) below them. Three Hurricanes took shots at the Oscars, dived down
and away to safety. Two "mixed-it up" with the Japanese; both were shot
On February 25th, Wavell left the NEI, essentially ending the ABDACOM. The
defeat on the Allied side was mirrored by victory on the Japanese. The JAAF
released its estimate of the damage it had done to the Allied air forces: 33
aircraft shot down, 53 destroyed on the ground; 150 damaged on the ground; JAAF
losses, 3 aircraft. The JNAF claims were smaller: 32 aircraft shot down, 11
probables, 48 burned on the ground. Whatever the exact numbers, the
Japanese had eliminated their opponents' air forces, which had been inadequate
in the first place.
On the last day of February, the 28th, six ancient Vilderbeests and one
Albacore flew from bases in western Java to an airfield on eastern Java in
order to attack the Japanese invasion fleet. Because there were no torpedoes,
the RAF biplanes were loaded up with bombs, and about 5 PM set off to find the
Japanese fleet. They bombed from low altitude with surprising results. Based on
photographic evidence, they were credited with sinking nine ships(!). Japanese
records indicate that at least two transports were seriously damaged and a
cruiser was damaged. Whether nine ships sunk or three damaged, the pilots and
crews of the "-beests" and the Albacore had done well.
Allied disasters continued on the night of February 27/28. Units of the
Japanese Imperial Navy sank two Allied cruisers – USS Houston and HMS
Perth – and three destroyers while suffering the loss of one
destroyer. By nighttime, February 28, Japanese troops had landed on Java.
||...early on the following morning,
1 March, the last air mission of any importance from Java bases was carried out
when all available pursuit planes – nine P-40's, six Hurricanes, and four
Brewsters – were thrown against one of the landings…. the planes attacked at
low level to sink several small boats and to strafe AA batteries on shore, but
the enemy took his toll….[Three P-40s were shot down and all were damaged; the
survivors returned to Blimbng.]. Then, before any of the American planes could
be made ready for a return to the air, Japanese fighters swept over the Ngoro
field [the pursuit field at Blimbing], which heretofore had escaped the enemy's
attention, and riddled with machinegun fire all the remaining P-40's. Thus
ended on 1 March the operations of the 17th Pursuit, whose surviving personnel
now joined the hurried and confused effort to evacuate Java while there was yet
17th PS (Prov.) personnel left Blimbing and traveled in trucks to Jocjacarta
"although the road by which they had to travel was almost in Japanese hands."
The airfield at Jocjacarta had been strafed, but the men of the pursuit
squadron were told that airplanes of the 19th BG would pick them up. The first
B-17 arrived at about 9:00 PM, and by 11:30 PM on March 2, the last of the
pursuit personnel were on their way to Australia. The bomb groups had
already flown their own personnel to Australia, and with the departure of the
men of the 17th PS (Prov.), the USAAF had quit Java.
Shores, Cull, and Izawa summarized the situation on Java at the end of
||Japanese preparations could not
have been more complete, thorough or effective. Virtually defenceless, Java now
hung like a ripe plum, ready to fall into the invader's outstretched hand.
Fighting continued on Java for a until March 8, 1942. Then units of the British
and Dutch armies and navies and the DAF and RAF surrendered.
Watson ends his chapter about the defense of the NEI with some thoughts about
whether the commitment of US air and naval forces to the defense of the NEI was
worthwhile when compared to an alternative course of action in early 1942. The
alternative was to husband US forces in Australia, build up air and naval
fleets, and strike targets that were most vital to the Japanese.
Watson makes no claim that the USAAF made significant contributions to blunting
or slowing Japanese conquest of the NEI. He points to no US victory that made a
difference. He writes of the USAAF commitment as being part of a heroic,
costly, and losing campaign that united the allies against Japan. "Even the
token use of land-based air power undoubtedly helped to sustain the morale of
one and all."
In contrast to Watson's argument that the NEI campaign benefited morale, there
are indications that it battered the morale of USAAF units fighting in the NEI.
General Brereton, in passages quoted above, said that men in his command were
on the verge of physical and mental collapse and that morale was low. There's
evidence, too, that the general's reading of the situation was incorrect. In
1945, pursuit pilots who had flown with the 17th PS (Prov.) were unstinting in
their praise of the unit, including its enlisted men, and such praise is
usually reserved for units with good morale.
Further investigation of morale in bomber units is necessary before concluding
that Brereton's evaluation was really at variance with the pursuit pilots'.
Brereton is closely associated with bomber operations, and he may have been
commenting on bomber units, where morale might have differed from pursuit
Did the USAAF make a difference in the willingness of our allies to fight?
Probably not. Our allies had little choice. The Dutch were defending their own
territory. The British, retreating from Singapore and Malaya, moved to the
south to the NEI and probably wanted to hold on there as bases for the
recapture of Singapore. The Australians, who committed their Navy and RAAF
bomber units, were trying to hold the Japanese at a distance from their
country. Most likely the Australians, British, and Dutch were so consumed
with their own struggles that they little noticed the USAAF's contributions.
Leaving the question of morale aside, it's possible to ask if the defense of
the NEI benefited the strategic position of the Allies. At best, the answer to
that is mixed.
Japanese objectives in the Pacific were limited. They wanted to conquer
and occupy the territory of the Malay Barrier, the Philippines, and a few other
island chains – "Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Wake Island,
Guam, the Gilbert Islands, Thailand, and Burma." To hold the newly acquired
territory, they would erect strong defenses (see map 5 on the following page:
source: Matloff, p. 500) from
||the Kurile Islands south through
Wake, the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls and Gilberts to Rabaul on
New Britain. From Rabaul the perimeter would extend westward to northwestern
New Guinea and would encompass the Indies, Malaya, Thailand, and Burma.
(The dark lines on Map 5 indicate the division of US Theaters of War in World
War II and are not of any significance to this discussion.)
The Japanese expected the US to fight a limited war, try to push through the
defensive perimeter, wear themselves out in those attacks, tire of fighting,
and negotiate a settlement that would allow the Japanese to hold onto their
conquests. They were not fighting to win a clear-cut victory.
The Japanese were being guided by their history. They had not achieved
victories over China or Russia in the early years of the century. They had
fought them to standstills and negotiated ends to the fighting that preserved
The reasoning went astray because the Japanese
||believed it necessary to destroy
or neutralize American striking power in the Pacific--the U.S. Pacific Fleet at
Pearl Harbor and the U.S. Far East Air Force in the Philippines--before moving
southward and eastward to occupy Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, the
Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, the Gilbert Islands, Thailand, and Burma.
The attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines inflamed the United States and
led its leaders to embark on an unconditional war – supported by all elements
of the population – against Japan. The Japanese soon recognized that the US was
not going to batter itself against the defensive frontier and was going to
build up overwhelming forces in Australia to drive the Japanese back to their
homeland. To thwart that buildup, the Japanese decided to capture islands from
where their navy and land-based airpower could threaten and damage US and
allied shipments to Australia. Japan launched attacks at Guadalcanal and Tulagi
in the Solomons, seized Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians, and tried and failed
to take Midway Island.
The Japanese had largely achieved their territorial ambitions by March 1942 and
intended to defend their gains and defeat limited efforts by the US and its
allies to drive them back. Their plans went awry when the US decided on
The costs and benefits to the United States of the defense of the NEI – like
the costs and benefits of all wars – are difficult to assess. The US lost
soldiers, sailors, aircraft and ships. And being chased from the NEI so soon
after being chased from the Philippines must have imposed psychological costs.
On the benefits side, Watson suggests that US efforts contributed to allied
morale. Moreover, the USAAF units committed to the NEI were bloodied, their
personnel learned the capabilities of their equipment, and the quality of their
enemy and his weapons, and began formulating the tactics necessary to fight him
The USAAF might have reaped the same operational gains from remaining on the
defensive in Australia. The woeful aerial defense of Australia would have
benefited. If the few combat-hardened pursuit pilots had been committed to the
defense of Australia, the horror of the Darwin attack might have been
Everyone weighs military campaigns differently. Watson considers the defense of
the NEI as valuable to morale. There are reasons to question that evaluation,
and it's possible that holding the meager American forces in Australia to
present a better defense against Japanese attacks there would have done more
for morale. From the standpoint of strategy, the Japanese were most interested
in the oil resources of the NEI, and they obtained those. They miscalculated
the US response to their aggression, but the defense of the NEI certainly
played no part in that miscalculation. Their reassessment of US intentions that
led them to try to interdict supply lines to Australia and to venture outside
of their projected defensive perimeter almost certainly was not influenced by
actions in the NEI.
The defense of the NEI was in keeping with the ideal of being a good ally. The
USAAF entered the battle and did what it could. There's no question of that. I
think the question remains about whether keeping with the ideal advanced
U.S. aims in the war.
Show Footnotes and
. For a pro-Japanese account of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, especially
the role of the Japanese in the "independence" of Korea (many people saw Korea
as a Japanese protectorate, rather than independent), see Russo-Japanese War
Research Society. Undated. "The Sino-Japanese War. 1894-1895." at
http://www.russojapanesewar.com/chino-war.html. More nuanced descriptions are
available. Paine, S. 2002. "The Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895" at
"Sino-Japanese War" at
. "Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905" at
. Rasenberger, J. 2008. "1908." Smithsonian Magazine, January 2008, pp. 50 @
p. 45. Rasenberger quotes T. Roosevelt, but does not provide a source for the
. What an introduction to American music. Can anyone sing our National
. "Says Japan Should Acquire Dutch East Indies," New York Times, April
22, 1917 available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.htm.
. Bussemaker, H.T. 2000. "Paradise in Peril: The Netherlands, Great Britain
and the Defense of the Netherlands East Indies, 1940-41." Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies 31.
. The NEI turned out to be nothing of the sort. Japan never had sufficient
tankers for efficient shipping of oil to the home islands, and losses of
tankers to United States submarines reduced the flow of oil to a trickle.
. See Bussemaker.
. "Army Action in the Philippines and Netherland East Indies 1941-1942" at
p. 101. Available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/AAF-HS-111.pdf.
The document, a typescript, is faint and difficult to read in places, and the
pagination goes awry in places. No individual is cited as the author of this
document, but the Air Force Historical Research Agency identifies Richard L.
Watson as the author at
http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/studies3.asp. Some of the material
in "Army Air Action" appears in Watson's chapter, "Loss of the Netherlands East
Indies," chapter 10 in Craven, W.F. and J.L. Cate (eds) Army Air Forces in
World War II, Vol. 1. [Office of Air Force History: Washington, DC, 1983] pp.
. Palazzo, A. 2005. "The Netherlands East Indies and the Pacific War."
. Watson, R. L. 1983. "Loss of the Netherlands East Indies," chapter 10 in
Army Air Forces in World War II [Office of Air Force History: Washington, DC,
1983] pp. 366-402 @ 366.
. "The conquer of Borneo Island, 1941-42,"
. "The capture of Makassar, February 1942,"
. Unless otherwise credited, the discussion of defense of the NEI, with the
exception of the defense of Java, depends primarily on Shores, C. and B. Cull
with Y. Izawa. 1993. Bloody Shambles. Volume 2. The Defense of Sumatra to the
Fall of Burma. [London: Grub Street, 1993]. Bloody Shambles is
a day-by-day accounting of air actions, with details of pilots and aircrew,
victories and losses. It is an even-handed treatment of the histories of the
DAF, the RAF, and the USAAF. I, on the other hand, focus more on USAAF actions
in the defense of the NEI.
. The ABDA airforces employed a bestiary of antique (Vildebeest),
antiquated (Dutch "Glenn Martins" were essentially USAAF B9Bs), and
poor-performing airplanes (Albacores, Blenheims, and Buffalos" as well as B17s,
Catalinas, Hurricanes, and P-40s that were mainstays of allied air power
throughout the war. "Uncle Ted" at http://uncleted.jinak.cz/minorafp.htm#paca
and http://uncleted.jinak.cz/, provides squadron-by-squadron information about
the air forces in the Pacific theater at the beginning of World War II. He also
provides links to diagrams and descriptions of the aircraft employed by those
air forces. (The information is designed for use by war gamers, and information
about dimensions and performances that I checked accords with that in standard
. Cate, J.L. "Establishment of the Fundamental Bases of Strategy" in
Craven, W.F. and J.L. Cate (eds) Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.
1, Chap. 7. [Office of Air Force History: Washington, DC, 1983, pp. 234 - 270].
. An early export version of the Consolidated B-24. It was Consolidated's
30th design for a land based bomber, hence LB-30.
. Brewster Buffalos, upon which much of the air defense of Singapore had
depended, had been largely destroyed because of the airplanes' deficiencies
and,, more importantly, their inadequately trained pilots.
. Except for the use of "Zero" for the Mitsubishi A6M fighter, I employ the
manufacturer's name and designation – Mitsubishi A6M – or the manufacturer's
designation – A6M – or the Allied code name applied to that aircraft – Babs –
later in the war to identify Japanese aircraft.
. See "Uncle Ted" at http://uncleted.jinak.cz/minorafp.htm#paca and
http://uncleted.jinak.cz/ for descriptions of aircraft. I will include the
Allies' code names for Japanese planes even though these names were not in use
in early 1942.
. Perhaps conditioned by movies about World War II, I remain horrified by
stories of shooting parachuting pilots and aircrew. However, fleeing ground
troops are fair game until and unless they surrender. A pilot parachuting over
land occupied by his forces is not surrendering. I understand the opprobrium
attached to machine-gunning parachuting aircrew, but it doesn't appear to
violate any convention of war. All of war is killing. It can be made glorious,
justified, or horrible, but it's killing.
. Broshot, J.A. "Dutch Air Force Order of Battle in the Dutch East Indies,
30 November 1941." http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/Dutch_OOB.html.
. Angelucci, E. with P. Bowers. The American Fighter. [New York:
Orion, 1987] @ pp. 153-154.
. "Uncle Ted" at http://uncleted.jinak.cz/minorafp.htm#paca and
http://uncleted.jinak.cz/, provides squadron-by-squadron information about the
air forces in the Pacific theater at the beginning of World War II. He also
provides links to diagrams and descriptions of the aircraft employed by those
air forces. (The information is designed for use by war gamers, but information
about dimensions and performances that I checked accords with that in standard
. Bartsch, W. H. December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor. [College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003] "Appendix C," p. 427 and Gough,
M. "Failure and Destruction, Clark Field, the Philippines, December 8, 1941."
Military History Online, Nov. 2007,
. Watson, p. 372.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa @ p. 146-148.
. Green, W. War Planes of the Second World War: Fighters. Volume Four.
[Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961] at pp.32-33; 44; 77.
. In "Army Air Action in the Philippines and Netherland East Indies" @ p.
107, it is noted that losses on the early ferry flights were about 25 percent.
. Sheppard, W.A. and E.B. Gilmore. 1945. "Narrative Statement." Typescript,
41 pp @ p. 30, in the collection of the Air Force Historical Research Agency,
Maxwell, Air Force Base, AL
. Watson, p. 391.
. Watson, p. 401.
. "Journey to Java," Valor, Journal of the Air Force Association. Nov.
1984. Available at http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/1184valor.asp.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa. Quoted @ pp. 198-199.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa @ p. 167.
. Watson @ pp. 389-390.
. Watson footnote number 111; call out on p. 400.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa, @ pp. 246 and 303.
. Information and quotes from Watson.
. Abbreviations: A/C, aircraft; A/F airfields
. All dates 1942.
. All missions originated from Malang.
. Refueling B-17s at Samaringh exhausted supplies of 100 octane fuel at
. Japanese fighters attacked Kendrai during the mission and forced the AAF
to abandon it.
. Del Monte, on Mindanao, was farther distant from Malang than the target
Jolo. The plan was to bomb Jolo on the way to and from Del Monte. Bad weather
prevented bombing Jolo on the return flight. The 6 B-17s that made the complete
flight evacuated 23 officers of the 19th Bomb Group that had been stranded at
. Entries in italics are summaries of several days' actions.
. Watson, R.L. , "Loss of the Netherlands East Indies" in Craven, W.F. and
J.L. Cate (eds) Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1, Chap. 10.
[Office of Air Force History: Washington, DC, 1983, pp. 366 – 402 @ p. 384].
. Watson, p. 385.
. Watson, pp. 384-85.
. "Army Air Action in the Philippines and the Netherland East Indies" @ p.
. Sheppard, W.A. and E.B. Gilmore. 1945. "Narrative Statement." Typescript,
41 pp, in the collection of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell,
Air Force Base, AL.
. For descriptions of the air war in the Philippines, see Bartsch, W. H.,
1992. Doomed at the Start [Texas A&M University: College Station,
TX] and Bartsch, W.H. 2003. December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor. [Texas
A&M University: College Station, TX]. Also see Gough, M. 2007. "Failure and
Destruction, Clark Field, the Philippines, December 8, 1941." Military History
Online.com. Available at
. Bartsch 1992 reports that 33 of 165 pursuit pilots were killed in action
or accidents in the Philippines, "a fortunate" 49 were evacuated to Australia,
and 83 (half of the pilots) entered Japanese POW camps. The 27 nonflying
officers and 1444 enlisted men fared worse: 1 nonflying officer and 20 enlisted
men (most of them wounded) were evacuated; 49 were killed in action. The
remaining 1504 officers and men became POWs, and about 60 percent, or about
900, perished while in captivity.
. The papers are first copy or carbon typescripts typed in 1944 or 45. When
I visited the AFHRA in 1999, many of the papers were frayed and fragile.
According to AFHRA officials, there are plans to put the documents on line.
. Sheppard and Gilmore.
. Kiser, G.E. undated. "Historical Information." Typescript, 4 pp. in the
collection of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell, Air Force
Base, AL., p.2.
. Kiser, p.2.
. Magnetos are the source of the spark to ignite the fuel in an internal
combustion engine cylinder. Airplanes have two for each engine as a safety
. In a reflection of the critical need for aircraft, Captain McFarland, the
pilot of the Beechcraft B-18, obtained parts to repair it, returned to
Banjermasin, repaired it, and flew it on to Sourabaya.
. The eighth pilot, Lt. William Sheppard was detained at Sourabaya after
being diagnosed with diphtheria. He too reached Darwin on a B-17.
. These flights are also described in the "Statement" of Nathaniel Blanton
(1945) typescript, 6 pp in the collection of the Air Force Historical Research
Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 21.
. The buildup of P-40s in Australia was rapid; 112 had arrived by January
25, 1942, and an additional 160 in the next 10 days [Watson, p. 374]. The
shortages of pilots, especially trained pilots, and organization delayed the
deployment of the pursuits.
. Sheppard and Gilmore @ p. 28.
. Blanton, pp. 3-4.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 35.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 33.
. Kiser, G. E. "Historical Information." Undated, 4 pp typescript. In the
collection of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base,
. Watson, pp. 386-387.
. Watson, p. 400.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 37.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 37.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 34.
. Watson, p. 401.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 38
. Kiser, p. 3.
. Blanton, p. 5.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa, p. 234.
. Watson, p. 400.
. Kiser, p. 4.
. Except for the use of "Zero" for the Mitsubishi A6M fighter, I employ the
manufacturer's name and designation – Mitsubishi C5M – or the manufacturer's
designation – C5M – or the name applied to that aircraft – Babs – later in the
war to identify Japanese aircraft.
. I have read extensively about the war in the Pacific. It may be that my
memory is faulty, but so far as I can recall, Shores, Cull, and Izawa are the
first authors I've read who draw attention to the importance of the C5M in
providing navigational assistance to Zeros (and other aircraft) on their
sometimes spectacularly long over-water flights.
. "Douglas DC-5" from Wikipedia at
. Some of the claims were for "Zeros" shot down. In the early days of the
Pacific War, U.S. and other Allied pilots often identified any Japanese fighter
as a Zero. This is despite the fact that the Ki 27s had non-retractable landing
gear, in contrast to the Zero, which had fully retractable landing gear.
. Watson, p. 395.
. A day-by-day record of USAAF activities is to be found in "Summary of Air
Action in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies" by the Assistant Chief
of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division and credited to C. Juliett
Abington by the Air Force Historical Research Agency (at
http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/studies1.asp (1945). I have not
relied on the document, available at
http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/467620.pdf because the claims for
victories are simply that, claims, impossible to verify at the time it was
written. The analyses in Shores, Cull, and Izawa, written well after the war
and based on records that became available after the war provides more certain
. Sheppard and Gilmore, pp 37-38.
. "5th AAF: Month by Month Chronology" @
. Quoted by Shores, Cull, and Izawa, p. 227.
. "5th AAF: Month by Month Chronology" @
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa, @ p. 227 write that Brereton left "taking with
him Capt Mahony from the 17th Pursuit Squadron: Lt Gerry McCallum, the unit's
engineering officer, was promoted to command in his stead." Blanton, @ p. 5,
also reports that Mahony took command of the squadron. In contrast to those
reported changes in command, George E. Kiser, in his "Historical Information,"
wrote, "Major "Bud" Sprague was shot down 20 February 1942 and I was put in
command of the squadron and held command until it was disbanded in Australia."
Shores, Cull, and Izawa note that Kiser was a flight leader on February 27 (p.
239) but never credit him as the squadron commanding officer.
. This seems a phenomenal altitude.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa, p. 228.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa, p. 231.
. Watson, p. 398.
. Sheppard and Gilmore, p. 40.
. The men of the pursuit squadron landed at Broome, Australia, where a
large number of flying boats – some ferrying Dutch civilians to safety from the
NEI – were docked. A Japanese strafing mission on March 3 destroyed 12 flying
boats, two B-17s, two LB-30s, two Hudsons, and 12 flying boats. At least 42
civilians, mostly women and children, died in the flying boats.
. Shores, Cull, and Izawa, p. 255.
. Watson, p. 401.
. In February 1942, the Australians were only breaking free from their
close alliance with the military needs of Britain. The bulk of the Australian
Army and its finest units were not protecting the homeland; they were fighting
alongside the British in North Africa. All operational RAAF fighter squadrons
were also serving with the British in Europe or North Africa.
. Matloff, M. American Military History. [Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1969] @ p. 499.
. Matloff, pp. 499, 501.
. Metloff, M. p. 499.
. Metloff, pp. 501-502.
. On February 19, 1942, carrier-based Japanese aircraft bombed Darwin,
devastating the harbor, sinking ships, destroying the airfield, shooting down
four of five P-40s, and killing 243 people of a population of about 2,000 (some
3,000 citizens of Darwin had been evacuated). The single surviving P-40 pilot
claimed two dive bombers shot down. The Japanese probably lost a total of four
Copyright © 2008 Michael Gough
Written by Michael Gough. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Michael Gough at:
About the author:
Michael Gough, trained in molecular biology, taught in medical schools and carried out basic research in genetics of microorganisms. After moving to Washington, he was a program manager at the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, did research and wrote at a number of think tanks, and worked as an expert witness before retiring in 1999. His uncle, Sgt Clifford Noel, USAAF, was wounded in the initial Japanese attack at Clark Field, December 8, 1941.
Published online: 04/06/2008.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.