This story is incomplete. With the maiden, 20-minute flight of the
first Technology Demonstrator of the Light Combat Aircraft on January 4, 2001, one could
say it was halfway through. Even at this point of time, it is of enormous interest to
nations in the far corners of the world. India has two priorities One, improve the quality
of life of a third of its population. Two keep inviolate its borders, shores and skies.
The latter requires military might.
The geo- politics of the region (South Asia and surrounds) is of such a
complexity that, despite good intentions of all, major conflicts have erupted; border
skirmishes and cross- border terror-ism continue. In fact, right from Day 1 (August 15,
1947) India has faced a military threat; because of this, there is a compulsion to achieve
self-reliance in design,development and production of weapon systems e.g. the LCA. It may
be noted that some Asian countries, with great economic wealth and technical know why/know
how, do not have such a compulsion Further, success of the LCA program is a must for
continuation and enhancement of India's aircraft industry. For these reasons, 33 R&D
establishments 60 major industries and 11 academic institutions participate in the
program. Unfortunately, there has been a great deal of hype by the Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO) as to its capabilities, contemporariness and when it will
enter service. This has led to, not unwarranted, cynicism.
An important recommendation of the Aeronautics Committee, which was accepted by Government
in 1969, was that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) should design and develop an advanced
technology fighter aircraft around a proven engine. Based on IAF 'air staff target'
papers, HAL finally completed design studies for a Tactical Air support Aircraft in 1975
and it appeared that HAL would, after a lapse of twenty years, get down to developing a
fighter. However, he selected proven engine' from abroad, could not be procured; the
project fell through. HAL's design and development capability started to de-cline. The
IAF' s requirement, for an air superiority fighter (primary role) with air
support/interdiction capability (secondary role) in the tactical battle area, continued.
The DRDO obtained feasibility studies from three leading aircraft companies (British,
French and German). Use was made of these studies in presenting a case to Government for
design and development of an LCA. In an unusual step, a Society was set up to over-see the
LCA development program. At its apex is a 15-member General Body, whose president is the
Defence Minister. The next rung is a 10-member Governing Body, whose Chairman is the SA to
the Defence Minister and Secretary DRDO. The third rung is a 10-member Technical
Committee, headed by the DG Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA); the latter post has
been vacant ever since the first DG resigned in 1986. ADA manages the development program
while HAL is the principal partner. The initial projection for completion of the program
was totally erroneous and is largely attributable to lack of knowledge and experience.
Projections were: first flight in 1990; production to commence in 1994.
Delay in commencement of Project Definition (PD) gave ADA time to marshal national
resources (80 work centers spread over the country); to construct buildings, recruit
personnel and create infra-structure; and to get a clearer perspective of the advanced
technologies that could be indigenously developed and those that would need to be
imported. The IAF's Air Staff Requirement, finalized in October 1985 is the base document
for development. Requirements of flight performance, systems performance, reliability,
maintainability criteria, stores carnage, etc. are spelt out. Concessions or a higher
standard of requirements have to be mutually agreed upon by the IAF (customer) and ADA
(constructor). Having a Society and Committees is, perhaps, the quickest way to bring
Project definition (PD) commenced in October 1987 and was completed in September I988.
The consultant, chosen from four contenders, was Dassault Aviation, France. Engineers,
connected with design and development of aircraft know how vital it is to get the
'definition' correct. From this flows detail de-sign, construction and eventually
After examining the PD documents, the IAF felt that the risks were too high (likely
shortfalls in performance, inordinate delay, Cost over-run, price escalations) to proceed
further. A Review Committee was formed in May 1989. Experts from outside the aviation
industry were included. The general view was that infrastructure, facilities and
technology had advanced in most areas to undertake the project. As a precaution, Full
Scale Engineering Development would proceed in two phases. Phase 1: design, construction
and flight test of two Technology Demonstrator aircraft (TDI & 2); construction of a
Structural Test Specimen; construction of two Prototype Vehicles (PVI &2); creation of
infrastructure and test facilities. Phase 2: construction of three more PV '5, the last
PV5, being a trainer; construction of a Fatigue Test Specimen; creation of facilities at
various work centres. Cost of Phase I - Rs.2188 crores, of Phase II - Rs. 2,340 crores.
Phase I commenced in 1990. However, due to a financial crunch, sanction was accorded in
April 1993 and was marked by an upsurge in work. The critical path in this program has
been the design, fabrication and testing of its fly-by-wire flight control system FCS). An
electronic FCS is a must for an aircraft with relaxed static stability.
The FCS also provides the pilot 'care free handling'; flight limits
cannot be exceeded, which at lower speeds on aircraft like the MiG-23/27 or Jaguar,
results in the loss of the aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) is
the nodal agency for development of the FCS. One reason for delay of the first flight
could have been the Unexpectedly large effort required for coding control laws into the
FCS software, which were then checked out on Minibird and Ironbird test rigs at ADE and
HAL, respectively. The control laws were developed with the aid of real time simulators at
ADE and BAe, UK. As a point of interest, a second series of inflight simulation tests of
flight control software took place in July 1996 at Calspan USA on an F-16D VISTA (variable
inflight stability aircraft); 33 test flight were carried out. Another reason for delay
was the sanction imposed after Pokhran II in May 1999. Scientists working at Lockheed
Martin, USA were sent hack; equipment, software and documents were impounded. Herculean
efforts brought the FCS software to a standard where the FCS performed flawlessly over 50
hours of testing on TD 1 by pilots, resulting in the aircraft being cleared for flight in
Space constraints prevent any meaningful description of materials, technology, facilities,
processes developed for execution of the project. Military aviation enthusiasts may read a
monograph on Aeronautical Technology that has attained maturity through DRDO efforts; much
of this technology finds application in the LCA project. The monograph was brought out at
Aero India 1998. The LCA is tailless with a double-sweep delta wing. Its wing span is 8.2
m, length 13.2 m, height 4.4 m. TOW clean 8.500 kg, MTOW 12500kg. It will be super-sonic
at all altitudes, max speed of M 1.5 at the tropopause. Specific excess power and g-over
load data has not been published. Maximum sustained rate of turn will be 17 deg per sec
and maximum attainable 30 deg per sec. Funds have been sanctioned for a Naval LCA. PD and
studies in critical technology areas have commenced. The aircraft will bee powered by a
Kaveri engine (more information follows) and is to operate from the Indian Navy's Air
Defence Ship, under construction. Launch speed over a 12 deg ramp is 100 kts; recovery
speed during a no flare deck landing, using arrester gear, is 120 kts. Take off mass 13
tonne, recovery mass 10 tonne. Most stringent requirements! The airframe will be modified:
nose droop to provide improved view during landing approach; wing leading edge vortexes
(LEVCON) to increase lift during approach and strengthened undercarriage. Nose wheel
steering will be powered for deck manoeuvrability.
During early flight development, the TD aircraft will be powered by a single GE F404 F2J3
engine (7,250 kg reheat thrust). The indigenous Kaveri engine, under development by the
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) is slated for installation in a PV aircraft.
Over 7,000 hours of ground testing of the core engine (Kabini) and four prototype Kaveri
engines, together with flights in a Tu-16 test-bed aircraft would have been completed.
Engine components have been produced by several manufacturing units, including HAL, where
the exclusive Cellular Manufacturing Facility (CNC machining) was established in November
1988. A concurrent engineering approach has been followed to provide engines early in the
LCA's flight development. Salient engine features; 3 stage fan; 6 stage HP compressor with
variable geometry IGV, I and II stators; annular combustion chamber; cooled single stage
HP and LP turbines; modulated after-burner; fully variable, convergent-divergent nozzle;
length 3490 mm; max diameter 910 mm; dry thrust 52 kN; reheat thrust 81 kN; thrust weight
ratio 7.8. The 'Achilles heel; in the successful development of the LCA, in the opinion of
this author, is the Kaveri engine.
Points of view
In the late eighties India's aircraft Industry was not as advanced as Sweden's; and yet
India follows a more arduous design/development route for its LCA, compared to Sweden for
its JAS-39 Gripen. The Gripen embodied a far higher percentage of foreign, off-the-shelf
technology, including its RM-12 engine (improved GE F404). France (Dassault Aviation)
built and exhaustively flew a demonstrator aircraft (Rafale-A) before embarking on
construction of Rafale prototypes. Over 2,000 flights were completed by September 1994
when first Flight of a production Rafale was still 20 months away. At that point of time,
Dassault Aviation had built or flown 93 prototypes, of which at least fifteen went into
production Sixteen years elapsed from first-metal-cut' of the Rafale demonstrator to
entry into service. Current plans for the LCA is ten years. And what of India's past
record? Just a hand-ful of trainer aircraft designed and productionised. The story is
similar for the Typhoon (earlier Eurofighter 2000). It was seventeen years from
'first-metal-cut' (EAP) to squadron entry in 2000. One more timeframe needs to be noted.
It took Gripen six and a half years from first flight (prototype) to entry into squadron.
For the LCA, four and a half years is the target! The quantum of test flying hours
required to attain Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) is about 2000 hours; an impossible
task in four and a half years. Concurrent production will shorten service entry time, but
this will not enable the present target to be reached.
The LCA remains a high-risk project. All too often glitches occur in development of a
fly-by-wire FCS. The Typhoon is an example; this, despite vast experimental work for over
a decade by leading aircraft manufacturers in the UK and Germany (Jaguar, F-104, EAP).
Engine development is the most complex of all activities. There are sure to be problems
during flight development of the Kaveri, GTRE's first engine. Teething problems after
service entry will occur; and major reliability improvements will be required in the first
decade of its exploitation. Engines of the Russian fleet of fighters operated by the IAF
(MiG-21 BIS, MiG-23BN/27M MiG-29) have this in-service history. Proceeding from this, four
(a) India has its best designers, engineers, scientists, academicians working
on/contributing to the project. In the main, they are devoted and tireless in their
efforts to success-fully complete the project. They need support (not blind sup-port) of
the polity, defence services and bureaucrats. Public support will follow, provided there
is honest transparency;
(b) Costs of the project will escalate. (checks and balance are necessary, but let there
be no inordinate delays, as have occurred in the past;
(c) The future of the aircraft industry, military and civil, depends on success of the LCA
(and ALH, Saras, HJT-36) project; and,
(d) It is unlikely that the LCA will attain initial operational clearance (IOC) before
2010 When it is achieved, it will be an industrial success of magnificent proportion, and
is sure to receive the acclaim it deserves.
A few words on final operational clearance (FOC). The entire avionics and weapon systems
are con-figured around three 1553 B data bus. Mission oriented computation/flight
management is through a 32 hit computer. Information: from sensors (e.g. multi-mode radar,
IRST, radar/laser/missile launch-warning receivers); from the inertial navigation System
with embedded GPS; from targetting pod (FLIR, laser designator) are presented to the pilot
on a head-up-display and head-down-displays. A helmet mounted target designator steers
radar and missile seekers for early target acquisition (during a 'close-in' air-to-air
engagement with a Vympel R-73 missile, currently the best dog-fight' missile in the
world). Laser guided bombs and TV guided missiles, require a pilot to initially 'zero-in'
the laser designator or missile-mounted TV camera, on the ground target. Considerable
engineering effort and expertise is necessary to achieve avionics-weapon integration and
to prove the integration by live trials. Success here means FOC. Depending on what is
stated in the (updated) ASR, it could take two years and around 1,500 hours of flight
testing to move from IOC to FOC.
There will he setbacks in the flight development phase. All major engineering projects
suffer them e.g. India's first two SLVs failed disastrously. The Prime Minister was
present at the first launch at Sriharikota; so was this author. Disappointment was
everywhere, but no recrimination; only determination to get it right. Loss of a
demonstrator aircraft or prototype could take place, lives could he lost, leading to
questions/debate. Therefore, let the recent transparency in tile program continue, even
intensify; let it he honest, 2010 is not far, for a first' program of this magnitude and
The author, Air Alarshal M.S.D. Wollen (Retd) was chairman Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited from September 1984 to March 1988. This aricle is reproduced with permission of
the author. It first appeared in. Indian Aviation, Opening Show report, Aero India