Kyrgyzstan - History
The modern nation of Kyrgyzstan is based on a civilization of nomadic
tribes who moved across the eastern and northern sections of present-day
Central Asia. In this process, they were dominated by, and intermixed
with, a number of other tribes and peoples that have influenced the
ultimate character of the Kyrgyz people.
Stone implements found in the Tian Shan mountains indicate the
presence of human society in what is now Kyrgyzstan as many as 200,000
to 300,000 years ago. The first written records of a Kyrgyz civilization
appear in Chinese chronicles beginning about 2000 B.C. The Kyrgyz, a
nomadic people, originally inhabited an area of present-day northwestern
Mongolia. In the fourth and third centuries B.C., Kyrgyz bands were
among the raiders who persistently invaded Chinese territory and
stimulated the building of the original Great Wall of China in the third
century B.C. The Kyrgyz achieved a reputation as great fighters and
traders. In the centuries that followed, some Kyrgyz tribes freed
themselves from domination by the Huns by moving northward into the
Yenisey and Baikal regions of present-day south-central Siberia.
The first Kyrgyz state, the Kyrgyz Khanate, existed from the sixth
until the thirteenth century A.D., expanding by the tenth century
southwestward to the eastern and northern regions of present-day
Kyrgyzstan and westward to the headwaters of the Ertis (Irtysh) River in
present-day eastern Kazakstan. In this period, the khanate established
intensive commercial contacts in China, Tibet, Central Asia, and Persia.
In the meantime, beginning about 1000 B.C., large tribes collectively
known as the Scythians also lived in the area of present-day Kyrgyzstan.
Excellent warriors, the Scythian tribes farther west had resisted an
invasion by the troops of Alexander the Great in 328-27 B.C. The Kyrgyz
tribes who entered the region around the sixth century played a major
role in the development of feudalism.
The Kyrgyz reached their greatest expansion by conquering the Uygur
Khanate and forcing it out of Mongolia in A.D. 840, then moving as far
south as the Tian Shan range--a position the Kyrgyz maintained for about
200 years. By the twelfth century, however, Kyrgyz domination had shrunk
to the region of the Sayan Mountains, northwest of present-day Mongolia,
and the Altay Range on the present-day border of China and Mongolia. In
the same period, other Kyrgyz tribes were moving across a wide area of
Central Asia and mingling with other ethnic groups.
Kyrgyzstan - Mongol Domination
The Mongols' invasion of Central Asia in the fourteenth century
devastated the territory of Kyrgyzstan, costing its people their
independence and their written language. The son of Chinggis (Genghis)
Khan, Dzhuchi, conquered the Kyrgyz tribes of the Yenisey region, who by
this time had become disunited. For the next 200 years, the Kyrgyz
remained under the Golden Horde and the Oriot and Jumgar khanates that
succeeded that regime. Freedom was regained in 1510, but Kyrgyz tribes
were overrun in the seventeenth century by the Kalmyks, in the
mid-eighteenth century by the Manchus, and in the early nineteenth
century by the Uzbeks.
The Kyrgyz began efforts to gain protection from more powerful
neighboring states in 1758, when some tribes sent emissaries to China. A
similar mission went to the Russian Empire in 1785. Between 1710 and
1876, the Kyrgyz were ruled by the Uzbek Quqon (Kokand) Khanate, one of
the three major principalities of Central Asia during that period (see
fig. 3). Kyrgyz tribes fought and lost four wars against the Uzbeks of
Quqon between 1845 and 1873. The defeats strengthened the Kyrgyz
willingness to seek Russian protection. Even during this period,
however, the Kyrgyz occupied important positions in the social and
administrative structures of the khanate, and they maintained special
military units that continued their earlier tradition of military
organization; some Kyrgyz advanced to the position of khan.
Kyrgyzstan - Russia
In 1876 Russian troops defeated the Quqon Khanate and occupied
northern Kyrgyzstan. Within five years, all Kyrgyzstan had become part
of the Russian Empire, and the Kyrgyz slowly began to integrate
themselves into the economic and political life of Russia. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of Russian and
Ukrainian settlers moved into the northern part of present-day
Kyrgyzstan. Russian specialists began large-scale housing, mining, and
road construction projects and the construction of schools. In the first
years of the twentieth century, the presence of the Russians made
possible the publication of the first books in the Kyrgyz language; the
first Kyrgyz reader was published in Russia in 1911. Nevertheless,
Russian policy did not aim at educating the population; most Kyrgyz
remained illiterate, and in most regions traditional life continued
largely as it had before 1870.
By 1915, however, even many Central Asians outside the intelligentsia
had recognized the negative effects of the Russian Empire's repressive
policies. The Kyrgyz nomads suffered especially from confiscation of
their land for Russian and Ukrainian settlements. Russian taxation,
forced labor, and price policies all targeted the indigenous population
and raised discontent and regional tension. The Kyrgyz in Semirech'ye
Province suffered especially from land appropriation. The bloody
rebellion of the summer of 1916 began in Uzbekistan, then spread into
Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. Kazaks, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz
participated. An estimated 2,000 Slavic settlers and even more local
people were killed, and the harsh Russian reprisals drove one-third of
the Kyrgyz population into China.
Kyrgyzstan - The Soviet Union and Recent History
Following a brief period of independence after the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution (see Glossary) toppled the empire, the territory of
present-day Kyrgyzstan was designated the Kara-Kyrghyz Autonomous Region
and a constituent part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Soviet Union) in 1924. In 1926 the official name changed to the Kyrgyz
Autonomous Republic before the region achieved the status of a full
republic of the Soviet Union in 1936.
In the late 1980s, the Kyrgyz were jolted into a state of national
consciousness by the reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and
by ethnic conflict much closer to home. As democratic activism stirred
in Kyrgyzstan's cities, events in Moscow pushed the republic toward
The most important single event leading to independence grew from an
outburst of ethnic friction. From the perspective of the Kyrgyz, the
most acute nationality problem long had been posed by the Uzbeks living
in and around the city of Osh, in the republic's southwest. Although
Kyrgyzstan was only about 13 percent Uzbek according to the 1989 census,
almost the entire Uzbek population was concentrated in Osh Province.
Tensions very likely had existed between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks
throughout the Soviet period, but Moscow was able to preserve the image
of Soviet ethnic harmony until the reforms of Gorbachev in the
mid-1980s. In the general atmosphere of glasnost (see
Glossary), an Uzbek-rights group called Adalat began airing old
grievances in 1989, demanding that Moscow grant local Uzbek autonomy in
Osh and consider its annexation by nearby Uzbekistan.
The real issue behind Adalat's demand was land, which is in extremely
short supply in the southernmost province of Osh. To protect their
claims, some Osh Kyrgyz also had formed an opposing ethnic association,
called Osh-aimagy (Osh-land). In early June 1990, the Kyrgyz-dominated
Osh City Council announced plans to build a cotton processing plant on a
parcel of land under the control of an Uzbek-dominated collective farm
in Osh Province.
The confrontation that erupted over control of that land brought
several days of bloody riots between crowds led by the respective
associations, killing at least 320 Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh. The precise
cause and sequence of events in early June 1990 is disputed between
Uzbek and Kyrgyz accounts. Scores of families were left homeless when
their houses were burned out. The government finally stopped the rioting
by imposing a military curfew.
Because the telephone lines remained open in the otherwise blockaded
city, news of the violence spread immediately to Frunze. In the capital,
a large group of students marched on the headquarters of the Communist
Party of Kyrgyzia (CPK), which also served as the seat of government, in
the center of the city. In the violent confrontation that ensued,
personal injuries were minimized by effective crowd control, and the
riotous crowd eventually was transformed into a mass meeting.
The Osh riots and the subsequent events in Frunze quickly brought to
the surface an undercurrent of political discontent that had been
forming among both the intelligentsia and middle-level party officials.
A loose affiliation of activists calling themselves the Democratic
Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) began to organize public opinion, calling
among other things for the resignation of Absamat Masaliyev, who was
president of the republic's parliament, the Supreme Soviet, as well as a
member of the Soviet Union's Politburo and the head of the CPK. The DDK
called for Masaliyev's resignation because he was widely viewed as
having mishandled the Osh riots.
Democratic activists erected tents in front of the party
headquarters, maintaining pressure with a series of hunger strikes and
highly visible public demonstrations. The continuing atmosphere of
crisis emboldened CPK members, who also wished to get rid of the
reactionary Masaliyev. Four months later, in a presidential election
prescribed by Gorbachev's reform policies, Masaliyev failed to win the
majority of Supreme Soviet votes required to remain in power.
The Rise of Akayev
With none of the three presidential candidates able to gain the
necessary majority in the 1990 election, the Supreme Soviet unexpectedly
selected Askar Akayev, a forty-six-year-old physicist, who had been
serving as head of the republic's Academy of Sciences. Although he had
served for a year in a science-related post on the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and was a party member,
Akayev was the first president of a Soviet republic who had not held a
high party position.
At the same meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the deputies changed the
name of the republic to Kyrgyzstan. They also began to speak seriously
of seeking greater national sovereignty (which was formally declared on
November 20, 1990) and of attaining political domination of the republic
by the Kyrgyz, including the establishment of Kyrgyz as the official
By mid-summer 1991, the Kyrgyz were beginning to make serious moves
to uncouple the government from the CPSU and its Kyrgyzstan branch. In
early August, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, which
governs the police and the internal security forces, announced a ban of
all CPSU affiliation or activity within the ministry. Events elsewhere
precluded a seemingly inevitable conflict with Moscow over that
decision; in August 1991, the attention of the entire union moved to
Moscow when reactionaries in Gorbachev's government attempted to remove
him from power.
Unlike the leaders of the other four Central Asian republics, who
temporized for a day about their course following the coup, Akayev
condemned the plot almost immediately and began preparations to repel
the airborne forces rumored to be on the way to Kyrgyzstan from Moscow.
The quick collapse of the coup made the preparations unnecessary, but
Akayev's declaration of support for Gorbachev and for the maintenance of
legitimate authority gained the Kyrgyz leader enormous respect among the
Kyrgyz people and among world leaders. On August 30, 1991, days after
the coup began, Akayev and the republic's Supreme Soviet declared
Kyrgyzstan an independent nation, and the president threw the CPSU and
its Kyrgyzstan branch out of the government. However, he did not go as
far as officials in most of the other former Soviet republics, where the
party was banned totally.
At the same time independence was declared, the republic's Supreme
Soviet scheduled direct presidential elections for October 1991. Running
unopposed, Akayev received 95 percent of the popular vote, thus becoming
the country's first popularly elected president. The so-called Silk
Revolution drew much international sympathy and attention. In December
1991, when the Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian republics signed the
Tashkent Agreement, forming a commonwealth that heralded the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, Akayev demanded that another meeting be held so
that Kyrgyzstan might become a founding member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS--see Glossary), as the new union was to be
The sympathy that Akayev had won for Kyrgyzstan earlier in his
presidency served the country well once the world generally acknowledged
the passing of the Gorbachev regime and the Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan was
recognized almost immediately by most nations, including the United
States, whose secretary of state, James Baker, made an official visit in
January 1992. A United States embassy was opened in the capital (which
had reassumed its pre-Soviet name of Bishkek in December 1990) in
February 1992. By early 1993, the new country had been recognized by 120
nations and had diplomatic relations with sixty-one of them.
Akayev's Early Years
Despite initial euphoria over the possibilities of independence and
membership in the CIS, Akayev recognized that his country's economic
position was extremely vulnerable and that the ethnic situation
exacerbated that vulnerability. Thus, the Akayev administration devoted
much attention to creating a legal basis of governance while struggling
to keep the economy afloat.
In the first two years of his presidency, Akayev seemed to work
effectively with the Supreme Soviet that had put him in office. By 1992,
however, Akayev's good relations with the legislature had fallen victim
to the rapidly declining economy, the failure of the CIS to become a
functioning body, and the country's inability to attract substantial
assistance or investment from any of the potential foreign partners whom
he had courted so assiduously.
In advancing his reform programs, Akayev experienced particular
difficulties in gaining the cooperation of entrenched local politicians
remaining from the communist government apparatus. To gain control of
local administration, Akayev imitated the 1992 strategy of Russia's
president Boris N. Yeltsin by appointing individuals to leadership
positions at the province, district, and city levels (see Structure of
Government, this ch.). Akayev filled about seventy such positions, the
occupants of which were supposed to combine direct loyalty and
responsibility to the president with a zeal to improve conditions for
their immediate locales. The system became a source of constant scandal
and embarrassment for Akayev, however. The most flagrant abuses came in
Jalal-Abad Province (which had been split from neighboring Osh in spring
1991 to dilute political power in the south), where the new akim,
the provincial governor, appointed members of his own family to the
majority of the positions under his control and used state funds to
acquire personal property. The situation in Jalal-Abad aroused strong
resentment and demonstrations that continued even after the governor had
been forced to resign.
In 1992 and 1993, the public perception grew that Akayev himself had
provided a model for the tendency of local leaders to put family and
clan interests above those of the nation. Indeed, several prominent
national government officials, including the head of the internal
security agency, the heads of the national bank and the national radio
administration, the minister of foreign affairs, and the ambassador to
Russia, came from Akayev's home area and from Talas, the home district
of his wife.
Akayev's loss of momentum was reflected in the debate over the
national constitution, a first draft of which was passed by the Supreme
Soviet in December 1992. Although draft versions had begun to circulate
as early as the summer of 1992, the commission itself agreed on a
definitive version only after prolonged debate. An umbrella group of
opposition figures from the DDK also began drawing up constitutional
proposals in 1992, two variations of which they put forward for public
Although broad agreement existed on the outlines of the constitution,
several specific points were difficult to resolve. One concerned the
status of religion. Although it was agreed that the state would be
secular, there was strong pressure for some constitutional recognition
of the primacy of Islam. Another much-debated issue was the role of the
Russian language. Kyrgyz had been declared the official state language,
but non-Kyrgyz citizens exerted pressure to have Russian assigned
near-equal status, as was the case in neighboring Kazakstan, where
Russian had been declared the "official language of interethnic
communication." The issue of property ownership was warmly debated,
with strong sentiment expressed against permitting land to be owned or
sold. Another important question was the role of the president within
the new state structure.
The proposed constitution was supposed to be debated by the full
Supreme Soviet (as the new nation's parliament continued to call itself
after independence) and by a specially convened body of prominent
citizens before its acceptance as law. However, some members of the
democratic opposition argued that a special assembly of Kyrgyz elders,
called a kuraltai , should be convened to consider the
document. A final draft of the constitution was passed by the Supreme
Soviet in May 1993, apparently without involvement of a kuraltai
In drafting a final document, the Supreme Soviet addressed some of
the most controversial issues that had arisen in predraft discussions.
Specific passages dealt with transfer and ownership of property, the
role of religion in the government, the powers of the president, and the
official language of the country (see Constitution, this ch.).
Akayev had spoken of the need to have a presidential system of
government--and, indeed, the constitution sets the presidency outside
the three branches of government, to act as a sort of overseer ensuring
the smooth functioning of all three. However, by the mid-1990s
dissatisfaction with the strong presidential model of government and
with the president himself was growing. With economic resources
diminished, political infighting became commonplace. Although the prime
minister and others received blame for controversial or unsuccessful
policy initiatives, President Akayev nonetheless found himself
increasingly isolated politically amid growing opposition forces.
Although the "democratic" opposition that had helped bring
Akayev to power had grown disenchanted, its constituent factions were
unable to exert serious pressure on the president because they could not
agree on ideology or strategy. In October 1992, the main democratic
opposition party Erk (Freedom) fractured into two new parties, Erkin and
Ata-Meken (Fatherland). More serious opposition originated within the
ranks of the former communist elite. Some of this opposition came
directly from the ranks of the reconstituted and still legal CPK (see
Political Parties, this ch.).
In January 1993, Akayev made an unusually harsh statement to the
effect that he had been misled by his economic advisers and that
Kyrgyzstan's overtures to the outside world had only raised false hopes.
The continuing outflow of ethnic Russians (who constitute the greater
part of Kyrgyzstan's technicians), the war in Tajikistan (which has
driven refugees and "freedom fighters" into Kyrgyzstan), the
growing evidence of wide-scale official corruption and incompetence,
rising crime, and--more than anything else--the spectacular collapse of
the economy increasingly charged the country's political atmosphere in
the first half of the 1990s.
Kyrgyzstan - Geography
The smallest of the newly independent Central Asian states,
Kyrgyzstan is about the same size as the state of Nebraska, with a total
area of about 198,500 square kilometers. The national territory extends
about 900 kilometers from east to west and 410 kilometers from north to
south. Kyrgyzstan is bordered on the southeast by China, on the north
and west by Kazakstan, and on the south and west by Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan. One consequence of the Stalinist division of Central Asia
into five republics is that many ethnic Kyrgyz do not live in
Kyrgyzstan. Three enclaves, legally part of the territory of Kyrgyzstan
but geographically removed by several kilometers, have been established,
two in Uzbekistan and one in Tajikistan (see fig. 8). The terrain of
Kyrgyzstan is dominated by the Tian Shan and Pamir mountain systems,
which together occupy about 65 percent of the national territory. The
Alay range portion of the Tian Shan system dominates the southwestern
crescent of the country, and, to the east, the main Tian Shan range runs
along the boundary between southern Kyrgyzstan and China before
extending farther east into China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
Kyrgyzstan's average elevation is 2,750 meters, ranging from 7,439
meters at Pik Pobedy (Mount Victory) to 394 meters in the Fergana Valley
near Osh. Almost 90 percent of the country lies more than 1,500 meters
above sea level.
Kyrgyzstan - Topography and Drainage
The mountains of Kyrgyzstan are geologically young, so that the
physical terrain is marked by sharply uplifted peaks separated by deep
valleys (see fig. 9). There is also considerable glaciation.
Kyrgyzstan's 6,500 distinct glaciers are estimated to hold about 650
billion cubic meters of water. Only around the Chu, Talas, and Fergana
valleys is there relatively flat land suitable for large-scale
Because the high peaks function as moisture catchers, Kyrgyzstan is
relatively well watered by the streams that descend from them. None of
the rivers of Kyrgyzstan are navigable, however. The majority are small,
rapid, runoff streams. Most of Kyrgyzstan's rivers are tributaries of
the Syrdariya, which has its headwaters in the western Tian Shan along
the Chinese border. Another large runoff system forms the Chu River,
which arises in northern Kyrgyzstan, then flows northwest and disappears
into the deserts of southern Kazakstan. Ysyk-Köl is the second largest
body of water in Central Asia, after the Aral Sea, but the saline lake
has been shrinking steadily, and its mineral content has been rising
gradually. Kyrgyzstan has a total of about 2,000 lakes with a total
surface area of 7,000 square kilometers, mostly located at altitudes of
3,000 to 4,000 meters. Only the largest three, however, occupy more than
500 square kilometers. The second- and third-largest lakes, Songköl and
Chatyr-Köl (the latter of which also is saline), are located in the
Natural disasters have been frequent and varied. Overgrazing and
deforestation of steep mountain slopes have increased the occurrence of
mudslides and avalanches, which occasionally have swallowed entire
villages. In August 1992, a severe earthquake left several thousand
people homeless in the southwestern city of Jalal-Abad.
Kyrgyzstan - Climate
The country's climate is influenced chiefly by the mountains,
Kyrgyzstan's position near the middle of the Eurasian landmass, and the
absence of any body of water large enough to influence weather patterns.
Those factors create a distinctly continental climate that has
significant local variations. Although the mountains tend to collect
clouds and block sunlight (reducing some narrow valleys at certain times
of year to no more than three or four hours of sunlight per day), the
country is generally sunny, receiving as much as 2,900 hours of sunlight
per year in some areas. The same conditions also affect temperatures,
which can vary significantly from place to place. In January the warmest
average temperature (-4°C) occurs around the southern city of Osh, and
around Ysyk-Köl. The latter, which has a volume of 1,738 cubic
kilometers, does not freeze in winter. Indeed, its name means "hot
lake" in Kyrgyz. The coldest temperatures are in mountain valleys.
There, readings can fall to -30°C or lower; the record is -53.6°C. The
average temperature for July similarly varies from 27°C in the Fergana
Valley, where the record high is 44°C, to a low of -10°C on the
highest mountain peaks. Precipitation varies from 2,000 millimeters per
year in the mountains above the Fergana Valley to less than 100
millimeters per year on the west bank of Ysyk-Köl.
Kyrgyzstan - Environmental Problems
Kyrgyzstan has been spared many of the enormous environmental
problems faced by its Central Asian neighbors, primarily because its
designated roles in the Soviet system involved neither heavy industry
nor large-scale cotton production. Also, the economic downturn of the
early 1990s reduced some of the more serious effects of industrial and
agricultural policy. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan has serious problems
because of inefficient use and pollution of water resources, land
degradation, and improper agricultural practices.
Although Kyrgyzstan has abundant water running through it, its water
supply is determined by a post-Soviet sharing agreement among the five
Central Asian republics. As in the Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan has the right
to 25 percent of the water that originates in its territory, but the new
agreement allows Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan unlimited use of the water
that flows into them from Kyrgyzstan, with no compensation for the
nation at the source. Kyrgyzstan uses the entire amount to which the
agreement entitles it, but utilization is skewed heavily in favor of
agricultural irrigation. In 1994 agriculture accounted for about 88
percent of total water consumption, compared with 8 percent by industry
and 4 percent by municipal water distribution systems. According to
World Bank (see Glossary) experts, Kyrgyzstan has an adequate supply of
high-quality water for future use, provided the resource is prudently
Irrigation is extremely wasteful of water because the distribution
infrastructure is old and poorly maintained. In 1993 only an estimated 5
percent of required maintenance expenditures was allocated. Overall, an
estimated 70 percent of the nation's water supply network is in need of
repair or replacement. The quality of drinking water from this aging
system is poorly monitored--the water management staff has been cut
drastically because of inadequate funds. Further, there is no money to
buy new water disinfection equipment when it is needed. Some aquifers
near industrial and mining centers have been contaminated by heavy
metals, oils, and sanitary wastes. In addition, many localities rely on
surface sources, making users vulnerable to agricultural runoff and
livestock waste, which seep gradually downward from the surface. The
areas of lowest water quality are the heavily populated regions of the
Chu Valley and Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces, and areas along the rivers
flowing into Ysyk-Köl.
In towns, wastewater collection provides about 70 percent of the
water supply. Although towns have biological treatment equipment, as
much as 50 percent of such equipment is rated as ineffective. The major
sources of toxic waste in the water supply are the mercury mining
combine at Haidarkan; the antimony mine at Kadamzai; the Kadzyi Sai
uranium mine, which ceased extraction in 1967 but which continues to
leach toxic materials into nearby Ysyk Köl; the Kara-Balta Uranium
Recovery Plant; the Min Kush deposit of mine tailings; and the Kyrgyz
Mining and Metallurgy Plant at Orlovka.
The most important problems in land use are soil erosion and
salinization in improperly irrigated farmland. An estimated 60 percent
of Kyrgyzstan's land is affected by topsoil loss, and 6 percent by
salinization, both problems with more serious long-term than short-term
effects. In 1994 the size of livestock herds averaged twice the carrying
capacity of pasturage land, continuing the serious overgrazing problem
and consequent soil erosion that began when the herds were at their peak
in the late 1980s (see Agriculture, this ch.). Uncertain land tenure and
overall financial insecurity have caused many private farmers to
concentrate their capital in the traditional form--livestock--thus
subjecting new land to the overgrazing problem.
The inherent land shortage in Kyrgyzstan is exacerbated by the
flooding of agricultural areas for hydroelectric projects. The creation
of Toktogol Reservoir on the Naryn River, for example, involved the
flooding of 13,000 hectares of fertile land. Such projects have the
additional effect of constricting downstream water supply; Toktogol
deprives the lower reaches of the Syrdariya in Uzbekistan and the Aral
Sea Basin of substantial amounts of water. Because the Naryn Basin,
where many hydroelectric projects are located, is very active
seismically, flooding is also a danger should a dam be broken by an
earthquake. Several plants are now in operation in zones where Richter
Scale readings may reach eleven.
The Aral Sea
In response to the internationally recognized environmental crisis of
the rapid desiccation of the Aral Sea, the five states sharing the Aral
Sea Basin (Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) are developing a strategy to end the crisis. The World Bank
and agencies of the United Nations (UN) have developed an Aral Sea
Program, the first stage of which is funded by the five countries and
external donors. That stage has seven areas of focus, one of which--land
and water management in the upper watersheds--is of primary concern to
Kyrgyzstan. Among the conditions detrimental to the Aral Sea's
environment are erosion from deforestation and overgrazing,
contamination from poorly managed irrigation systems, and uncontrolled
waste from mining and municipal effluents. Kyrgyzstan's National
Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) has addressed these problems as part of
its first-phase priorities in cooperation with the Aral Sea Program.
Environmental Policy Making
The NEAP, adopted in 1994, is the basic blueprint for environmental
protection. The plan focuses on solving a small number of critical
problems, collecting reliable information to aid in that process, and
integrating environmental measures with economic and social development
strategy. The initial planning period is to end in 1997. The main
targets of that phase are inefficient water resource management, land
degradation, overexploitation of forest reserves, loss of biodiversity,
and pollution from inefficient mining and refining practices.
Because of severe budget constraints, most of the funds for NEAP
operations come from international sources, including official
institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and
numerous international nongovernmental organizations. Implementation is
guided by a committee of state ministers and by a NEAP Expert Working
Group, both established in 1994 by executive order. A NEAP office in
Bishkek was set up with funds from Switzerland.
The main environmental protection agency of the Kyrgyzstani
government is the State Committee on Environmental Protection, still
known by its Soviet-era acronym, Goskompriroda. Established by the old
regime in 1988, the agency's post-Soviet responsibilities have been
described in a series of decrees beginning in 1991. In 1994 the state
committee had a central office in Bishkek, one branch in each of the
seven provinces, and a total staff of about 150 persons. Because of
poorly defined lines of responsibility, administrative conflicts often
occur between local and national authorities of Goskompriroda and
between Goskompriroda and a second national agency, the
Hydrometeorological Administration (Gidromet), which is the main
monitoring agency for air, water, and soil quality. In general, the
vertical hierarchy structure, a relic of Soviet times, has led to poor
coordination and duplication of effort among environmental protection
Kyrgyzstan - Society
The ethnic identity of the Kyrgyz has been strongly linked to their
language and to ethnic traditions, both of which have been guarded with
particular zeal once independence provided an opportunity to make
national policy on these matters. Less formally, the Kyrgyz people have
maintained with unusual single-mindedness many elements of social
structure and a sense of their common past. The name Kyrgyz derives from
the Turkic kyrk plus yz , a combination meaning
In the period after A.D. 840, the Kyrgyz joined other Turkic groups
in an overall Turkification pattern extending across the Tian Shan into
the Tarim River basin, east of present-day Kyrgyzstan's border with
China. In this process, which lasted for more than two centuries, the
Kyrgyz tribes became mixed with other tribes, thoroughly absorbing
Turkic cultural and linguistic characteristics.
The forebears of the present-day Kyrgyz are believed to have been
either southern Samoyed or Yeniseyan tribes. Those tribes came into
contact with Turkic culture after they conquered the Uygurs and settled
the Orkhon area, site of the oldest recorded Turkic language, in the
ninth century (see Early History, this ch.). If descended from the
Samoyed tribes of Siberia, the Kyrgyz would have spoken a language in
the Uralic linguistic subfamily when they arrived in Orkhon; if
descended from Yeniseyan tribes, they would have descended from a people
of the same name who began to move into the area of present-day
Kyrgyzstan from the Yenisey River region of central Siberia in the tenth
century, after the Kyrgyz conquest of the Uygurs to the east in the
preceding century. Ethnographers dispute the Yeniseyan origin, however,
because of the very close cultural and linguistic connections between
the Kyrgyz and the Kazaks (see Early Tribal Movement; Ethnic Groups, ch.
In the period of tsarist administration (1876-1917), the Kazaks and
the Kyrgyz both were called Kyrgyz, with what are now the Kyrgyz
subdenominated when necessary as Kara-Kyrgyz (black Kyrgyz). Although
the Kyrgyz language has more Mongolian and Altaic elements than does
Kazak, the modern forms of the two languages are very similar. As they
exist today, both are part of the Nogai group of the Kipchak division of
the Turkic languages, which belong to the Uralic-Altaic language family.
The modern Kyrgyz language did not have a written form until 1923, at
which time an Arabic-based alphabet was used. That was changed to a
Latin-based alphabet in 1928 and to a Cyrillic-based one in 1940. In the
years immediately following independence, another change of alphabet was
discussed, but the issue does not seem to generate the same passions in
Kyrgyzstan that it does in other former Soviet republics (see National
Identity, ch. 1; Culture and the Arts, ch. 3; The Spoken Language, ch.
4; The Written Language, ch. 4; Language and Literature, ch. 5).
One important difference between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan is that the
Kyrgyz people's mastery of their own language is almost universal,
whereas the linguistic phase of national identity is not as clear in the
much larger area and population of Kazakstan (see Language, ch. 1). As
in Kazakstan, mastery of the "titular" language among the
resident Europeans of Kyrgyzstan is very rare. In the early 1990s, the
Akayev government pursued an aggressive policy of introducing Kyrgyz as
the official language, forcing the remaining European population to use
Kyrgyz in most public situations. Public pressure to enforce this change
was sufficiently strong that a Russian member of President Akayev's
staff created a public scandal in 1992 by threatening to resign to
dramatize the pressure for "Kyrgyzification" of the non-native
population. A 1992 law called for the conduct of all public business to
be converted fully to Kyrgyz by 1997. But in March 1996, Kyrgyzstan's
parliament adopted a resolution making Russian an official state
language alongside Kyrgyz and marking a reversal of earlier sentiment.
Substantial pressure from Russia was a strong factor in this change,
which was part of a general rapprochement with Russia urged by Akayev.
Kyrgyzstan - Ethnic Traditions
The Kyrgyz also have retained a strong sense of cultural tradition.
Figures from the 1989 Soviet census show that Kyrgyz males were the
least likely of the men of any Soviet nationality to marry outside their
people (only 6.1 percent of their marriages were
"international") and that Kyrgyz women did so in only 5.8
percent of marriages. Moreover, although the degree of such changes is
difficult to measure, Kyrgyz "mixed" marriages seem uncommonly
likely to assimilate in the direction of a Kyrgyz identity, with the
non-Kyrgyz spouse learning the Kyrgyz language and the children assuming
the Kyrgyz nationality. Even ordinary citizens are thoroughly familiar
with the Kyrgyz oral epic, Manas , a poem of several hundred
thousand lines (many versions are recited) telling of the eponymous
Kyrgyz hero's struggles against invaders from the east. Many places and
things in Kyrgyzstan, including the main airport, bear the name of this
ancient hero, the one-thousandth anniversary of whose mythical
adventures were cause for great national celebration in 1995.
Kyrgyzstan - Social Structure
The age-old geographic separation of pockets of the Kyrgyz population
has tended to reinforce conservatism in all of the country's society.
The modern Kyrgyz still apply great significance to family and clan
origins. The majority of Kyrgyz continued a nomadic lifestyle until the
Soviet campaigns of forcible collectivization forced them first into
transitional settlements and then into cities and towns or state and
collective farms in the 1930s. Within the centralized farm systems,
however, many Kyrgyz continued to move seasonally with their herds.
There has been strong resistance to industrial employment.
Kyrgyz identity in public and private life is said to be determined
primarily by membership in one of three clan groupings known as
"wings" (right, or ong ; left, or sol ; and ichkilik
, which is neither) and secondarily by membership in a particular clan
within a wing. The history of this grouping is unknown, although several
legends explain the phenomenon. The left wing now includes seven clans
in the north and west. Each of the seven has a dominant characteristic,
and all have fought each other for influence. The Buguu warrior clan
provided the first administrators of the Kyrgyz Republic under the
Soviet Union; when the purges of Stalin eradicated their leaders in the
1930s, their place was taken by a second northern warrior clan, the
Sarybagysh, who have provided most Kyrgyz leaders since that time,
including Akayev. The right wing contains only one clan, the Adygine.
Located in the south, the Adygine are considered the most genuinely
Kyrgyz clan because of their legendary heritage. The southern Ichkilik
is a group of many clans, some of which are not of Kyrgyz origin, but
all of which claim Kyrgyz identity in the present.
Acutely aware of the roles each of the clans traditionally has
played, the Kyrgyz are still very conscious of clan membership in
competing for social and economic advantage. Support for fellow clan
members is especially strong in the northern provinces. Kyrgyz men
frequently wear traditional black-on-white felt headgear, which informs
others of their clan status and the degree of respect to be accorded
them. Larger clans are subdivided by origin and by the nobility of their
ancestors; although there is no prohibition of advancement for those of
non-noble descent, descent from a high-born extended family still is
considered a social advantage.
Like other Central Asian groups, the Kyrgyz venerate history and see
themselves as part of a long flow of events. A traditional requirement
is the ability to name all the people in the previous seven generations
of one's family. Clan identity extends this tradition even further, to
the legendary origins of the Kyrgyz people. Kyrgyz clans are said to
spring from "first fathers," most of whom appear in both oral
legends and in history. Clan history and genealogy are entrusted to
tribal elders, whose ongoing knowledge of those subjects makes
falsification of lineage difficult. Because clan identity remains an
important element of social status, however, Kyrgyz do sometimes claim
to have descended from a higher branch of their clan than is actually
The Kyrgyz are classified as nomadic pastoralists, meaning that they
traditionally have herded sheep, horses, or yaks, following the animals
up and down the mountains as the seasons change. The basic dwelling is
the yurt, a cylindrical felt tent easily disassembled and mounted on a
camel or horse. The image of a yurt's circular smoke opening is the
central design of Kyrgyzstan's flag. Various parts of the yurt have
ritual significance. Because the herding economy continues in many parts
of the country, the yurt remains a strong symbol of national identity.
Families living in Western-style dwellings erect yurts to celebrate
weddings and funerals.
Traditional domestic life centers on the flocks. The diet of the
nomads is limited to mutton and noodles; fruit and vegetables are rare
even in today's Kyrgyz cuisine. The most traditional dishes are besh
barmak , a mutton stew, and roast lamb. For ceremonial meals,
the lamb is killed without spilling its blood, and the head is served to
the guest of honor, who slices portions of the eyes and ears and
presents them to other guests to improve their sight and hearing.
Horsemeat is eaten fresh and in sausages. Traditional beverages are kumys
, fermented mare's milk, and two varieties of beer.
Family traditions continue to demonstrate the patriarchal and feudal
character of a nomadic people. Family relations are characterized by
great respect for older family members and the dominance of male heads
of households. Traditional celebrations of special events retain the
markings of religious and magical rites. For example, the cutting of a
child's umbilical cord is celebrated with elaborate consumption of food
and humorous games. The naming of a child and the cutting of the child's
hair are conducted in such a way as to appease supernatural forces. The
full observance of the most important family event, the wedding
celebration, requires considerable expense that relatively few Kyrgyz
can afford: payment for a bride, dowry, animal sacrifice, and an
exchange of clothing between the relatives of the bride and the groom.
The Role of Women
In traditional Kyrgyz society, women had assigned roles, although
only the religious elite sequestered women as was done in other Muslim
societies. Because of the demands of the nomadic economy, women worked
as virtual equals with men, having responsibility for chores such as
milking as well as child-rearing and the preparation and storage of
food. In the ordinary family, women enjoyed approximately equal status
with their husbands. Kyrgyz oral literature includes the story of
Janyl-myrza, a young woman who led her tribe to liberation from the
enemy when no man in the tribe could do so. In the nineteenth century,
the wife of Khan Almyn-bek led a group of Kyrgyz tribes at the time of
the Russian conquest of Quqon.
In modern times, especially in the first years of independence, women
have played more prominent roles in Kyrgyzstan than elsewhere in Central
Asia. Since 1991 women have occupied the positions of state procurator
(the top law enforcement official in the national government), minister
of education, ambassador to the United States and Canada, and minister
of foreign affairs. Women have also excelled in banking and business,
and the editor of Central Asia's most independent newspaper, Respublika
, is a woman. Roza Otunbayeva, who was minister of foreign affairs in
1996, has been mentioned frequently as a successor to Akayev.
Kyrgyzstan - Contemporary Culture
As the capital of a Soviet republic, Bishkek (which until 1990 had
been named Frunze after the Soviet general who led the military conquest
of the Basmachi rebels in the mid-1920s) was endowed with the standard
cultural facilities, including an opera, ballet, several theater
companies, and an orchestra, as well as a Lenin museum, national art and
craft museums, and an open-air sculpture museum. Since independence,
funding for those institutions has decreased dramatically, and the
cultural facilities have also been hard hit by the departure of local
Russians. It also is unclear whether younger Kyrgyz will continue their
parents' substantial interest in classical music, which in the Soviet
era led several generations to support the national orchestra.
In the Soviet-directed propagation of "all-union culture,"
Kyrgyz actors, directors, and dancers achieved fame throughout the
Soviet Union. Chingiz Aitmatov, the republic's most prominent writer,
became one of the best-known and most independent artists in the Soviet
Union in the 1980s. The Kyrgyz film industry, which had been very
productive while supported by Soviet government funds, essentially
vanished after 1991. Film projects that survive, such as a large-scale
production on the life of Chinggis Khan directed by noted Kyrgyz
director T. Okeyev, do so through foreign financing (an Italian film
company has supported production of the Okeyev film).
Perhaps the best indicator of the condition of the fine arts in
postcommunist Kyrgyzstan is the fate of the open-air sculpture museum in
Bishkek, which began suffering a series of thefts in early 1993. Because
the targets were all bronze, presumably the sculptures were stolen for
their value as metal, not as art. When a large statuary group
commemorating Aitmatov's Ysyk-Köl Forum (a notable product of the early
glasnost period) disappeared, the museum's remaining statues
were removed to a more secure location.
Kyrgyzstan - Population
The population of Kyrgyzstan is divided among three main groups: the
indigenous Kyrgyz, the Russians who remained after the end of the Soviet
Union, and a large and concentrated Uzbek population. Topography divides
the population into two main segments, the north and the south. Each has
differing cultural and economic patterns and different predominant
The censuses of 1979 and 1989 indicated annual population growth of a
little over 2 percent, with a birth rate of 30.4 per 1,000 in 1989. The
estimated birth rate in 1994 was twenty-six per 1,000, the death rate
seven per 1,000, with a rate of natural increase of 1.9 percent (see
table 2, Appendix). In 1993 average life expectancy was estimated at
sixty-two years for males, seventy years for females--the second lowest
rate among the former Soviet republics. In 1993 the infant mortality
rate was estimated at 47.8 deaths per 1,000 live births. Early marriage
and large family size have combined to make Kyrgyzstan's population a
relatively young one. In 1989, some 39.5 percent of the population was
below working age, and only 10.1 percent was of pension age. The 1989
census indicated that only about 38 percent of the country's population
was urbanized (see table 3, Appendix).
In 1993 the population of Kyrgyzstan was estimated at 4.46 million,
of whom 56.5 percent were ethnic Kyrgyz, 18.8 percent were Russians,
12.9 percent were Uzbeks, 2.1 percent were Ukrainians, and 1.0 percent
were Germans (see table 4, Appendix). The rest of the population was
composed of about eighty other nationalities. Of some potential
political significance are the Uygurs. That group numbers only about
36,000 in Kyrgyzstan, but about 185,000 live in neighboring Kazakstan.
The Uygurs are also the majority population in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region of China, whose population is about 15 million,
located to the northeast of Kyrgyzstan. In November 1992, the Uygurs in
Kyrgyzstan attempted to form a party calling for establishment of an
independent Uygurstan that also would include the Chinese-controlled
Uygur territory. The Ministry of Justice denied the group legal
Between 1989 and 1993, a significant number of non-Kyrgyz citizens
left the republic, although no census was taken in the early 1990s to
quantify the resulting balances among ethnic groups. A considerable
portion of this exodus consisted of Germans repatriating to Germany,
more than 8,000 of whom left in 1992 alone. According to reports, more
than 30,000 Russians left the Bishkek area in the early 1990s,
presumably for destinations outside Kyrgyzstan. In 1992 and 1993,
refugees from the civil war in Tajikistan moved into southern
Kyrgyzstan. In 1989 about 64,000 Kyrgyz were living in Tajikistan, and
about 175,000 were living in Uzbekistan. Reliable estimates of how many
of these people subsequently returned to Kyrgyzstan have not been
The Fergana Valley, which eastern Kyrgyzstan shares with Central
Asian neighbors Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is one of the most densely
populated and agriculturally most heavily exploited regions in Central
Asia. As such, it has been the point of bitter contention among the
three adjoining states, both before and after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Members of the various ethnic groups who have inhabited the
valley for centuries have managed to get along largely because they
occupy slightly different economic niches. The sedentary Uzbeks and
Tajiks traditionally have farmed lower-lying irrigated land while the
nomadic Kyrgyz have herded in the mountains. However, the potential for
ethnic conflict is ever present. Because the borders of the three
countries zigzag without evident regard for the nationality of the
people living in the valley, many residents harbor strong irredentist
feelings, believing that they should more properly be citizens of a
different country. Few Europeans live in the Fergana Valley, but about
552,000 Uzbeks, almost the entire population of that people in
Kyrgyzstan, reside there in crowded proximity with about 1.2 million
Population statistics depict only part of the demographic situation
in Kyrgyzstan. Because of the country's mountainous terrain, population
tends to be concentrated in relatively small areas in the north and
south, each of which contains about two million people. About two-thirds
of the total population live in the Fergana, Talas, and Chu valleys. As
might be expected, imbalances in population distribution lead to extreme
contrasts in how people live and work. In the north, the Chu Valley,
site of Bishkek, the capital, is the major economic center, producing
about 45 percent of the nation's gross national product (GNP--see
Glossary). The Chu Valley also is where most of the country's Europeans
live, mainly because of economic opportunities. The ancestors of today's
Russian and German population began to move into the fertile valley to
farm at the end of the nineteenth century. There was a subsequent influx
of Russians during World War II, when industrial resources and personnel
were moved en masse out of European Russia to prevent their capture by
the invading Germans. In the era of Soviet First Secretary Leonid I.
Brezhnev, a deliberate development policy brought another in-migration.
Bishkek is slightly more than 50 percent Kyrgyz, and the rest of the
valley retains approximately that ethnic ratio. In the mid-1990s,
observers expected that balance to change quickly, however, as Europeans
continued to move out while rural Kyrgyz moved in, settling in the
numerous shantytowns springing up around Bishkek. The direct distance
from Bishkek in the far north to Osh in the southwest is slightly more
than 300 kilometers, but the mountain road connecting those cities
requires a drive of more than ten hours in summer conditions; in winter
the high mountain passes are often closed. In the Soviet period, most
travel between north and south was by airplane, but fuel shortages that
began after independence have greatly limited the number of flights,
increasing a tendency toward separation of north and south (see
Topography and Drainage; Transportation and Telecommunications, this
The separation of the north and the south is clearly visible in the
cultural mores of the two regions, although both are dominated by ethnic
Kyrgyz. Society in the Fergana Valley is much more traditional than in
the Chu Valley, and the practice of Islam is more pervasive. The people
of the Chu Valley are closely integrated with Kazakstan (Bishkek is but
four hours by car from Almaty, the capital of Kazakstan). The people of
the south are more oriented, by location and by culture, to Uzbekistan,
Iran, Afghanistan, and the other Muslim countries to the south.
Geographical isolation also has meant that the northern and southern
Kyrgyz have developed fairly distinct lifestyles. Those in the north
tend to be nomadic herders; those in the south have acquired more of the
sedentary agricultural ways of their Uygur, Uzbek, and Tajik neighbors.
Both groups came to accept Islam late, but practice in the north tends
to be much less influenced by Islamic doctrine and reflects considerable
influence from pre-Islamic animist beliefs. The southerners have a more
solid basis of religious knowledge and practice. It is they who pushed
for a greater religious element in the 1993 constitution.
Updated population figures for Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan - Religion
The vast majority of today's Kyrgyz are Muslims of the Sunni (see
Glossary) branch, but Islam came late and fairly superficially to the
area. Kyrgyz Muslims generally practice their religion in a specific way
influenced by earlier tribal customs. The practice of Islam also differs
in the northern and southern regions of the country. Kyrgyzstan remained
a secular state after the fall of communism, which had only superficial
influence on religious practice when Kyrgyzstan was a Soviet republic.
Most of the Russian population of Kyrgyzstan is atheist or Russian
Orthodox. The Uzbeks, who make up 12.9 percent of the population, are
generally Sunni Muslims.
The Introduction of Islam
Islam was introduced to the Kyrgyz tribes between the ninth and
twelfth centuries. The most intense exposure to Islam occurred in the
seventeenth century, when the Jungars drove the Kyrgyz of the Tian Shan
region into the Fergana Valley, whose population was totally Islamic.
However, as the danger from the Jungars subsided and Kyrgyz groups
returned to their previous region, the influence of Islam became weaker.
When the Quqon Khanate conquered the territory of the Kyrgyz in the
eighteenth century, the nomadic Kyrgyz remained aloof from the official
Islamic practices of that regime. By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, most of the Kyrgyz population had been converted to at least a
superficial recognition of Islamic practice.
Alongside Islam the Kyrgyz tribes also practiced totemism, the
recognition of spiritual kinship with a particular type of animal. Under
this belief system, which predated their contact with Islam, Kyrgyz
tribes adopted reindeer, camels, snakes, owls, and bears as objects of
worship. The sun, moon, and stars also played an important religious
role. The strong dependence of the nomads on the forces of nature
reinforced such connections and fostered belief in shamanism (the power
of tribal healers and magicians with mystical connections to the spirit
world) and black magic as well. Traces of such beliefs remain in the
religious practice of many of today's Kyrgyz.
Knowledge of and interest in Islam are said to be much stronger in
the south, especially around Osh, than farther north. Religious practice
in the north is more heavily mixed with animism (belief that every
animate and inanimate object contains a spirit) and shamanist practices,
giving worship there a resemblance to Siberian religious practice.
Islam and the State
Religion has not played an especially large role in the politics of
Kyrgyzstan, although more traditional elements of society urged that the
Muslim heritage of the country be acknowledged in the preamble to the
1993 constitution. That document mandates a secular state, forbidding
the intrusion of any ideology or religion in the conduct of state
business. As in other parts of Central Asia, non-Central Asians have
been concerned about the potential of a fundamentalist Islamic
revolution that would emulate Iran and Afghanistan by bringing Islam
directly into the making of state policy, to the detriment of the
non-Islamic population. Because of sensitivity about the economic
consequences of a continued outflow of Russians, President Akayev has
taken particular pains to reassure the non-Kyrgyz that no Islamic
revolution threatens (see Ethnic Groups, this ch.). Akayev has paid
public visits to Bishkek's main Russian Orthodox church and directed 1
million rubles from the state treasury toward that faith's
church-building fund. He has also appropriated funds and other support
for a German cultural center. The state officially recognizes Orthodox
Christmas (but not Easter) as a holiday, while also noting two Muslim
feast days, Oroz ait (which ends Ramadan) and Kurban ait (June 13, the
Day of Remembrance), and Muslim New Year, which falls on the vernal
Kyrgyzstan - Education
In the mid-1990s, much of the Soviet-era education system remained in
Kyrgyzstan, which had made a conscientious effort to educate all of its
citizens before 1991 and continued to do so after that date. Substantial
structural and curriculum changes were underway by 1995, however. The
1993 constitution continues the Soviet guarantee of free basic education
at state institutions to all citizens; education is compulsory through
grade nine. Free education at the vocational, secondary specialized, and
higher levels also continues to be offered by the state to qualified
individuals. The fundamentals of post-Soviet education policy were
enumerated in the 1992 law on education, which established the Ministry
of Education as the central administrative body of the national system.
Although Soviet-era statistics indicated that 100 percent of the people
between the ages of nine and forty-nine were literate, the actual
literacy rate probably is somewhat less.
Once independence was achieved, the Ministry of Education began
working energetically to revamp the old Soviet course of study. The
ministry is responsible for developing curriculum, setting national
standards and educational policy, developing certification examinations,
and awarding degrees. The ministry is divided into departments for
general education, higher education, and material support. Below the
ministry level, the education hierarchy includes the six provinces and
the separate city of Bishkek, representatives from each of which provide
input to the ministry on local conditions. The level of basic local
administration is the district (rayon ), where the district
education officer hires faculty and appoints school inspectors and
General education is financed from district budgets, and the college
preparatory and higher education programs are financed by the national
budget. For the former category of expenditures, school principals
negotiate their requirements with district officials, but the central
government sets norms based on previous expenditures and on the relative
resources of the provinces. In the last years of the Soviet period,
Kyrgyzstani schools had a surplus of money, but available funds declined
sharply beginning in 1992. Since that time, insufficient funds in local
budgets have forced the Ministry of Education to make special requests
for support from the Ministry of Economics and Finance.
General education traditionally has been accessible to nearly all
children in Kyrgyzstan. In primary and secondary grades, about 51
percent of students are female; that number increases to 55 percent in
higher education, with a converse majority of males in vocational
programs. There is little difference in school attendance between urban
and rural areas or among the provinces. Higher education, however, has
been much more available to the urban and more wealthy segments of the
population. Because of a shortage of schools, 37 percent of general
education students attend schools operating in two or three shifts.
Construction of new facilities has lagged behind enrollment growth, the
rate of which has been nearly 3 percent per year.
In line with the reform of 1992, children start school at age six and
are required to complete grade nine. The general education program has
three stages: grades one through four, grades five through nine, and
grades ten and eleven. Students completing grade nine may continue into
advanced or specialized (college preparatory) secondary curricula or
into a technical and vocational program. The school year is thirty-four
weeks long, extending from the beginning of September until the end of
May. The instruction week is twenty-five hours long for grades one
through four and thirty-two hours for grades five through eleven. In
1992 about 960,000 students were enrolled in general education courses,
42,000 in specialized secondary programs, 49,000 in vocational programs,
and 58,000 in institutions of higher education. About 1,800 schools were
in operation in 1992. That year Kyrgyzstan's state system had about
65,000 teachers, but an estimated 8,000 teachers resigned in 1992 alone
because of poor salaries and a heavy work load that included double
shifts for many. Emigration also has depleted the teaching staff. In
1993 the national pupil-teacher ratio for grades one through eleven was
14.4 to 1, slightly higher in rural areas, and considerably higher in
the primary grades. The city of Bishkek, however, had a ratio of almost
19 to 1.
Post-Soviet curriculum reform has aroused much controversy in
Kyrgyzstan. A fundamental question is the language of instruction, which
has become increasingly Kyrgyz as non-indigenous citizens leave the
country and textbooks in Kyrgyz slowly become available. The Ministry of
Education has held competitions, supported by foreign donations, for the
design of new textbooks in Kyrgyz. Until 1992 textbook production and
distribution were inefficient and costly aspects of the education
system. By the mid-1990s, the single, state-supported publisher of
textbooks had gradually improved the quality and availability of its
products. In 1992 the first major curriculum reform provided for
mandatory foreign language study (English, French, or German) beginning
in grade one; computer science courses in grades eight through eleven (a
program hampered by lack of funds); and the replacement of Soviet
ideology with concepts of market economy and ethnic studies. The
reformed curriculum requirements also leave room for elective courses,
and instructional innovation is encouraged.
In 1994 Kyrgyzstan had twenty-six institutions of higher learning,
all but seven of which were located in Bishkek. Seven of the
institutions were private and the remainder state-funded. Approximately
4,700 faculty were employed there, of which only 150 had doctoral
degrees and 1,715 were candidates, the step below the doctorate in the
Soviet system. The language of instruction remained predominantly
Russian in the mid-1990s, although the use of Kyrgyz increased yearly.
Long-term plans call for a more Western style of university study, so
that, for example, the universities would begin to offer a baccalaureate
degree. In 1992 President Akayev created a Slavic University in Bishkek
to help Kyrgyzstan retain its population of educated Russians, for whom
the increased "Kyrgyzification" of education was a reason to
emigrate. Because Russian students from outside the Russian Federation
had lost their Soviet-era right to free education in Russian
universities, Akayev hoped to provide a Russian-language institution for
Russian-speaking students from all the Central Asian states. The
shortage of education funds in Kyrgyzstan brought strong objections to a
project that did not promote the education of ethnic Kyrgyz students,
Kyrgyzstan - Health
In 1993 the World Bank reported that the population of Kyrgyzstan
enjoyed better health care than most other countries with similar per
capita income, which averaged US$3,410 per year for Kyrgyzstan's
category in 1992. The current health conditions and health prospects of
Kyrgyzstan's population are difficult to calculate, however, because of
the sudden change that independence visited upon the medical community.
Until 1991 Kyrgyzstan's medical system was financed through the Soviet
Union's Ministry of Health, which guaranteed a health establishment
equal to that of other Soviet republics. With the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the slow collapse of fiscal ties between Kyrgyzstan and
Moscow, the medical community has inherited an aging but generally
adequate physical plant. However, the system often lacks the vaccines,
medicines, and other resources needed to maintain the health of the
Health Care System
Kyrgyzstan inherited the Soviet system of free universal health care,
which in Kyrgyzstan's case generally provided sufficient numbers of
doctors, nurses, and doctor's assistants, as well as medical clinics and
hospitals. However, since 1991 citizens often have received inadequate
care because medical personnel are not well trained; pharmaceuticals,
medical supplies, and equipment are insufficient; and facilities are
generally inadequate and unsanitary.
In 1991 Kyrgyzstan had 15,354 doctors, or 34.2 per 10,000 people.
Paramedical workers totaled 42,448, or 94.6 per 10,000 people. Some 588
outpatient clinics were in operation, averaging 139 hours of patient
visits per eight-hour shift. In addition, 246 general and twenty
specialized hospitals were in operation; nearly one-third of all
hospitals were located in Osh Province (which also had about one-third
of the country's total population). By contrast, the capital city,
Bishkek, had the fewest hospital facilities per capita of all regions,
providing 1.55 general hospitals per 100,000 population. Like other
Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan has continued the Soviet practice of
state enterprises having their own clinics and sanatoriums. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan's residents lost the right
to free treatment in the hospitals of other former republics, making
unavailable many types of specialized treatment that the Soviet system
had apportioned among adjacent republics.
Very few truly private health facilities have developed in the early
post-Soviet period, and those that exist face very high licensing fees.
Although it is illegal for state employees in the health field to
diversify their activity into private practice, by 1993 many health
workers were accepting unreported payments for providing additional
treatment. In 1992 the maximum salary of a medical specialist such as a
surgeon was only about 18 percent higher than the maximum salary of a
technician or laboratory worker. Under such conditions, the rising cost
of living in 1992 and 1993 forced many doctors to leave medicine for
higher salaries in other professions.
Kyrgyzstan produces no vaccines of its own and almost no medicines or
other pharmaceuticals. Drug availability is substantially higher at
regional facilities than at smaller ones, but items such as
antihistamines, insulin, antiseptics, vaccines, and some narcotics are
either extremely scarce or extremely expensive. The other former Soviet
republics now demand payment in United States dollars, which Kyrgyzstan
does not have, for medical supplies. Because of the scarcity of
vaccines, there is a greatly increased likelihood of epidemics of
diseases such as diphtheria and measles. An outbreak of measles in
Bishkek in early 1993 was said to be just below epidemic level. It has
become common practice in hospitals and clinics to require patients to
provide their own medicines for operations and other medical procedures.
Because virtually the only available medicines are those for sale in the
public bazaars, quality is questionable, and accidental poisonings
caused by misuse and spoilage have been reported.
Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet financial crisis has reduced government
support of the Soviet-era health system, forcing government planners to
formulate an ambitious health care delivery reform program. The center
of the program is a transformation of the national health system into a
system of public health insurance, in which compulsory employer fees and
a health insurance tax on employees would support care for employees,
and state contributions would support care for unemployed citizens. All
employed citizens would be required to carry health insurance. All care
providers would switch from the salary basis of the old system to a
fee-for-service payment system. Because the banking, record-keeping, and
tax systems of the country are not ready to support such a nationwide
program, however, installation has lagged far behind the original
timetable, which called for a pilot program in Bishkek in 1993.
The main causes of adult deaths in Kyrgyzstan are, in order of
occurrence, cardiovascular conditions, respiratory infections, and
accidents (see table 5, Appendix). Sexually transmitted diseases
reportedly are very low in incidence; only five cases of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) were recorded in 1992. In the early 1990s,
major health hazards have been posed by growing shortages of chlorine to
purify water supplies and the increasing danger of typhus outbreaks
resulting from the closure of most of the country's public baths. In
1993 Kyrgyzstan suffered increasing cases of hepatitis and
gastrointestinal infections, especially in the southern provinces of Osh
and Jalal-Abad. The cause of such infections is believed to be the use
of open water supplies contaminated by livestock and improper disposal
of waste (see Environmental Problems, this ch.). Although adults
traditionally consume most of their water in the form of boiled tea,
children have greater access to untreated water and foods.
Additional stress is placed on the population by the rising cost of
food, which has reduced the quality and quantity of most people's diets.
In 1993 meat consumption was reported to have dropped by 20 percent
since 1990, intake of milk products by 30 percent, and consumption of
fish (which was imported in the Soviet period) by 70 percent. The
average caloric intake was reported to have decreased by about 12
percent since 1990. There are also frequent reports of deaths or
injuries caused by tainted or falsely labeled food and drink,
particularly alcoholic beverages, which are widely sold by extralegal
private concerns. The rising cost of energy has meant insufficient heat
for many apartments and public buildings. Naryn Province, the coldest
and most remote part of the country, has been particularly affected. In
that region, many buildings lack central heating, and residents have
been forced to devise homemade stoves vented directly out the windows.
In addition, the availability and range of ambulance services have been
restricted severely by fuel shortages.
Kyrgyzstan - Social Welfare
Like the other former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan inherited a social
welfare system that allocated benefits very broadly without targeting
needy groups in society. In this system, nearly half of society received
some sort of benefit, and many benefit payments were excessive. By
necessity, the post-Soviet government has sought to make substantial
reductions in state social protection payments, emphasizing
identification of the most vulnerable members of society.
The Soviet Heritage
In 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union, the payment of pensions,
child allowances, and other forms of support amounted to 18 percent of
the Kyrgyz Republic's gross domestic product (GDP--see Glossary). At
that point, about 600,000 pensioners and 1.6 million children received
some form of payment. Eligibility requirements were extremely liberal,
defined mainly by age and work history rather than by social position or
contributions to a pension fund. This generous system failed to
eliminate poverty, however; according to a 1989 Soviet survey, 35
percent of the population fell below the official income line for
"poorly supplied" members of society. Thus poverty, which
became an increasingly urgent problem during the economic decline of the
transition period of the early 1990s, already was rooted firmly in
Kyrgyzstan when independence was achieved.
Reforming Social Welfare
The Akayev government addressed the overpayment problem by reducing
categorical subsidies and government price controls; by indexing
benefits only partially as inflation raised the cost of living; and by
targeting benefits to the most needy parts of society. Under the new
program, child allowances went only to people with incomes below a fixed
level, and bread price compensation went only to groups such as
pensioners who lacked earning power. By 1993 such measures had cut
government welfare expenses by more than half, from 57 percent of the
state budget to 25 percent.
Nevertheless, the percentage of citizens below the poverty line grew
rapidly in the early 1990s as the population felt the impact of the
government's economic stabilization program (see Economic Reform, this
ch.). In addition, the Soviet system delegated delivery of many social
services, including health, to state enterprises, which in the
post-Soviet era no longer had the means to guarantee services to
employees (or, in many cases, even to continue employing them). The
state's Pension Fund (a government agency with the relatively
independent status of a state committee) went into debt in 1994 because
workers who retired early or worked only for a short period remained
eligible for pensions and the poor financial state of enterprises made
revenue collection difficult. The pension system is supported by payroll
taxes of 33 percent on industries and 26 percent on collective and state
farms. Besides retirement pensions, disability and survivors' benefits
also are paid. Of the amount collected, 14 percent goes to the labor
unions' Social Insurance Fund and the remainder to the Pension Fund. The
standard pension eligibility age is sixty for men and fifty-five for
women, but in 1992 an estimated 156,000 people were receiving benefits
at earlier ages. In 1994 the minimum pension amount was raised to
forty-five som (for value of the som--see Glossary) per month, the
latest in a long series of adjustments that did not nearly keep pace
with inflation's impact on the real value of the pension.
New pension legislation prepared in 1994 made enterprises responsible
for the costs of early retirement; established a five-year minimum for
pension eligibility; clearly separated the categories of work pensions
from social assistance payments; abolished supplementary pension
payments for recipients needing additional support; eliminated the
possibility of receiving a pension while continuing to work (the
position of an estimated 49,000 workers in 1992); and provided for
long-term linkage of contributions made to pensions later received.
Child allowances are paid for children up to the age of eighteen, and
a lump sum payment is made on the birth of a child. In 1991 child
allowances consumed 6.7 percent of GDP; since that time, targeting of
benefits has been a major concern in this category to reduce spending
but cover vulnerable groups. The first alteration of eligibility
standards occurred in 1993. Cash for this category is provided by direct
transfers from the state budget combined with Pension Fund
Besides pensions and family allowances, Kyrgyzstani citizens also
receive maternity benefits and sick pay covered by the Social Insurance
Fund, which is managed by the Federation of Independent Labor Unions and
the individual unions; it receives money only from its 14 percent share
of payroll taxes, not from the state budget or individual contributions.
All public and private employees are eligible for sick leave, with
payments depending on length of service. The maternity allowance is a
single payment equal to two months' minimum wage. World Bank experts
consider the sick and maternity benefits excessive in relation to the
state of the economy and the state budget.
In assessing the future of social assistance in Kyrgyzstan, experts
predict that economic restructuring through the 1990s will increase the
number of citizens requiring assistance from the state system. To meet
such needs, thorough reform of the system--aimed mainly at tightening
eligibility standards--will be necessary. It is also expected that
Kyrgyzstan will require other methods of social assistance to provide
for individuals who do not fall into existing categories, or for whom
inflation erodes excessively the value of payments now received. The
officially and unofficially unemployed (together estimated at 300,000 at
the end of 1994) are an especially vulnerable group because of the
unlikelihood of workers being reabsorbed rapidly into the country's
faltering economy. (Unemployment benefits are paid for twenty-six weeks
to those who register, but the number of "non-participants" is
much greater than the number of registered unemployed.)
Kyrgyzstan - The Economy
In the first five years of independence, Kyrgyzstan's economy made
more progress in market-oriented reform legislation but less progress in
economic growth than the other four Central Asian states. This disparity
was largely because Kyrgyzstan lacked the diversified natural resources
and processing infrastructure that enable a national economy to survive
the shutdown of some sectors by shifting labor and other inputs to new
areas of production.
The economic system of Kyrgyzstan is undergoing a slow, painful, and
uncertain transition. Once a highly integrated provider of raw materials
for the centrally controlled economy of the Soviet Union, the republic's
economy is reorienting itself toward processing its own raw materials
and producing its own industrial products. During the late 1980s and
early 1990s, however, industry accounted for only about one-third of the
country's net material product (NMP--see Glossary) while employing less
than one-fifth of the labor force. The primary emphasis of the economy
remained agriculture, which accounted for about 40 percent of NMP and
officially employed about one-third of the labor force. The
transportation and communications sector employed only about 3.2 percent
of the labor force in 1991. As in other Soviet republics, the vast
majority of workers were employed by the state, while most of the
remainder worked on private agricultural plots.
<>Role in the
Kyrgyzstan - Role in the Soviet Economy
As part of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan played a small but highly
integrated role in the centrally controlled economy. Figures for 1990
show that agriculturally the republic contributed 1 percent or less of
the total Soviet output of preserved vegetables, animal fats, plant
oils, and meat, and 3 percent of the total Soviet output of beet sugar.
Kyrgyzstan also produced small proportions of Soviet wine products and
tobacco. Industrially, the republic supplied 1 to 2 percent of the
Soviet Union's total output of cotton cloth, silk cloth, linen, and
woolen cloth, and an equal proportion of ready-made clothing and shoes.
Machine-assembly plants, steel plants, motor-assembly plants, and
miscellaneous light industry contributed another 1 percent or less of
the Soviet total. The only energy resources that Kyrgyzstan contributed
in any volume were coal (0.5 percent of the Soviet total) and
hydroelectric power (0.8 percent). Kyrgyzstan's radio-assembly and other
electronic plants accounted for a small portion of the defense industry.
A torpedo-assembly plant was located on the shores of Ysyk-Köl. One of
the Soviet Union's two military airbases for the training of foreign
pilots was located outside Bishkek.
Kyrgyzstan's largest role in the Soviet economy was as a supplier of
minerals, especially antimony (in which the republic had a near
monopoly), mercury, lead, and zinc. Of greatest significance
economically, however, was gold, of which Kyrgyzstan was the Soviet
Union's third-largest supplier.
Kyrgyzstan - Natural Resources
Soviet geologists have estimated Kyrgyzstan's coal reserves at about
27 billion tons, of which the majority remained entirely unexploited in
the mid-1990s. About 3 billion tons of that amount are judged to be of
highest quality. This coal has proven difficult to exploit, however,
because most of it is in small deposits deep in the mountains.
Kyrgyzstan also has oil resources; small deposits of oil-bearing shale
have been located in southern Kyrgyzstan, and part of the Fergana oil
and natural gas complex lies in Kyrgyzstani territory. In the Osh
region, four pools of oil, four of natural gas, and four mixed pools
have been exploited since the 1950s; however, the yield of all of them
is falling in the 1990s. In 1992 their combined output was 112,000 tons
of oil and 65 million cubic meters of natural gas, compared with the
republic's annual consumption of 2.5 million tons of oil and 3 billion
cubic meters of natural gas.
Kyrgyzstan's iron ore deposits are estimated at 5 billion tons, most
containing about 30 percent iron. Copper deposits in the mountains are
located in extremely complex mineral deposits, making extraction costly.
The northern mountains also contain lead, zinc, molybdenum, vanadium,
and bismuth. The south has deposits of bauxite and mercury; Kyrgyzstan
was the Soviet Union's main supplier of mercury, but in the 1990s
plummeting mercury prices have damaged the international market. A tin
and tungsten mine was 80 percent complete in 1995. Kyrgyzstan had a
virtual monopoly on supplying antimony to the Soviet Union, but
post-Soviet international markets are small and highly specialized.
Uranium, which was in high demand for the Soviet Union's military and
atomic energy programs, no longer is mined in Kyrgyzstan.
The Soviet Union's largest gold mine was located at Makmal in
Kyrgyzstan, and in the Soviet period Kyrgyzstan's 170 proven deposits
put it in third place behind only Russia and Uzbekistan in gold
production in the union. Two more promising deposits, at Kumtor and
Jerui, have been discovered. Kumtor, said to be the seventh-largest gold
deposit in the world with an estimated value of US$5.5 billion, is being
explored by the Canadian Metals Company (Cameco), a uranium company, in
a joint-venture operation. Gold deposits are concentrated in Talas
Province in north-central Kyrgyzstan, where as much as 200 tons may
exist; deposits in Makmal are estimated at sixty tons. Deposits adjacent
to the Chatkal River in the northwest amount to an estimated 150 tons.
The terms of the agreement for Kumtor exploitation with Cameco, which
gains one-third of profits from gold extraction, caused public concern
in 1992. To improve control of the mineral-extraction and refining
processes, and to address the uncontrolled movement of precious metals
out of the country, President Akayev created a new administrative
agency, Kyrgyzaltyn (Kyrgyzstan Gold), to replace Yuzhpolmetal, the
Soviet-era body responsible for precious metals. In January 1993, Akayev
also brought the country's antimony and mercury mines into Kyrgyzaltyn.
The latter are especially important because mercury is used to refine
gold. Control of the mercury mines makes more likely the realization of
Akayev's hope that Kyrgyzstan will become more than just a supplier of
Although Kyrgyzstan has one of the largest proven gold reserves in
the world, in the early 1990s fuel and spare parts shortages combined
with political disputes to hamper output (see Government and Politics,
this ch.). Production in 1994 was 3.5 tons, but the output goal for 1996
was ten tons.
Kyrgyzstan's major energy source, water, has also been discussed as a
commercial product. The export of bottled mineral and fresh water was
the object of several unrealized plans in the mid-1990s.
Kyrgyzstan - Agriculture
The condition of agriculture in Kyrgyzstan is determined by the
state's continuing control of production, marketing, and prices, as well
as by the republic-wide specialization mandated by the former Soviet
Union to promote interdependence among the republics. Most agricultural
production continues to occur in the state farm and collective farm
systems, which are slowly being privatized. In the early post-Soviet
years, government policy encouraged self-sufficiency in cereal grains to
provide food security. Maintaining such self-sufficiency, however, has
entailed continued government regulation such as compulsory marketing,
which in turn has discouraged the development of diversified farm
enterprise. The main agricultural regions are in the Fergana Valley (Osh
and Jalal-Abad provinces), in the northern Chu and Talas valleys, and in
the Ysyk-Köl basin in the northeast. In the early 1990s, income
declined steadily in both state-run and privatized agricultural
Kyrgyzstan has about 1.4 million hectares of arable land, which is
only about 7 percent of the nation's total area. More than 70 percent of
the arable area depends on irrigation for its productivity. In the
Soviet period, only about 4 percent of agricultural land was owned
privately, although private plots contributed a much higher percentage
of overall output, especially in fruits and vegetables. In 1994 only an
additional 6 percent of agricultural land had passed to some form of
private ownership. The privatization of land was a difficult issue that
was contested between President Akayev and more conservative government
officials. The latter reflected the Soviet-era view that land should be
common property protected and disposed of only by the state. More
immediately, these officials represented the interests of state farm
administrators, whose enterprises suffered greatly from post-Soviet
economic shocks and redistribution of resources.
In 1992 and 1993, the land redistribution program also was hindered
by poor cooperation between the national and local governments and by
lack of clarity in the program outline. Nevertheless, by early 1993 some
165 of the 470 existing state and collective farms had been reorganized
or privatized into about 17,000 peasant enterprises, cooperatives, or
peasant associations. However, the state retained control over vital
agricultural inputs and market distribution channels, meaning that
private land users often lacked material support and that price controls
limited the profitability of private farms. The privatization program
was halted in early 1993, and a more comprehensive reform program was
developed. In early 1995, the government offered debt relief to state
and collective farms that expedited the availability of land to private
According to privatization law, state agricultural assets are
distributed according to a share system in which all citizens have the
right to a garden plot, but only individuals in the rural population
have the right to occupy land and other agricultural assets formerly
owned by state and collective farms. Recipients of shares can maintain
the property as part of the collective, transfer it to a cooperative, or
establish an individual farm. In the early 1990s, the former alternative
was much more popular because of the perception that larger units
offered greater security in a time of financial uncertainty. Private
ownership of land remained illegal in 1995, but use rights are
guaranteed for forty-nine years, and use rights can be bought, sold, and
used as collateral for loans. In 1994 a new decree on land reform
expanded and clarified the legal basis for the use and exchange of land
and improved the administration of land privatization, which is the
responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
In the post-Soviet years, Kyrgyzstan has continued to emphasize
production of raw materials for industrial processing, a role assigned
to the republic in the Soviet system. An estimated 62 percent of the
population is rural (see Population, this ch.). The chief crops are
fodder crops, wheat, barley, and cotton. Other agricultural products are
sugar beets, tobacco, fruit, vegetables, and silk (see table 13,
Appendix). In 1994 the largest crop harvests were of wheat (611,000
tons), barley (300,000 tons), potatoes (288,000 tons), and tomatoes
The chief agricultural use of land is pasturage for livestock, mainly
sheep, goats, and cattle, the tending of which is the traditional
vocation of the Kyrgyz people. An estimated 83 percent of land in
agricultural use is mountainous pastureland. In the 1980s, livestock
production accounted for about 60 percent of the value of the country's
agricultural output; such production included mutton, beef, eggs, milk,
wool, and thoroughbred horses. In 1987, when herds reached their largest
numbers, about twice as much grain was used for animal feed as for human
consumption. However, the prices of and demand for livestock products
have dropped significantly in the 1990s relative to those of crops. For
this reason and because Soviet-era herds had been supported largely by
cheap imported grain, in 1994 livestock contributed less than half the
total value of Kyrgyzstan's agricultural earnings. In 1994 the most
important livestock products were cow's milk (750,000 tons), beef and
veal (70,000 tons), mutton and lamb (50,000 tons), eggs (30,600 tons),
wool (56,300 tons), pork products (30,000 tons), and poultry meat
(25,000 tons). All of those figures were below the totals for the
previous two years.
Agricultural Trends and Problems
The early 1990s saw many farmers turn from commercial production to
subsistence crops, a trend that hurt the country's export activities
(roughly half of its exports were agricultural in 1990) as well as the
availability of foods within Kyrgyzstan. Experts believe that
Kyrgyzstan's main agricultural problems are inappropriate and
slow-moving reforms (especially land redistribution), intrusive
bureaucratic regulations, poor availability of credit, and delayed
payments to farmers for their crops. More immediately, both water and
fertilizers have been in short supply since the end of the Soviet Union.
In addition, Kyrgyzstan's agriculture uses an average of less than 50
percent of the amount of pesticides used by agriculture in the Western
In 1994 the agriculture sector was in the fourth and most difficult
year of a major decline that included reduced output, isolation from
commercial markets, decreased earnings, and a deteriorating natural
resource base (see table 6, Appendix). In 1994 total agricultural output
dropped by 17 percent, and the decline in marketed and processed output
was substantially greater because of the trend toward subsistence
farming. Production ceased to increase at about the time of the collapse
of the Soviet system, an event that initiated the loss of markets and
trading partners, the loss of transfer payments from Moscow, and a
condition of general monetary instability. The national government did
not address these problems effectively in the first years of
independence; in fact, government marketing quotas, price controls, and
trade restrictions exacerbated the decline. By restricting farmers'
marketing and pricing practices, the government in effect levied a tax
on agriculture that redistributed income to other sectors of society.
National reforms in land tenure, farm organization, and the financial
system, together with privatization of services, were eroded by the
continued authority of local officials to interfere in administration of
A key agricultural resource, pastureland, was degraded severely by
the Soviet-era practice of mandating livestock populations too large for
available pasturage on state farms and by post-Soviet transfer of
livestock from inefficient collective and state farms to private
ownership without limiting grazing rights on common pastures. By 1994
over-grazing had led to serious erosion of much pasture land (see
Environmental Problems, this ch.).
In 1994 a continuing controversy over granting central bank credits
to support farmers during the growing season again made financial
support a dubious proposition. Without such support, planting and
fertilization would be severely limited because farmers in many rural
areas lack financial resources to buy seed and fertilizer. On the other
hand, such credits have always been a threat to the government's overall
economic program. For several reasons, including the state's failure to
pay farmers on time for their crops, the agricultural sector's bank
debts increased rapidly in the early 1990s. This situation was the basis
of arguments that the government could not afford to pay agricultural
Kyrgyzstan - Industry
Industrial production in Kyrgyzstan declined significantly in 1992
and 1993, especially in comparison to the average annual growth rate
from 1985 to 1990, which was 3.3 percent. Important factors in this
decline were the energy crisis caused by the loss of Soviet-era fuel
supply agreements and the outflow of skilled Russian industrial and
management personnel. By 1994, when output had fallen by another 25
percent, Kyrgyzstan's production was only 42 percent of its 1990 level.
Only four of the country's 200 most important industrial products--oil,
electrical power, household electric appliances, and alcoholic
beverages--showed an increased output in 1994. By the first quarter of
1995, some 120 enterprises, more than one-third of the national total,
were idle. The decline was caused by problems in obtaining raw
materials, components, and other inputs; a drop in effective demand; the
economic weakness of trading partners; and problems in arranging for
payments. An important additional problem, however, is the nature of
Kyrgyzstan's Soviet-era industrial structure, which was specialized for
defense-related manufacturing. Many defense-related industries closed in
the early 1990s because they could not find alternative types of
production once Soviet defense contracts ended. The government's initial
policy was to avoid supporting unprofitable state enterprises, but
intense political pressure has kept many such firms open.
Including mining, the electric power industries, and construction,
industry contributed about 45 percent of GDP in 1991, but that
percentage dropped significantly in the following years, even with a
parallel agricultural decline. For example, between 1991 and 1993
production of crude steel decreased 45 percent, cement production
decreased by 49 percent, and production of metal cutting machines
dropped by 77 percent. Gross capital formation decreased an estimated 55
percent in 1994, and investment for that year was below 25 percent of
the rate at the end of the Soviet period. Private investment, however,
rose slightly to nearly half of total investment for 1994.
None of the major industrial projects planned for 1993-94 was
completed on time. Included in major construction postponements was a
cigarette factory in Osh, which could have taken advantage of southern
Kyrgyzstan's favorable tobacco-growing conditions. Many other projects
were completed on a much smaller scale than originally planned. As
conversion to useful new lines of manufacture was delayed, the national
economy shrank. In addition, unemployment grew rapidly as state-owned
enterprises were phased out but not replaced.
In the mid-1990s, the most valuable industrial components of
Kyrgyzstan's economy were machine building, textiles, and food
processing, which are centered in Bishkek, Osh, and Jalal-Abad (see fig.
5; table 14, Appendix). Some electronics and instruments are produced in
former defense plants, and a limited metallurgical industry also exists.
The most productive"industry" is electric power, which is
produced in the country's numerous hydroelectric plants.
Kyrgyzstan - Energy
Unlike its neighbors Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan has no
significant exploited reserves of oil or natural gas; in 1994 petroleum
production was 88,000 tons, and natural gas production was 39 million
cubic meters. Although substantial coal deposits are present, in the
mid-1990s experts described Kyrgyzstan's coal industry as in a state of
collapse. In the early 1990s, only four of the fourteen state-owned coal
mines were considered economically viable, and little coal came from
privately owned mines. Between 1991 and 1993, brown coal production
decreased by 50 percent (to 959,000 tons), and black coal production
decreased by 53 percent (to 712,000 tons). The domestic price of
conventional fuels rose slightly above world levels after the much
cheaper energy-sharing arrangements of the Soviet era ended. (In 1992
oil and gas import costs were 50 percent of the total state budget,
compared with 10 percent in 1991.) In 1994 some 39 percent of
Kyrgyzstan's total import expenditures went for the purchase of
conventional fuels, contributing an estimated US$100 million to the
country's trade imbalance (see Foreign Trade, this ch.). Energy
consumption, meanwhile, has declined sharply since 1991, and experts do
not expect it to return to its 1990 level.
Management of national energy and fuel policy is distributed among
several ministries and other state agencies--an arrangement that has
hindered efficient acquisition and distribution. Distribution of heat
and electricity is the responsibility of the state-run Kyrgyzstan
National Energy Holding Company, and natural gas purchases are managed
by the Kyrgyzstan Natural Gas Administration (Kyrgyzgas). Oil, gas, and
coal exploration is the responsibility of the State Geological
Commission (Goskomgeologiya). Natural gas, provided by the Republic of
Turkmenistan in the Soviet era, now comes mainly from neighboring
Uzbekistan. Coal, used to heat households and to fuel some
thermoelectric plants, is mainly received from Kazakstan in a barter
arrangement for electrical power. Kazakstan's coal is preferred because
the heaviest demand in Kyrgyzstan is concentrated in the north, and
Kyrgyzstan's remaining coal mines are in the south, from which
transportation is problematic.
For these reasons, existing thermoelectric stations have been
deemphasized in the 1990s in favor of expanded hydroelectric production.
Thus, in 1994 thermoelectric power production dropped by 46 percent
while hydroelectric production rose by 30 percent. These statistics
enabled the national energy sector to show a modest drop of 4 percent in
total power generation in 1994, but district heating, which comes from
coal- and gas-powered combined heat and power plants, suffered heavily
from the transition. Meanwhile, government promotion of electricity
brought an increase of 117 percent in household power use between 1991
and 1994, although overall household energy consumption declined by 36
percent during that period. Some aspects of the promotion plan have been
criticized, including the large-scale promotion of electric heat in a
country with poorly insulated houses.
Emphasis on electricity is backed by abundant water power, mainly
from the country's location at the mountain headwaters of the Syrdariya,
one of the two largest rivers in Central Asia. On the Naryn River, chief
tributary of the Syrdariya, a series of hydroelectric stations has been
built, the largest of which is the Kürp-Say Hydroelectric Plant, fed by
the Toktogol Reservoir in central Kyrgyzstan. Other major hydroelectric
plants are located at Atabashin, Alamedin, and Uchkorgon. Such stations
have made possible the net export of electric power, worth an estimated
US$100 million in 1994. That figure was only about half the value of
Kyrgyzstan's 1990 export, however, because demand in neighboring
republics dropped considerably in the early 1990s. The main customer is
Kazakstan, with which power is exchanged through the Central Asian
Only about 10 percent of Kyrgyzstan's hydroelectric power potential
and only about 3 percent of the potential of its smaller streams are
currently being exploited; the Naryn River is estimated to afford an
additional 2,200 megawatts of easily accessible rated capacity.
Meanwhile, the Fergana Valley, the only working oil field in the
country, has remaining reserves of 14 million tons of oil that require
expensive recovery tech-nolgy. No serious oil exploration has been done
elsewhere, although the Chu and Ak-Say valleys are believed to be
Kyrgyzstan - Economic Reform
Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has undertaken significant structural
reforms of its economy; in 1994 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary) ranked Kyrgyzstan fourth among former Soviet
republics (behind the three Baltic states) in the pace of economic
reform, but positive results have not been forthcoming. As elsewhere in
the former Soviet Union, one of the most significant reforms is
privatization. The goal of privatization, a high priority in the early
1990s, has been to create new productive enterprises with efficient
management systems while involving the population in the reform program
at a fundamental level. The process began in December 1991 with the
adoption of the Privatization and Denationalization Law and the creation
of the State Property Fund as the agency to design and implement the
program. In late 1992, a new parliamentary "Concept Note"
reoriented the program toward rapid sale of small enterprises and
ownership transition in larger enterprises by vouchers and other special
payments. By the end of 1993, about 4,450 state enterprises, including
33 percent of total fixed enterprise assets, were fully or partially
privatized. By mid-1994, nearly all services and 82 percent of assets in
trade enterprises, 40 percent of assets in industry, and 68 percent of
construction assets were in private hands.
However, the practical results of those statistics have not been
nearly so positive. Most privatization (and almost all privatization in
industry) was accomplished by creation of joint-stock companies,
transferring enterprise shares to labor groups within them. Almost no
public bidding for enterprise shares occurred, and the state maintained
significant shares in enterprises after their conversion to joint-stock
companies. Also, because the sale of shares was prohibited, shareholders
wishing to leave the company had to return their holdings to the labor
collective. The 1994 Law on Privatization remedied this situation by
providing for competitive bidding for shares in small enterprises (with
fewer than 100 employees) as well as long-term privatization of
medium-sized (with 100 to 1,000 employees) and large enterprises by
competitive cash bidding among individuals. The new law also provided
for the auctioning of all enterprise shares remaining in state hands,
over an undetermined period of time. In 1994 and early 1995, voucher
privatization moved toward its goals quickly; by the end of 1994, an
estimated 65 percent of industrial output came from non-state
Privatization was not the final step in economic success, however.
After that step, many firms needed drastic restructuring--most notably
in management and technology--to function in a market environment.
Because the commercial banking system had not been reformed
substantially, enterprises found little financial or technical support
for such upgrading (see Financial System, this ch.). On the other hand,
enterprises (especially state enterprises) have not been discouraged
from defaulting on loans because they often are closely associated with
banks, whose pliable loan policy is backed by the National Bank of
Kyrgyzstan. Plans called for establishment of an intermediary agency to
distribute foreign and international funds to privatized enterprises
until the banking system is able to take over lending activities. A
stock exchange opened in Bishkek in May 1995 and was considered an
important step in expediting this process.
In the early years of independence, a major cause of Kyrgyzstan's
economic distress has been corruption and malfeasance. In a January 1993
speech, President Akayev reported that as much as 70 percent of the
money that the country had invested in its economy had been diverted
into private hands. Meanwhile, a poll of the country's few entrepreneurs
found that 85 percent of them reported having to offer bribes to stay in
business. The truth of Akayev's statement was difficult to verify, but
reports in newspapers and elsewhere suggest that it could be correct.
Official data indicated that since independence at least 100,000 tons of
cast iron, steel, aluminum, and zinc had been sold abroad without legal
permission, and that a credit for 1.7 billion rubles for the purchase of
grain had vanished. Other anecdotal evidence of corruption, often
connected with local centers of political power, was plentiful (see
Structure of Government, this ch.).
Kyrgyzstan - Financial System
In mid-1995, the banking system continued to be dominated by the
central savings bank (the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan, created in 1991)
and by the three major commercial banks that succeeded the sectoral
banks of the Soviet era and remained under state control. Those
banks--the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (Agroprombank), the
Industrial and Construction Bank (Promstroybank), and the Commercial
Bank of Kyrgyzstan--owned 85 percent of banking assets in 1994. New
commercial banks, of which fifteen were established in 1993 and 1994,
were owned by individuals or enterprises and had much less financial
power than the state-owned banks. The new commercial banks have the
right to buy and sell foreign currency and open deposit accounts. The
National Bank is the official center of currency exchange, but in the
mid-1990s it did not adhere to official exchange rates. In mid-1994, the
government established the Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
which uses state funds, foreign currency assets, and loans from abroad
to aid small and medium-sized enterprises and to invest in targeted
spheres of the economy, especially housing, construction, power
generation, and agriculture.
The banking system has remained concentrated in the same areas as in
the Soviet period. Although some diversification has occurred, loans
tend to go to traditional clients. Because new commercial banks are
small and initially were owned by state ministries and state-owned
enterprises, competition has developed slowly. Through 1994 Soviet-style
accounting and reporting systems remained in use, and banking services
such as domestic and international payments have remained at the same
noncompetitive level as they were prior to 1991. Capabilities vital to a
market-type economy, such as credit risk assessment and project
appraisal, are lacking. Post-Soviet regulations on capital funds,
exposure limits, and lending practices have not been enforced. The
technical infrastructure of the banks also requires substantial
overhaul. In addition, the National Bank has been plagued by scandal;
the first director, an Akayev protégé, was linked to several illegal
financial operations in 1993 and 1994.
The limitations of the banking system have made it unable to
efficiently mobilize and allocate financial resources into the national
economy. This failure has hindered privatization and other types of
economic reform that require substantial amounts of risk capital upon
which borrowers can rely. Especially critical are the bad loans held by
the three state-owned banks (influenced by government interference in
loan decisions, together with poor financial discipline on the part of
major enterprises) and eroded capital base. In 1995 the National Bank's
outstanding loans to agricultural and industrial enterprises totaled 1
billion som each.
Kyrgyzstan - Government
As independence has progressed, politics have grown increasingly
tangled in Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev, who took office amid a chain of
events that lent credence to an idealistic promise of democratic reform
and stability, has proven more able to formulate goals than to carry
them out. Although a constitution was ratified in 1993, many terms of
that document have not yet gone into force.
In March 1990, while still part of the Soviet Union, the republic
elected a 350-member Jogorku Kenesh (parliament), which remained in
power until it dissolved itself in September 1994. This body was elected
under the rules prescribed by the perestroika (see Glossary)
policy of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, which mandated that at
least 80 percent of legislative seats be contested even though
communists likely would win most seats. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, five
seats went to the initial opposition movement, the Democratic Movement
of Kyrgyzstan (DDK).
Over time it has become apparent that President Akayev prefers
dealing with administrators subordinate to him rather than with
legislators. The initial harmony between Akayev and the parliament began
to sour in 1993. A number of specific points of contention arose, most
of them related to growing legislative resistance to what was widely
viewed to be government corruption and mismanagement. Throughout 1993
the parliament sought aggressively to extend control over the executive
branch. The allotment of development concessions for two of the
republic's largest gold deposits was a particular rallying point (see
Natural Resources, this ch.). The chief representative of Cameco, Boris
Birshtein, was a Swiss citizen who had been named in a number of
financial scandals in Russia and elsewhere in the CIS. When it was
discovered that the Kyrgyzstani negotiating team that had sealed the
Cameco transaction had financial interests in the deal, the agreement
nearly was cancelled entirely. In December 1993, public protest about
this gold concession brought down the government of Prime Minister
Tursunbek Chyngyshev and badly damaged Akayev's popularity and
Chyngyshev was replaced by Apas Jumagulov, who had been prime
minister during the late Soviet period. Jumagulov was reappointed in
March 1995 and again in March 1996. Akayev was not publicly accused of
being involved in the gold scandals, but numerous rumors have mentioned
corruption and influence-peddling in the Akayev family, especially in
the entourage of his wife. As these rumors circulated more widely,
President Akayev held a public referendum of approval for his presidency
in January 1994. Most impartial observers regarded the 96 percent
approval that Akayev claimed after the referendum as a political
Kyrgyzstan - Constitution
Besides electing Akayev, the 1990 parliament fashioned the
legislative foundation for the political transformation of the republic,
in concert with the president. Perhaps the biggest accomplishment in
this phase was the drafting and passage, in May 1993, of the country's
constitution. The constitution mandates three branches of government: a
unicameral parliament; an executive branch, consisting of government and
local officials appointed by the president; and a judiciary, with a
presidentially appointed Supreme Court and lower courts.
In many ways, however, the constitution has not been put into force.
Akayev is still president under a popular mandate gained in an
uncontested election in 1991, and most of the judicial system has not
been appointed. The existing bicameral parliament, which was elected
early in 1995, does not match the unicameral body prescribed by the
constitution. This structural change was attained through popular
referendum, for which the constitution does not provide, although the
same referendum simultaneously gave popular (and retroactive) permission
for this abrogation of the constitution. In February 1996, Akayev's
proposed constitutional amendments strengthening the office of president
were approved by 94 percent of voters in a national referendum.
Kyrgyzstan - Structure of Government
Although the constitution calls for a government of three branches,
in practice the presidency has been the strongest government office. As
economic and social conditions deteriorated in the early 1990s,
President Akayev sought extraconstitutional authority in dealing with a
series of crises. Under these conditions, Akayev faced occasional
opposition from parliament, and pockets of local resistance grew
stronger in the southern provinces.
President and Council of Ministers
Akayev is able to act as he does because under the constitution the
president stands outside the three-branch system in the capacity of
guarantor of the constitutional functioning of all three branches. The
president names the prime minister and the Council of Ministers, subject
to legislative confirmation.
According to the constitution, the president is to be elected once
every five years, for no more than two terms, from among citizens who
are between thirty-five and sixty-five years of age, who have lived at
least fifteen years in the republic, and who are fluent in the state
language, which is Kyrgyz. There is no vice president. Akayev defied
predictions that he would seek referendum approval of an extension of
his term rather than stand for reelection in 1996 as mandated in the
constitution. (The presidents of Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
had followed the former course in 1994 and 1995.) In the presidential
election of December 1995, Akayev gained 71.6 percent of the vote
against two communist challengers. Several other political figures
protested that they had been prevented illegally from participating.
International observers found the election free and fair. Earlier, newly
elected deputies of the 1995 parliament had proposed that presidential
elections be postponed until at least the year 2000, with Akayev to
remain president in the interim. According to rumors, Akayev favored
using a referendum to extend his own term of office, but he found
acceptance of parliament's proposal unwise. Kyrgyzstan depends heavily
on the loans of Western banks and governments, who objected strenuously
to the cancellation of elections as a "step back from
The Council of Ministers nominally is entrusted with day-to-day
administration of the government. In general, however, the office of the
presidency has dominated policy making; in most cases, Akayev's
prerogative of appointing the prime minister and all cabinet positions
has not been effectively balanced by the nominal veto power of
parliament over such appointments. The new parliament of 1995 showed
considerably more independence by vetoing several key Akayev
administrative appointments. In February 1996, the government resigned
following the approval of Akayev's constitutional amendments. The new
government that Akayev appointed in March 1996 included fifteen
ministries: agriculture, communications, culture, defense, economy,
education and science, finance, foreign affairs, health, industry and
trade, internal affairs, justice, labor and social welfare,
transportation, and water resources, plus deputy prime ministers for
agrarian policy, sociocultural policy, and industrial policy and the
chairmen of nine committees and agencies. Many individuals retained
their positions from the preceding government; changes occurred mainly
in agencies dealing with social affairs and the economy.
In October 1994, Akayev took the legally questionable step of holding
a referendum to ask public approval for bypassing legal requirements to
amend the constitution. The referendum asked permission to amend the
constitution to establish a bicameral legislature that would include an
upper chamber, called the Legislative House, which would have only
thirty-five members. Those deputies would receive government salaries
and would sit in permanent session. A lower chamber, the House of
National Representatives, would have seventy members and would convene
more irregularly. Akayev's plan also provided that deputies in this new
parliament would not be able to hold other government positions, a
clause that caused most of the republic's prominent politicians to drop
out of consideration for election to parliament.
In the elections to the new parliament that began in February 1995,
only sixteen deputies managed to get clear mandates on the first round
of balloting. Second-round voting also proved indecisive. When the
parliament was convened for the first time, in March 1995, fifteen seats
remained unfilled; two important provinces (Naryn and Talas) had no
deputies in the upper house at all, prompting angry cries that regional
interests were not being properly represented when the two houses
elected their respective speakers. A later round of elections, which
extended into May, was marked by widespread accusations of fraud,
ballot-stuffing, and government manipulation.
Such circumstances aroused strong doubts about the legislative
competency of the parliament. Only six of the deputies have previous
parliamentary experience, and a number of prominent political figures,
including Medetkan Sherymkulov, speaker of the 1990-94 parliament,
failed to win what had been assumed were "safe" seats. Even
more serious were concerns about the incomplete mandate of the new
legislative system. The constitutional modifications voted on by
referendum did not specify what the duties and limitations of the two
houses would be. Thus, the early sessions of 1995 were preoccupied by
procedural wranglings over the respective rights and responsibilities of
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Because little
business of substance was conducted in that session, several deputies
threatened that this parliament, like the previous one, might
"self-dissolve." However, the body remained intact as of
According to the constitution, judges are to be chosen by the
president, subject to parliamentary confirmation. Potential judges must
be Kyrgyzstani citizens between thirty-five and sixty-five years of age
who have legal training and at least ten years of legal experience. The
length of judges' tenure is unlimited, but judges are subject to
dismissal for cause by parliament. In the mid-1990s, the judicial system
remained incomplete both in the filling of prescribed positions and in
the establishment of judicial procedures and precedents. A Supreme Court
was appointed, but its functioning was delayed in 1995 by parliament's
refusal to approve Akayev's nominee as chief justice. Although the
parliament of 1991-94 also mandated a national constitutional court
(over the objections of Akayev), that body never has been established.
In general, the rule of law is not well established in the republic.
The one area of the law that has flourished in Kyrgyzstan is libel law,
which public figures have used widely to control the republic's press.
By contrast, the observance of laws designed for the regulation of the
economy is not uniform or consistent, even by government officials. The
functioning of the State Arbitration Court, which has responsibility for
financial and jurisdictional disputes within government agencies and
between government agencies and private enterprises, has been extremely
irregular and lacking in oversight by any other government institution.
The republic is divided into seven administrative regions: six
provinces and the capital city of Bishkek. The so-called northern
provinces are Naryn, Ysyk-Köl, Chu, and Talas, and the southern
provinces are Osh and Jalal-Abad. Jalal-Abad was formed out of Osh
Province in 1991, largely to disperse the political strength of the
south that had become centered in Osh. Each province has a local
legislature, but real power is wielded by the province governor (until
1996 called the akim ), who is a presidential appointee. In
some cases, the akim became a powerful spokesman for regional
interests, running the district with considerable autonomy. Particularly
notable in this regard was Jumagul Saadanbekov, the akim of
Ysyk-Köl Province. The government reorganization of early 1996 widened
the governors' responsibilities for tax collection, pensions, and a
variety of other economic and social functions.
Akayev has had difficulty establishing control over the two southern
provinces. Several southern politicians (the most important of whom was
Sheraly Sydykov, scion of an old Osh family that enjoyed great
prominence in the Soviet era) have taken the lead in national opposition
against Akayev. Sydykov headed the parliamentary corruption commission
in 1994, and he headed the influential banking and ethics committees of
the parliament elected in 1995.
When the akim of Osh resigned to run for the new parliament,
Akayev appointed as his replacement Janysh Rustambekov, an Akayev protégé
who had been state secretary. Rustambekov, the first northerner to head
this southern province and a highly controversial appointment, was
considered to be a direct surrogate of Akayev in improving control over
the south. Rustambekov, who has fired large numbers of local
administrators, is opposed chiefly by Osh Province Council head Bekamat
Osmonov, who is one of the most skilled and influential politicians in
the south. Osmonov, who also was a deputy in the lower house of the new
legislature, emerged as a powerful critic of Akayev and a possible
presidential rival if Akayev could not prevent the next election.
Kyrgyzstan - Political Parties
The period immediately preceding and following independence saw a
proliferation of political groups of various sizes and platforms.
Although President Akayev emerged from the strongest of those groups, in
the early 1990s no organized party system developed either around Akayev
or in opposition to him.
The Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK), which was the only legal
political party during the Soviet years, was abolished in 1991 in the
aftermath of the failed coup against the Gorbachev government of the
Soviet Union. A successor, the Kyrgyzstan Communist Party, was allowed
to register in September 1992. It elected two deputies to the lower
house of parliament in 1995. In that party, significant oppositionists
include past republic leader Absamat Masaliyev, a former first secretary
of the CPK. The 1995 election also gave a deputy's mandate to T.
Usubaliyev, who had been head of the CPK and leader of the republic
between 1964 and 1982. Another party with many former communist
officials is the Republican People's Party. Two other, smaller
neocommunist parties are the Social Democrats of Kyrgyzstan, which
gained three seats in the upper house and eight seats in the lower house
of the 1995 parliament, and the People's Party of Kyrgyzstan, which
holds three seats in the lower house.
All of the other parties in existence in 1995 began as unsanctioned
civic movements. The first is Ashar (Help), which was founded in 1989 as
a movement to take over unused land for housing; Ashar took one seat in
the upper house in the 1995 elections. A fluctuating number of parties
and groups are joined under the umbrella of the Democratic Movement of
Kyrgyzstan (DDK); the most influential is Erkin Kyrgyzstan (Freedom for
Kyrgyzstan), which in late 1992 split into two parties, one retaining
the name Erkin Kyrgyzstan, and the other called Ata-meken (Fatherland).
In the 1995 elections, Erkin Kyrgyzstan took one seat and Ata-meken two
seats in the upper house. In the spring of 1995, the head of Erkin
Kyrgyzstan was indicted for embezzling funds from the university of
which he is a rector; it is unclear whether or not this accusation was
Another democratically inclined party, Asaba (Banner) also took one
seat in the upper house. Registration was denied to another group, the
Freedom Party, because its platform includes the creation of an Uygur
autonomous district extending into the Chinese Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region, which the Chinese government opposes. The Union of Germans took
one seat in the lower house, and a Russian nationalist group, Concord,
also took one seat.
For all their proliferation, parties have not yet played a large part
in independent Kyrgyzstan. In the mid-1990s, early enthusiasm for the
democratic parties faded as the republic's economy grew worse and party
officials were implicated in the republic's proliferating political
corruption. The communist successor parties, on the other hand, appeared
to gain influence in this period. In the absence of elections, and with
President Akayev belonging to no party, it is difficult to predict the
future significance of any of these parties.
Kyrgyzstan - The Media
For the first two years of independence, Kyrgyzstan's newspapers were
a remarkable phenomenon, with real political significance and power.
Save that Kyrgyzstan's newspapers had not yet developed a Western-style
code of journalistic scrupulousness and restraint, it would have been
possible to say that the press was beginning to become the fourth estate
that the media represent in developed democracies. Through late 1993,
Kyrgyzstan's newspapers enjoyed the greatest freedom of publication in
any of the Central Asian nations, rivaling the freedom of the post-1991
Moscow press. Although a state secrecy committee had the power to
require submission of materials in advance of publication, in fact the
newspapers were able to discuss issues of public interest closely and
dispassionately. During the gold scandals, for example, the newspapers
played a crucial role in airing both opposition attacks on Akayev and
his government, and the government's defense against those attacks.
Since 1993, however, the government has moved increasingly to impose
control. In August 1993, formal censorship was briefly reimposed, but
then a spirited outcry from the press brought a reversal of that move.
More subtle methods of censorship were applied in January 1994, during
the run-up to the public referendum on Akayev's performance. Although
there are several independent or quasi-independent newspapers in the
republic, all printing presses remain in government hands, which gives
the state the option of simply refusing to print opposition newspapers.
In 1994 the Akayev government stepped up pressure on the local press,
closing three newspapers entirely, including the popular
Russian-language Svobodnye gory , the official organ of the
parliament. Government officials also began to bring suits against
newspapers as private individuals, claiming defamation and slander. One
such case resulted in a costly judgement against the editor of Delo
No , a tabloid-style scandal sheet that is perhaps the most widely
read newspaper in the country. In the spring of 1995, Akayev used the
same tactic against the editor of Respublika , long one of the
most persistent and successful critics of the regime; the president
succeeded in getting a judgement that forbids the editor from working
for eighteen months.
Beginning in 1994, the Kyrgyz populace began to feel threatened by
the government and other forces in the republic. The atmosphere has not
been helped by a series of unexplained attacks on journalists, including
one popular commentator, a persistent investigator of the gold scandals,
who died after being struck on the head. Although the newsman's grave
also was desecrated shortly after his burial, no government
investigation was conducted. The government has shown reluctance to
impose direct Soviet-style censorship, but Akayev warned in January 1995
that the press would be wise to begin practicing self-censorship and to
print more positive news.
The economic conditions of journalism prevent any Kyrgyzstani
newspaper from being totally free. None of the republic's papers has yet
developed a sustaining readership, and because the economy is
insufficiently developed to provide advertising revenue, all newspapers
must depend on sponsors. For many papers, including Slovo
Kyrgyzstana , which has the largest circulation, the sponsor is the
government. Others such as Asaba have political sponsors, and
at least one is sponsored by Turkish investors. Even the most
independent of the papers, Respublika , has been forced to turn
to commercial sponsors, which, according to rumor, include
Seabeco-Kyrgyzstan, the scandal-tainted intermediary in the Kumtor gold
The most important Russian-language newspapers are Slovo
Kyrgyzstana , the official government paper (circulation about
15,000 in 1994); Vechernii Bishkek , a more domestic city paper
(reaching 75,000 readers on Fridays); the tabloid scandal sheet Delo
No (30,000 copies); Asaba , the organ of the party of the
same name (20,000 copies); and Respublika , the most prominent
surviving opposition paper (7,000 copies). The major Kyrgyz language
newspapers are Kyrgyz guusu and Kut Bilim . A
bilingual newspaper, Erkin Too/Svobodnye gory , has appeared,
but, unlike its earlier namesake, it is not an opposition paper. One
English-language paper, Kyrgyzstan Chronicle , mostly
reproduces articles from foreign English-language sources.
The electronic media are unevenly developed in the republic, both
because of the physical constraints imposed by the country's mountainous
terrain and because of financial difficulties. Resources are
concentrated in Bishkek, which is well supplied with television and with
radio. Penetration of more remote areas, however, is incomplete.
The government retains ownership of all but one broadcast facility,
giving it a strong voice in the development of independent programming.
There is at least one independent radio company, called Piramida, and
several independent television production companies. In June 1995, the
government proposed reinstitution of formal state control over all
broadcasting in the republic.
Financial problems have caused Kyrgyzstan to cut back on the number
of hours of Russian television that it relays from Moscow, although the
Russian government has shown an inclination to work with Kyrgyzstan to
keep Russian-language programming on the air in the republic. In the
south, most programming originates in Uzbekistan, a situation that tends
to exacerbate the north-south split within Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan - Human Rights
In its early days, Kyrgyzstan demonstrated a strong commitment to
observation of human rights, from which it has subsequently stepped
back. Nevertheless, the republic remains generally more sensitive to
human rights than are the states in its immediate environment.
The republic's constitution provides very strong guarantees of
personal liberty, protection of privacy, freedom of assembly and
expression, and other hallmarks of democratic societies. On several
occasions, the government has violated or abrogated the constitution,
raising the possibility of abuse of human rights.
In practice, however, the Akayev government has proven itself
generally responsive on issues of human rights, at least in part because
of the republic's dependence upon the approval of Western financial
supporters. The present legal system, which remains based almost
entirely upon Soviet-era practices, does permit pre-trial detention of
up to one year (there is no bail), which in one or two celebrated cases
has appeared abusive. However, international monitoring organizations
have found no evidence of political arrests, detentions, disappearances,
or extrajudicial punishments. There have been some unsubstantiated
complaints by political activists of wiretapping and other illegal
In a celebrated case in 1992, Uzbekistani security forces arrested
two Uzbek delegates to a human rights conference held in Bishkek.
Although this arrest was subsequently found to be in technical agreement
with Kyrgyzstani law, the public manner in which the arrest was
conducted demonstrated Kyrgyzstan's lack of resources to defend human
Kyrgyzstan - Foreign Relations
Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy has been controlled by two
considerations--first, that the country is too small and too poor to be
economically viable without considerable outside assistance, and second,
that it lies in a volatile corner of the globe, vulnerable to a number
of unpleasant possibilities. These two considerations have influenced
substantially the international position taken by Kyrgyzstan, especially
toward the developed nations and its immediate neighbors.
Akayev and his ministers have traveled the globe tirelessly since
independence, seeking relations and partners. In the first four years of
independence, Akayev visited the United States, Turkey, Switzerland,
Japan, Singapore, and Israel. His emissaries have also been to Iran,
Lebanon, and South Africa, and his prime minister made a trip through
most of Europe. One consequence of these travels is that Kyrgyzstan is
recognized by 120 nations and has diplomatic relations with sixty-one of
them. The United States embassy opened in Bishkek in February 1992, and
a Kyrgyzstani embassy was established in Washington later that year.
Kyrgyzstan is a member of most major international bodies, including the
UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE--see
Glossary), the World Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD. It has also joined the
Asian Development Bank, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO--see
Glossary), and the Islamic Bank.
Akayev has stressed repeatedly that the principle behind his search
for contacts is strict neutrality; Kyrgyzstan is a small, relatively
resource-poor, remote nation more likely to seek help from the world
community than to contribute to it. Especially in the first months of
independence, Akayev stressed Kyrgyzstan's intellectual and political
potential, hoping to attract the world community to take risks in an
isolated experiment in democracy. Akayev referred to making his nation
an Asian Switzerland, transformed by a combination of international
finance and the light, clean industry, mostly electronic, that he
expected to spring up from conversion of the Soviet-era defense
industries. Largely because of Akayev's reputation and personality,
Kyrgyzstan has become the largest per capita recipient of foreign aid in
the CIS (see Foreign Investment, this ch.).
However, the decay of the domestic economy and increasing
dissatisfaction among constituents have made the Akayev government
distinctly less optimistic about the degree to which it can rely upon
the distant world community. At the same time, political and social
developments in the republic's immediate area have directed the
republic's attention increasingly to foreign policy concerns much closer
Central Asian Neighbors
Kyrgyzstan is bordered by four nations, three of which--Kazakstan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan--are former Soviet republics. China's
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where a substantial separatist
movement has been active, also adjoins the republic. Although Kazakstan
and Uzbekistan have recognized their existing borders with Kyrgyzstan,
as of 1996 Tajikistan had not done so. China recognizes the old Soviet
Union border but is said to have objections to twelve specific points of
its common border with Kyrgyzstan. The objections have been referred to
a Chinese-CIS border committee for resolution.
Undoubtedly the most immediate concern is neighboring Uzbekistan,
which, under the leadership of President Islam Karimov, is emerging as
the strongest state in post-Soviet Central Asia. Although Uzbekistan
faces serious economic problems of its own, it has a homogeneous and
well-educated population of more than 20 million, a diversified and
developed economy, and sufficient natural resources to allow the country
to become self-sufficient in energy and a major exporter of gold,
cotton, and natural gas (see The Economy, ch. 5).
Uzbekistan has the best organized and best disciplined security
forces in all of Central Asia, as well as a relatively large and
experienced army and air force. Uzbekistan dominates southern Kyrgyzstan
both economically and politically, based on the large Uzbek population
in that region of Kyrgyzstan and on economic and geographic conditions
(see Ethnic Groups, this ch.). Much of Kyrgyzstan depends entirely on
Uzbekistan for natural gas; on several occasions, Karimov has achieved
political ends by shutting pipelines or by adjusting terms of delivery.
In a number of television appearances broadcast in the Osh and
Jalal-Abad provinces of Kyrgyzstan, Karimov has addressed Akayev with
considerable condescension; Akayev, in turn, has been highly deferential
to his much stronger neighbor. Although Uzbekistan has not shown overt
expansionist tendencies, the Kyrgyz government is acutely aware of the
implications of Karimov's assertions that he is responsible for the
well-being of all Uzbeks, regardless of their nation of residence.
Although it presents no such expansionist threat, Kazakstan is as
important to northern Kyrgyzstan as Uzbekistan is to the south. The
virtual closure of Manas Airport at Bishkek makes Kazakstan's capital,
Almaty, the principal point of entry to Kyrgyzstan. The northwestern
city of Talas receives nearly all of its services through the city of
Dzhambyl, across the border in Kazakstan. Although Kazakstan's president
Nursultan Nazarbayev has cooperated in economic agreements, in May 1993
Kyrgyzstan's introduction of the som caused Nazarbayev to close his
country's border with Kyrgyzstan to avoid a flood of worthless
Kyrgyzstan's relations with Tajikistan have been tense. Refugees and
antigovernment fighters in Tajikistan have crossed into Kyrgyzstan
several times, even taking hostages. Kyrgyzstan attempted to assist in
brokering an agreement between contesting Tajikistani forces in October
1992 but without success. Akayev later joined presidents Karimov and
Nazarbayev in sending a joint intervention force to support Tajikistan's
president Imomali Rahmonov against insurgents, but the Kyrgyzstani
parliament delayed the mission of its small contingent for several
months until late spring 1993. In mid-1995 Kyrgyzstani forces had the
responsibility of sealing a small portion of the Tajikistan border near
Panj from Tajikistani rebel forces.
The greater risk to Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan is the general
destabilization that the protracted civil war has brought to the region.
In particular, the Khorugh-Osh road, the so-called "highway above
the clouds," has become a major conduit of contraband of all sorts,
including weapons and drugs (see Internal Security, this ch.). A meeting
of the heads of the state security agencies of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan, held in Osh in the spring of 1995, also drew
the conclusion that ethnic, social, and economic conditions in Osh were
increasingly similar to those in Tajikistan in the late 1980s, thus
recognizing the contagion of Tajikistan's instability.
Chinese-Kyrgyzstani relations are an area of substantial uncertainty
for the government in Bishkek. China has become Kyrgyzstan's largest
non-CIS trade partner, but China's influence is stronger in the north of
Kyrgyzstan than in the south. This limitation could change if efforts to
join the Karakorum Highway to Osh through Sary-Tash are successful. The
free-trade zone in Naryn has attracted large numbers of Chinese
businesspeople, who have come to dominate most of the republic's import
and export of small goods. Most of this trade is in barter conducted by
ethnic Kyrgyz or Kazaks who are Chinese citizens. The Kyrgyzstani
government has expressed alarm over the numbers of Chinese who are
moving into Naryn and other parts of Kyrgyzstan, but no preventive
measures have been taken.
The Akayev government also must be solicitous of Chinese
sensibilities on questions of nationalism because the Chinese do not
want the independence of the Central Asian states to stimulate dreams of
statehood among their own Turkic Muslim peoples. Although the Kyrgyz in
China have been historically quiescent, China's Uygurs (of whom there is
a small exile community in Kyrgyzstan) have been militant in their
desire to attain independence. This is the major reason that Kyrgyzstan
has refused to permit the formation of an Uygur party (see Political
Parties, this ch.).
In the 1990s, trade with China has grown to such a volume that some
officials in Kyrgyzstan fear that by the late 1990s Kyrgyzstan's economy
will be entirely dominated by China. In some political quarters, the
prospect of Chinese domination has stimulated nostalgia for the days of
In fact, whereas the other Central Asian republics have sometimes
complained of Russian interference, Kyrgyzstan has more often wished for
more attention and support from Moscow than it has been able to obtain.
For all the financial support that the world community has offered,
Kyrgyzstan remains economically dependent on Russia, both directly and
through Kazakstan. In early 1995, Akayev attempted to sell Russian
companies controlling shares in the republic's twenty-nine largest
industrial plants, an offer that Russia refused.
Akayev has been equally enthusiastic about more direct forms of
reintegration, such as the Euro-Asian Union that Nazarbayev proposed in
June 1994. Because Kyrgyzstan presumably would receive much more from
such a union than it would contribute, Akayev's enthusiasm has met with
little response from Russia and the other, larger states that would be
involved in such an arrangement. Akayev's invitation for Russian border
guards to take charge of Kyrgyzstan's Chinese border, a major revision
of his policy of neutrality, was another move toward reintegration (see
Armed Forces, this ch.).
The Kyrgyzstani government also has felt compelled to request
Russia's economic protection. The harsh reality of Kyrgyzstan's economic
situation means that the nation is an inevitable international client
state, at least for the foreseeable future. Despite concerted efforts to
seek international "sponsors," Akayev has not received much
more than a great deal of international good will. Even if the president
had not lived seventeen years in Russia himself and even if his
advisers, family, and friends were not all Soviet-era intellectuals with
a high degree of familiarity with Russia, economic necessity probably
would push Kyrgyzstan further toward Russia.
On his February 1994 visit to Moscow, Akayev signed several economic
agreements. Having promised the republic a 75-billion-ruble line of
credit (presumably for use in 1994) and some US$65 million in trade
agreements, Russia also promised to extend to Kyrgyzstan
most-favored-nation status for the purchase of oil and other fuels. For
its part, Kyrgyzstan agreed to the creation of a Kyrgyzstani-Russian
investment company, which would purchase idle defense-related factories
in the republic to provide employment for the increasingly dissatisfied
Russian population of Kyrgyzstan. In early 1995, prime ministers
Jumagulov of Kyrgyzstan and Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia signed a
series of agreements establishing bilateral coordination of economic
reform in the two states, further binding Kyrgyzstan to Russia. After
lobbying hard for inclusion, Kyrgyzstan became a member of the customs
union that Russia, Belarus, and Kazakstan established in February 1996.
For its part, Russia sees aid to Kyrgyzstan as a successful precedent
in its new policy of gaining influence in its "near abroad,"
the states that once were Soviet republics. Russia does not want a
massive in-migration of Russians from the new republics; some 2 million
ethnic Russians moved back to Russia between 1992 and 1995, with at
least that many again expected by the end of the century. Akayev, on the
other hand, must find a way to stem the loss of his Russian population,
which already has caused an enormous deficit of doctors, teachers, and
For these reasons, despite opposition from Kyrgyz nationalists and
other independence-minded politicians, in 1995 Akayev granted the
request of Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin to review the
constitutional provision making Kyrgyz the sole official language. Early
in 1996, Kyrgyzstan took legal steps toward making Russian the
republic's second official language, subject to amendment of the
constitution. That initiative coincided with the customs union signed
with Russia, Kazakstan, and Belarus in February 1996. The long-term
success of Akayev's search for reintegration is questionable because of
Kyrgyzstan's minimal strategic importance and the potential cost to an
outside country supporting the republic's shaky economy.
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