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Goal: Introduce ideas for improving EOS legislation with a "Houses" model.
In this video at about 02:00, @thomasbcox refers to voting by token holders as the Legislative Branch of EOS governance.
He discusses the possibility of having different "Houses". I think such a model would greatly benefit EOS's long-term success.
Problems with having one single procedure for funding and/or referendums:
1) Voter apathy. There's a lot to keep track of. With a monolothic process, many issues and ideas can get lost in the noise.
2) Without side-by-side systems, there is no basis for comparison, critique, and improvement. Having different procedures and/or different groups completing similar work generates a lot of useful data.
What is a legislative "House"?
A separate body of the legislative government. Usually, legislatives are Uni-, Bi-, or Tricameral. There are usually two rationales given. First is a check and balance on the other house.
"A formidable sinister interest may always obtain the complete command of a dominant assembly by some chance and for a moment, and it is therefore of great use to have a second chamber of an opposite sort, differently composed, in which that interest in all likelihood will not rule." — Walter Bagehot, 19th century British essayist
The second rationale, is the empowering of different interest groups. The U.S. Senate, before the 17th Amendment, represented the interests of State governments, and the U.S. House of Representatives represented the interests of the people.
Why use a system of Houses?
Houses help solve both problems listed above.
1) It is easier to take initiative for people who are in smaller groups.
2) The different cultures and processes that evolve in different houses will be a great basis for comparison and improvement.
3) Arbiters or devs are critical to the eco-system, but without their own house, they risk losing their voice.
What Houses should we have?
One for every identifiable group in the eco-system, and we should create new houses when new interest groups arise.
General House - This can be the standard proposal process as outlined elsewhere. It mimicks the process used by Dash. We can hedge against the failure of this experiment by routing a vast majority of WP funds through this process.
House of Commons - The idea here is to have a low bar of entry for proposals. Fees are low and/or refundable. Proposals will be plentiful.
House of Lords - Voting here requires a high reputation score. Fees are high and non-refundable. Proposals will be few, but they'll get a lot of attention.
House of Devs - For developers who've crossed a certain threshold of contributions.
House of Dapps - For the owners of smart contracts which exceed a threshold of usage.
House of Judges - Arbiters will have unique problems and unique perspectives. Great things might happen if we give them their own channel for fudning projects. Since they are a separate branch of government, maybe they should not be able to propose governance changes through this house.
House of BPs - Since BPs have their own funding, maybe they should not be able to propose projects through this house, only governance amendements and feature requests.
How might voting work?
The document "States and Timeline for Project Proposals" is a basis of comparison. https://docs.google.com/drawings/d/1wpaVp4WuiGsCnRCqsrIeziF5RpUImTuv5t_jVAlgaeQ
Every House can develop its own process to reach the "Final Proposal" state.
If a House is proposing a project and operating inside of its allocated budget, then we can lower the standard of approval from 10% yes / 5% quorum. Another idea is consider the project approved, but give other houses veto power.
For Governance Changes:
We should probably be more careful with governance changes.
Comments and criticisms welcome. I'd be especially curious to hear the comments of anyone familiar with BitShares's legislative problems.