Nixon Doctrine, a foreign policy of the U.S. government, announced by U.S. Pres. Richard Nixon in 1969, whereby the United States would thereafter support allies facing military threats with economic and military aid rather than with ground troops. It was announced during the Vietnam War (1954–75), at the beginning of a global tour by Nixon, in an informal discussion with reporters on the island of Guam. Nixon stated that the United States could no longer afford to defend its allies fully. He added that, although the United States would continue to uphold all of its treaty obligations, it would expect its allies to contribute significantly to their own defense.
At the same time, he assured U.S. allies that the United States would continue to use its nuclear arsenal to shield them from nuclear threats.
The Nixon Doctrine was not intended to apply to South Vietnam, where U.S. ground troops were already committed. It was, in fact, because of the tremendous drain of the Vietnam War on U.S. resources that Nixon created the doctrine. Even so, from 1969 onward the Nixon administration did not adhere strictly to the doctrine. The U.S. invasions of Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971, for example, employed U.S. ground troops.
Historians and foreign-policy experts agree that the Nixon Doctrine was part of a shift in U.S. foreign policy away from a bilateral view of international relations—that is, away from a sole focus on the U.S.-Soviet struggle for power. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, envisioned a world in which the United States would not be the sole defender of freedom but would share that responsibility with its most-powerful allies. Nixon hoped that one day the United States, the Soviet Union, western Europe, China, and Japan would coexist peacefully and trade together to their mutual benefit.
The Nixon Doctrine influenced the U.S. decision to sell arms to Iran and to Israel in the 1970s. In Iran, the United States agreed to sell conventional weapons to the government of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the shah of Iran). Iran purchased a total of $15 billion of the most-advanced U.S. arms, weapons that were technologically superior to most of those in the U.S. arsenal. Nixon and Kissinger believed that strengthening Iran’s military would stabilize the Middle East, thereby protecting not only Iran’s oil supply but also the oil reserves of all countries bordering the Persian Gulf.
An unintended negative consequence of the decision to sell arms to Iran was its impact on the U.S. economy. To pay for the weapons, the shah raised the price of Iranian oil beyond the already high price charged by OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), of which Iran was a member. The price increase hurt U.S. consumers of oil and gasoline.
Although the sale of arms to Israel improved U.S. relations with that country, application of the Nixon Doctrine in that case may have inadvertently spurred Israel’s development of nuclear weapons. Israel’s entry into the nuclear community (though never confirmed by Israel itself) destabilized the region by raising the possibility that Israel would resort to nuclear weapons if attacked by Arab countries.
During the administration of Pres. Jimmy Carter, continuing violence in the Middle East and the overthrow of the shah of Iran by revolutionary forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 destabilized the region so much that the guidelines of the Nixon Doctrine no longer served U.S. national interests. In the Carter Doctrine of 1980, Carter declared that the United States would resist, if necessary with military force (including ground troops), any attempt by a foreign power to gain control of any country in the Persian Gulf region.