(Note: The entirety of this article can be obtained typeset in one part at Goretti Publications.)
3. The Social Animal and the Common Good
Western civilization has always held that man is by his very nature a social animal, and that he lives in society not merely because it’s advantageous for him, but because in no other way can he achieve the end for which he was created. The Philosopher, Aristotle, enunciated what is among the earliest and best statements of this principle:
[I]t is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is…either a beast or a god.
Aristotle shows that the state is the creation of nature by showing that man is fundamentally not complete in himself; that is, that he cannot reach his end without society, including the state, and thus exists within these societies, and within the state, by nature and not by choice.
To begin with, certain questions are clearly beyond the scope of this short essay. The first of these is what the proper end of the individual man is. This is a question which Catholic thinkers have considered thoroughly settled for many centuries, and I consequently will simply state it as a given, as it will be necessary to accept it to proceed very far in the argument. The end of man is happiness, which is defined as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life. This definition of man’s end is extremely deep, but in brief summary, man is created so that he might be happy, and to be happy man must act virtuously. We are leaving out here many important questions, most significantly what is meant by “virtue,” but too much detail would again be beyond our scope. This is Aristotle’s definition. Catholics are able to know further that perfect happiness comes after this life, when Deo volente a man reaches the Beatific Vision. However, we are speaking here of the order of nature, not the order of grace; therefore, Aristotle’s definition will work for us nicely.
Keeping that in mind, is man able to be happy while in Locke’s “state of nature,” or indeed by himself without the assistance of society? The answer is clearly no, because man cannot possibly act virtuously without a society in which to act. So many of the virtues involve relations within a society that it would be impossible to outline them all, but one example will be sufficient. Unless he lives within society, man cannot possibly exercise the virtue of justice; that is, the giving to each what is his due.
Justice is not merely a virtue; it is, in a very real sense, the virtue, the virtue which sums up and completes all the others. The Philosopher states that justice “is not part of virtue but entire virtue, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire.” It is “the greatest of virtues, and ‘neither evening nor morning star’ is so wonderful.” It is, specifically, “virtue in its fullest sense” because “he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also.” Due to its centrality in Catholicmoral thought, justice is an extremely important concept in Catholic social thought; indeed, the system of Distributism, which attempts to put Catholic social thought into practice, takes its name from that type of justice that is called “distributive.”
So man cannot possibly reach his end except when he is in society, because he cannot possibly act virtuously except when he is in society. So a man living outside of society is, once again, “either a bad man or above humanity; he is… either a beast or a god.” Man lives in society by his very nature, not by his own choice; he lives in society not because he finds it advantagous, but because living in a society is part of what he is.
So much for Lockean individualism, which is clearly fundamentally incompatible with any traditional system of Catholic social thinking.6 But what of Rothbard’s thesis, that man may be a social animal, but that society does not necessarily entail the state?
It is ironic that Rothbard accuses the Thomists—and by extension Catholic social teaching itself, which follows Thomistic thinking very closely—of missing the point regarding man the social animal, since Rothbard himself completely misses the point of the Thomists. The state is society. There are societies other than the state, of course, but it is in the nature of man to live not only within these other societies, but within the state itself. Without the state, these other societies are insufficient; they are, in fact, deficient, because they cannot be ordered toward their proper end.
It is strange that Rothbard wasn’t aware of this very clear Catholic social teaching when he argued that society did not require the state, as Leo XIII had enunciated it quite clearly as early as 1885. The great social pope stated:
[I]t is divinely ordained that he [man] should lead his life—be it family, or civil—with his fellow men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied. But, as no society can hold together unless some one be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every body politic must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its Author.
In these words, Leo XIII clearly argues that not only does man exist in society by nature, but that man exists in the state by nature; and further, that the state, “no less than society itself,” is a natural institution with God at its origin. No Catholic, therefore, can go along with Rothbard’s characterization of the state as “a coercive criminal organization” which is no part of a good and free society; whatever else a Catholic might say about the state, he certainly cannot say that.
But why is the state a natural organization, a necessary and integral part of the society which itself is a part of man’s own nature? Aristotle explains it by means of the origin of the state, which arises out of lesser communities which themselves meet lesser needs. For Aristotle, man is born into community, first and foremost the family. Like all things which exist by nature, the family has an end, which is the provision of the most basic fundamental needs of its members, including the simple need of propagating the species. St. Thomas refers to them as “daily” needs, for those “who sit by the same fire.” However, the family by itself is not enough; families therefore come together in higher communities, which St. Thomas Aquinas refers to as vici. These higher communities, these vici have as their end the service of those needs which are not daily and fundamental needs. These vici (usually translated as “village,” though that’s not really accurate) are themselves natural communities, like the family and the state. However, man has needs even beyond those which the vicus can provide; for these, vici come together to form civitas, the state.
The state is the “perfect community,” which literally translated from the Latin means roughly “the complete community.” St. Thomas argues very succinctly and cogently for this:
The state is the perfect community; which he [Aristotle] proves from this, that since every relationship of all men is ordered to some necessity of life, that community will be perfect which is ordered to this, that man might have sufficiently whatever is necessary to life; and this is the community of the state. For this is the reason of the state, that in it might be found everything which suffices for human life, just as it happens to be. And because of this it is made up from many vici, in which the craft of the carpenter is done in one, and the craft of the weaver in another, and thus concerning the others. From which it is clearly shown that the state is the perfect [complete] community.
In other words, man cannot possibly get everything he needs in any community lesser than the state; therefore, the state is the complete community, the community which has everything necessary “that men might not only live, but that they might live well.”
But when St. Thomas refers to living well, he’s not just talking about having nice clothes and good food; he means specifically that men live so as to become happy, the end of man as we discussed earlier. Thus, he notes that the state has what men need to live well “inasmuch as the life of men is ordered to the virtues through the laws of the state.” The state has more than just the means to ensure that he’s provided with enough food and clothing, and an environment in which he can practice the virtues. It also has the means to encourage virtue and discourage vice in him and his fellow citizens. It does this in many ways, many of which are unavailable to other and lower societies.
Does this mean, though, that the end of the state is many; that is, that the state has as many ends as it has citizens to help lead toward happiness? No; indeed, this is another fundamental difference between the Catholic view of the state and the liberal one. For the liberal, the state is just a group of people who agree to certain rules so that each can pursue his own ends; for the Catholic, the state is an organic whole and exists for a very specific and single end of its own.
Leo XIII provided the first statement of this doctrine in modern Catholic social teaching, holding that “[c]ivil society exists for the common good, and hence is concerned with the interests of all in general.” Pius XI also spoke on the end of the state as unitary and independent of the particular goods within it:
Because order, as St. Thomas well explains, is unity arising from the harmonious arrangement of many objects, a true, genuine social order demands that the various members of a society be united together by some strong bond. This unifying force is present not only in the producing of goods or the rendering of services—in which the employers and employees of an identical Industry or Profession collaborate jointly—but also in that common good, to achieve which all Industries and Professions together ought, each to the best of its ability, to cooperate amicably.
In other words, the state is only properly ordered when its parts are properly united by a strong bond directed toward the common good.
This doctrine has a deep significance for the life of the state. It means that the various parts of the state—individuals, families, workmen’s associations, and so on—have to be united and directed toward a good which is common to all of them. This is in sharp contrast to the liberal doctrine, which holds that members of the state are all to pursue their own ends in ways that they themselves see fit. For the liberal, the individual working for the good of the state is an anomaly, abandoning his own reasonable self-interest. In the Catholic doctrine, the state can only be properly ordered when all its parts are ordered “harmoniously” toward the common good. For the Catholic, the individual not working for the common good is an aberration, like a hand trying to work for its own good rather than the good of its body. For this reason, traditional Catholic thinkers have often used the term “body politic”; the phrase emphasizes that the state is a single whole composed of many parts, all united and working toward a given end.
This notion of a unified body politic, the state as an organic whole, runs as deeply in traditional Western philosophy as any concept could. Plato took it as a given, arguing with it as a premise without question, in The Republic. Aristotle likewise assumed it, though he argued for it earlier, when he discussed the end of the state as one rather than many.24 Catholic thinkers explicitly took up these arguments of their pagan predecessors, and indeed perfected the doctrine just as grace perfects nature.
St. Thomas Aquinas argued eloquently and repeatedly that the state is an organic whole, and that its members are parts of that whole who can only meet their own ends when they are directed toward its end:
The goodness of any part is considered in proportion to its whole …because every part which does not harmonize with its whole is a disgrace. Since, therefore, any man is a part of the state, it is impossible that any man be good, unless he be well proportioned to the common good, nor can the whole remain well except from parts proportionate to itself.25
The Thomistic doctrine, following all the long centuries of Western philosophy and imbuing them with the knowledge gained from the Deposit of Faith, is that man cannot be good, cannot reach the end for which he was made, unless he is a part of a state; and more, unless he is a good part of the state.
The state attempts to ensure that its parts are well-ordered toward the common good through many means, the most important of which is law. The author has no intention of taxing his reader with an exhaustive exposition of the Catholic doctrine of law; however, a brief examination of human law and its purpose will serve to show what exactly the common good is. For while we’ve shown here conclusively that the Catholic doctrine is that the state exists for its own single end, which is called the common good, we’ve not yet identified what the common good actually is. Learning the purpose of law, by which the state orders itself and its members, will show us what the state itself is ordered to; that is, it will show us what is the state’s end, which is the common good.
Human law, the law which man makes for himself, has as its purpose helping the members of the state toward their proper goods. In other words, it is to help the members of the state to be happy, which they can only do by living well and acting virtuously. As St. Thomas puts it, “it is a property of the law, to lead [its] subjects to to their proper virtue.” Law does not exist to help people do what they want without interference from others; rather, “the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given good.” Moreover, it makes men good “simply…[i]f the intention of the one making the law is directed to the true good; that is, the common good.” To make an otherwise long story short, the law is ordered to making men good, which means it is ordered to making men happy. More, it is ordered to the common happiness, and exists in order to ensure that the common happiness is promoted and upheld:
The last end of human life is happiness or blessedness…Whence it is right that the law look exceedingly toward the order which is in blessedness. In turn, since all the parts are ordered to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect; and one man is a part of the perfect community; it is necessary that the law look particularly to the order directed at the common happiness.
St. Thomas is even more explicit about this elsewhere; in his famous treatise on kingship, the De Regno, he stated clearly that the only purpose of a ruler is to promote the common happiness, which is virtuous living in a complete life:
Therefore, having been taught by the divine law, he [the king] ought to lean to this particular study, that the multitude subject to him live well; which study is divided into three [parts]. First, that he establish in the subject multitude the good life; second, that having established it he preserve it; third, that having preserved it he move it toward being better. And to the good life of one man two things are required: one principly, that is action according to virtue (for virtue is that by which [life] is lived well); the next, truly secondary and in a way instrumental, is of course the sufficiency of bodily goods, whose use is necessary for virtuous acting.
The ruler, who is charged with directing the state toward its end, has as his particular study fostering virtue in the members of the state. Indeed, what is usually considered a state’s sole end by liberals, ensuring that each man can pursue material goods as he sees fit (a portion of liberalism usually known as “capitalism”), is called by St. Thomas “secondary” and “instrumental” to living virtuously. And it is important to remember that living well and living virtuously are themselves synonymous with being happy, which is the ultimate end of man. The end of the state, then, called the common good, is the common happiness of its members.
The state makes laws to order itself, so that it might help order its members toward virtue. It does this to ensure the common good, or “common happiness.” That common happiness is the end of the state. Thus is summarized, extremely briefly, the great Catholic doctrine on the state.
We set out at the beginning of this little essay to examine the theory of individualism and its effects on our theory of the state. We noted that individualism as a principle was informative in most of our theories of government and economics in the modern age, and we further noted that, if individualism were found to be erroneous, many of the conclusions drawn from it would likely be found erroneous, as well. This in itself is a good day’s work; we’ve shown that the principle is faulty, and we can legitimately leave it to others to show how the conclusions drawn from it are faulty, and what correct conclusions can be drawn from the correct principles.
However, to demonstrate how significant this different philosophy about the state really is, and what very different conclusions must be drawn about economic life from these very different principles, a few of the most salient differences must be noted.
The first is among the most important, the most basic, and the most hateful to a capitalistic mind: private property is not subject to the sole and absolute control of its owner. Indeed, while ownership of property is certainly a right in all civilized states, use of private property is subject to just state and community regulation. For this reason, Leo XIII taught that “the individual and the family should be permitted to retain their freedom of action, so far as this is possible without jeopardizing the common good and without injuring anyone”; clearly, if it does jeopardize the common good, their freedom of action with their property should be properly limited. And further, the great pope taught that the state cannot forbid private ownership, but it can “control its exercise and bring it into conformity with the commonweal.”
Another conclusion we can draw from our traditional principles on the nature of the state is also very important: free competition is not the only sensible, or even the best, way to organize an economic system. Capitalists, a species of individualists, have long argued that free competition of individuals is the only reasonable way to run an economy. However, the organic nature of the state as a single entity tending toward a single end makes that position untenable:
Just as the unity of human society cannot be founded on an opposition of classes, so also the right ordering of economic life cannot be left to a free competition of forces. For from this source, as from a poisoned spring, have originated and spread all the errors of individualist economic teaching.
Catholic social teaching, aware of the true nature of the state, has long taught that although free competition is “justified and certainly useful provided it is kept within certain limits, [it] clearly cannot direct economic life.” While an “economic dictatorship” is clearly not the answer, a social order permeated with “social justice and social charity” must be in place to direct all parts of the body politic to the body’s end.
Another conclusion hateful to economic individualism which we can draw from our knowledge of the true nature of that state is that the profit motive is not a good primary director of economic action. Capitalism holds that men should pursue their own personal profits, because acting in this way—to maximize their own profits and minimize their own losses—will end up benefiting society. In other words, being greedy for one’s own gain will benefit everyone else, too. This notion first appeared in Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees, which held that a country informed by virtue could not possibly be prosperous, while a prosperous country could not be virtuous, because “Private Vices” yield “Public Benefits.”42As Mandeville himself said, his work was intended
to shew the impossibility of enjoying all the most elegant Comforts of Life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful Nation, and at the same time be bless’d with all the Virtue and Innocence that can be wish’d for in a Golden Age.
This notion has been followed even by Catholics, some of whom actually claim that this isn’t greed, but in fact care for one’s fellow man. Dr. Thomas Woods, for example, has argued that “he who seeks the greatest profit, seeks to meet the greatest needs of his neighbor and thus fulfills the precept of charity.”44 This is not the place to observe in detail how such an argument completely ignores the reality of original sin, which drastically skews consumption away from the good and toward gluttony and other vices. The fact is that capitalists here argue that vice—greed for personal gain in particular, but sometimes other vices, as well—is really virtue, because it ensures that the market is working properly.
However, Catholic social teaching holds that “men must consider in this matter not only their own advantage but also the common good.” In fact, man has duties beyond his own profit to consider when using his property; and “[t]o define these duties in detail when necessity requires and the natural law has not done so, is the function of those in charge of the State.” Men must act economically just as they must act politically: for the common good, not for their own personal gain. Arguing that greed is really charity in disguise simply misses the point. Profit should not be man’s primary motive in economic life; the common good should be. And since the end of the state is to promote virtue and discourage vice in its members, in pursuit of the common good, the state which encourages greed in the hope of getting public benefit, even if that hope is correct, is fundamentally failing in its duty.
Clearly, a proper understanding of the state, its origins, and its ends drastically alters which economic positions are credible and which are not. Yet the nature of the state and its ends are perfectly clear when Catholic social teaching is consulted and submitted to. Now, as always, the only way society can recover its way and come closer to God is by submission to the perennial teaching of the Church. Let us all pursue that end with all our strength for the rest of our days.
Praise be to Christ the King!
*Photograph by Mazintosh – Fotogranada from Spain.
 Aristotle, Politics 1131–32 (Benjamin Jowett trans.) in The Basic Works of Aristotle (Richard McKeon ed., New York: 1941).
 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 1004 (Benjamin Jowett trans.) inThe Basic Works of Aristotle (Richard McKeon ed., Random House: 1941)..
 Id. at 1003.
 Id. at 1003–04.
 Aristotle, Politics, supra note.
 This doctrine of Aristotle is clearly part of Catholic doctrine, as well. The Lord Himself tells us that “[n]on est bonum esse hominem solum” (“[i]t is not good that the man is alone”) (Gn. 2:18); and later documents have definitively and specifically held this interpretation. Leo XIII, for example, held that “it is divinely ordained that he [man] should lead his life—be it family, or civil—with his fellow men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied.” Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, no. 3.
 Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, no. 3 (emphasis added). Throughout this text, I’ve utilized sometimes the Vatican’s own translation and sometimes that of the Daughters of St. Paul; I’ve verified that the statements in both translations have the same import, but the paragraphs are not always numbered the same, so in the event of difficulty locating a citation, looking at the other translation should solve the problem.
 Rothbard, supra note , at 172.
 Aristotle, Politica, supra note , at 1128-29.
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, lib. 1, l. 1, n. 18.
 Id. (“sedent ad eumdem ignem”).
 See id., n. 19.
 Id., n. 20.
 Id., n. 23.
 Id. (“civitas est communitas perfecta”).
 Id. (“civitas est communitas perfecta: quod ex hoc probat, quia cum omnis communicatio omnium hominum ordinetur ad aliquid necessarium vitae, illa erit perfecta communitas, quae ordinatur ad hoc quod homo habeat sufficienter quicquid est necessarium ad vitam: talis autem est communitas civitatis. Est enim de ratione civitatis, quod in ea inveniantur omnia quae sufficiunt ad vitam humanam, sicut contingit esse. Et propter hoc componitur ex pluribus vicis, in quorum uno exercetur ars fabrilis, in alio ars textoria, et sic de aliis. Unde manifestum est, quod civitas est communitas perfecta”).
 Id. (“quod homines non solum vivant, sed quod bene vivant”).
 Id. (“inquantum per leges civitatis ordinatur vita hominum ad virtutues”). Emphasis here is added, though the placement of the clause does indicate that it was the focus of the sentence.
 See supra at .
 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, no. 51. That Pope Leo is referring here to a single good, not merely ensuring that individuals can achieve their own goods, is clear, since he adds, “albeit with individual interests also in their due place and degree.”
 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, no. 84.
 Plato, The Republic 43–44 (G. M. A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing Company 1992).
 Aristotle, supra note , at 1127.
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-IIæ Q. 92 A. 1 ad 3 (“bonitas cuiuslibet partis consideratur in proportione ad suum totum, unde et Augustinus dicit, in III Confess., quod turpis omnis pars est quae suo toti non congruit. Cum igitur quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quodaliquis homo sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi, nec totum potest bene consistere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis”) (emphasis added).
 Id. at co. (“hoc sit proprium legis, inducere subiectos ad propriam ipsorum virtutem”).
 Id. (“proprius effectus legis sit bonos facere eos quibus datur”).
 Id. (“simpliciter…[s]i …intention ferentis legem tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum commune”).
 Id., Ia-IIæ Q. 90 A. 2 co. (“Est autem ultimus finis humanae vitae felicitas vel beatitudo,…Unde oportet quod lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem. Rursus, cum omnis pars ordinetur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae, necesse est quod lex proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem”).
 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Regno Lib. 2 cap. 16 (“Per legem igitur divinam edoctus, ad hoc praecipuum studium debet intendere, qualiter multitudo sibi subdita bene vivat: quod quidem studium in tria dividitur, ut primo quidem in subiecta multitudine bonam vitam instituat; secundo, ut institutam conservet; tertio, ut conservatam ad meliora promoveat. Ad bonam autem unius hominis vitam duo requiruntur: unum principale, quod est operatio secundum virtutem (virtus enim est qua bene vivitur); aliud vero secundarium et quasi instrumentale, scilicet corporalium bonorum sufficientia, quorum usus est necessarius ad actum virtutis”).
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, supranote , at lib. 1 l. 1 n. 23 (“inquantum per leges civitatis ordinatur vita hominum ad virtutues”).
 See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, supra note , at n. 23.
 St. Thomas Aquinas, supra note , Ia-IIæ Q. 90 A. 2 co. (“felicitas communis”). See also id. (“et ideo omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur”); Aristotle, supra note , at 1129 (arguing that the state is “for the sake of the good life”).
 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, no. 22 (“it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money and another to have a right to use money as one wills”); Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, no. 47–49 (“[t]he right of property is distinct from its use…they are in error who assert that ownership and its right use are limited by the same boundaries…when the State brings private ownership into harmony with the needs of the common good, it does not commit a hostile act against private owners but rather does them a friendly service”). While Leo XIII does state that almsgiving is “a duty not enforced by human law,” he also adds “save in extreme cases,” which clearly means that human law does limit the use of property directly in such “extreme” cases, such as when the survival of a family is in jeopardy.
 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, no. 52 (emphasis added).
 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, no. 67.
 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, no. 88.
 See, e.g., Ronald H. Nash, Poverty and Wealth: Why Socialism Doesn’t Work 52 (Word Publishing 1986) (holding that “profits and losses give people incentives to act in ways that turn out to benefit society”). This is a commonly-used elementary textbook of Austrian-school capitalism.
 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits (1714), available and searchable at the Online Library of Liberty, http://oll.libertyfund.org.
 Id. Mandeville also stated that “To make a Great an [sic] Honest Hive/ Without great Vices, is a vain / EUTOPIA [sic] seated in the Brain. / Fraud, Luxury and Pridemust live, / While we the Benefits receive.” Id.
 Thomas Woods, Three Catholic Cheers for Capitalism in http://www.LewRockwell.com, 7 October 2002.
 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, no. 49 (emphasis added). The Pope is here speaking specifically about the use of private property; the principle holds good here, as well.