Since the election, American public policy debate has been focused on prospective budget deficits and what can be done to reduce them. The concerns are in part economic, with a recognition that debts cannot be allowed, indefinitely, to grow faster than incomes and the capacity repay. And they have a heavy moral dimension with regard to this generation not unduly burdening our children. There is also an international and security dimension: The excessive buildup of debt would leave the United States vulnerable to foreign creditors and without the flexibility to respond to international emergencies.
While economic forecasts are uncertain, the great likelihood is that debts will rise relative to incomes in an unsustainable way over the next 15 years without further actions beyond those undertaken in the 2011 budget deal and the end of year agreement that averted a fall over the “fiscal cliff.” So even without the risk of self-inflicted catastrophes — like the possible failure to meet debt obligations or the shutting down of government — it is entirely appropriate for policy to focus on reducing prospective deficits.
Those who argue against a further concentration on prospective deficits on the grounds that – contingent on a forecast that assumes no recessions – the debt to gross domestic product ratio may stabilize for a decade counsel irresponsibly. Given all uncertainties and current debt levels, we should be planning to reduce debt ratios if the next decade goes well economically.
Reducing prospective deficits should be a priority – but not an obsession that takes over economic policy. This would risk the enactment of measures such as pseudo-temporary tax cuts that produce cosmetic improvements in deficits at the cost of extra uncertainty and long-run fiscal burdens. It could preclude high-return investment in areas such as infrastructure, preventive medicine and tax enforcement that would, in the very long term, improve our fiscal position.
Economists have long been familiar with the concept of “repressed inflation.” When concern with measured inflation takes over economic policy and drives the introduction of price controls or subsidies to hold down prices, the results are perverse. Measured prices may not rise and so the appearance of inflation is avoided. But shortages, black markets, and enlarged budget deficits appear. The repression is unsustainable. When it is relaxed, measured inflation explodes, as in the case of the Nixon price controls in the early ’70s.