The debate over free will has evolved through several paradigms. The first might be called a religious paradigm trying to resolve God's omnipotence with human responsibility. The second might be called a reductionist paradigm, revolving around the determinist and indeterminist debate. A more recent paradigm frames the topic in terms of inter-level causality using systems theory, and is called non-reductive physicalism.
One thread driving the evolution of the free-will paradigms is the impact of the scientific method on the debate. Some of the previous debate is little better than â€œhow many angels can dance on the head of a pin?â€ Many diverse fields now provide facts which need to be integrated into a common explanatory theory, such as philosophy, neurobiology, physics, neurophysics, information theory, chaos theory, language theory, psychology, neuropsychology, etc.
I am not aware of one theory that explains all of the facts available. I believe that more research needs to be done just to ensure all of the relevant facts are considered. If all of the facts aren't available, then skepticism about any given theory is justified. Given all that qualification, I'm going to assert that human agency exists in some sense, and summarize two theories which attempt to explain how agency can work.
The two theories of agency that will be summarized are The Non-Reductive Physicalism Theory, and The Cogito Model. Each theory will provide information on the following topics. What is the correct model of causality? What is the correct theory of the person? What is action or choice? How does action or choice occur? What requirements need to be met in order to validly assert moral responsibility?
Theories of Causality
Any theory of agency must presuppose the existence of some kind of causality ( Praxeology ). This section will summarize 6 theories of causality. The six theories are Determinism, Atomism, Reductionism, Indeterminism, Adequate Determinism, and Non-Reductive Physicalism. This section will also introduce definitions for Downward Causation, Emergence, Propensity and Self-Directed System, which are necessary to understand Non-Reductive Physicalism.
Problems with Determinism
The following quotes illustrate just how little consensus there is in defining determinism, as well as highlighting problems with particular definitions:
There are at least three alternative explanations for causality: Aristotle's fourfold account; the Atomist account; and self-causation. Data can be found to fit the atomist and self-causation theories, while the Aristotelian theory has been rejected. Data can be found that doesn't fit within either the atomist account or the self-causation theory. Therefore, I conclude that the Non-reductive Physicalist account of causation is better since it has more explanatory power than either the atomist or self-causation theories alone. The following quotes emphasize this line of reasoning:
Problems with the Atom
For another example, look at the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) theory proposed in my metaphysics section, where atoms are formed by the vibrations of space. If the universe isn't accurately modeled by Newtonian billiard balls or clocks, or by Einsteinian particles projecting mysterious forces, then Determinism and Atomism aren't accurate enough ( Metaphysics ).
The Source of Motion and Change
In other words, the Epicurean atomists, the Newtonian determinists, and the Big Bang cosmologists have all failed to explain the source of motion and change. This lack of explanatory theory is at the very least a cause for skepticism of the Determinist / Atomist / Reductionist world views by themselves. For an alternative explanation of motion and change, see my Metaphysics section.
a. "The essential elements of reality are the atoms." (DMNMMDI, pg53)
b. "Atoms are unaffected by their interaction with other atoms or by the composites of which they are apart." (DMNMMDI, pg53)
c. "The atoms are the source of all motion and change." (DMNMMDI, pg53)
d. "Insofar as the atoms behave deterministically (the Epicureans countenanced spontaneous swerves, but Laplace and his followers did not), they determine the behavior of all complex entities. (DMNMMDI, pg53)
e. "Complex entities are not, ultimately, causes in their own right." (DMNMMDI, pg53)
a. Methodological reductionism: a research strategy of analyzing the thing to be studied in terms of its parts. This was the focus of early modern science. It is now recognized that it needs to be supplemented by approaches that recognize the role of environment (DMNMMDI, pg53)
b. Epistemological reductionism: the view that laws or theories pertaining to the higher levels of the hierarchy of the sciences can (and should) be shown to follow from lower-level laws, and ultimately from the laws of physics. This was the focus of twentieth-century positivist philosophers of science. It is now thought to be possible only in a limited number of cases, and how â€œlimitedâ€ is still controversial. It is closely related to logical or definitional reductionism: the view that words and sentences referring to a higher-level entity can be translated without residue into language about lower-level entities. The lack of such translatability in many cases is one of the reasons for the failure of epistemological reductionism. (DMNMMDI, pg53)
c. Causal reductionism: the view that the behavior of the parts of a system (ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic physics) is determinative of the behavior of all higher-level entities. Thus, this is the thesis that all causation in the hierarchy is bottom-up. (DMNMMDI, pg54)
d. Ontological reductionism: the view that higher-level entities are nothing but the sum of their parts. However, this thesis is ambiguous; we need names here for two distinct positions: (DMNMMDI, pg54)
i. One is the view that as one goes up the hierarchy of levels, no new kinds of non-physical ingredients need to be added to produce higher-level entities from lower. No vital force or entelechy must be added to get living beings from non-living materials; no immaterial mind or soul is needed to get consciousness, no Zeitgeist to form individuals into a society. (DMNMMDI, pg54)
ii. A much stronger thesis is that only the entities at the lowest level are really real; higher-level entities-molecules, cells, organisms-are only composite structures (temporary aggregates) made of atoms. This is the assumption, mentioned above, that the atoms have ontological priority over the things they constitute. We shall designate this position atomist reductionism to distinguish it from 4a, for which we shall retain the designation of ontological reductionism. It is possible to hold a physicalist ontology without subscribing to atomist reductionism. Thus, one might say that higher-level entities are real-as real as the entities that compose them-and at the same time reject all sorts of vitalism and dualism. (DMNMMDI, pgs54-55)
"...the concept that events (certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically (cf. causality) by prior events; the doctrine that not all events in the physical world are predetermined with absolute precision; it is possible for everything to have a necessary cause, even while indeterminism holds and the future is open, because a necessary cause does not lead to a single inevitable effect. Wikipedia, Indeterminism
5. Adequate Determinism
a. "Indeterminism is true in that some prior causal events have unpredictable, probabilistic, or undetermined consequences; the existence of quantum indeterminacy is an example;"
b. "Indeterminism is true in that the future is unpredictable"
c. "Indeterminism is true in that alternative futures exist and can be chosen"
d. "A degree of determinism is true in that natural laws can be discovered, predicted and verified in the macro-world"
e. "We can have causality without determinism, if among the causes is a quantum event that was itself unpredictable and to some extent uncaused; we call it soft causality"
f. "Adequate determinism means that we can usually understand the causes for events, despite the fact that some causes for our actions are surprising, even to us, and after the fact seem to have been unpredictable, the result of a causa sui."
g. "There is also no problem imagining a role for randomness in the brain in the form of quantum level noise. Noise can introduce random errors into stored memories. Noise could create random associations of ideas during memory recall. This randomness may be driven by microscopic fluctuations that are amplified to the macroscopic level. Such randomness is at the heart of the idea of a causa sui."
h. "provides statistical predictability, which in normal situations for physical objects approaches statistical certainty."
i. Source: The Information Philosopher Website, Adequate Determinism
6. Non-Reductive Physicalism
a. "So let us take physicalism to be short for physicalist monism." (DMNMMDI, pg20)
b. "In recent philosophical literature physicalism and materialism are both used to refer both to monist accounts of the person and to monistic world views. A physicalist account of the person does not entail a materialist / physicalist world view; in particular, it does not entail atheism. We choose to call our view of the person physicalist rather than materialist, first, because it is in keeping with current philosophical usage, but, second, because materialism has been used more often to designate a world view, and thus seems to carry additional atheistic connotations that we prefer to avoid." (DMNMMDI, pg20)
c. Dynamic Systems explain multiple levels of causality:
i. "The essential elements of dynamic systems are not atoms in any sense, but component processes." (DMNMMDI, pg98)
ii. "The components of systems are affected (constrained) by their relationships within the whole." (DMNMMDI, pg98)
iii. "Dynamic systems are often the source of their own changes." (DMNMMDI, pg98)
iv. "Some components of systems behave deterministically, and others are affected by genuine quantum-level indeterminacy; but the system as a whole behaves according to propensities." (DMNMMDI, pg98)
v. "Some systems are causes in their own right." (DMNMMDI, pg98)
d. "The universe is now seen to be composed not so much of objects as of systems. The components of the systems themselves are not atoms but structures defined by their relations to one another and to their environment, rather than by their primary qualities." (DMNMMDI, pgs76-77)
e. "Concepts of causation based on mechanical pushing and pulling have been replaced by the concept of attraction in phase space." (DMNMMDI, pg77)
f. "The picture we have presented is of a world in which many systems come into being, preserve themselves, and adapt to their environments as a result of a tri-level process. Lower-level entities or systems manifest or produce (mid-level) variation; higher-level structures select or constrain the variation." (DMNMMDI, pg97)
g. "So the basic causal structure of the universe, all the way from the bottom to the top may be a dynamic interplay of downward causation from large webs of structures that have evolved over time with bottom-up constraints provided by the original lower-level constituents." (DMNMMDI, pg236)
h. "If we give up on the notion that determinism and indeterminism are exhaustive categories, then perhaps strict indeterminism applies only at the quantum level (and in cases where macro-systems amplify quantum events); determinism applies largely to the realm of mechanical processes, and propensity, a genuinely distinct option, applies to much of organismic behavior. Juarrero interprets propensities in terms of dynamical attractors." (DMNMMDI, pg238)
i. "Higher order properties act by the selective activation of physical powers and not by their alteration." (DMNMMDI, pg69)
j. Downward Causation: "..involves selection or constraint of lower-level causal processes on the basis of how those lower-level processes or entities fit into a broader (higher-level) causal system." (DMNMMDI, pg25)
i. "Deacon applies the terms first-order emergence or supervenient emergence to systems in which lower-order relational properties are the constitutive factor determining some higher-order property." (DMNMMDI, pg80)
ii. "Second-order emergence occurs when there is temporal development, or symmetry breaking, in a system." (DMNMMDI, pg80)
iii. "Third-order emergent systems involve, in addition, some form of information or memory." (DMNMMDI, pg81)
iv. "If we were to employ the term emergent, we would speak not of emergent entities but rather of emergent levels of causal efficacy." (DMNMMDI, pg20)
l. Propensity: "...an irregular or non-necessitating causal disposition of an object or system to produce some result or effect" , "...usually conceived of as essentially probabilistic in nature." (DMNMMDI, pg98)
m. Self-Directed System: "...complex adaptive systems are characterized, first, by positive feedback processes in which the product of the process is necessary for the process itself. Contrary to Aristotle, this circular type of causality is a form of self-cause. Second, when parts interact to produce wholes, and the resulting distributed wholes in turn affect the behavior of their parts, interlevel causality is at work. Interactions among certain dynamical processes can create a systems-level organization with new properties that are not the simple sum of the components that create the higher level. In turn, the overall dynamics of the emergent distributed system not only determine which parts will be allowed into the system: the global dynamics also regulate and constrain the behavior of the lower-level components." (DMNMMDI, pg85)
Conclusion about Causality
I currently prefer Non-reductive Physicalism as my tentative theory of causality. It incorporates facts explained by Determinism, Atomism, Reductionism, Indeterminism, and Adequate Determinism, while providing additional explanatory power. Specifically, many observations are impossible to explain without posing a hierarchical web of interactive causality.
Murphy and Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?
The Information Philosopher Website, Adequate Determinism
Theories of the Person
What is a person? Is it clay formed into God's own image? Is it a lump of meat? Is it a machine? Is it a system within the context of a larger system? As you can see, the analogy or metaphor used to describe a person (the theory of a person), will have a significant impact on understanding both agency and your larger world view. In this section I will delineate the main assumptions of two competing theories of the person. The first theory is a modern version of Cartesian Materialism, and the second theory is Physicalist Monism. I hope to show that the evidence is against a Cartesian Materialist theory of the person, and that a Physicalist Monism theory of the person is a solid working alternative.
The modern Cartesian Materialism thesis makes the following 7 assumptions. (1) Brain-body dualism substitutes the brain for the mind and then opposes the brain to the body. (2) CM discounts emotion by assuming the purpose of reason is to control emotion. (3) CM invented the Cartesian Theater which portrays the real I, or self, as this thing in the mind that looks at representations of the outside world. (4) CM led to two forms of skepticism-skepticism of the accuracy of these representations of this outside world; and skepticism of the agency of other minds. (5) CM influences researchers to focus on the individual, as opposed to the individual contextually embedded in the environment. (6) CM identifies the person as something inside the head. (7) CM assumes that the mind is a mirror that passively reflects representations. The rest of this section will provide evidence proving each of these 7 assumptions to be wrong, or at least inaccurate.
Brain-body dualism has evolved since Descarte first proposed that the mind and soul are synonymous. He proposed that the brain and mind interacted through the Pineal Gland. Since then, finding and measuring the interaction between mind and brain has plagued philosophers. Given recent advances in science, theories have shifted from Dualism to several versions of Physicalism. These Physicalist theories include Mind-Brain Identity Theories and a Non-Reductive Physicalist theory. This section will provide quotes which limit the applicability of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory and argue for a Non-Reductive Physicalist account:
The Purpose of Reason vs Emotion
Descarte proposed the Cartesian Materialist idea that the purpose of reason is to control emotions. Modern scientists have held on to this CM idea by picturing reason and emotion as separate brain areas. Reason and emotion are actually interdependent systems. The following quotes will illustrate this shift in thought:
The Cartesian Theater
Descartes proposed that the real person is a separate thing thinking his way to certainty somewhere within the body. This idea of the Cartesian Theater has hung on in modern versions of Cartesian Materialism. Physicalist Monism argues that the whole person is the subject of experience. The following quotes will compare and contrast these two theses:
Skepticism of Representation and Other Minds
Descartes used the certainty of his thinking to infer that other minds exist. This skepticism of representation and skepticism of the existence of other minds has hung on in modern versions of Cartesian Materialism. Physicalist Monism shows that human brains are hard-wired, through systems like mirror neurons, to detect other persons. The following quotes describe how thinking has evolved on this subject:
Individuals Out of Context
Descartes started his inferences from the knowledge of his own thinking, a particularly individualist approach. This individualism shows up in modern versions of Cartesian Materialism. Physicalist Monism argues that yes, we are individuals, and it's fine to start there. However, the context within which the individual is important as well. The following quotes illustrates how CM focuses on the individual at the expense of environmental and social contexts:
The CM Person in your Head:
Descarte proposed the idea of the person viewing the world through representations on the Cartesian Theater. Modern versions of Cartesian Materialism still wrongly use this concept. Physicalist Monism argues that rather than having an agent in your head, the person is an agent. The following quotes highlight this important distinction:
Mind as Passive Mirror
Descartes proposed that the mind is a passive mirror that receives representations of the outside world. Modern versions of Cartesian Materialism make the same mistake by picturing mental activities out of the context of a person's action. Physicalist Monism, by contrast, visualizes mental processes as embodied and active. The following quotes show this shift in thinking:
The Physicalist Monism thesis makes the following 7 assumptions. (1) Mental states supervene over contextualized brain events. (2) Reason and emotion are interdependent. (3) The brain is embodied. (4) The human brain is hard-wired to perceive persons in an environment. (5) Individuals are best understood in the context of their environment. (6) The person as a whole is an agent. (7) The mind modulates and regulates embodied activity.
The following quotes provide evidence for the supervenience assumption:
- This Lakoff and Johnson quote is a wonderful validation of my world view project. Embodiment is an applicable concept not only in this section on agency, but is also relevant to epistemology via the Langen school, and of course has the tie in to praxeology and epistemology first noted by Hoppe. By bringing these sections of the worldview together, we are indeed seeing a consensus form on word usage.
Reason and Emotion are Interdependent
The following quotes are drawn from the IWV section on emotional intelligence, in the Paedeutics section. These quotes should adequately illustrate the interdependence of reason and emotion:
The Embodied Brain
The following quotes illustrate how a brain can be embodied, as a contrast to the Cartesian Theater:
Humans are hard-wired to perceive persons in an environment
Humans have evolved biological systems whose function is to help interpret the emotional states of other humans. When around another human, humans can't help but to interpret the emotional signals that are sent socially. Skepticism of other minds seems untenable given the structure of our brains. The following quote should help bolster this Physicalist Monism assumption:
Individuals in Context
Individuals don't function physically the same when they are isolated, as they do when they are in a social environment. The social environment, in fact, is necessary for healthy cognitive development to occur. Physicalist Monism asserts that individuals need to be studied both in isolation and in their environment. The following quote highlights the importance of this distinction:
The person as a whole is an agent
Minds are embodied and contextualized brain events. Even the neural system is not limited to just the brain. Brains don't have an agent in the head. Rather, the person as a whole is an agent. The following quote supports this Physicalist Monism assumption:
The mind modulates and regulates embodied activity
The Cartesian Materialist assumption is that the mind is a passive receptor of sense data. Physicalist Monism, by contrast, assumes that the mind modulates and regulates activity. Humans are active beings. Trying to study the mind outside the context of action unnecessarily limits the scope of study. The following quotes reinforce this Physicalist Monism assumption:
Choice and action
To understand choice and action, I'm going to divide this section into two parts. The first part conceives action as a logical category and analyzes the necessary presuppositions and implications of action as a concept. This section will rely entirely on Mises' conception of Praxeology, the science of human action. I intend this first section to be as general as I can get it. The second part will explore recent scientific observations on what goes on biologically when an action occurs. My intent is to show that the content of scientific observations fit the logical requirements of action as a concept.
According to Mises, action is purposeful behavior. Action as a concept logically requires five presuppositions, and nine implications. The five presuppositions of action are a felt uneasiness, the image of a more satisfactory state, "the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness", causality, and the existence of space. The nine logical implications of action are ends, means, value, choice, preference, uncertainty, time, knowledge and exchange. Notice that choice is a necessary logical deduction from action. These 14 laws of action are completely general and should inform any empirical study of what goes on biologically when action happens. We should expect scientific observations to conform to these 14 concepts. If observations don't match theory, then language will have to shift and rework theory. These praxeological laws of action are discussed in more detail at: Praxeology.
From the perspective of biological observations, I've found a few praxeological terms to be synonymous with those used in biology. First, scientists will speak in terms of needs, instead of ends. Second, the phrase changing needs is used to describe a change in value. Third, the phrase history of feedback from the environment denotes a concept of time. The following quotes illustrate how the content of biological observations adequately fit into the categories of action defined by praxeology:
The Cogito Model describes choice as Fixed Past, then Generate Possibilities, then Evaluate Possibilities, then Think Again or Decision, then Undetermined Liberty or Self-Determination.
The process of choice and action
A non-reductive physicalist explanation of choice and action describe how the following factors affect choice and action. Mental properties are causal systems that are not reducible to neurobiological systems. Consciousness provides survival and adaptive benefits. Beliefs play a causal role in behavior when sensory updating results in brain states that represent a readiness to act. Reasons play a causal role in behavior by being a contextual constraint on impulsive behavior. The understanding of logical principles can emerge from evolution and play a causal role in behavior if sets of propositions work in the world, while others do not.
Mental properties can be causal systems
Brain events don't just happen. They happen in the context of an environment and a history of prior experiences. The mental, then, is the context in which a brain event happens. The mental relates a physical function to an agent's broader needs and desires, in the context of what the agent is doing. From a systems point of view, then, the mental, indeed, has a causal role. The following quotes illustrate how mental properties can be causal systems:
Consciousness provides survival and adaptive benefits
Consciousness provides the ability to go meta. Humans can evaluate their needs and goals, then evaluate the evaluation, then evaluate again, to an unknown number of iterations. This ability to evaluate our evaluations allows us to replace our base physiological needs with more abstract goals. This ability to go meta gives us a wider range of options for action. If a wider range of options isn't freedom, then it's at least freer. This section will provide quotes which describe this concept:
Beliefs lead to a readiness to act
Perceptions lead to internal adaptations which represent a conditional readiness to act. This internal adaptation leads to shifts in our mental states called beliefs. Beliefs are stored in the part of the brain that starts the process of acting. Thus, beliefs lead to a readiness to act. The following quotes denote how this process occurs:
Reasons play a causal role in behavior
At any given time, humans have some set of behavioral alternatives which they can perform. A biological need drives first-order behavior. A reason is a higher-order contextual constraint that supervenes on first order behavior. Reasons are causal by allowing a range of behavior that is greater than first-order biological needs. Reasons constrain impulsive behavior. The following quotes illustrate the causal role of reasons:
Logic is a causal influence on behavior
Logic amounts to a process of analyzing patterns among sentences. Some patterns work in the world, and other patterns do not work. The ability to go meta, talked about earlier, when applied to sentence formation, provides obvious benefits when trying to act, or model off-line action before committing in real time. The following quotes describe the causal influence of logic:
The Cogito Model
The Cogito Model from The Information Philosopher website uses a 2 stage model of free will to explain human action and choice. Philosophers struggled with the concept of possible alternatives because they reduced the decision process to a single moment. The key to the dilemma is to recognize that the decision process is, indeed, a process. It occurs through a period of time. So instead of having decision, you have instead evaluate alternatives, and then decide. This addition of evaluate alternatives before the decision is what is meant when philosophers talk about a two stage process. The following quotes illustrate the process details developed by the Cogito Model:
The first stage of The Cogito Model is all about generating and evaluating possibilities. The model posits three sources of alternative generation. The following quotes highlight these three alternative sources:
Testing of the following freedom requirements must be validated in order for the Cogito Model to hold true:
Testing of the following will requirements must be validated in order for the Cogito Model to hold true:
- Information Philosopher, Two-Stage Models
- Information Philosopher, Cogito Model
- Information Philosopher, Temporal Sequence
- Information Philosopher, Conceptual Analysis
What are the requirements for moral responsibility?
Non-Reductive Physicalism uses the following quotes to define morally responsible action:
Given the definitions above, Non-reductive physicalism asserts that 6 requirements must be met in order for a human to be an agent with moral responsibility (DMNMMDI, pg211):
1. A symbolic sense of self (different possible futures for me)
2. A sense of the narrative unity of life (to imagine myself moving forward from the present; nearer and more distant futures).
3. The ability to run behavioral scenarios (magination) and predict the outcome (knowledge; attach probabilities to the future results).
4. The ability to evaluate predicted outcomes in light of goals.
5. The ability to evaluate the goals themselves (alternative sets of goods-different possible modes of flourishing) in light of abstract concepts.
6. The ability to act in light of 1-5.
The following quotes illustrate how a symbolic sense of self may be considered a valid concept:
1. Patricia Churchland views the awareness of self as a function of the self-representational capacities of the brain, and lists some of the brain systems known to be involvedâ€”for example, representation of the internal milieu of the viscera via pathways to the brain stem and hypothalamus, and autobiographical events via the medial temporal lobes. (DMNMMDI, pg212)
2. Thomas Metzinger describes self-awareness as a form of consciousness that involves a model of the self (the phenomenal self-model) embedded within, but differentiated from, the organism's model of the external world. Intentionality is formed by a relational vector between the self-model and various aspects of the model of the external world. (DMNMMDI, pg212)
3. Lewis describes two stages in the origination of the idea of me, of explicit self-consciousness. The first is physical self-recognition, which generally appears around 18 months of age. It is tested by putting a spot on the child's nose to see if the child reacts to it in a mirror. Chimpanzees also have this ability. A more advanced form of self-awareness appears during the third year of life and is measured by the ability to engage in pretend play and by the use of personal pronouns. This capacity is closely linked to the development of a theory of mind-that is, the ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to others. (DMNMMDI, pg212)
4. Leslie Brothers reports on research showing that we come well equipped neurobiologically to develop and use what she calls the person concept. (DMNMMDI, pg212)
5. However, Brothers notes that there is another dimension to the concept of person, which is the ability to locate ourselves in social networks of morals, reasons, and status. (DMNMMDI, pg213)
6. Terrence Deacon emphasizes the essential role of language in the development of this symbolic self-concept: Consciousness of self in this way implicitly includes consciousness of other selves, and other consciousness's can only be represented through the virtual reference created by symbols. The self that is the source of one's experience of intentionality, the self that is judged by itself as well as by others for its moral choices, the self that worries about its impending departure from the world, this self is a symbolic self. (DMNMMDI, pg213)
7. M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker point out that to have concepts is to know how to use words. The idea of me is thus dependent on the ability to use the words I and me. These words cannot be used correctly without acquisition of a system of words including second- and third-person pronouns, which depends on the ability to distinguish other people from inanimate objects. (DMNMMDI, pg213)
The following quotes illustrate factors necessary for the narrative unity of life to be a valid concept:
1. â€œUnderstanding of the narrative unity of our lives depends on the existence of a long-term memory for events from our pasts that is accessible to consciousness. This sort of memory is called episodic memory (memory of previous life episodes) or autobiographical memory (memory of oneâ€™s own autobiography). Episodic memory is our recall of the events of our past that are marked in our recollection by specifics of time and place.â€ (DMNMMDI, pgs213-214)
2. â€œThe capacity to imagine and describe a â€œstretch of timeâ€ extending â€œbackwardsâ€ to long before the beginning of our own episodic memories allows us to place our stories in the context of longer histories, of family, nation, and now even of cosmic history. More important for present purposes is the fact that it allows us to consider the distant future consequences of our current actions.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg215)
The following quotes illustrate how running behavioral scenarios and predicting outcomes might be considered a valid concept:
1. â€œâ€¦we characterize perception (following Donald MacKay) as a conditional readiness to reckon with what is perceived, and a belief as a conditional readiness to reckon with something that is not immediately present.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg217)
2. â€œSuch off-line processing means for Metzinger that organisms (presumably humans) can â€œengage in the activation of globally available representational structures independently of current external inputâ€. (DMNMMDI, pg218)
3. â€œRick Grushâ€™s distinction between representations and emulations highlights the value of being able to manipulate internal representations in order to plan action.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg218)
4. â€œâ€¦we noted Andy Clarkâ€™s concept of external scaffoldingâ€”external devices we can manipulate in order to increase our capacity to predict consequences of action. Symbolic language is one of the most important sorts of external scaffolding for mental operations.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg218)
The following quotes illustrate how agents may be able to evaluate predicted outcomes in terms of goals set:
1. â€œMuch human evaluation of predicted outcomes of behavior is done primarily at the emotional level. Michael Lewis reports on the development in children of â€œself-evaluative emotionsâ€â€”shame, pride, guilt, and embarrassment.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg219)
2. â€œRobert H. Frank, reporting the work of Jerome Kagan on moral development in children, maintains that the desire to avoid negative emotions is the principal motive force behind moral behavior.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg219)
3. â€œThus, the experience of the emotional responses of our bodies (â€œgut reactionsâ€) is important in translating moral reasoning into adequate practical behavior.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg219)
4. â€œSophisticated language allows not only for understanding a variety of abstract possibilities, but also for second-order evaluations of oneâ€™s own evaluative processes.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg220)
The following quotes illustrate how it might be possible that agents can evaluate goals in the light of abstract concepts and develop new goals:
1. â€œWe have already noted (in Ch.3) that even quite simple organisms have the capacity to abandon the pursuit of one goal (e.g., getting a drink of water) in favor of a more salient goal (e.g., avoiding a predator).â€ (DMNMMDI, pg220)
2. â€œAnimals also have the capacity to evaluate goals in light of the fact that their pursuit is turning out to be either unattainable or simply too costlyâ€¦â€. (DMNMMDI, pg220)
3. â€œOne can act for a motive without having the concept for denoting such a motive, but one cannot know that one is acting for such a motive. Moral responsibility, then, depends on the capacity to use moral concepts to describe (and in so doing to evaluate) oneâ€™s own actions, character traits, dispositions, and so on.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg221)
4. â€œResponsible action, as here understood, is that which is consequent upon the ability to represent to oneself what one is doing and why one is doing it.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg221)
5. â€œThis means that as soon as the suspicion of social determination arises for the agent, he is able to transcend that determination.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg224)
6. â€œThere is no limit, other than lack of imagination, to the ability of the agent to transcend earlier conceptionsâ€. (DMNMMDI, pg224)
The following quotes illustrate some of the concepts that determine the ability to act:
1. â€œWhat are the necessary conditions for enacting our intentions?â€ (DMNMMDI, pg224)
a. â€œThe first, obvious one is that one not be physically constrained in any wayâ€”bound and gagged or paralyzed.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg224)
b. â€œOn the positive side, we have presented the hypothesis that our ability to get ourselves to do what we know we should do is dependent in part on self-talk.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg224)
2. â€œThe weakness of will as temporal discounting: A long-standing interest in the philosophical literature is the problem of akrasiaâ€”that is, weakness of will.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg225)
a. â€œAinslie provides several speculative accounts of why both humans and animals might have come to be biologically pre-disposed to discount the future in this way. When life is typically a struggle to survive (long enough to reproduce), it makes sense genetically to opt for the bird in the handâ€”one may well be dead before the two in the bushes can be caught.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg227)
b. â€œSo akerasia can be seen as a simple case of maximizing expected reward, given the way we perceive nearer rewards as greater than more distant ones.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg228)
c. â€œAinslie says that we can understand a great deal about the exercise of will if we think of ourselves as a temporal series of selves who have to bargain with one another.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg228)
d. â€œIn general, knowing that the later self is likely to do, the current self can set up external constraints to foil the later.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg228)
e. â€œSo another strategy for increasing self-control is to recognize the effect of a single lapse as a self-fulfilling predictor of failure and to make the behavior in question a matter of principle. The longer one adheres to the principle, the greater stake one has in not violating it, and the greater confidence one has that the long-term reward will be forthcoming. Such principled action greatly increases motivation.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg228)
f. â€œThis is yet another example (as we suggested in sec. 3.4) of humansâ€™ capacity to â€œgo metaâ€. Consciousness of patterns in oneâ€™s own motivational systems allows for higher-order evaluation of the patterns, running scenarios off-line, and setting up contingencies to cope with self-defeating patterns.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg228)
6. Juarrero explains akrasia in the terms of a dynamical process: (DMNMMDI, pg228)
a. â€œâ€¦how does it happen that our intentions are sometimes not enacted? The answer involves the shape of the agentâ€™s dynamical probability landscape. Self-organized systemsâ€™ basins of attraction are intertwined. If the basin of attraction representing the intended act is shallow and there are other deeper attractors nearby, one of those other attractors may succeed in pulling behavior into its basin.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg229)
b. â€œThe belief that one will succeed or fail is one of the factors that re-contours oneâ€™s dynamical landscape.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg229)
b. â€œSelf-organized systems tend to have shallower topographies at the beginning but to lock in features over time. This explains the fact that peopleâ€™s character becomes more set with age. An old dog learning a new trick requires a catastrophic transformation of neural dynamics.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg229)
The Cogito Model
The Cogito Model describes the following factors as necessary for moral responsibility:
1. â€œSince we always have Alternative Possibilitiesâ€
2. â€œSince we can knowingly say, we Could Have Done Otherwiseâ€
3. â€œSince our Actions are Causally Determined by Our Will and are Up to Usâ€
4. â€œWe are Morally Responsible for our Actionsâ€
The Cogito Model describes choice as a temporal process where alternatives are generated, evaluated, and a decision is made. Praxeology tells us that choice is a necessary logical implication of action. Non-Reductive Physicalism describes how it is possible that humans can be agents and have the capacity for agency. If choice and agency exist, then both theories describe the requirements necessary for moral responsibility. The following definitions describe the Non-reductive Physicalist and Adequate Determinist accounts of â€œfree agency or free choiceâ€ (DMNMMDI, pg233):
Choice: â€œFixed Past, then Generate Possibilities, then Evaluate Possibilities, then Think Again or Decision, then Undetermined Liberty or Self-Determination.â€
Information Philosopher, Cogito Model
Agent: â€œThe one who is able to evaluate that which moves her to act (Frankfurtâ€™s lower-order desires included), on the basis of reason (Kant), especially moral reasons (Taylor, MacIntyre); who is furthermore not unduly influenced by the judgments of others (autonomy in the first sense), nor prevented from acting according to that evaluation by weakness of will or overpowering emotions (Mele; autonomy in the second sense) is indeed an agent, the primary, top-down cause (agent causation of her own actionsâ€. (Did My Neurons Make Me Do It, pg305)
Free Agency: An agent is the primary cause of its own behavior (Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?, pg305); â€œâ€¦an agentâ€™s capacity, as a dynamic system, to redesign her own character through many instances of responsible action.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg24) â€œâ€¦â€œWe shall suggest that free will be seen as a holistic capacity of mature, self-reflective human organisms acting within a suitable social context.â€ (DMNMMDI, pg232)
Moral Agency: a person's ability to make moral judgments and take actions that comport with morality
I conclude, then, that free will, viewed through the paradigm of agency, exists. Humans can not only develop it, but the process can be interfered with. Free will has very definite limits. If the limits proposed above are verified, then Iâ€™d expect this knowledge to ripple through other parts of a world view like deontology.Â