military doctrine was defined had also considerable implications for the subordination of the military to political leadership.
Given the cataclysmic nature of atomic weaponry, especially in its particular employment configuration, which calls on massive retaliation, decisions in this area are inevitably more political than military. Moreover, the integrated character of French deterrence renders decisions regarding tactics on not only nuclear but also on conventional responses inseparable from those concerning strategy. Contrary to the American model of graduated response, against a conventional attack, for example, France has evolved a doctrine according to which conventional and tactical force components are not supposed to be used in an independent fashion as, for example, battle instruments, but rather as means for testing the enemy's intentions and as a warning to signify readiness to resort to a strategic strike, against cities, to boot. The renaming of the tactical nuclear stratum as prestrategic is significant in this respect. Therefore, in such a system, because the ultimate use of massive atomic retaliation is always presupposed, the engagement of even the lowest echelon of the defense machinery is inherently political and may belong only to the civilian powers. Deterrence appears then as a kind of dialogue developed between the French leaders and their foreign adversaries. The military is no longer positioned to determine the terms of this relation; its role is circumscribed to putting into work the various elements of defense by conferring on them the greatest readiness.
As a result, a dynamic of civilian intervention in the area of military actions, from confrontations susceptible to involving the nuclear force to lower-intensity operations, was thus put into motion. Concomitant statutory changes regarding, for instance, pay and retirement pensions, promotions, continuing education and facilities for reintegrating into the civilian labor force lessen military differences with society. Building consensus within public opinion around the military institution and nuclear defense appeased all tensions and indeed facilitated the political control of the institution, putting an end, at least for the time being, to a rather complex history of political-military relations. Whether the situation will last is another question, not to be dealt with here, especially with the reconfiguration of the French defense posture rendered necessary by recent world changes and the probable emergence of a new institutional format, away from the conscription-based system.
The literature covering civil-military relations in France is considerable. The following selection offers only some of the most salient references on the topic under a book form and written from an academic or scientific perspective.
André Louis. Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique. Paris: n.p., 1906.
Bankwitz Philip C. F. Maxime Weygand and Civil- Military Relations in Modem France. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.