Myres, Eugenics Review, April, 1915.
 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Kultur der Gegenwart, 2, 4, 1.
 Cimon, Pericles,
and Socrates all had three sons, and
apparently no daughters.—Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth,
 Cf. (e.g.) Plato, Theaetetus, 149.
 We may suppose that the disproportion of the sexes, caused by female infanticide, was about rectified by the deaths of males in battle and civic strife. We do not hear that the Greek had any difficulty in finding a wife.
 Families, he says,
were limited to one or two ’in order
to leave these rich.’
 The population of England and Wales is said to have been 4,800,000 in 1600, and 6,500,000 in 1750. It was 8,890,000 in 1801, 32,530,000 in 1901, and approximately 37,000,000 in 1914.
 Statistics are wanting for the early part of the industrial revolution, but my study of pedigrees leads me to think that the average duration of life was considerably increased in the eighteenth century.
 The Family and the Nation, p. 143.
 The births per 1000 married men under fifty-five in the different classes are:—Upper and middle class, 119; Intermediate, 132; Skilled workmen, 153; Intermediate, 158; Unskilled workmen, 213.
 It must be remembered
that the illegitimate birth-rate
in Berlin is scandalously high.
 The crude birth-rate
of Ireland is wholly misleading,
because so many young couples emigrate before the birth of
their first child.
 The possible effect of the labour movement in diminishing the population is considered in the next Essay. The last two years have, in my opinion, made the outlook less favourable.
THE FUTURE OF THE ENGLISH RACE
(THE GALTON LECTURE, 1919)
In the year 1890 Sir Charles Dilke ended his survey of ‘Greater Britain’ and its problems with the prediction that ’the world’s future belongs to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Chinese races.’ This was in the heyday of British imperialism, which was inaugurated by Seeley’s ‘Expansion of England’ and Froude’s ‘Oceana,’ and which inspired Mr. Chamberlain to proclaim at Toronto in 1887 that the ’Anglo-Saxon stock is infallibly destined to be the predominant force in the history and civilisation of the world.’ It was an arrogant, but not truculent, mood, which reached its climax at the 1897 Jubilee, and rapidly declined during and after the Boer war. These writers and statesmen were utterly blind to the German peril, though the disciples of Treitschke were already working out a theory about the future destinies of the world, in which neither Great Britain nor Russia