This article demonstrates “circuitous but intended outcomes”–or the desirable consequences accurately anticipated and predicted by the actors involved at the moment the act is carried out–in the case of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt. This case provides a strong illustration of how an actor who wages war can circuitously achieve political goals despite suffering military defeat on the battleground. Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat astonishingly predicted the indirect results of the war he initiated. Sadat forecast that Egypt needed a spark–“crossing the canal and capturing just ten centimeters of Sinai”—which would trigger the involvement of much more powerful forces, such as the superpowers—and the United States in particular—leading them to successfully compel Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt’s desired goal.
According to the Jewish calendar, September 14, 2013, marked the 40-year anniversary of the October War of 1973, also known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel or the Ramadan War among Arabs. Due to various academic obstacles, the entire story behind Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s strategy of aiming to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula may never be known. There is a significant amount of literature on the subject at this point, as well as on the role played in the conflict by the three main international actors–Egypt, Israel, and the United States. On the occasion of the 40-year anniversary and given the plethora of sources on the subject, it is an opportune time to take a new look at what happened and how.
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition of 1969-1970 ended in a military draw. It was also followed by a stalemate on the diplomatic front. This deadlock was broken at 14:00 on October 6, 1973. It was Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement–the holiest and most solemn holiday for the Jews–when the Egyptian and Syrian armies broke a two-year cease-fire and launched synchronized surprise attacks against Israel. Jerusalem had obviously been the victim of hostility, and the sudden act of Egyptian and Syrian aggression still constitutes the most traumatic event in Israel’s history.
In order to make an accurate evaluation of national decisionmaking, it is necessary to assess the decisions and relate them directly to their outcomes. The results of national decisions are international in nature, since they are dependent both on the content of the decisions themselves and on the actions of other actors at the same time. It is possible to attain terrible tactical results but at the same time to achieve favorable strategic outcomes, since other forces in the system can get involved and subsequently accomplish the original desired goals.
The 1973 war and the repeated practices of interstate relations among the three main players developed under circumstances of interdependence. Consequently, the outcomes of Egypt’s choices were as much a function of the actions of others as of its own. Analyzing the decisionmaking processes that were responsible for the turn of events leading to Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai presents a relationship that is circuitous in nature, which is neither direct nor straightforward. Sadat realized that reclaiming Sinai could not be achieved directly and visibly by military option, but only in roundabout manner. Thus, Sadat’s decision to wage the 1973 war was related to his prediction that the superpowers, and mainly the United States, would compel an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Ultimately, Cairo anchored Washington to be part of the solution, thus allowing Egypt to circuitously achieve its intended consequences of reclaiming Sinai.
The key foundation of this study is the concept that international outcomes are defined as an intersection of the choices of two or more players in an interdependent situation. Empirically, the study deals with the relationship between the national policy decision made by Egypt and the outcomes of the surrounding interstate events. By focusing on the key occurrences of that period, this article will make some observations on how things have turned out the way they have. The article will also explore decisionmaking in interactive international settings and try to shed light on the relationship between choice and consequences in an interdependent international environment and on the relationship between national decisions and international outcomes.
EGYPT’S PATH TO RECLAIM THE SINAI PENINSULA
Following the June 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt’s policy toward Jerusalem focused on reclaiming Sinai by triggering a complete Israeli withdrawal. Three policy options were considered by Cairo to achieve Egypt’s strategic goal of reclaiming Sinai: a military option; a no-war, no-peace option; and a political settlement option. Cairo’s strategy to achieve this goal included three main steps. Initially, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser relied on Cairo’s patron Moscow and launched the War of Attrition. When Sadat succeeded Nasser as Egyptian president after Nasser’s sudden death on September 28, 1970, Sadat initiated numerous peace plans. Ultimately, Sadat launched the 1973 war by relying on Israel’s patron, the United States.
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970
Following the 1967 war, the two superpowers quickly committed to Egypt and Israel, and both Washington and Moscow provided military support. The colossal failure of the Arabs in the 1967 war almost totally destroyed Egypt’s military capability and damaged Moscow’s prestige. At the same time, it also forced Egypt to rely heavily on Soviet support. Given the extent of the Arab defeat, both Cairo and Damascus quickly turned to Moscow for assistance. Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny arrived in Cairo on June 21, 1967. The Soviets replaced 130 aircrafts by July 15, their vessels were moored in Egyptian ports, and they dispatched several thousand military advisers to Egypt. Washington provided even greater support to Jerusalem. This included ending the wartime embargo of weapons with the delivery of Skyhawk fighters in December, an informal agreement for the sale of Phantom fighters, and the sale of additional HAWK anti-aircraft missiles in July 1968.
In October 1969, Cairo launched a series of artillery exchanges along the Suez Canal. These were followed in March 1969 with the War of Attrition, which lasted until the restoration of the ceasefire on August 7, 1970. By imposing a stable stream of casualties on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Nasser hoped he would persuade Jerusalem to withdraw from Sinai on acceptable terms. In Nasser’s words, the war was intended to be “one long battle to exhaust the enemy.”
In the fall of 1969, Moscow made a decision to supply combat personnel in addition to the 3,000 Soviet advisers already present in Egypt. In the spring of 1970, Moscow deployed a large number of highly capable air defense missiles and aircrafts into Egypt. Moscow also sent almost 20,000 military personnel, including technicians, advisers, air defense crews, and Soviet pilots. Actually, Soviet forces assumed responsibility for Egypt’s air defense, the first substantial deployment of Soviet combat troops into a third world country.
The Pre-1973 War Peace Initiatives
The time period between the War of Attrition and the 1973 war seems to have been a period of lost opportunities to prevent war between Cairo and Jerusalem and make a move towards peace. It was an era of diplomatic activity in order to achieve a comprehensive agreement between the belligerent sides. Cairo’s demand for complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai was rejected by Jerusalem until the war. Several attempts were made throughout this time period to break the diplomatic deadlock between Israel and Egypt.
The UN Mission of Gunner Jarring (1968-1971)
UN envoy Gunnar Jarring resumed his mediation efforts after the bloody confrontation between King Hussein and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) during the Jordan Crisis of 1970. Jerusalem seized the initiative in early 1971 by inviting Jarring to begin his mission with a journey to Israel. Jarring faced the problem that had stalemated negotiations the year before: Jerusalem insisted on peace while Cairo insisted on withdrawal. Jarring’s effort collapsed when the Israeli cabinet refused to consider the new proposals.
The Secretary of State William Rogers Plan (1969-1970)
After Jarring’s mission failed, Sadat revived a previous proposal for a limited withdrawal along the Suez Canal. Secretary of State William Rogers undertook a lengthy campaign to endorse this idea. Washington avoided imposing the Rogers Plan on Jerusalem, since as long as Egypt was essentially a Soviet military base, the Americans had no incentive to turn on an ally on behalf of a client of Moscow. The aim of President Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was, “to produce a stalemate until Moscow urged compromise or until, even better, some moderate Arab regimes decided that the route to progress was through Washington.”
Some argue that during Sadat’s early years in office, Cairo was ready to warm relations with Jerusalem. Sadat signaled his readiness to break the stalemate between Egypt and Israel in an address he made to Egypt’s National Assembly on February 4, 1971. Two peace initiatives followed.
President Sadat’s Initiative of Early 1971
The first fundamental change in the Egyptian position was implemented in early 1971. Sadat’s proposal to discuss an interim agreement along the Suez Canal became the focus of his diplomacy in 1971. In a speech to the Egyptian Parliament, Sadat accepted an extension of the ceasefire and revealed the idea of an interim agreement. Sadat also accepted the idea of partial Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal, permitting the reopening of the canal as the “first stage of a timetable which will be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the Security Council resolution .” Egypt’s February 15 reply to Jarring included, for the first time, an expression of willingness to sign a peace agreement with Jerusalem. Of course, it was conditioned on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, which Jerusalem would not accept. Sadat considered these steps of early 1971 as the beginning of his long and difficult journey to peace. Sadat made the same point in his address to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, on his November 20, 1977, visit to Jerusalem.
Sadat’s Secret Peace Initiative of February 1973
Sadat’s secret peace initiative of February 1973 was probably the most important proposal of the 1967-1973 period. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir’s unwillingness to enter into negotiations and Cairo’s refusal to reach peace with Jerusalem were the most important factors behind the failure. Ultimately, the distant Israeli and American response to Sadat’s initiatives led him to conclude that:
It was impossible, as I have always said, for the United States (or, indeed, any other power) to make a move if we ourselves didn’t take military action to break the deadlock. …the United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority.
Both Jerusalem and Washington seemed to fail to understand Egypt’s preferences and strategy. They therefore may have failed to recognize the impact their reaction had on Sadat’s motivations to go to war in October 1973. The diplomatic options were closed. Sadat now set in motion plans for war.
The October 1973 Yom Kippur War
The 1967 military disaster, the third time Israel imposed a military defeat on the Arabs, proved to them that as long Jerusalem preserved its military superiority it would be impossible for them to defeat Israel militarily. Under these conditions Nasser was unwilling to accept any political solution proposed by Jerusalem, since this would imply Cairo’s acquiesce to Israeli demands. Already in 1969, while acknowledging Egypt was unlikely to have the military capability to restore Sinai, al-Ahram editor Muhammad Heykal expounded a theory behind the would-be 1973 war in one of his weekly columns. As he wrote, Cairo could effectively transform the political situation to force Jerusalem to return the territories if a limited military defeat could be imposed on Israel.
When assuming office in September 1970, Sadat’s major foreign policy goal was to reclaim Sinai. Following the changes in Egypt’s leadership and the failure of previous attempts, Sadat took the risk of further escalation and initiated the October War. Sadat did not make the decision to go to war until mid-1973, and he actually “dreaded the prospect of having to order Egypt’s army to cross the canal,” since Cairo was expected to suffer high casualties.
Sadat did not fight a war for the liberation of the entire Sinai Peninsula by military means. He thought that a military initiative with a limited goal of capturing territory would have the greatest chance of breaking the stalemate situation and creating momentum for a political process. Sadat claimed that “crossing the canal and capturing just ten centimeters of Sinai would change the political situation from the point of view of the Arabs and the international community.”
Accordingly, Sadat planned the war with the intention of achieving a limited tactical success, which would then trigger U.S. involvement, in effect allowing the Egyptians to achieve their goal circuitously. Skillfully predicting Washington would be eager to avoid the danger of another Arab-Israeli war and to bring about peace between Israel and the Arabs in the explosive Middle East region, Sadat thus initiated the war. Because it was incapable of reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula by military means alone, Cairo circuitously led Washington to intervene in the conflict during and after the war, thereby assisting Egypt to achieve its goal.
Between 1971-1973, following the end of the War of Attrition and the Jordan crisis, both superpowers increased military support to their clients. Moscow’s military aid to Cairo included an expanded air defense system. During his talks with Soviet officials, Sadat was promised additional military supplies. In May 1971, Cairo signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, which appeared to reinforce the Soviet-Egyptian alliance. Washington’s military and economic support to Jerusalem was also massive and included additional F-4 aircrafts and engines for Israel’s Kfir jets, a $500 million loan, and a guarantee for long-term supply of Phantoms and Skyhawks fighters.
In July 1972, Moscow refused to give Cairo the offensive military support it needed to have a viable military option against Israel. In response, Sadat expelled the 20,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians. This marked the break between Moscow and Cairo. In August, both countries recalled their ambassadors.
Following the expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt, Sadat made the decision to approach Washington. He intensified his efforts to use the good services of Kissinger in order to promote a political solution for the Egyptian-Israeli dispute. Sadat’s policy aim was to avoid Nasser’s military failures. While Nasser directly confronted the United States and exclusively relied on Moscow’s support, Sadat visited Washington soon after taking office.
After Sadat had recognized that the possibility of reclaiming Sinai by relying solely on the Soviets was a dead-end, he turned to the Americans, trying to convince them to compel an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai to the pre-1967 borders, as Washington had done following the Sinai War of 1956. Sadat correctly assumed that Washington was the only party able to influence Jerusalem.
Sadat disagreed with Nasser’s approach of favoring full-scale military preparation to liberate Sinai. Instead, he wrote, “I used to tell Nasser that if we could recapture even four inches of Sinai territory (by which I mean a foothold, pure and simple), and establish ourselves there so firmly that no power on earth could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change – east, west, all over.”
Already in October 1972, Sadat proposed the concept of a war as a bridgehead at a meeting with his military chiefs. Some of those present, including War Minister and Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ahmad Sadeq, strongly opposed that view. Sadat soon fired Sadeq and several of his colleagues. The new appointees, General Ahmad Isma’il as minister of war and General Sa’d al-Din al-Shazly as chief of staff, were instructed to prepare operational plans for a bridgehead war.
Israel’s military capabilities when weighed against those of the combined Arab states lied overwhelmingly in Jerusalem’s favor. Following the Arabs’ colossal defeat of 1967, Sadat concluded that Israel’s destruction was impractical because of Washington’s strong commitment to Jerusalem’s security. Thus, Cairo’s conclusion was that an all-out military option was inconceivable for Egypt. During the preparations for achieving his goal, Sadat placed Egypt in a position of exclusive dependence on Washington and lost all possible support from Moscow.
The strategic goal of such a plan is a political resolution that acquires a favorable military position. Achievement of the desired strategic objectives would depend upon the complete tactical success of the limited military operation. Sadat successfully trapped the Israelis in what is known as the fatal “conception,” according to which Cairo would not attack Israel until it had achieved air superiority. The conception’s origins could be found in Nasser’s words to the Soviets in late 1968, in which he stated he would not get involved in a major war with Israel until he was certain of Egypt’s military ability: “Unfortunately our military capability is not ready yet to advance east after [a canal] crossing.”
In April 1973, Sadat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad gave their approval for the war plan. Assad was brought by Sadat to confront Israel with a two-front war. While Sadat wanted war to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula, Assad sought to recover the Golan Heights from Israel. Before initiating the war, Sadat assembled Egypt’s Armed Forces Supreme Council and informed them of his decision to go to war without waiting for the necessary Soviet weapons. Soon after, the Egyptian army was deployed.
On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a military strike into Sinai in an effort to regain the territories lost in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Sadat was the main mover and planner of the 1973 war. He pursued limited objectives, stating that the key goal of the war was to break the diplomatic stalemate in the Middle East and reignite the peace process with Israel. Sadat initiated the war when he failed to reach a political solution to reclaim Sinai. However, he turned in this direction only after he had obtained increased military support from the Soviets, Egypt’s patron, and simultaneously built an effective anti-Israeli alliance with the Arabs.
THE SUPERPOWERS’ INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1973 WAR
The 1973 war was a watershed event in terms of influencing the involvement of the superpowers in the Middle East. Sadat took the lead in forging the alliance with Syria and in setting strictly limited aims for the joint operation. Sadat also provoked the international crisis in which the two superpowers, as he predicted, would intervene in order to secure the settlement of reclaiming Sinai.
Despite Soviet military support, Moscow had failed to trigger an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Sadat was convinced that Washington held the key to the Israelis and that Secretary of State Kissinger was willing to use his influence to pressure Jerusalem. Between Sadat’s two visits to Moscow, in February and April 1972, Cairo had opened a secret channel to Washington.
The United States, which had so much leverage over Jerusalem, chose not to use its influence as assertively before the 1973 war as it did after. The new situation emerged when Sadat initiated the war. It was at that point that international dynamics developed in the direction of pushing Washington to take an active role. However, the substance of a plan alone is unlikely to determine its success or failure. Thus, by initiating the 1973 war, Sadat hoped to circuitously create the conditions that would force a diplomatic intervention by the two superpowers–especially the United States–pressuring Israel into making territorial concessions.
Egypt’s massive military strike into Sinai had an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy decisions. Washington did not criticize the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack, and the American political and military establishment expected a quick Israeli victory. Kissinger, however, was worried that the IDF would succeed in capturing Arab territory beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines, which would make a settlement even more difficult.
There were three main phases involving the superpowers during the war. On October 6-10, Egypt and Syria both implemented strategic and tactical surprises. The Egyptians succeeded in conquering territory on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and the Syrians managed to break through the Israeli lines of defense on the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon. Moscow’s efforts to obtain a ceasefire were rejected by its clients. Washington rejected the Soviet request with the expectation that Jerusalem would rapidly defeat its attackers.
On October 11-18, the superpowers took an increasingly active role as Jerusalem gained military achievements. Both superpowers began to provide massive supplies to their clients. By October 15, while absorbing massive Soviet assistance, Kissinger was invited to Cairo in the first clear indication of Sadat’s political strategy of turning to Washington for diplomatic support.
On October 19-27, the two superpowers succeeded in imposing a ceasefire. By October 19, after Israeli forces had routed Syria and were threatening to encircle Egypt’s Third Army, Kissinger flew to Moscow and Jerusalem to negotiate a ceasefire, which was accepted on the October 27 and brought the war to a close.
A U.S. airlift of military supplies to Israel began on October 13 and lasted about a month. This could be marked as a possible turning point of the war. The airlift started after Nixon gave the order to send Israel “everything that can fly.”
The lesson Moscow learned from the 1967 war was that in the absence of Soviet help, their clients were incapable of fighting Israel in a full-scale military operation without running serious risks. Thus, before and after the 1973 war, Moscow delivered massive shipments of arms to Egypt and Syria, enabling them to initiate the war and then to prolong it. The Soviets probably should not be blamed for prompting the Arab attack against Israel. However, they quickly developed a policy intended to minimize the risk of an Arab defeat or a superpower confrontation.
THE POST-OCTOBER 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR
During the Cold War era the Middle East was a region characterized by intense superpower competition. This rivalry could have made it possible for small states to manipulate Washington and Moscow and play them off each other. Both Nasser and Sadat thought that only substantial pressure could reclaim Sinai on terms the Egyptians would accept. The 1973 war was a key element in Sadat’s strategy of achieving the goal of reclaiming Sinai, and the war was a necessary precondition for Cairo’s readiness to reach peace with Jerusalem. Sadat believed that even if the Egyptian army would only cross the canal, it would be a significant achievement, since it would cause a superpower intervention.
One of the most significant developments of the 1973 war was Egypt’s dramatic realignment with the United States. From Sadat’s viewpoint, it was Washington’s motivation to approach both Cairo and Jerusalem–accompanied by Kissinger’s ability to be an objective mediator–that enabled such a dramatic change in Egypt’s foreign policy attitude. Sadat’s decision to shun Moscow and rely on Washington to mediate a solution to reclaim Sinai was a result of the following factors: Washington’s close relationship with Jerusalem and U.S. leverage over Israel through economic and military aid; Sadat’s decision to avoid Soviet participation since he felt Egyptians had been continuously sold-out by Moscow; and Moscow’s unsupportive track record over the past two decades. Sadat was convinced that the Soviets were not prepared to play an “even-handed” role in settling the conflict.
Kissinger visited Cairo immediately after the war. By January 1974, Sadat could state publicly that, “the U.S. is following a new policy.” A month later, Cairo and Washington restored diplomatic relations. In June 1974, Richard Nixon became the first U.S. president to visit Egypt. Washington’s aid for FY-1975 climbed to $408 million. By 1977, American economic and military assistance to Cairo would grow to almost $2 billion, indicating Egypt’s realignment from Moscow to Washington.
Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy proved Sadat’s predictions and assessments were correct. With both Jerusalem and Cairo dependent on Washington’s mediation, Kissinger was able to approach three major agreements in 1974 and 1975. Simultaneously, U.S.-Israel relations were spoiled by intense disputes, disrupting the negotiating process since Kissinger’s tactics involved a combination of carrots and sticks.
In the fall of 1977, the Egyptian President initiated peace with Israel. Sadat thought that a dramatic gesture would “break the psychological and political barriers to peace.” The secret meetings between Sadat’s special envoy, Hasan Tuhamy, and Moshe Dayan in the summer of 1977 convinced Sadat that he should secretly meet Begin and, as Tuhamy advised Sadat, “go to Jerusalem”: “Go to Jerusalem. Let us go to Jerusalem – our land, our holy place, center of the world and center of the problem… From there we will declare our demands and let the world hear and know in a last attempt for true peace. We shall see if they have the courage to go along with us in the same way.” Sadat’s decision to go to Jerusalem reflected his overall strategy. His goal was simple: Going straight to the “head” of Israel and offering peace and recognition, in return for the principle of “withdrawal for peace.”
The post-1973 Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations included the limited agreement on the disengagement of forces between Egypt and Israel in May 1974, the September 1975 Sinai Interim Agreement, and the form of the September 1978 Camp David Agreements. Sadat went to Camp David convinced he had U.S. President Jimmy Carter on his side, promising to implement resolution 242. As a result of the March 26, 1979, Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, which was signed at the Camp David Peace Summit, Cairo peacefully regained territories lost in the 1967 war–achieving its national policy objectives of total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Washington also organized a peacekeeping regime along the Egyptian-Israeli border–the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)–and maintains a rotating infantry battalion in the force. Egypt also benefited from its peace with Israel in terms of increased American aid and foreign investments.
From its rebirth in 1947, the Jewish State of Israel fought five major wars. The Arab-Israeli conflict, one of the most enduring and dangerous regional conflicts in recent history, included the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Suez War, the June 1967 Six-Day War, the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition of 1969-1970, and the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, the most favorable opportunities for an overall peace in the Middle East occurred after the 1973 war.
Before the October War, Kissinger advised Sadat to be realistic. Since Egypt was the defeated side, Kissinger argued, it should not make demands acceptable only from victors and not dictate her conditions to the victor, Israel. The war, however, changed everything. It had removed the stigma of defeat, since most Egyptians viewed the canal crossing on the first day of the war as passing from defeat to victory and from shame to dignity. Ultimately, Egypt’s military victories at the beginning of the war enabled Sadat to break the barrier of shame that had been created by the humiliating 1967 defeat. Sadat cleverly initiated the 1973 war and was able to secure Washington as an active mediator in conducting the process with Jerusalem. Thus, Egypt circuitously achieved its intended consequences of returning Sinai.
The war essentially served the purpose of breaking the diplomatic stalemate that had become the norm since the 1967 war. By launching the war, Sadat moved his country and the region toward a revolution in international affairs, succeeding to change the course of history by transforming military defeat to political victory.
From an Israeli perspective, the war’s aftermath was traumatic; Prime Minister Golda Meir and her government were forced to resign in disgrace on April 11, 1974. Sadat was assassinated in October 1981 and was replaced by Husni Mubarak. Six months later Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai.
*Dr. Ofer Israeli is a geostrategist and an international security policy and Middle East expert. He teaches international relations theory, foreign policy decisionmaking, and the Middle East at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya and Hadassah Academic College in Jerusalem. He is also a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center (NSSC), University of Haifa. Previously, he was a Visiting Researcher at the Center for Peace & Security Studies (CPASS) at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service (SFS). His postdoctoral research is in the field of complexity of international relations.
 A poll by Yedioth Ahronot, April 26, 2002.
 Irving Janis, Crucial Decision (New York: Free Press, 1989).
 Cherif M. Bassiouni, “An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy Toward Israel,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1980), pp. 3-26.
 Ghali Shoukri, Egypt (London: Zed Press, 1981); David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (Winchester, MA: Faber and Faber, 1982).
 For Moscow’s attitude toward and involvement with the 1967 war, see: Yaacov Ro’i and Morozov Boris, (eds.), The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
 For the changing Arab attitudes towards the USSR since the mid-1950s to mid-1980s, see: Rashid Khalidi, “Arab Views of the Soviet Role in the Middle East,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 716-732.
 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 107.
 Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs (Baltimore.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 66-68.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 107.
 For the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, see: Ahmed Khalidi, “The War of Attrition,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1973), pp. 60-87; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969–1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
 Nasser, as quoted in: Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 108.
 Arnold Horelick, “Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” in Paul Hammond and Sidney Alexander (eds.), Political Dynamics in the Middle East (New York: American Elsevier, 1972), p. 596.
 Alvin Rubinstein, “Air Support in the Arab East,” in Stephen Kaplan (ed.), Diplomacy of Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1981), p. 474.
 Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 221.
 William Quandt, Decade of Decisions (Berkley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 129. For the question of whether the 1973 war was avoidable, see: Gershon Shafir, “The Miscarriage of Peace,” Israel Studies Forum Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 3-26.
 For Egypt’s general peace policy over the years 1967-1978, see: Bassiouni, “An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy Toward Israel.”
 Uri Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 545-56, on p. 549.
 Quandt, Decade of Decision, chap. 4; Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), chap XV.
 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1277-78.
 Nadav Safran, Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 459.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 114-115.
 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1278-79.
 Quandt, Decade of Decisions; Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1974). Mordechai Gazit, however, argues that in 1971-1973 Sadat was not yet willing to make any compromises. Mordechai Gazit, “Egypt and Israel – Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971?” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 97-115.
 Kissinger, White House Years, 1279-1280.
 Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 219, 221-22.
 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1280, fn. 1.
 Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War,” pp. 545-46.
 El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 238.
 Zeev Maoz and Allison Astorino, “Waging War, Waging Peace,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 373-99.
 Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War,” p. 551.
 Moshe Shemesh, “The Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-Face,” Israel Studies Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer 2008), pp. 28-53, on p. 30.
 For a detailed description of the 1973 war, see: Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975); Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
 Nadav Safran, “Trial by Ordeal,” International Security Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 133-70, on p. 134.
 Yossi Beilin, Israel (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 43.
 Mohamed Heikal, Secret Channels (London: Harper Collins, 1996), pp. 163, 179.
 Protocol, G.H.Q. meeting, October 24, 1972, Sabri, Documents, pp. 37-88; Amin Huwaydi, The Lost Opportunities, 3rd ed. (Beirut, 1986) [Arabic], pp. 318-50.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 115.
 Whetten, The Canal War, pp. 162-66, 146-53.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 118-19.
 Mohrez Mahmoud El Hussini, Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945-85 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 199.
 Alvin Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 188-91.
 William Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1976), p. 6. Uri Ra’anan argued “that the Soviets were not asked to leave Egypt, but rather that they chose to do so when the policy of deep involvement there no longer provided sufficient gains to justify its continuation.” Uri Ra’anan, “The USSR and the Middle East,” Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 1973), pp. 946-77.
 El Hussini, Soviet-Egyptian Relations, p. 199.
 Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War,” p. 546.
 El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 166.
 William Wesselman, U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making During the 1973 Arab/Israel Conflict (Montgomery, AL: Maxwell Air Force Base, April 1995), p. 4.
 For the U.S. economic and political pressures that led Israel, Britain and France to withdraw at the end of the Sinai War of 1956, see: Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 146-49; Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), chap. 2; Ofer Israeli, “Twilight of Colonialism: Mossadegh And the Suez Canal,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 147-56.
 Shemesh, “The Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-Face,” pp. 34-39.
 El-Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 244.
 Safran, “Trial by Ordeal,” pp. 134-35.
 Bassiouni, “An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy Toward Israel,” p. 8.
 Shemesh, “The Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-Face,” p. 30.
 Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle Press, 1975).
 The Agranat Report: The Yom Kippur War Commission of Inquiry (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975) [Hebrew], p. 19.
 Avd al-Majid Farid, Protocols from Nasir’s Arab and International Meetings 1967-1970 (Beirut, 1979), pp. 114-15. Quoted and translated from Arabic, in: Shemesh, “The Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-Face,” p. 33.
 Shemesh, “The Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-Face,” p. 45.
 Elizabeth Stephens, “Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War,” History Today Vol. 58, No. (October 2008), pp. 44-50, on p. 46.
 Sa’ad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Canal (San Francisco, CA: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 173-81; el-Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 234-37.
 Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War,” p. 547.
 For Egypt’s objectives during the October 1973 War, see: Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamassy, The Ramadan War (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993); el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Canal, pp. 172–81; el-Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 234–37; Raphael Israeli, Man of Defiance (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 29; Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), pp. 111–12.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 114.
 Ibid., p. 126.
 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1276.
 Wesselman, “U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making During the 1973 Arab/Israel Conflict,” p. 3.
 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 490; Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 171–72.
 Shmuel Tzabag, “The End of the Yom Kippur War Between Israel and Egypt,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2007), 141-63, on p. 143.
 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 471-73; Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 172.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 122-23.
 Ibid., p. 123.
 For the U.S. airlift to Israel in 1973, see: Zach Levey, “Anatomy of an Airlift,” Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (November 2008), pp. 481-501; Avraham Greenbaum, “The US Airlift to Israel in 1973 and Its Origins,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2007), 131-140.
 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1990), p. 927.
 Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War, p. 3.
 For details on the Soviet airlift and sealift to Egypt and other Arab countries during the 1973 war, see: Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp. 130-31, 145-46; Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War, pp. 18-27.
 Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War, pp. iii, vi.
 Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, p. ix.
 Huwaydi, The Lost Opportunities, pp. 325-27.
 Wesselman, “U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making During the 1973 Arab/Israel Conflict,” p. 21.
 Ibid., fn. 63.
 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, p. 205.
 For Kissinger’s account of his first meeting with Sadat, see: Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 635-45. For Sadat’s statement regarding the change in U.S. policy, see: Raphael Israeli (ed.), The Public Diary of President Sadat (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1978), p. 448.
 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 125.
 For Kissinger step-by-step diplomacy, see: Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 224-29, 238-45; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, chaps. 18, 23.
 David Pollock, The Politics of Pressure (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 167-70, 179-96.
 Zahid Mahmood, “Sadat and Camp David Reappraised,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Autumn 1985), pp. 62-87, on p. 66.
 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
 Ibid., p. 74. For UN Security Council Resolution 242, see: 22 UN SCOR (1382d mtg.) 8, UN Doc. S/INF/22/REv. 2 (1967). For UN Security Council Resolution 338, see: 28 UN SCOR (1747th mtg.) 10, UN Doc. S/INF/29 (1973).
 For an analysis of the time frame beginning with the 1973 war and ending with the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979, see: Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 1999).
 Although most analysts agree there were four wars, Israel insists it has fought five. The difference of opinion is regarding the War of Attrition that was embarked upon by Egypt in March of 1969.
 The 1982 Lebanon War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the Second Lebanon War of 2006 are beyond the scope of this topic since there were limited scale two-sided wars between Israel and the PLO, Iraq, and Hizballah.
 Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War,” p. 551.
 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1277.
 Howard Sachar, A History of Israel, Vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 3-4.