In “part 2” of these series of articles we came to two conclusions: first, that “the belief in “proposition g” (I.e. the generational intra-species etiological dependence) and therefore in common ancestry is, at this point, unjustified” and second, that “explanations other than naturalism fail to warrant common descent”.
What does all of this mean? Certainly something can be unwarranted and yet be correct. A belief can lack evidence and yet be reasonable. This is exactly what the great philosopher Alvin Plantinga thinks (see his book “God and Other Minds”) regarding justified belief: a belief can be held reasonably even in absence of evidence. Such scenario would somehow contradict the formulations of the conclusions here reported. Their formulation seems, in fact, to imply that, because no positive evidence can warrant the belief in common ancestry (I.e. the last feasible remaining part of evolution which could have been held by a theistic evolutionist), then such belief is unwarranted.
So, clearly, the argument, as presented in “part 2”, results to be incomplete. Our final conclusions, in fact, do not even show, per se, whether theistic evolutionism is a better or worse explanation of biological origins than philosophical creationism.
Realizing, therefore, that the proposed argument against Theory 2) has to be continued, let’s approach part 5 of such argument.
Truth rigidity: the “truth rigidity” indicates the defeater proneness of a theory given its lack to adapt to new or different explananda (i.e. data that requires explanation). An example in which truth rigidity is inferred and compared is the following: postulate the scenario in which a person has to guess a given number between 1 and 100. The theory that he chose any number between 1 and 50 is less rigid than the theory which says that he chose, let’ say, number 51. The first theory has 50 defeaters while the second has 99 defeaters. The more a theory is rigid and the more it is prone to be falsified.
Truth malleability: it is to be taken as the opposite of truth rigidity.
Convergence: Within evolutionary biology, is the phenomenon by which biological similarities are brought about by independent evolutionary paths and are therefore accountable by a multiplicity of causes and not a unifying explanation such as a single common ancestor between the lineages. Convergence multiplies the evolutionary improbability insofar as the naturalistic process of random mutations and natural selection would have to reach twice (or more) instead of once, the improbable formation of a complex biological structure.
Theory 2): The version of theistic evolution which recognized the need of God’s active intervention to actualize the evolutionary process (for more information, see past articles).
PC: Abbreviation for Philosophical Creationism
Part 5: THE FACT THAT PROPOSITION G) AND THEREFORE COMMON ANCESTRY ARE UNJUSTIFIED, RENDERS THEORY 2) UNTENABLE
The Implausibility of Theory 2)
Lack of positive evidence doesn’t invalidate “per se” a theory, but if such lack of evidence renders the theory ad hoc and implausible, we have significant information which suffices to make the inference that the theory is more probably false than the competing theory which is less ad hoc and implausible. In particular, this applies to theistic evolutionism which, I will show, specifically derives its ad hocness and implausibility form its lack of evidence. Such status will show how it is most probably false and pales in comparison to the strength and truth malleability of the theory of Philosophical Creationism.
Before entering into the argument, let me provide this imaginary but illustrative scenario.
Imagine person 1 was asked to detect the path by which person 2 went from point a to point b. To make this less abstract, let’s say, Mark was asked to describe the path that Tom had taken from Rome to London. Now, let’s say that, for some reason, Mark knew a Tom who loved to explore the world and one day, starting from Rome (presumably the place where he lived) he went to visit a hundred different cities throughout several years around the world such as Washington, Tokio, Sidney, Brasilia and so forth ending, at last, in London where he died. If we postulate that Mark thought that the request to detect Tom’s path was referring to the Tom he knew, it would be rational for Mark to depict Tom’s adventures as starting from Rome, constructing a theory with the attempt to describe the most accurately possible the several cities he visited around the world with him ending with his arrival in London. Imagine Mark elaborating such theory by carefully examining the evidence of Thomas’ life: he looks at his Facebook profile and the date of the pictures he posted. Mark, somehow, gets ahold of Tom’s spending account, and track his bills all around the world: he is able to carefully construct Tom’s itinerary by inferring the order and sequence which he followed. At the end of his research, Mark feels confident in being able to say which cities Tom visited first and which ones he visited after. Mark, in the end, is also able to conclude the exact order of the 100 cities Tom visited from Rome to London.
Mark would be reasonable in believing in the truth of the itinerary he so carefully inferred.
But, let’s now postulate that Mark discovers that the itinerary he was asked to study belonged to another Tom, which he never knew. At this point, it would be reasonable for Mark to throw in the trash the articulated and complex theory regarding how the previous Tom arrived to London from Rome through these 100 cities and start over again. But let’s now say that Mark, throwing a tantrum instead, decides to say: “well I still believe this new Tom did the very itinerary the old Tom underwent! I cannot waste all my efforts in the research I did. I will confidently assert that the Tom which I do not know much about did this very precise itinerary of these 100 cities in the precise order I inferred previously. I may have no reason to believe it, but I decide to do so.
Theory 2) is Mark’s scenario
This represents very closely the scenario of theory 2) and its attempt to reconcile Theism with Darwinism. Here is why.
Theory 2) represents Marks attempt to preserve his initial efforts to track the first Tom he was doing his research on and apply it, unjustifiably, to the second Tom. Why? The first Tom represents the evolutionary inferences made under the premise of methodological naturalism: such background information would justify, as we have seen, bottom-top causation which then can support particular specifications of the evolutionary theory. Such premises, in fact, allow very particular inferences regarding evolutionary branching such as speculations on when and how a specific animal developed and from who. Speculations of the sort which do not have to be argumentative but presuppositional. For example, under these lenses, it is understandable to speculate how and when marine mammals developed and from which ancestors. Such premises represent the initial presupposition of Mark had in researching Tom’s trip: the assumption was that they were asking him to study the itinerary of the Tom he knew. But just as Mark’s initial assumption was shown to be erroneous, methodological naturalism has been shown to be falsified by Axe’s implication: genetic information is a product of the active will of a mind, in this case God. Just as the first Tom had to be thrown out of the picture, also purely naturalistic evolution had to be (given the impossibility of purely natural processes to produce genetic information). As the first Tom got substituted by another Tom which mimicked the first one, naturalistic evolution had to be saved by being substituted by theistic evolution. But just as Mark was only justified to infer his particular conclusions (such as the specific 100 cities he visited) under the premise that he had to research the Tom he previously knew, common ancestry and the evolutionary phylogenetic tree was justified only under the very first version of evolution (i.e. naturalistic evolution). Just as Mark would be considered a fool in maintaining that the second Tom which we do not know much about did the specific itinerary the first Tom did, to assess the Darwinian phylogenetic tree and other assertions such as “proposition g”, under Theory 2) is foolish. When the illustrative example mentions the fact that Tom went from Rome to London, which represents the starting point a and the finishing point b, I am parallelling such narrative with the starting point of God’s first creation of a biological life form and God’s last creation (presumably man).
Now a person might ask how come the second form of evolution ought to be as unknown as the second Tom? I believe the answer lies in “part 2” of my series of articles, but, to reiterate, we can say the following in a non-syllogistic/quasi-narrative form:
-Axe’s implication requires God’s active intervention in history
-God’s active intervention in history qualifies as a defeater to methodological naturalism
-The fact that we know God had to intervene increases exponentially the strength of “proposition m” (i.e. “But if you have two competing theories for which the data confirmed both predictions, the data becomes inconclusive”). This is because the option of a supernatural account of origins increased its probability and therefore is rendered more plausible in accounting for the data among the pool of possible explanations (such as naturalism).
-such a strong version of “proposition m” impedes, given the sole actual data, strong positive assertions regarding the nature of origins
-background information is therefore needed
-background information does not support, and actually disqualifies, the possibility to assert indirect creation (see paragraph “The Perfect Evolutionary Scenario” in “part 2”)
-Axe’s implication, therefore, disqualifies the previously made inferences constructed under naturalistic evolutionism.
I think I have, therefore, shown the validity of the parallel between the acknowledgment that the old information cannot apply to the second Tom and the old inferences on naturalistic evolution cannot apply to theistic evolution version 2.
We can call, for simplicity, the epistemic attitude exerted by Mark, “Mark’s fallacy”.
The big implication of all of this is that, when the evidence for the evolutionary inferences is disqualified, different possible worlds seems to gain equal probability, therefore increasing the potential falsity of the evolutionary scenario. If there is no positive evidence for a particular specification of reality (i.e. possible world), such specification could well be false given its apparent similar truth probability with other specifications. This is exactly why Mark’s behavior seems to us foolish. To assert that the other Tom did the journey of the old Tom is extremely improbable given the equal likelihood of other possible journeys given the lack of evidence for any particular journey. In this context, positive evidence increases (epistemically) the truth probability of a specification of reality over other specifications making therefore that particular specification probably true and hence the belief in it justified.
Because theistic evolutionism tries to maintain the most possible the theory of Darwinian evolution, it tries to maintain its specifications such as the postulation of a set of specific animals and a specific order of animals, all with a specific etiological dependence which we have not witnessed. This is exactly what Mark was trying to do with the itinerary he presumed the second Tom took. But, once again, how could someone now believe this?
The implausibility arises from the fact that when possible scenarios are equally plausible (at the eyes of the observer), given equal evidence (i.e. equal absence of evidence), to assert and guess the truth of one of them over the other is as implausible as the number of possible scenarios (proposition p). 
This is to say that the more possible scenarios could be true the more implausible it is for you to be right in saying which scenario is actually the true one (given their equal evidence). I used purposefully the world “guess” because no other inferential method can be used given the available evidence, background evidence and the equalizing power of “proposition m”.
To understand this fundamental concept think about this example.
Postulate a deck of 100 cards. Now imagine that a person were to state the exact order in which the cards are: it would be very unlikely that the order he guessed would be the actual order given the ratio of the wide range of possible actualities.
Clearly, given the information available, all combinations of how the deck could be ordered are equally probable, there is no reason to think that, let’s say, the heart cards are probably found on the top rather than the bottom. 
The possibilities of God’s creation compared to the purported evolutionary one seem to me to be uncountable, probably similar to the magnitude of the numbers proposed by the defenders of the “fine tuning” argument. Theory 2) cannot therefore rationally be believed as true. It should therefore be believed to be false.
Now a person might say that all possibilities are equally improbable but some always actualize and therefore it is not really improbable to have any of the possible actualities. This argument is ludicrous because something actualizes for a reason, it is the unwarrantedness that makes the the theory improbably true (on an epistemic level), for if all options are equally probable (given the evidence) that theory would have to compete with all the other possible actualities. Would the person presenting the objection use the same reasoning if someone were to guess the exact script of a book we do not know anything about? Clearly, the multitude of possibilities by which a book can be composed of makes it extremely unlikely to guess the text of the book in question. The same thing applies to theistic evolution and its pustulating million of unwarranted factors (such as unseen intermediary animals, which not ought to have existed): to guess reality is improbable. Yes, also if reality is always the actualization of a possibility. Reality is not improbable insofar as it is actual. In the realm of inquiry, possibilities become improbable insofar as evidence is not presented to favor one possible world over another. While the objection may have an ontological truth, its epistemic version holds no true argumentative power.
The scenario proposed by Theory 2) is therefore extremely unlikely true (i.e. almost certainly false). Such high improbability qualifies as a defeater for the theory.
Now a person might say that the purported truth improbability of theory 2) is easily overcome by the will of the actualizing agent (I.e. God). Clearly such thing is true. The Improbability is epistemic (given the current conditions) not existential. God could easily actualize theory 2) as he could actualize PC. To give the argument and ontological route would be absurd for it would make all possible actualities actually improbable therefore making reality probably false when we know it is certainly true.
Lastly, a person could object by saying that PC, given the laid out criteria of proposition p, has the same probabilities to be false. To say for example that all animals are directly created is subject to the same probability of falsification. First, PC does not assert that all animals or species are directly created, second its truth malleability (which I will later defend) makes it a less falsifiable and more probably true theory the theory 2) and third, as we will see, there is good background evidence to assert PC over theory 2) (such as Occam’s razor).
On the rigidity and possible world defeaters of Theory 2): developing “proposition p”
Quite reasonably a person might question the actual improbability of Theory 2) by questioning the actual number of possible actualities and the supposed rigidity (lack of truth malleability) of Theory 2). So how rigid is the theory and, consequently, how many are its possible defeaters?
Well, whatever disqualifies common ancestry is a defeater of theory 2), therefore, given the postulation of all casual connections through proposition g), one single animal (except the very first common ancestor) ought to not be etiologically dependent from the precedent one (i.e. he is directly created) for the entire theistic evolutionary theory to be falsified. Let us assume that the probability of God producing a known animal directly is as likely as God producing a known animal indirectly which means that P (dc/m & ai) is 0.5 and P (ic/m &ai) is 0.5 (nomenclature explained in the note).  Which means that, let’s say, given our epistemic position, if there are 11 million species on earth there is a 1/2^11,000,000 chance that God created them all indirectly. So there are (at least) 1/2^11,000,000 possible worlds in which all of them except one are (the one in which all animals are created indirectly) defeaters of Theory 2). All possible worlds seem to have the same probability of actualization.
Further, if we assess the species came indirectly the animal which they came from would increase the wideness of the explananda given that the evolutionary phylogenetic tree postulates more species than the currently existing ones. Those postulated animals themselves could be either directly or indirectly created. We know this for the evolutionary transitional sequence requires more animals than the postulated existing ones. So, while it is true that some species can arise naturally from another given a decrease of information (which brings us to say that some species can arise naturally as explained in “part 2”) the number of naturally occurring species which would diminish the explananda of 11 million species is compensated by the possible duplex origin (i.e. direct or indirect) of the postulated transitional animals. 
While this expanded explananda is conditional (it exists only under the hypothesis of indirect creation) it ought to be assumed as true if the likelihood of Theory 2) is to be calculated given the fact that such explananda would be a necessary entailment of Theory 2). The more the theory is postulated to be verified (indirect creation is said to have happened for the existing species) the more it becomes open to be falsified given the widening of the explananda.
Therefore, to oppose universality of indirect creation (given the numerous possible worlds that arise from the abandonment of such assumption) is the first defeater to theory 2).
But is this the only way we can envision possible world defeaters? No. And explaining why will highlight the even greater majority of possible worlds with equal probability to the evolutionary one which defeats Theory 2).
Premise to further defeaters
To fully answer the question and detect other defeaters, certain things have to be kept in mind. First, how rigid evolutionism actually is? As now, we saw just a single criterion for defeatability (direct vs indirect creation). If Theory 2) works on the assumption that God actively actualized the neo-Darwinian history of life then it seems to me that the possible world defeaters increase. At the end of the day, given naturalistic assumptions, there is only one evolutionary way life developed. The actual world is just one world, possible actualities don’t take away the fact that reality was specified in one way only. Therefore, technically, it could be said that whatever possible tree that is not the actual one given naturalism, is a defeater and enters into the realm of possible actualities with equal probability. But do all possible tree really have equal probability? Would naturalistic evolution be really falsified by a sole change in its proposed evolutionary tree? Can it be slightly different and yet properly be considered evolutionary? I think, to an extent, yes. What would exactly contradict an evolutionary tree of life? Are there ways in which indirect creation, even if complete (i.e. all the animals were indirectly created), would contradict evolutionism? What are the assumptions which help construct an evolutionary tree but are not dependent upon evolutionary presuppositions and therefore ought to be maintained as limiting factors of possible worlds with equal probability? All these questions deserve serious inquiry. I will attempt to only briefly scratch the surface of the answers hoping that it will suffice to convincingly conclude my argument against Theory 2).
So, is there an assumption that ought to be maintained regardless of the truth of Theory 2)? I think so. The justified non evolutionary assumptions are that on a large-scale, given the assumption of uniformitarism (which might be wrong given, let’s say, evidence for large-scale catastrophism), is that, generally speaking, what is lower in the fossil record is (or has more probability to be) created first than what is found later (proposition q). This would definitely make more improbable completely random proposed phylogenetic trees with, let’s say, man at the bottom and bacteria at the top. And, what we have to search for, to calculate the evolutionary improbability, are possible worlds with the same probability.
To attempt to answer all of the question relative to the rigidity of Theory 2) we have to know the assumptions under which the field of computational phylogenetics operates to understand what current evolutionists conceive as a necessary criterion for evolutionary development.
Given “part 2” which showed their total unwarrantedness, a denial of these assumptions is legitimated and will create other possible worlds with (at least apparent) the same probability. The major evolutionary assumption seems to be the following: similar genomes are an indication of evolutionary proximity, while genetic dissimilarity is an indication of evolutionary distance (proposition r).
This assumption is dependent upon naturalism given the idea that it would be improbable for extremely similar genomes to have evolved independently (this is why hypotheses of large-scale convergence are discouraged by evolutionists). To say that two similar mammals evolved from two completely independent evolutionary paths originating way far back than “what is needed” would multiply causes beyond necessity and render the theory itself even more improbable (given the greater need for functional mutations: these genes would have to originate independently twice or more). The implausibility of non-sporadic convergence seems to drive the approach of uniting under the same evolutionary path similar genomes. But, given Axe’s implication, even under the assumption that God created only indirectly, to say that similar genomes indicate evolutionary proximity is unjustified. God could have created a phylogenesis that, for example, instead of resembling a tree, would resemble a sun and its rays in which every species independently “evolved” from this center, this first common ancestor.  In this case, all similarities would be due to convergence and the improbability that this scenario would have under naturalism or the passive will of God, would not subsist under the creation of His active will, even if indirect. We can call this hypothesis the one of “absolute convergence”.
Now a person might say that such sort of phylogenesis still multiplies causes beyond necessity even under Axe’s implication paradigm. This is not true. First, we have to remember that we are assuming God is using only indirect creation for the sake of multiplying an already high improbability; God’s direct creation in parts of the phylogenesis could well bring down the number of purported causes to a number inferior to the ones needed for the actualization of Theory 2). Second, even without invoking possible sporadic direct creation, the number causes would be higher than the neo-Darwinian phylogenetic tree only if we assume that God infused one mutation per generation. While I am of the position, as expressed in “part 2” that the theistic evolutionist should, under theory 2) assume that God infuses only one mutation per generation, this ought not to be the case if theistic evolutionism doesn’t have to be defended. The possibility, therefore, of God infusing, under indirect creation, more functional mutations at once, expands substantially the possibilities of phylogenetic histories with equal probability which defeat the evolutionary one. To allow more mutations in a sole generation, such as infusing more than one in a single animal allows the creation of less animals and therefore the invocation of less causes. The multiplicity of multiple infused mutation does not have to be considered as a multiplicity of causes because it can be done instantaneously and completely by God. On the other side, to create different types of animals across different generations, cannot be united under one casual action. To allow God infusing more than one mutation can defeat the required gradualism of Theory 2) while maintaining common ancestry. The assumption of “proposition r” cannot be held any more given the flawed assumption of naturalism (as we saw in “part 2”) and therefore, whatever purported evolutionary tree contradicts this assumption but maintains the predictions of “proposition q” is a possible defeater which has the same probability of Theory 2).
So how many more possible actualities does the lack of validity of this assumption open? It opens all variants of proposed phylogenetic trees which respect “proposition q” but falsify “proposition r”. It is not the scope of this article, given my lack of time (and willpower) to infer the mathematical degree to which this increases the calculated improbability.
But even without radically changing the evolutionary model by making all species convergent, the evolutionary tree can be falsified with less of a change to its structure.
It suffices to make a partial, but increased convergence, to falsify the conservatism maintained by the naturalist background of theistic evolution. To provide a concrete example it is enough to postulate how a major evolutionary step, such as, let’s say the formation of lungs, does not bring about all the successive animals with the same or very similar feature (or take, for example, the common tripartite body structure of insects, or the common underlining structure of mammal limbs).
We can, therefore, postulate that a possible world in which all animals with lungs instead of deriving from a singular strand of lung formation, come from, let’s say, 10 different branches which originated with animals who all developed lungs independently (whether directly or indirectly). Under evolutionism, all animals with lungs want to be united into one branch by postulating a singular point of deviation (I.e. what would create a new branch of the tree): but, by rejecting the improbability of repeated features given the intentionality of the agent (I.e. God), it is perfectly possible that the point/s of deviation (branching) in the a phylogenetic tree, under a model of, let’s say, indirect creation, do not coincide with the episodic events of major change within the evolutionary paradigm. 
Now a person might say that the model in which all animal with lungs independently proceed from ten different ancestors which represent (for their ancestral history) 10 different strains of animals with lungs which are not ultimately connected by a further ancestor with lungs, multiplies causes beyond necessity. Such thing is not true for the extreme gradualism which evolutionism maintains would entail anyways, at one point or another, further diversifications which would then give rise to a multitude of species with lungs and their varieties. If this defeater theory really does something, is “bypassing” the evolutionary intermediary steps which Theory 2) entails. In fact, it would “bring back” all the strains ultimately to a single animal with the first pair of lungs, which the defeater theory completely bypasses.
The possibility of the defeater paradigms to not postulate a singular functional mutation per generation (which allows to form indirectly in one generation 10 different strains) defeats evolutionary inferences regarding the points of divergence. It seems to be, in fact, the particular points of divergence within the evolutionary paradigm are contingent upon the avoidance of convergence and the extreme gradualism entailed by the evolutionary mechanism. And here we enter into our third assumption.
Another defeater which therefore falsifies the evolutionary tree while maintaining the non-evolutionary assumptions is the lack of extreme gradualism which not ought to be assumed any more as true given Axe’s discoveries. The abandonment of such assumption creates completely different phylogenetic trees with equal probability to the evolutionary one.
It is not the scope of the article to measure the extent to which the abandonment of this assumption creates equally probable falsifying history of origins. What can be said though, is that numerous evolutionary paths which would seem improbable under Darwinism would be made possible with the abandonment of naturalism.
For example, we could create phylogenetic models which respect evolutionary datings and indirect creation but do not include any transitionality at all: the animals indirectly created through a common ancestor would therefore be substantially changed via infused mutation and all the animals postulated are the ones either currently existing or the ones which we know existed through the fossil record.
Clearly, models which include only some transitionality would still falsify evolutionism. If we were to propose a model in which a single intermediary species mediates the evolution of a land mammal to a sea mammal, such thing would be incompatible with evolutionary predictions and assumptions. By abandoning gradualism we can also get more creative in conceiving falsifying phylogenetic histories. Given God’s intentionality, for example, we could construct a much more linear evolutionary history (with fewer branchings) in which existing animals and the ones recorded in the fossil record, constitute direct ancestry to other known animals (though an substantial infusion of new genes via indirect creation, for example). Such hypothesis has to be opposed by evolutionism given gradualism and mutational rates based upon mechanichistic processes. Such slow rates, with a linear phylogenesis, would be incompatible with the fossil evidence (such as the fact that, under this scenario, ancestors and offspring would appear to closely for gradualism to account for the data. See, for example, the Cambrian record) .
On the other side, given the fact that the presuppositions of the molecular clock are shown to be irrelevant in the formation of meaningful information (given its supernatural origin which does not operate under “rates”), the assessment of precise timing of evolutionary development can be falsified to the extent to which the fossil record permits it.
Now a person might say that if the fossil record permits such a thing, then also evolutionism would permit it. But such thing is not true given that it has to postulate countless life forms which we do not see or know actually existed to account for the complexification of the genome found in the fossil record. By abandoning mutation rates and transitionality, we can find numerous falsifying histories which still respect “proposition q”.
Conclusion to “Part 5”
To summarize what I just said we individuated other two defeaters: “non r” (or ¬r) and non extreme gradualism (or ¬extreme gradualism). The former falsifies the assumption which seems to be based upon the improbability of convergence while the second one falsifies the assumption which is based upon the improbability of purposeful mutations and the molecular clock rates. The abandonment of the former and the latter allow to conceive and construct possible tree defeaters with different points of divergence in time, number and nature (to the extent which proposition q allows).
These two defeaters create an incredible new number of possible world defeaters given the opportunity which they present to conceive phylogenetic histories with completely different points of divergence, in number and time, and a completely different number of involved causes (i.e. intermediary animals), even given indirect creation. Notice how I was careful in keeping the second and third defeater independent from the first, to genuinely increase the improbability of theory 2). But now, think of the exponential increase of possible non-evolutionary worlds with same probability (given background evidence such as proposition q) if the possibilities created by the defeaters are intertwined and combined: worlds with a variance of direct and indirect creation, rate of infused mutations per generation in indirect creation, and different “evolutionary” paths and points of divergence would be created. The extent of the variance which permits me to conceive worlds which vary from theory 2) but do not start becoming more unlikely is something I am still researching. As now, it is sufficient realizing how this approximative approach and language suffices to demonstrate the extreme improbability of Theory 2).
What has to be remembered is that theory 2) would have fewer defeaters if it were to accept a substantial distancing with regards to naturalistic evolution. In this case, any tree of life would be ok if, let’s say, universal common descent is maintained. So, first of all, a very high improbability would yet still be maintained (given the first defeater). Second, the more theory 2) distances itself from Darwinism, the more the theory loses its ratio. On an epistemic level, common descent was kept given the will to reconcile neo-Darwinism with God’s sovereignty, just as Mark wanted to maintain the inferences made regarding the first Tom. But if we completely abandon the attempt to reconcile neo-Darwinism with God, it would be like taking away from the equation the very first Tom. Therefore, Mark would be completely randomly expressing his idea on a Tom which he knows he doesn’t know about and doesn’t even consider the path of the very first Tom. At least, in the original scenario, Tom’s inference regarding the second Tom, was explained by the fact that he wanted to attribute to him the itinerary of the first one. With this new scenario, we might not be applying any more 100 random cities to the new Tom, maybe 50, but those 50 are furtherly unjustified and arbitrary. All the theory ultimately would hinge upon the weird and unjustified claim that God, always, for some reason, instead of directly creating, actively infused new mutations in the prole, at conception or during his life. To hold such thing with such strength and conviction for no reason at all is ludicrous. Ultimately, under Theory 2), I think we can all conclude that it would be ridiculous to maintain, given God’s active intervention in the genesis of biological life forms, the belief that the same exact evolutionary tree of Darwinism is true. We simply at this point don’t know, and to believe it is madness.
Ultimately, this article has shown how proposition f) (i.e.God is intervening miraculously in His creation to actualize the evolutionary process), because unwarranted, is almost certainly false.
This article has therefore shown, beyond a reasonable doubt that “Theory 2” is almost certainly false. The lack of evidence for the theory has been shown to substantiate our skepticism towards the theory.
In “part 4” (hopefully the last one!) I will try to show how, given the extreme improbability of theory 2, Philosophical Creationism results to be a superior theory. I will therefore show how the possible world defeater argument does not and cannot apply to Philosophical Creationism and then I provide a positive case for it.
In Christ, my incommensurably beautiful Savior,
Amedeo Da Pra
 (I.e. 1/× with “x” being the possible scenarios).
 Now a person might not realize the scope and purpose of the analogy and state that we have evidence to determine the order of what is first and what is last given the reasonable assumption that what is lower in the fossil record presided what is higher in it. But this is not what is in dispute, as I will explain later in the article, this may well be a reasonable assumption that transcends the veracity of theory 2) if we assume uniformitarianism. The wide range of possible defeaters relies on the falsification of other principles as it will be shown throughout the article.
 Which is read: the probability of direct creation given proposition m and the background evidence of Axe’s implication is 50%. The second formula is read: the probability of indirect creation given proposition m and the background evidence of Axe’s implication is 50%.
 In my research, the purported number of the totality of existing species varied so much from source to source (i.e. some report a few million and some claim a trillion), that I will take this number only as representative of what the totality of species could be.
 I, intuitively, expect there to be overall a significative widening of the explananda given that the existing species whose origin can be accounted for by a decrease of information are less than all the additional animals which represent an increase in information postulated by the evolutionary theory. If, in fact, we maintain the reasonable assumption that Axe’s requirement brings us to reasonably assess a single infused new gene per generation, it is clear that the possible animals postulated by evolutionism which could be either directly or indirectly created are far more numerous than the whole number of existing species, given the number of different available genes among all the animal kingdom.
Given this assumption, the improbability of the evolutionary scenario might be calculated by using as an explanda the number of genes in stead of the number of total existing animals. The problems which subsists in this approach is the circularity which would subsist in postulating directly such complete evolutionary explanada. For the wideness of the explananda would be really actual only if we assume indirect creation (given that the intermediary animals would not have to be postulated in case direct creation would have taken place for an existing species). But if we assume indirect creation to be true we are actually not calculating the improbability of evolutionism under the possibility that God could either directly or indirectly create. Therefore, it seems to me, that the correct approach ought to start from an uncontroversial body of elements which qualify as an explanda. The probability then would change according to how this explananda is actually explained, the more it is explained by indirect creation, the more the explananda widens and the overall improbability of the theory increases. This way circularity seems to be avoided for the end probability of purely conditional upon the various possible actualities.
 Why? I don’t know, I guess they believe He was particularly fond of the Charlie he would have created and therefore followed what he would have developed in his theory
 To anticipate divergence is to increase convergence and therefore multiply causes beyond necessity under evolutionary presuppositions
 This purported non-evolutionary tree of life ought not to be confused with modern trees of life which simply, for representative purposes, portray evolutionary branchings in a circular mode. See https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/160505_treeoflife and https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evotrees_fieldguide_01 to see how evolutionary trees can be constructed.
 Evolutionism ultimately maintains that all animals with lungs are reconducible to a single event in history: the moment in which a mutation made what were precursors of lungs into the first pair of proper lungs from which then all modern lungs arise. The singularity is stressed to impede unnecessary accrual of improbability under evolutionism.