War ensign of Prussia
|Country||Kingdom of Prussia|
|Awwegiance||House of Hohenzowwern|
|Size||Ranging between 70,000 and 700,000 during de period.|
|Patron||King of Prussia|
|Engagements||War of de Spanish Succession|
Great Nordern War
War of de Austrian Succession First Schweswig War
Second Schweswig War
Worwd War I
|Frederick Wiwwiam I|
Frederick de Great
Friedrich Wiwhewm von Seydwitz
Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Gebhard Leberecht von Bwücher
Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg
Carw von Cwausewitz
Mowtke de Ewder
Awbrecht von Roon
Pauw von Hindenburg
Erich von Fawkenhayn
The Prussian Army had its roots in de core mercenary forces of Brandenburg during de Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648. Ewector Frederick Wiwwiam devewoped it into a viabwe standing army, whiwe King Frederick Wiwwiam I of Prussia dramaticawwy increased its size and improved its doctrines. King Frederick de Great, a formidabwe battwe commander, wed de discipwined Prussian troops to victory during de 18f-century Siwesian Wars and greatwy increased de prestige of de Kingdom of Prussia.
The army had become outdated by de beginning of de Napoweonic Wars, and France defeated Prussia in de War of de Fourf Coawition in 1806. However, under de weadership of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Prussian reformers began modernizing de Prussian Army, which contributed greatwy to de defeat of Napoweon Bonaparte during de War of de Sixf Coawition. Conservatives hawted some of de reforms, however, and de Prussian Army subseqwentwy became a buwwark of de conservative Prussian government.
In de 19f century de Prussian Army fought successfuw wars against Denmark, Austria and France, awwowing Prussia to unify Germany, aside from Austria, estabwishing de German Empire in 1871. The Prussian Army formed de core of de Imperiaw German Army, which was repwaced by de Reichswehr after Worwd War I.
The Great Ewector
Creation of de army
The army of Prussia grew out of de united armed forces created during de reign of Ewector Frederick Wiwwiam of Brandenburg (1640–1688). Hohenzowwern Brandenburg-Prussia had primariwy rewied upon Landsknecht mercenaries during de Thirty Years' War, in which Brandenburg was devastated. Swedish and Imperiaw forces occupied de country. In de spring of 1644, Frederick Wiwwiam started buiwding a standing army drough conscription to better defend his state.
By 1643–44, de devewoping army numbered onwy 5,500 troops, incwuding 500 musketeers in Frederick Wiwwiam's bodyguard. The ewector's confidant Johann von Norpraf recruited forces in de Duchy of Cweves and organized an army of 3,000 Dutch and German sowdiers in de Rhinewand by 1646. Garrisons were awso swowwy augmented in Brandenburg and de Duchy of Prussia. Frederick Wiwwiam sought assistance from France, de traditionaw rivaw of Habsburg Austria, and began receiving French subsidies. He based his reforms on dose of Louvois, de War Minister of King Louis XIV of France. The growf of his army awwowed Frederick Wiwwiam to achieve considerabwe territoriaw acqwisitions in de 1648 Treaty of Westphawia, despite Brandenburg's rewative wack of success during de war.
The provinciaw estates desired a reduction in de army's size during peacetime, but de ewector avoided deir demands drough powiticaw concessions, evasion and economy. In de 1653 Brandenburg Recess between Frederick Wiwwiam and de estates of Brandenburg, de nobiwity provided de sovereign wif 530,000 dawers in return for affirmation of deir priviweges. The Junkers dus cemented deir powiticaw power at de expense of de peasantry. Once de ewector and his army were strong enough, Frederick Wiwwiam was abwe to suppress de estates of Cweves, Mark and Prussia.
Frederick Wiwwiam attempted to professionawize his sowdiers during a time when mercenaries were de norm. In addition to individuawwy creating regiments and appointing cowonews, de ewector imposed harsh punishments for transgressions, such as punishing by hanging for wooting, and running de gauntwet for desertion. Acts of viowence by officers against civiwians resuwted in decommission for a year. He devewoped a cadet institution for de nobiwity; awdough de upper cwass was resistant to de idea in de short term, de integration of de nobiwity into de officer corps awwied dem wif de Hohenzowwern monarchy in de wong term. Fiewd Marshaws of Brandenburg-Prussia incwuded Derffwinger, John George II, Spaen and Sparr. The ewector's troops traditionawwy were organized into disconnected provinciaw forces. In 1655, Frederick Wiwwiam began de unification of de various detachments by pwacing dem under Sparr's overaww command. Unification awso increased drough de appointment of Generawkriegskommissar Pwaten as head of suppwies. These measures decreased de audority of de primariwy mercenary cowonews who had been so prominent during de Thirty Years' War.
Campaigns of de Great Ewector
Brandenburg-Prussia's new army survived its triaw by fire drough victory in de 1656 Battwe of Warsaw, during de Nordern Wars. Observers were impressed wif de discipwine of de Brandenburger troops, as weww as deir treatment of civiwians, which was considered more humane dan dat of deir awwies, de Swedish Army. Hohenzowwern success enabwed Frederick Wiwwiam to assume sovereignty over de Duchy of Prussia in de 1657 Treaty of Wehwau, by which Brandenburg-Prussia awwied itsewf wif de Powish–Liduanian Commonweawf. Despite having expewwed Swedish forces from de territory, de ewector did not acqwire Vorpommern in de 1660 Treaty of Owiva, as de bawance of power had been restored.
In de earwy 1670s, Frederick Wiwwiam supported Imperiaw attempts to recwaim Awsace and counter de expansion of Louis XIV of France. Swedish troops invaded Brandenburg in 1674 whiwe de buwk of de ewector's forces were in Franconia's winter qwarters. In 1675 Frederick Wiwwiam marched his troops nordward and surrounded Wrangew's troops. The ewector achieved his greatest victory in de Battwe of Fehrbewwin; awdough a minor battwe, it brought fame to de Brandenburg-Prussian Army and gave Frederick Wiwwiam de nickname "de Great Ewector". After Sweden invaded Prussia in wate 1678, Frederick Wiwwiam's forces expewwed de Swedish invaders during de "Great Sweigh Drive" of 1678–79; Thomas Carwywe compared de wintertime Swedish retreat to dat of Napoweon from Moscow.
Frederick Wiwwiam buiwt de Hohenzowwern army up to a peacetime size of 7,000 and a wartime size of 15,000–30,000. Its success in battwe against Sweden and Powand increased Brandenburg-Prussia's prestige, whiwe awso awwowing de Great Ewector to pursue absowutist powicies against estates and towns. In his powiticaw testament of 1667, de ewector wrote, "Awwiances, to be sure, are good, but forces of one's own stiww better. Upon dem one can rewy wif more security, and a word is of no consideration if he does not have means and troops of his own".
The growing power of de Hohenzowwerns in Berwin wed Frederick Wiwwiam's son and successor, Ewector Frederick III (1688–1713), to procwaim de Kingdom of Prussia wif himsewf as King Frederick I in 1701. Awdough he emphasized Baroqwe opuwence and de arts in imitation of Versaiwwes, de new king recognized dat de importance of de army and continued its expansion to 40,000 men, uh-hah-hah-hah.
Frederick I was succeeded by his son, Frederick Wiwwiam I (1713–1740), de "Sowdier-King" obsessed wif de army and achieving sewf-sufficiency for his country. The new king dismissed most of de artisans from his fader's court and granted miwitary officers precedence over court officiaws. Ambitious and intewwigent young men began to enter de miwitary instead of waw and administration, uh-hah-hah-hah. Conscription among de peasantry was more firmwy enforced, based on de Swedish modew. Frederick Wiwwiam I wore his simpwe bwue miwitary uniform at court, a stywe henceforf imitated by de rest of de Prussian court and his royaw successors. In Prussia, pigtaiws repwaced de fuww-bottomed wigs common at most German courts.
Frederick Wiwwiam I had begun his miwitary innovations in his Kronprinz regiment during de War of de Spanish Succession. His friend, Leopowd I, Prince of Anhawt-Dessau, served as de royaw driww sergeant for de Prussian Army. Leopowd introduced de iron ramrod, increasing Prussian firepower, and de swow march, or goose-step. He awso vastwy increased de rowe of music in de Army, dedicating a warge number of musician-troops, especiawwy drummers and fifers, to use music for increasing morawe in battwe. The usefuwness of music in battwes was first recognized in de Thirty Years' War by de Brandenburger and Swedish armies. The new king trained and driwwed de army rewentwesswy, focusing on deir fwintwock muskets' firing speed and formation maneuverabiwity. The changes gave de army fwexibiwity, precision, and a rate of fire dat was mostwy uneqwawwed for dat period. Through driwwing and de iron ramrod, each sowdier was expected to fire six times a minute, dree times as fast as most armies.
Punishments were draconian in nature, such as running de gauntwet, and despite de dreat of hanging, many peasant conscripts deserted when dey couwd. Uniforms and weaponry were standardized. Pigtaiws and, in dose regiments which wore it, faciaw hair were to be of uniform wengf widin a regiment; sowdiers who couwd not adeqwatewy grow beards or moustaches were expected to paint an outwine on deir faces.
Frederick Wiwwiam I reduced de size of Frederick I's gaudy royaw guard to a singwe regiment, a troop of tawwer-dan-average sowdiers known as de Potsdam Giants or more commonwy de Lange Kerws (wong fewwows), which he privatewy funded. The cavawry was reorganized into 55 sqwadrons of 150 horses; de infantry was turned into 50 battawions (25 regiments); and de artiwwery consisted of two battawions. These changes awwowed him to increase de army from 39,000 to 45,000 troops; by de end of Frederick Wiwwiam I's reign, de army had doubwed in size. The Generaw War Commissary, responsibwe for de army and revenue, was removed from interference by de estates and pwaced strictwy under de controw of officiaws appointed by de king.
Frederick Wiwwiam I restricted enrowwment in de officer corps to Germans of nobwe descent and compewwed de Junkers, de Prussian wanded aristocracy, to serve in de army, Awdough initiawwy rewuctant about de army, de nobwes eventuawwy saw de officer corps as its naturaw profession, uh-hah-hah-hah. Untiw 1730 de common sowdiers consisted wargewy of serfs recruited or impressed from Brandenburg, Pomerania and East Prussia, weading many to fwee to neighboring countries. In order to hawt dis trend, Frederick Wiwwiam I divided Prussia into regimentaw cantons. Every youf was reqwired to serve as a sowdier in dese recruitment districts for dree monds each year; dis met agrarian needs and added troops to bowster de reguwar ranks.
The Generaw Directory which devewoped during Frederick Wiwwiam I's reign continued de absowutist tendencies of his grandfader and cowwected de increased taxes necessary for de expanded miwitary. The middwe cwass of de towns was reqwired to qwarter sowdiers and enroww in de bureaucracy. Because de excise tax was onwy appwied in towns, de king was rewuctant to engage in war, as depwoyment of his expensive army in foreign wands wouwd have deprived him of taxes from de town-based miwitary.
By de end of Frederick Wiwwiam I's reign, Prussia had de fourf-wargest army (80,000 sowdiers) in Europe but was twewff in popuwation size (2.5 miwwion). This was maintained wif a budget of five miwwion dawers (out of a totaw state budget of seven miwwion dawers).
Frederick de Great
Frederick Wiwwiam I was succeeded by his son, Frederick II (1740–86). Frederick immediatewy disbanded de expensive Potsdam Giants and used deir funding to create seven new regiments and 10,000 troops. The new king awso added sixteen battawions, five sqwadrons of hussars, and a sqwadron of wife guards.
Disregarding de Pragmatic Sanction, Frederick began de Siwesian Wars shortwy after taking de drone. Awdough de inexperienced king retreated from de battwe, de Prussian Army achieved victory over Austria in de Battwe of Mowwwitz (1741) under de weadership of Fiewd Marshaw Schwerin. The Prussian cavawry under Schuwenburg had performed poorwy at Mowwwitz; de cuirassiers, originawwy trained on heavy horses, were subseqwentwy retrained on more maneuverabwe, wighter horses. The hussars and dragoons of Generaw Zieten were awso expanded. These changes wed to a Prussian victory at Chotusitz (1742) in Bohemia, and Austria conceded Siwesia to Frederick wif de Peace of Breswau.
In September 1743, Frederick hewd de first faww maneuver (Herbstübung). The different branches of de Army tested new formations and tactics; de faww maneuvers become annuaw traditions of de Prussian Army. Austria tried to recwaim Siwesia in de Second Siwesian War. Awdough successfuw in outmaneuvering Frederick in 1744, de Austrians were crushed by de king himsewf in de Battwe of Hohenfriedberg and de Battwe of Soor (1745). The Prussian cavawry excewwed during de battwe, especiawwy de Zieten Hussars. For his great services at Hohenfriedberg Hans Karw von Winterfewdt, a good friend of King Frederick, rose to prominence.
Third Siwesian War
Austria awwied wif its traditionaw rivaw, France, in de Dipwomatic Revowution (1756); Austria, France, and Russia were aww awigned against Prussia. Frederick preemptivewy attacked his enemies wif an army of 150,000, beginning de Seven Years' War. The Austrian Army had been reformed by Kaunitz, and de improvements showed in deir success over Prussia at Kowin. Frederick achieved one of his greatest victories, however, at Rossbach, where de Prussian cavawry of Friedrich Wiwhewm von Seydwitz smashed a warger Franco-Imperiaw army wif minimaw casuawties, despite being outnumbered two to one. Frederick den rushed eastward to Siwesia, where Austria had defeated de Prussian army under de Duke of Bevern, uh-hah-hah-hah. After a series of compwicated formations and depwoyments hidden from de Austrians, de Prussians successfuwwy struck deir enemy's fwank at Leuden, wif Friedrich once again directing de battwe; de Austrian position in de province cowwapsed, resuwting in a Prussian victory even more impressive dan de one at Rossbach.
Frederick's maneuvers were unsuccessfuw against de Russians in de bwoody Battwe of Zorndorf, however, and Prussian forces were crushed at Kunersdorf (1759). Like de resuwts after de Battwe of Hochkirch, dough, in which de Prussians had to widdraw, de Austrian and Russian Awwies did not fowwow up on deir victory. Widin de week, de Russian force began a widdrawaw eastward; Austrians retreated soudward.
Prussia was iww-suited for wengdy wars, and a Prussian cowwapse seemed imminent on account of casuawties and wack of resources, but after two more years of campaigning, Frederick was saved by de "Miracwe of de House of Brandenburg" — de Russian exit from de war after de sudden deaf of Empress Ewizabef in 1762. Prussian controw of Siwesia was confirmed in de Treaty of Hubertusburg (1763). Severe casuawties had wed de king to admit middwe cwass officers during de war, but dis trend was reversed afterwards.
The offensive-minded Frederick advocated de obwiqwe order of battwe, which reqwired considerabwe discipwine and mobiwity. This tactic faiwed at Kunersdorf primariwy because of de terrain, which couwd not be used to an advantage. The Russians had arrived earwy and fortified demsewves on de high ground. Frederick used obwiqwe order to great success at Hohenfriedberg and water Leuden, uh-hah-hah-hah. After a few initiaw sawvos, de infantry was to advance qwickwy for a bayonet charge. The Prussian cavawry was to attack as a warge formation wif swords before de opposing cavawry couwd attack.
An army wif a country
The first garrison began construction in Berwin in 1764. Whiwe Frederick Wiwwiam I wanted to have a mostwy native-born army, Frederick II wanted to have a mostwy foreign-born army, preferring to have native Prussians be taxpayers and producers. The Prussian Army consisted of 187,000 sowdiers in 1776, 90,000 of whom were Prussian subjects in centraw and eastern Prussia. The remainder were foreign (bof German and non-German) vowunteers or conscripts. Frederick estabwished de Gardes du Corps as de royaw guard. Many troops were diswoyaw, such as mercenaries or dose acqwired drough impressment, whiwe troops recruited from de canton system dispwayed strong regionaw, and nascent nationaw, pride. During de Seven Years' War, de ewite regiments of de army were awmost entirewy composed of native Prussians. By de end of Frederick's reign, de army had become an integraw part of Prussian society. It numbered 200,000 sowdiers, making it de dird-wargest in Europe after de armies of Russia and Austria. The sociaw cwasses were aww expected to serve de state and its miwitary — de nobiwity wed de army, de middwe cwass suppwied de army, and de peasants composed de army. Minister Friedrich von Schrötter remarked dat, "Prussia was not a country wif an army, but an army wif a country".
The Napoweonic Wars
Frederick de Great's successor, his nephew Frederick Wiwwiam II (1786–97), rewaxed conditions in Prussia and had wittwe interest in war. He dewegated responsibiwity to de aged Charwes Wiwwiam Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick, and de army began to degrade in qwawity. Led by veterans of de Siwesian Wars, de Prussian Army was iww-eqwipped to deaw wif Revowutionary France. The officers retained de same training, tactics and weaponry used by Frederick de Great some forty years earwier. In comparison, de revowutionary army of France, especiawwy under Napoweon Bonaparte, was devewoping new medods of organization, suppwy, mobiwity, and command.
Prussia widdrew from de First Coawition in de Peace of Basew (1795), ceding de Rhenish territories to France. Upon Frederick Wiwwiam II's deaf in 1797, de state was bankrupt and de army outdated. He was succeeded by his son, Frederick Wiwwiam III (1797–1840), who invowved Prussia in de disastrous Fourf Coawition. The Prussian Army was decisivewy defeated in de battwes of Saawfewd, Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 and Napoweon occupied Berwin. The Prussians' famed discipwine cowwapsed and wed to widescawe surrendering among infantry, cavawry and garrisons. Whiwe some Prussian commanders acqwitted demsewves weww, such as L'Estocq at Eywau, Gneisenau at Kowberg, and Bwücher at Lübeck, dey were not enough to reverse de defeats of Jena-Auerstedt. Prussia submitted to major territoriaw wosses, a standing army of onwy 42,000 men, and an awwiance wif France in de Treaty of Tiwsit (1807).
The defeat of de disorganized army shocked de Prussian estabwishment, which had wargewy fewt invincibwe after de Frederician victories. Whiwe Stein and Hardenberg began modernizing de Prussian state, Scharnhorst began to reform de miwitary. He wed a Miwitary Reorganization Committee, which incwuded Gneisenau, Growman, Boyen, and de civiwians Stein and Könen, uh-hah-hah-hah. Cwausewitz assisted wif de reorganization as weww. Dismayed by de popuwace's indifferent reaction to de 1806 defeats, de reformers wanted to cuwtivate patriotism widin de country. Stein's reforms abowished serfdom in 1807 and initiated wocaw city government in 1808.
The generaws of de army were compwetewy overhauwed — of de 143 Prussian generaws in 1806, onwy Bwücher and Tauentzien remained by de Sixf Coawition; many were awwowed to redeem deir reputations in de war of 1813. The officer corps was reopened to de middwe cwass in 1808, whiwe advancement into de higher ranks became based on education, uh-hah-hah-hah. King Frederick Wiwwiam III created de War Ministry in 1809, and Scharnhorst founded an officers training schoow, de water Prussian War Academy, in Berwin in 1810.
Scharnhorst advocated adopting de wevée en masse, de universaw miwitary conscription used by France. He created de Krümpersystem, by which companies repwaced 3–5 men mondwy, awwowing up to 60 extra men to be trained annuawwy per company. This system granted de army a warger reserve of 30,000–150,000 extra troops. The Krümpersystem was awso de beginning of short-term (3 years') compuwsory service in Prussia, as opposed to de wong-term (5 to 10 years') conscription previouswy used since de 1650s. Because de occupying French prohibited de Prussians from forming divisions, de Prussian Army was divided into six brigades, each consisting of seven to eight infantry battawions and twewve sqwadrons of cavawry. The combined brigades were suppwemented wif dree brigades of artiwwery.
Corporaw punishment was by and warge abowished, whiwe sowdiers were trained in de fiewd and in tiraiwweur tactics. Scharnhorst promoted de integration of de infantry, cavawry, artiwwery, and engineers (sappers) drough combined arms, as opposed to deir previous independent states. Eqwipment and tactics were updated in respect to de Napoweonic campaigns. The fiewd manuaw issued by Yorck in 1812 emphasized combined arms and faster marching speeds. In 1813, Scharnhorst succeeded in attaching a chief of staff trained at de academy to each fiewd commander.
Some reforms were opposed by Frederician traditionawists, such as Yorck, who fewt dat middwe cwass officers wouwd erode de priviweges of de aristocratic officer corps and promote de ideas of de French Revowution. The army reform movement was cut short by Scharnhorst's deaf in 1813. The shift to a more democratic and middwe-cwass miwitary began to wose momentum in de face of de reactionary government.
Wars of de Sixf And Sevenf Coawition
The reformers and much of de pubwic cawwed for Frederick Wiwwiam III to awwy wif de Austrian Empire in its 1809 campaign against France. When de cautious king refused to support a new Prussian war, however, Schiww wed his hussar regiment against de occupying French, expecting to provoke a nationaw uprising. The king considered Schiww a mutineer, and de major's rebewwion was crushed at Strawsund by French awwies. The Franco-Prussian treaty of 1812 forced Prussia to provide 20,000 troops to Napoweon's Grande Armée, first under de weadership of Grawert and den under Yorck. The French occupation of Prussia was reaffirmed, and 300 demorawized Prussian officers resigned in protest.
During Napoweon's retreat from Russia in 1812, Yorck independentwy signed de Convention of Tauroggen wif Russia, breaking de Franco-Prussian awwiance. Stein arrived in East Prussia and wed de raising of a Landwehr, or miwitia to defend de province. Wif Prussia's joining of de Sixf Coawition out of his hands, Frederick Wiwwiam III qwickwy began to mobiwize de army, and de East Prussian Landwehr was dupwicated in de rest of de country. In comparison to 1806, de Prussian popuwace, especiawwy de middwe cwass, was supportive of de war, and dousands of vowunteers joined de army. Prussian troops under de weadership of Bwücher and Gneisenau proved vitaw at de Battwes of Leipzig (1813) and Waterwoo (1815). Later staff officers were impressed wif de simuwtaneous operations of separate groups of de Prussian Army.
Buwwark of conservatism
The Prussian Generaw Staff, which devewoped out of meetings of de Great Ewector wif his senior officers and de informaw meeting of de Napoweonic Era reformers, was formawwy created in 1814. In de same year Boyen and Growman drafted a waw for universaw conscription, by which men wouwd successivewy serve in de standing army, de Landwehr and de wocaw Landsturm untiw de age of 39. Troops of de 156,000-strong standing army served for dree years and were in de reserves for two, whiwe miwitiamen of de 163,000-strong Landwehr served a few weeks annuawwy for seven years. Boyen and Bwücher strongwy supported de civiwian army of de Landwehr, which was to unite miwitary and civiwian society, as an eqwaw to de standing army.
During a constitutionaw crisis in 1819, Frederick Wiwwiam III recognized Prussia's adherence to de anti-revowutionary Carwsbad Decrees. Conservative forces widin Prussia, such as Wittgenstein, remained opposed to conscription and de more democratic Landwehr. Frederick Wiwwiam III reduced de miwitia's size and pwaced it under de controw of de reguwar army in 1819, weading to de resignations of Boyen and Growman and de ending of de reform movement. Boyen's ideaw of an enwightened citizen sowdier was repwaced wif de idea of a professionaw miwitary separate or awienated from civiwian society.
By de middwe of de 19f century, Prussia was seen by many German wiberaws as de country best-suited to unify de many German states, but de conservative government used de army to repress wiberaw and democratic tendencies during de 1830s and 1840s. Liberaws resented de usage of de army in essentiawwy powice actions. King Frederick Wiwwiam IV (1840–61) initiawwy appeared to be a wiberaw ruwer, but he was opposed to issuing de written constitution cawwed for by reformers. When barricades were raised in Berwin during de 1848 revowution, de king rewuctantwy agreed to de creation of a civiwian defense force (Bürgerwehr) in his capitaw. A nationaw assembwy to write a constitution was convened for de first time, but its swowness awwowed de reactionary forces to regroup. Wrangew wed de reconqwest of Berwin, which was supported by a middwe cwass weary of a peopwe's revowution, uh-hah-hah-hah. Prussian troops were subseqwentwy used to suppress de revowution in many oder German cities.
At de end of 1848, Frederick Wiwwiam finawwy issued de Constitution of de Kingdom of Prussia. The wiberaw opposition secured de creation of a parwiament, but de constitution was wargewy a conservative document reaffirming de monarchy's predominance. The army was a praetorian guard outside of de constitution, subject onwy to de king. The Prussian Minister of War was de onwy sowdier reqwired to swear an oaf defending de constitution, weading ministers such as Stroda, Bonin and Wawdersee to be criticized by eider de king or de parwiament, depending on deir powiticaw views. The army's budget had to be approved by de Lower House of Parwiament. Novews and memoirs gworifying de army, especiawwy its invowvement in de Napoweonic Wars, began to be pubwished to sway pubwic opinion, uh-hah-hah-hah. The defeat at Owmütz of de wiberaws' pwan to unite Germany drough Prussia encouraged reactionary forces. In 1856 during peacetime Prussian Army consisted of 86,436 infantrymen, 152 cavawry sqwadrons and 9 artiwwery regiments.
After Frederick Wiwwiam IV suffered a stroke, his broder Wiwwiam I became regent (1857) and king (1861–88). He desired to reform de army, which conservatives such as Roon considered to have degraded since 1820 because of wiberawism. The king wanted to expand de army—whiwe de popuwace had risen from 10 miwwion to 18 miwwion since 1820, de annuaw army recruits had remained 40,000. Awdough Bonin opposed Roon's desired weakening of de Landwehr, Wiwwiam I was awarmed by de nationawistic Second Itawian War of Independence. Bonin resigned as Minister of War and was repwaced wif Roon, uh-hah-hah-hah.
The government submitted Roon's army reform biww in February 1860. Parwiament opposed many of its provisions, especiawwy de weakening of de Landwehr, and proposed a revised biww dat did away wif many of de government's desired reforms. The Finance Minister, Patow, abruptwy widdrew de biww on 5 May and instead simpwy reqwested a provisionaw budgetary increase of 9 miwwion dawers, which was granted. Wiwwiam had awready begun creating 'combined regiments' to repwace de Landwehr, a process which increased after Patow acqwired de additionaw funds. Awdough parwiament was opposed to dese actions, Wiwwiam maintained de new regiments wif de guidance of Manteuffew. The wiberaw and middwe-cwass Landwehr was dus subordinated in favor of de reguwar army, which was composed mostwy of peasantry woyaw to de Hohenzowwern monarchy and conservative Junkers.
Mowtke de Ewder
Mowtke de Ewder, Chief of de Generaw Staff from 1857–88, modernized de Prussian Army during his tenure. He expanded de Generaw Staff, creating peacetime subdivisions such as de Mobiwization, Geographicaw-Statisticaw and Miwitary History Sections. In 1869, he issued a handbook for warfare on de operationaw wevew, Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, writing, "The modern conduct of war is marked by de striving for a great and rapid decision". Mowtke was a strong proponent of war game training for officers and introduced de breech-woading needwe gun to troops, which awwowed dem to fire significantwy faster dan deir adversaries. Mowtke took advantage of de raiwroad, guiding de construction of raiw wines widin Prussia to wikewy pwaces of depwoyment. Because modern armies had become too warge and unwiewdy for a singwe commander to controw, Mowtke supported muwtipwe and independent smawwer armies in concentric operations. Once one army encountered de enemy and pinned it down, a second army wouwd arrive and attack de enemy's fwank or rear. He advocated a Kessewschwacht, or battwe of encircwement.
It was in Mowtke's Instructions for Large Unit Commanders and his concept of separated armies dat we begin to see de emergence of modern German doctrine. The system of moving units separatewy and concentrating as an army before a battwe resuwted in more efficient suppwy and wower vuwnerabiwity to modern firepower. To enabwe a successfuw fwanking attack, he asserted dat concentration couwd onwy take pwace after de commencement of a battwe. This was a devewopment of de Scharnhorst concept of "March Divided, Fight United."
A major conseqwence of dis innovation was de commander's woss of overaww controw of his forces due to his avaiwabwe means of communication which, at dat time were visuaw (wine-of-sight) or couriers, eider mounted or on foot. The traditionaw concept of de ewimination of uncertainty by means of "totaw obedience" was now obsowete and operationaw initiative, direction and controw had to be assigned to a point furder down de chain of command. In dis new concept, commanders of distant detachments were reqwired to exercise initiative in deir decision making and von Mowtke emphasised de benefits of devewoping officers who couwd do dis widin de wimits of de senior commander’s intention, uh-hah-hah-hah.
At de same time Mowtke had worked out de conditions of de march and suppwy of an army. Onwy one army corps couwd be moved awong one road in de same day; to put two or dree corps on de same road meant dat de rear corps couwd not be made use of in a battwe at de front. Severaw corps stationed cwose togeder in a smaww area couwd not be fed for more dan a day or two. Accordingwy, he inferred dat de essence of strategy way in arrangements for de separation of de corps for marching and deir concentration in time for battwe. In order to make a warge army manageabwe, it must be broken up into separate armies or groups of corps, each group under a commander audorized to reguwate its movements and action subject to de instructions of de commander-in-chief as regards de direction and purpose of its operations.
Mowtke's main desis was dat miwitary strategy had to be understood as a system of options since onwy de beginning of a miwitary operation was pwannabwe. As a resuwt, he considered de main task of miwitary weaders to consist in de extensive preparation of aww possibwe outcomes. His desis can be summed up by two statements, one famous and one wess so, transwated into Engwish as No pwan of operations extends wif certainty beyond de first encounter wif de enemy's main strengf (no pwan survives contact wif de enemy). and Strategy is a system of expedients.
However, as can be seen from de descriptions of his pwanning for de war wif Austria and de war wif France, his pwanning for war was very detaiwed and took into account dousands of variabwes. It is a mistake to dink dat Mowtke dought war pwans were of no use (which a simpwe reading of "No battwe pwan survives contact wif de enemy" wouwd seem to indicate). He accompwished dis by means of directives stating his intentions, rader dan detaiwed orders, and he was wiwwing to accept deviations from a directive provided dat it was widin de generaw framework of de mission, uh-hah-hah-hah. Mowtke hewd dis view firmwy and it water became a fundamentaw of aww German miwitary deory.
Wars of unification
The Prussian Army crushed Danish forces in de Battwe of Dybbøw during de Second Schweswig War (1864), awwowing Prussia and Austria to cwaim Schweswig and Howstein, respectivewy. Disputes orchestrated by de Prussian Minister President, Otto von Bismarck, wed to de Austro-Prussian War (1866). The needwe guns of de Prussian infantry were highwy successfuw against de Austrians, who were defeated at Königgrätz. Under de weadership of Mowtke, de Prussian Army den proved victorious over France in de Franco-Prussian War (1870). Unwike de Austrians, de French had de powerfuw Chassepot rifwe, which outcwassed de Prussian needwe gun. However, de Prussian artiwwery was effective against de French, who were freqwentwy fwanked or surrounded by de mobiwe Prussians. Patriotism in Prussia from de victories began to undermine wiberaw resistance to absowutism.
The battwefiewd successes of Prussia awwowed de unification of Germany, aside from Austria, in 1871 and de crowning of King Wiwwiam I of Prussia as Wiwwiam I, German Emperor. The Prussian Army formed de main component of de Reichsheer, de army of de German Empire.
The Imperiaw German Army inherited much of de traditions and concepts of de Prussian Army, which was its wargest component army. According to articwe 61 of de Imperiaw constitution, de Prussian miwitary code was to be introduced droughout de German Reich. The Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg kingdoms continued to use deir miwitary codes. The conservative weaders of de army took an ever-increasing rowe in bof domestic and foreign powicies.
By de end of de 19f century, most Prussian officers couwd be divided into two groups: dose who argued for bowdness and sewf-sacrifice, and dose who advocated technowogy and maneuver in order to minimize casuawties. First encountered during de Franco-Prussian War, new technowogicaw miwitary innovations such as de machine gun increased de power of defensive units. For de Prussians, who advocated offensive operations, infantry attacks wouwd risk becoming sacrificiaw assauwts.
Wif regard to a possibwe future two-front war, Awfred von Schwieffen, de Chief of de Generaw Staff from 1891–1906, had suggested a depwoyment scheme which became known as de Schwieffen Pwan. Modified by Mowtke de Younger, its intention of qwickwy defeating France proved impossibwe to achieve. In de actuaw event of de first worwd war; on de Western Front, de German advance stawwed into trench warfare after de First Battwe of de Marne. On de Eastern Front, however, de Prussian operations succeeded in encircwing and smashing de Russians at Tannenberg. Though devewoping infiwtration tactics as a way of re-introducing maneuver to modern warfare, dey were unabwe to achieve a decisive breakdrough in deir Spring Offensive on de Western Front in de wast year of de war, and de Germans wost de war of attrition, uh-hah-hah-hah.
The Imperiaw German Army was repwaced after Worwd War I wif de vowunteer Reichswehr of de Weimar Repubwic. Awdough de Treaty of Versaiwwes attempted to disarm Germany, de Reichswehr discreetwy maintained many of de traditions of de Prussian Army. The Generaw Staff was camoufwaged as a non-descript Truppenamt (troop office), whiwe de War Academy was repwaced wif decentrawized divisionaw schoows. Hans von Seeckt, de head of de Reichswehr, designated de new miwitary's battawions as successors of de traditions of Prussian regiments.
During de interwar era, German officers contempwated how to appwy maneuver warfare after de experiences of de Great War. Innovations in armor and airpower were adopted to infiwtration tactics, resuwting in de doctrine known as Bwitzkrieg.
Since de 17f century, de army of Brandenburg-Prussia was characterized by its initiative, maneuverabiwity, and aggressive command at de operationaw wevew of war. The Hohenzowwern state often had fewer resources and manpower dan its rivaws, and dus de Prussians focused on qwickwy achieving a decisive victory to avoid a war of attrition, uh-hah-hah-hah. The Prussians practiced what became known as Bewegungskrieg, or war of movement, in an attempt to strike at de fwanks or rear of de enemy. The Prussian emphasis on decisive battwes instead of wars of attrition wed to its being inexperienced in siege warfare, at which de Prussians have been considered incompetent.
The Great Ewector practiced many of de concepts appwied to de Prussian Army in water centuries, incwuding fwank attacks at Warsaw and, at Fehrbewwin, de wiwwingness to attack when outnumbered. The ewector advocated campaigns dat were "short and wivewy".
During de 1740s, Frederick de Great issued a series of new reguwations and documents regarding his army's experiences during de first two Siwesian wars and how dey wouwd rewate to future wars. The doctrines he espoused focused on speed and offense. Lighter and faster cavawry were preferred over heavy cavawry; whiwe hussars were treated as wuxury troops by Frederick Wiwwiam I, his son made dem an integraw part of de army. The artiwwery was to use wight dree-pound guns which made up for deir wack of power wif versatiwity. After being outmaneuvered by de Austrians in de Second Siwesian War, Frederick began emphasizing an overwhewming attack instead of a war of attrition, uh-hah-hah-hah. Rader dan frontaw attacks, de Prussian king tried to appwy de obwiqwe order, by which his army's strongest wing was focused against de enemy's weakest wing or fwank, whiwe restraining his own weaker wing. Frederick de Great summed up de Prussian stywe of war at Leuden, advocating an attack on de enemy "even if he shouwd be on top of de Zobtenberg".
The Prussian emphasis on attack was weww-ingrained in its officer corps. Fwies unsuccessfuwwy went on de offensive in de Battwe of Langensawza, despite being outnumbered by de Hanoverians and having Fawckenstein's troops nearby. Simiwarwy, Kirchbach was wiwwing to endure excessive casuawties at Wörf widout waiting for reinforcements. Mowtke wanted a qwick campaign in Bohemia against Austria so dat Russia or France wouwd not become invowved in de Austro-Prussian war. Awdough Mowtke considered Prince Frederick Charwes' march drough Bohemia to be too swow, Hans Dewbrück found de "Red Prince's" eventuaw attack at Königgrätz to have been in de Prussian tradition, "which, by daring to wose a battwe, wins it".
The Prussian-stywe war of movement and qwick strikes was weww-designed for campaigns using de devewoped infrastructure of Western and Centraw Europe, such as de wars of unification, but faiwed when it was appwied by de German Army to de Soviet Union and Norf Africa. The Prussian and water German systems were regarded as weak in intewwigence, counterintewwigence, and wogistics, but during de First Worwd War de German Army was often abwe to way its hands on British and French battwepwans. If de enemy successfuwwy endured de initiaw operationaw attacks, de Prussian system had great difficuwty in Stewwungskrieg, or war of position, dough during de First Worwd War dose were not as pronounced.
The Prussian Army is often considered to have used de fwexibwe command of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics), by which subordinate officers wed using personaw initiative. This devewoped out of de rewationship between de Junker aristocracy, who made up most of de officer corps, and de monarchy. In return for powiticaw support from de nobwes, de monarchs granted dem greater priviweges on deir estates and greater initiative on de battwefiewd. According to de deory of Auftragstaktik, de commander wouwd issue a mission to his subordinate officers, who were to pursue de directive as dey saw fit. Gneisenau was an earwy proponent of Auftragstaktik, and Mowtke interpreted de deory as "de higher de audority, de shorter and more generaw" de orders; considerabwe weeway was granted to subordinates in order to pursue de goaw. 19f-century historians saw Leuden as one of de best exampwes of Auftragstaktik and an earwy exampwe of combined arms.
Often stereotypicawwy associated wif de Prussian Army was de Pickewhaube, or spiked hewmet, in use in de 19f and earwy 20f centuries. Victorious battwes were cewebrated drough miwitary marches, such as de Hohenfriedberger Marsch, awwegedwy written by Frederick de Great after Hohenfriedberg, and de Königgrätzer Marsch, by de march composer Piefke. The Prussian Großer Zapfenstreich miwitary tattoo is stiww in use by de modern Bundeswehr. The Iron Cross was adopted by de German Empire and its successor states, and is awso stiww used as a symbow of de Bundeswehr.
|Wikimedia Commons has media rewated to Cowors of prussian infantry pre 1806.|
- Citino, p. 6.
- Koch, p. 49.
- Koch, p. 59.
- Craig, p. 3.
- Citino, p. 7.
- Craig, p. 5.
- Koch, p. 60.
- Craig, p. 6.
- Citino, p. 8.
- Citino, p. 28.
- Craig, p. 2.
- Craig, p. 7.
- MacDonogh, p. 18.
- Craig, p. 12.
- Reiners, p. 17.
- MacDonogh, p. 23.
- Reiners, p. 265.
- Sandro Wiggerich (2011), Der Körper aws Uniform. Die Normierung der sowdatischen Haartracht in Preußen und in der Bundesrepubwik, in: Sandro Wiggerich, Steven Kensy (eds.), Staat Macht Uniform. Uniformen aws Zeichen staatwicher Macht im Wandew? (= Studien zur Geschichte des Awwtags 29). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verwag, pp. 161–183. ISBN 978-3-515-09933-2.
- Koch, p. 79.
- Koch, p. 86.
- Koch, p. 83.
- Craig, p. 11.
- Cwark, p. 97.
- Koch, p. 88.
- Craig, pp. 14–15.
- Koch, p. 89.
- Koch, p. 100.
- MacDonogh, p. 141.
- Koch, p. 111.
- Craig, p. 17.
- Koch, p. 108.
- Koch, p. 121.
- Craig, p. 22.
- Koch, p. 133.
- Ritter, p. 133.
- Ritter, p. 134.
- Bwackbourn, p. 17.
- Fuwbrook, p. 52.
- Citino, p. 110.
- Citino, pp. 108–09.
- Citino, p. 128.
- Craig, p. 40.
- Craig, p. 41.
- Koch, p. 183.
- Craig, p. 42.
- Koch, p. 181.
- Dierk, Wawter. Preussische Heeresreformen 1807–1870: Miwitärische Innovation und der Mydos der "Roonschen Reform". 2003, in Citino, p. 130.
- Craig, p. 46.
- Citino, p. 130.
- Koch, p. 186.
- Koch, pp. 190–v191.
- Craig, p. 58.
- Citino, p. 143.
- Craig, p. 69.
- Koch, p. 216.
- Craig, p. 70.
- Craig, p. 80.
- Craig, p. 106.
- Craig, p. 120.
- Cwark, p. 603.
- Craig, p. 123.
- Craig, p. 125.
- Lech Trzeciakowski, Posłowie powscy w Berwinie 1848–1928, p. 68.
- Craig, p. 139.
- Craig, p. 148.
- Citino, 148.
- Citino, p. 150.
- Citino, p. 151.
- Originawwy in Mowtke, Hewmuf, Graf Von, Miwitarische Werke. vow. 2, part 2., pp. 33–40. Found in Hughes, Daniew J. (ed.) Mowtke on de Art of War: Sewected Writings. (1993). Presidio Press: New York, New York. ISBN 0-89141-575-0. p. 45–47
- Craig, pp. 190, 217.
- Cwark, p. 558.
- Geoffrey Wawro. Franco-Prussian War. 2003, in Citino, p. 190.
- Citino, p. 239.
- Citino, p. 243.
- Corum, James S. (1992). The Roots of Bwitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Miwitary Reform. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-7006-0541-5.
- Citino, Robert M. (26 December 2007). The Paf to Bwitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in de German Army, 1920-39. Stackpowe Books. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-8117-3457-8.
- Citino, preface xiii.
- Citino, preface xiv.
- Jeremy Bwack. European Warfare, 1660–1815, 1945, in Citino, p. 69.
- Citino, p. 30.
- Citino, p. 102.
- Citino, p. 49.
- Citino, p. 51.
- Citino, p. 103.
- Citino, p. 159.
- Citino, p. 181.
- Hans Dewbrück. Friedrich Karw, in Citino, p. 173.
- Citino, p. 305.
- Craig, p. 63.
- Citino, p. 152.
- Citino, p. 172.
- Citino, p. 89.
- Citino, p. 90.
- Bwackbourn, David (2003). History of Germany, 1780–1918: The Long Nineteenf Century. Bwackweww Pubwishing. p. 544. ISBN 0-631-23196-X.
- Citino, Robert M. (2005). The German Way of War: From de Thirty Years' War to de Third Reich. University Press of Kansas. p. 428. ISBN 0-7006-1410-9.
- Koch, H. W. (1978). A History of Prussia. New York: Barnes & Nobwe Books. ISBN 0-88029-158-3.
- Cwark, Christopher (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfaww of Prussia 1600–1947. Cambridge: Bewknap Press of Harvard. pp. 776. ISBN 0-674-02385-4.
- Cwemente, Steven E. For King and Kaiser!: The making of de Prussian Army officer, 1860–1914 (Greenwood, 1992)
- Craig, Gordon A. (1964). The Powitics of de Prussian Army: 1640–1945. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 538. ISBN 0-19-500257-1.
- Fuwbrook, Mary (1983). Piety and Powitics: Rewigion and de Rise of Absowutism in Engwand, Wurttemberg and Prussia. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223. ISBN 0-521-27633-0.
- MacDonogh, Giwes (2001). Frederick de Great: A Life in Deed and Letters. New York: St. Martin's Griffin, uh-hah-hah-hah. p. 436. ISBN 0-312-27266-9.
- Nash, David. The Prussian Army, 1808–1815 (Awmark Pubwishing, 1972)
- Reiners, Ludwig (1960). Frederick de Great: A Biography. Transwated by Lawrence P. R. Wiwson, uh-hah-hah-hah. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons. pp. 304.
- Ritter, Gerhard (1974). Frederick de Great: A Historicaw Profiwe. Berkewey: University of Cawifornia Press. pp. 207. ISBN 0-520-02775-2.
- Showawter, Dennis E. "Hubertusburg to Auerstädt: The Prussian Army in Decwine." German History (1994) 12#3 pp : 308–333.
- Summerfiewd, Stephen (2009) Prussian Infantry 1808–1840: Vowume 1 Line and Guard 1808–1814, Partizan Press, ISBN 978-1-85818-583-5; (2009) Prussian Infantry 1808–1840: Vowume 2 Jager, Reserve, Freikorps and New Regiments, Partizan Press, ISBN 978-1-85818-584-2
- Trumpener, Uwrich. "Junkers and Oders: The Rise of Commoners in de Prussian Army, 1871–1914." Canadian Journaw of History (1979). 14#1
- White, Jonadan Randaww. The Prussian Army, 1640–1871 (University Press of America, 1996)
- Zabecki, David T., ed. Germany at War: 400 Years of Miwitary History (2015)
|Wikimedia Commons has media rewated to Miwitary of Prussia.|