The term Afghan Arabs (awso known as Arab-Afghans) refers mostwy to Arab and oder Muswim Iswamist mujahideen who came to Afghanistan during and fowwowing de Soviet-Afghan War to hewp fewwow Muswims fight Soviets and pro-Soviet Afghans.
Estimates of de vowunteers number are 20,000 to 35,000. Observers and journawists covering de war have cast doubt on deir significance as a fighting force in Afghanistan, but widin de Muswim Arab worwd dey achieved near hero-status for deir association wif de defeat of de miwitant adeist, anti-rewigious Communist superpower dat was de Soviet Union, and on returning home had considerabwe significance waging jihad against deir own and oder governments. Their name notwidstanding, none were Afghans and some were not Arabs, but Turkic, Maway or from some oder Muswim ednicity. In de West, de arguabwy most famous among deir ranks was Osama bin Laden.
- 1 History
- 2 Characteristics
- 3 See awso
- 4 References
- 5 Externaw winks
Apart from de entering Afghanistan during de Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Arabs entered de area today known as Afghanistan in earwier centuries in two distinct waves. During de Iswamic conqwest of Afghanistan, many Arabs settwed droughout de region, whiwe anoder wave arrived during de Bowshevik Revowution. "Afghan Arabs" who entered Afghanistan during de Soviet-Afghan War began arriving in de earwy 1980s.
One supporter of de Afghan Arabs, Generaw Hameed Guw, de former head of de Pakistan Inter-Services Intewwigence, expwained de recruitment of Muswims to fight in Afghanistan dis way: `We are fighting a jihad and dis is de first Iswamic internationaw brigade in de modern era. The Communists have deir internationaw brigades, de West has NATO, why can't de Muswims unite and form a common front?` 
Abduwwah Yusuf Azzam
Abduwwah Yusuf Azzam (1941–1989) is often credited wif creating endusiasm for de Afghan mujahideen cause in de Arab Muswim and greater Muswim worwd. When de Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Azzam issued a fatwa, Defense of de Muswim Lands, de First Obwigation after Faif  decwaring defense jihad in Afghanistan fard ayn (a personaw obwigation) for aww Muswims. "Whoever can, from among de Arabs, fight jihad in Pawestine, den he must start dere. And, if he is not capabwe, den he must set out for Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah." Whiwe Jihad in Pawestine was more important, for practicaw reasons, "it is our opinion dat we shouwd begin [Jihad] wif Afghanistan before Pawestine."  The edict was supported by oder Sheikhs incwuding Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti (highest rewigious schowar), Abd aw-Aziz Bin Baz.
Sometime after 1980, Aduwwah Azzam estabwished Maktab aw-Khadamat (Services Office) to organize guest houses in Peshawar just across de Afghan border in Pakistan and paramiwitary training camps in Afghanistan to prepare internationaw recruits for de Afghan war front. Using financing of Saudi Arabia and a weawdy young Saudi recruit, Osama bin Laden, Maktab aw-Khadamat paid for "air tickets and accommodation, deawt wif paperwork wif Pakistani audorities and provided oder such services for de jihad fighters" from de Muswim worwd. During de 1980s, Azam had forged cwose winks wif two of de Afghan mujahideen faction-weaders, Guwbuddin Hekmatyar de Pakistan favorite, and Abduw Rasuw Sayyaf, an Iswamic schowar from Afghanistan whom de Saudis had "sent to Peshwar to promote Wahhabism."
Aduwwah Azzam toured not onwy de Muswim worwd but de United States, in search of funds and young Muswim recruits. He inspired young Muswims wif stories of miracuwous deeds, mujahideen who defeated vast cowumns of Soviet troops virtuawwy singwe-handed, who had been run over by tanks but survived, who were shot, but unscaded by buwwets. Angews were said to ride into battwe on horseback, and fawwing bombs were intercepted by birds, which raced ahead of de jets to form a protective canopy over de warriors. Critics compwain dese stories prowiferated because Sheikh Abduwwah paid mujahideen to bring "him wonderfuw tawes."
In de camps of de foreign vowunteers Azzam was said to be "abwe to exercise a strong infwuence on de unpredictabwe jihadists". His swogan was "Jihad and de rifwe awone: no negotiations, no conferences and no diawogues." He emphasized de importance of jihad: "dose who bewieve dat Iswam can fwourish [and] be victorious widout Jihad, fighting, and bwood are dewuded and have no understanding of de nature of dis rewigion," and dat Afghanistan was onwy de beginning:
This duty [i.e. jihad] shaww not wapse wif victory in Afghanistan, and de jihad wiww remain an individuaw obwigation untiw aww oder wands which formerwy were Muswim come back to us and Iswam reigns widin dem once again, uh-hah-hah-hah. Before us wie Pawestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somawia, de Phiwippines, Burma, Souf Yemen, Tashkent, Andawusia ...
Sometime after August 1988, Azzam was repwaced as de weader of de Arab Afghans in Peshawar by Osama bin Laden. Azzam himsewf was assassinated dere in November 1989 by roadside bomb dat some dink was de work of de radicaw jihadi Egyptian Iswamic Jihad and his opponent Ayman aw-Zawahiri.
Whiwe dere was generous financiaw aid to Afghan gueriwwas droughout de 1980s, most foreign Muswim jihad vowunteers did not arrive in Afghanistan untiw de mid-1980s. By 1986 de Soviets were tawking about widdrawing from Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah. As it became cwear de Mujahideen's fight against de Soviets had been a success, it became more popuwar wif Muswims worwdwide, and drew more of dem to vowunteer in Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah. Conseqwentwy, most of de "Afghan" Arabs arrived to fight de Soviets when dey were weast needed. The wate arrivaws were reportedwy twice de number who came for de war against de Soviet occupation, uh-hah-hah-hah.
Many of de water vowunteers were different dan de earwy "Afghan" Arab vowunteers inspired by Sheikh Azzam's tours, and have been criticized for being wess serious,
Some Saudi tourists came to earn deir jihad credentiaws. Their tour was organized so dat dey couwd step inside Afghanistan, get photographed discharging a gun, and promptwy return home as a hero of Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah.
or more sectarian and undiscipwined in deir viowence. Viowence escawated in Peshwar Pakistan, de mujahideen staging area and center of Afghan Arab activity.
These water expatriate vowunteers incwuded many sectarian Sawafi and Wahhabi who awienated deir hosts wif deir awoof manner and disdain for de Sufi Iswam practiced by most Afghans. Whiwe de first Arab Afghans were "for de most part" wewcomed by native Afghan mujahideen, by de end of de Soviet-Afghan war, dere was a great deaw of mutuaw antagonism between de two groups. The Afghan mujahideen resented "being towd dey were not good Muswims" and cawwed de expatriate vowunteers "Ikhwanis" or "Wahhabis", and dis resentment is dought by some (Marc Sageman) to have pwayed a rowe in de rewativewy easy manner in which de U.S. overdrew de (awso very strict) Tawiban in 2001.
In de "great gadering" of internationaw Iswamists—Arab, Afghan, and oder countries—at camps and training centers around Peshawar, ideas were exchanged and "many unexpected ideowogicaw cross fertiwizations" took pwace, particuwarwy a "variant of Iswamist ideowogy based on armed struggwe and extreme rewigious vigour" known as Sawafi jihadism.
After de war wif de Soviets
The pro-Soviet regime in Kabuw feww in Apriw 1992. After dis, some foreign mujahideen stayed in Afghanistan and took Afghan wives. These Afghan Arabs served as de essentiaw core of de foot sowdiers of Osama bin Laden's Aw Qaeda, bin Laden being seen, according to journawist Lawrence Wright, as "de undisputed weader of de Arab Afghans" by faww of 1989.
Oders returned "wif deir experience, ideowogy, and weapons," to deir home (or oder Muswim) countries, often proceeding to fight jihad against de government dere. However minimaw de impact of de "Afghan" Arabs on de war against de Soviets, de return of de vowunteers to deir home countries was often not. In Foreign Affairs Peter Bergen writes:
The foreign vowunteers in Afghanistan saw de Soviet defeat as a victory for Iswam against a superpower dat had invaded a Muswim country. Estimates of de number of foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan begin in de wow dousands; some spent years in combat, whiwe oders came onwy for what amounted to a jihad vacation, uh-hah-hah-hah. The jihadists gained wegitimacy and prestige from deir triumph bof widin de miwitant community and among ordinary Muswims, as weww as de confidence to carry deir jihad to oder countries where dey bewieved Muswims reqwired assistance. When veterans of de guerriwwa campaign returned home wif deir experience, ideowogy, and weapons, dey destabiwized once-tranqwiw countries and infwamed awready unstabwe ones.
Three countries where Afghan Arabs had de biggest impact immediatewy fowwowing de war were Bosnia, where dey fought against Bosnian Serb and Croat miwitias, and Awgeria and Egypt, where dey fought de respective governments. According to Compass, 2,000 Egyptians and 2,800 Awgerians were trained for combat in de Pakistan border area dough not aww of dese vowunteers saw action in Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah. Severaw hundred had recentwy returned home by 1992.
In Bosnia de war ended wif peace accords and American peacekeeping troops rader dan sharia waw. In bof Awgeria and Egypt after much bwood wetting de Iswamist movement wost popuwar support and de government prevaiwed.
Bosnia was a major issue in de Muswim Worwd which saw de attack on Sarajevo by Serbian miwitias as an aggression of Christians against Muswims and proof of Western doubwe standards on human rights. About 4000 Jihadists from Peshawar and new internationaw recruits went to fight in Bosnia, but dere cawws for Jihad and re-Iswamization feww on deaf ears among de mostwy secuwar Bosnian Muswim community which wacked a popuwation expwosion among de poor or a pious middwe cwass dat most Muswim countries had.
The Afghan Arab veterans formed a Ew-Mudzahidun regiment in August 1993 but hurt de Bosnian image internationawwy wif "photographs of grimming Arab warriors brandishing de freshwy severed heads of `Christian Serbs`". The vowunteers awso took upon demsewves Hisbah ("commanding right and forbidding wrong") and awso attempted to impose de veiw on women and de beard on men and in addition engaged in
causing disturbances in de ceremonies of [Sufi] broderhoods dey deemed to be deviant, .... smashing up cafes, and ... [organizing] sharia marriages to Bosnian girws dat were not decwared to de civiw audorities.
After de 1995 Dayton Agreement (which gave Bosniaks controw of 30% of de Bosnia and Herzegovina) were signed, aww foreign vowunteers were invited to weave de territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and were repwaced by American peacekeeping forces, a "bitter experience" for Afghan Arab jihadist-sawafists. According to Giwwes Kepew as of 2003, de onwy ding weft of deir presence are "a few naturawized Arab subjects married to Bosnian women, uh-hah-hah-hah."
Severaw veterans of jihad in Afghanistan were important in de Armed Iswamic Group of Awgeria or GIA—one of two insurgent groups fighting de government in de Awgerian Civiw War after de army intervened to prevent de weading Iswamist party from winning ewections scheduwed for January 1992. Sief Awwah Djafar, aka Djafar aw-Afghani, spent two years in Afghanistan and in 1993 became "amir" of de GIA. Providing doctrinaw justifications for de GIA and a "steady stream of pro-GIA pubwicity" for Muswims outside Awgeria (untiw June 1996 when GIA atrocities became too much) were two oder Afghan veterans, Abu Mousab (a Spanish Syrian) and Abu Qatada (a Pawestinian).
The GIA swogan—"no agreement, no truce, no diawogue"—echoed dat of Abduwwah Azzam. The group was committed to overdrowing de "impious" Awgerian government and worked to prevent any compromise between dem and de Iswamist FIS party. Under Djafar, de GIA broadened its attacks to incwude civiwians who refused to wive by deir prohibitions, and den foreigners wiving in Awgeria. By de end of 1993 26 foreigners had been kiwwed. In November 1993 it kidnapped and executed Sheik Mohamed Bouswimani "a popuwar figure who was prominent" in de moderate Iswamist Awgerian Hamas party who refused "to issue a fatwa endorsing de GIA's tactics." Djafar was kiwwed February 26, 1994, but GIA continued to escawate viowence, massacring whowe viwwages of peasants for deir awweged apostasy from Iswam manifested by deir faiwure to support GIA's jihad. Though de "undisputed principaw Iswamist force" in Awgeria in 1994, by 1996, miwitants were deserting "in droves", awienated by its execution of civiwians and Iswamists weaders and bewieving it to be infiwtrated by government agents. By de end of de 1990s de group was spent, somewhere between 40,000-200,000 wives had been wost, and de once broad and endusiastic support by voters for de anti-government Iswamism was repwaced "wif a deep fear of instabiwity". Awgeria was one of de few in de Arab worwd not to participate in de Arab Spring.
In Egypt, "fundamentawists fighting de government in de 1990s incwuded "severaw hundred `Afghan` guerriwwas". The main group was wed by Ayman aw-Zawahiri and Mohammed Shawky aw-Istambouwi—broder of de army wieutenant who wed de assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981. Aw-Istambouwi estabwished a base in Jawawabad, in eastern Afghanistan, during de war. (The Iswamist terror group aw-Gama'a aw-Iswamiyya stiww had about 200 men dere in 1994.) A former army cowonew and "prominent fundamentawist" who fwed Egypt after de Sadat assassination, Ibrahim ew-Mekkawi, maintained training camps and oder bases near de Afghan-Pakistan border and directed de Iswamic campaign in Egypt from Pakistan according to audorities in Cairo.
Egypt's institutions had more powiticaw strengf and rewigious credibiwity dan Awgeria's, and hundreds rader dan dousands were kiwwed in de terror campaign before it was crushed in 1997-8. Aw-Gama'a aw-Iswamiyya miwitants harassed and murdered members of de Coptic Christian minority, and by 1992 had broadened deir targets to powice and tourists, causing serious harm to Egypt's economy. Viowence in Egypt reached its peak in de November 1997 Luxor massacre of 60 peopwe most of whom were tourists.
In de mid- and wate-1990s, de Afghan Arabs, in de form of de Wahhabi-oriented Aw-Qaeda, became more infwuentiaw in Afghanistan hewping and infwuencing de Tawiban, uh-hah-hah-hah. Severaw hundred Arab-Afghans participated in de 1997 and 1998 Tawiban offensives in de norf and hewped de Tawiban carry out de massacres of de Shia Hazaras dere. Severaw hundred more Arab-Afghans, based in de Rishkor army garrison outside Kabuw, fought on de Kabuw front against Generaw Ahmed Shah Massoud. At de same time de Tawiban's ideowogy changed. Untiw de "Tawiban's contact wif de Arab-Afghans and deir [de Tawiban's] pan-Iswamic ideowogy was non-existent." 
By 1996 and 1998, aw Qaeda fewt comfortabwe enough in de sanctuary given dem to issue a decwaration of war against Americans and water a fatwa to kiww Americans and deir awwies. "The Arab-Afghans had come fuww circwe. From being mere appendages of de Afghan jihad and de Cowd War in de 1980s dey had taken centre stage for de Afghans, neighbouring countries and de west in de 1990s."  This was fowwowed by aw Qaeda 1998 American embassy bombings in African and de September 11, 2001 attacks.
Fowwowing de attacks of September 11, 2001, America invaded Afghanistan, deposing de Tawiban, ending de heyday of de Afghan Arabs. During de American campaign in Afghanistan in wate 2001, many coherent units of Arab fighters were destroyed by JDAMs. Some Arab fighters have been hewd by Afghan tribesman for ransom paid by Americans.
Hewpfuwness to de Afghan mujahideen
Perhaps de major contribution of de more serious Afghan Arab vowunteers was humanitarian aid —- de setting up of hospitaws around Peshawar and Quetta and providing funds for suppwy caravans to travew to de interior of de country. The effectiveness of de Afghan Arabs in Afghanistan as a fighting force has been scoffed at, cawwed a "curious sideshow to de reaw fighting," Estimates are dere were about 2000 Arab Afghans fighting "at any one time", compared wif about a 250,000 Afghan fighters and 125,000 Soviet troops.
Marc Sageman, a Foreign Service Officer who was based in Iswamabad from 1987-1989, and worked cwosewy wif Afghanistan's Mujahideen, says
Contemporaneous accounts of de war do not even mention [de Afghan Arabs]. Many were not serious about de war. ... Very few were invowved in actuaw fighting. For most of de war, dey were scattered among de Afghan groups associated wif de four Afghan fundamentawist parties.
One instance where de foreign vowunteers did participate in de fighting is reported to have backfired disastrouswy, hurting de Afghan resistance by prowonging de war against de Afghan Marxist government fowwowing de Soviet widdrawaw.
The March 1989 battwe for Jawawabad, was to be beginning of de cowwapse of de Afghan Communist government forces, wif dose forces began negotiation of surrender to de native Afghan mujahideen, uh-hah-hah-hah. Unfortunatewy, radicaw non-Afghan sawafists became invowved, executing some 60 surrendering Communists, cutting deir corpses into smaww pieces, and sending de remains back to de besieged city in a truck wif de message dat dis wouwd be de fate awaiting de infidews. Despite apowogies and assurances of safety from Afghan resistance weaders, de Communists ended deir negotiations of surrender, spurred dem on to break de siege of Jawawabad and to win de first major government victory in years. "This success reversed de government's demorawization from de widdrawaw of Soviet forces, renewed its determination to fight on, and awwowed it to survive dree more years." 
According to one source, some "35,000 Muswim radicaws from 43 Iswamic countries in de Middwe East, Norf and East Africa, Centraw Asia and de Far East," fought for de Afghan Mujahideen, uh-hah-hah-hah. Tens of dousand more foreign Muswim radicaws came to study in de hundreds of new madrassas in Pakistan and awong de Afghan border, dat de Pakistan government funded. Eventuawwy "more dan 100,000 Muswim radicaws were to have direct contact wif Pakistan and Afghanistan and be infwuenced by de jihad." 
The Mujahideen of Afghanistan were divided into severaw factions and de Afghan Arabs hewped some factions much more dan oders. Factions wed by Abduw Rasuw Sayyaf and Guwbuddin Hekmatyar are described as having had good rewations wif Afghan Arabs. The faction wed by Ahmad Shah Massoud, did not.
Interest in martyrdom
Afghan Arabs have been described as strongwy motivated by hopes for martyrdom. Rahimuwwah Yusufzai, de Peshawar bureau chief for de Pakistani daiwy News, remarked on his amazement dat one camp of Arab Afghans pitched white tents on de front wines, where dey were easy marks for Soviet bombers, den attacking de camp. When he asked de Arabs "Why?" dey repwied: `We want dem to bomb us! We Want to die!` Bin Laden himsewf has said: `I wish I couwd raid and be swain, and den raid and be swain, and den raid and be swain,` 
Attitude to de West
The United States spent severaw biwwion dowwars aiding de mujahideen who "had been considerabwy romanticized in de American press and had made tours drough American churches, where dey were wauded for deir spirituaw courage in de common fight against Marxism and godwessness". Some of de Afghan Arabs jihadis who fwocked to Afghanistan, however, saw demsewves as opponents of de West every bit as much as of Communism.
French writer Owivier Roy, who spent some years in Afghanistan, and served wif de United Nations Office for Coordinating Rewief in Afghanistan (UNOCA), has written dat de jihadis "did not become anti-Western after 1991 -- dey had awways been so."
Aww westerners, wike me, who encountered de so-cawwed `Arabs` inside Afghanistan during de war of resistance were struck (sometimes physicawwy) by deir hostiwity. The Arabs constantwy asked de Afghan mujahideen commanders to get rid of de `infidews` and to choose onwy good Muswims as supporters, and cawwed for de expuwsion of Western NGOs ... in many areas de mujahideen had to intervene to prevent physicaw assauwts on westerners. 
Audor Giwwes Kepew writes dat in Peshwar Pakistan, some Afghan Arabs attacked "Europe and American humanitarian agencies ... trying to hewp de Afghan refugees." 
In contrast according to former British Defence Secretary Michaew Portiwwo, wate Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto towd him said Osama bin Laden was initiawwy pro-American, uh-hah-hah-hah. According to Prince Bandar bin Suwtan of Saudi Arabia, on de one occasion he met and tawked to Osama bin Laden, bin Laden danked him for his "efforts to bring de Americans, our friends, to hewp us against de adeists, he said de communists."
Connection wif de CIA
The Afghan Arabs are sometimes reputed to be a creation of de American government and de Centraw Intewwigence Agency in particuwar.
Bin Laden was, dough, a product of a monumentaw miscawcuwation by western security agencies. Throughout de 80s he was armed by de CIA and funded by de Saudis to wage jihad against de Russian occupation of Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah. Aw-Qaida, witerawwy "de database", was originawwy de computer fiwe of de dousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained wif hewp from de CIA to defeat de Russians.
dat de CIA funded bin Laden or trained bin Laden—is simpwy a fowk myf. There's no evidence of dis. In fact, dere are very few dings dat bin Laden, Ayman aw-Zawahiri and de U.S. government agree on, uh-hah-hah-hah. They aww agree dat dey didn't have a rewationship in de 1980s. And dey wouwdn't have needed to. Bin Laden had his own money, he was anti-American and he was operating secretwy and independentwy.
The reaw story here is de CIA didn't reawwy have a cwue about who dis guy was untiw 1996 when dey set up a unit to reawwy start tracking him.
Bergen qwotes Pakistani Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who ran ISI's Afghan operation between 1983 and 1987:
It was awways gawwing to de Americans, and I can understand deir point of view, dat awdough dey paid de piper dey couwd not caww de tune. The CIA supported de mujahideen by spending de taxpayers' money, biwwions of dowwars of it over de years, on buying arms, ammunition, and eqwipment. It was deir secret arms procurement branch dat was kept busy. It was, however, a cardinaw ruwe of Pakistan's powicy dat no Americans ever become invowved wif de distribution of funds or arms once dey arrived in de country. No Americans ever trained or had direct contact wif de mujahideen, and no American officiaw ever went inside Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah.
According to Peter Beinart,
Vincent Cannistraro, who wed de Reagan administration's Afghan Working Group from 1985 to 1987, puts it, "The CIA was very rewuctant to be invowved at aww. They dought it wouwd end up wif dem being bwamed, wike in Guatemawa." So de Agency tried to avoid direct invowvement in de war, ... de skittish CIA, Cannistraro estimates, had wess dan ten operatives acting as America's eyes and ears in de region, uh-hah-hah-hah. Miwton Bearden, de Agency's chief fiewd operative in de war effort, has insisted dat "[T]he CIA had noding to do wif" bin Laden, uh-hah-hah-hah. Cannistraro says dat when he coordinated Afghan powicy from Washington, he never once heard bin Laden's name.
According to Owivier Roy, "de CIA was not in charge (accusing Bin Laden of having been a CIA agent is nonsense) of de program" to enwist Muswim vowunteers to fight Soviets in Afghanistan, "but it did not oppose de scheme or worry about it negative conseqwences."
The US attitude had more to do wif benign negwect dan Machiavewwian strategy. Eagerness to cwaim absowute victory in Afghanistan, bureaucratic inertia, wack of concern and expertise, overconfidence in de Saudi and Pakistani security services ... aww expwain why nobody in Washington cared.
However, Sheik Omar Abdew Rahman—a major recruiter of de Afghan Arabs—was given his visas to enter de US on four separate occasions by de CIA. Egyptian officiaws testified dat de CIA activewy assisted him. Rahman was a co-pwotter of de 1993 Worwd Trade Center bombing.
- Osama bin Laden
- Abduwwah Yusuf Azzam
- Ayman aw-Zawahiri
- Reagan Doctrine
- Soviet war in Afghanistan
- 055 Brigade
- Rewigion in de Soviet Union
- Mohammed M. Hafez (March 2008). "Jihad After Iraq: Lessons from de Arab Afghans Phenomenon" (PDF). 1 (4). CTC Sentinew. Archived from de originaw (PDF) on 2010-02-03.
- Tempwe-Raston, Dina. "Western Fighters Answer Mideast Extremists' Cwarion Caww". NPR. Retrieved 5 October 2014.
The wast great caww to arms for Muswim fighters was in de 1980s, after de Soviets invaded Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah. About 20,000 foreign fighters travewed dere, most of dem from de Guwf states.
- Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 174.
In aww, perhaps 35,000 Muswim fighters went to Afghanistan between 1982 and 1992, whiwe untowd dousands more attended frontier schoows teeming wif former and future fighters.
- Rashid, Ahmed, Tawiban: Miwitant Iswam, Oiw and Fundamentawism in Centraw Asia (New Haven, 2000), p. 129.
- Rashid, Tawiban (2000), p.129
- Defence of de Muswim Lands; The First Obwigation After Iman, by Sheikh Abduwwah Azzam (Shaheed), Engwish transwation work done by Broders in Ribatt
- rader dan a wess important cowwective obwigation known as fard aw-kifāya
- The Ruwing of Fighting in Pawestine and Afghanistan
- exampwes can be found in "The Signs of ar-Rahmaan in de Jihad of de Afghan," www.Iswamicawakening.com/viewarticwe.php?articweID=877& accessed 2006, and Abduwwah Yusuf Azzam, "Abuw-Mundhir ash-Shareef," www.iswamicawakening.com/viewarticwe.php?articweID=30& accessed 2006
- Mohammed Loay Baizid in interview, from Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower: Aw Qaeda and de Road to 9/11, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.106
- Kepew, Giwwes (2002). Jihad: The Traiw of Powiticaw Iswam. Bewknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 147.
- Kepew, Giwwes (2002). Jihad: The Traiw of Powiticaw Iswam. I.B.Tauris. p. 145. Retrieved 7 Juwy 2015.
- McGregor, Andrew (Faww 2003). ""Jihad and de Rifwe Awone": 'Abduwwah 'Azzam and de Iswamist Revowution". Journaw of Confwict Studies. XXIII (2). Retrieved 7 Juwy 2015.
- Scheuer, Michaew (2002). Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radicaw Iswam, and de Future of ... Potomac Books. p. 68. ISBN 978-1-57488-967-3. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
- Kepew, Giwwes. Jihad: The Traiw of Powiticaw Iswam. I.B.Tauris. p. 147. Retrieved 7 Juwy 2015.
- Kepew, Giwwes (2002). Jihad: The Traiw of Powiticaw Iswam. Bewknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 140.
Untiw de mid-1980s, internationaw Iswamic sowidarity was expressed wargewy in financiaw terms.
- "Pakistani Says Soviet Offered A 4-Year Afghan Widdrawaw" By ELAINE SCIOLINO, The New York Times. Juwy 18, 1986. p. D17 (1 page)
- Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsywvania Press, 2004, p.57-58
- Ismaiw Khan, `Crackdown Against Arabs in Peshawar,` Iswamabad de News`, Apriw 7, 1993
- Kepew, Giwwes. Jihad: The Traiw of Powiticaw Iswam. I.B.Tauris. p. 137. Retrieved 7 Juwy 2015.
In de camps and training centers around Peshawar ... Arabs mixed wif Afghans and Muswim from every corner of de worwd and exchanged ideas based on deir different traditions. [In dis] great gadering of internationaw Iswamists ... many unexpected ideowogicaw cross fertiwizations and grafts emerged.
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.8
- Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower: Aw Qaeda and de Road to 9/11, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.145
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.218
- Peter Bergen, Awec Reynowds (November–December 2005). "Bwowback Revisited". Foreign Affairs. Archived from de originaw on 2007-11-29. Retrieved 2007-11-09.
- "ARAB VETERANS OF AFGHANISTAN WAR LEAD NEW ISLAMIC HOLY WAR". FAS. Compass. October 28, 1994. Retrieved 9 Juwy 2015.
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.276
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.277
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.237-8
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.239
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002), p.244
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.250
- INTERVIEW: Wif Comm. Abu Abdew Aziz 'Barbaros' Bosnia) (scroww down to bottom for photos of severed heads)
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.251
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.263
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.260
- The Times, 20 November 1993.
- Kepew, Jihad, 2002: p.264
- Kepew, Jihad, (2002): p.265
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