Battle of Huế
The Battle of Huế during 1968 (also called the Siege of Huế), was one of the bloodiest and longest battles of the Vietnam War (1959–1975). Battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), two U.S. Army battalions, and three understrength U.S. Marine Corps battalions defeated 10 battalions of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN or NVA) and the Viet Cong (Việt Cộng or VC, also known as National Liberation Front or NLF).
With the beginning of the Tet Offensive on January 30, 1968, the Vietnamese lunar New Year (Vietnamese: Tết Nguyên Đán) large conventional American forces had been committed to combat upon Vietnamese soil for almost three years. Passing through the city of Huế, Highway One was an important supply line for ARVN, US and allied forces from the coastal city of Đà Nẵng to the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). It also provided access to the Perfume River (Vietnamese: Sông Hương or Hương Giang) at the point the river ran through Huế, dividing the city into northern and southern areas. Huế was also a base for United States Navy supply boats. Considering its logistical value and its proximity to the DMZ (only 50 kilometres (31 mi)), Huế should have been well-defended, fortified, and prepared for any communist attack.
However, the city had few fortifications and was poorly defended. The South Vietnamese and U.S. forces were completely unprepared when the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong failed to observe the promised Tet Truce. Instead, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army launched a massive assault throughout South Vietnam, attacking hundreds of military targets and population centers across the country, among them the city of Huế.
The North Vietnamese forces rapidly occupied most of the city. Over the next month they were gradually driven out during intense house-to-house fighting led by the Marines. In the end, although the Allies declared a military victory, the city of Huế was virtually destroyed and more than 5000 civilians were killed (2,800 of them executed by the PAVN and Viet Cong according to the South Vietnamese government). The North Vietnamese forces lost an estimated 1,042 to 5,000 killed, while Allied forces lost 668 dead and 3,707 wounded. The tremendous losses negatively affected the American public's perception of the war and political support for the war began to wane.
In the early morning hours of January 31, 1968, a division-sized force of NVA and Viet Cong soldiers launched a coordinated attack on the city of Huế. Their targets were the Tay Loc airfield at , the 1st ARVN Division headquarters in the Citadel, and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound in the New City on the south side of the river. Their strategic objective was to "liberate" the entire city to help sweep the Communist insurgents into power.
At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky and two additional battalions from the NVA Sixth Regiment attacked the western bank of the fortress-like Citadel on the northern side of the city. Their objective was to capture the Mang CA Compound, the Tac Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The NVA Fourth Regiment launched a simultaneous attack on the headquarters of the U.S. MACV Compound in the southern part of Huế. At the Western Gate of the Citadel, a four-man North Vietnamese sapper team, dressed in South Vietnamese Army uniforms, killed the guards and opened the gate. Upon their flashlight signals, lead elements of the 6th NVA entered the old city.
North Vietnamese regulars poured into the old imperial capital. The 800th and 802nd Battalions pushed through the Western Gate and then drove north. On the Tay Loc airfield, the ARVN "Black Panther Company", reinforced by the division's 1st Ordnance Company, stopped the 800th Battalion. Although one battle account stated that the South Vietnamese "offered no strong resistance", the NVA report acknowledged "the heavy enemy ARVN fire enveloped the entire airfield. By dawn, our troops were still unable to advance". The fighting for the airfield continued to seesaw, with first the ARVN having the upper hand and then the Communists.
The 802nd NVA Battalion struck the ARVN 1st Division headquarters at Mang Ca. Although the enemy battalion penetrated the division compound, an ad hoc 200-man defensive force of staff officers and clerks staved off the enemy assaults. General Truong called back most of his Black Panther Company from the airfield to bolster the headquarters defenses, which kept division headquarters secure.
At 08:00, North Vietnamese troops raised the red and blue Viet Cong banner with its gold star over the Citadel flag tower.
From February 12 through the 29th (it was a leap year) the embattled General Truong called in reinforcements. He ordered his 3rd Regiment; the 3rd Troop, 7th ARVN Cavalry; and the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force to relieve the pressure on his Mang Ca headquarters. Responding to the call at PK 17, the ARVN base located near a road marker on Route l, 17 kilometers north of Huế, the 3rd Troop and the 7th Battalion of the Airborne task force rolled out of their base area in an armored convoy onto Route l. A North Vietnamese blocking force stopped the ARVN relief force about 400 meters short of the Citadel wall. Unable to force their way through the enemy positions, the South Vietnamese paratroopers asked for assistance.
The 2nd ARVN Airborne Battalion reinforced the convoy and the South Vietnamese finally penetrated the lines and entered the Citadel in the early morning hours of the next day. The cost had been heavy: the ARVN suffered 131 casualties including 40 dead, and lost four of the 12 armored personnel carriers in the convoy. According to the South Vietnamese, the enemy also paid a steep price in men and equipment. The ARVN claimed to have killed 250 of the NVA, captured five prisoners, and recovered 71 individual and 25 crew-served weapons.
The 3rd ARVN Regiment had an even more difficult time. On the 31st, two of its battalions, the 2nd and 3rd, advanced east from encampments southwest of the city along the northern bank of the Perfume River, but North Vietnamese defensive fires forced them to fall back. Unable to enter the Citadel, the two battalions established their night positions outside the southeast wall of the old City. Enemy forces surrounded the 1st and 4th Battalions of the regiment, operating to the southeast, as they attempted to reinforce the units in Huế. Captain Phan Ngoc Luong, the commander of the 1st Battalion, retreated with his unit to the coastal Ba Long outpost, arriving there with only three eight-round clips per man for their World War II vintage M1 Garand rifles. At Ba Long, the battalion then embarked upon motorized junks and reached the Citadel the following day. The 4th Battalion, however, remained unable to break its encirclement for several days.
South of the city, on January 31, Lieutenant Colonel Phan Hu Chi, the commander of the ARVN 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron attempted to break the enemy stranglehold. He led an armored column toward Hue, but like the other South Vietnamese units, found it impossible to break through. With the promise of U.S. Marine reinforcements, Chi's column, with three tanks in the lead, tried once more. This time they crossed the An Cuu Bridge into the new city. Coming upon the central police headquarters in southern Huế, the tanks attempted to relieve the police defenders, but an enemy B-40 rocket made a direct hit upon Lieutenant Colonel Chi's tank, killing him instantly. The South Vietnamese armor pulled back.
After this the Marines at Phu Bai were called and the first U.S. Marines to bolster the South Vietnamese in the city were on their way. They were from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, part of Task Force X-Ray.
Three United States Marine Corps battalions were protecting the air base at Phú Bài (approximately ten miles southeast of Huế), Highway One and all western entrances to Huế, when there should have been two complete regiments. The Commanding Officer of the Marines in Huế was Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, a veteran of World War II and the Korean War who had already been awarded the Navy Cross and Silver Star for action in World War II and was eventually awarded his second Navy Cross for Hue City.
On the night of January 30 – January 31, the same time the North Vietnamese struck Huế, the Marines faced rocket and mortar fire at the Phú Bài airstrip and Communist infantry units hit Marine Combined Action Platoons and local PF and RF units in the region including the Truoi River and Phu Loc sectors. At the key Truoi River Bridge, about 0400 a North Vietnamese company attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment and the nearby Combined Action Platoon (CAP) H-8. Colonel Hughes ordered Captain G. Ronald Christmas, the Company H commander to relieve the embattled CAP unit. The Marines caught the enemy force beginning to withdraw from the CAP enclave and took it under fire. Seeing an opportunity to trap the North Vietnamese, Cheatham reinforced Company H with his Command Group and Company F.
With his other companies in blocking positions, Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi River. While inflicting casualties, the events in Huế were to interfere with his plans. At 1030, January 31, Company G departed for Phu Bai as the Task Force reserve. Later that afternoon, the battalion lost operational control of Company F. Captain Downs years later remembered the company "disengaged . .. where we had them pinned up against a river, moved to the river and trucked into Phu Bai." With the departure of Company F about 1630, the NVA successfully disengaged and Companies H and E took up night defensive positions. According to the Marines, 2nd Battalion 5th Marines (2/5) killed 18 enemy troops, took 1 prisoner, and recovered sundry equipment and weapons including 6 AK-47s, at a cost of three Marines killed and 13 wounded.
While the fighting continued in the Truoi River and the Phu Loc sectors, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had begun to move into Huế city. In the early morning hours of January 31 after the rocket bombardment of the airfield and the initial attack on the Truoi River Bridge, Task Force X-Ray received reports of enemy strikes all along Route l between the Hai Van Pass and Huế. All told, the enemy hit some 18 targets from bridges, Combined Action units, and company defensive positions. With Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines as the Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughes directed Lieutenant Colonel Gravel to stage the company for any contingency. At 0630, Colonel Hughes ordered the company to reinforce the Truoi River Bridge. All Captain Batcheller recalled several years later was that "we were rousted up about 0400 on the 31st and launched south on trucks to rendezvous with and reinforce ARVN forces about a map sheet and a half south of Phu Bai."
Up to this point the fighting for Huế had been entirely a South Vietnamese affair. General LaHue, the Task Force X-Ray commander, actually had very little reliable intelligence on the situation. All he knew was that Truong's headquarters had been under attack, as was the MACV compound. Because of enemy mortaring of the LCU ramp in southern Huế, the allies had stopped all river traffic to the city. As LaHue later wrote: "Initial deployment of forces was made with limited information."
As the Marines approached the southern suburbs of the city, they began to come under increased sniper fire. In one village, the troops dismounted and cleared the houses on either side of the main street before proceeding. The Marine convoy stopped several times to eliminate resistance in heavy house-to-house and street fighting before proceeding again. At about 15:15 after bloody fighting the Marines managed to make their way toward the MACV compound. By this time, the enemy attackers had pulled back their forces from the immediate vicinity of the compound. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel met with Army Colonel George O. Adkisson, the U.S. senior advisor to the 1st ARVN Division.
Leaving Company A behind to secure the MACV compound, the Marine battalion commander took Company G, reinforced by the three tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion and a few South Vietnamese tanks from the ARVN 7th Armored Squadron, and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River. Gravel left the armor behind on the southern bank to provide direct fire support. As he remembered, the American M48s were too heavy for the bridge and the South Vietnamese tankers in light M24 tanks "refused to go." As the Marine infantry started across, an enemy machine gun on the other end of the bridge opened up, killing and wounding several Marines. One Marine, Lance Corporal Lester A. Tully, later awarded the Silver Star for his action, ran forward, threw a grenade, and silenced the gun. Two platoons successfully made their way to the other side. They turned left and immediately came under automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire from the Citadel wall. The Marines decided to withdraw.
This was easier said than done. The enemy was well dug-in and firing from virtually every building in Huế city north of the river. The number of wounded was rising, the Marines commandeered some abandoned Vietnamese civilian vehicles and used them as makeshift ambulances to carry out the wounded. Among the casualties on the bridge was Major Walter M. Murphy, the 1st Battalion S-3 or operations officer, who later died of his wounds.
By 20:00, a battalion of Marines  had established defensive positions near the MACV compound and a helicopter landing zone in a field just west of the Navy LCU Ramp in southern Huế. On that first day, the two Marine companies in Huế had sustained casualties of 10 Marines killed and 56 wounded. During the night, the battalion called in a helicopter into the landing zone to take out the worst of the wounded. The American command still had little realization of the situation in Huế.
The next morning at 0700, Gravel launched a two-company assault supported by tanks towards the jail and provincial building. The Marines did not progress further than one block before they came under sniper fire. A tank was knocked out by a 57 mm recoilless rifle. After that the attack was stopped and the battalion returned to the MACV compound. North of the Perfume River, on the 1st, the 1st ARVN Division enjoyed some limited success. Although the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 3rd ARVN Regiment remained outside of the Citadel walls unable to penetrate the NVA defenses, the 2nd and 7th Airborne Battalions, supported by armored personnel carriers and the Black Panther Company, recaptured the Tay Loc airfield.
About 1500, the 1st Battalion, 3rd ARVN reached the 1st ARVN command post at the Mang Ca compound. Later that day, U.S. Marine helicopters from HMM-165 brought part of the 4th Battalion, 2nd ARVN Regiment from Dong Ha into the Citadel. One of the pilots, Captain Denis M. Duna-gan, remembered that the call for an emergency trooplift came in about 1400. Eight CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters made the flight in marginal weather with a 200–500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility, arriving in an improvised landing zone under enemy mortar fire. The deteriorating weather forced the squadron to cancel the remaining lifts with about one-half of the battalion in the Citadel.
Shortly after 1500 Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines made a helicopter landing into southern Huế. They were to relieve a MACV Microwave/Tropo communications facility surrounded by a VC force. It was the main communications link for the Huế area, the DMZ, and for Khe Sanh. The company spent the better part of the afternoon trying to reach the isolated United States Army Signal Corps 513th Signal Detachment, 337th Signal Company, 37th Signal Battalion communications site which was about one and one half miles southeast of the MACV compound. They never made it. The company sustained casualties of 3 dead and 13 wounded.
On February 1, General Cushman alerted the 1st Cavalry Division commander, Major General John J.Tolson, to be ready to deploy his 3rd Brigade into a sector west of Huế. By 2215 that night, Tolson's command had asked III MAF to coordinate with I Corps and Task Force X-Ray its designated area of operations in the Huế sector. Tolson's plan called for an air assault by two battalions of the 3d Brigade northwest of Huế. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was to arrive in the landing zone first, followed by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry to be inserted near PK-17. Attacking in a southeasterly direction, the two battalions would then attempt to close the enemy supply line into Huế.
Under difficult circumstances, the 'First Team' began its movement into the Huế area. In mid-afternoon on the 2nd, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry arrived in a landing zone about 6 miles (10 km) northwest of Huế and then pushed towards the city.' In southern Huế, on February 2, the Marines made some minor headway and brought in further reinforcements. The 1st Battalion finally relieved the MACV radio facility that morning and later, after a three-hour fire fight, reached the Huế University campus.' Although the NVA, during the night, had dropped the railroad bridge across the Perfume River west of the city, they left untouched the bridge across the Phu Cam Canal. About 11:00, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Captain G. Ronald Christmas, crossed the An Cuu Bridge over the canal in a 'Rough Rider' armed convoy.
As the convoy, accompanied by Army trucks equipped with quad .50-caliber machine guns and two M50 Ontos, entered the city, enemy snipers opened up on the Marine reinforcements. Near the MACV compound, the Marines came under heavy enemy machine gun and rocket fire. The Army gunners with their 'quad .50s' and the Marine Ontos, each with six 106 mm recoilless rifles, quickly responded. In the resulting confusion, the convoy exchanged fire with a Marine unit already in the city. About mid-day, the NVA, continued to block any advance to the south. An enemy 75 mm recoilless rifle knocked out one of the supporting tanks. By the end of the day, the Marines had sustained 2 dead and 34 wounded and claimed to have killed nearly 140 of the enemy. The battalion consolidated its night defensive positions and waited to renew its attack on the following day.
Battle for the Citadel
Heavy street fighting followed the Marines all the way through the city for more than three weeks. Marines of the 1st and 5th Regiments, fighting alongside the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s 1st Division, and also supported by U.S. Army 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments drove the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces out of Huế little by little and retook the city one block at a time.
Many of the Marines of Task Force X-Ray had little or no urban combat experience, and the US troops were not trained for urban close-quarters combat, so this battle was especially tough for them. Due to Huế's religious and cultural status, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city, for fear of destroying the historic structures. Also, since it was still monsoon season in that area of the country with heavy rain and low clouds on many days during the battle, it was virtually impossible for the U.S. forces to use air support. But as the intensity of the battle increased, the policy was eliminated. The communist forces were constantly using snipers, hidden inside buildings or in spider holes, and prepared makeshift machine gun bunkers. They organized local counterattacks and, during the night, they prepared explosive booby traps. Sometimes booby traps were even placed under dead bodies.
Finally it was only down to the Citadel and the Imperial Palace which was in the center of it. Marine A-4 Skyhawks dropped bombs and napalm on the Citadel. The Marines raised an American flag but shortly thereafter were ordered to lower it, for in accordance with South Vietnamese law, no US flag was permitted to be flown without an accompanying South Vietnamese flag. The Marines objected to this law, but eventually took it down themselves under an order from their superior officer. Shortly before doing so, the Marines who took part in hoisting Old Glory all posed for a photograph with the Vietcong banner displayed as a war trophy.
On February 29, 1968, the Imperial Palace in the center of the Citadel was secured and the elite Black Panther Company of the First South Vietnamese Division, along with Task Force X-Ray, tore down the NVA's flag, which had flown since the battle's start on January 31. A few days later the NVA withdrew from the city completely.
The Communist forces suffered heavy losses in this battle, losing 1,042 men (according to PAVN) to 5,133 men at Huế (according to MACV); about 1,400 (according to PAVN) to 3,000 more were estimated to be killed outside of the city (according to MACV).
Moreover, in addition to the significant civilian casualties inflicted in the battle by U.S. forces to retake the cities from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, eighty percent of the city was destroyed by US Air Force's air strikes, and Marine Captain Myron Harrington who commanded a one-hundred-man company during the battle said: "Did we have to destroy the town in order to save it?"
Comparisons with Fallujah
During the Iraq War, the November 2004 anti-insurgent Marine operation in the city of Fallujah has been compared to the Battle of Hue. Both were fought in a close-quartered urban setting where the enemy ensconced itself in the midst of civilians. In Fallujah, Sunni insurgents turned mosques into fortresses, much the same way as NVA forces utilized Buddhist temples in Hue. Both battles also had insurgents and NVA forces utilizing snipers, significantly increasing the combat potential of the combatants. The Marines also constituted the tip of the spear in both battles.
Lastly, both battles had some of the heaviest fighting in both wars. The operation in Fallujah killed 95 US troops, with operations in Hue killing more than 200 U.S. servicemen. In both cities the US force "destroyed the town in order to save it".
Impact on American public opinion
Militarily, Huế was an Allied victory, because the NVA and VC forces (ultimately numbering about 8,000, less than a full division) were driven from the city paying a heavy price for their offensive, but because of the change in the opinion of the American public, Huế was the beginning of the end. Marine Captain Myron Harrington who commanded a one-hundred-man company during the battle said: "Did we have to destroy the town in order to save it?" Years later in a 1981 interview, Harrington answered in the affirmative, saying "I think in the case of Huế that it was required, because the NVA wanted it." From this time forward, American support for the war in Vietnam declined, and during the next five years American involvement slowly but steadily decreased until March 1973 when the last American troops left Vietnam and communist forces captured Saigon in 1975, thus ending the war.
In popular culture
In the 1987 film Full Metal Jacket (based on Gustav Hasford's 1979 novel The Short-Timers), the main characters are sent from Đà Nẵng to Huế to cover the fighting, and the majority of the Vietnam scenes take place during the battle.
The Battle of Huế also appears in the video games Battlefield Vietnam (2004), Conflict: Vietnam (2004),Men of Valor (2004), Vietcong 2 (2005), and Call of Duty: Black Ops (2010), which covers the protagonists attempting to break into the MAC-V compound and subsequently fighting their way out.
- Warr, Nicholas (1997). Phase line green: the battle for Hue, 1968. Naval Institute Press, p. xi. ISBN 1-55750-911-5
- The History Place – Vietnam War 1965–1968
- PAVN's Department of warfare, 124th/TGi, document 1.103 (11-2-1969): Tri-Thien front
- Schulimson, p. 213. A PAVN document allegedly captured by the ARVN stated that 1,042 troops had been killed in the city proper and that several times that number had been wounded. Hoang, p. 84.
- Shelby L. Stanton book: Vietnam Order of Battle. 2006. Page 11. ISBN 0-8117-0071-2.
- Willbanks, James H. (2 October 2002). "Urban Operations: An Historical Casebook". Combat Studies, Institute Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Battle for Hue, 1968. Retrieved 2007-08-26.
- Hue Massacre , Tet 1968 (An Excerpt from the Viet Cong Strategy of Terror, by Mr. Douglas Pike, p. 23-39)
- NOTE: It was actually the 2nd Batt. 5th Marines who established the positions and landing zone mentioned in the following. I was with B Co 1st Shore Party Batt assigned to H. Co 2/5 and was with the team in charge of the landing zone. Our call sign was rockmatteam Hotel.
- Schulimson, Jack; LtCol. Leonard Blasiol; Charles R. Smith; Capt. David A. Dawson (1997). U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 1968, the Defining Year. History and Museums Division, USMC. ISBN 0-16-049125-8. pp. 172
- Schulimson, pp. 176
- Schulimson, pp. 177
- VMA-311 personnel
- "Fight for a Citadel". Time. 1968-03-01. Retrieved 2007-04-06.
- Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945—1990 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 223
- Anatomy of a War by Gabriel Kolko. ISBN 1-56584-218-9. pages 308–309
- Karnow, Stanley (1983). Vietnam A History. Penguin Books. p. 534.
- Robert D. Kaplan (1 July 2004). "Five Days in Fallujah". The Atlantic.
- Tony Karon (8 November 2004). "The Grim Calculations of Retaking Fallujah". Time.
- "Transcript of Interview with Myron Harrington, WGBH". Retrieved October 2010.
Contemporary news reporting
- Tuohy, William (1968-02-08). "Many U.S. Civilians Are Liberated in Hue". Washington Post. pp. A8.
- Tuohy, William (1968-02-09). "Marines Are Taking Hue Wall by Wall". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "Reds Said To Execute 300 in Hue". Washington Post. 1968-02-12. pp. A11.
- Braestrup, Peter (1968-02-12). "Weather and Thin Ranks Slow Marines' Tough Fight in Hue". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "Battle of Hue". Time. 1968-02-16. Retrieved 2007-04-18.
- Lescaze, Lee (1968-02-16). "Hue: Fires Pinpoint the Foe". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- Pigott, Bruce (1968-02-17). "Truck Route Said to Help Foe in Hue". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- Lescaze, Lee (1968-02-19). "Shortage of Men, Air Support Slows Marine Drive in Hue". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "It's Up to 'Grunt And His Rifle'". Hartford Courant. 1968-02-20. p. 1.
- Lescaze, Lee (1968-02-20). "Hue Marines: Bitter as They Are Brave". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "Marine Chief Sees Lengthy Battle In Hue". Chicago Tribune. 1968-02-21. p. 1.
- "Commission Leaves Hue". Washington Post. 1968-02-21. pp. F6.
- Lescaze, Lee (1968-02-22). "U.S. Relieves Unit Hard-Hit at Hue". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "U.S. Marines Capture Strategic Corner of Hue's Citadel". Washington Post. 1968-02-23. pp. A9.
- "Grappling for Normalcy". Time. 1968-02-23. Retrieved 2007-04-19.
- "South Vietnamese recapture Hue". BBC. 1968-02-24. Retrieved 2007-04-06.
- Lescaze, Lee (1968-02-24). "Hue Marines Keep Determined Vigil Over a Dead Comrade". Washington Post. pp. A8.
- Emery, Fred (1968-02-25). "Allies Clear Enemy from Hue's Palace". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "Hue Ruin Inspected By Thieu". Washington Post. 1968-02-26. pp. A1.
- "After 26-Day Battle, Hue Is Devastation and Misery". Hartford Courant. 1968-02-27.
- Braestrup, Peter (1968-02-29). "Capture of Hue Citadel Was a Must for S. Viet Unit". Washington Post. pp. A22.
- "Fight for a Citadel". Time. 1968-03-01. Retrieved 2007-04-19.
- Tuohy, William (1968-03-07). "New Red Assault on Hue Expected". LA Times. p. 1.
- Braestrup, Peter (0968-03-07). "Foe Seen Aiming At Hue". Washington Post. pp. A1.
- "Unburied Dead Lie Around the Citadel". Hartford Courant. 1968-03-10. pp. 18A.
- "After "Tet", Measuring and Repairing Damage". Time. 1968-03-15. Retrieved 2007-04-18.