Strategic Bombing Didn’t Work
For decades after the war, Western liberals and pacifists insisted that strategic bombing played little or no role in defeating Nazi Germany.
Agenda-driven historians, some undoubtedly suffering from a misplaced sense of collective “guilt,” insist that somehow Adolf Hitler’s regime could have been toppled without heavy bombing. They note what seemed an inverse relationship: the more the U.S. and Britain bombed, the more German industry produced.
And to an extent that is true.
The mere numbers of production, however, offer a simplistic “answer” to simple-minded critics. The fact is that German industry increased under the superb management of armaments minister Albert Speer, while production centers were dispersed and hardened.
What is not evident in the mere numbers is that Allied (especially American) targeting made the difference. After D-Day, which required air superiority over northern France, the Army Air Forces (AAF) increasingly struck German petroleum production. In the end, the Luftwaffe still possessed thousands of modern aircraft, including jets, but lacked the fuel to fly them frequently or to train enough new pilots.
Beyond that, Axis transportation was largely immobilized. It became almost impossible to move trucks or trains by daylight.
Additionally, the Combined Bomber Offensive represented a second front long before D-Day. Allied bombers in Reich skies forced a huge diversion of Wehrmacht forces from the fighting fronts—perhaps three million personnel. And every 88mm flak gun booming away at Allied bombers was one less to oppose the Soviet Union’s massive force of tanks.
Below: B-24s substantially outnumbered the B-17s but suffered heavier losses. They participated in early raids on the Ploieşti oil fields, among others. (Photo by John Dibbs/ planepicture.com)
Above: Massive B-17 raids greatly limited Germany’s ability to conduct the business of war and nearly stopped petroleum production. (Photo by John Dibbs/planepicture.com)