George Packer, in his article on Dresden, writes that the government of reunified Germany is trying to normalize the place of the military in its democracy by acknowledging, again and again, the crimes of the past (“Embers,” February 1st). Packer notes, too, that the war in Afghanistan, where German troops are deployed, is such a sensitive topic in Germany that the government won’t refer to the conflict as a war; instead, officials speak of a “stabilization effort” and a “non-international armed conflict.” No doubt the sensitivity of German officials to the dangers of militarism and the glorification of war reflects a positive change. There is, however, a way in which civil-military relations in Germany today represent continuity with the German past. In both World Wars, as well as in Afghanistan, German politicians and military leaders demonstrated a remarkable inability to coördinate policy ends with military means. Democracy demands dialogue between a political leadership that understands the limits of the military instrument it wields and a military that has the courage to inform policy of what can and cannot be accomplished by military force. In the absence of such a dialogue, policy remains detached from military force; and political and military establishments will not be inhibited from pursuing foreign military adventures that are doomed to fail. In Iraq and Afghanistan, North American and other European democracies have also demonstrated an inability to coördinate policy ends with military means. There has been a want of strategy. In this aspect of civil-military relations, we’re all Germans now.