Kim Jong Il, who died Saturday at the age of 69, was the last leader of a Stalinist state held together by a Stalin-like cult of personality, brutal repression and disposition of rents to supporters. Like Stalin, Kim Jong Il rid the North Korean leadership of any possible independent-thinking rivals. There are no Gorbachevs or Dengs in the wings. But the grooming of his chosen successor, third son Kim Jong Un, remains incomplete, and this throws something of a monkey wrench in succession plans.
Kim Jong Il leaves behind a failed economy and a starving people. He built a regime that could survive the grossest of economic failures by means of a blustering and threatening foreign policy, an oversized military that sucked up huge resources, strategic payments to key supporters in the party and military from arms and drug sales, and absolute repression of his people.
The death of a Stalinist leader is always followed by a power struggle of some kind. Stalin’s death in 1953 set in motion a protracted power struggle within his inner circle that was really not resolved until Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964. The power struggle following Mao’s death was more violent and shorter with the defeat of the Gang of Four by Deng’s faction only a month after Mao’s passing.
Although North Korean state media have anointed the “beloved successor” to replace the “beloved leader,” the power struggle is far from over. Whereas both Stalin and Mao made certain to limit the political power of the military, it is an integral part of the North Korean power structure. The military is therefore a wild card that Stalin’s and Mao’s successors did not have to face. It is notable that the “beloved leader” headed both the party and the state military commission. This was his way of keeping tabs on a military that secured his hold on power.
The death of a Stalinist leader disrupts the equilibrium of established coalitions and payments systems. Party and military leaders are uncertain as to whom to pledge their allegiance. But one thing is sure: The “beloved leader” made sure that there is no Gorbachev or Deng ready to embark on real economic or political reform.
What are the possible outcomes for a post-beloved-leader North Korea?
The most likely outcome is a successful passing of the baton to the anointed successor. Kim Jong Il’s father wrote the playbook on communist dynastic successions, and it has worked elsewhere, such as in Syria. Yet, the faction of the “beloved successor” must have the financial resources to solidify its hold on power. If the West can effectively deny it the illicit proceeds from drug, weapons trade, and Macao banks, it could deny Kim Jong Un’s succession victory.
An Arab Spring is unlikely, given the emaciated and helpless state of the North Korean population. But we do know that the North Korean people are now much better informed about world events. Refugees now know the latest South Korean hit songs and the names of its soap opera stars. I cannot imagine an Arab Spring but the beloved leader’s passing could spark an attempted mass exodus, such as the one that brought down the East German regime.
The Chinese state has never been tested with a massive flow of refugees. We do not know how it will react. Unfortunately, the South Koreans (joined of course by China) do not appear to welcome such a mass flight that would lead to the reunification of Korea. In such a case, China might intervene to make North Korea its protectorate.
Certain is that North Korea will withdraw into its shell until the succession is resolved. During this period, it makes no sense to conduct diplomacy or to make any initiatives. It is also a time of danger. A threatened Kim Jong Un regime will seek out foreign enemies to distract attention. There are few limits to its potential mischief.
The passing of a tyrant offers opportunities for change. In such a time, we should remember the poor suppressed people of North Korea and hope that some positive change is in store for them.