  This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA),
an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can
offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent
conditional on all Agents' messages. We identify the set of equilibrium
allocations using deviator-reporting mechanisms (DRMs) on the path and single
transfer schedules off the path. We design a lab experiment implementing DRMs.
We observe that implemented outcomes are efficient more often than random. A
majority of the time, Agents do tell the truth on the identity of a deviating
Principal, despite potential gains from (tacit) collusion on false reports. As
play progresses, Agents learn to play with their counterparty Agent with the
average predicted probability of collusion on false reports across groups
increasing from about 9% at the beginning of the experiment to just under 20%
by the end. However, group heterogeneity is significant.
