  In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action an
agent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is an
extension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilities
are personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalism
implies either that the quantum state assignments of two agents or their
respective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently,
Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurement
is invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, following
Stacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa's
mathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBism
is incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreement
in QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agents
to agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive to
create conditions under which she would expect another agent's reported
measurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions of
Ozawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.
