  There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner's
hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical
collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect(s) of
consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer-Ranchin, Chalmers-McQueen and
Okon-Sebasti\'an have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a
numerical measure of consciousness. More recently, Chalmers-McQueen have argued
that any single measure is inadequate because it will allow superpositions of
distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They suggest a
satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures
quantifying aspects of consciousness, such as the "Q-shapes" defined by Tononi
et al. in their "integrated information theory" (IIT) of consciousness. I argue
here that Chalmers-McQueen's argument against associating a single measure with
collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated with
different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have
strong intuitions, namely human (or other terrestrial biological) observers. In
defence of Chalmers-McQueen's stance, it might be argued that idealized
artificial information processing networks could display such symmetries.
However, I argue that any theory (such as IIT) that postulates a map from
network states to mind states should assign identical mind states to isomorphic
network states (as IIT does). This suggests that, if such a map exists, no
familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or
experiencing pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries.
