  Sharing systems have facilitated the redistribution of underused resources by
providing convenient online marketplaces for individual sellers and buyers.
However, sellers in these systems may not fully disclose the information of
their shared commodities, due to strategic behaviors or privacy concerns.
Sellers' strategic information disclosure significantly affects buyers' user
experiences and systems' reputation. This paper presents the first analytical
study on information disclosure and pricing of competing sellers in sharing
systems. In particular, we propose a two-stage game framework to capture
sellers' strategic behaviors and buyers' decisions. Although the optimization
problem is challenging due to sellers' non-convex and non-monotonic objectives,
we completely characterize the complex market equilibria by decomposing it into
several tractable subproblems. We demonstrate that full disclosure by all
sellers or non-disclosure by all sellers will both lead to intense price
competition. The former all-disclosure case is never an equilibrium even when
all sellers have good commodity qualities and low privacy costs, while the
latter non-disclosure case can be an equilibrium under which all sellers get
zero profit. We also reveal several critical factors that affect sellers'
information disclosure. Interestingly, sellers' sharing capacity limitation and
buyers' estimation biases encourage information disclosure as they mitigate
sellers' competition.
