  We develop an equilibrium theory of attention and politics. In a spatial
model of electoral competition where candidates have varying policy
preferences, we examine what kinds of political behaviors capture voters'
limited attention and how this concern affects the overall political outcomes.
Following the seminal works of Downs (1957) and Sims (1998), we assume that
voters are rationally inattentive and can process information about the
policies at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. The main finding is an
equilibrium phenomenon called attention- and media-driven extremism, namely as
we increase the attention cost or garble the news technology, a truncated set
of the equilibria captures voters' attention through enlarging the policy
differentials between the varying types of the candidates. We supplement our
analysis with historical accounts, and discuss its relevance in the new era
featured with greater media choices and distractions, as well as the rise of
partisan media and fake news.
