  This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic
notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a
topological semantics to represent the structure of an agent's collection of
evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of
evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We
discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a
formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete
axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence
in a 'rational' way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based
beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference
between an agent's reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her
available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this
point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief
should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.
