  As the scale of networked control systems increases and interactions between
different subsystems become more sophisticated, questions of the resilience of
such networks increase in importance. The need to redefine classical system and
control-theoretic notions using the language of graphs has recently started to
gain attention as a fertile and important area of research. This paper presents
an overview of graph-theoretic methods for analyzing the resilience of
networked control systems. We discuss various distributed algorithms operating
on networked systems and investigate their resilience against adversarial
actions by looking at the structural properties of their underlying networks.
We present graph-theoretic methods to quantify the attack impact, and
reinterpret some system-theoretic notions of robustness from a graph-theoretic
standpoint to mitigate the impact of the attacks. Moreover, we discuss
miscellaneous problems in the security of networked control systems which use
graph-theory as a tool in their analyses. We conclude by introducing some
avenues for further research in this field.
