  The paper argues that we ought to conceive of the Dark Energy problem -- the
question of how to account for observational data, naturally interpreted as
accelerated expansion of the universe -- as a crisis of underdetermined
pursuit-worthiness. Not only are the various approaches to the Dark Energy
problem evidentially underdetermined; at present, no compelling reasons single
out any of them as more likely to be true than the other. More vexingly for
working scientists, none of the approaches stands out as uncontroversially
preferable over its rivals in terms of its rationally warranted promise, i.e.
the reasons to further work on, explore and develop it. We demonstrate this
claim by applying a Peircean economic model of pursuit-worthiness in terms of a
cognitive cost/benefit estimate -- with the instantiation of theory virtues as
key indicators of cognitive gains -- to the four main Dark Energy proposals
(the cosmological constant approach, modified gravity, quintessence, and
inhomogeneous cosmologies). Our analysis yields that these approaches do not
admit of an unambiguous, or uncontroversial, ranking with respect to which
ansatz deserves distinguished attention and research efforts. The overall
methodological counsel that our analysis underwrites recommends a pragmatic
double research strategy forward: to encourage and foster theory pluralism and
the search for tests -- with the goal of enhancing the testability of the
$\Lambda$CDM model and "testing it to destruction".
