  We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching
mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank
order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility
for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of
rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to
submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that
non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they \emph{report}
as higher ranked may increase market welfare. We test these hypotheses with a
matching experiment in a strategyproof mechanism, the random serial
dictatorship, and a non-strategyproof mechanism, the Boston mechanism. A novel
feature of our experimental design is that the objects allocated in the
matching markets are real goods, which allows us to directly measure
rankings-dependence by eliciting values for goods both inside and outside of
the mechanism. The experimental results are mixed, with stronger evidence for
rankings-dependence in the RSD treatment than the Boston treatment. We find no
differences between the two mechanisms for the rates of truth-telling and the
final welfare.
