  Global change is reshaping ecosystems and societies. Strategic choices that
were best yesterday may be sub-optimal tomorrow; and environmental conditions
that were once taken for granted may soon cease to exist. In this setting, how
people choose behavioral strategies has important consequences for
environmental dynamics. Economic and evolutionary theories make similar
predictions for strategic behavior in a static environment, even though one
approach assumes perfect rationality and the other assumes no cognition
whatsoever; but predictions differ in a dynamic environment. Here we explore a
middle ground between economic rationality and evolutionary myopia. Starting
from a population of myopic agents, we study the emergence of a new type that
forms environmental forecasts when making strategic decisions. We show that
forecasting types can have an advantage in changing environments, even when the
act of forecasting is costly. Forecasting types can invade but not overtake the
population, producing a stable coexistence with myopic types. Moreover,
forecasters provide a public good by reducing the amplitude of environmental
oscillations and increasing mean payoff to forecasting and myopic types alike.
We interpret our results for understanding the evolution of different modes of
decision-making. And we discuss implications for the management of
environmental systems of great societal importance.
