  This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum
mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack
containing a critique of the "objective preparations view" or OPV. It also aims
to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and
proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted,
including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to
the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a
preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and
proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the
continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to
a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or
subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper
views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement
to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities.
This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable
feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement
outcomes...
