  In this paper, a delay-angle information spoofing (DAIS) strategy is proposed
for location-privacy enhancement. By shifting the location-relevant delays and
angles without the aid of channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter,
the eavesdropper is obfuscated by a physical location that is distinct from the
true one. A precoder is designed to preserve location-privacy while the
legitimate localizer can remove the obfuscation with the securely shared
information. Then, a lower bound on the localization error is derived via the
analysis of the geometric mismatch caused by DAIS, validating the enhanced
location-privacy. The statistical hardness for the estimation of the shared
information is also investigated to assess the robustness to the potential
leakage of the designed precoder structure. Numerical comparisons show that the
proposed DAIS scheme results in more than 15 dB performance degradation for the
illegitimate localizer at high signal-to-noise ratios, which is comparable to a
recently proposed CSI-free location-privacy enhancement strategy and is less
sensitive to the precoder structure leakage than the prior approach.
