  We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between
several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the
agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport
(Monge-Kantorovich) between two measure spaces where one of the measures is
discrete (capacities) and the costs of transport are the wisdoms of the agents.
We concentrate on the individual value for each agent under optimal partition
and show that, counter-intuitively, this value may decrease if the agent's
wisdom is increased. Sufficient and necessary conditions for increment of the
individual values will be given, independently of the other agents. The
sharpness of these conditions is also discussed.
  Motivated by the above we define a cooperative game based on optimal
partition and investigate conditions for the existence of a core for this game,
guaranteeing the stability of the grand coalition.
