  A new game theoretical solution concept for open spectrum sharing in
cognitive radio (CR) environments is presented, the Lorenz equilibrium (LE).
Both Nash and Pareto solution concepts have limitations when applied to real
world problems. Nash equilibrium (NE) rarely ensures maximal payoff and it is
frequently Pareto inefficient. The Pareto set is usually a large set of
solutions, often too hard to process. The Lorenz equilibrium is a subset of
Pareto efficient solutions that are equitable for all players and ensures a
higher payoff than the Nash equilibrium. LE induces a selection criterion of
NE, when several are present in a game (e.g. many-player discrete games) and
when fairness is an issue. Besides being an effective NE selection criterion,
the LE is an interesting game theoretical situation per se, useful for CR
interaction analysis.
