  The Algebraic Eraser (AE) is a cryptographic primitive that can be used to
obscure information in certain algebraic cryptosystems. The Colored Burau Key
Agreement Protocol (CBKAP), which is built on the AE, was introduced by I.
Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, and S. Lemieux in 2006 as a protocol suitable
for use on platforms with constrained computational resources, such as RFID and
wireless sensors. In 2009 A. Myasnikov and A. Ushnakov proposed an attack on
CBKAP that attempts to defeat the generalized simultaneous conjugacy search
problem, which is the public-key computational problem underlying CBKAP. In
this paper we investigate the effectiveness of this attack. Our findings are
that success of the attack only comes from applying it to short keys, and that
with appropriate keys the attack fails in 100% of cases and does not pose a
threat against CBKAP. Moreover, the attack makes assumptions about CBKAP that
do not hold in practical implementations, and thus does not represent a threat
to the use of CBKAP in applications.
