  In this paper, an augmented analysis of a delay-angle information spoofing
(DAIS) is provided for location-privacy preservation, where the
location-relevant delays and angles are artificially shifted to obfuscate the
eavesdropper with an incorrect physical location. A simplified misspecified
Cramer-Rao bound (MCRB) is derived, which clearly manifests that not only
estimation error, but also the geometric mismatch introduced by DAIS can lead
to a significant increase in localization error for an eavesdropper. Given an
assumption of the orthogonality among wireless paths, the simplified MCRB can
be further expressed as a function of delay-angle shifts in a closed-form,
which enables the more straightforward optimization of these design parameters
for location-privacy enhancement. Numerical results are provided, validating
the theoretical analysis and showing that the root-mean-square error for
eavesdropper's localization can be more than 150 m with the optimized
delay-angle shifts for DAIS.
