  Rhino populations are at a critical level due to the demand for rhino horn
and the subsequent poaching. Wildlife managers attempt to secure rhinos with
approaches to devalue the horn, the most common of which is dehorning. Game
theory has been used to examine the interaction of poachers and wildlife
managers where a manager can either `dehorn' their rhinos or leave the horn
attached and poachers may behave `selectively' or `indiscriminately'. The
approach described in this paper builds on this previous work and investigates
the interactions between the poachers. We build an evolutionary game theoretic
model and determine which strategy is preferred by a poacher in various
different populations of poachers. The purpose of this work is to discover
whether conditions which encourage the poachers to behave selectively exist,
that is, they only kill those rhinos with full horns.
  The analytical results show that full devaluation of all rhinos will likely
lead to indiscriminate poaching. In turn it shows that devaluing of rhinos can
only be effective when implemented along with a strong disincentive framework.
This paper aims to contribute to the necessary research required for informed
discussion about the lively debate on legalising rhino horn trade.
