  We present a new quantum secret sharing protocol based on recent advances in
Mermin-type contextuality scenarios, which has some security guarantees against
postquantum nonsignaling attackers. It is a fundamental assumption of secret
sharing protocols that not all players are trusted parties, and that some may
collude amongst themselves and with eavesdroppers to break confidentiality. To
this extent, quantum secret sharing introduces a new layer of security,
enabling eavesdropping detection via entangled states and noncommuting
observables. A more thorough security analysis, however, becomes crucial if the
protocol relies on untrusted devices for its implementation: for example, it
cannot be excluded that some players may collude with the device supplier. In
this paper, we put recent developments in Mermin-type contextuality to work in
a new quantum secret sharing protocol. The maximal contextuality (aka maximal
non-locality, or zero local fraction) demonstrated by the measurement scenarios
results in some device-independent security guarantees against nonsignaling
attackers -- be they classical, quantum or postquantum.
