  Net neutrality on the Internet is perceived as the policy that mandates
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to treat all data equally, regardless of the
source, destination, or type of transmitted data. In this work, we consider a
scheme in which the decision makers of the market are two ISPs, one "big"
Content Provider (CP), and a continuum of end-users. One of the ISPs is neutral
and the other is non-neutral, i.e. she offers a premium quality to a CP in
exchange for a side-payment. In addition, we assume that the CP can
differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content she is
offering on each one. In this part of the paper, we consider a scenario in
which end-users are not locked in with the ISPs and can switch between ISPs
easily. We formulate a sequential game, and show that there exists a unique
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) for the game, where the CP pays the
side-payment to the non-neutral ISP and offers her content with the premium
quality. In addition, the CP does not offer her content on the neutral ISP.
Thus, driving this ISP out of the market.
