  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) have emerged as a promising technique to
rapidly provide wireless services to a group of mobile users simultaneously.
The paper aims to address a challenging issue that each user is selfish and may
misreport his location or preference for changing the optimal UAV location to
be close to himself. Using algorithmic game theory, we study how to determine
the final location of a UAV in the 3D space, by ensuring all selfish users'
truthfulness in reporting their locations for learning purpose. To minimize the
social service cost in this UAV placement game, we design strategyproof
mechanisms with the approximation ratios, when comparing to the social optimum.
We also study the obnoxious UAV placement game to maximally keep their social
utility, where each incumbent user may misreport his location to keep the UAV
away from him. Moreover, we present the dual-preference UAV placement game by
considering the coexistence of the two groups of users above, where users can
misreport both their locations and preference types (favorable or obnoxious)
towards the UAV. Finally, we extend the three games above to include multiple
UAVs and design strategyproof mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.
