  We introduce a generalization of the concept of sufficientarianism, intended
to rank allocations involving multiple consumption goods. In ranking
allocations of goods for a fixed society of agents, sufficientarianism posits
that allocations are compared according to the number of individuals whose
consumption is deemed sufficient. We base our analysis on a novel ethical
concept, which we term sufficientarian judgment. Sufficientarian judgment
asserts that if in starting from an allocation in which all agents have
identical consumption, a change in one agent's consumption hurts society, then
there is no change in any other agent's consumption which could subsequently
benefit society. Sufficientarianism is shown to be equivalent to
sufficientarian judgment, symmetry, and separability. We investigate our axioms
in an abstract environment, and in specific economic environments. Finally, we
argue formally that sufficientarian judgment is closely related to the leximin
principle.
