  This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability
in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a
coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition
structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where
peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution.
To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and
peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a
"Shapley-like" payoff mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is
unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave, which is in
sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a single provider where the
grand coalition is stable. We also show that irrespective of stability of the
grand coalition, there always exist coalition structures which are not
convergent to the grand coalition. Our results give us an important insight
that a provider does not tend to cooperate with other providers in
peer-assisted services, and be separated from them. To further study the case
of the separated providers, three examples are presented; (i) underpaid peers,
(ii) service monopoly, and (iii) oscillatory coalition structure. Our study
opens many new questions such as realistic and efficient incentive structures
and the tradeoffs between fairness and individual providers' competition in
peer-assisted services.
