  The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of
neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational
free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and
(2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance - in relation to the
ontological and epistemological status of representations - is most
appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and
fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of
mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents
of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a
fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are
scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After
reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the
model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to
furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific
phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far
from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account: an
organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the
free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of
neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content
involved in the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position
is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist
position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the
aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse
their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
