  Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in
acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this
work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states.
Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in
intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge -- for example, many now
celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known.
This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual
progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the
epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual
inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry
(rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a
better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress
through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and
increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by
considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my
account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to
articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.
