  Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice
theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone
gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing
balance with respect to gender or ethnicity in committee elections. Yet, the
egalitarian approach has received little attention in judgment aggregation -- a
powerful framework for aggregating logically interconnected issues. We make the
first steps towards filling that gap. We introduce axioms capturing two
classical interpretations of egalitarianism in judgment aggregation and situate
these within the context of existing axioms in the pertinent framework of
belief merging. We then explore the relationship between these axioms and
several notions of strategyproofness from social choice theory at large.
Finally, a novel egalitarian judgment aggregation rule stems from our analysis;
we present complexity results concerning both outcome determination and
strategic manipulation for that rule.
