  For common knowledge to arise in dynamic settings, all players must
simultaneously come to know it has arisen. Consequently, common knowledge
cannot arise in many realistic settings with timing frictions. This
counterintuitive observation of Halpern and Moses (1990) was discussed by Arrow
et al. (1987) and Aumann (1989), was called a paradox by Morris (2014), and has
evaded satisfactory resolution for four decades. We resolve this paradox by
proposing a new definition for common knowledge, which coincides with the
traditional one in static settings but is more permissive in dynamic settings.
Under our definition, common knowledge can arise without simultaneity,
particularly in canonical examples of the Haplern-Moses paradox. We demonstrate
its usefulness by deriving for it an agreement theorem \`a la Aumann (1976),
showing it arises in the setting of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) with
timing frictions added, and applying it to characterize equilibrium behavior in
a dynamic coordination game.
