  We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the
collusion channel are unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host
sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated
copies to the colluders.
  Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a
sequence of maximin games with mutual information as their payoff functions.
However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are very
hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking
assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person
zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution.
  If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprinting alphabet is binary,
we show that capacity decays quadratically with k. Furthermore, we prove
rigorously that the asymptotic capacity is 1/(k^2 2ln2) and we confirm our
earlier conjecture that Tardos' choice of the arcsine distribution
asymptotically maximizes the mutual information payoff function while the
interleaving attack minimizes it. Along with the asymptotic behavior, numerical
solutions to the game for small k are also presented.
