  Paul A. M. Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central figures of the last
century physics, contributing in several and remarkable ways to the development
of Quantum Mechanics (QM); he was also at the centre of an active community of
physicists, with whom he had extensive interactions and correspondence. In
particular, the British physicist was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg
and Pauli. For this reason, among others, Dirac is generally considered a
supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. Similarly, he was considered
a physicist sympathetic with the positivistic attitude which shaped the
development of quantum theory in the twenties. Against this background, the aim
of the present essay is twofold: on the one hand, we will argue that, analyzing
specific examples taken from Dirac's published works, he can neither be
considered a positivist nor a physicist methodologically guided by the
observability doctrine. On the other hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac's
figure from the mentioned Copenhagen interpretation, since in his long career
he employed remarkably different - and often contradicting - methodological
principles and philosophical perspectives with respect to those followed by the
supporters of that interpretation.
