  We demonstrate a simple, statistically secure, ORAM with computational
overhead $\tilde{O}(\log^2 n)$; previous ORAM protocols achieve only
computational security (under computational assumptions) or require
$\tilde{\Omega}(\log^3 n)$ overheard. An additional benefit of our ORAM is its
conceptual simplicity, which makes it easy to implement in both software and
(commercially available) hardware.
  Our construction is based on recent ORAM constructions due to Shi, Chan,
Stefanov, and Li (Asiacrypt 2011) and Stefanov and Shi (ArXiv 2012), but with
some crucial modifications in the algorithm that simplifies the ORAM and enable
our analysis. A central component in our analysis is reducing the analysis of
our algorithm to a "supermarket" problem; of independent interest (and of
importance to our analysis,) we provide an upper bound on the rate of "upset"
customers in the "supermarket" problem.
