  Demand response has been a promising solution for accommodating renewable
energy in power systems. In this study, we consider a demand response scheme
within a distribution network facing an energy supply deficit. The utility
company incentivizes load aggregators to adjust their pre-scheduled energy
consumption and generation to match the supply. Each aggregator, which
represents a group of prosumers, aims to maximize its revenue by bidding
strategically in the demand response scheme. Since aggregators act in their own
self-interest and their revenues and feasible bids influence one another, we
model their competition as a network-constrained aggregative game. This model
incorporates power flow constraints to prevent potential line congestion. Given
that there are no coordinators and aggregators can only communicate with their
neighbours, we introduce a fully distributed generalized Nash equilibrium
seeking algorithm to determine the optimal bidding strategies for aggregators
in this game. Within this algorithm, only estimates of the aggregate and
certain auxiliary variables are communicated among neighbouring aggregators. We
demonstrate the convergence of this algorithm by constructing an equivalent
iteration using the forward-backward splitting technique.
