  Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking
availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used
in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be
taken during the meeting, therefore each team would like to maximize its
relative attendance in the meeting (i.e., the proportional number of its
participating team members). We introduce a corresponding game, where each team
can declare (in the scheduling poll) a lower total availability, in order to
improve its relative attendance---the pay-off. We are especially interested in
situations where teams can form coalitions.
  We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal
way for each team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show
that deciding whether such a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the
existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash equilibria for various small sizes
of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time while it is coNP-hard if
the coalition size is unbounded.
