  We study a sender-receiver model where the receiver can commit to a decision
rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can
depend on the signal structure and the signal realization that the sender
adopts. This framework captures applications where a decision-maker (the
receiver) solicit advice from an interested party (sender). In these
applications, the receiver faces uncertainty regarding the sender's preferences
and the set of feasible signal structures. Consequently, we adopt a unified
robust analysis framework that includes max-min utility, min-max regret, and
min-max approximation ratio as special cases. We show that it is optimal for
the receiver to sacrifice ex-post optimality to perfectly align the sender's
incentive. The optimal decision rule is a quota rule, i.e., the decision rule
maximizes the receiver's ex-ante payoff subject to the constraint that the
marginal distribution over actions adheres to a consistent quota, regardless of
the sender's chosen signal structure.
