  We consider the problem of risk diversification in complex networks. Nodes
represent e.g. financial actors, whereas weighted links represent e.g.
financial obligations (credits/debts). Each node has a risk to fail because of
losses resulting from defaulting neighbors, which may lead to large failure
cascades. Classical risk diversification strategies usually neglect network
effects and therefore suggest that risk can be reduced if possible losses
(i.e., exposures) are split among many neighbors (exposure diversification,
ED). But from a complex networks perspective diversification implies higher
connectivity of the system as a whole which can also lead to increasing failure
risk of a node. To cope with this, we propose a different strategy (damage
diversification, DD), i.e. the diversification of losses that are imposed on
neighboring nodes as opposed to losses incurred by the node itself. Here, we
quantify the potential of DD to reduce systemic risk in comparison to ED. For
this, we develop a branching process approximation that we generalize to
weighted networks with (almost) arbitrary degree and weight distributions. This
allows us to identify systemically relevant nodes in a network even if their
directed weights differ strongly. On the macro level, we provide an analytical
expression for the average cascade size, to quantify systemic risk.
Furthermore, on the meso level we calculate failure probabilities of nodes
conditional on their system relevance.
