  Renewable resources are starting to constitute a growing portion of the total
generation mix of the power system. A key difference between renewables and
traditional generators is that many renewable resources are managed by
individuals, especially in the distribution system. In this paper, we study the
capacity investment and pricing problem, where multiple renewable producers
compete in a decentralized market. It is known that most deterministic capacity
games tend to result in very inefficient equilibria, even when there are a
large number of similar players. In contrast, we show that due to the inherent
randomness of renewable resources, the equilibria in our capacity game becomes
efficient as the number of players grows and coincides with the centralized
decision from the social planner's problem. This result provides a new
perspective on how to look at the positive influence of randomness in a game
framework as well as its contribution to resource planning, scheduling, and
bidding. We validate our results by simulation studies using real world data.
