  Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid
overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We
model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and
users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on
natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and
defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that
capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between
resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for
the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead
to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on
the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some
processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users
more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding
of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance
policies and interventions.
