  Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasingly
popular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicles
will be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the near
future. Motivated by this, we propose a game theoretic model for charging
management, where we assume that it is the fleet-operator that wants to
minimize its operational cost, which among others include the price of
charging. To avoid overcrowded charging stations, a central authority will
design pricing policies to incentivize the vehicles to spread out among the
charging stations, in a setting where several ride-hailing companies compete
about the resources. We show that it is possible to construct pricing policies
that make the Nash-equilibrium between the companies follow the central
authority's target value when the desired load is feasible. Moreover, we
provide a decentralized algorithm for computation of the equilibrium and
conclude the paper with a numerical example illustrating the results.
