  We introduce a framework within evolutionary game theory for studying the
distinction between objective and subjective rationality and apply it to the
evolution of cooperation on 3-regular random graphs. In our simulations, agents
evolve misrepresentations of objective reality that help them cooperate and
maintain higher social welfare in the Prisoner's dilemma. These agents act
rationally on their subjective representations of the world, but irrationally
from the perspective of an external observer. We model misrepresentations as
subjective perceptions of payoffs and quasi-magical thinking as an inferential
bias, finding that the former is more conducive to cooperation. This highlights
the importance of internal representations, not just observed behavior, in
evolutionary thought. Our results provide support for the interface theory of
perception and suggest that the individual's interface can serve not only the
individual's aims, but also society as a whole, offering insight into social
phenomena such as religion.
