  The nodes of a regular two-dimensional lattice play a game based on the joint
action of two distinct levels. At the first step of the game, using a random
prescription half players are assigned the cooperation and half the defection
state. At the bottom level the strategy choice is done on the mere basis of
imitation according to the homo imitans principle, generating a form of
collective intelligence that makes the system sensitive to the criteria
determining the strategy choice adopted at the top level. The units of the top
level, in fact, play the prisoner's dilemma game and are allowed to update
their strategy either by selecting the strategy of the most successful nearest
neighbor, success model, or merely on the basis of the criterion of the best
financial benefit, selfishness model. The intelligence emerging from
imitation-induced criticality leads in the former case to the extinction of
defection and in the latter case to the extinction of cooperation. The former
case is interpreted as a form of network reciprocity enhanced by the
imitation-induced criticality and contributing to the evolution towards
cooperation. We perturb the selfishness model with a form of morality pressure,
exerted by a psychological reward Lambda for cooperation, to establish the
sensitivity of collective intelligence to morality. We find that when Lambda
gets a crucial value Lambda-c, exceeding the temptation to cheat, the system
makes a transition from the supercritical defection state to the critical
regime, with the warning that an excess of morality and religion pressure may
annihilate the criticality-induced resilience of the system.
