  Let $V$ be a multiset of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, which we call voters,
and let $k\geq 1$ and $\ell\geq 1$ be two given constants. We consider the
following game, where two players $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ compete over
the voters in $V$: First, player $\mathcal{P}$ selects $k$ points in
$\mathbb{R}^d$, and then player $\mathcal{Q}$ selects $\ell$ points in
$\mathbb{R}^d$. Player $\mathcal{P}$ wins a voter $v\in V$ iff
$\mathrm{dist}(v,P) \leq \mathrm{dist}(v,Q)$, where $\mathrm{dist}(v,P) :=
\min_{p\in P} \mathrm{dist}(v,p)$ and $\mathrm{dist}(v,Q)$ is defined
similarly. Player $\mathcal{P}$ wins the game if he wins at least half the
voters. The algorithmic problem we study is the following: given $V$, $k$, and
$\ell$, how efficiently can we decide if player $\mathcal{P}$ has a winning
strategy, that is, if $\mathcal{P}$ can select his $k$ points such that he wins
the game no matter where $\mathcal{Q}$ places her points.
  Banik et al. devised a singly-exponential algorithm for the game in
$\mathbb{R}^1$, for the case $k=\ell$. We improve their result by presenting
the first polynomial-time algorithm for the game in $\mathbb{R}^1$. Our
algorithm can handle arbitrary values of $k$ and $\ell$. We also show that if
$d\geq 2$, deciding if player $\mathcal{P}$ has a winning strategy is
$\Sigma_2^P$-hard when $k$ and $\ell$ are part of the input. Finally, we prove
that for any dimension $d$, the problem is contained in the complexity class
$\exists\forall \mathbb{R}$, and we give an algorithm that works in polynomial
time for fixed $k$ and $\ell$.
