  A novel modelling framework is proposed for the analysis of aggregative games
on an infinite-time horizon, assuming that players are subject to heterogeneous
periodic constraints. A new aggregative equilibrium notion is presented and the
strategic behaviour of the agents is analysed under a receding horizon
paradigm. The evolution of the strategies predicted and implemented by the
players over time is modelled through a discrete-time multi-valued dynamical
system. By considering Lyapunov stability notions and applying limit and
invariance results for set-valued correspondences, necessary conditions are
derived for convergence of a receding horizon map to a periodic equilibrium of
the aggregative game. This result is achieved for any (feasible) initial
condition, thus ensuring implicit adaptivity of the proposed control framework
to real-time variations in the number and parameters of players. Design and
implementation of the proposed control strategy are discussed and an example of
distributed control for data routing is presented, evaluating its performance
in simulation.
