  One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding
it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most
stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically,
for a group of players that collect payoffs by playing a pairwise Prisoner's
Dilemma game with their partners, we consider an external entity that
distributes a fixed reward equally among all cooperators. Thus, individuals
confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the
shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the
other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward
and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be
shared a vast variety of scenarios arises, including traditional ones in the
study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected
behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of
the $n$-player game as well as of its evolutionary dynamics.
