  In the wake of increasing numbers of attacks on radio communication systems,
a range of techniques are being deployed to increase the security of these
systems. One such technique is radio fingerprinting, in which the transmitter
can be identified and authenticated by observing small hardware differences
expressed in the signal. Fingerprinting has been explored in particular in the
defense of satellite systems, many of which are insecure and cannot be
retrofitted with cryptographic security.
  In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of radio fingerprinting
techniques under interference and jamming attacks, usually intended to deny
service. By taking a pre-trained fingerprinting model and gathering a new
dataset in which different levels of Gaussian noise and tone jamming have been
added to the legitimate signal, we assess the attacker power required in order
to disrupt the transmitter fingerprint such that it can no longer be
recognized. We compare this to Gaussian jamming on the data portion of the
signal, obtaining the remarkable result that transmitter fingerprints are still
recognizable even in the presence of moderate levels of noise. Through deeper
analysis of the results, we conclude that it takes a similar amount of jamming
power in order to disrupt the fingerprint as it does to jam the message
contents itself, so it is safe to include a fingerprinting system to
authenticate satellite communication without opening up the system to easier
denial-of-service attacks.
