  A new model of collusions in an organization is proposed. Each actor
$a_{i=1,\cdots,N}$ disposes one unique good $g_{j=1,\cdots,N}$. Each actor
$a_i$ has also a list of other goods which he/she needs, in order from desired
most to those desired less. Finally, each actor $a_i$ has also a list of other
agents, initially ordered at random. The order in the last list means the order
of the access of the actors to the good $g_j$. A pair after a pair of agents
tries to make a transaction. This transaction is possible if each of two actors
can be shifted upwards in the list of actors possessed by the partner. Our
numerical results indicate, that the average time of evolution scales with the
number $N$ of actors approximately as $N^{2.9}$. For each actor, we calculate
the Kendall's rank correlation between the order of desired goods and actor's
place at the lists of the good's possessors. We also calculate individual
utility funcions $\eta_i$, where goods are weighted according to how strongly
they are desired by an actor $a_i$, and how easily they can be accessed by
$a_i$. Although the individual utility functions can increase or decrease in
the time course, its value averaged over actors and independent simulations
does increase in time. This means that the system of collusions is profitable
for the members of the organization.
