  Crowdfunding has emerged as a prominent way for entrepreneurs to secure
funding without sophisticated intermediation. In crowdfunding, an entrepreneur
often has to decide how to disclose the campaign status in order to collect as
many contributions as possible. Such decisions are difficult to make primarily
due to incomplete information. We propose information design as a tool to help
the entrepreneur to improve revenue by influencing backers' beliefs. We
introduce a heuristic algorithm to dynamically compute information-disclosure
policies for the entrepreneur, followed by an empirical evaluation to
demonstrate its competitiveness over the widely-adopted immediate-disclosure
policy. Our results demonstrate that the immediate-disclosure policy is not
optimal when backers follow thresholding policies despite its ease of
implementation. With appropriate heuristics, an entrepreneur can benefit from
dynamic information disclosure. Our work sheds light on information design in a
dynamic setting where agents make decisions using thresholding policies.
