  Renewable distributed energy resources (DERs) have the potential to provide
multi-location electricity consumers (MLECs) with electricity at prices lower
than those offered by the grid using behind-the-meter advantages. This study
examines the pricing power of such DER owners in a local environment with few
competitors and how it depends on the MLEC's ability to migrate a portion of
the load between locations. We simulate a dynamic game between an MLEC and the
local DER owners, where the MLEC is modeled as a cost-minimizer and the DER
owners as strategic profit maximizers. We show that, when the MLEC is
inflexible, the DER owners' optimal behavior is to offer their electricity
close to maximal prices, that is, at the grid price level. However, when the
MLEC can migrate a fraction of the load to the other locations, the prices
offered by the DER owners quickly decrease to the minimum level, that is, the
DERs' grid feed-in tariffs quickly decrease to a lower level, depending on the
load migration capability.
