  Here, a novel energy trading system is proposed for demand-side management of
a neighborhood area network (NAN) consisting of a shared energy storage (SES)
provider, users with non-dispatchable energy generation, and an electricity
retailer. In a leader-follower Stackelberg game, the SES provider first
maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the
grid. Then, by following the SES provider's actions, the retailer minimizes
social cost for the users, i.e., the sum of the total users' cost when they
interact with the SES and the total cost for supplying grid energy to the
users. A pricing strategy, which incorporates mechanism design, is proposed to
make the system incentive-compatible by rewarding users who disclose true
energy usage information. A unique Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved where
the SES provider's revenue is maximized and the user-level social cost is
minimized, which also rewards the retailer. A case study with realistic energy
demand and generation data demonstrates 28\%~-~45\% peak demand reduction of
the NAN, depending on the number of participating users, compared to a system
without SES. Simulation results confirm that the retailer can also benefit
financially, in addition to the SES provider and the users.
