  We present a techno-economic analysis of a cellular market that operates
under the licensed shared access (LSA) regime, consisting of a mobile network
operator (MNO) that leases spectrum to a number of Programme Making and Special
Events (PMSE) users. The MNO offers two quality-of-service (QoS) classes (high
and low), differentiating the price based on the QoS class. The key question
that we address is whether and to which extent the MNO has incentive to adopt
this form of QoS-aware pricing. The first step is to model the parameters that
are controlled by each PMSE user: i) the way to choose between the two QoS
classes and ii) the available budget per QoS class. The second step is to
compute the maximum revenue of the MNO. Our analysis reveals that the MNO can
always tune the prices so as to maximise its revenue for the scenario where all
users belong to the high QoS class. This is a consistent result throughout our
study, that holds for any considered set of user-controlled parameters and of
technical parameters. We conclude that the adoption of QoS-aware pricing in the
LSA market generates a tussle between the MNO and the regulator. The MNO has
incentive to support fewer users but with high QoS and charge them more, which
is not aligned with the regulator's goal for social welfare maximisation.
