  A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of
mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set
theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists
argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically
privileged. Often model-theoretic constructions that add sets to models are
cited as evidence in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by
providing a hitherto unexamined way for a Universist to interpret talk that
seems to necessitate the addition of sets to $V$. We argue that, despite the
prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist, she nonetheless has
reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse. We present a method
of interpreting extension-talk ($V$-logic), and show how it captures
satisfaction in `ideal' outer models and relates to impredicative class
theories. We provide some reasons to regard the technique as philosophically
virtuous, and argue that it opens new doors to philosophical and mathematical
discussions for the Universist.
