  Internet and graphs are very much related. The graphical structure of
internet has been studied extensively to provide efficient solutions to routing
and other problems. But most of these studies assume a central authority which
controls and manages the internet. In the recent years game theoretic models
have been proposed which do not require a central authority and the users are
assumed to be routing their flows selfishly. The existence of Nash Equilibria,
congestion and the amount of inefficiency caused by this selfish routing is a
major concern in this field. A type of paradox in the selfish routing networks,
Braess' Paradox, first discovered by Braess, is a major contributor to
inefficiency. Several pricing mechanisms have also been provided which give a
game theoretical model between users(consumers) and ISPs ({Internet Service
Providers} or sellers) for the internet.
  We propose a novel pricing mechanism, based on real world Internet network
architecture, which reduces the severity of Braess' Paradox in selfish routing
game theoretic networks. It's a pricing mechanism between combinatorial users
and ISPs. We prove that Nash equilibria exists in this network and provide
bounds on inefficiency . We use graphical properties of internet to prove our
result. Several interesting extensions and future work have also been
discussed.
