  The Internet of Things (IoT) is a fast growing field of devices being added
to an interconnected environment in an abstract heterogeneous array of servers
and other devices, called smart environments, ranging from private local (home)
environments to nation-wide infrastructures, often accessible via unsecured
wireless communications and information technologies, hence, massively open to
attacks. In this paper we address some of issues that arise when connecting
smart devices endowed with low computational capabilities to a home gateway via
unsecured wireless communication channels, by using a One Time Pad (OTP)
protocol based upon an On-the-fly Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. Our assumptions
are that only a user and the gateway have enough processing power to perform -
say - secured RSA encrypted communication, hence relaxing the need for a
trusted secure server outside the domain and that the protocol should at least
be secure for a range of known attacks, as replay or DoS attacks.
