  We present a formal multiagent framework for coordinating a class of
collaborative industrial practices called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)
as cooperative games. The game-theoretic formulation of ISNs enables systematic
reasoning about what we call the ISN implementation problem. Specifically, the
characteristics of ISNs may lead to the inapplicability of standard fair and
stable benefit allocation methods. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and
following the literature on normative multiagent systems, we consider
regulations and normative socio-economic policies as coordination instruments
that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation. In this multiagent
system, employing Marginal Contribution Nets (MC-Nets) as rule-based
cooperative game representations foster the combination of regulations and ISN
games with no loss in expressiveness. We develop algorithmic methods for
generating regulations that ensure the implementability of ISNs and as a policy
support, present the policy requirements that guarantee the implementability of
all the desired ISNs in a balanced-budget way.
