  We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with
remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic
flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the
addition of a zero cost edge decreases the efficiency of the network. A
quantization scheme applicable to non-atomic routing games is applied to the
canonical example of the network used in Braess' Paradox. The quantum players
are modeled by simulating repeated game play. The players are allowed to sample
their local payoff function and update their strategies based on a selfish
routing condition in order to minimize their own cost, leading to the Wardrop
equilibrium flow. The equilibrium flow in the classical network has a higher
cost than the optimal flow. If the players have access to quantum resources, we
find that the cost at equilibrium can be reduced to the optimal cost, resolving
the paradox.
