  Formal analyses of incentives for compliance with network protocols often
appeal to game-theoretic models and concepts. Applications of game-theoretic
analysis to network security have generally been limited to highly stylized
models, where simplified environments enable tractable study of key strategic
variables. We propose a simulation-based approach to game-theoretic analysis of
protocol compliance, for scenarios with large populations of agents and large
policy spaces. We define a general procedure for systematically exploring a
structured policy space, directed expressly to resolve the qualitative
classification of equilibrium behavior as compliant or non-compliant. The
techniques are illustrated and exercised through an extensive case study
analyzing compliance incentives for introduction-based routing. We find that
the benefits of complying with the protocol are particularly strong for nodes
subject to attack, and the overall compliance level achieved in equilibrium,
while not universal, is sufficient to support the desired security goals of the
protocol.
