  The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a
multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are
touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous
operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of
designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off
and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having
heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while
enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports.
Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational
vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which
encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all
operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we
improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism
by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that is based on
constructing network flow graph corresponding to the underlying problem.
