  Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever
the preferences of all voters belong to this set, the majority relation has no
cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, such domain can be assumed
to be closed in the sense that it contains the majority relation of every
profile with an odd number of individuals whose preferences belong to this
domain.
  We show that every closed Condorcet domain is naturally endowed with the
structure of a median graph and that, conversely, every median graph is
associated with a closed Condorcet domain (which may not be a unique one). The
subclass of those Condorcet domains that correspond to linear graphs (chains)
are exactly the preference domains with the classical single crossing property.
As a corollary, we obtain that the domains with the so-called `representative
voter property' (with the exception of a 4-cycle) are the single crossing
domains.
  Maximality of a Condorcet domain imposes additional restrictions on the
underlying median graph. We prove that among all trees only the chains can
induce maximal Condorcet domains, and we characterize the single crossing
domains that in fact do correspond to maximal Condorcet domains.
  Finally, using Nehring's and Puppe's (2007) characterization of monotone
Arrowian aggregation, our analysis yields a rich class of strategy-proof social
choice functions on any closed Condorcet domain.
