  A recent trend in cryptography is to protect data and computation against
various side-channel attacks. Dziembowski and Faust (TCC 2012) have proposed a
general way to protect arbitrary circuits against any continual leakage
assuming that: (i) the memory is divided into the parts, which leaks
independently (ii) the leakage in each observation is bounded (iii) the circuit
has an access to a leak-free component, which samples random orthogonal
vectors. The pivotal element of their construction is a protocol for refreshing
the so-called Leakage-Resilient Storage (LRS).
  In this note, we present a more efficient and simpler protocol for refreshing
LRS under the same assumptions. Our solution needs O(n) operations to fully
refresh the secret (in comparison to {\Omega}(n^2) for a protocol of
Dziembowski and Faust), where n is a security parameter that describes the
maximal amount of leakage in each invocation of the refreshing procedure
