  We consider a set of secondary transmitter-receiver pairs in a cognitive
radio setting. Based on channel sensing and access performances, we consider
the problem of assigning channels orthogonally to secondary users through
distributed coordination and cooperation algorithms. Two economic models are
applied for this purpose: matching markets and competitive markets. In the
matching market model, secondary users and channels build two agent sets. We
implement a stable matching algorithm in which each secondary user, based on
his achievable rate, proposes to the coordinator to be matched with desirable
channels. The coordinator accepts or rejects the proposals based on the channel
preferences which depend on interference from the secondary user. The
coordination algorithm is of low complexity and can adapt to network dynamics.
In the competitive market model, channels are associated with prices and
secondary users are endowed with monetary budget. Each secondary user, based on
his utility function and current channel prices, demands a set of channels. A
Walrasian equilibrium maximizes the sum utility and equates the channel demand
to their supply. We prove the existence of Walrasian equilibrium and propose a
cooperative mechanism to reach it. The performance and complexity of the
proposed solutions are illustrated by numerical simulations.
