  We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the
following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that
it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore
A is true. We then examine an argument of this form in the informal
introduction of Goedel's classic (1931) and examine some auxiliary premises
which might have been at work in that context. Philosophically significant as
it may be, that particular informal argument plays no role in Goedel's
technical results. Going deeper into the issue and investigating truth
conditions of Goedelian sentences (i.e., those sentences which are provably
equivalent to their own unprovability) will provide us with insights regarding
the philosophical debate on the truth of Goedelian sentences of systems--a
debate which is at least as old as Dummett (1963).
