  Opinion dynamics is nowadays a very common field of research. In this article
we formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such
dynamics: There are the usual normal agents that update their opinions, for
instance according the well-known bounded confidence mechanism. But,
additionally, there is at least one strategic agent. That agent uses opinions
as freely selectable strategies to get control on the dynamics: The strategic
agent of our benchmark problem tries, during a campaign of a certain length, to
influence the ongoing dynamics among normal agents with strategically placed
opinions (one per period) in such a way, that, by the end of the campaign, as
much as possible normals end up with opinions in a certain interval of the
opinion space. Structurally, such a problem is an optimal control problem. That
type of problem is ubiquitous. Resorting to advanced and partly non-standard
methods for computing optimal controls, we solve some instances of the campaign
problem. But even for a very small number of normal agents, just one strategic
agent, and a ten-period campaign length, the problem turns out to be extremely
difficult. Explicitly we discuss moral and political concerns that immediately
arise, if someone starts to analyze the possibilities of an optimal opinion
control.
