  In an era where digital connectivity is increasingly foundational to daily
life, the security of Wi-Fi Access Points (APs) is a critical concern. This
paper addresses the vulnerabilities inherent in Wi-Fi APs, with a particular
focus on those using proprietary file systems like MiniFS found in TP-Link's
AC1900 WiFi router. Through reverse engineering, we unravel the structure and
operation of MiniFS, marking a significant advancement in our understanding of
this previously opaque file system. Our investigation reveals not only the
architecture of MiniFS but also identifies several private keys and underscores
a concerning lack of cryptographic protection. These findings point to broader
security vulnerabilities, emphasizing the risks of security-by-obscurity
practices in an interconnected environment. Our contributions are twofold:
firstly, based, on the file system structure, we develop a methodology for the
extraction and analysis of MiniFS, facilitating the identification and
mitigation of potential vulnerabilities. Secondly, our work lays the groundwork
for further research into WiFi APs' security, particularly those running on
similar proprietary systems. By highlighting the critical need for transparency
and community engagement in firmware analysis, this study contributes to the
development of more secure network devices, thus enhancing the overall security
posture of digital infrastructures.
