  We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and
rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents
are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.
Inexperienced agents are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of
opponents' play, but believe that opponents never choose conditionally
dominated strategies. Agents engage in active learning and update beliefs based
on personal observations. Payoff information can refine or expand learning
predictions, since patient young senders' experimentation incentives depend on
which receiver responses they deem plausible. We show that with payoff
knowledge, the limiting set of long-run learning outcomes is bounded above by
rationality-compatible equilibria (RCE), and bounded below by uniform RCE. RCE
refine the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and include all divine
equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1987). Uniform RCE sometimes but not always
exists, and implies universally divine equilibrium.
