  Consumer data can be used to sort consumers into different market segments,
allowing a monopolist to charge different prices at each segment. We study
consumer-optimal segmentations with redistributive concerns, i.e., that
prioritize poorer consumers. Such segmentations are efficient but may grant
additional profits to the monopolist, compared to consumer-optimal
segmentations with no redistributive concerns. We characterize the markets for
which this is the case and provide a procedure for constructing optimal
segmentations given a strong redistributive motive. For the remaining markets,
we show that the optimal segmentation is surprisingly simple: it generates one
segment with a discount price and one segment with the same price that would be
charged if there were no segmentation. We also show that a regulator willing to
implement the redistributive-optimal segmentation does not need to observe
precisely the composition and the frequency of each market segment, the
aggregate distribution over prices suffices.
