  The recent success of crowd-funding for supporting new and innovative
products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In
many crowd-funding platforms, firms set a campaign goal and contributions are
collected only if this goal is reached. At the time of the campaign, consumers
are often uncertain as to the ex-post value of the product, the business model
viability, or the seller's reliability. Consumer who commit to a contribution
therefore gambles. This gamble is effected by the campaign's threshold.
Contributions to campaigns with higher thresholds are collected only if a
greater number of agents find the offering acceptable. Therefore, high
threshold serves as a social insurance and thus in high-threshold campaigns,
potential contributors feel more at ease with contributing. We introduce the
crowdunding game and explore the contributor's dilemma in the context of
experience goods. We discuss equilibrium existence and related social welfare,
information aggregation and revenue implications.
