  The executive branch, or government, is typically not elected directly by the
people, but rather formed by another elected body or person such as the
parliament or the president. As a result, its members are not directly
accountable to the people, individually or as a group. We consider a scenario
in which the members of the government are elected directly by the people, and
wish to achieve proportionality while doing so. We propose a formal model
consisting of $k$ offices, each with its own disjoint set of candidates, and a
set of voters who provide approval ballots for all offices. We wish to identify
good aggregation rules that assign one candidate to each office. As using a
simple majority vote for each office independently might result in disregarding
minority preferences altogether, here we consider an adaptation of the greedy
variant of Proportional Approval Voting (GreedyPAV) to our setting, and
demonstrate -- through computer-based simulations -- how voting for all offices
together using this rule overcomes this weakness. We note that the approach is
applicable also to a party that employs direct democracy, where party members
elect the party's representatives in a coalition government.
