  As advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) propel progress in the life
sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological
agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that could pose
such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design
tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4 and its successors, might provide dual-use
information and thus remove some barriers encountered by historical biological
weapons efforts. As LLMs are turned into multi-modal lab assistants and
autonomous science tools, this will increase their ability to support
non-experts in performing laboratory work. Thus, LLMs may in particular lower
barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities
of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic
pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms
of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, the
convergence of LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological
agents and could make them broadly accessible. A range of interventions would
help to manage risks. Independent pre-release evaluations could help understand
the capabilities of models and the effectiveness of safeguards. Options for
differentiated access to such tools should be carefully weighed with the
benefits of openly releasing systems. Lastly, essential for mitigating risks
will be universal and enhanced screening of gene synthesis products.
