  Ethereum 2.0 is the second-largest cryptocurrency by market capitalization
and a widely used smart contract platform. Therefore, examining the reliability
of Ethereum 2.0's incentive mechanism is crucial, particularly its
effectiveness in encouraging validators to adhere to the Ethereum 2.0's
protocol. This paper studies the incentive mechanism of Ethereum 2.0 and
evaluates its robustness by analyzing the interaction between block proposers
and attesters in a single slot. To this end, we use Bayesian games to model the
strategies of block proposers and attesters and calculate their expected
utilities. Our results demonstrate that the Ethereum 2.0 incentive mechanism is
incentive-compatible and promotes cooperation among validators. We prove that a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and an ex ante dominant strategy exist between the
block proposer and attesters in a single slot. Our research provides a solid
foundation for further analysis of Ethereum 2.0's incentive mechanism and
insights for individuals considering participation as a validator in Ethereum
2.0.
