  We propose enhancing the use of propositions for denoting decisions and
strategies as established in temporal languages such as CTL*, if interpreted on
concurrent game models. The enhancement enables specifying varying coalition
structure. In quantified CTL* this technique also enables quantifying over
coalition structure, and we use it to quantify over an extended form of
strategy profiles which capture temporary coalitions. We also extend CTL* by a
temporal form of a binary preference operator that can be traced back to the
work of Von Wright. The resulting extension of quantified CTL* can be used to
spell out conditions on the rationality of behaviour in concurrent multiplayer
games such as what appear in solution concepts, with players having multiple
individual objectives and preferences on them, and with the possibility to form
temporary coalitions taken in account. We propose complete axiomatisations for
the extension of CTL* by the temporal preference operator. The decidability of
the logic is not affected by that extension.
