  In the case of the need of extraordinary security,
Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-(like)-noise ciphers can easily be integrated on
existing types of digital chips in order to provide secure data communication
between hardware processors, memory chips, hard disks and other units within a
computer or other data processor system. The secure key exchange can take place
at the very first run and the system can renew the key later at random times
with an authenticated fashion to prohibit man-in-the-middle attack. The key can
be stored in flash memories within the communicating chip units at hidden
random addresses among other random bits that are continuously generated by the
secure line but are never actually used. Thus, even if the system is
disassembled, and the eavesdropper can have direct access to the communication
lines between the units, or even if she is trying to use a man-in-the-middle
attack, no information can be extracted. The only way to break the code is to
learn the chip structure, to understand the machine code program and to read
out the information during running by accessing the proper internal ports of
the working chips. However such an attack needs extraordinary resources and
even that can be prohibited by a password lockout. The unconditional security
of commercial algorithms against piracy can be provided in a similar way.
