  Pricing multi-interval economic dispatch of electric power under operational
uncertainty is considered in this two-part paper. Part I investigates
dispatch-following incentives for generators under the locational marginal
pricing (LMP) and temporal locational marginal pricing (TLMP) policies.
Extending the theoretical results developed in Part I, Part II evaluates a
broader set of performance measures under a general network model. For networks
with power flow constraints, TLMP is shown to have an energy-congestion-ramping
price decomposition. Under the one-shot dispatch and pricing model, this
decomposition leads to a nonnegative merchandising surplus equal to the sum of
congestion and ramping surpluses. It is also shown that, comparing with LMP,
TLMP imposes a penalty on generators with limited ramping capabilities, thus
giving incentives for generators to reveal their ramping limits truthfully and
improve their ramping capacities. Several benchmark pricing mechanisms are
evaluated under the rolling-window dispatch and pricing models. The performance
measures considered are the level of out-of-the-market uplifts, the revenue
adequacy of the system operator, consumer payment, generator profit, level of
discriminative payment, and price volatility.
