  We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of
nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of
the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have
access to each other's payoff matrix. Each has to observe the other's actions
up to present and plays the action generated based on the best response to
these observations. However, when the game is played over a communication
network, there are several practical issues that need to be taken into account:
First, the players may make random decision errors from time to time. Second,
the players' observations of each other's previous actions may be incorrect.
The players will try to compensate for these errors based on the information
they have. We examine convergence property of the game in such scenarios, and
establish convergence to the equilibrium point under some mild assumptions when
both players are restricted to two actions.
