  In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a
vertex, form a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by
simultaneously removing an adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al.,
2013). The cost of a player considers the average distance to all other players
or the maximum distance to other players. Any SG by $n$ players starting from a
tree converges to an equilibrium with a constant Price of Anarchy (PoA) within
$O(n^3)$ edge swaps (Lenzner, 2011). We focus on SGs where each player knows
the subgraph induced by players within distance $k$. Therefore, each player
cannot compute its cost nor a best response. We first consider pessimistic
players who consider the worst-case global graph. We show that any SG starting
from a tree (i) always converges to an equilibrium within $O(n^3)$ edge swaps
irrespective of the value of $k$, (ii) the PoA is $\Theta(n)$ for $k=1,2,3$,
and (iii) the PoA is constant for $k \geq 4$. We then introduce weakly
pessimistic players and optimistic players and show that these less pessimistic
players achieve constant PoA for $k \leq 3$ at the cost of best response
cycles.
