  Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients
requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services.
Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key
design parameter of the marketplace platform. The platform might perform an
allocation to maximize its revenue or optimize for social welfare of all
participants. However, individual participants might not get maximum value from
their match and reject it to form matches (called blocking groups) themselves,
thereby bypassing the platform. This paper considers the bipartite matching
problem in MaaS marketplaces in a dynamic environment and proposes
approximately stable matching solutions using mechanism design and mathematical
programming approaches to limit the formation of blocking groups. Matching is
based on non-strict, incomplete and interdependent preferences of participants
over contracts enabling negotiations between both sides. Empirical simulations
are used to test the mechanisms in a simulated 3D printing marketplace and to
evaluate the impact of stability on its performance. It is found that stable
matching results in small degradation in social welfare of the marketplace.
However, it leads to a significantly better outcome in terms of stability of
allocation. Unstable matchings introduce anarchy into marketplace with
participants rejecting its allocation leading to performance poorer than stable
matchings.
