  A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against
the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse
implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite
exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The
eavesdropper (Eve) is supposed to have unlimited technological power while the
honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present day technology, in particular an
attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. They exploit
the nonorthogonality of quantum states for decreasing the information
accessible to Eve in the multi-photon pulses accidentally produced by the
imperfect source. An implementation of some of these protocols using present
day technology allow for a secure key distribution up to distances of $\sim$
150 km. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is
included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photon
number splitting attacks.
