  Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) have recently piqued the
interest of participants from diverse backgrounds, including business owners,
engineers, individual and institutional investors. In part, the promised
autonomy (less rigid structure and more voice) in decision making along with
ease of market access, has resulted in its participants pouring in their time
and economic resources. In a DAO, governance is typically enacted via posting
proposals and collectively voting on it. The winning proposals are then
implemented. However, governance alone may be insufficient, when its
participants economic incentives are misaligned. Governance and tokenomics need
to work in tandem to ensure business stability. We present a case study on an
example building data asset from the construction industry and present its
tokenomics. We show its working, both as a caretaker and strategic DAO, to
illustrate its effects on governance and DAO stability. The case study serves
as an example for participants to decide whether their DAO tokenomics are
aligned with participation incentives. Finally, we propose the DAO tension
quadrilateral to study DAO stability and build a tool to measure agreement
among its participants.
