  Signal loss poses a significant threat to the security of quantum
cryptography when the chosen protocol lacks loss-tolerance. In quantum position
verification (QPV) protocols, even relatively small loss rates can compromise
security. The goal is thus to find protocols that remain secure under
practically achievable loss rates. In this work, we modify the usual structure
of QPV protocols and prove that this modification makes the potentially high
transmission loss between the verifiers and the prover security-irrelevant for
a class of protocols that includes a practically-interesting candidate protocol
inspired by the BB84 protocol ($\mathrm{QPV}_{\mathrm{BB84}}^{f}$). This
modification, which involves photon presence detection, a small time delay at
the prover, and a commitment to play before proceeding, reduces the overall
loss rate to just the prover's laboratory. The adapted protocol
c-$\mathrm{QPV}_{\mathrm{BB84}}^{f}$ then becomes a practically feasible QPV
protocol with strong security guarantees, even against attackers using adaptive
strategies. As the loss rate between the verifiers and prover is mainly
dictated by the distance between them, secure QPV over longer distances becomes
possible. We also show possible implementations of the required photon presence
detection, making c-$\mathrm{QPV}_{\mathrm{BB84}}^{f}$ a protocol that solves
all major practical issues in QPV. Finally, we discuss experimental aspects and
give parameter estimations.
