  Rental Harmony is the problem of assigning rooms in a rented house to tenants
with different preferences, and simultaneously splitting the rent among them,
such that no tenant envies the bundle (room+price) given to another tenant.
Different papers have studied this problem under two incompatible assumptions:
the miserly tenants assumption is that each tenant prefers a free room to a
non-free room; the quasilinear tenants assumption is that each tenant
attributes a monetary value to each room, and prefers a room of which the
difference between value and price is maximum. This note shows how to adapt the
main technique used for rental harmony with miserly tenants, using Sperner's
lemma, to a much more general class of preferences, that contains both miserly
and quasilinear tenants as special cases. This implies that some recent results
derived for miserly tenants apply to this more general preference class too.
