  This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal
delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the
monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately
possesses complete knowledge about the state transitions and study how she can
use her private observation to support the incentive compatibility of the
delegation via informational burning, a process we refer to as the
looking-forward persuasion. The delegation mechanism is formulated in which the
agents form belief hierarchies due to the persuasion and play a dynamic
Bayesian game. We propose a novel randomized mechanism, known as Bayesian
promised delegation (BPD), in which the periodic incentive compatibility is
guaranteed by persuasions and promises of future delegations. We show that the
BPD can achieve the same optimal social welfare as the original mechanism in
stationary Markov perfect Bayesian equilibria. A revelation-principle-like
design regime is established to show that the persuasion with belief
hierarchies can be fully characterized by correlating the randomization of the
agents' local BPD mechanisms with the persuasion as a direct recommendation of
the future promises.
