  Large language models (LLMs) have taken centre stage in debates on Artificial
Intelligence. Yet there remains a gap in how to assess LLMs' conformity to
important human values. In this paper, we investigate whether state-of-the-art
LLMs, GPT-4 and Claude 2.1 (Gemini Pro and LLAMA 2 did not generate valid
results) are moral hypocrites. We employ two research instruments based on the
Moral Foundations Theory: (i) the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), which
investigates which values are considered morally relevant in abstract moral
judgements; and (ii) the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs), which evaluate
moral cognition in concrete scenarios related to each moral foundation. We
characterise conflicts in values between these different abstractions of moral
evaluation as hypocrisy. We found that both models displayed reasonable
consistency within each instrument compared to humans, but they displayed
contradictory and hypocritical behaviour when we compared the abstract values
present in the MFQ to the evaluation of concrete moral violations of the MFV.
