  Recent advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence are now being
considered in safety-critical autonomous systems where software defects may
cause severe harm to humans and the environment. Design organizations in these
domains are currently unable to provide convincing arguments that their systems
are safe to operate when machine learning algorithms are used to implement
their software.
  In this paper, we present an efficient method to extract equivalence classes
from decision trees and tree ensembles, and to formally verify that their
input-output mappings comply with requirements. The idea is that, given that
safety requirements can be traced to desirable properties on system
input-output patterns, we can use positive verification outcomes in safety
arguments. This paper presents the implementation of the method in the tool
VoTE (Verifier of Tree Ensembles), and evaluates its scalability on two case
studies presented in current literature.
  We demonstrate that our method is practical for tree ensembles trained on
low-dimensional data with up to 25 decision trees and tree depths of up to 20.
Our work also studies the limitations of the method with high-dimensional data
and preliminarily investigates the trade-off between large number of trees and
time taken for verification.
