  Scientific coauthorship, generated by collaborations and competitions among
researchers, reflects effective organizations of human resources. Researchers,
their expected benefits through collaborations, and their cooperative costs
constitute the elements of a game. Hence we propose a cooperative game model to
explore the evolution mechanisms of scientific coauthorship networks. The model
generates geometric hypergraphs, where the costs are modelled by space
distances, and the benefits are expressed by node reputations, i. e. geometric
zones that depend on node position in space and time. Modelled cooperative
strategies conditioned on positive benefit-minus-cost reflect the spatial
reciprocity principle in collaborations, and generate high clustering and
degree assortativity, two typical features of coauthorship networks. Modelled
reputations generate the generalized Poisson parts and fat tails appeared in
specific distributions of empirical data, e. g. paper team size distribution.
The combined effect of modelled costs and reputations reproduces the
transitions emerged in degree distribution, in the correlation between degree
and local clustering coefficient, etc. The model provides an example of how
individual strategies induce network complexity, as well as an application of
game theory to social affiliation networks.
