  In the presence of non-convexities, the power market may not have an
equilibrium price for power that provides economic stability of the centralized
dispatch outcome. In this case, to achieve an economically stable outcome, the
uplift payments to the market players are introduced as part of the pricing
principle. Given the general pricing principle that involves the lost profit
compensation in the form of the uplift payments, we study a question if it is
possible to introduce new products/services at the market and the associated
prices such that the set of the optimal solutions to the centralized dispatch
optimization problem is unaffected, the profit received by each market player
at the centralized dispatch schedule is unchanged, and no market player has
lost profit. These new products/services and the corresponding prices can be
viewed as originating from the Lagrangian relaxation of redundant constraints,
which dot not change the centralized dispatch schedule. For any given market
price (or a pricing algorithm that sets the producer revenue as a function of
its output volume) in a uninode multi-period power market with fixed load, we
explicitly construct a family of the redundant constraints that do not change
the maximum profit of any producer and result in zero total uplift payment. The
analysis can be straightforwardly extended to a multi-node multi-period market
with price-sensitive demand.
