  A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one
possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), ''it is not
just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of
the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all
time.'' Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like
ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and discuss
its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural
properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise
definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical
ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a
strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory -- the Everettian
Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is
strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined.
