  We consider the problem of committee selection from a fixed set of candidates
where each candidate has multiple quantifiable attributes. To select the best
possible committee, instead of voting for a candidate, a voter is allowed to
approve the preferred attributes of a given candidate. Though attribute based
preference is addressed in several contexts, committee selection problem with
attribute approval of voters has not been attempted earlier. A committee formed
on attribute preferences is more likely to be a better representative of the
qualities desired by the voters and is less likely to be susceptible to
collusion or manipulation. In this work, we provide a formal study of the
different aspects of this problem and define properties of weak unanimity,
strong unanimity, simple justified representations and compound justified
representation, that are required to be satisfied by the selected committee. We
show that none of the existing vote/approval aggregation rules satisfy these
new properties for attribute aggregation. We describe a greedy approach for
attribute aggregation that satisfies the first three properties, but not the
fourth, i.e., compound justified representation, which we prove to be
NP-complete. Furthermore, we prove that finding a committee with justified
representation and the highest approval voting score is NP-complete.
