  The deterministic nature of EQM (the Everett Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics) seems to be inconsistent to the use of probability in EQM, giving
rise to what is known as the "incoherence problem". In this paper, I explore
approaches to solve the incoherence problem of EQM via pre-measurement
uncertainty. Previous discussions on the validity of pre-measurement
uncertainty have leaned heavily on intricate aspects of the theory of semantics
and reference, the embrace of either 4-dimensionalism or 3-dimensionalism of
personhood, or the ontology of EQM. In this paper, I argue that, regardless of
the adoption of whether 3-dimensionalism or 4-dimensionalism of personhood, the
overlapping view or the divergence view of the ontology of EQM, the
pre-measurement uncertainty approach to the incoherence problem of EQM can only
archive success while contradicting fundamental principles of physicalism. I
also use the divergence view of EQM as an example to illustrate my analyses.
