  Consciousness and intelligence are properties commonly understood as
dependent by folk psychology and society in general. The term artificial
intelligence and the kind of problems that it managed to solve in the recent
years has been shown as an argument to establish that machines experience some
sort of consciousness. Following the analogy of Russell, if a machine is able
to do what a conscious human being does, the likelihood that the machine is
conscious increases. However, the social implications of this analogy are
catastrophic. Concretely, if rights are given to entities that can solve the
kind of problems that a neurotypical person can, does the machine have
potentially more rights that a person that has a disability? For example, the
autistic syndrome disorder spectrum can make a person unable to solve the kind
of problems that a machine solves. We believe that the obvious answer is no, as
problem solving does not imply consciousness. Consequently, we will argue in
this paper how phenomenal consciousness and, at least, computational
intelligence are independent and why machines do not possess phenomenal
consciousness, although they can potentially develop a higher computational
intelligence that human beings. In order to do so, we try to formulate an
objective measure of computational intelligence and study how it presents in
human beings, animals and machines. Analogously, we study phenomenal
consciousness as a dichotomous variable and how it is distributed in humans,
animals and machines. As phenomenal consciousness and computational
intelligence are independent, this fact has critical implications for society
that we also analyze in this work.
