  Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded
rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a
game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each
round by observing own or others payoff results but can be also modified after
interchanging impressions with other players. In this way, the update of the
strategies can become a question that goes beyond simple evolutionary rules
based on fitness and become a social issue. In this work, we explore this
scenario by coupling a game with an opinion dynamics model. The opinion is
represented by a continuous variable that corresponds to the certainty of the
agents respect to which strategy is best. The opinions transform into actions
by making the selection of an strategy a stochastic event with a probability
regulated by the opinion. A certain regard for the previous round payoff is
included but the main update rules of the opinion are given by a model inspired
in social interchanges. We find that the dynamics fixed points of the coupled
model is different from those of the evolutionary game or the opinion models
alone. Furthermore, new features emerge such as the resilience of the fraction
of cooperators to the topology of the social interaction network or to the
presence of a small fraction of extremist players.
