  The problem of integrating renewables and storage into a distribution network
is considered under two integration models: (i) a centralized model involving a
retail utility that owns the integration as part of its portfolio of energy
resources, and (ii) a decentralized model in which each consumer individually
owns and operates the integration and is capable of selling surplus electricity
back to the retailer in a net-metering setting.
  The two integration models are analyzed using a Stackelberg game in which the
utility is the leader in setting the retail price of electricity, and each
consumer schedules its demand by maximizing individual consumer surplus. The
solution of the Stackelberg game defines the Pareto front that characterizes
fundamental trade-offs between retail profit of the utility and consumer
surplus.
  It is shown that, for both integration models, the centralized integration
uniformly improves retail profit. As the level of integration increases, the
proportion of benefits goes to the consumers increases. In contrast, the
consumer-based decentralized integration improves consumer surplus at the
expense of retail profit of the utility. For a profit regulated utility, the
consumer based integration may lead to smaller consumer surplus than that when
no renewable or storage is integrated at either the consumer or the retailer
end.
