  In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on
cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their
mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a
one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy
observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework
based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding
strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze
the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies, and derive the threshold
of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The
numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic
solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic
exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance
of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close
agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.
