  Motivated by recent applications of sequential decision making in matching
markets, in this paper we attempt at formulating and abstracting market designs
for P2P lending. We describe a paradigm to set the stage for how peer to peer
investments can be conceived from a matching market perspective, especially
when both borrower and lender preferences are respected. We model these
specialized markets as an optimization problem and consider different utilities
for agents on both sides of the market while also understanding the impact of
equitable allocations to borrowers. We devise a technique based on sequential
decision making that allow the lenders to adjust their choices based on the
dynamics of uncertainty from competition over time and that also impacts the
rewards in return for their investments. Using simulated experiments we show
the dynamics of the regret based on the optimal borrower-lender matching and
find that the lender regret depends on the initial preferences set by the
lenders which could affect their learning over decision making steps.
