  Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support
a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that
is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats.
First, the prices alone are not sufficient to coordinate the market, and buyers
may need to select among their most preferred bundles in a coordinated way to
find a feasible allocation. Second, we don't in practice expect to encounter
exact equilibrium prices tailored to the market, but instead only approximate
prices, somehow encoding "distributional" information about the market. How
well do prices work to coordinate markets when tie-breaking is not coordinated,
and they encode only distributional information?
  We answer this question. First, we provide a genericity condition such that
for buyers with Matroid Based Valuations, overdemand with respect to
equilibrium prices is at most 1, independent of the supply of goods, even when
tie-breaking is done in an uncoordinated fashion. Second, we provide
learning-theoretic results that show that such prices are robust to changing
the buyers in the market, so long as all buyers are sampled from the same
(unknown) distribution.
