  I use mechanized verification to examine several first- and higher-order
formalizations of Anselm's Ontological Argument against the charge of begging
the question. I propose three different but related criteria for a premise to
beg the question in fully formal proofs and find that one or another applies to
all the formalizations examined. I also show that all these formalizations
entail variants that are vacuous, in the sense that they apply no
interpretation to "than which there is no greater" and are therefore vulnerable
to Gaunilo's refutation.
  My purpose is to demonstrate that mechanized verification provides an
effective and reliable technique to perform these analyses; readers may decide
whether the forms of question begging and vacuity so identified affect their
interest in the Argument or its various formalizations.
  This version updates the paper that originally appeared as Chapter 13 in
"Beyond Faith and Rationality: Essays on Logic, Religion and Philosophy"
published by Springer to respond to criticisms by Oppenheimer and Zalta.
