  We are studying the Gately point, an established solution concept for
cooperative games. We point out that there are superadditive games for which
the Gately point is not unique, i.e. in general the concept is rather
set-valued than an actual point. We derive conditions under which the Gately
point is guaranteed to be a unique imputation and provide a geometric
interpretation. The Gately point can be understood as the intersection of a
line defined by two points with the set of imputations. Our uniqueness
conditions guarantee that these two points do not coincide. We provide
demonstrative interpretations for negative propensities to disrupt. We briefly
show that our uniqueness conditions for the Gately point include quasibalanced
games and discuss the relation of the Gately point to the $\tau$-value in this
context. Finally, we point out relations to cost games and the ACA method and
end upon a few remarks on the implementation of the Gately point and an
upcoming software package for cooperative game theory.
