  Despite the wealth of empirical and theoretical studies, the origin and
maintenance of cooperation is still an evolutionary riddle. In this context,
ecological life-history traits which affect the efficiency of selection may
play a role, though these are often ignored. We consider here species such as
bacteria, fungi, invertebrates and plants which exhibit resting stages in the
form of a quiescent state or a seedbank. When quiescent, individuals are
inactive and reproduce upon activation, while under seed bank parents produce
offspring remaining dormant for different amount of time. We assume weak
frequency-dependent selection modeled using game-theory and the prisoners
dilemma (cooperation/defect) as payoff matrix. The cooperators and defectors
are allowed to evolve different quiescence or dormancy times. By means of
singular perturbation theory we reduce the model to a one-dimensional equation
resembling the well known replicator equation, where the gain functions are
scaled with lumped parameters reflecting the time scale of the resting state of
the cooperators and defectors. If both time scales are identical cooperation
cannot persist in a homogeneous population. If, however, the time scale of the
cooperator is distinctively different from that of the defector, cooperation
may become a locally asymptotically stable strategy. Interestingly enough, in
the seedbank case the cooperator needs to be faster than the defector, while in
the quiescent case the cooperator has to be slower. We use adaptive dynamics to
identify situations where cooperation may evolve and form a convergent stable
ESS. We conclude by highlighting the relevance fo these results for many
non-model species and the maintenance of cooperation in microbial, invertebrate
or plant populations.
