  This paper presents a security analysis of the InfiniBand architecture, a
prevalent RDMA standard, and NVMe-over-Fabrics (NVMe-oF), a prominent protocol
for industrial disaggregated storage that exploits RDMA protocols to achieve
low-latency and high-bandwidth access to remote solid-state devices. Our work,
NeVerMore, discovers new vulnerabilities in RDMA protocols that unveils several
attack vectors on RDMA-enabled applications and the NVMe-oF protocol, showing
that the current security mechanisms of the NVMe-oF protocol do not address the
security vulnerabilities posed by the use of RDMA. In particular, we show how
an unprivileged user can inject packets into any RDMA connection created on a
local network controller, bypassing security mechanisms of the operating system
and its kernel, and how the injection can be used to acquire unauthorized block
access to NVMe-oF devices. Overall, we implement four attacks on RDMA protocols
and seven attacks on the NVMe-oF protocol and verify them on the two most
popular implementations of NVMe-oF: SPDK and the Linux kernel. To mitigate the
discovered attacks we propose multiple mechanisms that can be implemented by
RDMA and NVMe-oF providers.
