  Automated negotiation is a well-known mechanism for autonomous agents to
reach agreements. To realize beneficial agreements quickly, it is key to employ
a good bidding strategy. When a negotiating agent has a good back-up plan,
i.e., a high reservation value, failing to reach an agreement is not
necessarily disadvantageous. Thus, the agent can adopt a risk-seeking strategy,
aiming for outcomes with a higher utilities.
  Accordingly, this paper develops an optimal bidding strategy called
MIA-RVelous for bilateral negotiations with private reservation values. The
proposed greedy algorithm finds the optimal bid sequence given the agent's
beliefs about the opponent in $O(n^2D)$ time, with $D$ the maximum number of
rounds and $n$ the number of outcomes. The results obtained here can pave the
way to realizing effective concurrent negotiations, given that concurrent
negotiations can serve as a (probabilistic) backup plan.
