  When a defendant's DNA matches a sample found at a crime scene, how
compelling is the match? To answer this question, DNA analysts typically use
relative frequencies, random-match probabilities or likelihood ratios. They
compute these quantities for the major racial or ethnic groups in the United
States, supplying prosecutors with such mind-boggling figures as ``one in nine
hundred and fifty sextillion African Americans, one in one hundred and thirty
septillion Caucasians, and one in nine hundred and thirty sextillion
Hispanics." In People v. Prince, a California Court of Appeals rejected this
practice on the theory that only the perpetrator's race is relevant to the
crime; hence, it is impermissible to introduce statistics about other races.
This paper critiques this reasoning. Relying on the concept of likelihood, it
presents a logical justification for referring to a range of races and
identifies some problems with the one-race-only rule. The paper also notes some
ways to express the probative value of a DNA match quantitatively without
referring to variations in DNA profile frequencies among races or ethnic
groups.
