  We study an information design problem for a non-atomic service scheduling
game. The service starts at a random time and there is a continuum of agent
population who have a prior belief about the service start time but do not
observe the actual realization of it. The agents want to make decisions of when
to join the queue in order to avoid long waits in the queue or not to arrive
earlier than the service has started. There is a planner who knows when the
service starts and makes suggestions to the agents about when to join the queue
through an obedient direct signaling strategy, in order to minimize the average
social cost. We characterize the full information and the no information
equilibria and we show in what conditions it is optimal for the planner to
reveal the full information to the agents. Further, by imposing appropriate
assumptions on the model, we formulate the information design problem as a
generalized problem of moments (GPM) and use computational tools developed for
such problems to solve the problem numerically.
