  This paper focuses on a decentralized profit-center firm that uses negotiated
transfer pricing as an instrument to coordinate the production process.
Moreover, the firm's headquarters gives its divisions full authority over
operating decisions and it is assumed that each division can additionally make
an upfront investment decision that enhances the value of internal trade. On
early works, the paper expands the number of divisions by one downstream
division and relaxes basic assumptions, such as the assumption of common
knowledge of rationality. Based on an agent-based simulation, it is examined
whether cognitively bounded individuals modeled by fuzzy Q-learning achieve the
same results as fully rational utility maximizers. In addition, the paper
investigates different constellations of bargaining power to see whether a
deviation from the recommended optimal bargaining power leads to a higher
managerial performance. The simulation results show that fuzzy Q-learning
agents perform at least as well or better than fully individual rational
utility maximizers. The study also indicates that, in scenarios with different
marginal costs of divisions, a deviation from the recommended optimal
distribution ratio of the bargaining power of divisions can lead to higher
investment levels and, thus, to an increase in the headquarters' profit.
