  Emerging deceptive systems present a new promise for the uprising security
problems in cloud-based virtual networks, especially those operated by small
and medium enterprises. The main goal of deceptive systems is to form a layer
of defensive nodes in an Internet-accessible cloud-based virtual network to
distract and deceive malicious clients. While numerous approaches provide
distinct models for developing decisive systems, misery digraphs present a
promising decisive model for distracting powerful remote intrusions. Misery
digraphs can delay access to targets deep in a cloud-based virtual network. A
central challenge to the theory of misery digraphs is verifying their
applicability in prominent cloud computing platforms as well as measuring the
efficiency of networks that adapt them. Thus, architectural support is needed
that can be realized with long-term support technologies and can be deployed
for large networks. This work presents and analyzes a high-throughput
architecture for misery digraphs, embarking on implementation details and
performance analysis. Full implementation of the architecture in Amazon Web
Services imposes modest performance delays in the request processing, while
highly delaying stealth intrusions in the network.
