  Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in
order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual
preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked
on a political axis. As a consequence it becomes interesting to measure how
diverse the preferences in a well-behaved domain can be.
  In this paper we introduce an egalitarian approach to measuring preference
diversity, focusing on the abundance of distinct suborders one subsets of the
alternative. We provide a common generalisation of the frequently used concepts
of ampleness and copiousness.
  We give a detailed investigation of the abundance for Condorcet domains. Our
theorems imply a ceiling for the local diversity in domains on large sets of
alternatives, which show that in this measure Black's single-peaked domain is
in fact optimal. We also demonstrate that for some numbers of alternatives,
there are Condorcet domains which have largest local diversity without having
maximum order.
