  We compare two Demand Side Management (DSM) mechanisms, introduced
respectively by Mohsenian-Rad et al (2010) and Baharlouei et al (2012), in
terms of efficiency and fairness. Each mechanism defines a game where the
consumers optimize their flexible consumption to reduce their electricity
bills. Mohsenian-Rad et al propose a daily mechanism for which they prove the
social optimality. Baharlouei et al propose a hourly billing mechanism for
which we give theoretical results: we prove the uniqueness of an equilibrium in
the associated game and give an upper bound on its price of anarchy. We
evaluate numerically the two mechanisms, using real consumption data from Pecan
Street Inc. The simulations show that the equilibrium reached with the hourly
mechanism is socially optimal up to 0.1%, and that it achieves an important
fairness property according to a quantitative indicator we define. We observe
that the two DSM mechanisms avoid the synchronization effect induced by non-
game theoretic mechanisms, e.g. Peak/OffPeak hours contracts.
