  We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized
multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly
optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput
blockchains or Web 3.0 platforms. In contrast to the stylized centralized
platform, the decentralized platform is powered by blockchain technology, which
allows for secure and transparent Peer-to-Peer transactions among users.
Traditional single-chain-based blockchains suffer from the well-known
blockchain trilemma. Beyond the single-chain-based scheme, decentralized
high-throughput blockchains adopt parallel protocols to reconcile the
blockchain trilemma, implementing any tasking and desired allocation. However,
unneglectable network latency may induce partial observability, resulting in
incoordination and misallocation issues for the decentralized transaction
packaging process at the current high-throughput blockchain protocols.
  To address this problem, we consider a strategic coordination mechanism for
the decentralized transaction packaging process by using a game-theoretic
approach. Under a tractable two-period model, we find a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the miner's strategic transaction packaging under partial
observability. Along with novel algorithms for computing equilibrium payoffs,
we show that the decentralized platform can achieve an efficient and stable
market outcome. The model also highlights that the proposed mechanism can
endogenously offer a base fee per gas without any restructuration of the
initial blockchain transaction fee mechanism. The theoretical results that
underlie the algorithms also imply bounds on the computational complexity of
equilibrium payoffs.
