  This paper is a significant step forward in understanding dependency
equilibria within the framework of real algebraic geometry encompassing both
pure and mixed equilibria. We start by breaking down the concept for a general
audience, using concrete examples to illustrate the main results. In alignment
with Spohn's original definition of dependency equilibria, we propose three
alternative definitions, allowing for an algebro-geometric comprehensive study
of all dependency equilibria. We give a sufficient condition for the existence
of a pure dependency equilibrium and show that every Nash equilibrium lies on
the Spohn variety, the algebraic model for dependency equilibria. For generic
games, the set of real points of the Spohn variety is Zariski dense.
Furthermore, every Nash equilibrium in this case is a dependency equilibrium.
Finally, we present a detailed analysis of the geometric structure of
dependency equilibria for $(2\times2)$-games.
