  I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the
ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue
that the so-called Hole Argument does not bear on the debate, because it
provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such
precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield
contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the
other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an
investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different
investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of
existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself
to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality,
a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of
philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I
conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the
broader debate between realists and instrumentalists.
