  We investigate the possibility of "having someone carry out the work of
executing a function for you, but without letting him learn anything about your
input". Say Alice wants Bob to compute some known function f upon her input x,
but wants to prevent Bob from learning anything about x. The situation arises
for instance if client Alice has limited computational resources in comparison
with mistrusted server Bob, or if x is an inherently mobile piece of data.
Could there be a protocol whereby Bob is forced to compute f(x) "blindly", i.e.
without observing x? We provide such a blind computation protocol for the class
of functions which admit an efficient procedure to generate random input-output
pairs, e.g. factorization. The cheat-sensitive security achieved relies only
upon quantum theory being true. The security analysis carried out assumes the
eavesdropper performs individual attacks.
  Keywords: Secure Circuit Evaluation, Secure Two-party Computation,
Information Hiding, Information gain vs disturbance.
