  We consider a Schelling-like segregation model, in which the behavior of
individual agents is determined by a mixed individual and global utility. With
a high ratio of global utility being incorporated, the agents are cooperative
in order to realize a homogenized state, otherwise the agents are less
cooperative, leading to an undesired Nash equilibrium with low utility. In the
present study, we introduce a dynamically varying cooperation degree parameter
to prevent the agents from falling into such a low-utility equilibrium state.
More precisely, a large cooperation degree is assigned when the agents are in
high-utility regions, whereas agents having low utility behave more
individually. Simulation results show that homogenized phases with globally
high utility are achieved with the present dynamical control, even for the case
of a low mean value of cooperation degree. Since the cooperation degree
represents the magnitude with which Pigouvian tax is enforced in the model of
residential movement within a city, this result suggests the possibility of tax
intervention to circumvent the undesired segregation of residents.
