  I argue that we must distinguish between:
  (0) the Three-Doors-Problem Problem [sic], which is to make sense of some
real world question of a real person.
  (1) a large number of solutions to this meta-problem, i.e., many specific
Three-Doors-Problem problems, which are competing mathematizations of the
meta-problem (0).
  Each of the solutions at level (1) can well have a number of different
solutions: nice ones and ugly ones; correct ones and incorrect ones. I discuss
three level (1) solutions, i.e., three different Monty Hall problems; and try
to give three short correct and attractive solutions. These are: an
unconditional probability question; a conditional probability question; and a
game-theory question.
  The meta-message of the article is that applied statisticians should beware
of solution-driven science.
