  With the rapidly growing demand for the cloud services, a need for efficient
methods to trade computing resources increases. Commonly used fixed-price model
is not always the best approach for trading cloud resources, because of its
inflexible and static nature. Dynamic trading systems, which make use of market
mechanisms, show promise for more efficient resource allocation and pricing in
the cloud. However, most of the existing mechanisms ignore the seller's costs
of providing the resources. In order to address it, we propose a single-sided
market mechanism for trading virtual machine instances in the cloud, where the
cloud provider can express the reservation prices for traded cloud services. We
investigate the theoretical properties of the proposed mechanism and prove that
it is truthful, i.e. the buyers do not have an incentive to lie about their
true valuation of the resources. We perform extensive experiments in order to
investigate the impact of the reserve price on the market outcome. Our
experiments show that the proposed mechanism yields near optimal allocations
and has a low execution time.
