  In recent years, various decentralized organizational forms have emerged,
posing a challenge for organizational design. Some design elements, such as
task allocation, become emergent properties that cannot be fully controlled
from the top down. The central question that arises in this context is: How can
bottom-up task allocation be guided towards an effective organizational
structure? To address this question, this paper presents a novel agent-based
model of an organization that features bottom-up task allocation that can be
motivated by either long-term or short-term orientation on the agents' side.
The model also includes an incentive mechanism to guide the bottom-up task
allocation process and create incentives that range from altruistic to
individualistic. Our analysis shows that when bottom-up task allocation is
driven by short-term orientation and aligned with the incentive mechanisms, it
leads to improved organizational performance that surpasses that of
traditionally designed organizations. Additionally, we find that the presence
of altruistic incentive mechanisms within the organization reduces the
importance of mirroring in task allocation.
