  This book concerns the metasemantics of quantum mechanics (QM). Roughly, it
pursues an investigation at an intersection of the philosophy of physics and
the philosophy of semantics, and it offers a critical analysis of rival
explanations of the semantic facts of standard QM. Two problems for such
explanations are discussed: categoricity and permanence of rules. New results
include 1) a reconstruction of Einstein's incompleteness argument, which
concludes that a local, separable, and categorical QM cannot exist, 2) a
reinterpretation of Bohr's principle of correspondence, grounded in the
principle of permanence, 3) a meaning-variance argument for quantum logic,
which follows a line of critical reflections initiated by Weyl, and 4) an
argument for semantic indeterminacy leveled against inferentialism about QM,
inspired by Carnap's work in the philosophy of classical logic.
