  The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest
in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of
complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or
biological diversity. The analysis so far has focused on random games of
independent payoff entries. In this paper, we overcome this restrictive
assumption by considering multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games where
the payoff matrix entries are correlated random variables. Using techniques
from the random polynomial theory we establish a closed formula for the mean
numbers of internal (stable) equilibria. We then characterise the asymptotic
behaviour of this important quantity for large group sizes and study the effect
of the correlation. Our results show that decreasing the correlation among
payoffs (namely, of a strategist for different group compositions) leads to
larger mean numbers of (stable) equilibrium points, suggesting that the system
or population behavioural diversity can be promoted by increasing independence
of the payoff entries. Numerical results are provided to support the obtained
analytical results.
