  The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on
cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and
social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic
driving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution
is also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness
differences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate
the effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas. By studying
the mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable sensitive to
fluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging 'edge of neutral
evolution' that delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Our
results reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutral
regimes. In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory,
where defectors beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Our
studies demonstrate that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way to
partly resolve social dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable to
estimate the role of random drift in evolutionary dynamics.
