  We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games,
where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can
rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this
setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is an ex ante
notion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is
committed to it, but chooses it in such a way that it remains optimal even off
the equilibrium path. The second is an interim notion, where a player can
reconsider at each information set whether he is doing the "right" thing, and
if not, can change his strategy. The two notions agree in games of perfect
recall, but not in games of imperfect recall. Although the interim notion seems
more appealing, \fullv{Halpern and Pass [2011] argue that there are some deep
conceptual problems with it in standard games of imperfect recall. We show that
the conceptual problems largely disappear in the computational setting.
Moreover, in this setting, under natural assumptions, the two notions coincide.
