  This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and its
outcome. Specifically, we analyze two aspects. First, we investigate how
marital status (i.e., marriage with an only child, that with a non-only child
and remaining single) differs between only children and non-only children. This
analysis allows us to know whether people choose mates in a positive or a
negative assortative manner regarding only-child status, and to predict whether
only-child individuals benefit from marriage matching premiums or are subject
to penalties regarding partner attractiveness. Second, we measure the
premium/penalty by the size of the gap in partner's socio economic status (SES,
here, years of schooling) between only-child and non--only-child individuals.
The conventional economic theory and the observed marriage patterns of positive
assortative mating on only-child status predict that only-child individuals are
subject to a matching penalty in the marriage market, especially when their
partner is also an only child. Furthermore, our estimation confirms that among
especially women marrying an only-child husband, only children are penalized in
terms of 0.57-years-lower educational attainment on the part of the partner.
