  One of the practical applications of cooperative transferable utility games
involves determining the fee structure for users of a given facility, whose
construction or maintenance costs need to be recouped. In this context, certain
efficiency and equity criteria guide the considered solutions. This paper
analyzes how to allocate the fixed costs of a highway among its users through
tolls, considering that different classes of vehicles or travelers utilize the
service. For this purpose, we make use of generalized highway games with a
priori unions that represent distinct user groups, such as frequent travelers
or truckers, who, due to enhanced bargaining power, often secure reductions in
their fares in real-world scenarios. In particular, the Owen value, the
coalitional Tijs value, and a new value termed the Shapley-Tijs value, are
axiomatically characterized. Additionally, straightforward formulations for
calculating these values are provided. Finally, the proposed methodology is
applied to actual traffic data from the AP-9 highway in Spain.
