  Peter Naur is the leading critic of formalist computing because of his
extensive writings that disprove the now dominate characterization of human
thought as cognitive information processing. Naur criticizes the ideological
position that only discourse that adopts computer inspired forms are
acceptable. Lakatosian philosophy of the methodology of scientific research
programmes (MSRP) is added to Naur's studies to allow testing of computing
theories. After discussing Naur's criticism of mechanical cognitive information
processing, I show how to add MSRP competition to Naur's descriptive
philosophy. Next, Naur's claim that computing can not become scientific until
organizational issues involving ideological suppression of discussions of
computing and human thinking are solved is corroborated by institutional
suppression of my 1970s attempts to criticize structured programming (SP).
  Various problems in computing related philosophy are discussed. First, I
argue that my MSRP based degenerating research programme disproof of SP is
better than Naur's programming as a human activity, Demillo's social processes
and Fetzer's unprovable causal nature. Three areas for post ideologically based
computing study are discussed: computing as a path to rediscovering 19th
century conceptions of infinity, axiom of choice testing facilitated by
computing and relation to physical theory, and testing concrete complexity
methods based on efficiency proof analysis.
