  Fluid democracy is a voting paradigm that allows voters to choose between
directly voting and transitively delegating their votes to other voters. While
fluid democracy has been viewed as a system that can combine the best aspects
of direct and representative democracy, it can also result in situations where
few voters amass a large amount of influence. To analyze the impact of this
shortcoming, we consider what has been called an epistemic setting, where
voters decide on a binary issue for which there is a ground truth. Previous
work has shown that under certain assumptions on the delegation mechanism, the
concentration of power is so severe that fluid democracy is less likely to
identify the ground truth than direct voting. We examine different, arguably
more realistic, classes of mechanisms, and prove they behave well by ensuring
that (with high probability) there is a limit on concentration of power. Our
proofs demonstrate that delegations can be treated as stochastic processes and
that they can be compared to well-known processes from the literature -- such
as preferential attachment and multi-types branching process -- that are
sufficiently bounded for our purposes. Our results suggest that the concerns
raised about fluid democracy can be overcome, thereby bolstering the case for
this emerging paradigm.
