  The unprecedented growth of demand for charging electric vehicles (EVs) calls
for novel expansion solutions to today's charging networks. Riding on the wave
of the proliferation of sharing economy, Airbnb-like charger sharing markets
opens the opportunity to expand the existing charging networks without
requiring costly and time-consuming infrastructure investments, yet the
successful design of such markets relies on innovations at the interface
between game theory, mechanism design, and large scale optimization. In this
paper, we propose a price-based iterative double auction for charger sharing
markets where charger owners rent out their under-utilized chargers to the
charge-needing EV drivers. Charger owners and EV drivers form a two-sided
market which is cleared by a price-based double auction. Chargers' locations,
availability, and time unit costs as well as the EV drivers' time, distance
constraints, and preferences are considered in the allocation and scheduling
process. The goal is to compute social welfare maximizing allocations which
benefits both charger owners and EV drivers and, in turn, ensure the continuous
growth of the market. We prove that the proposed double auction is budget
balanced, individually rational, and that it is a weakly dominant strategy for
EV drivers and charger owners to truthfully report their charging time
constraints. In addition, results from our computation study show that the
double auction achieves on average 94% efficiency compared with the optimal
solutions and scales well to larger problem instances.
