  Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g.,
Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move
games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution
concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious
dominance). First, if a solution concept is additive, implementation in
sequential-move games is equivalent to implementation in simultaneous-move
games. Second, for any solution concept \r{ho} and any social choice function
f, we identify a canonical operator {\gamma}^{(\r{ho},f)}, which is defined on
primitives. We prove that, if \r{ho} is monotonic, f can be implemented by a
sequential-move game if and only if {\gamma}^{(\r{ho},f)} is achievable, which
translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions
defined on primitives. Most of the existing solution concepts are either
additive or monotonic.
