  In this paper, we study the efficiency of egoistic and altruistic strategies
within the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic
environment (the ViSE model) using two criteria: maximizing the average capital
increment and minimizing the number of bankrupt participants. The proposals are
generated stochastically; three families of the corresponding distributions are
considered: normal distributions, symmetrized Pareto distributions, and
Student's $t$-distributions. It is found that the "pit of losses" paradox
described earlier does not occur in the case of heavy-tailed distributions. The
egoistic strategy better protects agents from extinction in aggressive
environments than the altruistic ones, however, the efficiency of altruism is
higher in more favorable environments. A comparison of altruistic strategies
with each other shows that in aggressive environments, everyone should be
supported to minimize extinction, while under more favorable conditions, it is
more efficient to support the weakest participants. Studying the dynamics of
participants' capitals we identify situations where the two considered criteria
contradict each other. At the next stage of the study, combined voting
strategies and societies involving participants with selfish and altruistic
strategies will be explored.
