  I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting
quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of
other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum
mechanics represents what Bohr called a ``natural generalisation of the
ordinary causal description'' in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of
science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic
necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of physics requires that one
be able to ``schematise the observer'' within it is elevated in quantum
mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the
outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about
the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic
representation of an observer in the form of a `Boolean frame' -- the Boolean
algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable
representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach's
central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical
properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context,
rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents
independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the
concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein's complaint that the
orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental
methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able,
according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from
one another.
