  We consider peer review in a conference setting where there is typically an
overlap between the set of reviewers and the set of authors. This overlap can
incentivize strategic reviews to influence the final ranking of one's own
papers. In this work, we address this problem through the lens of social
choice, and present a theoretical framework for strategyproof and efficient
peer review. We first present and analyze an algorithm for reviewer-assignment
and aggregation that guarantees strategyproofness and a natural efficiency
property called unanimity, when the authorship graph satisfies a simple
property. Our algorithm is based on the so-called partitioning method, and can
be thought as a generalization of this method to conference peer review
settings. We then empirically show that the requisite property on the
authorship graph is indeed satisfied in the submission data from the ICLR
conference, and further demonstrate a simple trick to make the partitioning
method more practically appealing for conference peer review. Finally, we
complement our positive results with negative theoretical results where we
prove that under various ways of strengthening the requirements, it is
impossible for any algorithm to be strategyproof and efficient.
