  We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown
binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state
and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to
convince him that the state is good. We focus on truth-leaning equilibria (cf.
Hart et al. (2017)), where the sender discloses truthfully when doing so is
optimal, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. In
equilibrium, seemingly sub-optimal truncations are disclosed, and the
disclosure contains the longest truncation that yields the maximal difference
between the number of good and bad signals. We also study a general framework
of disclosure games which is compatible with large evidence spaces, a wide
range of disclosure technologies, and finitely many states. We characterize the
unique equilibrium value function of the sender and propose a method to
construct equilibria for a broad class of games.
