  Operational Technology (OT)-networks and -devices, i.e. all components used
in industrial environments, were not designed with security in mind. Efficiency
and ease of use were the most important design characteristics. However, due to
the digitisation of industry, an increasing number of devices and industrial
networks is opened up to public networks. This is beneficial for administration
and organisation of the industrial environments. However, it also increases the
attack surface, providing possible points of entry for an attacker. Originally,
breaking into production networks meant to break an Information Technology
(IT)-perimeter first, such as a public website, and then to move laterally to
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) to influence the production environment.
However, many OT-devices are connected directly to the Internet, which
drastically increases the threat of compromise, especially since OT-devices
contain several vulnerabilities. In this work, the presence of OT-devices in
the Internet is analysed from an attacker's perspective. Publicly available
tools, such as the search engine Shodan and vulnerability databases, are
employed to find commonly used OT-devices and map vulnerabilities to them.
These findings are grouped according to country of origin, manufacturer, and
number as well as severity of vulnerability. More than 13000 devices were
found, almost all contained at least one vulnerability. European and Northern
American countries are by far the most affected ones.
