  The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player
valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without
relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on
inferring agent values from data relies on the assumption that all participant
strategies are best responses of the observed play of other players, i.e. they
constitute a Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show how to perform inference
relying on a weaker assumption instead: assuming that players are using some
form of no-regret learning. Learning outcomes emerged in recent years as an
attractive alternative to Nash equilibrium in analyzing game outcomes, modeling
players who haven't reached a stable equilibrium, but rather use algorithmic
learning, aiming to learn the best way to play from previous observations. In
this paper we show how to infer values of players who use algorithmic learning
strategies. Such inference is an important first step before we move to testing
any learning theoretic behavioral model on auction data. We apply our
techniques to a dataset from Microsoft's sponsored search ad auction system.
