  In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the benefits of
having services provide auditable logs of data, as demonstrated by the
deployment of Certificate Transparency and the development of other
transparency projects. Most proposed systems, however, rely on a gossip
protocol by which users can be assured that they have the same view of the log,
but the few gossip protocols that do exist today are not suited for near-term
deployment. Furthermore, they assume the presence of global sets of auditors,
who must be blindly trusted to correctly perform their roles, in order to
achieve their stated transparency goals. In this paper, we address both of
these issues by proposing a gossip protocol and a verifiable registry, Mog, in
which users can perform their own auditing themselves. We prove the security of
our protocols and demonstrate via experimental evaluations that they are
performant in a variety of potential near-term deployments.
