  We consider a setting in which a single divisible good ("cake") needs to be
divided between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function
over pieces of the cake. For this setting, we address the problem of finding
divisions that maximize the social welfare, focusing on divisions where each
player needs to get one contiguous piece of the cake. We show that for both the
utilitarian and the egalitarian social welfare functions it is NP-hard to find
the optimal division. For the utilitarian welfare, we provide a constant factor
approximation algorithm, and prove that no FPTAS is possible unless P=NP. For
egalitarian welfare, we prove that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimum to
any factor smaller than 2. For the case where the number of players is small,
we provide an FPT (fixed parameter tractable) FPTAS for both the utilitarian
and the egalitarian welfare objectives.
