  In this paper, we consider an adversarial scenario where one agent seeks to
achieve an objective and its adversary seeks to learn the agent's intentions
and prevent the agent from achieving its objective. The agent has an incentive
to try to deceive the adversary about its intentions, while at the same time
working to achieve its objective. The primary contribution of this paper is to
introduce a mathematically rigorous framework for the notion of deception
within the context of optimal control. The central notion introduced in the
paper is that of a belief-induced reward: a reward dependent not only on the
agent's state and action, but also adversary's beliefs. Design of an optimal
deceptive strategy then becomes a question of optimal control design on the
product of the agent's state space and the adversary's belief space. The
proposed framework allows for deception to be defined in an arbitrary control
system endowed with a reward function, as well as with additional
specifications limiting the agent's control policy. In addition to defining
deception, we discuss design of optimally deceptive strategies under
uncertainties in agent's knowledge about the adversary's learning process. In
the latter part of the paper, we focus on a setting where the agent's behavior
is governed by a Markov decision process, and show that the design of optimally
deceptive strategies under lack of knowledge about the adversary naturally
reduces to previously discussed problems in control design on partially
observable or uncertain Markov decision processes. Finally, we present two
examples of deceptive strategies: a "cops and robbers" scenario and an example
where an agent may use camouflage while moving. We show that optimally
deceptive strategies in such examples follow the intuitive idea of how to
deceive an adversary in the above settings.
