  We investigate the voluntary disclosure decision of activist speculators
under uncertainty about information endowment (Dye 1985). In our model, a
speculator first uncovers initial evidence about the target firm and then seeks
additional information to help interpret the initial evidence. The speculator
takes a position in the firm's stock, then voluntarily discloses some or all of
their findings, and finally closes their position after the disclosure. We
present three main findings. First, the speculator will always disclose the
initial evidence, even though the market is uncertain about whether the
speculator possesses such evidence. Second, the speculator's disclosure
strategy of the additional information increases stock price volatility: they
disclose extreme news and withhold moderate news. Third, this distortion in
disclosure enables the speculator to engage in market manipulation, whereby
they take a short (long) position despite having good (bad) news.
  Keywords: activist speculators, short and distort, voluntary disclosure,
complex information, market manipulation
  JEL Classifications: D82, D83, G14, M41
