  The old Bohr-Einstein debate about the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM)
was held on an ontological ground. The completeness problem becomes more
tractable, however, if it is preliminarily discussed from a semantic viewpoint.
Indeed every physical theory adopts, explicitly or not, a truth theory for its
observative language, in terms of which the notions of semantic objectivity and
semantic completeness of the physical theory can be introduced and inquired. In
particular, standard QM adopts a verificationist theory of truth that implies
its semantic nonobjectivity; moreover, we show in this paper that standard QM
is semantically complete, which matches Bohr's thesis. On the other hand, one
of the authors has provided a Semantic Realism (or SR) interpretation of QM
that adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence for the observative
language of QM (which was previously mantained to be impossible); according to
this interpretation QM is semantically objective, yet incomplete, which matches
EPR's thesis. Thus, standard QM and the SR interpretation of QM come to
opposite conclusions. These can be reconciled within an integrationist
perspective that interpretes non-Tarskian theories of truth as theories of
metalinguistic concepts different from truth.
