  RowHammer stands out as a prominent example, potentially the pioneering one,
showcasing how a failure mechanism at the circuit level can give rise to a
significant and pervasive security vulnerability within systems. Prior research
has approached RowHammer attacks within a static threat model framework.
Nonetheless, it warrants consideration within a more nuanced and dynamic model.
This paper presents a low-overhead DRAM RowHammer vulnerability profiling
technique termed DRAM-Profiler, which utilizes innovative test vectors for
categorizing memory cells into distinct security levels. The proposed test
vectors intentionally weaken the spatial correlation between the aggressors and
victim rows before an attack for evaluation, thus aiding designers in
mitigating RowHammer vulnerabilities in the mapping phase. While there has been
no previous research showcasing the impact of such profiling to our knowledge,
our study methodically assesses 128 commercial DDR4 DRAM products. The results
uncover the significant variability among chips from different manufacturers in
the type and quantity of RowHammer attacks that can be exploited by
adversaries.
