  The integration of IoT-controllable devices in power systems (such as smart
electric vehicle charging stations, heat pumps, etc.), despite their apparent
benefits, raises novel cybersecurity concerns. These vulnerabilities in these
devices can be leveraged to launch load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can
potentially compromise power system safety. In this paper, we analyze the
impact of LAAs on the voltage profile of distribution systems. We derive
closed-form expressions to quantify the attack impact. Using the insights
derived from this analysis, we propose a method to mitigate LAAs based on
reconfiguring the distribution system as a reactive defense approach. We study
optimal defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game theory
approach that is robust to LAAs. The proposed solution takes the potential
errors in the attack localization into account. Our results show that attacks
launched on the deepest nodes in the distribution network result in the highest
detrimental impact on the grid voltage profile. Furthermore, the proposed
game-theoretic strategy successfully mitigates the effect of the attack while
ensuring minimum system reconfiguration.
