  Cryptography algorithm standards play a key role both to the practice of
information security and to cryptography theory research. Among them, the MQV
and HMQV protocols ((H)MQV, in short) are a family of (implicitly
authenticated) Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols that are widely
standardized and deployed. In this work, from some new perspectives and
approaches and under some new design rationales and insights, we develop a new
family of practical implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols, which enjoy
notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency and easy deployment. We
make detailed comparisons between our new DHKE protocols and (H)MQV, showing
that the newly developed protocols outperform HMQV in most aspects. Along the
way, guided by our new design rationales, we also identify a new vulnerability
(H)MQV, which brings some new perspectives (e.g., computational fairness) to
the literature.
