  Within the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model, we study social
dynamics determined by collective decisions in a society with an elite. The
model allows the analysis of the influence of participants' social attitudes,
such as the effects of selfishness, collectivism, lobbying, altruism, etc., on
the welfare of the society and its strata. Social dynamics is determined by the
change in capital over time, as well as the formation and dissociation of
groups. We show that the presence of a responsible elite, which partially cares
for its own benefit, stabilizes society and removes the `pit of damage'
paradox. Society's gain from having a responsible elite is comparable to that
from an altruistic group of the same size. If the responsible elite succumbs to
the temptation to dramatically increase the weight of the group component in
its combined voting strategy, then its income rises sharply, while the income
of the society decreases. The rest of the participants benefit from joining the
elite, while for the elite it is beneficial to maintain a moderate size. If, in
response to insufficient responsibility of the elite, an altruistic group
emerges that outnumbers the elite and becomes a new responsible elite, then
society again stabilizes, and monopoly of the previous elite (a `clique') ends.
If the responsible elite competing with the clique becomes a second clique,
then tough competition between the cliques is still preferable for society over
having a unique clique.
