  The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is used in several fields due to the
emergence of cooperation among selfish players. Here, we have considered a
one-dimensional lattice, where each cell represents a player, that can
cooperate or defect. This one-dimensional geometry allows us to retrieve the
results obtained for regular lattices and to keep track of the system
spatio-temporal evolution. Players play PD with their neighbors and update
their state using the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy. If the players receive a
positive payoff greater than an aspiration level, they keep their states and
switch them, otherwise. We obtain analitycally the critical temptation values,
we present the cluster patterns that emerge from the players local interaction
and we perform an exploration of paramater space. The numerical results are in
accordance to the critical temptation analitycal results, it confirms that the
Pavlovian strategy foment the cooperation among the players and avoid the
defection. The system also presented a new phase in the steady state, the
quasi-regular phase, where several players switch their states during round to
round, but the proportion of cooperators does not alter significantly.
