  The canonical formalism of general relativity affords a particularly
interesting characterisation of the infamous hole argument. It also provides a
natural formalism in which to relate the hole argument to the problem of time
in classical and quantum gravity. In this paper, we examine the connection
between these two much discussed problems in the foundations of spacetime
theory along two interrelated lines. First, from a formal perspective, we
consider the extent to which the two problems can and cannot be precisely and
distinctly characterised. Second, from a philosophical perspective, we consider
the implications of various responses to the problems, with a particular focus
upon the viability of a `deflationary' attitude to the
relationalist/substantivalist debate regarding the ontology of spacetime.
Conceptual and formal inadequacies within the representative language of
canonical gravity will be shown to be at the heart of both the canonical hole
argument and the problem of time. Interesting and fruitful work at the
interface of physics and philosophy relates to the challenge of resolving such
inadequacies.
