  If the Past Hypothesis underlies the arrows of time, what is the status of
the Past Hypothesis? In this paper, I examine the role of the Past Hypothesis
in the Boltzmannian account and defend the view that the Past Hypothesis is a
candidate fundamental law of nature. Such a view is known to be compatible with
Humeanism about laws, but as I argue it is also supported by a minimal
non-Humean "governing" view. Some worries arise from the non-dynamical and
time-dependent character of the Past Hypothesis as a boundary condition, the
intrinsic vagueness in its specification, and the nature of the initial
probability distribution. I show that these worries do not have much force, and
in any case they become less relevant in a new quantum framework for analyzing
time's arrows -- the Wentaculus. Hence, the view that the Past Hypothesis is a
candidate fundamental law should be more widely accepted than it is now.
