  We consider a sensor-receiver pair communicating over a wireless channel in
the presence of a jammer who may launch a denial-of-service attack. We
formulate a zero-sum game between a coordinator that jointly designs the
transmission and estimation policies, and the jammer. We consider two cases
depending on whether the jammer can sense the channel or not. We characterize a
saddle-point equilibrium for the class of symmetric and unimodal probability
density functions when the jammer cannot sense the channel. If the jammer can
sense if the channel is being used, we provide an efficient algorithm that
alternates between iterations of Projected Gradient Ascent and the
Convex-Concave Procedure to find approximate First-order Nash-Equilibria. Our
numerical results show that in certain cases the jammer may decide to launch a
denial-of-service attack with the goal of deceiving the receiver even when the
sensor decides not to transmit.
