  In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, application of a
repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others' packets, so that the
network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such
networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes do not depend on
them. This problem is sometimes known as {\em the curse of the boundary nodes}.
To overcome this problem, an approach based on coalition games is proposed, in
which the boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the backbone
nodes in the middle of the network. In return, the backbone nodes are willing
to forward the boundary nodes' packets. Here, the concept of core is used to
study the stability of the coalitions in such games. Then three types of
fairness are investigated, namely, min-max fairness using nucleolus, average
fairness using the Shapley function, and a newly proposed market fairness.
Based on the specific problem addressed in this paper, market fairness is a new
fairness concept involving fairness between multiple backbone nodes and
multiple boundary nodes. Finally, a protocol is designed using both repeated
games and coalition games. Simulation results show how boundary nodes and
backbone nodes form coalitions according to different fairness criteria. The
proposed protocol can improve the network connectivity by about 50%, compared
with pure repeated game schemes.
