  Despite its existing incentives for leecher cooperation, BitTorrent file
sharing fundamentally relies on the presence of seeder peers. Seeder peers
essentially operate outside the BitTorrent incentives, with two caveats: slow
downlinks lead to increased numbers of "temporary" seeders (who left their
console, but will terminate their seeder role when they return), and the
copyright liability boon that file segmentation offers for permanent seeders.
Using a simple epidemic model for a two-segment BitTorrent swarm, we focus on
the BitTorrent rule to disseminate the (locally) rarest segments first. With
our model, we show that the rarest-segment first rule minimizes transition time
to seeder (complete file acquisition) and equalizes the segment populations in
steady-state. We discuss how alternative dissemination rules may {\em
beneficially increase} file acquisition times causing leechers to remain in the
system longer (particularly as temporary seeders). The result is that leechers
are further enticed to cooperate. This eliminates the threat of extinction of
rare segments which is prevented by the needed presence of permanent seeders.
Our model allows us to study the corresponding trade-offs between performance
improvement, load on permanent seeders, and content availability, which we
leave for future work. Finally, interpreting the two-segment model as one
involving a rare segment and a "lumped" segment representing the rest, we study
a model that jointly considers control of rare segments and different uplinks
causing "choking," where high-uplink peers will not engage in certain
transactions with low-uplink peers.
