  This paper introduces Freestyle, a randomized and variable round version of
the ChaCha cipher. Freestyle uses the concept of hash based halting condition
where a decryption attempt with an incorrect key is likely to take longer time
to halt. This makes Freestyle resistant to key-guessing attacks i.e.
brute-force and dictionary based attacks. Freestyle demonstrates a novel
approach for ciphertext randomization by using random number of rounds for each
block, where the exact number of rounds are unknown to the receiver in advance.
Freestyle provides the possibility of generating $2^{128}$ different
ciphertexts for a given key, nonce, and message; thus resisting key and nonce
reuse attacks. Due to its inherent random behavior, Freestyle makes
cryptanalysis through known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-ciphertext
attacks difficult in practice. On the other hand, Freestyle has costlier cipher
initialization process, typically generates 3.125% larger ciphertext, and was
found to be 1.6 to 3.2 times slower than ChaCha20. Freestyle is suitable for
applications that favor ciphertext randomization and resistance to key-guessing
and key reuse attacks over performance and ciphertext size. Freestyle is ideal
for applications where ciphertext can be assumed to be in full control of an
adversary, and an offline key-guessing attack can be carried out.
