  Thomas Schelling developed an influential demographic model that illustrated
how, even with relatively mild assumptions on each individual's nearest
neighbor preferences, an integrated city would likely unravel to a segregated
city, even if all individuals prefer integration. Individuals in Schelling's
model cities are divided into two groups of equal number and each individual is
'happy' or 'unhappy' when the number of similar neighbors cross a simple
threshold. In this manuscript we consider natural extensions of Schelling's
original model to allow the two groups have different sizes and to allow
different notions of happiness of an individual. We observe that differences in
aggregation patterns of majority and minority groups are highly sensitive to
the happiness threshold; for low threshold, the differences are small, and when
the threshold is raised, striking new patterns emerge. We also observe that
when individuals strongly prefer to live integrated neighborhoods, the final
states exhibit a new tessellated-like structure.
