  This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and
shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar)
as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various
proposed solutions (the revenge of the Liar). This solution complements the
classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own
failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift
allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. Formally
speaking, the solution is a language with one meaning of symbols and two
valuations of the truth values of sentences. The primary valuation is a
classical valuation that is partial in the presence of the truth predicate. It
enables us to determine the classical truth value of a sentence or leads to the
failure of that determination. The language with the primary valuation is
precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued
semantics (LIFPSK3). The semantic shift that allows us to express the failure
of the primary valuation is precisely the classical closure of LIFPSK3: it
extends LIFPSK3 to a classical language in parts where LIFPSK3 is undetermined.
Thus, this article provides an argumentation, which has not been present in
contemporary debates so far, for the choice of LIFPSK3 and its classical
closure as the right model for the truth predicate. In the end, an erroneous
critique of Kripke-Feferman axiomatic theory of truth, which is present in
contemporary literature, is pointed out.
