  Consider a time-slotted, single-hop, wireless sensor network (WSN) consisting
of n correct devices and and t=f*n Byzantine devices where f>=0 is any
constant; that is, the Byzantine devices may outnumber the correct ones. There
exists a trusted sender Alice who wishes to deliver a message m over a single
channel to the correct devices. There also exists a malicious user Carol who
controls the t Byzantine devices and uses them to disrupt the communication
channel. For a constant k>=2, the correct and Byzantine devices each possess a
meager energy budget of O(n^{1/k}), Alice and Carol each possess a limited
budget of \tilde{O}(n^{1/k}), and sending or listening in a slot incurs unit
cost. This general setup captures the inherent challenges of guaranteeing
communication despite scarce resources and attacks on the network. Given this
Alice versus Carol scenario, we ask: Is communication of m feasible and, if so,
at what cost?
  We develop a protocol which, for an arbitrarily small constant \epsilon>0,
ensures that at least (1-\epsilon)n correct devices receive m with high
probability. Furthermore, if Carol's devices expend T energy jamming the
channel, then Alice and the correct devices each spend only
\tilde{O}(T^{1/(k+1)}). In other words, delaying the transmission of m forces a
jammer to rapidly deplete its energy supply and, consequently, cease attacks on
the network.
