  The advances of the Internet of Things (IoT) have had a fundamental impact
and influence in sharping our rich living experiences. However, since IoT
devices are usually resource-constrained, lightweight block ciphers have played
a major role in serving as a building block for secure IoT protocols. In CHES
2015, SIMECK, a family of block ciphers, was designed for resource-constrained
IoT devices. Since its publication, there have been many analyses on its
security. In this paper, under the one bit-flip model, we propose a new
efficient fault analysis attack on SIMECK ciphers. Compared to those previously
reported attacks, our attack can recover the full master key by injecting
faults into only a single round of all SIMECK family members. This property is
crucial, as it is infeasible for an attacker to inject faults into different
rounds of a SIMECK implementation on IoT devices in the real world.
Specifically, our attack is characterized by exercising a deep analysis of
differential trail between the correct and faulty immediate ciphertexts.
Extensive simulation evaluations are conducted, and the results demonstrate the
effectiveness and correctness of our proposed attack.
