  We consider the problem of detecting deliberate traffic discrimination on the
Internet. Given the complex nature of the Internet, detection of deliberate
discrimination is not easy to detect, and tools developed so far suffer from
various limitations. We study challenges in detecting the violations (focusing
on the HTTPS traffic) and discuss possible mitigation approaches. We focus on
`Wehe,' the most recent tool developed to detect net-neutrality violations.
Wehe hosts traffic from all services of interest in a common server and replays
them to mimic the behavior of the traffic from original servers. Despite Wehe's
vast utility and possible influences over policy decisions, its mechanisms are
not yet validated by others. In this work, we highlight critical weaknesses in
Wehe where its replay traffic is not being correctly classified as intended
services by the network middleboxes. We validate this observation using a
commercial traffic shaper. We propose a new method in which the SNI parameter
is set appropriately in the initial TLS handshake to overcome this weakness.
Using commercial traffic shapers, we validate that SNI makes the replay traffic
gets correctly classified as the intended traffic by the middleboxes. Our new
approach thus provides a more realistic method for detecting neutrality
violations of HTTPS traffic.
