  We consider a wireless services market where a set of operators compete for a
large common pool of users. The latter have a reservation utility of U0 units
or, equivalently, an alternative option to satisfy their communication needs.
The operators must satisfy these minimum requirements in order to attract the
users. We model the users decisions and interaction as an evolutionary game and
the competition among the operators as a non cooperative price game which is
proved to be a potential game. For each set of prices selected by the
operators, the evolutionary game attains a different stationary point. We show
that the outcome of both games depend on the reservation utility of the users
and the amount of spectrum W the operators have at their disposal. We express
the market welfare and the revenue of the operators as functions of these two
parameters. Accordingly, we consider the scenario where a regulating agency is
able to intervene and change the outcome of the market by tuning W and/or U0.
Different regulators may have different objectives and criteria according to
which they intervene. We analyze the various possible regulation methods and
discuss their requirements, implications and impact on the market.
