  The paper builds a general model of vote transfer systems on the basis of the
current Hungarian electoral rules. It combines single-seat districts and list
mandates with three possible compensation rule for 'wasted' votes in
constituencies: no compensation (direct vote transfer, DVT), compensation for
votes cast for losing party candidates (positive vote transfer, PVT) and
compensation for all votes that are not necessary to win the district (negative
vote transfer, NVT).
  The model is studied in the case of two parties. When the number of votes for
the majority party follows a uniform distribution in each district, DVT results
in the greatest expected seat share, however, application of PVT, and,
especially, NVT increases the probability of winning the election. The
trade-off between vote transfer formulas and the number of list mandates
reveals that the majority party should use an appropriately calibrated NVT
system if it focuses on these two variables.
