  Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network
operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next
generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known
model for resource sharing, the 'share-constrained proportional allocation'
mechanism, to realize network slicing. This mechanism enables tenants to reap
the performance benefits of sharing, while retaining the ability to customize
their own users' allocation. This results in a network slicing game in which
each tenant reacts to the user allocations of the other tenants so as to
maximize its own utility. We show that, under appropriate conditions, the game
associated with such strategic behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium. At the
Nash equilibrium, a tenant always achieves the same, or better, performance
than under a static partitioning of resources, hence providing the same level
of protection as such static partitioning. We further analyze the efficiency
and fairness of the resulting allocations, providing tight bounds for the price
of anarchy and envy-freeness. Our analysis and extensive simulation results
confirm that the mechanism provides a comprehensive practical solution to
realize network slicing. Our theoretical results also fill a gap in the
literature regarding the analysis of this resource allocation model under
strategic players.
