  The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source)
in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while
remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network
administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of which
nodes have been infected. We model the infection spreading and source
identification problem as a strategic game, where the infection source and the
network administrator are the two players. As the Jordan center estimator is a
minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in recent works, we
assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy
that can probe any nodes within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any
estimation strategy, we design a best-response infection strategy for the
source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response estimation
strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which a Nash
equilibrium of the strategic game exists. Simulations in both synthetic and
real-world networks demonstrate that our proposed infection strategy infects
more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the true source
node and the Jordan center source estimator.
