  Simple agent based exchange models are a commonplace in the study of wealth
distribution in an artificial economy. Generally, in a system that is composed
of many agents characterized by their wealth and risk-aversion factor, two
agents are selected sequentially and randomly to exchange wealth, allowing for
its redistribution. Here we analyze how the effect of a social protection
policy, which favors agents of lower wealth during the exchange, influences
stability and some relevant economic indicators of the system. On the other
hand, we study how periods of interruption of these policies produce, in the
short and long term, changes in the system. In most cases, a steady state is
reached, but with varying relaxation times. We conclude that regulations may
improve economic mobility and reduce inequality. Moreover, our results indicate
that the removal of social protection entails a high cost associated with the
hysteresis of the distribution of wealth. Economic inequalities increase during
a period without social protection, but also they remain high for an even
longer time and, in some extreme cases, inequality may be irreversible,
indicating that the withdrawal of social protection yields a high cost
associated with the hysteresis of the distribution of wealth.
