  The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule
is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally
susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous
approaches have been proposed to compare the manipulability of voting rules in
terms of the probability of manipulation, the domains on which manipulation is
possible, the complexity of finding such a manipulation, and others. In the
closely related field of matching, Pathak and Sonmez pioneered a notion of
manipulability based on case-by-case comparison of manipulable profiles. The
advantage of this approach is that it is independent of the underlying
statistical culture or the computational power of the agents, and it has proven
fruitful in the matching literature. In this paper, we extend the notion of
Pathak and Sonmez to voting, studying the families of $k$-approval and
truncated Borda scoring rules. We find that, with one exception, the notion
does not allow for a meaningful ordering of the manipulability of these rules.
