  Recent experiments (gedanken or otherwise) and theorems in quantum mechanics
(QM), such as new iterations on Wigner's friend and delayed choice, have led
many people to claim that QM is not compatible with determinate and
intersubjectively consistent experience (what some call absoluteness of
observed events), such as experiences of experimental outcomes. In the case of
delayed choice the tension is between our experience of free will and a
possible "superdeterminism" at work in QM. At the very least, some have
suggested that the only way to save absoluteness of observed events, is to give
up one or more of the following assumptions: free will, locality, or the
completeness of QM. Our goal in this paper is to provide a take on QM that
explains why there is and must always be determinate and intersubjectively
consistent experience about all experimental outcomes (absoluteness of observed
events). Our take accepts the completeness of the theory and requires no
invocation of relative states (e.g., outcomes being relative to branches,
conscious observers, etc.). And finally, this take requires no allegedly hybrid
models such as claims about "subjective collapse." We provide a take on QM that
yields a single world wherein all the observers (conscious or otherwise) agree
about determinate and definite outcomes, because those outcomes are in fact
determinate and definite. We provide a realist psi-epistemic take on QM that
saves the absoluteness of observed events and the completeness of QM, without
giving up free will or locality. We also show how our realist psi-epistemic
account eliminates the measurement problem and, coupled with our take on
neutral monism, also eliminates the hard problem of consciousness.
