  The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent
theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the
effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various
explicit and also implicit assumptions about the information of the contracting
parties. This paper relaxes key assumptions regarding the availability of
information included in the hidden-action model in order to study whether and,
if so, how fast the optimal sharing rule is achieved and how this is affected
by the various types of information employed in the principal-agent relation.
Our analysis particularly focuses on information about the environment and
about feasible actions for the agent. We follow an approach to transfer
closed-form mathematical models into agent-based computational models and show
that the extent of information about feasible options to carry out a task only
has an impact on performance if decision makers are well informed about the
environment, and that the decision whether to perform exploration or
exploitation when searching for new feasible options only affects performance
in specific situations. Having good information about the environment, on the
contrary, appears to be crucial in almost all situations.
