  A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with
different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed.
Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion
formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are
equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics
proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined,
such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can
not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different
inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the
others. In this way, we obtain the so-called ``Stubborn individuals and
Orators'' (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which
the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We
explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose
further generalizations that can be implemented.
