  The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief
change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against
putative counterexamples to the axiom--while agreeing that some of their
insight deserves to be preserved--and present additional recovery-like axioms
in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the
object of revisions. This provides a framework in which iterated revision
becomes possible and makes explicit the connection between iterated belief
change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem that
connects the semantic conditions that we impose on iterated revision and the
additional syntactical properties mentioned. We also show some interesting
similarities between our framework and that of Darwiche-Pearl. In particular,
we show that the intuitions underlying the controversial (C2) postulate are
captured by the recovery axiom and our recovery-like postulates (the latter can
be seen as weakenings of (C2).
