  In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretical models useful to
design marketing channels attribution mechanisms based on cooperative TU games
and bankruptcy problems, respectively. First, we analyse the Sum Game, a
coalitional game introduced by Morales (2016). We extend the ideas introduced
in Zhao et al. (2018) and Cano-Berlanga et al. (2017) to the case in which the
order and the repetition of channels on the paths to conversion are taken into
account. In all studied cases, the Shapley value is proposed as the attribution
mechanism. Second, a bankruptcy problem approach is proposed, and a similar
analysis is developed relying on the Constrained Equal Loss (CEL) and
Proportional (PROP) rules as attribution mechanisms. In particular, it is
relevant to note that the class of attribution bankruptcy problems is a proper
subclass of bankruptcy problems.
