  In this paper, we consider the coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty of
Walley, in which beliefs are represented through sets of probability
distributions, and we focus on the problem of modeling prior ignorance about a
categorical random variable. In this setting, it is a known result that a state
of prior ignorance is not compatible with learning. To overcome this problem,
another state of beliefs, called \emph{near-ignorance}, has been proposed.
Near-ignorance resembles ignorance very closely, by satisfying some principles
that can arguably be regarded as necessary in a state of ignorance, and allows
learning to take place. What this paper does, is to provide new and substantial
evidence that also near-ignorance cannot be really regarded as a way out of the
problem of starting statistical inference in conditions of very weak beliefs.
The key to this result is focusing on a setting characterized by a variable of
interest that is \emph{latent}. We argue that such a setting is by far the most
common case in practice, and we provide, for the case of categorical latent
variables (and general \emph{manifest} variables) a condition that, if
satisfied, prevents learning to take place under prior near-ignorance. This
condition is shown to be easily satisfied even in the most common statistical
problems. We regard these results as a strong form of evidence against the
possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real statistical
problems.
