  In the realm of algorithmic economics, voting systems are evaluated and
compared by examining the properties or axioms they satisfy. While this pursuit
has yielded valuable insights, it has also led to seminal impossibility results
such as Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems, which pose
challenges in designing ideal voting systems. Enter the domain of quantum
computing: recent advancements have introduced the concept of quantum voting
systems, which have many potential applications including in security and
blockchain. Building on recent works that bypass Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
using quantum voting systems, our research extends Quantum Condorcet Voting
(QCV) to counter the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem in a quantum
setting. To show this, we introduce a quantum-specific notion of truthfulness,
extend ideas like incentive compatibility and the purpose of onto to the
quantum domain, and introduce new tools to map social welfare functions to
social choice functions in this domain.
