  In this paper we revisit some major orthodoxies which lie at the heart of the
bitcoin crypto currency and its numerous clones. In particular we look at The
Longest Chain Rule, the monetary supply policies and the exact mechanisms which
implement them. We claim that these built-in properties are not as brilliant as
they are sometimes claimed. A closer examination reveals that they are closer
to being... engineering mistakes which other crypto currencies have copied
rather blindly. More precisely we show that the capacity of current crypto
currencies to resist double spending attacks is poor and most current crypto
currencies are highly vulnerable. Satoshi did not implement a timestamp for
bitcoin transactions and the bitcoin software does not attempt to monitor
double spending events. As a result major attacks involving hundreds of
millions of dollars can occur and would not even be recorded. Hundreds of
millions have been invested to pay for ASIC hashing infrastructure yet
insufficient attention was paid to network neutrality and to insure that the
protection layer it promises is effective and cannot be abused. In this paper
we develop a theory of Programmed Self-Destruction of crypto currencies. We
observe that most crypto currencies have mandated abrupt and sudden
transitions. These affect their hash rate and therefore their protection
against double spending attacks which we do not limit the to the notion of 51%
attacks which is highly misleading. In addition we show that smaller bitcoin
competitors are substantially more vulnerable. In addition to small hash rate,
many bitcoin competitors mandate incredibly important adjustments in miner
reward. We exhibit examples of 'alt-coins' which validate our theory and for
which the process of programmed decline and rapid self-destruction has clearly
already started.
