  Causality is omnipresent in scientists' verbalisations of their
understanding, even though we have no formal consensual scientific definition
for it. In Automata Networks, it suffices to say that automata "influence" one
another to introduce a notion of causality. One might argue that this merely is
an incidental side effect of preferring statements expressed in natural
languages to mathematical formulae. The discussion of this paper shows that if
this is the case, then it is worth considering the effects of those preferences
on the contents of the statements we make and the formulae we derive. And if it
is not the case, that causality is a mere incidental side effect of our
preferences of formulation, then causality must be worth some scientific
attention per se. In any case, the paper illustrates how the innate sense of
causality we have may be made deliberate and formal use of without having to
pin down the elusive notion of causality to anything fixed and formal that
wouldn't do justice to the wide range of ways it is involved in science-making.
