  A group of $n$ users want to run a distributed protocol $\pi$ over a network
where communication occurs via private point-to-point channels. Unfortunately,
an adversary, who knows $\pi$, is able to maliciously flip bits on the
channels. Can we efficiently simulate $\pi$ in the presence of such an
adversary? We show that this is possible, even when $L$, the number of bits
sent in $\pi$, and $T$, the number of bits flipped by the adversary are not
known in advance. In particular, we show how to create a robust version of
$\pi$ that 1) fails with probability at most $\delta$, for any $\delta>0$; and
2) sends $\tilde{O}(L + T)$ bits, where the $\tilde{O}$ notation hides a $\log
(nL/ \delta)$ term multiplying $L$. Additionally, we show how to improve this
result when the average message size $\alpha$ is not constant. In particular,
we give an algorithm that sends $O( L (1 + (1/\alpha) \log (n L/\delta) + T)$
bits. This algorithm is adaptive in that it does not require a priori knowledge
of $\alpha$. We note that if $\alpha$ is $\Omega\left( \log (n L/\delta)
\right)$, then this improved algorithm sends only $O(L+T)$ bits, and is
therefore within a constant factor of optimal.
