  How subjective experience (i.e., consciousness) arises out of objective
material processes has been called the hard problem. The neuroscience of
consciousness has set out to find the sufficient conditions for consciousness
and theoretical and empirical endeavours have placed a particular focus on the
cortex and subcortex, whilst discounting the cerebellum. However, when looking
at neuroimaging research, it becomes clear there is substantial evidence that
cerebellar, cortical and subcortical functions are correlated with
consciousness. Neurostimulation evidence suggests that alterations in any part
of the brain may provoke alterations in experience, but the most extreme
changes are provoked via the subcortex. I then evaluate neuropsychological
evidence and find abnormality in any part of the brain may provoke changes in
experience; but only damage to the oldest regions seem to completely obliterate
experience. Finally, I review congenital and experimental decorticate cases,
and find that behavioral evidence of experience is largely compatible with the
absence of the cortex. The evidence, taken together, indicates that the body,
subcortex and environment are sufficient for behaviours that suggest bastic
experiences. I then emphasise both the importance of the individual's
developmental trajectory and the interdependencies between different neural
systems.
