  We study a well-known communication abstraction called Byzantine Reliable
Broadcast (BRB). This abstraction is central in the design and implementation
of fault-tolerant distributed systems, as many fault-tolerant distributed
applications require communication with provable guarantees on message
deliveries. Our study focuses on fault-tolerant implementations for
message-passing systems that are prone to process-failures, such as crashes and
malicious behavior.
  At PODC 1983, Bracha and Toueg, in short, BT, solved the BRB problem. BT has
optimal resilience since it can deal with t < n/3 Byzantine processes, where n
is the number of processes. The present work aims at the design of an even more
robust solution than BT by expanding its fault-model with self-stabilization, a
vigorous notion of fault-tolerance. In addition to tolerating Byzantine and
communication failures, self-stabilizing systems can recover after the
occurrence of arbitrary transient-faults. These faults represent any violation
of the assumptions according to which the system was designed to operate
(provided that the algorithm code remains intact).
  We propose, to the best of our knowledge, the first self-stabilizing
Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) solution for repeated BRB in signature-free
message-passing systems (that follows BT's problem specifications). Our
contribution includes a self-stabilizing variation on a BT that solves a
single-instance BRB for asynchronous systems. We also consider the problem of
recycling instances of single-instance BRB. Our self-stabilizing BFT recycling
for time-free systems facilitates the concurrent handling of a predefined
number of BRB invocations and, by this way, can serve as the basis for
self-stabilizing BFT consensus.
