  In the setting of conference peer review, the conference aims to accept
high-quality papers and reject low-quality papers based on noisy review scores.
A recent work proposes the isotonic mechanism, which can elicit the ranking of
paper qualities from an author with multiple submissions to help improve the
conference's decisions. However, the isotonic mechanism relies on the
assumption that the author's utility is both an increasing and a convex
function with respect to the review score, which is often violated in peer
review settings (e.g.~when authors aim to maximize the number of accepted
papers). In this paper, we propose a sequential review mechanism that can
truthfully elicit the ranking information from authors while only assuming the
agent's utility is increasing with respect to the true quality of her accepted
papers. The key idea is to review the papers of an author in a sequence based
on the provided ranking and conditioning the review of the next paper on the
review scores of the previous papers. Advantages of the sequential review
mechanism include 1) eliciting truthful ranking information in a more realistic
setting than prior work; 2) improving the quality of accepted papers, reducing
the reviewing workload and increasing the average quality of papers being
reviewed; 3) incentivizing authors to write fewer papers of higher quality.
