  Virtually every connection to an Internet service is preceded by a DNS lookup
which is performed without any traffic-level protection, thus enabling
manipulation, redirection, surveillance, and censorship. To address these
issues, large organizations such as Google and Cloudflare are deploying
recently standardized protocols that encrypt DNS traffic between end users and
recursive resolvers such as DNS-over-TLS (DoT) and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH). In
this paper, we examine whether encrypting DNS traffic can protect users from
traffic analysis-based monitoring and censoring. We propose a novel feature set
to perform the attacks, as those used to attack HTTPS or Tor traffic are not
suitable for DNS' characteristics. We show that traffic analysis enables the
identification of domains with high accuracy in closed and open world settings,
using 124 times less data than attacks on HTTPS flows. We find that factors
such as location, resolver, platform, or client do mitigate the attacks
performance but they are far from completely stopping them. Our results
indicate that DNS-based censorship is still possible on encrypted DNS traffic.
In fact, we demonstrate that the standardized padding schemes are not
effective. Yet, Tor -- which does not effectively mitigate traffic analysis
attacks on web traffic -- is a good defense against DoH traffic analysis.
