  This work considers reasons for and implications of discarding the assumption
of transitivity, which (transitivity) is the fundamental postulate in the
utility theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, the adiabatic accessibility
principle of Caratheodory and most other theories related to preferences or
competition. The examples of intransitivity are drawn from different fields,
such as law, biology, game theory, economics and competitive evolutionary
dynamic. This work is intended as a common platform that allows us to discuss
intransitivity in the context of different disciplines. The basic concepts and
terms that are needed for consistent treatment of intransitivity in various
applications are presented and analysed in a unified manner. The analysis
points out conditions that necessitate appearance of intransitivity, such as
multiplicity of preference criteria and imperfect (i.e. approximate)
discrimination of different cases. The present work observes that with
increasing presence and strength of intransitivity, thermodynamics gradually
fades away leaving space for more general kinetic considerations.
Intransitivity in competitive systems is linked to complex phenomena that would
be difficult or impossible to explain on the basis of transitive assumptions.
Human preferences that seem irrational from the perspective of the conventional
utility theory, become perfectly logical in the intransitive and relativistic
framework suggested here. The example of competitive simulations for the
risk/benefit dilemma demonstrates the significance of intransitivity in cyclic
behaviour and abrupt changes in the system. The evolutionary intransitivity
parameter, which is introduced in the Appendix, is a general measure of
intransitivity, which is particularly useful in evolving competitive systems.
Quantum preferences are also considered in the Appendix.
