  In his constructive and well-informed commentary, Andrei Khrennikov
acknowledges a privileged status of classical probability theory with respect
to statistical analysis. He also sees advantages offered by the
Contextuality-by-Default theory, notably, that it `demystifies quantum
mechanics by highlighting the role of contextuality,' and that it can detect
and measure contextuality in inconsistently connected systems. He argues,
however, that classical probability theory may have difficulties in describing
empirical phenomena if they are described entirely in terms of observable
events. We disagree: contexts in which random variables are recorded are as
observable as the variables' values. Khrennikov also argues that the
Contextuality-by-Default theory suffers the problem of non-uniqueness of
couplings. We disagree that this is a problem: couplings are all possible ways
of imposing counterfactual joint distributions on random variables that de
facto are not jointly distributed. The uniqueness of modeling experiments by
means of quantum formalisms brought up by Khrennikov is achieved for the price
of additional, substantive assumptions. This is consistent with our view of
quantum theory as a special-purpose generator of classical probabilities.
Khrennikov raises the issue of `mental signaling,' by which he means
inconsistent connectedness in behavioral systems. Our position is that it is as
inherent to behavioral systems as their stochasticity.
