  We study a crowdsourcing problem where the platform aims to incentivize
distributed workers to provide high quality and truthful solutions without the
ability to verify the solutions. While most prior work assumes that the
platform and workers have symmetric information, we study an asymmetric
information scenario where the platform has informational advantages.
Specifically, the platform knows more information regarding worker average
solution accuracy, and can strategically reveal such information to workers.
Workers will utilize the announced information to determine the likelihood that
they obtain a reward if exerting effort on the task. We study two types of
workers, naive workers who fully trust the announcement, and strategic workers
who update prior belief based on the announcement. For naive workers, we show
that the platform should always announce a high average accuracy to maximize
its payoff. However, this is not always optimal for strategic workers, as it
may reduce the credibility of the platform announcement and hence reduce the
platform payoff. Interestingly, the platform may have an incentive to even
announce an average accuracy lower than the actual value when facing strategic
workers. Another counterintuitive result is that the platform payoff may
decrease in the number of high accuracy workers.
