  This study investigates the role of the client isolation technology Public
Secure Packet Forwarding (PSPF) in defending 802.11 wireless (Wi-Fi) clients,
connected to a public wireless access point, from Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP)cache poisoning attacks, or ARP spoofing. Exploitation of wireless attack
vectors such as these have been on the rise and some have made national and
international news. Although client isolation technologies are common place in
most wireless access points, they are rarely enabled by default. Since an
average user generally has a limited understanding of IP networking concepts,
it is rarely enabled during access point configurations. Isolating wireless
clients from one another on unencrypted wireless networks is a simple and
potentially effective way of protection. The purpose of this research is to
determine if a commonly available and easily implementable wireless client
isolation security technology, such as PSPF, is an effective method for
defending wireless clients against attacks.
