  Internet voting will probably be one of the most significant achievements of
the future information society. It will have an enormous impact on the election
process making it fast, reliable and inexpensive. Nonetheless, so far remote
voting is considered to be very difficult, as one has to take into account
susceptibility of the voter's PC to various cyber-attacks. As a result, most
the research effort is put into developing protocols and machines for poll-site
electronic voting. Although these solutions yield promising results, they
cannot be directly adopted to Internet voting because of secure platform
problem. However, the cryptographic components they utilize may be very useful.
This paper presents a scheme based on combination of mixnets and homomorphic
encryption borrowed from robust poll-site voting, along with techniques
recommended for remote voting -- code sheets and test ballots. The protocol
tries to minimize the trust put in voter's PC by making the voter responsible
for manual encryption of his vote. To achieve this, the voter obtains a paper
ballot that allows him to scramble the vote by performing simple operations
(lookup in a table). Creation of paper ballots, as well as decryption of votes,
is performed by a group of cooperating trusted servers. As a result, the scheme
is characterized by strong asymmetry -- all computations are carried out on the
server side. In consequence it does not require any additional hardware on the
voter's side, and offers distributed trust, receipt-freeness and verifiability.
