  In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends
not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on
strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces
hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs. We study the impacts of strategic ambiguity
in global games and demonstrate the distinct effects of ambiguous-quality and
low-quality information. Ambiguous-quality information makes more players
choose an action yielding a constant payoff, whereas (unambiguous) low-quality
information makes more players choose an ex-ante best response to the uniform
belief over the opponents' actions. If the ex-ante best-response action yields
a constant payoff, sufficiently ambiguous-quality information induces a unique
equilibrium, whereas sufficiently low-quality information generates multiple
equilibria. In applications to financial crises, we show that news of more
ambiguous quality triggers a debt rollover crisis, whereas news of less
ambiguous quality triggers a currency crisis.
