  This paper presents a general strategy to recover a block cipher secret key
in the cold boot attack setting. More precisely, we propose a key-recovery
method that combines key enumeration algorithms and Grover's quantum algorithm
to recover a block cipher secret key after an attacker has procured a noisy
version of it via a cold boot attack. We also show how to implement the quantum
component of our algorithm for several block ciphers such as AES, PRESENT and
GIFT, and LowMC. Additionally, since evaluating the third-round post-quantum
candidates of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
post-quantum standardization process against different attack vectors is of
great importance for their overall assessment, we show the feasibility of
performing our hybrid attack on Picnic, a post-quantum signature algorithm
being an alternate candidate in the NIST post-quantum standardization
competition. According to our results, our method may recover the Picnic
private key for all Picnic parameter sets, tolerating up to $40\%$ of noise for
some of the parameter sets. Furthermore, we provide a detailed analysis of our
method by giving the cost of its resources, its running time, and its success
rate for various enumerations.
