  Lattice-based cryptography is one of the leading proposals for post-quantum
cryptography. The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is arguably the most important
problem for the cryptanalysis of lattice-based cryptography, and many
lattice-based schemes have security claims based on its hardness. The best
quantum algorithm for the SVP is due to Laarhoven [Laa16 PhD] and runs in
(heuristic) time $2^{0.2653d + o(d)}$. In this article, we present an
improvement over Laarhoven's result and present an algorithm that has a
(heuristic) running time of $2^{0.2570 d + o(d)}$ where $d$ is the lattice
dimension. We also present time-memory trade-offs where we quantify the amount
of quantum memory and quantum random access memory of our algorithm. The core
idea is to replace Grover's algorithm used in [Laa16 PhD] in a key part of the
sieving algorithm by a quantum random walk in which we add a layer of local
sensitive filtering.
