  Ladyman and Ross (LR) argue that quantum objects are not individuals (or are
at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea to ground their
metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational
structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of
quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory (BT), according to which particles do
have definite trajectories at all times. However, LR interpret the research by
Brown {\em et al.} as implying that "raw stuff" or {\em haecceities} are needed
for the individuality of particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle
metaphysics. In this paper we note that Brown {\em et al.}'s research does not
imply that {\em haecceities} are needed. Thus BT remains as a genuine option
for those who seek to understand quantum particles as individuals. However, we
go on to discuss some problems with BT which led Bohm and Hiley to modify it.
This modified version underlines that, due to features such as
context-dependence and non-locality, Bohmian particles have a very limited
autonomy in situations where quantum effects are non-negligible. So while BT
restores the possibility of quantum individuals, it also underlines the primacy
of the whole over the autonomy of the parts. The later sections of the paper
also examine the Bohm theory in the general mathematical context of symplectic
geometry. This provides yet another way of understanding the subtle, holistic
and dynamic nature of Bohmian individuals. We finally briefly consider Bohm's
other main line of research, the "implicate order", which is in some ways
similar to LR's structural realism.
