  A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which
arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process or exchange
information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography
can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general
secure multi-party computations can be built.
  The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems,
which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for
oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems
apply even to protocols which take relativistic signalling constraints into
account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols
computationally secure against quantum attack. I describe here a method for
building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other
mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin tossing protocol. No
security proof is attempted, but I sketch reasons why these protocols might
resist quantum computational attack.
