  Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor networks are
vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. Both frauds aim at passing an
authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance between the prover
and the verifier. To cope these security issues, distance-bounding protocols
have been designed. However, none of the current proposals simultaneously
resists to these two frauds without requiring additional memory and
computation. The situation is even worse considering that just a few
distance-bounding protocols are able to deal with the inherent background noise
on the communication channels. This article introduces a noise-resilient
distance-bounding protocol that resists to both mafia and distance frauds. The
security of the protocol is analyzed with respect to these two frauds in both
scenarios, namely noisy and noiseless channels. Analytical expressions for the
adversary's success probabilities are provided, and are illustrated by
experimental results. The analysis, performed in an already existing framework
for fairness reasons, demonstrates the undeniable advantage of the introduced
lightweight design over the previous proposals.
