  Except for the traditional threat that candidates may want to cheat, exams
have historically not been seen as a serious security problem. That threat is
routinely thwarted by having invigilators ensure that candidates do not
misbehave during testing. However, as recent exam scandals confirm, also
invigilators and exam authorities may have interest in frauds, hence they may
pose security threats as well. Moreover, new security issues arise from the
recent use of computers, which can facilitate the exam experience for example
by allowing candidates to register from home. Thus, exams must be designed with
the care normally devoted to security protocols.
  This dissertation studies exam protocol security and provides an in-depth
understanding that can be also useful for the study of the security of similar
systems, such as personnel selections, project reviews, and conference
management systems. It introduces an unambiguous terminology that leads to the
specification of a taxonomy of various exam types, depending on the level of
computer assistance. It then establishes a theoretical framework for the formal
analysis of exams. The framework defines several authentication, privacy, and
verifiability requirements that modern exams should meet, and enables the
security of exam protocols to be studied. Using the framework, we formally
analyse traditional, computer-assisted, and Internet-based exam protocols. We
find some security issues and propose modifications to partially achieve the
desired requirements.
  This dissertation also designs three novel exam protocols that guarantee a
wide set of security requirements.
  Finally, this dissertation looks at exams as carried out through modern
browsers. We advance a formal analysis of requirements that are not only
logically conditioned on the technology but also on user actions. We conclude
with best-practice recommendations to browser vendors.
