  In the early $20^{th}$ century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost
tax on the usage of a public good induces a socially efficient level of use as
an equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a "Pigouvian" tax may also induce other,
socially inefficient, equilibria. We observe that this social inefficiency may
be unbounded, and study whether alternative tax structures may lead to milder
losses in the worst case, i.e. to a lower price of anarchy. We show that no tax
structure leads to bounded losses in the worst case. However, we do find a tax
scheme that has a lower price of anarchy than the Pigouvian tax, obtaining
tight lower and upper bounds in terms of a crucial parameter that we identify.
We generalize our results to various scenarios that each offers an alternative
to the use of a public road by private cars, such as ride sharing, or using a
bus or a train.
