  Liquid democracy is a hybrid direct-representative decision making process
that provides each voter with the option of either voting directly or to
delegate their vote to another voter, i.e., to a representative of their
choice. One of the proposed advantages of liquid democracy is that, in general,
it is assumed that voters will delegate their vote to others that are better
informed, which leads to more informed and better decisions. Considering an
audience from various knowledge domains, we provide an accessible high-level
analysis of a prominent critique of liquid democracy by Caragiannis and Micha.
Caragiannis and Micha's critique contains three central topics: 1. Analysis
using their $\alpha$-delegation model, which does not assume delegation to the
more informed; 2. Novel delegation network structures where it is advantageous
to delegate to the less informed rather than the more informed; and 3. Due to
NP hardness, the implied impracticability of a social network obtaining an
optimal delegation structure. We show that in the real world, Caragiannis and
Micha's critique of liquid democracy has little or no relevance. Respectively,
our critique is based on: 1. The identification of incorrect
$\alpha$-delegation model assumptions; 2. A lack of novel delegation structures
and their effect in a real-world implementation of liquid democracy, which
would be guaranteed with constraints that sensibly distribute voting power; and
3. The irrelevance of an optimal delegation structure if the correct result is
guaranteed regardless. We conclude that Caragiannis and Micha's critique has no
significant negative relevance to the proposition of liquid democracy.
