  We study the learning dynamics of agents who adapt to heterogeneous comfort
levels in the context of an El-Farol type game, and show that even an
infinitesimal degree of heterogeneity in the resource levels leads to a
significant reduction of the fluctuations of the collective action, and removes
the phase transition observed in models with homogeneous comfort level. Our
analysis is based on dynamical methods of disordered systems theory, in
particular on a generating functional approach, and confirmed by numerical
experiments. We also report on simulations of a system in which the comfort
levels fluctuate in time, and point out crucial differences between models in
which the comfort levels of the agents fluctuate collectively and individually
respectively. Finally we comment on a possible characterisation of El-Farol and
Minority Games according to the presence or absence of ergodicity-breaking
phase transitions at infinite integrated response.
