  In this paper I present a mathematically novel approach to the Prisoner's
Dilemma. I do so by first defining recursively a distinct action type, what I
call 'universalizing', that I add to the original prisoner's dilemma. Such a
modified version of the Prisoner's Dilemma provides a very food productive
model of the choices that would be made in a prisoner's dilemma by agents who
trust each other. As I show, players playing a universalized prisoner's dilemma
get as far out of the dilemma as is mathematically possible. I then add the
concept of risk to the universalized version of prisoner's dilemma. Doing so
provide a model that is sensitive to the trustworthiness of the agents in any
prisoner's dilemma. As I show, with no risk, agents get out of the prisoners
dilemma; and with maximal risk, the succumb to it. succumb to it.
