  The aim of this paper is to explore the potential of Game Theory (GT) in
extracting rules of behaviour for emerging Cognitive Radio environments. We
revisit the commons approach to unlicensed spectrum and try to show that a
commons can be basically regulated from the inside out. GT simulations of CR
interactions reveal the emergence of certain equilibria mirroring
behaviours/trends?. Once these ?trends identified, norms may be expressed and
then embedded into machines (CRs). Internalized norms may thus become the
alternative to external enforcement of rules. We call these emerging norms
techno-social norms (TSNs). TSNs could eventually become a means of regulating
the use of unlicensed spectrum and making open spectrum access feasible. Open
spectrum access scenarios are considered and analysis is performed based on
reformulations of two game theoretical models: Cournot and Bertrand. The
standard oligopoly models are reformulated in terms of radio resource access in
unlicensed bands. In order to capture the large variety of CR interaction
situations, several GT equilibrium concepts are considered: Nash, Pareto,
Berge-Zhukovskii, and Lorenz. In order to capture the heterogeneity of CR
interactions, the standard GT model is enriched allowing players to be biased
toward different types of equilibrium (or rationality). An evolutionary
game-equilibrium detection method is used. Numerical simulations bring relevant
insights on the problem of autonomy vs. regulation in emerging CR environments.
Relying on extensive GT simulations, some rules of behaviour - to be expanded
into techno-social norms - may be derived.
