  Despite the tremendous successes of science in providing knowledge and
technologies, the Replication Crisis has highlighted that scientific
institutions have much room for improvement. Peer-review is one target of
criticism and suggested reforms. However, despite numerous controversies peer
review systems, plus the obvious complexity of the incentives affecting the
decisions of authors and reviewers, there is very little systematic and
strategic analysis of peer-review systems. In this paper, we begin to address
this feature of the peer-review literature by applying the tools of game
theory. We use simulations to develop an evolutionary model based around a game
played by authors and reviewers, before exploring some of its tendencies. In
particular, we examine the relative impact of double-blind peer-review and open
review on incentivising reviewer effort under a variety of parameters. We also
compare (a) the impact of one review system versus another with (b) other
alterations, such as higher costs of reviewing. We find that is no reliable
difference between peer-review systems in our model. Furthermore, under some
conditions, higher payoffs for good reviewing can lead to less (rather than
more) author effort under open review. Finally, compared to the other
parameters that we vary, it is the exogenous utility of author effort that
makes an important and reliable difference in our model, which raises the
possibility that peer-review might not be an important target for institutional
reforms.
