  It was shown in [WST08] that cryptographic primitives can be implemented
based on the assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. In this work
we analyze a protocol for the universal task of oblivious transfer that can be
implemented using quantum-key-distribution (QKD) hardware in the practical
setting where honest participants are unable to perform noise-free operations.
We derive trade-offs between the amount of storage noise, the amount of noise
in the operations performed by the honest participants and the security of
oblivious transfer which are greatly improved compared to the results in
[WST08]. As an example, we show that for the case of depolarizing noise in
storage we can obtain secure oblivious transfer as long as the quantum
bit-error rate of the channel does not exceed 11% and the noise on the channel
is strictly less than the quantum storage noise. This is optimal for the
protocol considered. Finally, we show that our analysis easily carries over to
quantum protocols for secure identification.
