  Institutions and investors are constantly faced with the challenge of
appropriately distributing endowments. No budget is limitless and optimising
overall spending without sacrificing positive outcomes has been approached and
resolved using several heuristics. To date, prior works have failed to consider
how to encourage fairness in a population where social diversity is ubiquitous,
and in which investors can only partially observe the population. Herein, by
incorporating social diversity in the Ultimatum game through heterogeneous
graphs, we investigate the effects of several interference mechanisms which
assume incomplete information and flexible standards of fairness. We quantify
the role of diversity and show how it reduces the need for information
gathering, allowing us to relax a strict, costly interference process.
Furthermore, we find that the influence of certain individuals, expressed by
different network centrality measures, can be exploited to further reduce
spending if minimal fairness requirements are lowered. Our results indicate
that diversity changes and opens up novel mechanisms available to institutions
wishing to promote fairness. Overall, our analysis provides novel insights to
guide institutional policies in socially diverse complex systems.
