  Traditionally, to be a realist about something means believing in the
independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific
realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities
postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does
that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms about what exists, scientific
realism can be understood as involving the adoption of an ontology that is
scientifically informed. But according to some philosophers, the realistic
attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been
understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by
science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits
to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of
providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the
Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best
of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the
wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible
with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical
method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are
incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum
mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our
focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics
and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid
error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a
productive relationship between science and metaphysics.
