  In this paper, we present a simplified framework to represent competition,
coordination and bargaining in fisheries when they operate under financial and
technological constraints. Competition within constraints leads to a particular
type of mathematical game in which the strategy choice by one player changes
strategy set of the other. By studying the equilibria and bargaining space of
this game when players maximize either profit or fishing capacity, we highlight
that differences in financial constraints among players leads to a tougher
play, with a reduced bargaining space as the least constrained player can
readily exclude another from the competition. The exacerbating effects of
constraints on competition are even stronger when players maximize capacity. We
discuss the significance of our results for global ocean governance in a
current context characterized by financialization and technological
development. We suggest that in order to maximize the chances of fruitful
negociations and aim towards a fair sharing of sea resources, it would be
helpful to focus on leveling current differences in the constraints faced
between competing fishing systems by supporting local financial systems and
technological control, before implementing sophisticated economic tools.
