  The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric
information available to the team members during the play, which makes the
equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms
available in the literature work with implicit representations of the strategy
space and mainly resort to Linear Programming and column generation techniques
to enlarge incrementally the strategy space. Such representations prevent the
adoption of standard tools such as abstraction generation, game solving, and
subgame solving, which demonstrated to be crucial when solving huge, real-world
two-player zero-sum games. Differently from these works, we answer the question
of whether there is any suitable game representation enabling the adoption of
those tools. In particular, our algorithms convert a sequential team game with
adversaries to a classical two-player zero-sum game. In this converted game,
the team is transformed into a single coordinator player who only knows
information common to the whole team and prescribes to the players an action
for any possible private state. Interestingly, we show that our game is more
expressive than the original extensive-form game as any state/action
abstraction of the extensive-form game can be captured by our representation,
while the reverse does not hold. Due to the NP-hard nature of the problem, the
resulting Public Team game may be exponentially larger than the original one.
To limit this explosion, we provide three algorithms, each returning an
information-lossless abstraction that dramatically reduces the size of the
tree. These abstractions can be produced without generating the original game
tree. Finally, we show the effectiveness of the proposed approach by presenting
experimental results on Kuhn and Leduc Poker games, obtained by applying
state-of-art algorithms for two-player zero-sum games on the converted games
