  {\it Ellsberg thought experiments} and empirical confirmation of Ellsberg
preferences pose serious challenges to {\it subjective expected utility theory}
(SEUT). We have recently elaborated a quantum-theoretic framework for human
decisions under uncertainty which satisfactorily copes with the Ellsberg
paradox and other puzzles of SEUT. We apply here the quantum-theoretic
framework to the {\it Ellsberg two-urn example}, showing that the paradox can
be explained by assuming a state change of the conceptual entity that is the
object of the decision ({\it decision-making}, or {\it DM}, {\it entity}) and
representing subjective probabilities by quantum probabilities. We also model
the empirical data we collected in a DM test on human participants within the
theoretic framework above. The obtained results are relevant, as they provide a
line to model real life, e.g., financial and medical, decisions that show the
same empirical patterns as the two-urn experiment.
