  A commonly shared component of antivirus suites is a local database of
malware signatures that is used during the static analysis process. Despite
possible encryption, heuristic obfuscation, or attempts to hide this database
from malicious end-users (or competitors), a currently avoidable eventuality
for offline static analysis is a need to use the contents of the database in
local computation to detect malicious files. This work serves as a preliminary
exploration of the use of concolic execution as a general-case technique for
reverse-engineering malware signature database contents: indeed, the existence
of a practical technique to such an end would certainly require the use of true
(in the sense of provable security) obfuscation in order for malware databases
to remain private against capable attackers--a major obstacle given the
scarcity of truly practical secure obfuscation constructions. Our work,
however, only shows that existing tools (at the time of this report) for
concolic execution have severe limitations which prevent the realization of
this strategy.
