  We consider {\em bidding games}, a class of two-player zero-sum {\em graph
games}. The game proceeds as follows. Both players have bounded budgets. A
token is placed on a vertex of a graph, in each turn the players simultaneously
submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token, where we break bidding ties
in favor of Player 1. Player 1 wins the game iff the token visits a designated
target vertex. We consider, for the first time, {\em poorman discrete-bidding}
in which the granularity of the bids is restricted and the higher bid is paid
to the bank. Previous work either did not impose granularity restrictions or
considered {\em Richman} bidding (bids are paid to the opponent). While the
latter mechanisms are technically more accessible, the former is more appealing
from a practical standpoint. Our study focuses on {\em threshold budgets},
which is the necessary and sufficient initial budget required for Player 1 to
ensure winning against a given Player 2 budget. We first show existence of
thresholds. In DAGs, we show that threshold budgets can be approximated with
error bounds by thresholds under continuous-bidding and that they exhibit a
periodic behavior. We identify closed-form solutions in special cases. We
implement and experiment with an algorithm to find threshold budgets.
