  This paper examines an adverse selection environment where a sender with
private information (high or low ability) tries to convince a receiver of their
high ability. Without commitment or costly signaling, market failure can occur.
Certification intermediaries reduce these frictions by enabling signaling
through hard information. This paper focuses on a monopolistic certifier and
its impact on equilibrium welfare and certificate design. Key findings show
that the certifier often provides minimal information, pooling senders of
varying abilities and leaving low rents for high-type senders, which typically
disadvantages the receiver. However, when precise information is demanded, the
certifier screens the sender perfectly, benefiting the receiver. Thus, the
monopolistic intermediary has an ambiguous effect on market efficiency. The
results emphasize the importance of high certification standards, which drive
low-ability senders out of the market. Conditions for such equilibria are
characterized, showing how simple threshold strategies by the receiver induce
first-best outcomes. Additionally, the relationship between the characteristics
of offered certificates and welfare is identified.
