  In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in
every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing
cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group
formation of players could be more sophisticated because not all players are
attractive enough for others to participate in a joint venture. What if only
those players can initiate a group formation and establish a game who are
successful enough to the neighbors? To elaborate this idea we employ a modified
protocol and demonstrate that a carefully chosen threshold to establish joint
venture could efficiently improve the cooperation level even if the synergy
factor would suggest a full defector state otherwise. The microscopic mechanism
which is responsible for this effect is based on the asymmetric consequences of
competing strategies: while the success of a cooperator provides a long-time
well-being for the neighborhood, the temporary advantage of defection cannot be
maintained if the protocol is based on the success of leaders.
