  Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants
success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of
evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy
even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other
players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based
win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma
game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by
dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their
nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to
change. We find that the proposed win-stay-lose-learn rule promotes the
evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the
initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of
cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly cooperative final
state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our
conclusions, we also present results obtained by means of the pair
approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of
related win-stay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of
resolving the prisoner's dilemma.
