  This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users:
leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system
information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the
leaders play and choose their actions based on their information about the
system and the followers choose their actions myopically according to their
observations of the aggregate impact of other users. However, obtaining the
exact value of these parameters is not practical in communication systems. To
study the effect of uncertainty and preserve the players' utilities in these
conditions, we introduce a robust equilibrium for Stackelberg games. In this
framework, the leaders' information and the followers' observations are
uncertain parameters, and the leaders and the followers choose their actions by
solving the worst-case robust optimizations. We show that the followers'
uncertain parameters always increase the leaders' utilities and decrease the
followers' utilities. Conversely, the leaders' uncertain information reduces
the leaders' utilities and increases the followers' utilities. We illustrate
our theoretical results with the numerical results obtained based on the power
control games in the interference channels.
