  Many historians of the calculus deny significant continuity between
infinitesimal calculus of the 17th century and 20th century developments such
as Robinson's theory. Robinson's hyperreals, while providing a consistent
theory of infinitesimals, require the resources of modern logic; thus many
commentators are comfortable denying a historical continuity. A notable
exception is Robinson himself, whose identification with the Leibnizian
tradition inspired Lakatos, Laugwitz, and others to consider the history of the
infinitesimal in a more favorable light. Inspite of his Leibnizian sympathies,
Robinson regards Berkeley's criticisms of the infinitesimal calculus as aptly
demonstrating the inconsistency of reasoning with historical infinitesimal
magnitudes. We argue that Robinson, among others, overestimates the force of
Berkeley's criticisms, by underestimating the mathematical and philosophical
resources available to Leibniz. Leibniz's infinitesimals are fictions, not
logical fictions, as Ishiguro proposed, but rather pure fictions, like
imaginaries, which are not eliminable by some syncategorematic paraphrase. We
argue that Leibniz's defense of infinitesimals is more firmly grounded than
Berkeley's criticism thereof. We show, moreover, that Leibniz's system for
differential calculus was free of logical fallacies. Our argument strengthens
the conception of modern infinitesimals as a development of Leibniz's strategy
of relating inassignable to assignable quantities by means of his
transcendental law of homogeneity.
