  We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations
in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an
eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be
the timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses
using the appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob's setup
have different efficiencies, the security of quantum key distribution can be
compromised. Specifically, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some
value of the control parameter gets large enough (roughly 15:1 or larger), Eve
can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate
lower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the
detector sensitivity mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two
different detectors are presented, and protection measures against this attack
are discussed.
