  Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first
part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are
created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or
(stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative games, and
importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a non-cooperative
Stackelberg game, they can be mapped to a Stackelberg game. I.e., the game
designer is the leader who is totally rational and honest, and the followers
are mapped to the players of the designed game. If now the game designer, or
"the leader" in the Stackelberg context, adopts a pure strategy, we postulate
the following second part following from axiomatic observation of ultimate game
leadership, where empirical insight leads to the second part of this postulate.
Importantly, implementing a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, with a very
honest and rational leader results in social optimality for all players
(followers), assuming pure strategy across all followers and leader, and that
the leader is totally rational, honest, and is able to achieve a minimum amount
of competency in leading this game, with any finite number of iterations of
leading this finite game.
