  We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and
clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts
established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients
that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every facility
location has a set of attracted clients and each client has a set of shopping
locations and a weight that corresponds to her spending capacity. Facility
agents selfishly select a location for opening their facility to maximize the
attracted total spending capacity, whereas clients strategically decide how to
distribute their spending capacity among the opened facilities in their
shopping range. We focus on a natural client behavior similar to classical load
balancing: our selfish clients aim for a distribution that minimizes their
maximum waiting times for getting serviced, where a facility's waiting time
corresponds to its total attracted client weight.
  We show that subgame perfect equilibria exist and give almost tight constant
bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability, which even hold for
a broader class of games with arbitrary client behavior. Since facilities and
clients influence each other, it is crucial for the facilities to anticipate
the selfish clients' behavior when selecting their location. For this, we
provide an efficient algorithm that also implies an efficient check for
equilibrium. Finally, we show that computing a socially optimal facility
placement is NP-hard and that this result holds for all feasible client weight
distributions.
