  We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to
the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be
made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting,
a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the
popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our
more general setting, and introduce three novel relaxations ---
\emph{proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic
proportional share} --- that are also interesting in the classic goods
allocation setting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare solution, which is
known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic setting,
satisfies or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also
provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding allocations
satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality.
