  Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity from trusted public certificates (e.g.,
national identity cards and/or ePassports; eSIM) is introduced here to
permissionless blockchains in order to remove the inefficiencies of
Sybil-resistant mechanisms such as Proof-of-Work (i.e., high energy and
environmental costs) and Proof-of-Stake (i.e., capital hoarding and lower
transaction volume). The proposed solution effectively limits the number of
mining nodes a single individual would be able to run while keeping membership
open to everyone, circumventing the impossibility of full decentralization and
the blockchain scalability trilemma when instantiated on a blockchain with a
consensus protocol based on the cryptographic random selection of nodes.
Resistance to collusion is also considered.
  Solving one of the most pressing problems in blockchains, a zk-PoI
cryptocurrency is proved to have the following advantageous properties:
  - an incentive-compatible protocol for the issuing of cryptocurrency rewards
based on a unique Nash equilibrium
  - strict domination of mining over all other PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies, thus
the zk-PoI cryptocurrency becoming the preferred choice by miners is proved to
be a Nash equilibrium and the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
  - PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies are condemned to pay the Price of Crypto-Anarchy,
redeemed by the optimal efficiency of zk-PoI as it implements the social
optimum
  - the circulation of a zk-PoI cryptocurrency Pareto dominates other PoW/PoS
cryptocurrencies
  - the network effects arising from the social networks inherent to national
identity cards and ePassports dominate PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies
  - the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence of a unique
equilibrium where it dominates other forms of payment
