  Approval-preferential voting is problematical since it combines two different
kinds of information that could by themselves lead to different choices. This
article analyses the problem and studies a new proposal to deal with it. The
existing methods are overviewed with special attention to several desirable
properties that are not always met. Particular emphasis is made on certain
rather unknown views of Condorcet about this subject. The proposed procedure
definitely aims for a choice in the spirit of approval voting. However, it
still makes use of the preferential information so as to improve the approval
one. This is done by means of the path scores, in common to Schulze's method
for preferential voting. The resulting method, that we call path-revised
approval choice, is shown to enjoy several good properties. In particular, it
fulfils in a well-defined sense Condorcet's latest view that a surely good
option should prevail over a doubtfully best one.
