  In sensor networks, nodes cooperatively work to collect data and forward it
to the final destination. Many protocols have been proposed in the literature
to provide routing and secure routing for ad hoc and sensor networks, but these
protocols either very expensive to be used in very resource-limited
environments such as sensor networks, or suffer from the lack of one or more
security guarantees and vulnerable to attacks such as wormhole, Sinkhole,
Sybil, blackhole, selective forwarding, rushing, and fabricating attacks. In
this paper we propose a secure lightweight routing protocol called SRPS. SRPS
uses symmetric cryptographic entities within the capabilities of the sensors,
supports intermediate node authentication of the routing information in
addition to end-to-end authentication, provides secure multiple disjoint paths,
and thwarts all the known attacks against routing infrastructure against
Byzantine cooperative attack model. We analyze the security guarantees of SRPS
and use Ns-2 simulations to show the effectiveness of SRPS in counter-measuring
known attacks against the routing infrastructure. Overhead cost analysis is
conducted to prove the lightweight-ness of SRPS
