  We explore the emergence of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game
theory. First we introduce the cooperation problem in a novel way that we
believe it have important consequences in how problem is addressed. Then we
present a minimal model for the emergence of cooperation in growing systems
with cultural reproduction where topological structure and the evolution of
strategies are decoupled instead a coevolution dynamic. We show that when
system grows, there exists cultural reproduction and a nonzero probability that
individuals take cooperation as first strategy; there are conditions to build
up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural
selection intensity. When the system is small cooperation is unstable but
become stable as soon as the system reaches an enough well defined topological
structure which size mainly depends on the intensity of natural selection. In
this way, we reduce the emergence of cooperation problem for systems with
cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure, what we
call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as
cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the
condition required to cooperation prevails into the systems are drastically
reduced compared to those found in statics networks.
