  Following the 2016 US elections Twitter launched their Information Operations
(IO) hub where they archive account activity connected to state linked
information operations. In June 2020, Twitter took down and released a set of
accounts linked to Turkey's ruling political party (AKP). We investigate these
accounts in the aftermath of the takedown to explore whether AKP-linked
operations are ongoing and to understand the strategies they use to remain
resilient to disruption. We collect live accounts that appear to be part of the
same network, ~30% of which have been suspended by Twitter since our
collection. We create a BERT-based classifier that shows similarity between
these two networks, develop a taxonomy to categorize these accounts, find
direct sequel accounts between the Turkish takedown and the live accounts, and
find evidence that Turkish IO actors deliberately construct their network to
withstand large-scale shutdown by utilizing explicit and implicit signals of
coordination. We compare our findings from the Turkish operation to Russian and
Chinese IO on Twitter and find that Turkey's IO utilizes a unique group
structure to remain resilient. Our work highlights the fundamental imbalance
between IO actors quickly and easily creating free accounts and the social
media platforms spending significant resources on detection and removal, and
contributes novel findings about Turkish IO on Twitter.
