  Sybil attacks, in which fake or duplicate identities (\emph{sybils})
infiltrate an online community, pose a serious threat to such communities, as
they might tilt community-wide decisions in their favor. While the extensive
research on sybil identification may help keep the fraction of sybils in such
communities low, it cannot however ensure their complete eradication. Thus, our
goal is to enhance social choice theory with effective group decision
mechanisms for communities with bounded sybil penetration. Inspired by
Reality-Aware Social Choice, we use the status quo as the anchor of \emph{sybil
resilience}, characterized by \emph{sybil safety} -- the inability of sybils to
change the status quo against the will of the genuine agents, and \emph{sybil
liveness} -- the ability of the genuine agents to change the status quo against
the will of the sybils.
  We consider the social choice settings of deciding on a single proposal, on
multiple proposals, and on updating a parameter. For each, we present social
choice rules that are sybil-safe and, under certain conditions, satisfy
sybil-liveness.
