  In Schelling's segregation model agents of two ethnic groups reside in a
regular grid and aim to live in a neighborhood that matches the minimum desired
fraction of members of the same ethnicity. The model shows that observed
segregation can be the emergent result of people interacting under spatial
constraints in pursuit of such homophily preferences. Even mild homophily
preferences can generate high degrees of segregation at the macro level. In
modern, ethnically diverse societies people might not define similarity based
on ethnicity. Instead, shared tolerance towards ethnic diversity might play a
more significant role, impacting segregation and integration patterns in
societies. Bearing this consideration in mind, we extend Schelling's model by
dividing the population of agents into value-oriented and ethnicity-oriented
agents. Using parameter sweeping, we explore the consequences that the mutual
adaptation of these two types of agents has on ethnic segregation, value
segregation, and population density in the neighborhood. Such consequences are
examined for equally sized ethnic groups and for majority-minority conditions.
The introduction of value-oriented agents reduces total ethnic segregation when
compared to Schelling's original model, but the new phenomenon of value
segregation appears to be more pronounced than ethnic segregation. Furthermore,
due to cross-contagion, stronger ethnic homophily preferences lead not only to
greater ethnic segregation but also to more value segregation. Stronger
value-orientation of the tolerant agents similarly leads to increased ethnic
segregation of the ethnicity-oriented agents. Also, value-oriented agents tend
to live in neighborhoods with more agents than ethnicity-oriented agents. In
majority-minority settings, such effects appear to be more drastic for the
minority than the majority ethnicity.
