  Cybercrime markets support the development and diffusion of new attack
technologies, vulnerability exploits, and malware. Whereas the revenue streams
of cyber attackers have been studied multiple times in the literature, no
quantitative account currently exists on the economics of attack acquisition
and deployment. Yet, this understanding is critical to characterize the
production of (traded) exploits, the economy that drives it, and its effects on
the overall attack scenario. In this paper we provide an empirical
investigation of the economics of vulnerability exploitation, and the effects
of market factors on likelihood of exploit. Our data is collected
first-handedly from a prominent Russian cybercrime market where the trading of
the most active attack tools reported by the security industry happens. Our
findings reveal that exploits in the underground are priced similarly or above
vulnerabilities in legitimate bug-hunting programs, and that the refresh cycle
of exploits is slower than currently often assumed. On the other hand,
cybercriminals are becoming faster at introducing selected vulnerabilities, and
the market is in clear expansion both in terms of players, traded exploits, and
exploit pricing. We then evaluate the effects of these market variables on
likelihood of attack realization, and find strong evidence of the correlation
between market activity and exploit deployment. We discuss implications on
vulnerability metrics, economics, and exploit measurement.
