  In this work, we analyze the circumstances under which social influence
operations are likely to succeed. These circumstances include the selection of
Confederate agents to execute intentional perturbations and the selection of
Perturbation strategies. We use Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) as a simulation
technique to observe the effect of intentional stance perturbations on
scale-free networks. We develop a co-evolutionary social influence model to
interrogate the tradeoff between perturbing stance and maintaining influence
when these variables are linked through homophily. In our experiments, we
observe that stances in a network will converge in sufficient simulation
timesteps, influential agents are the best Confederates and the optimal
Perturbation strategy involves the cascade of local ego networks. Finally, our
experimental results support the theory of tipping points and are in line with
empirical findings suggesting that 20-25% of agents need to be Confederates
before a change in consensus can be achieved.
