  An experiment is described that confirms the security of a well-studied class
of cryptographic protocols (Dolev-Yao intruder model) can be verified by
two-way nondeterministic pushdown automata (2NPDA). A nondeterministic pushdown
program checks whether the intersection of a regular language (the protocol to
verify) and a given Dyck language containing all canceling words is empty. If
it is not, an intruder can reveal secret messages sent between trusted users.
The verification is guaranteed to terminate in cubic time at most on a
2NPDA-simulator. The interpretive approach used in this experiment simplifies
the verification, by separating the nondeterministic pushdown logic and program
control, and makes it more predictable. We describe the interpretive approach
and the known transformational solutions, and show they share interesting
features. Also noteworthy is how abstract results from automata theory can
solve practical problems by programming language means.
