  Much of the strength of quantum cryptography may be attributed to the
no-cloning property of quantum information. We construct three new
cryptographic primitives whose security is based on uncloneability, and that
have in common that their security can be established via a novel
monogamy-of-entanglement (MoE) property:
  - We define interactive uncloneable encryption, a version of the uncloneable
encryption defined by Broadbent and Lord [TQC 2020] where the receiver must
partake in an interaction with the sender in order to decrypt the ciphertext.
We provide a one-round construction that is secure in the information-theoretic
setting, in the sense that no other receiver may learn the message even if she
eavesdrops on all the interactions.
  - We provide a way to make a bit string commitment scheme uncloneable. The
scheme is augmented with a check step chronologically in between the commit and
open steps, where an honest sender verifies that the commitment may not be
opened by an eavesdropper, even if the receiver is malicious.
  - We construct a receiver-independent quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme,
which strengthens the notion of one-sided device independent QKD of Tomamichel,
Fehr, Kaniewski, and Wehner (TFKW) [NJP 2013] by also permitting the receiver's
classical device to be untrusted. Explicitly, the sender remains fully trusted
while only the receiver's communication is trusted.
  To show security, we prove an extension of the MoE property of coset states
introduced by Coladangelo, Liu, Liu, and Zhandry [Crypto 2021]. In our stronger
version, the player Charlie also receives Bob's answer prior to making his
guess, simulating a party who eavesdrops on an interaction. To use this
property, we express it as a new type of entropic uncertainty relation which
arises naturally from the structure of the underlying MoE game.
