  This study explores the intricacies of waiting games, a novel dynamic that
emerged with Ethereum's transition to a Proof-of-Stake (PoS)-based block
proposer selection protocol. Within this PoS framework, validators acquire a
distinct monopoly position during their assigned slots, given that block
proposal rights are set deterministically, contrasting with Proof-of-Work (PoW)
protocols. Consequently, validators have the power to delay block proposals,
stepping outside the honest validator specs, optimizing potential returns
through MEV payments. Nonetheless, this strategic behaviour introduces the risk
of orphaning if attestors fail to observe and vote on the block timely. Our
quantitative analysis of this waiting phenomenon and its associated risks
reveals an opportunity for enhanced MEV extraction, exceeding standard protocol
rewards, and providing sufficient incentives for validators to play the game.
Notably, our findings indicate that delayed proposals do not always result in
orphaning and orphaned blocks are not consistently proposed later than
non-orphaned ones. To further examine consensus stability under varying network
conditions, we adopt an agent-based simulation model tailored for PoS-Ethereum,
illustrating that consensus disruption will not be observed unless significant
delay strategies are adopted. Ultimately, this research offers valuable
insights into the advent of waiting games on Ethereum, providing a
comprehensive understanding of trade-offs and potential profits for validators
within the blockchain ecosystem.
