  Advances in quantum computing make Shor's algorithm for factorising numbers
ever more tractable. This threatens the security of any cryptographic system
which often relies on the difficulty of factorisation. It also threatens
methods based on discrete logarithms, such as with the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange method. For a cryptographic system to remain secure against a quantum
adversary, we need to build methods based on a hard mathematical problem, which
are not susceptible to Shor's algorithm and which create Post Quantum
Cryptography (PQC). While high-powered computing devices may be able to run
these new methods, we need to investigate how well these methods run on limited
powered devices. This paper outlines an evaluation framework for PQC within
constrained devices, and contributes to the area by providing benchmarks of the
front-running algorithms on a popular single-board low-power device.
