  Cloud computing is a paradigm that has the potential to transform and
revolutionalize the next generation IT industry by making software available to
end-users as a service. A cloud, also commonly known as a cloud network,
typically comprises of hardware (network of servers) and a collection of
softwares that is made available to end-users in a pay-as-you-go manner.
Multiple public cloud providers (ex., Amazon) co-existing in a cloud computing
market provide similar services (software as a service) to its clients, both in
terms of the nature of an application, as well as in quality of service (QoS)
provision. The decision of whether a cloud hosts (or finds it profitable to
host) a service in the long-term would depend jointly on the price it sets, the
QoS guarantees it provides to its customers, and the satisfaction of the
advertised guarantees. In this paper, we devise and analyze three
inter-organizational economic models relevant to cloud networks. We formulate
our problems as non co-operative price and QoS games between multiple cloud
providers existing in a cloud market. We prove that a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (NE) exists in two of the three models. Our analysis paves the path
for each cloud provider to 1) know what prices and QoS level to set for
end-users of a given service type, such that the provider could exist in the
cloud market, and 2) practically and dynamically provision appropriate capacity
for satisfying advertised QoS guarantees.
