  The Egalitarian Allocation (EA) is a well-known profit sharing method for
cooperative games which attempts to distribute profit among participants in a
most equal way while respecting the individual contributions to the obtained
profit. Despite having desirable properties from the viewpoint of game theory
like being contained in the core, the EA is in general hard to compute. Another
well-known method is given by Vickrey Payments (VP). Again, the VP have
desirable properties like coalitional rationality, the VP do not fulfill budget
balance in general and, thus, are not contained in the core in general. One
attempt to overcome this shortcoming is to scale down the VP. This can be done
by a unique scaling factor, or, by individual scaling factors. Now, the
individual scaled Vickrey Payments (ISV) are computed by maximizing the scaling
factors lexicographically. In this paper we show that the ISV payments are in
fact identical to a weighted EA, thus exhibiting an interesting connection
between EA and VP. With this, we conclude the uniqueness of the ISV payments
and provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing a special weighted EA.
