  This paper proposes a doubled-sided auction mechanism with price
discrimination for social welfare (SW) maximization in the electricity and
heating market. In this mechanism, energy service providers (ESPs) submit
offers and load aggregators (LAs) submit bids to an energy trading center (ETC)
to maximize their utility; in turn, the selfless ETC as an auctioneer leverages
dis-criminatory price weights to regulate the behaviors of ESPs and LAs, which
combines the individual benefits of each stakeholder with the overall social
welfare to achieve the global optimum. Nash games are employed to describe the
interactions between players with the same market role. Theoretically, we first
prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium; then, considering
the requirement of game players to preserve privacy, a distributed algorithm
based on the alternating direction method of multipliers is developed to
implement distributed bidding and analytical target cascading algorithm is
applied to reach the balance of demand and supply. We validated the proposed
mechanism using case studies on a city-level distribution system. The results
indicated that the achieved SW improved by 4%-15% compared with other
mechanisms, and also verified the effectiveness of the distributed algorithm.
