  Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) provided a categorization of quantum ontological
models classifying them as $\psi$-ontic or $\psi$-epistemic if the quantum
state describes respectively either a physical reality or mere observers'
knowledge. Moreover, they claimed that Einstein - who was a supporter of the
statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics - endorsed an epistemic view of
$\psi$. In this essay we critically assess such a classification and some of
its consequences by proposing a two-fold argumentation. Firstly, we show that
Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization implicitly assumes that a complete
description of a quantum system (its ontic state, $\lambda$) only concerns
single, individual systems instantiating absolute, intrinsic properties.
Secondly, we argue that such assumptions conflict with some current
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which employ different ontic states as a
complete description of quantum systems. In particular, we will show that,
since in the statistical interpretation ontic states describe ensembles rather
than individuals, such a view cannot be considered psi-epistemic. As a
consequence, the authors misinterpreted Einstein's view concerning the nature
of the quantum state. Next, we will focus on Relationalist Quantum Mechanics
and Perspectival Quantum Mechanics, which in virtue of their relational and
perspectival metaphysics employ ontic states lambda dealing with relational
properties. We conclude that Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization is too
narrow and entails an inadequate classification of the mentioned
interpretations of quantum theory. Hence, any satisfactory classification of
quantum ontological models ought to take into account the variations of
$\lambda$ across different interpretations of quantum mechanics.
