  We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional
stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural
and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition
equilibrium. We assume that players in a strategic game are embedded in a
social network, and there are coordination constraints that restrict the
potential coalitions that can jointly deviate in the game to the set of cliques
in the social network. In addition, players act in a "considerate" fashion to
ignore potentially profitable (group) deviations if the change in their
strategy may cause a decrease of utility to their neighbors.
  We study the properties of such considerate equilibria in application to the
class of resource selection games (RSG). Our main result proves existence of a
considerate equilibrium in all symmetric RSG with strictly increasing delays,
for any social network among the players. The existence proof is constructive
and yields an efficient algorithm. In fact, the computed considerate
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for the standard RSG showing that there
exists a state that is stable against selfish and considerate behavior
simultaneously. In addition, we show results on convergence of considerate
dynamics.
