  A probabilistic framework is developed that gives a unifying perspective on
both the classical and the quantum games. We suggest exploiting peculiar
probabilities involved in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments to
construct quantum games. In our framework a game attains classical
interpretation when joint probabilities are factorizable and a quantum game
corresponds when these probabilities cannot be factorized. We analyze how
non-factorizability changes Nash equilibria in two-player games while
considering the games of Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. In this
framework we find that for the game of Prisoner's Dilemma even non-factorizable
EPR joint probabilities cannot be helpful to escape from the classical outcome
of the game. For a particular version of the Chicken game, however, we find
that the two non-factorizable sets of joint probabilities, that maximally
violates the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations, indeed
result in new Nash equilibria.
