  We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing
preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is
largely motivated by emerging blockchain governance systems, which include
voters with different weights and a massive number of community generated
proposals. In such scenarios, it is natural to expect that voters will have
incomplete preferences, as they may only be able to evaluate or be confident
about a very small proportion of the alternatives. As a result, the election
outcome may be significantly affected, leading to suboptimal decisions. Our
central inquiry revolves around whether delegation of ballots to proxies
possessing greater expertise or a more comprehensive understanding of the
voters' preferences can lead to outcomes with higher legitimacy and enhanced
voters' satisfaction in elections where voters submit incomplete preferences.
To explore its aspects, we introduce the following model: potential proxies
advertise their ballots over multiple issues, and each voter either delegates
to a seemingly attractive proxy or casts a ballot directly. We identify
necessary and sufficient conditions that could lead to a socially better
outcome by leveraging the participation of proxies. We accompany our
theoretical findings with experiments on instances derived from real datasets.
Overall, our results enhance the understanding of the power of delegation
towards improving election outcomes.
