  Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection
model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the
viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted
locus. The model draws attention to the role of viability selections of
different types to examine the stable nature of polymorphic equilibrium. A
bridge between population genetics and evolutionary game theory has been built
up by applying the concept of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. In
addition to pointing out the influences of male and female segregation ratios
on selection, configuration structure reveals some noted results, e.g.,
Hardy-Weinberg frequencies hold in replicator dynamics, occurrence of faster
evolution at the maximized variance fitness, existence of mixed Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy ($ESS$) in asymmetric games, the tending evolution to follow
not only a $1:1$ sex ratio but also a $1:1$ different alleles ratio at
particular gene locus. Through construction of replicator dynamics in the group
selection framework, our selection model introduces a redefining bases of game
theory to incorporate non-random mating where a mating parameter associated
with population structure is dependent on the social structure. Also, the model
exposes the fact that the number of polymorphic equilibria will depend on the
algebraic expression of population structure.
