  Governments, regulatory bodies, and manufacturers are proposing plans to
accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), with the goal of reducing
the impact of greenhouse gases and pollutants from internal combustion engines
on human health and climate change. In this context, the paper considers a
scenario where ride-sharing enterprises utilize a 100%-electrified fleet of
vehicles, and seeks responses to the following key question: How can
renewable-based EV charging be maximized without disrupting the quality of the
ride-sharing services? We propose a new mechanism to promote EV charging during
hours of high renewable generation, and we introduce the concept of charge
request, which is issued by a power utility company. Our mechanism is inspired
by a game-theoretic approach where the power utility company proposes
incentives and the ride-sharing platform assigns vehicles to both ride and
charge requests; the bargaining mechanism leads to prices and EV assignments
that are aligned with the notion of Nash equilibria. Numerical results show
that it is possible to shift the EV charging during periods of high renewable
generation and adapt to intermittent generation while minimizing the impact on
the quality of service. The paper also investigates how the users' willingness
to ride-share affects the charging strategy and the quality of service.
