  This paper surveys mathematical models, structural results and algorithms in
controlled sensing with social learning in social networks.
  Part 1, namely Bayesian Social Learning with Controlled Sensing addresses the
following questions: How does risk averse behavior in social learning affect
quickest change detection? How can information fusion be priced? How is the
convergence rate of state estimation affected by social learning? The aim is to
develop and extend structural results in stochastic control and Bayesian
estimation to answer these questions. Such structural results yield fundamental
bounds on the optimal performance, give insight into what parameters affect the
optimal policies, and yield computationally efficient algorithms.
  Part 2, namely, Multi-agent Information Fusion with Behavioral Economics
Constraints generalizes Part 1. The agents exhibit sophisticated decision
making in a behavioral economics sense; namely the agents make anticipatory
decisions (thus the decision strategies are time inconsistent and interpreted
as subgame Bayesian Nash equilibria).
  Part 3, namely {\em Interactive Sensing in Large Networks}, addresses the
following questions: How to track the degree distribution of an infinite random
graph with dynamics (via a stochastic approximation on a Hilbert space)? How
can the infected degree distribution of a Markov modulated power law network
and its mean field dynamics be tracked via Bayesian filtering given incomplete
information obtained by sampling the network? We also briefly discuss how the
glass ceiling effect emerges in social networks.
  Part 4, namely \emph{Efficient Network Polling} deals with polling in large
scale social networks. In such networks, only a fraction of nodes can be polled
to determine their decisions. Which nodes should be polled to achieve a
statistically accurate estimates?
