  In practical quantum cryptography, the source sometimes produces multi-photon
pulses, thus enabling the eavesdropper Eve to perform the powerful
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. Recently, it was shown by Curty and
Lutkenhaus [Phys. Rev. A 69, 042321 (2004)] that the PNS attack is not always
the optimal attack when two photons are present: if errors are present in the
correlations Alice-Bob and if Eve cannot modify Bob's detection efficiency, Eve
gains a larger amount of information using another attack based on a 2->3
cloning machine. In this work, we extend this analysis to all distances
Alice-Bob. We identify a new incoherent 2->3 cloning attack which performs
better than those described before. Using it, we confirm that, in the presence
of errors, Eve's better strategy uses 2->3 cloning attacks instead of the PNS.
However, this improvement is very small for the implementations of the
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. Thus, the existence of these new attacks
is conceptually interesting but basically does not change the value of the
security parameters of BB84. The main results are valid both for Poissonian and
sub-Poissonian sources.
