  To address the exponentially increasing data rate demands of end users,
necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in
licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands to cater to the temporal and spatial
variations of traffic in the wireless network. In this paper, we address the
spectrum allocation problem among non-cooperative operators via auctions. The
classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) approach provides the framework for a
strategy-proof and social welfare maximizing auction at high computational
complexity, which makes it infeasible for practical implementation. We propose
sealed bid auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation which are computationally
tractable and hence applicable for allocating spectrum by performing auctions
in short durations as per the dynamic load variations of the network. We
establish that the proposed algorithm is strategy-proof for uniform demand.
Furthermore, for non-uniform demand we propose an algorithm that satisfies weak
strategy-proofness. We also consider non-linear increase in the marginal
valuations with demand. Simulation results are presented to exhibit the
performance comparison of the proposed algorithms with VCG and other existing
mechanisms.
