  The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions
referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant
theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional
structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the
traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition
in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either 'true' or
'false', describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time.
Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by
means of a variety of 'no go' theorems, that it is not possible to assign
definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system
without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the
Bub-Clifton 'uniqueness theorem' is utilized for arguing that truth-value
definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice
of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a
particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual
correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of
discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down
and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of
correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more
generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit
specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.
