  In contrast to today's IP-based host-oriented Internet architecture,
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) emphasizes content by making it directly
addressable and routable. Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture is an
instance of ICN that is being developed as a candidate next-generation Internet
architecture. By opportunistically caching content within the network (in
routers), NDN appears to be well-suited for large-scale content distribution
and for meeting the needs of increasingly mobile and bandwidth-hungry
applications that dominate today's Internet.
  One key feature of NDN is the requirement for each content object to be
digitally signed by its producer. Thus, NDN should be, in principle, immune to
distributing fake (aka "poisoned") content. However, in practice, this poses
two challenges for detecting fake content in NDN routers: (1) overhead due to
signature verification and certificate chain traversal, and (2) lack of trust
context, i.e., determining which public keys are trusted to verify which
content. Because of these issues, NDN does not force routers to verify content
signatures, which makes the architecture susceptible to content poisoning
attacks.
  This paper explores root causes of, and some cures for, content poisoning
attacks in NDN. In the process, it becomes apparent that meaningful mitigation
of content poisoning is contingent upon a network-layer trust management
architecture, elements of which we construct while carefully justifying
specific design choices. This work represents the initial effort towards
comprehensive trust management for NDN.
