  Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for
auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network.
Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific
auction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper
considers the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given
a classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ suited for
it, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key
properties of $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design
meta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from
classical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable
properties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide
solutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1)
combinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction
with general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.
