  Smart metering infrastructure (SMI) is the core component of the smart grid
(SG) which enables two-way communication between consumers and utility
companies to control, monitor, and manage the energy consumption data. Despite
their salient features, SMIs equipped with information and communication
technology are associated with new threats due to their dependency on public
communication networks. Therefore, the security of SMI communications raises
the need for robust authentication and key agreement primitives that can
satisfy the security requirements of the SG. Thus, in order to realize the
aforementioned issues, this paper introduces a lightweight and secure
authentication protocol, "LiSA", primarily to secure SMIs in SG setups. The
protocol employs Elliptic Curve Cryptography at its core to provide various
security features such as mutual authentication, anonymity, replay protection,
session key security, and resistance against various attacks. Precisely, LiSA
exploits the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Qu Vanstone (EVQV) certificate
mechanism along with Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Problem (ECDHP) and Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Additionally, LiSA is designed to
provide the highest level of security relative to the existing schemes with
least computational and communicational overheads. For instance, LiSA incurred
barely 11.826 ms and 0.992 ms for executing different passes across the smart
meter and the service providers. Further, it required a total of 544 bits for
message transmission during each session.
