  In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group
of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain
candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we
depart from this assumption, and consider the setting where all voters are
strategic. In this case, the election can be viewed as a game, and the election
outcomes correspond to Nash equilibria of this game. We use this framework to
analyze two variants of Plurality voting, namely, simultaneous voting, where
all voters submit their ballots at the same time, and sequential voting, where
the voters express their preferences one by one. For simultaneous voting, we
characterize the preference profiles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium, but
show that it is computationally hard to check if a given profile fits our
criterion. For sequential voting, we provide a complete analysis of the setting
with two candidates, and show that for three or more candidates the equilibria
of sequential voting may behave in a counterintuitive manner.
