  In this article we discuss the proof in the short unpublished paper appeared
in the 3rd volume of Godel's Collected Works entitled "On undecidable
sentences" (*1931?), which provides an introduction to Godel's 1931 ideas
regarding the incompleteness of arithmetic. We analyze the meaning of the
negation of the provability predicate, and how it is meant not to lead to
vicious circle. We show how in fact in Godel's entire argument there is an
omission regarding the cases of non-provability, which, once taken into
consideration again, allow a completely different view of Godel's entire
argument of incompleteness. Previous results of the author are applied to show
that the definition of a contradiction is included in the argument of *1931?.
Furthermore, an examination of the application of substitution in the
well-known Godel formula as a violation of uniqueness is also briefly
presented, questioning its very derivation.
