  In this part of the paper, we obtain analytical results for the case that
transport costs are not small (complement of Part I), and combine them with the
results in Part I of the paper to provide general results for all values of
transport costs. We show that, in general, if an SPNE exists, it would be one
of the five possible strategies each of which we explicitly characterize. We
also prove that when EUs have sufficiently high inertia for at least one of the
ISPs, there exists a unique SPNE with a non-neutral outcome in which both of
the ISPs are active, and the CP offers her content with free quality on the
neutral ISP and with premium quality on the non-neutral ISP. Moreover, we show
that an SPNE does not always exist. We also analyze a benchmark case in which
both ISPs are neutral, and prove that there exists a unique SPNE in which the
CP offers her content with free quality on both ISPs, and both ISPs are active.
We also provide extensive numerical results and discussions for all ranges of
transport costs. Simulation results suggest that if the SPNE exists, it would
be unique. In addition, results reveal that the neutral ISP receives a lower
payoff and the non-neutral ISP receives a higher payoff (most of the time) in a
non-neutral scenario. However, we also identify scenarios in which the
non-neutral ISP loses payoff by adopting non-neutrality. In addition, we show
that a non-neutral regime yields a higher welfare for EUs than a neutral one if
the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity of EUs
(respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively, high), or a
combinations of these factors.
