  To what extent, hiring incentives targeting a specific group of vulnerable
unemployed (i.e. long term unemployed) are more effective, with respect to
generalised incentives (without a definite target), to increase hirings of the
targeted group? Are generalized incentives able to influence hirings of the
vulnerable group? Do targeted policies have negative side effects too important
to accept them? Even though there is a huge literature on hiring subsidies,
these questions remained unresolved. We tried to answer them, comparing the
impact of two similar hiring policies, one oriented towards a target group and
one generalised, implemented on the italian labour market. We used
administrative data on job contracts, and counterfactual analysis methods. The
targeted policy had a positive and significant impact, while the generalized
policy didn't have a significant impact on the vulnerable group. Moreover, we
concluded the targeted policy didn't have any indirect negative side effect.
