  Modern hardware systems are composed of a variety of third-party Intellectual
Property (IP) cores to implement their overall functionality. Since hardware
design is a globalized process involving various (untrusted) stakeholders, a
secure management of the valuable IP between authors and users is inevitable to
protect them from unauthorized access and modification. To this end, the widely
adopted IEEE standard 1735-2014 was created to ensure confidentiality and
integrity.
  In this paper, we outline structural weaknesses in IEEE 1735 that cannot be
fixed with cryptographic solutions (given the contemporary hardware design
process) and thus render the standard inherently insecure. We practically
demonstrate the weaknesses by recovering the private keys of IEEE 1735
implementations from major Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tool vendors,
namely Intel, Xilinx, Cadence, Siemens, Microsemi, and Lattice, while results
on a seventh case study are withheld. As a consequence, we can decrypt, modify,
and re-encrypt all allegedly protected IP cores designed for the respective
tools, thus leading to an industry-wide break. As part of this analysis, we are
the first to publicly disclose three RSA-based white-box schemes that are used
in real-world products and present cryptanalytical attacks for all of them,
finally resulting in key recovery.
