  In this paper we review some of the main results obtained in the field of
truels. A "truel" is a generalization of a duel involving three players.
Depending on the rules used for chosing the players, we may distinguish between
the random, sequential and simultaneous truel. A paradoxical result appears in
these games, as the player with the highest marksmanship does not necessarily
possess the highest survival (or winning) probability. In this work we limit
ourselves to the random and sequential truels in which players use their best
possible strategy with no coalitions. Furthermore, we have modified the random
truel and converted it into an opinion model. In this version each of the three
players holds a different opinion on a given topic. We address next the
question of who wins a "truel league". We will see that, despite the
paradoxical result mentioned above, still the distribution of winners is peaked
around the players with the higher marksmanship for the random and opinion
versions. In the sequential truel, however, the paradoxical result remains
partially since the distribution of winners is peaked around the intermediate
players.
  If the rules of truels are extended from three to $N$ players, the
paradoxical results shows up even more clearly since as $N$ increases it is
more difficult for the player with the highest marksmanship to win the game.
Finally, we consider the dynamics of the games in a spatial distribution in a
given network of interactions.
