  An increasing number of systems have been proposed or deployed to the transit
core of the Internet with the goal of observing and manipulating traffic in
flight, systems we term Traffic Manipulating Boxes. Examples of these include:
decoy routing systems, surveillance infrastructure like the NSA's alleged
QUANTUM project, and traffic shaping middleboxes. In this work, we examine a
new approach that a routing capable adversary might take to resisting these
systems: the use of economic pressure to incentivize ISPs to remove them.
Rather than directly attacking the availability of these systems, our attack
inflicts economic losses, in the form of reduced transit revenue, on ISPs that
deploy them, while at the same time incentivizing ISPs that do not.
  We alter and expand upon previous routing around decoys attack of Schuchard
et al., by adjusting the priority given to avoiding TMBs. This reduces or
eliminates the key costs faced by routing capable adversary while maintaining
the effectiveness of the attack. Additionally, we show that since the flow of
traffic on the Internet is directly related to the flow of cash between ISPs, a
routing capable adversary is actually a powerful economic adversary. Our
findings show that by preferentially using routes which are free of TMBs, some
routing capable adversaries can inflict in excess of a billion dollars in
annual revenue losses.
