  In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with
continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria
of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also
resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong
equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy
to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select
one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium
and evolutionarily stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these
strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics, such as
Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Smith dynamics and replicator dynamics. In
addition, we examine correlated equilibrium for the single-receiver model.
Correlated strategies are based on signaling structures before making decisions
on rates. We then focus on evolutionary games for hybrid additive white
Gaussian noise multiple access channel with multiple users and multiple
receivers, where each user chooses a rate and splits it over the receivers.
Users have coupled constraints determined by the capacity regions. Building
upon the static game, we formulate a system of hybrid evolutionary game
dynamics using G-function dynamics and Smith dynamics on rate control and
channel selection, respectively. We show that the evolving game has an
equilibrium and illustrate these dynamics with numerical examples.
