  An important feature of a dynamic game is its monitoring structure namely,
what the players effectively see from the played actions. We consider games
with arbitrary monitoring structures. One of the purposes of this paper is to
know to what extent an encoder, who perfectly observes the played actions and
sends a complementary public signal to the players, can establish perfect
monitoring for all the players. To reach this goal, the main technical problem
to be solved at the encoder is to design a source encoder which compresses the
action profile in the most concise manner possible. A special feature of this
encoder is that the multi-dimensional signal (namely, the action profiles) to
be encoded is assumed to comprise a component whose probability distribution is
not known to the encoder and the decoder has a side information (the private
signals received by the players when the encoder is off). This new framework
appears to be both of game-theoretical and information-theoretical interest. In
particular, it is useful for designing certain types of encoders that are
resilient to single deviations and provide an equilibrium utility region in the
proposed setting; it provides a new type of constraints to compress an
information source (i.e., a random variable). Regarding the first aspect, we
apply the derived result to the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
