  On-demand and resource reservation pricing models have been widely used in
cloud computing, catering to different user requirements. Nevertheless, in
Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC), as the edge has limited resources compared
to the cloud, on-demand users may not get their jobs served on time, or at all,
if too many resources were reserved by reservation plan users. Concurrently,
reservation plan users may possess excess un-utilized quota. To optimize this
resource mismatch scenario, we propose a Sharing Quota Model (SQM) where
reservation plan users can re-sell unused resource quota to on-demand users,
with the mobile network operator (MNO) taking a commission. To analyze the
user's aggregate behavior at equilibrium and investigate the MNO's incentive of
allowing re-selling, we formulate a 3-stage non-cooperative Stackelberg Game.
Solving this game, we characterize the optimal strategies of buyers and
re-sellers. We show that on aggregate, users' optimal strategies give rise to 4
disjoint regions, dependent on the MNO's prices and supply levels. Based on
this, we characterise the MNO's optimal prices for on-demand users. Numerical
results show that having both the sharing and on-demand pool gives the MNO an
optimal revenue when the on-demand pool's supply is low, and when the MNO's
commission is low.
