  We introduce a novel framework that considers how a firm could fairly
compensate its workers. A firm has a group of workers, each of whom has varying
productivities over a set of tasks. After assigning workers to tasks, the firm
must then decide how to distribute its output to the workers. We first consider
three compensation rules and various fairness properties they may satisfy. We
show that among efficient and symmetric rules: the Egalitarian rule is the only
rule that does not decrease a worker's compensation when every worker becomes
weakly more productive (Group Productivity Monotonicity); the Shapley Value
rule is the only rule that, for any two workers, equalizes the impact one
worker has on the other worker's compensation (Balanced Impact); and the
Individual Contribution rule is the only rule that is invariant to the removal
of workers and their assigned tasks (Consistency). We introduce other rules and
axioms, and relate each rule to each axiom.
