  Liquid democracy allows members of an electorate to either directly vote over
alternatives, or delegate their voting rights to someone they trust. Most of
the liquid democracy literature and implementations allow each voter to
nominate only one delegate per election. However, if that delegate abstains,
the voting rights assigned to her are left unused. To minimise the number of
unused delegations, it has been suggested that each voter should declare a
personal ranking over voters she trusts. In this paper, we show that even if
personal rankings over voters are declared, the standard delegation method of
liquid democracy remains problematic. More specifically, we show that when
personal rankings over voters are declared, it could be undesirable to receive
delegated voting rights, which is contrary to what liquid democracy
fundamentally relies on. To solve this issue, we propose a new method to
delegate voting rights in an election, called breadth-first delegation.
Additionally, the proposed method prioritises assigning voting rights to
individuals closely connected to the voters who delegate.
