  Designing an efficient protocol for avoiding the threat of recording based
attack in presence of a powerful eavesdropper remains a challenge for more than
two decades. During authentication, the absence of any secure link between the
prover and verifier makes things even more vulnerable as, after observing a
threshold challenge-response pair, users' secret may easily get derived due to
information leakage. Existing literature only present new methodologies with
ensuring superior aspects over previous ones, while ignoring the aspects on
which their proposed schemes cope poorly. Unsurprisingly, most of them are far
from satisfactory - either are found far from usable or lack of security
features.
  To overcome this issue, we first introduce the concept of "leakage control"
which puts a bar on the natural information leakage rate and greatly helps in
increasing both the usability and security standards. Not just prevention, but
also, by introducing the threat detection strategy (based on the concept of
honeyword), our scheme "lights two candles". It not only eliminates the long
terms security and usability conflict under the practical scenario, but along
with threat detection from the client side, it is capable of protecting the
secret at the server side under the distributed framework, and thus,
guaranteeing security beyond the conventional limit.
