  Deception, which includes leading cyber-attackers astray with false
information, has shown to be an effective method of thwarting cyber-attacks.
There has been little investigation of the effect of probing action costs on
adversarial decision-making, despite earlier studies on deception in
cybersecurity focusing primarily on variables like network size and the
percentage of honeypots utilized in games. Understanding human decision-making
when prompted with choices of various costs is essential in many areas such as
in cyber security. In this paper, we will use a deception game (DG) to examine
different costs of probing on adversarial decisions. To achieve this we
utilized an IBLT model and a delayed feedback mechanism to mimic knowledge of
human actions. Our results were taken from an even split of deception and no
deception to compare each influence. It was concluded that probing was slightly
taken less as the cost of probing increased. The proportion of attacks stayed
relatively the same as the cost of probing increased. Although a constant cost
led to a slight decrease in attacks. Overall, our results concluded that the
different probing costs do not have an impact on the proportion of attacks
whereas it had a slightly noticeable impact on the proportion of probing.
