  Today, Internet involves many actors who are making revenues on it
(operators, companies, service providers,...). It is therefore important to be
able to make fair decisions in this large-scale and highly competitive
economical ecosystem. One of the main issues is to prevent actors from
manipulating the natural outcome of the decision process. For that purpose,
game theory is a natural framework. In that context, voting systems represent
an interesting alternative that, to our knowledge, has not yet been considered.
They allow competing entities to decide among different options. Strong
theoretical results showed that all voting systems are susceptible to be
manipulated by one single voter, except for some "degenerated" and
non-acceptable cases. However, very little is known about how much a voting
system is manipulable in practical scenarios. In this paper, we investigate
empirically the use of voting systems for choosing end-to-end paths in
multi-carrier networks, analyzing their manipulability and their economical
efficiency. We show that one particular system, called \Single Transferable
Vote (STV), is largely more resistant to manipulability than the natural system
which tries to get the economical optimum. Moreover, STV manages to select
paths close to the economical optimum, whether the participants try to cheat or
not.
