  We model the dynamics of the Schelling model for agents described simply by a
continuously distributed variable - wealth. Agents move to neighborhoods where
their wealth is not lesser than that of some proportion of their neighbors, the
threshold level. As in the case of the classic Schelling model where
segregation obtains between two races, we find here that wealth-based
segregation occurs and persists. However, introducing uncertainty into the
decision to move - that is, with some probability, if agents are allowed to
move even though the threshold level condition is contravened - we find that
even for small proportions of such disallowed moves, the dynamics no longer
yield segregation but instead sharply transition into a persistent mixed wealth
distribution. We investigate the nature of this sharp transformation between
segregated and mixed states, and find that it is because of a non-linear
relationship between allowed moves and disallowed moves. For small increases in
disallowed moves, there is a rapid corresponding increase in allowed moves, but
this tapers off as the fraction of disallowed moves increase further and
finally settles at a stable value, remaining invariant to any further increase
in disallowed moves. It is the overall effect of the dynamics in the initial
region (with small numbers of disallowed moves) that shifts the system away
from a state of segregation rapidly to a mixed wealth state.
  The contravention of the tolerance condition could be interpreted as public
policy interventions like minimal levels of social housing or housing benefit
transfers to poorer households. Our finding therefore suggests that it might
require only very limited levels of such public intervention - just sufficient
to enable a small fraction of disallowed moves, because the dynamics generated
by such moves could spur the transformation from a segregated to mixed
equilibrium.
