  Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a significant incentive on
blockchain networks, referring to the value captured through the manipulation
of transaction execution order and strategic issuance of profit-generation
transactions. We argue that transaction ordering techniques used for MEV
extraction in blockchains where fees can influence the execution order do not
directly apply to blockchains where the order is determined based on
transactions' arrival times. Such blockchains' First-Come-First-Served (FCFS)
nature can yield different optimization strategies for entities seeking MEV,
known as searchers, requiring further study. This paper explores the
applicability of MEV extraction techniques observed on Ethereum, a fee-based
blockchain, to Algorand, an FCFS blockchain. Our results show the prevalence of
arbitrage MEV getting extracted through backruns on pending transactions in the
network, uniformly distributed to block positions. However, on-chain data do
not reveal latency optimizations between specific MEV searchers and Algorand
block proposers. We also study network clogging attacks and argue how searchers
can exploit them as a viable ordering technique for MEV extraction in FCFS
networks.
