  The Independence of Clones (IoC) criterion for social choice functions
(voting rules) measures a function's robustness to strategic nomination.
However, prior literature has established empirically that individuals cannot
always recognize whether or not a mechanism is strategy-proof and may still
submit costly, distortionary misreports even in strategy-proof settings. The
intersection of these issues motivates the search for mechanisms which are
Obviously Independent of Clones (OIoC): where strategic nomination or strategic
exiting of clones obviously have no effect on the outcome of the election. We
examine three IoC ranked-choice voting mechanisms and the pre-existing proofs
that they are independent of clones: Single Transferable Vote (STV), Ranked
Pairs, and the Schulze method. We construct a formal definition of a voting
system being Obviously Independent of Clones based on a reduction to a clocked
election by considering a bounded agent. Finally, we show that STV and Ranked
Pairs are OIoC, whereas we prove an impossibility result for the Schulze method
showing that this voting system is not OIoC.
