  Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked,
software-based controller implementations which have been found to be
vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research
works have proposed CPS-specific attack detection schemes as well as techniques
for attack resilient controller design. However, such schemes also incur
platform-level overheads. In this regard, some recent works have leveraged the
use of skips in control execution to enhance the resilience of a CPS against
false data injection (FDI) attacks.
  In this paper, we provide an analytical discussion on when and how skipping a
control execution can improve the resilience of the system against FDI attacks
while maintaining the control performance requirement. We also propose a
methodology to synthesize such optimal control execution patterns. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous work has provided any quantitative analysis about
the trade-off between attack resilience and control performance for such
aperiodic control execution. Finally, we evaluate the proposed method on
several safety-critical CPS benchmarks.
