  Ethics and safety research in artificial intelligence is increasingly framed
in terms of "alignment" with human values and interests. I argue that Turing's
call for "fair play for machines" is an early and often overlooked contribution
to the alignment literature. Turing's appeal to fair play suggests a need to
correct human behavior to accommodate our machines, a surprising inversion of
how value alignment is treated today. Reflections on "fair play" motivate a
novel interpretation of Turing's notorious "imitation game" as a condition not
of intelligence but instead of value alignment: a machine demonstrates a
minimal degree of alignment (with the norms of conversation, for instance) when
it can go undetected when interrogated by a human. I carefully distinguish this
interpretation from the Moral Turing Test, which is not motivated by a
principle of fair play, but instead depends on imitation of human moral
behavior. Finally, I consider how the framework of fair play can be used to
situate the debate over robot rights within the alignment literature. I argue
that extending rights to service robots operating in public spaces is "fair" in
precisely the sense that it encourages an alignment of interests between humans
and machines.
