  Segment routing is a modern form of source-based routing, i.e., a routing
technique where all or part of the routing decision is predetermined by the
source or a hop on the path. Since initial standardization efforts in 2013,
segment routing seems to have garnered substantial industry and operator
support. Especially segment routing over IPv6 (SRv6) is advertised as having
several advantages for easy deployment and flexibility in operations in
networks. Many people, however, argue that the deployment of segment routing
and SRv6 in particular poses a significant security threat if not done with the
utmost care. In this paper we conduct a first empirical analysis of SRv6
deployment in the Internet. First, we analyze SRv6 behavior in an emulation
environment and find that different SRv6 implementations have the potential to
leak information to the outside. Second, we search for signs of SRv6 deployment
in publicly available route collector data, but could not find any traces.
Third, we run large-scale traceroute campaigns to investigate possible SRv6
deployments. In this first empirical study on SRv6 we are unable to find traces
of SRv6 deployment even for companies that claim to have it deployed in their
networks. This lack of leakage might be an indication of good security
practices being followed by network operators when deploying SRv6.
