  Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems
in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to
obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable
Utility (TU) setting, coalition worths can be freely distributed amongst
agents. However, in several application scenarios, this is not the case and the
Non-Transferable Utility setting (NTU) must be considered, where additional
application-oriented constraints are imposed on the possible worth
distributions. In this paper, an approach to define NTU games is proposed which
is based on describing allowed distributions via a set of mixed-integer linear
constraints applied to an underlying TU game. It is shown that such games allow
non-transferable conditions on worth distributions to be specified in a natural
and succinct way. The properties and the relationships among the most prominent
solution concepts for NTU games that hold when they are applied on
(mixed-integer) constrained games are investigated. Finally, a thorough
analysis is carried out to assess the impact of issuing constraints on the
computational complexity of some of these solution concepts.
