  Cloud providers' support for network evasion techniques that misrepresent the
server's domain name is more prevalent than previously believed, which has
serious implications for security and privacy due to the reliance on domain
names in common security architectures. Domain fronting is one such evasive
technique used by privacy enhancing technologies and malware to hide the
domains they visit, and it uses shared hosting and HTTPS to present a benign
domain to observers while signaling the target domain in the encrypted HTTP
request. In this paper, we construct an ontology of domain name misinformation
and detail a novel measurement methodology to identify support among cloud
infrastructure providers. Despite several of the largest cloud providers having
publicly stated that they no longer support domain fronting, our findings
demonstrate a more complex environment with many exceptions.
  We also present a novel and straightforward attack that allows an adversary
to man-in-the-middle all the victim's encrypted traffic bound to a content
delivery network that supports domain fronting, breaking the authenticity,
confidentiality, and integrity guarantees expected by the victim when using
HTTPS. By using dynamic linker hijacking to rewrite the HTTP Host field, our
attack does not generate any artifacts that are visible to the victim or
passive network monitoring solutions, and the attacker does not need a separate
channel to exfiltrate data or perform command-and-control, which can be
achieved by rewriting HTTP headers.
