  Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and
conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,
so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant
strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a
linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents' payoff, in a
unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the
iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player evolutionary game
where in each round each player will choose whether or not put his tokens into
a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor larger than
one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical
results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-player
games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication factor, a
player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other
players; (ii) a player is able to set the ratio between his payoff and the
total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound
if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of
players.
