  TASP (Time Average Shapley Polygon, Bena{\=\i}m, Hofbauer and Hopkins,
\emph{Journal of Economic Theory}, 2009), as a novel evolutionary dynamics
model, predicts that a game could converge to cycles instead of fix points
(Nash equilibria). To verify TASP theory, using the four strategy
Dekel-Scotchmer games (Dekel and Scotchmer, \emph{Journal of Economic Theory},
1992), four experiments were conducted (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins,
\emph{Journal of Economic Theory}, 2010), in which, however, reported no
evidence of cycles (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, \emph{The Review of Economic
Studies}, 2013). We reanalysis the four experiment data by testing the
stochastic averaging of angular momentum in period-by-period transitions of the
social state. We find, the existence of persistent cycles in Dekel-Scotchmer
game can be confirmed. On the cycles, the predictions from evolutionary models
had been supported by the four experiments.
