  Currently, wind energy is one of the most important sources of renewable
energy. Offshore locations for wind turbines are increasingly exploited because
of their numerous advantages. However, offshore wind farms require high
investment in maintenance service. Due to its complexity and special
requirements, maintenance service is usually outsourced by wind farm owners. In
this paper, we propose a novel approach to determine, quantify, and reduce the
possible conflicts of interest between owners and maintenance suppliers. We
created a complete techno-economic model to address this problem from an
impartial point of view. An iterative process was developed to obtain
statistical results that can help stakeholders negotiate the terms of the
contract, in which the availability of the wind farm is the reference parameter
by which to determine penalisations and incentives. Moreover, a multi-objective
programming problem was addressed that maximises the profits of both parties
without losing the alignment of their interests. The main scientific
contribution of this paper is the maintenance analysis of offshore wind farms
from two perspectives: that of the owner and the maintenance supplier. This
analysis evaluates the conflicts of interest of both parties. In addition, we
demonstrate that proper adjustment of some parameters, such as penalisation,
incentives, and resources, and adequate control of availability can help reduce
this conflict of interests.
