  Many resources for forensic scholars and practitioners, such as journal
articles, guidance documents, and textbooks, address how to make a value of
evidence assessment in the form of a likelihood ratio (LR) when deciding
between two competing propositions. These texts often describe experts
presenting their LR values to other parties in the judicial system, such as
lawyers, judges, and potentially jurors, but few texts explicitly address how a
recipient is expected to utilize the provided LR value. Those that do often
imply, or directly suggest, a hybrid modification of Bayes' rule in which a
decision maker multiplies their prior odds with another person's assessment of
LR to obtain their posterior odds. In this paper, we illustrate how someone
adhering to Bayesian reasoning would update their personal uncertainty in
response to someone else presenting a personal LR value (or any other form of
an opinion) and emphasize that the hybrid approach is a departure from Bayesian
reasoning. We further consider implications of recipients adhering to Bayesian
reasoning on the role and ideal content of expert's reports and testimony and
address published responses to our 2017 paper (Lund and Iyer, 2017), where we
previously argued that the hybrid equation is not supported by Bayesian
reasoning.
