  An important part of the influential Humean doctrine in philosophy is the
supervenience principle (sometimes referred to as the principle of
separability). This principle asserts that the complete state of the world
supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its most fundamental components and
their spatiotemporal relations (the so-called Humean mosaic). There are
well-known arguments in the literature purporting to show that in quantum
mechanics the Humean supervenience principle is violated, due to the existence
of entangled states. Recently, however, arguments have been presented to the
effect that the supervenience principle can be defended in Bohmian mechanics.
The key element of this strategy lies in the observation that according to
Bohmian mechanics the fundamental facts about particles are facts about their
spatial locations, and moreover, for any proper subsystem of the world its
state may non-trivially depend on the spatial configuration of the rest of the
universe. Thus quantum-mechanical states of subsystems do not represent their
intrinsic properties but rather characterize their relations with the
environment. In this paper we point out the worry that this Bohmian strategy
--known as Bohumianism-- saves the letter but not the spirit of the Humean
doctrine of supervenience, since it prima facie violates another seemingly
important Humean principle, which we call Strong Supervenience and whose denial
implies the existence of necessary connections among distinct individuals. We
argue that the best defense for Bohumians is to question the fundamental
existence of complex physical systems and their states by treating any
reference to them as a convenient description of the underlying collection of
Bohmian particles. We consider several pros and cons of this strategy.
