  As far as we know, the literature on secure computation from cut-and-choose
has focused on achieving computational security against malicious adversaries.
It is unclear whether the idea of cut-and-choose can be adapted to secure
computation with information-theoretic security. In this work we explore the
possibility of using cut-and-choose in information theoretic setting for secure
three-party computation (3PC). Previous work on 3PC has mainly focus on the
semi-honest case, and is motivated by the observation that real-word
deployments of multi-party computation (MPC) seem to involve few parties. We
propose a new protocol for information-theoretically secure 3PC tolerating one
malicious party with cheating probability $2^{-s}$ using $s$ runs of circuit
computation in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our
protocol is essentially only a small constant worse than that of
state-of-the-art 3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its
communication round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC
protocols in information-theoretic setting.
