  In this work we study an economic agent based model under different
asymmetric information degrees. This model is quite simple and can be treated
analytically since the buyers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking
into account only the quality of the last good purchased plus her perceptive
capacity \beta . As a consequence the system evolves according to a stationary
Markovian stochastic process. The value of a product offered by the seller
increases with quality according to the exponent \alpha, which is a measure of
technology. It incorporates all the technological capacity of production
systems such as education, scientific development and techniques that change
the productivity growth. The technological level plays an important role to
explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution in
this model. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can
control adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum
asymmetric information degree before market collapse. Below this critical point
the market evolves during a very limited time and then dies out completely.
When \beta is closer to 1(symmetric information), the market becomes more
profitable for high quality goods, although high and low quality markets
coexist. All the results we obtained from the model are analytical and the
maximum asymmetric information level is a consequence of an ergodicity
breakdown in the process of quality evaluation.
