  In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, " 'I' is not
the name of a person, nor 'here' of a place, .... But they are connected with
names. ... [And] it is characteristic of physics not to use these words." This
statement expresses the dominant way of thinking in physics: Physics is about
the impersonal laws of nature; the "I" never makes an appearance in it. Since
the advent of quantum theory, however, there has always been a nagging pressure
to insert a first-person perspective into the heart of physics. In incarnations
of lesser or greater strength, one may consider the "Copenhagen" views of Bohr,
Heisenberg, and Pauli, the observer-participator view of John Wheeler, the
informational interpretation of Anton Zeilinger and Caslav Brukner, the
relational interpretation of Carlo Rovelli, and, most radically, the QBism of
N. David Mermin, Ruediger Schack, and the present author, as acceding to the
pressure. These views have lately been termed "participatory realism" to
emphasize that rather than relinquishing the idea of reality (as they are often
accused of), they are saying that reality is more than any third-person
perspective can capture. Thus, far from instances of instrumentalism or
antirealism, these views of quantum theory should be regarded as attempts to
make a deep statement about the nature of reality. This paper explicates the
idea for the case of QBism. As well, it highlights the influence of John
Wheeler's "law without law" on QBism's formulation.
