  In the standard oracle model, an oracle efficiently evaluates an unknown
classical function independent of the quantum algorithm itself. Quantum
algorithms have a complex interrelationship to their oracles; for example the
possibility of quantum speedup is affected by the manner by which oracles are
implemented. Therefore, it is physically meaningful to separate oracles from
their quantum algorithms, and we introduce one such separation here. We define
the Blind Oracular Quantum Computation (BOQC) scheme, in which the oracle is a
distinct node in a quantum network. Our work augments the client-server setting
of quantum computing, in which a powerful quantum computer server is available
on the network for discreet use by clients on the network with low quantum
power. In BOQC, an oracle is another client that cooperates with the main
client so that an oracular quantum algorithm is run on the server. The
cooperation between the main client and the oracle takes place (almost) without
communication. We prove BOQC to be blind: the server cannot learn anything
about the clients' computation. This proof is performed within the composable
security definitions provided by the formalism of Abstract Cryptography. We
enhance the BOQC scheme to be runnable with minimal physical qubits when run on
a solid-state quantum network; we prove that this scheme, which we refer to as
BOQCo (BOQC-optimized), possesses the same security as BOQC.
