  I begin to develop a framework for emergence in the physical sciences.
Namely, I propose to explicate ontological emergence in terms of the notion of
'novel reference', and of an account of interpretation as a map from theory to
world. I then construe ontological emergence as the "failure of the
interpretation to mesh" with an appropriate linkage map between theories.
Ontological emergence can obtain between theories that have the same extension
but different intensions, and between theories that have both different
extensions and intensions. I illustrate the framework in three examples: the
emergence of spontaneous magnetisation in a ferromagnet, the emergence of
masslessness, and the emergence of space, in specific models of physics. The
account explains why ontological emergence is independent of reduction: namely,
because emergence is primarily concerned with adequate interpretation, while
the sense of reduction that is relevant here is concerned with inter-theoretic
relations between uninterpreted theories.
