  This paper explores a research question about whether defensive and offensive
cyber security power and the capabilities to exercise the power influence the
incentives of nation-states to participate in bilateral and multilateral
cooperation (BMC) through formal and informal agreements, alliances, and norms.
Drawing from international relations in general and structural realism in
particular, three hypotheses are presented for assessing the research question
empirically: (i) increasing cyber capability lessens the incentives for BMC;
(ii) actively demonstrating and exerting cyber power decreases the willingness
for BMC; and (iii) small states prefer BMC for cyber security and politics
thereto. According to a cross-country dataset of 29 countries, all three
hypotheses are rejected. Although presenting a "negative result" with respect
to the research question, the accompanying discussion contributes to the
state-centric cyber security research in international relations and political
science.
