  The network virus propagation is influenced by various factors, and some of
them are neglected in most of the existed models in the literature. In this
paper, we study the network virus propagation based on the the epidemiological
viewpoint. We assume that nodes can be equipped with protection against virus
and the security of a node depends not only on his protection strategy but also
by those chosen by other nodes in the network. A crucial aspect is whether
owners of device, e.g., either smartphones, machines or tablets, are willing to
be equipped to protect themselves or to take the risk to be contaminated in
order to avoid the payment for a new antivirus. We model the interaction
between nodes as a non-cooperative games where the node has two strategies:
either to update the antivirus or not. To this aim, we provide a full
characterization of the equilibria of the game and we investigate the impact of
the price of protection on the equilibrium as well as the efficiency of the
protection at equilibrium. Further we consider more realistic scenarios in
which the dynamic of sources that disseminate the virus, evolves as function of
the popularity of virus. In this work, the interest in the virus by sources
evolves under the Influence Linear Threshold (HILT) model.
