  Peer reviewed publications are considered the gold standard in certifying and
disseminating ideas that a research community considers valuable. However, we
identify two major drawbacks of the current system: (1) the overwhelming demand
for reviewers due to a large volume of submissions, and (2) the lack of
incentives for reviewers to participate and expend the necessary effort to
provide high-quality reviews. In this work, we adopt a mechanism-design
approach to propose improvements to the peer review process, tying together the
paper submission and review processes and simultaneously incentivizing
high-quality submissions and reviews. In the submission stage, authors
participate in a VCG auction for review slots by submitting their papers along
with a bid that represents their expected value for having their paper
reviewed. For the reviewing stage, we propose a novel peer prediction mechanism
(H-DIPP) building on recent work in the information elicitation literature,
which incentivizes participating reviewers to provide honest and effortful
reviews. The revenue raised in the submission stage auction is used to pay
reviewers based on the quality of their reviews in the reviewing stage.
