  This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of
propositions within the framework of Church's intensional logic. A predicative
response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts
that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating
the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability
of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative
response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this
consistency also model other axioms of Church's intensional logic that have
been criticized by Parsons and Klement: this, it turns out, is due to resources
which also permit an interpretation of a fragment of Gallin's intensional
logic. Finally, the relation between the predicative response to the
Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions and the Russell paradox of sets is
discussed, and it is shown that the predicative conception of set induced by
this predicative intensional logic allows one to respond to the Wehmeier
problem of many non-extensions.
