  COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no remedy for this
epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing are seemed to be effective
preventive measures to control this pandemic. Therefore, in this paper, an
optimization problem is formulated that accommodates both isolation and social
distancing features of the individuals. To promote social distancing, we solve
the formulated problem by applying a noncooperative game that can provide an
incentive for maintaining social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Furthermore, the sustainability of the lockdown policy is interpreted with the
help of our proposed game-theoretic incentive model for maintaining social
distancing where there exists a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we perform an
extensive numerical analysis that shows the effectiveness of the proposed
approach in terms of achieving the desired social-distancing to prevent the
outbreak of the COVID-19 in a noncooperative environment. Numerical results
show that the individual incentive increases more than 85% with an increasing
percentage of home isolation from 25% to 100% for all considered scenarios. The
numerical results also demonstrate that in a particular percentage of home
isolation, the individual incentive decreases with an increasing number of
individuals.
