  Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum
mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. In this paper we give a
strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much
larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number of rounds, in
which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may
include aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be
bound to a fixed "honest" strategy, so that "anonymous state protocols", which
were recently suggested as a possible way to beat the known no-go results are
also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows the sender to find a
cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any
strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only
approximately, the cheat goes undetected with a high probability, which we
explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit formalization of general two
party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and a new
estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum
channel. The result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that
fall outside the standard setting of unlimited available technology, and thus
may allow secure bit commitment. We present a new such protocol whose security,
perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver's lab.
