  In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an
extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In
such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player
seeking to minimize her own delay, or - with a certain probability - the player
is malicious in which case her only goal is to disturb the other players as
much as possible.
  We show that such games do in general not possess a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies (i.e. a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Moreover, given a
game, we show that it is NP-complete to decide whether it admits a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This result even holds when resource latency
functions are linear, each player is malicious with the same probability, and
all strategy sets consist of singleton sets. For a slightly more restricted
class of malicious Bayesian congestion games, we provide easy checkable
properties that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  In the second part of the paper we study the impact of the malicious types on
the overall performance of the system (i.e. the social cost). To measure this
impact, we use the Price of Malice. We provide (tight) bounds on the Price of
Malice for an interesting class of malicious Bayesian congestion games.
Moreover, we show that for certain congestion games the advent of malicious
types can also be beneficial to the system in the sense that the social cost of
the worst case equilibrium decreases. We provide a tight bound on the maximum
factor by which this happens.
