  In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. [1, 2, 3] initiated the design of
ultralightweight RFID protocols -with the UMAP family of protocols- involving
only simple bitwise logical or arithmetic operations such as bitwise XOR, OR,
AND, and addition. This combination of operations was revealed later to be
insufficient for security. Then, Chien et al. proposed the SASI protocol [4]
with the aim of offering better security, by adding the bitwise rotation to the
set of supported operations. The SASI protocol represented a milestone in the
design of ultralightweight protocols, although certain attacks have been
published against this scheme [5, 6, 7]. In 2008, a new protocol, named
Gossamer [8], was proposed that can be considered a further development of both
the UMAP family and SASI. Although no attacks have been published against
Gossamer, Lee et al. [9] have recently published an alternative scheme that is
highly reminiscent of SASI. In this paper, we show that Lee et al.'s scheme
fails short of many of its security objectives, being vulnerable to several
important attacks like traceability, full disclosure, cloning and
desynchronization.
