  The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line
segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are
uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest
server. In this paper, we study a fault-prone version of the Hotelling game,
where the line fails at multiple random locations. Each failure disconnects the
line, blocking the passage of clients. We show that the game admits a Nash
equilibrium if and only if the rate of faults exceeds a certain threshold, and
calculate that threshold approximately. Moreover, when a Nash equilibrium
exists we show it is unique and construct it explicitly.
  Hence, somewhat surprisingly, the potential occurrence of failures has a
stabilizing effect on the game (provided there are enough of them).
Additionally, we study the social cost of the game (measured in terms of the
total transportation cost of the clients), which also seems to benefit in a
certain sense from the potential presence of failures.
