  Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If
there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as
choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of
developing group consensus mechanisms over the internet, where the numbers of
candidates could easily number in the thousands, we study an urn-based voting
rule where each participant acts as a voter and a candidate. We prove that when
participants lie in a one-dimensional space, this voting protocol finds a
$(1-\epsilon/sqrt{n})$ approximation of the Condorcet winner with high
probability while only requiring an expected $O(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}\log^2
\frac{n}{\epsilon^2})$ comparisons on average per voter. Moreover, this voting
protocol is shown to have a quasi-truthful Nash equilibrium: namely, a Nash
equilibrium exists which may not be truthful, but produces a winner with the
same probability distribution as that of the truthful strategy.
