  In a recent paper Griffiths [38] has argued, based on the consistent
histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics (QM) is
noncontextual. According to Griffiths the problem of contextuality disappears
if the apparatus is "designed and operated by a competent experimentalist" and
we accept the Single Framework Rule (SFR). We will argue from a
representational realist stance that the conclusion is incorrect due to the
misleading understanding provided by Griffiths to the meaning of quantum
contextuality and its relation to physical reality and measurements. We will
discuss how the quite general incomprehension of contextuality has its origin
in the "objective-subjective omelette" created by Heisenberg and Bohr. We will
argue that in order to unscramble the omelette we need to disentangle, firstly,
representational realism from naive realism, secondly, ontology from
epistemology, and thirdly, the different interpretational problems of QM. In
this respect, we will analyze what should be considered as Meaningful Physical
Statements (MPS) within a theory and will argue that Counterfactual Reasoning
(CR) -considered by Griffiths as "tricky"- must be accepted as a necessary
condition for any representational realist interpretation of QM. Finally we
discuss what should be considered as a problem (and what not) in QM from a
representational realist perspective.
