  Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages a large number of
sensor-equipped mobile phones to collect sensing data. To attract more
participants to provide good quality, bidding mechanisms that solicit the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants are natural fits for
crowd sensing applications in mobile social networks. However, in practical
continuous crowd sensing applications, where bids cannot be solicited and only
posted pricing mechanisms can be implemented. Obviously, these mechanisms for
continuous crowd sensing are not applicable. To tackle the issue, we propose a
collection-behavior based multi-parameter posted pricing mechanism, not only to
consider extensive user participating and sensing data submission quality under
given budget constraints by applying all-pay auctions and posted pricing
mechanisms, but also to maximize the coverage utilities by applying crowd
aversion. Simulation results indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed
framework outperform the best existing solution.
