  The automobile industry is no longer relying on pure mechanical systems;
instead, it benefits from advanced Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in order to
provide new and complex functionalities in the effort to move toward fully
connected cars. However, connected cars provide a dangerous playground for
hackers. Vehicles are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks as they
come equipped with more connected features and control systems. This situation
may expose strategic assets in the automotive value chain. In this scenario,
the Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most widely used communication
protocol in the automotive domain. However, this protocol lacks encryption and
authentication. Consequently, any malicious/hijacked node can cause
catastrophic accidents and financial loss. Starting from the analysis of the
vulnerability connected to the CAN communication protocol in the automotive
domain, this paper proposes EXT-TAURUM P2T a new low-cost secure CAN-FD
architecture for the automotive domain implementing secure communication among
ECUs, a novel key provisioning strategy, intelligent throughput management, and
hardware signature mechanisms. The proposed architecture has been implemented,
resorting to a commercial Multi-Protocol Vehicle Interface module, and the
obtained results experimentally demonstrate the approach's feasibility.
