  There is currently a drive in the aerospace domain to introduce machine to
machine communication over wireless networks to improve ground processes at
airports such as refuelling and air conditiong. To this end a session key has
to be established between the aircraft and the respective ground unit such as a
fuel truck or a pre-conditiong unit. This is to be provided by a `touch and go
assistant in the aerospace domain' (TAGA), which allows an operator to pair up
a ground unit and an aircraft present at a parking slot with the help of a NFC
system. In this paper, we present the results of our security analysis and
co-development of requirements, security concepts, and modular verification
thereof. We show that by, and only by, a combination of advanced security
protocols and local process measures we obtain secure and resilient designs for
TAGA. In particular, the design of choice is fully resilient against long-term
key compromises and parallel escalation of attacks.
