  The origins of proof-theoretic semantics lie in the question of what
constitutes the meaning of the logical connectives and its response: the rules
of inference that govern the use of the connective. However, what if we go a
step further and ask about the meaning of a proof as a whole? In this paper we
address this question and lay out a framework to distinguish sense and
denotation of proofs. Two questions are central here. First of all, if we have
two (syntactically) different derivations, does this always lead to a
difference, firstly, in sense, and secondly, in denotation? The other question
is about the relation between different kinds of proof systems (here: natural
deduction vs. sequent calculi) with respect to this distinction. Do the
different forms of representing a proof necessarily correspond to a difference
in how the inferential steps are given? In our framework it will be possible to
identify denotation as well as sense of proofs not only within one proof system
but also between different kinds of proof systems. Thus, we give an account to
distinguish a mere syntactic divergence from a divergence in meaning and a
divergence in meaning from a divergence of proof objects analogous to Frege's
distinction for singular terms and sentences.
