  We address the problem of securing distributed storage systems against
passive eavesdroppers that can observe a limited number of storage nodes. An
important aspect of these systems is node failures over time, which demand a
repair mechanism aimed at maintaining a targeted high level of system
reliability. If an eavesdropper observes a node that is added to the system to
replace a failed node, it will have access to all the data downloaded during
repair, which can potentially compromise the entire information in the system.
We are interested in determining the secrecy capacity of distributed storage
systems under repair dynamics, i.e., the maximum amount of data that can be
securely stored and made available to a legitimate user without revealing any
information to any eavesdropper. We derive a general upper bound on the secrecy
capacity and show that this bound is tight for the bandwidth-limited regime
which is of importance in scenarios such as peer-to-peer distributed storage
systems. We also provide a simple explicit code construction that achieves the
capacity for this regime.
