  In the framework of the three-party constrained voter model, where voters of
two radical parties (A and B) interact with "centrists" (C and Cz), we study
the competition between a persuasive majority and a committed minority. In this
model, A's and B's are incompatible voters that can convince centrists or be
swayed by them. Here, radical voters are more persuasive than centrists, whose
sub-population consists of susceptible agents C and a fraction zeta of centrist
zealots Cz. Whereas C's may adopt the opinions A and B with respective rates
1+delta_A and 1+delta_B (with delta_A>=delta_B>0), Cz's are committed
individuals that always remain centrists. Furthermore, A and B voters can
become (susceptible) centrists C with a rate 1. The resulting competition
between commitment and persuasion is studied in the mean field limit and for a
finite population on a complete graph. At mean field level, there is a
continuous transition from a coexistence phase when
zeta<Delta_c=delta_A/(1+delta_A) to a phase where centrism prevails when zeta>=
Delta_c. In a finite population of size N, demographic fluctuations lead to
centrism consensus and the dynamics is characterized by the mean consensus time
tau. Because of the competition between commitment and persuasion, here
consensus is reached much slower (zeta<Delta_c) or faster (zeta>=Delta_c) than
in the absence of zealots (when tau\simN). In fact, when zeta<Delta_c and there
is an initial minority of centrists, the mean consensus time asymptotically
grows as tau\simN^{-1/2} e^{N gamma}, where gamma is determined. The dynamics
is thus characterized by a metastable state where the most persuasive voters
and centrists coexist when delta_A>delta_B, whereas all species coexist when
delta_A=delta_B. When zeta>=Delta_c and the initial density of centrists is
low, one finds tau\simln N (when N>>1). Our analytical findings are
corroborated by stochastic simulations.
