  The extensive use of distributed vehicle platoon controllers has resulted in
several benefits for transportation systems, such as increased traffic flow,
fuel efficiency, and decreased pollution. The rising reliance on interconnected
systems and communication networks, on the other hand, exposes these
controllers to potential cyber-attacks, which may compromise their safety and
functionality. This thesis aims to improve the security of distributed vehicle
platoon controllers by investigating attack scenarios and assessing their
influence on system performance. Various attack techniques, including
man-in-the-middle (MITM) and false data injection (FDI), are simulated using
Model Predictive Control (MPC) controller to identify vulnerabilities and
weaknesses of the platoon controller. Countermeasures are offered and tested,
that includes attack analysis and reinforced communication protocols using
Machine Learning techniques for detection. The findings emphasize the
significance of integrating security issues into their design and
implementation, which helps to construct safe and resilient distributed platoon
controllers.
