  Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) or
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for precise (Positioning,
Navigation, and Timing) PNT solutions. However, the vulnerability of GPS
signals to intentional and unintended threats due to their lack of encryption
and weak signal strength poses serious risks, thereby reducing the reliability
of AVs. GPS spoofing is a complex and damaging attack that deceives AVs by
altering GPS receivers to calculate false position and tracking information
leading to misdirection. This study explores a stealthy slow drift GPS spoofing
attack, replicating the victim AV's satellite reception pattern while changing
pseudo ranges to deceive the AV, particularly during turns. The attack is
designed to gradually deviate from the correct route, making real-time
detection challenging and jeopardizing user safety. We present a system and
study methodology for constructing covert spoofing attacks on AVs,
investigating the correlation between original and spoofed pseudo ranges to
create effective defenses. By closely following the victim vehicle and using
the same satellite signals, the attacker executes the attack precisely.
Changing the pseudo ranges confuses the AV, leading it to incorrect
destinations while remaining oblivious to the manipulation. The gradual
deviation from the actual route further conceals the attack, hindering its
swift identification. The experiments showcase a robust correlation between the
original and spoofed pseudo ranges, with R square values varying between 0.99
and 1. This strong correlation facilitates effective evaluation and mitigation
of spoofing signals.
