  Celebrities can significantly influence the public towards any desired
outcome. In a bid to tackle an infectious disease, a leader (government)
exploits such influence towards motivating a fraction of public to get
vaccinated, sufficient enough to ensure eradication. The leader also aims to
minimize the vaccinated fraction of public (that ensures eradication) and use
minimal incentives to motivate the influencers; it also controls
vaccine-supply-rates. Towards this, we consider a three-layered Stackelberg
game, with the leader at the top. A set of influencers at the middle layer are
involved in a stochastic vaccination game driven by incentives. The public at
the bottom layer is involved in an evolutionary game with respect to vaccine
responses.
  We prove the disease can always be eradicated once the public is sufficiently
sensitive towards the vaccination choices of the influencers -- with a minimal
fraction of public vaccinated. This minimal fraction depends only on the
disease characteristics and not on other aspects. Interestingly, there are many
configurations to achieve eradication, each configuration is specified by a
dynamic vaccine-supply-rate and a number -- this number represents the count of
the influencers that needs to be vaccinated to achieve the desired influence.
Incentive schemes are optimal when this number equals all or just one; the
former curbs free-riding among influencers while the latter minimizes the
dependency on influencers.
