  In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet
on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have
privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this
information to uninformed players. However, this information may be true if the
informed player is altruist or false if he is selfish. So, in this game, the
players are divided in three categories: informed and altruist players,
informed and selfish players, and uninformed players. By considering the
matchings ($N/2$ distinct pairs of randomly chosen players) and that the payoff
of the winning group follows aspects captured from two important games, the
public goods game and minority game, we showed quantitatively and qualitatively
how the altruism can impact on the privileged information. We localized
analytically the regions of positive payoffs which were corroborated by
numerical simulations performed for all values of information and altruism
densities given that we know the information level of the informed players.
Finally, in an evolutionary version of the game ,we showed that the gain of the
informed players can get worse if we adopted the following procedure: the
players increase their investment for situations of positive payoffs, and
decrease their investment when negative payoffs occur.
