  We introduce a game model called "customer attraction game" to demonstrate
the competition among online content providers. In this model, customers
exhibit interest in various topics. Each content provider selects one topic and
benefits from the attracted customers. We investigate both symmetric and
asymmetric settings involving agents and customers. In the symmetric setting,
the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is guaranteed, but finding a PNE
is PLS-complete. To address this, we propose a fully polynomial time
approximation scheme to identify an approximate PNE. Moreover, the tight Price
of Anarchy (PoA) is established. In the asymmetric setting, we show the
nonexistence of PNE in certain instances and establish that determining its
existence is NP-hard. Nevertheless, we prove the existence of an approximate
PNE. Additionally, when agents select topics sequentially, we demonstrate that
finding a subgame-perfect equilibrium is PSPACE-hard. Furthermore, we present
the sequential PoA for the two-agent setting.
