  Peripheral authentication is an important aspect in the vehicle networks to
provide services to only authenticated peripherals and a security to internal
vehicle modules such as anti-lock braking system, power-train control module,
engine control unit, transmission control unit, and tire pressure monitoring.
In this paper a three-way handshake scheme is proposed for a vehicle to a
keyfob authentication. A keyfob is a key with a secure hardware that
communicates and authenticates the vehicle over the wireless channel.
Conventionally, a vehicle to keyfob authentication is realized through a
challenge-response verification protocol. An authentic coupling between the
vehicle identity and the keyfob avoids any illegal access to the vehicle.
However, these authentication messages can be relayed by an active adversary,
thereby, can amplify the actual distance between an authentic vehicle and a
keyfob. Eventually, an adversary can possibly gain access to the vehicle by
relaying wireless signals and without any effort to generate or decode the
secret credentials. Hence, the vehicle to keyfob authentication scheme must
contain an additional attribute verification such as physical movement of a
keyfob holder.
  Our solution is a two-party and three-way handshake scheme with proactive and
reactive commitment verification. The proposed solution also uses a time
interval verification such that both vehicle and keyfob would yield a similar
locomotion pattern of a dynamic keyfob within a similar observational time
interval. Hence, the solution is different from the distance bounding protocols
that require multiple iterations for the round-trip delay measurement. The
proposed scheme is shown to be adaptable with the existing commitment scheme
such as Schnorr identification scheme and Pedersen commitment scheme.
