  This paper focuses on a one person game called Indian policeman's dilemma
(IPD). It represents the internal conflict between emotion and profession of a
typical Indian police officer. We have 'split' the game to be played
independently by different personality modules of the same player. Each module
then appears as an independent individual player of the game. None of the
players knows the exact payoff values of any of the others. Only greater than
or less than type of inequalities among the payoff values across the players
are to be inferred probabilistically. There are two Nash equilibrium (NE)
points in this game signifying two completely opposing behavior by the
policeman involved. With the help of the probabilistic inequalities probable
propensities of the different behaviors have been determined. The model
underscores the need for new surveys and data generation. A design of one such
survey to measure professionalism of the police personnel has been outlined.
