  This paper presents a meta-theory of the usage of the free energy principle
(FEP) and examines its scope in the modelling of physical systems. We consider
the so-called `map-territory fallacy' and the fallacious reification of model
properties. By showing that the FEP is a consistent, physics-inspired theory of
inferences of inferences, we disprove the assertion that the map-territory
fallacy contradicts the principled usage of the FEP. As such, we argue that
deploying the map-territory fallacy to criticise the use of the FEP and
Bayesian mechanics itself constitutes a fallacy: what we call the {\it
map-territory fallacy fallacy}. In so doing, we emphasise a few key points: the
uniqueness of the FEP as a model of particles or agents that model their
environments; the restoration of convention to the FEP via its relation to the
principle of constrained maximum entropy; the `Jaynes optimality' of the FEP
under this relation; and finally, the way that this meta-theoretical approach
to the FEP clarifies its utility and scope as a formal modelling tool. Taken
together, these features make the FEP, uniquely, {\it the} ideal model of
generic systems in statistical physics.
