  This paper analyzes whether a minimum wage should be used for redistribution
on top of taxes and transfers. I characterize optimal redistribution for a
government with three policy instruments -- labor income taxes and transfers,
corporate income taxes, and a minimum wage -- using an empirically grounded
model of the labor market with positive firm profits. A minimum wage can
increase social welfare when it increases the average post-tax wages of
low-skill labor market participants and when corporate profit incidence is
large. When chosen together with taxes, the minimum wage can help the
government redistribute efficiently to low-skill workers by preventing firms
from capturing low-wage income subsidies such as the EITC and from enjoying
high profits that cannot be redistributed via corporate taxes due to capital
mobility in unaffected industries. Event studies show that the average US
state-level minimum wage reform over the last two decades increased average
post-tax wages of low-skilled labor market participants and reduced corporate
profits in affected industries, namely low-skill labor-intensive services. A
sufficient statistics analysis implies that US minimum wages typically remain
below their optimum under the current tax and transfer system.
