  In this paper, we propose a novel class of symmetric key distribution
protocols that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost,
hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers. The
keys are derived from the temporal dynamics of a physical, micro-scale
time-keeping device which makes the keys immune to any potential side-channel
attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. Using the behavioral model of the
self-powered timers, we first show that the derived key-strings can pass the
randomness test as defined by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) suite. The key-strings are then used in two SPoTKD
(Self-Powered Timer Key Distribution) protocols that exploit the timer's
dynamics as one-way functions: (a) protocol 1 facilitates secure communications
between a user and a remote Server, and (b) protocol 2 facilitates secure
communications between two users. In this paper, we investigate the security of
these protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks.
Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we also investigate the robustness of these
protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and propose
error-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts.
