  Recently, Yang et al. introduced an efficient searchable encryption scheme
titled "Dynamic Consensus Committee-Based for Secure Data Sharing With
Authorized Multi-Receiver Searchable Encryption (DCC-SE)," published in IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (DOI:
10.1109/TIFS.2023.3305183). According to the authors, DCC-SE meets various
security requirements, especially the keyword trapdoor indistinguishability
against chosen keyword attacks (KT-IND-CKA). In this letter, however, we reveal
a significant vulnerability of DCC-SE: any users involved in the system can
execute attacks against KT-IND-CKA security. This flaw potentially results in
the unintended disclosure of sensitive keyword information related to the
documents. We present a detailed cryptanalysis on DCC-SE. In addition, to
address this vulnerability, we discuss the root cause and identify a flaw in
the security proof of DCC-SE. Subsequently, we provide a solution that
effectively addresses this concern without significantly increasing
computational overhead.
