  This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two
alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly
benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets
information based on what happens with the first investor, as well as cost
reduction benefits. We describe the payoff functions for both the leader and
follower firm. Then, we present a stochastic control game where the firms can
choose when to invest, and hence influence whether they become the leader or
the follower. In order to solve this problem, we combine techniques from
optimal stopping and game theory. For a specific choice of parametres, we show
that no pure symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. However, an
asymmetric equilibrium is characterized. In this equilibrium, two disjoint
intervals of market demand level give rise to preemptive investment behavior of
the firms, while the firms otherwise are more reluctant to be the first mover.
