  The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the
voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is
deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define
("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance:
a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of
the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is
known that many classic voting rules can be distance rationalized. In this
paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several
Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalize
Young's rule and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance.
We show that the claim that Young's rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet
consensus class and the Hamming distance is incorrect; in fact, these consensus
class and distance yield a new rule which has not been studied before. We prove
that, similarly to Young's rule, this new rule has a computationally hard
winner determination problem.
