  The "measurement problem" of quantum mechanics, and the "hard problem" of
cognitive science are the most profound open problems of the two research
fields, and certainly among the deepest of all unsettled conundrums in
contemporary science in general. Occasionally, scientists from both fields have
suggested some sort of interconnectedness of the two problems. Here we revisit
the main motives behind such expectations and try to put them on more formal
grounds. We argue not only that such a relation exists, but that it also bears
strong implications both for the interpretations of quantum mechanics and for
our understanding of consciousness. The paper consists of three parts. In the
first part, we formulate a "no-go-theorem" stating that a brain, functioning
solely on the principles of classical physics, cannot have any greater ability
to induce subjective experience than a process of writing (printing) a certain
sequence of digits. The goal is to show, with an attempt to mathematical rigor,
why the physicalist standpoint based on classical physics is not likely to ever
explain the phenomenon of consciousness -- justifying the tendency to look
beyond the physics of the 19th century. In the second part, we aim to establish
a clear relation, with a sort of correspondence mapping, between attitudes
towards the hard problem and interpretations of quantum mechanics. Then we
discuss these connections in the light of the no-go theorem, pointing out that
the existence of subjective experience might differentiate between otherwise
experimentally indistinguishable interpretations. Finally, the third part is an
attempt to illustrate how quantum mechanics could take us closer to the
solution of the hard problem and break the constraints set by the no-go
theorem.
