  A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the
partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer
(/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the
stock market: each seller(buyer) can either offer a selling(buying) price to
all buyers(sellers) or accept a price offered by another buyer(seller). The
offered prices are known to all. Once a player accepts a price offered by
another one, the division of a pie between them is determined. Each player has
a constant discounting factor and the discounting factors of all players are
common knowledge. In this article, we prove that the equilibrium of this
bargaining problem is a unanimous division rate, which is equivalent to Nash
bargaining equilibrium of a two-player bargaining game in which the discounting
factors of two players are the average of n buyers and the average of n sellers
respectively. This result shows the relevance between bargaining equilibrium
and general equilibrium of markets.
