  Analyzing the security of cryptosystems under attacks based on the malicious
modification of memory registers is a research topic of high importance. This
type of attacks may affect the randomness of the secret parameters by forcing a
limited number of bits to a certain value which can be unknown to the attacker.
In this context, we revisit the attack on DSA presented by Faug\`ere, Goyet and
Renault during the conference SAC 2012: we simplify their method and we provide
a probabilistic approach in opposition to the heuristic proposed in the former
to measure the limits of the attack. More precisely, the main problem is
formulated as the search for a closest vector to a lattice, then we study the
distribution of the vectors with bounded norms in a this family of lattices and
we apply the result to predict the behavior of the attack. We validated this
approach by computational experiments.
