  We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters
who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary
preferences, which govern their behavior when their vote cannot affect the
election outcome. Specifically, we study two models that have been recently
considered in the literature: lazy voters, who prefer to abstain when they are
not pivotal, and truth-biased voters, who prefer to vote truthfully when they
are not pivotal. We extend prior work by investigating the behavior of both
lazy and truth-biased voters under different tie-breaking rules (lexicographic
rule, random voter rule, random candidate rule). Two of these six combinations
of secondary preferences and a tie-breaking rule have been studied in prior
work. In order to understand the impact of different secondary preferences and
tie-breaking rules on the election outcomes, we study the remaining four
combinations. We characterize pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of the resulting
strategic games and study the complexity of related computational problems. Our
results extend to settings where some of the voters may be non-strategic.
