  We present a two-level model of organizational training and agent production.
Managers decide whether or not to train based on both the costs of training
compared to the benefits and on their expectations and observations of the
number of other firms that also train. Managers also take into account the sum
of their employees' contributions and the average tenure length within their
organization. Employees decide whether or not to contribute to production based
on their expectations as to how other employees will act. Trained workers learn
over time and fold their increased productivity into their decision whether or
not to contribute. We find that the dynamical behavior at the two levels is
closely coupled: the evolution of the industry over time depends not only on
the characteristics of training programs, learning curves, and cost-benefit
analyses, but on the vagaries of chance as well. For example, in one case, the
double dilemma can be resolved for the industry as a whole and productivity
then increases steadily over time. In another, the organizational level dilemma
may remain unresolved and workers may contribute at fluctuating levels. In this
case the overall productivity stays low. We also find a correlation between
high productivity and low turnover and show that a small increase in training
rates can lead to explosive growth in productivity.
