  Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social
choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational
approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of
voters.
  In a recent paper, Meir et al.[EC'14] made another step in this direction, by
suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncertainty. For
a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved initial existence
and convergence results in the Plurality voting system.
  In this paper, we extend the model in multiple directions, considering voters
with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions, and a more
permissive notion of best-response. We prove that a voting equilibrium exists
even in the most general case. Further, any society voting in an iterative
setting is guaranteed to converge.
  We also analyze an alternative behavior where voters try to minimize their
worst-case regret. We show that the two behaviors coincide in the simple
setting of Meir et al., but not in the general case.
