  Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields,
including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence,
where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or
cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in
many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug
interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often
have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player
inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along
this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models
widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and
extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential
games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models,
(approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research
frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing
algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research
directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.
