  In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto
game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two
players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to
randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The
other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the
informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique
equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We
then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular
variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the unique equilibrium
payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies. We quantify the value of information
- the difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game
and complete information game. We find information strictly improves the
informed player's performance guarantee. However, the magnitude of improvement
varies with the informed player's strength as well as the game parameters. Our
analysis highlights the interplay between strength and information in
adversarial environments.
