  Social marketing is becoming increasingly important in contemporary business.
Central to social marketing is quantifying how consumers choose between
alternatives and how they influence each other. This work considers a new but
simple multinomial choice model for multiple agents connected in a
recommendation network based on the explicit modeling of choice adoption
behavior. Efficiently computable closed-form solutions, absent from analyses of
threshold/cascade models, are obtained together with insights on how the
network affects aggregate decision making. A stylized "brand ambassador"
selection problem is posed to model targeting in social marketing. Therein, it
is shown that a greedy selection strategy leads to solutions achieving at least
$1-1/e$ of the optimal value. In an extended example of imposing exogenous
controls, a pricing problem is considered wherein it is shown that the single
player profit optimization problem is concave, implying the existence of pure
strategy equilibria for the associated pricing game.
