  Corruption is an endemic societal problem with profound implications in the
development of nations. In combating this issue, cross-national evidence
supporting the effectiveness of the rule of law seems at odds with poorly
realized outcomes from reforms inspired in such literature. This paper provides
an explanation for such contradiction. By taking a computational approach, we
develop two methodological novelties into the empirical study of corruption:
(1) generating large within-country variation by means of simulation (instead
of cross-national data pooling), and (2) accounting for interactions between
covariates through a spillover network. The latter (the network), seems
responsible for a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the rule of
law; especially among the least developed countries. We also find that
effectiveness can be boosted by improving complementary policy issues that may
lie beyond the governance agenda. Moreover, our simulations suggest that
improvements to the rule of law are a necessary yet not sufficient condition to
curve corruption.
