  Debates concerning philosophical grounds for the validity of classical and
intuitionistic logics often have the very nature of logical proofs as one of
the main points of controversy. The intuitionist advocates for a strict notion
of constructive proof, while the classical logician advocates for a notion
which allows non-construtive proofs through \textit{reductio ad absurdum}. A
great deal of controversy still subsists to this day on the matter, as there is
no agreement between disputants on the precise standing of non-constructive
methods.
  Two very distinct approaches to logic are currently providing interesting
contributions to this debate. The first, oftentimes called logical ecumenism,
aims to provide a unified framework in which two "rival" logics may peacefully
coexist, thus providing some sort of neutral ground for the contestants. The
second, proof-theoretic semantics, aims not only to elucidate the meaning of a
logical proof, but also to provide means for its use as a basic concept of
semantic analysis. Logical ecumenism thus provides a medium in which meaningful
interactions may occur between classical and intuitionistic logic, whilst
proof-theoretic semantics provides a way of clarifying what is at stake when
one accepts or denies reductio ad absurdum as a meaningful proof method.
  In this paper we show how to coherently combine both approaches by providing
not only a medium in which classical and intuitionistic logics may coexist, but
also one in which classical and intuitionistic notions of proof may coexist.
