  In the quest for market mechanisms that are easy to implement, yet close to
optimal, few seem as viable as posted pricing. Despite the growing body of
impressive results, the performance of most posted price mechanisms however,
rely crucially on price discrimination when multiple copies of a good are
available. For the more general case with non-linear production costs on each
good, hardly anything is known for general multi-good markets. With this in
mind, we study a Bayesian setting where the seller can produce any number of
copies of a good but faces convex production costs for the same, and buyers
arrive sequentially. Our main contribution is a framework for
non-discriminatory pricing in the presence of production costs: the framework
yields posted price mechanisms with O(1)-approximation factors for fractionally
subadditive (XoS) buyers, logarithmic approximations for subadditive buyers,
and also extends to settings where the seller is oblivious to buyer valuations.
Our work presents the first known results for Bayesian settings with production
costs and is among the few posted price mechanisms that do not charge buyers
differently for the same good.
