  The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the most economically valuable resources
on the planet, and as such has become a source of territorial disputes between
its bordering nations. Among other things, states compete to harvest the
multitude of fish species in the SCS. In an effort to gain a competitive
advantage states have turned to increased maritime patrols, as well as the use
of "maritime militias," which are fishermen armed with martial assets to resist
the influence of patrols. This conflict suggests a game of strategic resource
allocation where states allocate patrols intelligently to earn the greatest
possible utility. The game, however, is quite computationally challenging when
considering its size (there are several distinct fisheries in the SCS), the
nonlinear nature of biomass growth, and the influence of patrol allocations on
costs imposed on fishermen. Further, uncertainty in player behavior attributed
to modeling error requires a robust analysis to fully capture the dispute's
dynamics. To model such a complex scenario, this paper employs a response
surface methodology to assess optimal patrolling strategies and their impact on
realized utilities. The methodology developed successfully finds strategies
which are more robust to behavioral uncertainty than a more straight-forward
method.
