  In this paper we study the security of a proposal for Post-Quantum
Cryptography from both a number theoretic and cryptographic perspective.
Charles-Goren-Lauter in 2006 [CGL06] proposed two hash functions based on the
hardness of finding paths in Ramanujan graphs. One is based on
Lubotzky-Phillips-Sarnak (LPS) graphs and the other one is based on
Supersingular Isogeny Graphs. A 2008 paper by Petit-Lauter-Quisquater breaks
the hash function based on LPS graphs. On the Supersingular Isogeny Graphs
proposal, recent work has continued to build cryptographic applications on the
hardness of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. A 2011
paper by De Feo-Jao-Pl\^{u}t proposed a cryptographic system based on
Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman as well as a set of five hard problems. In
this paper we show that the security of the SIDH proposal relies on the
hardness of the SIG path-finding problem introduced in [CGL06]. In addition,
similarities between the number theoretic ingredients in the LPS and Pizer
constructions suggest that the hardness of the path-finding problem in the two
graphs may be linked. By viewing both graphs from a number theoretic
perspective, we identify the similarities and differences between the Pizer and
LPS graphs.
