  We conjecture that Borda count is the ranked choice voting method that best
preserves the outcome of an election with randomly corrupted votes, among all
fair voting methods with small influences satisfying the Condorcet Loser
Criterion. This conjecture is an adaptation of the Plurality is Stablest
Conjecture to the setting of ranked choice voting. Since the plurality function
does not satisfy the Condorcet Loser Criterion, our new conjecture is not
directly related to the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture. Nevertheless, we show
that the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture implies our new Borda count is
Stablest conjecture. We therefore deduce that Borda count is stablest for
elections with three candidates when the corrupted votes are nearly
uncorrelated with the original votes. We also adapt a dimension reduction
argument to this setting, showing that the optimal ranked choice voting method
is "low-dimensional."
  The Condorcet Loser Criterion asserts that a candidate must lose an election
if each other candidate is preferred in head-to-head comparisons. Lastly, we
discuss a variant of our conjecture with the Condorcet Winner Criterion as a
constraint instead of the Condorcet Loser Criterion. In this case, we have no
guess for the most stable ranked choice voting method.
