  Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because
of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial
entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models,
while insightful, often fail to model the unpredictability and constraints of
real-world threat assessment scenarios. We refine sabotage games to reflect the
realistic limitations of the saboteur and the network operator. By transforming
sabotage games into reachability problems, our approach allows applying
existing computational solutions to model realistic restrictions on attackers
and defenders within the game. Modifying sabotage games into dynamic network
security problems successfully captures the nuanced interplay of strategy and
uncertainty in dynamic network security. Theoretically, we extend sabotage
games to model network security contexts and thoroughly explore if the
additional restrictions raise their computational complexity, often the
bottleneck of game theory in practical contexts. Practically, this research
sets the stage for actionable insights for developing robust defense mechanisms
by understanding what risks to mitigate in dynamically changing networks under
threat.
