  Logging systems are an essential component of security systems and their
security has been widely studied. Recently (2017) it was shown that existing
secure logging protocols are vulnerable to crash attack in which the adversary
modifies the log file and then crashes the system to make it indistinguishable
from a normal system crash. The attacker was assumed to be non-adaptive and not
be able to see the file content before modifying and crashing it (which will be
immediately after modifying the file). The authors also proposed a system
called SLiC that protects against this attacker. In this paper, we consider an
(insider) adaptive adversary who can see the file content as new log operations
are performed. This is a powerful adversary who can attempt to rewind the
system to a past state. We formalize security against this adversary and
introduce a scheme with provable security. We show that security against this
attacker requires some (small) protected memory that can become accessible to
the attacker after the system compromise. We show that existing secure logging
schemes are insecure in this setting, even if the system provides some
protected memory as above. We propose a novel mechanism that, in its basic
form, uses a pair of keys that evolve at different rates, and employ this
mechanism in an existing logging scheme that has forward integrity to obtain a
system with provable security against adaptive (and hence non-adaptive) crash
attack. We implemented our scheme on a desktop computer and a Raspberry Pi, and
showed in addition to higher security, a significant efficiency gain over SLiC.
