  Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel
framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in
resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with
nonatomic players, the coincidence of strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in
such games, and the uniqueness of the cost of each given resource across all
Nash equilibria. Our proofs allow for explicit calculation of Nash equilibrium
and for explicit and direct calculation of the resulting (unique) costs of
resources, and do not hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on the Minimax theorem
or any equivalent result, on linear programming, or on the existence of a
potential (though our analysis does provide powerful insights into the
potential, via a natural concrete physical interpretation). A generalization of
resource selection games, called resource selection games with I.D.-dependent
weighting, is defined, and the results are extended to this family, showing the
existence of strong equilibria, and showing that while resource costs are no
longer unique across Nash equilibria in games of this family, they are
nonetheless unique across all strong Nash equilibria, drawing a novel
fundamental connection between group deviation and I.D.-congestion. A natural
application of the resulting machinery to a large class of
constraint-satisfaction problems is also described.
