  Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting
critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of
such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide
how to allocate limited resources to protect specific targets, aiming to
maximize their expected utility (such as minimizing the extent of damage) and
considering that attackers will respond in a way that is most advantageous to
them.
  We present novel valid inequalities to find a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
in both Stackelberg games and Stackelberg security games. We also consider a
Stackelberg security game that aims to protect targets with a defined budget.
We use branch-and-price in this game to show that our approach outperforms the
standard formulation in the literature, and we conduct an extensive
computational study to analyze the impact of various branch-and-price
parameters on the performance of our method in different game settings.
