  Power producers can exhibit strategic behavior in electricity markets to
maximize their profits. This behavior is more pronounced with the deregulation
of distribution markets, which offers an opportunity for profit arbitrage
between transmission and distribution (T&D) markets. However, the temporally
distinct nature of these two markets introduces a significant risk in profit
for such producers. This paper derives its motivation from the perspective of a
strategic producer and develops a Single Leader Multi-Follower (SLMF) game for
deriving its participation strategies in T&D markets, while accounting for
different T&D coordination schemes based on the individual market Gate Closure
Times (GCT). We compare and contrast joint and sequential market clearing
models with regulated and deregulated distribution environments and evaluate
the risk of producer by leveraging consistent and coherent risk measures. SLMF
game is reformulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPEC) and is solved using the seminal Scholtes's relaxation scheme. We
validate the efficacy of our model and solution approach via the case study
carried out on the 11-zone New York ISO, and 7-bus Manhattan power networks,
used as transmission and distribution markets, respectively.
