  Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows
the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the
instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure
strategy -- an issue we refer to as information leakage -- is a significant
concern in practical applications. While previous research on patrolling games
has considered the attacker's real-time surveillance, our settings, therefore
models and techniques, are fundamentally different. More specifically, after
describing the information leakage model, we start with an LP formulation to
compute the defender's optimal strategy in the presence of leakage. Perhaps
surprisingly, we show that a key subproblem to solve this LP (more precisely,
the defender oracle) is NP-hard even for the simplest of security game models.
We then approach the problem from three possible directions: efficient
algorithms for restricted cases, approximation algorithms, and heuristic
algorithms for sampling that improves upon the status quo. Our experiments
confirm the necessity of handling information leakage and the advantage of our
algorithms.
