  Following the enactment of the UN Regulation, substantial efforts have been
directed toward implementing intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs)
and vulnerability analysis in Controller Area Network (CAN). However, Society
of Automotive Engineers (SAE) J1939 protocol, despite its extensive application
in camping cars and commercial vehicles, has seen limited vulnerability
identification, which raises significant safety concerns in the event of
security breaches. In this research, we explore and demonstrate attack
techniques specific to SAE J1939 communication protocol. We introduce 14 attack
scenarios, enhancing the discourse with seven scenarios recognized in the
previous research and unveiling seven novel scenarios through our elaborate
study. To verify the feasibility of these scenarios, we leverage a
sophisticated testbed that facilitates real-time communication and the
simulation of attacks. Our testing confirms the successful execution of 11
scenarios, underscoring their imminent threat to commercial vehicle operations.
Some attacks will be difficult to detect because they only inject a single
message. These results highlight unique vulnerabilities within SAE J1939
protocol, indicating the automotive cybersecurity community needs to address
the identified risks.
