  Critics object that the Everett view cannot make sense of quantum
probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it cannot make sense of
probability at all, or it cannot explain why probability should be governed by
the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections by
appealing to an Everettian version of Savage's rational decision theory.
Deutsch argues not only that an analogue of classical decision under
uncertainty makes sense in an Everett world; but also that under reasonable
assumptions, the betting odds of a rational Everettian agent should be
constrained by the Born rule. Deutsch's proposal has been defended and
developed by David Wallace, and in a different form by Hilary Greaves. In this
paper I offer some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace-Greaves argument,
focussing in particular on the supposed analogy with classical decision under
uncertainty.
