  I study a repeated binary-action supermodular game with endogenous exit where
many short-lived agents attempt to coordinate a revolt against a regime. The
regime undertakes costly actions to increase the short-run players'
coordination frictions, though acts only after if the revolt is unsuccessful,
inducing a lack-of-commitment problem. In the complete-information repeated
game, a folk theorem holds, with payoff multiplicity arising due to both the
regime's dynamic incentives and agents' stage-game strategic complementarities.
Neither the regime's reputational incentives nor belief dispersion among agents
(via global-games type uncertainty) alone meaningfully refine the equilibrium
payoff set. Together, though, the interaction between these two forces uniquely
select the regime's highest payoff in equilibrium. Furthermore, under a Markov
refinement, they select a unique equilibrium where the regime plays their
optimal commitment action. Methodologically, I develop tools to analyze
repeated games with endogenous exit where the regime's commitment action
flexibly varies with their discount rate.
