  We propose the problem of wiretapped commitment, where two parties, say
committer Alice and receiver Bob, engage in a commitment protocol using a noisy
channel as a resource, in the presence of an eavesdropper, say Eve. Noisy
versions of Alice's transmission over the wiretap channel are received at both
Bob and Eve. We seek to determine the maximum commitment throughput in the
presence of an eavesdropper, i.e., wiretapped commitment capacity, where in
addition to the standard security requirements for two-party commitment, one
seeks to ensure that Eve doesn't learn about the commit string.
  A key interest in this work is to explore the effect of collusion (or lack of
it) between the eavesdropper Eve and either Alice or Bob. Toward the same, we
present results on the wiretapped commitment capacity under the so-called
1-private regime (when Alice or Bob cannot collude with Eve) and the 2-private
regime (when Alice or Bob may possibly collude with Eve).
