  There is growing concern over the potential misuse of artificial intelligence
(AI) research. Publishing scientific research can facilitate misuse of the
technology, but the research can also contribute to protections against misuse.
This paper addresses the balance between these two effects. Our theoretical
framework elucidates the factors governing whether the published research will
be more useful for attackers or defenders, such as the possibility for adequate
defensive measures, or the independent discovery of the knowledge outside of
the scientific community. The balance will vary across scientific fields.
However, we show that the existing conversation within AI has imported concepts
and conclusions from prior debates within computer security over the disclosure
of software vulnerabilities. While disclosure of software vulnerabilities often
favours defence, this cannot be assumed for AI research. The AI research
community should consider concepts and policies from a broad set of adjacent
fields, and ultimately needs to craft policy well-suited to its particular
challenges.
