  Unlicensed spectrum has been viewed as a way to increase competition in
wireless access and promote innovation in new technologies and business models.
However, several recent papers have shown that the openness of such spectrum
can also lead to it becoming over congested when used by competing wireless
service providers (SPs). This in turn can result in the SPs making no profit
and may deter them from entering the market. However, this prior work assumes
that unlicensed access is a separate service from any service offered using
licensed spectrum. Here, we instead consider the more common case were service
providers bundle both licensed and unlicensed spectrum as a single service and
offer this with a single price. We analyze a model for such a market and show
that in this case SPs are able to gain higher profit than the case without
bundling. It is also possible to get higher social welfare with bundling.
Moreover, we explore the case where SPs are allowed to manage the customers'
average percentage of time they receive service on unlicensed spectrum and
characterize the social welfare gap between the profit maximizing and social
welfare maximizing setting.
