  Social scientists have observed that human behavior in society can often be
modeled as corresponding to a threshold type policy. A new behavior would
propagate by a procedure in which an individual adopts the new behavior if the
fraction of his neighbors or friends having adopted the new behavior exceeds
some threshold. In this paper we study the question of whether the emergence of
threshold policies may be modeled as a result of some rational process which
would describe the behavior of non-cooperative rational members of some social
network. We focus on situations in which individuals take the decision whether
to access or not some content, based on the number of views that the content
has. Our analysis aims at understanding not only the behavior of individuals,
but also the way in which information about the quality of a given content can
be deduced from view counts when only part of the viewers that access the
content are informed about its quality. In this paper we present a game
formulation for the behavior of individuals using a meanfield model: the number
of individuals is approximated by a continuum of atomless players and for which
the Wardrop equilibrium is the solution concept. We derive conditions on the
problem's parameters that result indeed in the emergence of threshold
equilibria policies. But we also identify some parameters in which other
structures are obtained for the equilibrium behavior of individuals.
