  This paper studies the provision of a wireless network by a monopolistic
provider who may be either benevolent (seeking to maximize social welfare) or
selfish (seeking to maximize provider profit). The paper addresses questions
that do not seem to have been studied before in the engineering literature on
wireless networks: Under what circumstances is it feasible for a provider,
either benevolent or selfish, to operate a network in such a way as to cover
costs? How is the optimal behavior of a benevolent provider different from the
optimal behavior of a selfish provider, and how does this difference affect
social welfare? And, most importantly, how does the medium access control (MAC)
technology influence the answers to these questions? To address these
questions, we build a general model, and provide analysis and simulations for
simplified but typical scenarios; the focus in these scenarios is on the
contrast between the outcomes obtained under carrier-sensing multiple access
(CSMA) and outcomes obtained under time-division multiple access (TDMA).
Simulation results demonstrate that differences in MAC technology can have a
significant effect on social welfare, on provider profit, and even on the
(financial) feasibility of a wireless network.
