  In this paper, an electric vehicle (EV) charging competition, among EV
aggregators that perform coordinated EV charging, is explored while taking into
consideration potential non-ideal actions of the aggregators. In the
coordinated EV charging strategy presented in this paper, each aggregator
determines EV charging start time and charging energy profiles to minimize
overall EV charging energy cost by including consideration of the actions of
the neighboring aggregators. The competitive interactions of the aggregators
are modeled by developing a two-stage non-cooperative game among the
aggregators. The game is then studied under prospect theory to examine the
impacts of non-ideal actions of the aggregators in selecting EV charging start
times according to subjectively evaluating their opponents' actions. It is
shown that the non-cooperative interactions among the aggregators lead to a
subgame perfect $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium when the game is played with either
ideal, or non-ideal, actions of the aggregators. A case study presented
demonstrates that the benefits of the coordinated EV charging strategy, in
terms of energy cost savings and peak-to-average ratio reductions, are
significantly resilient to non-ideal actions of the aggregators.
