  To demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge we probe the limits of what
might be called an experiment. By appeal to examples of scientific practice
from astrophysics and analogue gravity, we demonstrate that the reliability of
knowledge regarding certain phenomena gained from an experiment is not
circumscribed by the manipulability or accessibility of the target phenomena.
Rather, the limits of experimental knowledge are set by the extent to which
strategies for what we call `inductive triangulation' are available: that is,
the validation of the mode of inductive reasoning involved in the source-target
inference via appeal to one or more distinct and independent modes of inductive
reasoning. When such strategies are able to partially mitigate reasonable
doubt, we can take a theory regarding the phenomena to be well supported by
experiment. When such strategies are able to fully mitigate reasonable doubt,
we can take a theory regarding the phenomena to be established by experiment.
There are good reasons to expect the next generation of analogue experiments to
provide genuine knowledge of unmanipulable and inaccessible phenomena such that
the relevant theories can be understood as well supported.
