  Classical logics of knowledge and belief are usually interpreted on Kripke
models, for which a mathematically well-developed model theory is available.
However, such models are inadequate to capture dynamic phenomena. Therefore,
epistemic plausibility models have been introduced. Because these are much
richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit the
model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic
plausibility structures are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive
investigation of their model theory has been lacking so far. The aim of the
present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic
exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in
'ordinary' modal logic, the focus will be on the notion of bisimulation. We
define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L) and show
that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We prove a Hennesy-Milner type
result, and also two undefinability results. However, our main point is a
negative one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized
to epistemic plausibility models if conditional belief is taken into account.
We present two ways of coping with this issue: (i) adding a modality to the
language, and (ii) putting extra constraints on the models. Finally, we make
some remarks about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model
changes.
