  A set of $2^n$ candidates is presented to a commission. At every round, each
member of this commission votes by pairwise comparison, and one-half of the
candidates is deleted from the tournament, the remaining ones proceeding to the
next round until the $n$-th round (the final one) in which the final winner is
declared. The candidates are arranged on a board in a given order, which is
maintained among the remaining candidates at all rounds. A study of the size of
the commission is carried out in order to obtain the desired result of any
candidate being a possible winner. For $2^n$ candidates with $n \geq 3$, we
identify a voting profile with $4n -3$ voters such that any candidate could win
just by choosing a proper initial order of the candidates. Moreover, in the
setting of a random number of voters, we obtain the same results, with high
probability, when the expected number of voters is large.
