  One formal way of studying cooperation and incentive mechanisms in wireless
ad hoc networks is to use game theory. In this respect, simple interaction
models such as the forwarder's dilemma have been proposed and used
successfully. However, this type of models is not suited to account for
possible fluctuations of the wireless links of the network. Additionally, it
does not allow one to study the way a node transmits its own packets. At last,
the repeated game models used in the related literature do not allow the
important scenario of nodes with partial information (about the link state and
nodes actions) to be studied. One of the contributions of the present work is
precisely to provide a general approach to integrate all of these aspects.
Second, the best performance the nodes can achieve under partial information is
fully characterized for a general form of utilities. Third, we derive an
equilibrium transmission strategy which allows a node to adapt its transmit
power levels and packet forwarding rate to link fluctuations and other nodes
actions. The derived results are illustrated through a detailed numerical
analysis for a network model built from a generalized version of the
forwarder's dilemma. The analysis shows in particular that the proposed
strategy is able to operate in presence of channel fluctuations and to perform
significantly better than existing transmission mechanisms (e.g., in terms of
consumed network energy).
