  Classical law and economics is foundational to the American legal system.
Centered at the University of Chicago, its assumptions, most especially that
humans act both rationally and selfishly, informs the thinking of legislatures,
judges, and government lawyers, and has shaped nearly every aspect of the way
commercial transactions are conducted. But what if the Chicago School, as I
refer to this line of thinking, is wrong? Alternative approaches such as
behavioral law and economics or law and political economy contend that human
decisionmaking is based on emotions or should not be regulated as a social
geometry of bargains. This Article proposes a different and wholly novel reason
that the Chicago School is wrong: a fundamental assumption central to many of
its game theory models has been disproven. This Article shows that a 2012
breakthrough from world famous physicist Freeman Dyson shocked the world of
game theory. This Article shows that Chicago School game theorists are wrong on
their own terms because these 2 x 2 games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma,
Chicken, and Snowdrift, ostensibly based on mutual defection and corrective
justice, in fact yield to an insight of pure cooperation. These new game theory
solutions can be scaled to design whole institutions and systems that honor the
pure cooperation insight, holding out the possibility of cracking large scale
social dilemmas like the tragedy of the commons. It demonstrates that, in such
systems, pure cooperation is the best answer in the right environment and in
the long run. It ends by calling for a new legal field to redesign the
structures based on the outdated assumptions of the Chicago School game
theorists.
