  Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic
benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General
Lotto games, a class of two-player competitive resource allocation models. We
consider an asymmetric information setting where the opponent is uncertain
about the resource budget of the other player, and holds a prior belief on its
value. We assume the other player, called the signaler, is able to send a noisy
signal about its budget to the opponent. With its updated belief, the opponent
then must decide to invest in costly resources that it will deploy against the
signaler's resource budget in a General Lotto game. We derive the subgame
perfect equilibrium to this extensive-form game. In particular, we identify
necessary and sufficient conditions for which a signaling policy improves the
signaler's resulting performance in comparison to the scenario where it does
not send any signal. Moreover, we provide the optimal signaling policy when
these conditions are met. Notably we find that for some scenarios, the signaler
can effectively double its performance.
