  We propose a parametric family of measures of fairness in allocations of
TU-cooperative games. Their definition is based on generalized Renyi Entropy,
is related to the Cowell-Kuga generalized entropy indices in welfare economics,
and aims to parallel the spirit of the notion of price of anarchy in the case
of convex TU-cooperative games.
  Since computing these indices is NP-complete in general, we first upper bound
the performance of a "reverse greedy" algorithm for approximately computing
worst-case fairness. The result provides a general additive error guarantee in
terms of two (problem dependent) packing constants. We then particularize this
result to the class of induced subset games. For such games computing
worst-case fairness is NP-complete, and the additive guarantee constant can be
explicitly computed. We compare this result to the performance of an alternate
algorithm based on "biased orientations".
