  In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with
non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as
players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their
long-run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network under
investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a strategy, knowing in
advance the strategy of the encoder. We characterize the encoding and decoding
functions that form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The
equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players
choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize their expected
utilities. This problem is closely related to the literature on "Information
Design" in Game Theory. We also characterize the set of posterior distributions
that are compatible with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the
decoder. Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions
corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.
