  We consider a two-sided matching problem with a defined notion of pairwise
stability. We propose a distributed blind matching algorithm (BLMA) to solve
the problem. We prove the solution produced by BLMA will converge to an
$\epsilon$-pairwise stable outcome with probability one. We then consider a
matching problem in cognitive radio networks. Secondary users (SUs) are allowed
access time to the spectrum belonging to the primary users (PUs) provided that
they relay primary messages. We propose a realization of the BLMA to produce an
$\epsilon$-pairwise stable solution assuming quasi-convex and quasi-concave
utilities. In the case of more general utility forms, we show another BLMA
realization to provide a stable solution. Furthermore, we propose negotiation
mechanism to bias the algorithm towards one side of the market. We use this
mechanism to protect the exclusive rights of the PUs to the spectrum. In all
such implementations of the BLMA, we impose a limited information exchange in
the network so that agents can only calculate their own utilities, but no
information is available about the utilities of any other users in the network.
