  Prominent ethical and policy issues such as affirmative action and female
enrollment in science and engineering revolve around the idea that diversity is
good. However, even though diversity is an ambiguous concept, a precise
definition is seldom provided. We show that diversity may be construed as a
factual description, a craving for symmetry, an intrinsic good, an instrumental
good, a symptom, or a side effect. These acceptions differ vastly in their
nature and properties. The first one cannot lead to any action and the second
one is mistaken. Diversity as intrinsic good is a mere opinion, which cannot be
concretely applied; moreover, the most commonly invoked forms of diversity
(sexual and racial) are not intrinsically good. On the other hand, diversity as
instrumental good can be evaluated empirically and can give rise to policies,
but these may be very weak. Finally, symptoms and side effects are not actually
about diversity. We consider the example of female enrollment in science and
engineering, interpreting the various arguments found in the literature in
light of this polysemy.
  Keywords: ethics, policy, higher education, female students, minority
students, affirmative action
