  In this work a four terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a
destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied under two different
set of assumptions: (i) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission,
and (ii) The jammer relay is causally given the source message. In both cases
the jammer relay assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable
secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase it. To help the
eavesdropper, the jammer relay can use pure relaying and/or send interference.
Each of the problems is formulated as a two-player, non-cooperative, zero-sum
continuous game. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer
relay in the first problem, the Nash equilibrium is found and shown to be
achieved with mixed strategies in general. The optimal cumulative distribution
functions (cdf) for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of
the game, which is the Nash equilibrium secrecy rate, are found. For the second
problem, the Nash equilibrium solution is found and the results are compared to
the case when the jammer relay is not informed about the source message.
