  We discuss the security implications of noise for quantum coin tossing
protocols. We find that if quantum error correction can be used, so that noise
levels can be made arbitrarily small, then reasonable security conditions for
coin tossing can be framed so that results from the noiseless case will
continue to hold. If, however, error correction is not available (as is the
case with present day technology), and significant noise is present, then
tossing a single coin becomes problematic. In this case, we are led to consider
random n-bit string generation in the presence of noise, rather than
single-shot coin tossing. We introduce precise security criteria for n-bit
string generation and describe an explicit protocol that could be implemented
with present day technology. In general, a cheater can exploit noise in order
to bias coins to their advantage. We derive explicit upper bounds on the
average bias achievable by a cheater for given noise levels.
