  Almost all courts to interpret Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
have construed its ambiguously worded immunity provision broadly, shielding
Internet intermediaries from tort liability so long as they are not the literal
authors of offensive content. Although this broad interpretation effects the
basic goals of the statute, it ignores several serious textual difficulties and
mistakenly extends protection too far by immunizing even direct participants in
tortuous conduct.
  This analysis, which examines the text and history of Section 230 in light of
two strains of pre-Internet vicarious liability defamation doctrine, concludes
that the immunity provision of Section 230, though broad, was not intended to
abrogate entirely traditional common law notions of vicarious liability. Some
bases of vicarious liability remain, and their continuing validity both
explains the textual puzzles courts have faced in applying Section 230 and
undergirds the push by a small minority of courts to narrow the section's
immunity provision.
