  This article focuses on the work of O. Chanel and G. Chichilnisky (2013) on
the flaws of expected utility theory while assessing the value of life.
Expected utility is a fundamental tool in decision theory. However, it does not
fit with the experimental results when it comes to catastrophic outcomes
---see, for example, Chichilnisky (2009) for more details. In the experiments
conducted by Olivier Chanel in 1998 and 2009, several subjects are ask to
imagine they are presented 1 billion identical pills. They are paid \$220,000
to take and swallow one, knowing that one out of 1 billion is deadly. The
objective of this article is to show that risk aversion phenomenon cannot
explain the experimental results found. This is an additional reason why a new
kind of utility function is necessary: the axioms proposed by Graciela
Chichilnisky will be briefly presented, and it will be shown that it better
fits with experiments than any risk aversion utility function.
