  Within the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model, we study the
effectiveness of majority voting in various environments. By the pit of losses
paradox, majority decisions in apparently hostile environments systematically
reduce the capital of society. In such cases, the basic action of ``rejecting
all proposals without voting'' outperforms simple majority. We reveal another
pit of losses appearing in favorable environments. Here, the simple action of
``accepting all proposals without voting'' is superior to simple majority,
which thus causes a loss compared to total acceptance. We show that the second
pit of losses is a mirror image of the pit of losses in hostile environments
and explain this phenomenon. Technically, we consider a voting society
consisting of individual agents whose strategy is supporting all proposals that
increase their capital and a group whose members vote for the increase of the
total group capital. According to the main result, the expected capital gain of
each agent in the environment whose proposal generator $\xi$ has mean $\mu>0$
exceeds by $\mu$ their expected capital gain with generator $-\xi$. This result
extends to the shift-based families of generators with symmetric distributions.
The difference by $\mu$ causes symmetry relative to the basic action that
rejects/accepts all proposals in unfavorable/favorable environments.
