  Previous work suggests that the charter value hypothesis is theoretically
grounded and empirically supported, but not universally. Accordingly, this
paper aims to perform an analysis of the relations between charter value, risk
taking, and supervision, taking into account the relations' complexity.
Specifically, using the CAMELS rating system as a general framework for
supervision, we study how charter value relates to risk and supervision by
means of classification and regression tree analysis. The sample covers the
period 2005-2016 and consists of listed banks in countries that were members of
the Eurozone when it came into existence, along with Greece. To evaluate the
crisis consequences, we also separately analyze four subperiods and countries
that required financial aid from third parties and those that did not so, along
with large and small banks. Our results reflect the complexity of the relations
between charter value, supervision, and risk. Indeed, supervision and charter
value seem aligned regarding only some types of risk
