  This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning
constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal
content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic
and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning
is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies
that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely
relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of
language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss
how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense
and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the
context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective
meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise
maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and
semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these
domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that
interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate
semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is
relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia.
We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based
theories of consciousness.
