  In this paper, we investigate the impact of reward schemes and committee
sizes motivated by governance systems over blockchain communities. We introduce
a model for elections with a binary outcome space where there is a ground truth
(i.e., a "correct" outcome), and where stakeholders can only choose to delegate
their voting power to a set of delegation representatives (DReps). Moreover,
the effort (cost) invested by each DRep positively influences both (i) her
ability to vote correctly and (ii) the total delegation that she attracts,
thereby increasing her voting power. This model constitutes the natural
counterpart of delegated proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols, where delegated stakes
are used to elect the block builders.
  As a way to motivate the representatives to exert effort, a reward scheme can
be used based on the delegation attracted by each DRep. We analyze both the
game-theoretic aspects and the optimization counterpart of this model. Our
primary focus is on selecting a committee that maximizes the probability of
reaching the correct outcome, given a fixed monetary budget allocated for
rewarding the delegates. Our findings provide insights into the design of
effective reward mechanisms and optimal committee structures (i.e., how many
DReps are enough) in these PoS-like governance systems.
