  There is a longstanding debate in the logico-philosophical community as to
why the G\"odelian sentences of a consistent and sufficiently strong theory are
true. The prevalent argument seems to be something like this: since every one
of the G\"odelian sentences of such a theory is equivalent to the theory's
consistency statement, even provably so inside the theory, the truth of those
sentences follows from the consistency of the theory in question. So,
G\"odelian sentences of consistent theories should be true. In this paper, we
show that G\"odelian sentences of only sound theories are true; and there is a
long road from consistency to soundness, indeed a hierarchy of conditions which
are satisfied by some theories and falsified by others. We also study the truth
of Rosserian sentences and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
truth of Rosserian (and also G\"odelian) sentences of theories.
