  Traditional network interdiction refers to the problem of an interdictor
trying to reduce the throughput of network users by removing network edges. In
this paper, we propose a new paradigm for network interdiction that models
scenarios, such as stealth DoS attack, where the interdiction is performed
through injecting adversarial traffic flows. Under this paradigm, we first
study the deterministic flow interdiction problem, where the interdictor has
perfect knowledge of the operation of network users. We show that the problem
is highly inapproximable on general networks and is NP-hard even when the
network is acyclic. We then propose an algorithm that achieves a logarithmic
approximation ratio and quasi-polynomial time complexity for acyclic networks
through harnessing the submodularity of the problem. Next, we investigate the
robust flow interdiction problem, which adopts the robust optimization
framework to capture the case where definitive knowledge of the operation of
network users is not available. We design an approximation framework that
integrates the aforementioned algorithm, yielding a quasi-polynomial time
procedure with poly-logarithmic approximation ratio for the more challenging
robust flow interdiction. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms through simulations, showing that they can be efficiently
implemented and yield near-optimal solutions.
