  Security and Privacy are crucial in modern Internet services. Transport Layer
Security (TLS) has largely addressed the issue of security. However,
information about the type of service being accessed goes in plain-text in the
initial handshakes of vanilla TLS, thus potentially revealing the activity of
users and compromising privacy. The ``Encrypted ClientHello'' or ECH overcomes
this issue by extending TLS 1.3 where all of the information that can
potentially reveal the service type is masked, thus addressing the privacy
issues in TLS 1.3. However, we notice that Internet services tend to use
different versions of TLS for application data (primary connection/channel) and
supporting data (side channels) such as scheduling information \textit{etc.}.
%, during the active session. Although many internet services have migrated to
TLS 1.3, we notice that it is only true for the primary connections which do
benefit from TLS 1.3, while the side-channels continue to use lower version of
TLS (e.g., 1.2) %which do not support ECH and continue to leak type of service
accessed. We demonstrate that privacy information leaked from the side-channels
can be used to affect the performance on the primary channels, like blocking or
throttling specific service on the internet. Our work demonstrates that
adapting ECH on primary channels alone is not sufficient to prevent the privacy
leaks and attacks on primary channels. Further, we demonstrate that it is
necessary for all of the associated side-channels also to migrate to TLS 1.3
and adapt ECH extension in order to offer complete privacy preservatio
