  Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major
topic of debate in the last decades. For example, several works have explored
whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of
pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results.
Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In Study 1 ($N=567$) we
implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets \$0.50 and
the recipient gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets \$0.50
and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words
describing the available actions using six terms, from very negative (e.g.,
stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find that the rate
of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available
actions. In Study 2 ($N=221$) we ask brand new participants to rate each of the
words used in Study 1 from ``extremely wrong'' to ``extremely right'' . We find
that these moral judgments explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our
studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme Dictator game can
be generated using morally loaded language.
