  The executive branch (the government) is usually not directly elected by the
people, but is created by another elected body or person such as the parliament
or the president. As a result, its members are not directly accountable to the
people, individually or as a group.
  We propose a scenario where government members are directly elected by the
people, and seek to achieve proportional representation in the process.
  We will present a formal model for the allocation of K offices, each
associated with a disjoint set of candidates contesting for that seat.
  A group of voters provides ballots for each of the offices. Since using
simple majority voting for each office independently may result in minority
preferences being completely ignored, here we adapt the greedy version of
proportional approval voting (GreedyPAV) to our framework.
  In the article Electing the Executive Branch you can find an in-depth
explanation of the model and a demonstration - through computer-based
simulations - of how voting for all offices together using this rule overcomes
this weakness and upholds the axiom of proportionality.
  In this article, we will present the implementation of the algorithm
(GreedyPAV) proposed by Rutvik Page, Ehud Shapiro, and Nimrod Talmon in the
article mentioned above. In addition, we tested our implementation through a
survey, the results of which will be presented and analyzed later in the
article.
