  The potential for advances in information-age technologies to undermine
nuclear deterrence and influence the potential for nuclear escalation
represents a critical question for international politics. One challenge is
that uncertainty about the trajectory of technologies such as autonomous
systems and artificial intelligence (AI) makes assessments difficult. This
paper evaluates the relative impact of autonomous systems and artificial
intelligence in three areas: nuclear command and control, nuclear delivery
platforms and vehicles, and conventional applications of autonomous systems
with consequences for nuclear stability. We argue that countries may be more
likely to use risky forms of autonomy when they fear that their second-strike
capabilities will be undermined. Additionally, the potential deployment of
uninhabited, autonomous nuclear delivery platforms and vehicles could raise the
prospect for accidents and miscalculation. Conventional military applications
of autonomous systems could simultaneously influence nuclear force postures and
first-strike stability in previously unanticipated ways. In particular, the
need to fight at machine speed and the cognitive risk introduced by automation
bias could increase the risk of unintended escalation. Finally, used properly,
there should be many applications of more autonomous systems in nuclear
operations that can increase reliability, reduce the risk of accidents, and buy
more time for decision-makers in a crisis.
