  We study the problem of making predictions of an adversarially chosen
high-dimensional state that are unbiased subject to an arbitrary collection of
conditioning events, with the goal of tailoring these events to downstream
decision makers. We give efficient algorithms for solving this problem, as well
as a number of applications that stem from choosing an appropriate set of
conditioning events.
  For example, we can efficiently make predictions targeted at polynomially
many decision makers, giving each of them optimal swap regret if they
best-respond to our predictions. We generalize this to online combinatorial
optimization, where the decision makers have a very large action space, to give
the first algorithms offering polynomially many decision makers no regret on
polynomially many subsequences that may depend on their actions and the
context. We apply these results to get efficient no-subsequence-regret
algorithms in extensive-form games (EFGs), yielding a new family of regret
guarantees for EFGs that generalizes some existing EFG regret notions, e.g.
regret to informed causal deviations, and is generally incomparable to other
known such notions.
  Next, we develop a novel transparent alternative to conformal prediction for
building valid online adversarial multiclass prediction sets. We produce class
scores that downstream algorithms can use for producing valid-coverage
prediction sets, as if these scores were the true conditional class
probabilities. We show this implies strong conditional validity guarantees
including set-size-conditional and multigroup-fair coverage for polynomially
many downstream prediction sets. Moreover, our class scores can be guaranteed
to have improved $L_2$ loss, cross-entropy loss, and generally any Bregman
loss, compared to any collection of benchmark models, yielding a
high-dimensional real-valued version of omniprediction.
