  Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting
problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee
selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities
among the alternatives that the voters believe that certain coalitions are more
effective and can more efficiently deliver desired outputs. To include such
possibilities, in this present study, we consider a committee selection problem
(or multi-winner voting problem) where voters are able to express their opinion
regarding interdependencies among alternatives. Using a dichotomous preference
scale termed generalized approval evaluation we construct an $m$-person
coalitional game which is more commonly called a cooperative game with
transferable utilities. To identify each alternative's score we use the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) of the cooperative game we construct for the purpose. Our
approach to the committee selection problem emphasizes on an important issue
called the compatibility principle. Further, we show that the properties of the
Shapley value are well suited in the committee selection context too. We
explore several properties of the proposed committee selection rule.
