  Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can
be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a
nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key
distribution system containing such detectors. In this regime, all single
photon detectors in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous
illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain
detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies polarization (or other
parameter used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such
that the target detector stops receiving light while the other detector(s)
continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon
sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single
click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can do a successful
intercept-resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, 3 different
models of passively-quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I
have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real
quantum key distribution system under attack. Control parameters and side
effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically
possible.
