  Multiple choice questions are at the heart of many standardized tests and
examinations at academic institutions allover the world. In this paper, we
argue that recent advancements in sensing and human-computer interaction expose
these types of questions to highly effective attacks that today's proctor's are
simply not equipped to detect. We design one such attack based on a protocol of
carefully orchestrated wrist movements combined with haptic and visual feedback
mechanisms designed for stealthiness. The attack is done through collaboration
between a knowledgeable student (i.e., a mercenary) and a weak student (i.e.,
the beneficiary) who depends on the mercenary for solutions. Through a
combination of experiments and theoretical modeling, we show the attack to be
highly effective. The paper makes the case for an outright ban on all tech
gadgets inside examination rooms, irrespective of whether their usage appears
benign to the plain eye.
