  We study the fair division of indivisible items with subsidies among $n$
agents, where the absolute marginal valuation of each item is at most one.
Under monotone valuations (where each item is a good), Brustle et al. (2020)
demonstrated that a maximum subsidy of $2(n-1)$ and a total subsidy of
$2(n-1)^2$ are sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-freeable
allocation. In this paper, we improve upon these bounds, even in a wider model.
Namely, we show that, given an EF1 allocation, we can compute in polynomial
time an envy-free allocation with a subsidy of at most $n-1$ per agent and a
total subsidy of at most $n(n-1)/2$. Moreover, we present further improved
bounds for monotone valuations.
