  This is the longer (partially unpublished) version of response; the shorter
version (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0605013) is published in Physics Letters
A. We point out that the claims in the comment-paper of Scheuer and Yariv are
either irrelevant or incorrect. We first clarify what the security of a
physically secure layer means. The idealized Kirchoff-loop-Johnson-like-noise
(KLJN) scheme is totally secure therefore it is more secure than idealized
quantum communication schemes which can never be totally secure because of the
inherent noise processes in those communication schemes and the statistical
nature of eavesdropper detection based on error statistics. On the other hand,
with sufficient resources, a practical/non-ideal realization of the KLJN cipher
can arbitrarily approach the idealized limit and outperform even the idealized
quantum communicator schemes because the non-ideality-effects are determined
and controlled by the design. The cable resistance issue analyzed by Scheuer
and Yariv is a good example for that because the eavesdropper has insufficient
time window to build a sufficient statistics and the actual information leak
can be designed. We show that Scheuer's and Yariv's numerical result of 1%
voltage drop supports higher security than that of quantum communicators.
Moreover, choosing thicker or shorter wires can arbitrarily reduce this voltage
drop further; the same conclusion holds even according to the equations of
Scheuer and Yariv.
