  The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to
trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and
in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the
behavioral assumption that humans are `compromising' beings and have privacy
preferences, (b) privacy as a good not having strict boundaries, and (c) the
practical inevitability of inappropriate data leakage by data holders
downstream in the data-release supply-chain, we propose a design of regulated
efficient/bounded inefficient economic mechanisms for oligopoly data trading
markets using a novel preference function bidding approach on a simplified
sellers-broker market. Our methodology preserves the heterogeneous privacy
preservation constraints (at a grouped consumer, i.e., app, level) upto certain
compromise levels, and at the same time satisfies information demand (via the
broker) of agencies (e.g., advertising organizations) that collect client data
for the purpose of targeted behavioral advertising.
