  Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be
observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic
models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility
function that ensures higher utility if an agent has more same-type neighbors.
The agents strategically choose their location on a given graph that serves as
residential area to maximize their utility. However, sociological polls suggest
that real-world agents are actually favoring mixed-type neighborhoods, and
hence should be modeled via non-monotone utility functions. To address this, we
study Swap Schelling Games with single-peaked utility functions. Our main
finding is that tolerance, i.e., agents favoring fifty-fifty neighborhoods or
being in the minority, is necessary for equilibrium existence on almost regular
or bipartite graphs. Regarding the quality of equilibria, we derive (almost)
tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. In particular,
we show that the latter is constant on bipartite and almost regular graphs.
