  There is a fierce competition between two-sided mobility platforms (e.g.,
Uber and Lyft) fueled by massive subsidies, yet the underlying dynamics and
interactions between the competing plat-forms are largely unknown. These
platforms rely on the cross-side network effects to grow, they need to attract
agents from both sides to kick-off: travellers are needed for drivers and
drivers are needed for travellers. We use our coevolutionary model featured by
the S-shaped learning curves to simulate the day-to-day dynamics of the
ride-sourcing market at the microscopic level. We run three scenarios to
illustrate the possible equilibria in the market. Our results underline how the
correlation inside the ride-sourcing nest of the agents choice set
significantly affects the plat-forms' market shares. While late entry to the
market decreases the chance of platform success and possibly results in
"winner-takes-all", heavy subsidies can keep the new platform in competition
giving rise to "market sharing" regime.
