  Renewable energy has achieved high penetration rates in many areas, leading
to curtailment, especially if existing network infrastructure is insufficient
and energy generated cannot be exported. In this context, Distribution Network
Operators (DNOs) face a significant knowledge gap about how to implement
curtailment rules that achieve desired operational objectives, but at the same
time minimise disruption and economic losses for renewable generators. In this
work, we study the properties of several curtailment rules widely used in UK
renewable energy projects, and their effect on the viability of renewable
generation investment. Moreover, we propose a new curtailment rule which
guarantees fair allocation of curtailment amongst all generators with minimal
disruption. Another key knowledge gap faced by DNOs is how to incentivise
private network upgrades, especially in settings where several generators can
use the same line against the payment of a transmission fee. In this work, we
provide a solution to this problem by using tools from algorithmic game theory.
Specifically, this setting can be modelled as a Stackelberg game between the
private transmission line investor and local renewable generators, who are
required to pay a transmission fee to access the line. We provide a method for
computing the empirical equilibrium of this game, using a model that captures
the stochastic nature of renewable energy generation and demand. Finally, we
use the practical setting of a grid reinforcement project from the UK and a
large dataset of wind speed measurements and demand to validate our model. We
show that charging a transmission fee as a proportion of the feed-in tariff
price between 15%-75% would allow both investors to implement their projects
and achieve desirable distribution of the profit.
