  With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee
mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An
ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive
compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness ($c$-SCP). However,
state-of-the-art works either fail to meet these three properties
simultaneously or only satisfy them under certain conditions. In this paper, we
propose a burning $N$-price auction TFM named BNP. This mechanism divides the
transaction fee into a base fee, which is burned, and a priority fee, which is
allocated to miners. Theoretical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrate
that, even under conditions of significant transaction congestion, this
mechanism satisfies UIC, MIC, and $c$-SCP simultaneously. Furthermore, the BNP
mechanism is not constrained by the type of blockchain consensus, making it
widely applicable.
