  This study examines the mechanism design problem for public goods provision
in a large economy with $n$ independent agents. We propose a class of
dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational
mechanisms, which we call the adjusted mean-thresholding (AMT) mechanisms. We
show that when the cost of provision grows slower than the $\sqrt{n}$-rate, the
AMT mechanisms are both eventually ex-ante budget balanced and asymptotically
efficient. When the cost grows faster than the $\sqrt{n}$-rate, in contrast, we
show that any incentive compatible, individually rational, and eventually
ex-ante budget balanced mechanism must have provision probability converging to
zero and hence cannot be asymptotically efficient. The AMT mechanisms have a
simple form and are more informationally robust when compared to, for example,
the second-best mechanism. This is because the construction of an AMT mechanism
depends only on the first moment of the valuation distribution.
