  We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination
game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players
may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash
equilibria of the original 2x2 game is stable under replicator dynamics. We
show that this Nash equilibrium is the {\omega}-limit of all initial conditions
in the interior of the state space for the modified 2x3 game. Thus, the
existence of a third action for one of the players, although not used, allows
both players to coordinate on one Nash equilibrium. This Nash equilibrium is
the one preferred by, at least, the player with access to the new action. This
approach deals with both coordination failure (players choose the
payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, if such a Nash equilibrium exists) and
miscoordination (players do not use mixed strategies).
