  We propose an extended spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) model
to study the dynamics of individual career choice and the corresponding social
output. Based on the social value orientation theory, we categorized two
classes of work, namely the public work if it serves public interests, and the
private work if it serves personal interests. Under the context of SEPGG,
choosing public work is to cooperate and choosing private work is to defect. We
then investigate the effects of employee productivity, human capital and
external subsidies on individual career choices of the two work types, as well
as the overall social welfare. From simulation results, we found that when
employee productivity of public work is low, people are more willing to enter
the private sector. Although this will make both the effort level and human
capital of individuals doing private work higher than those engaging in public
work, the total outcome of the private sector is still lower than that of the
public sector provided a low level of public subsidies. When the employee
productivity is higher for public work, a certain amount of subsidy can greatly
improve system output. On the contrary, when the employee productivity of
public work is low, provisions of subsidy to the public sector can result in a
decline in social output.
