  The rapid increase of photovoltaic cells, batteries, and Electric Vehicles
(EVs) in electric grids can result in congested distribution networks. An
alternative to enhancing network capacity is a redispatch market, allowing
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to alleviate congested networks by asking
energy consumers to change their consumption schedules. However, energy
consumers can anticipate the redispatch market outcomes and strategically
adjust their bids in the day-ahead market. This behaviour, known as
increase-decrease gaming, can result in the exacerbation of congestion and
enable energy consumers to gain windfall profits from the DSO. In this paper,
we consider a two-stage problem consisting of the day-ahead market (first
stage) and redispatch market (second stage). Then, we model the
increase-decrease game for large populations of energy consumers in power
networks using a stochastic mean field game approach. The agents (energy
consumers) maximize their individual welfare in the day-ahead market with
anticipation of the redispatch market. We show that all the agent strategies
are ordered along their utilities and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
for this game.
