  The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by
means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in
simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the
Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras approach. We also survey the main
contributions on imperfect competition and strategic market games that are
linked with our analysis. Secondly, we show how the bilateral oligopoly model
can be used to study different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where
all agents act strategically; asymmetric oligopoly where only some agents act
strategically; simultaneous oligopoly, where sellers and buyers make their
choices without knowledge of others' decisions; and sequential oligopoly, where
some agents move first. Thirdly, we focus on how the bilateral oligopoly model
can clarify how either strategic or competitive behaviours may emerge
endogenously depending on the fundamentals of the economy.
