  Electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to be a major component of the smart
grid. The rapid proliferation of EVs will introduce an unprecedented load on
the existing electric grid due to the charging/discharging behavior of the EVs,
thus motivating the need for novel approaches for routing EVs across the grid.
In this paper, a novel gametheoretic framework for smart routing of EVs within
the smart grid is proposed. The goal of this framework is to balance the
electricity load across the grid while taking into account the traffic
congestion and the waiting time at charging stations. The EV routing problem is
formulated as a noncooperative game. For this game, it is shown that selfish
behavior of EVs will result in a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the price
of anarchy upper bounded by the variance of the ground load induced by the
residential, industrial, or commercial users. Moreover, the results are
extended to capture the stochastic nature of induced ground load as well as the
subjective behavior of the owners of EVs as captured by using notions from the
behavioral framework of prospect theory. Simulation results provide new
insights on more efficient energy pricing at charging stations and under more
realistic grid conditions.
