  Scholars have wondered for a long time whether quantum mechanics (QM)
subtends a quantum concept of truth which originates quantum logic (QL) and is
radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept of truth. We show in
this paper that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language of pragmatically
decidable assertive formulas, which formalize statements about physical systems
that are empirically justified or unjustified in the framework of QM. According
to this interpretation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic concept
of empirical justification within QM rather than properties of a quantum
concept of truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist
perspective, according to which nonstandard logics can be interpreted as
theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth, avoiding competition
with classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some
elucidations of the standard concept of quantum truth are also obtained.
