  A boardroom election is an election that takes place in a single room -- the
boardroom -- in which all voters can see and hear each other. We present an
initial exploration of boardroom elections with ballot privacy and voter
verifiability that use only "low-tech cryptography" without using computers to
mark or collect ballots. Specifically, we define the problem, introduce several
building blocks, and propose a new protocol that combines these blocks in novel
ways. Our new building blocks include "foldable ballots" that can be rotated to
hide the alignment of ballot choices with voting marks, and "visual secrets"
that are easy to remember and use but hard to describe. Although closely seated
participants in a boardroom election have limited privacy, the protocol ensures
that no one can determine how others voted. Moreover, each voter can verify
that their ballot was correctly cast, collected, and counted, without being
able to prove how they voted, providing assurance against undue influence.
Low-tech cryptography is useful in situations where constituents do not trust
computer technology, and it avoids the complex auditing requirements of
end-to-end cryptographic voting systems such as Pr\^{e}t-\`{a}-Voter. This
paper's building blocks and protocol are meant to be a proof of concept that
might be tested for usability and improved.
