  Cryptographic protocols rely on message-passing to coordinate activity among
principals. Each principal maintains local state in individual local sessions
only as needed to complete that session. However, in some protocols a principal
also uses state to coordinate its different local sessions. Sometimes the
non-local, mutable state is used as a means, for example with smart cards or
Trusted Platform Modules. Sometimes it is the purpose of running the protocol,
for example in commercial transactions.
  Many richly developed tools and techniques, based on well-understood
foundations, are available for design and analysis of pure message-passing
protocols. But the presence of cross-session state poses difficulties for these
techniques.
  In this paper we provide a framework for modeling stateful protocols. We
define a hybrid analysis method. It leverages theorem-proving---in this
instance, the PVS prover---for reasoning about computations over state. It
combines that with an "enrich-by-need" approach---embodied by CPSA---that
focuses on the message-passing part. As a case study we give a full analysis of
the Envelope Protocol, due to Mark Ryan.
