  Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating
beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the
information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and
the deceivee. This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework of a deception
game to model the strategic behaviors of the deceiver and deceivee and
construct strategies for both attacks and defenses over a continuous
one-dimensional information space. We use the signaling game model to capture
the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of deceptions by
modeling the deceiver as a privately-informed player called sender and the
deceivee as an uninformed player called receiver. We characterize perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) solution of the game and study the
deceivability. We highlight the condition of deceivee's knowledge enhancement
through evidences to maintain the equilibrium and analyze the impacts of direct
deception costs and players' conflict of interest on the deceivability.
