  Classic network utility maximization problems are usually solved assuming all
information is available, implying that information not locally available is
always truthfully reported. This may not be practical in all scenarios,
especially in distributed/semi-distributed networks. In this paper, incentive
for truthful reporting in network optimizations with local information is
studied. A novel general model for extending network utility maximization (NUM)
problems to incorporate local information is proposed, which allows each user
to choose its own objective locally and/or privately. Two specific problems,
i.e., a user-centric problem (UCP) and a network-centric problem (NCP), are
studied. In the UCP, a network center aims to maximize the collective benefit
of all users, and truthful reporting from the users regarding their local
information is necessary for finding the solution. We show that the
widely-adopted dual pricing cannot guarantee truthful information reporting
from a user unless the resource is over-supplied or the price is too high for
this user to afford. In the NCP, the network center has its own objective and
preferred solution, and incentive needs to be provided for the users to adopt
the solution it prefers. Truthful reporting from users is necessary for the
center to determine the incentives and achieve its solution. For two-user and
multiuser cases, we propose two mechanisms to motivate truthful reporting from
users while guaranteeing nonnegative utility gains for both the users and the
center. A case study on underlay D2D communication illustrates the application
of the UCP and NCP. Simulations are conducted for the D2D application to
validate the analytical results and demonstrate the proposed mechanisms.
