  We consider the problem of private information retrieval through wiretap
channel II (PIR-WTC-II). In PIR-WTC-II, a user wants to retrieve a single
message (file) privately out of $M$ messages, which are stored in $N$
replicated and non-communicating databases. An external eavesdropper observes a
fraction $\mu_n$ (of its choice) of the traffic exchanged between the $n$th
database and the user. In addition to the privacy constraint, the databases
should encode the returned answer strings such that the eavesdropper learns
absolutely nothing about the \emph{contents} of the databases. We aim at
characterizing the capacity of the PIR-WTC-II under the combined privacy and
security constraints. We obtain a general upper bound for the problem in the
form of a max-min optimization problem, which extends the converse proof of the
PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints. We propose an achievability
scheme that satisfies the security constraint by encoding a secret key, which
is generated securely at each database, into an artificial noise vector using
an MDS code. The user and the databases operate at one of the corner points of
the achievable scheme for the PIR under asymmetric traffic constraints such
that the retrieval rate is maximized under the imposed security constraint. The
upper bound and the lower bound match for the case of $M=2$ and $M=3$ messages,
for any $N$, and any $\boldsymbol{\mu}=(\mu_1, \cdots, \mu_N)$.
