  This paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism
17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in
Bradwardine's Insolubilia. Prompted by the occurrence of the paradox in
Cervantes's Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions to the
problem, namely Bradwardine's "just false" conception, Buridan's "contingently
true/false" theory, Cervantes's "both true and false" view, and then
Jacquette's "neither true simpliciter nor false simpliciter" account. All have
in common to accept that the Bridge expresses a truth-apt proposition, but only
the latter three endorse the transparency of truth. Against some previous
commentaries I first show that Buridan's solution is fully compliant with an
account of the paradox within classical logic. I then show that Cervantes's
insights, as well as Jacquette's treatment, are both supportive of a
dialetheist account, and Jacquette's in particular of the strict-tolerant
account of truth. I defend dialetheist intuitions (whether in LP or ST guise)
against two objections: one concerning the future, the other concerning the
alleged simplicity of the Bridge compared to the Liar.
