  We develop an analytical framework for distribution of popular content in an
Information Centric Network (ICN) that comprises of Access ICNs, a Transit ICN
and a Content Provider. Using a generalized Zipf distribution to model content
popularity, we devise a game theoretic approach to jointly determine caching
and pricing strategies in such an ICN. Under the assumption that the caching
cost of the access and transit ICNs is inversely proportional to popularity, we
show that the Nash caching strategies in the ICN are 0-1 (all or nothing)
strategies. Further, for the case of symmetric Access ICNs, we show that the
Nash equilibrium is unique and the caching policy (0 or 1) is determined by a
threshold on the popularity of the content (reflected by the Zipf probability
metric), i.e., all content more popular than the threshold value is cached. We
also show that the resulting threshold of the Access and Transit ICNs, as well
as all prices can be obtained by a decomposition of the joint caching and
pricing problem into two independent caching only and pricing only problems.
