  Social consensus is important for society. Sometimes the success of society
depends on a consensus (e.g. the decision to pay taxes or to commit to the
constitution). Examples for continuous opinion dynamics are discussions about
tax rates or budget plan proposals for governments investments. Another example
is a commission of experts which should reach a estimate about a certain issue,
e.g. the tax revenues of the next year. In all these situations we got a group
of agents which should reach a common agreement either for reaching a good
approximation to the truth but on the other hand for the reason, that reaching
consensus is a good in itself.
  From social judgment theory and experiments we know that humans either tend
to agreement with others for normative and informational reasons but on the
other hand have bounded confidence against others with differing opinions.
  In a framework of models of continuous opinion dynamics we ask, which
structural conditions foster the achievement of consensus? We present evidence
by simulation that bringing more issues in does, but only if the issues are
under budget constraints. Further, the installation of meetings where everyone
hears all opinions has a better impact than relying on gossip.
