  We analyze and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and
for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two
different boundedly rational (i.e., sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely,
myopic and unconditional strategies) and compare them between each other and
with the utility effect of full information. We show that effects are mainly
caused by full information and predictability, being the effect of learning
marginal. We also investigate the saver's decision of whether to manage her/his
portfolio personally (DIY investor) or hire, against the payment of a
management fee, a professional investor and find that delegation is mainly
motivated by the belief that professional advisors are, depending on investment
horizon and risk aversion, either better informed ("insiders") or more capable
of gathering and processing information rather than their ability of learning
from financial data. In particular, for very short investment horizons,
delegation is primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by the beliefs that
professional investors are better informed.
