  We study evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which
agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to
other positions within a given migration radius. Using the imitation of the
best rule for strategy revision, it is shown that cooperation may evolve and be
stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game space for several migration distances but
only for small game interaction radius while the Stag Hunt class of games
become fully cooperative. We also show that only a few trials are needed for
cooperation to evolve, i.e. searching costs are not an issue. When the
stochastic Fermi strategy update protocol is used cooperation cannot evolve in
the Prisoner's Dilemma if the selection intensity is high in spite of
opportunistic migration. However, when imitation becomes more random, fully or
partially cooperative states are reached in all games for all migration
distances tested and for short to intermediate interaction radii.
