  We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games
introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently
finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose
an extension of the sabotage games in which the first player (Runner) traverses
an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second player (Saboteur). In
our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget that
he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to
minimise the quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show
that, on the one hand, for most of the classical cost functions considered in
the literature, the problem of determining if Runner has a strategy to ensure a
cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, if the budget
of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost
functions. Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also
leads to better complexity.
