  This paper studies the action dynamics of network coordination games with
bounded-rational agents. I apply the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model
to the analysis as the EWA model has several free parameters that can capture
different aspects of agents' behavioural features. I show that the set of
possible long-term action patterns can be largely different when the
behavioural parameters vary, ranging from a unique possibility in which all
agents favour the risk-dominant option to some set of outcomes richer than the
collection of Nash equilibria. Monotonicity and non-monotonicity in the
relationship between the number of possible long-term action profiles and the
behavioural parameters are explored. I also study the question of influential
agents in terms of whose initial predispositions are important to the actions
of the whole network. The importance of agents can be represented by a left
eigenvector of a Jacobian matrix provided that agents' initial attractions are
close to some neutral level. Numerical calculations examine the predictive
power of the eigenvector for the long-run action profile and how agents'
influences are impacted by their behavioural features and network positions.
