  In this paper we address the interplay among intention, time, and belief in
dynamic environments. The first contribution is a logic for reasoning about
intention, time and belief, in which assumptions of intentions are represented
by preconditions of intended actions. Intentions and beliefs are coherent as
long as these assumptions are not violated, i.e. as long as intended actions
can be performed such that their preconditions hold as well. The second
contribution is the formalization of what-if scenarios: what happens with
intentions and beliefs if a new (possibly conflicting) intention is adopted, or
a new fact is learned? An agent is committed to its intended actions as long as
its belief-intention database is coherent. We conceptualize intention as
commitment toward time and we develop AGM-based postulates for the iterated
revision of belief-intention databases, and we prove a Katsuno-Mendelzon-style
representation theorem.
