  In this work we propose and examine Location Verification Systems (LVSs) for
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) in the realistic setting of Rician fading
channels. In our LVSs, a single authorized Base Station (BS) equipped with
multiple antennas aims to detect a malicious vehicle that is spoofing its
claimed location. We first determine the optimal attack strategy of the
malicious vehicle, which in turn allows us to analyze the optimal LVS
performance as a function of the Rician $K$-factor of the channel between the
BS and a legitimate vehicle. Our analysis also allows us to formally prove that
the LVS performance limit is independent of the properties of the channel
between the BS and the malicious vehicle, provided the malicious vehicle's
antenna number is above a specified value. We also investigate how tracking
information on a vehicle quantitatively improves the detection performance of
an LVS, showing how optimal performance is obtained under the assumption of the
tracking length being randomly selected. The work presented here can be readily
extended to multiple BS scenarios, and therefore forms the foundation for all
optimal location authentication schemes within the context of Rician fading
channels. Our study closes important gaps in the current understanding of LVS
performance within the context of VANETs, and will be of practical value to
certificate revocation schemes within IEEE 1609.2.
