  In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle
is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world.
Game-theoretical studies showed that pool punishment, particularly second-order
punishment, plays a key role in understanding the evolution of cooperation.
Second-order pool punishment, however, is tautological in nature; the
punishment system itself is caused by its own effects. The emergence of pool
punishment poses a logical conundrum that, to date, has been overlooked in the
study of the evolution of social norms and institutions. Here, we tackle the
issue by considering the interplay of (a) cognitive biases in reasoning and (b)
Agamben's notion of homo sacer (Agamben, G. 1998, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power
and Bare Life, Stanford University Press); that is, a person who may be killed
without legal consequences. Based on the cognitive disposition of reversing the
cause-and-effect relationship, we propose a new system: the preemptive
punishment of homo sacer. This action can lead to retrospectively forming moral
assessments, particularly for second-order pool punishment. This study
potentially provides new insight into the evolutionary process behind the
emergence of social norms and institutions.
