  In this short paper, I present a few theorems on sentences of arithmetic
which are related to Yablo's Paradox as G\"odel's first undecidable sentence
was related to the Liar paradox. In particular, I consider two different
arithemetizations of Yablo's sentences: one resembling G\"odel's
arithmetization of the Liar, with the negation outside of the provability
predicate, one resembling Jeroslow's undecidable sentence, with negation
inside. Both kinds of arithmetized Yablo sentence are undecidable, and
connected to the consistency sentence for the ambient formal system in roughly
the same manner as G\"odel and Jeroslow's sentences.
  Finally, I consider a sentence which is related to the Henkin sentence "I am
provable" in the same way that first two arithmetizations are related to
G\"odel and Jeroslow's sentences. I show that this sentence is provable, using
L\"ob's theorem, as in the standard proof of the Henkin sentence.
