  We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of
applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include
ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of
courses. Since this is the most general setting examined so far in the
literature, our work unifies and generalizes several known results.
Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the \emph{Generalized Serial
Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT)} that effectively handles ties via
properties of network flows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using
different priority orderings over the applicants, but it satisfies truthfulness
only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our
mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is
prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case
(with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do
exist.
