  Credences are mental states corresponding to degrees of confidence in
propositions. Attribution of credences to Large Language Models (LLMs) is
commonplace in the empirical literature on LLM evaluation. Yet the theoretical
basis for LLM credence attribution is unclear. We defend three claims. First,
our semantic claim is that LLM credence attributions are (at least in general)
correctly interpreted literally, as expressing truth-apt beliefs on the part of
scientists that purport to describe facts about LLM credences. Second, our
metaphysical claim is that the existence of LLM credences is at least
plausible, although current evidence is inconclusive. Third, our epistemic
claim is that LLM credence attributions made in the empirical literature on LLM
evaluation are subject to non-trivial sceptical concerns. It is a distinct
possibility that even if LLMs have credences, LLM credence attributions are
generally false because the experimental techniques used to assess LLM
credences are not truth-tracking.
