  A crowdsourced wireless community network can effectively alleviate the
limited coverage issue of Wi-Fi access points (APs), by encouraging individuals
(users) to share their private residential Wi-Fi APs with each other. This
paper presents the first study on the users' joint membership selection and
network access problem in such a network. Specifically, we formulate the
problem as a two-stage dynamic game: Stage I corresponds to a membership
selection game, in which each user chooses his membership type; Stage II
corresponds to a set of network access games, in each of which each user
decides his WiFi connection time on the AP at his current location. We analyze
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) systematically, and study whether and how
best response dynamics can reach the equilibrium. Through numerical studies, we
further explore how the equilibrium changes with the users' mobility patterns
and network access evaluations. We show that a user with a more popular home
location, a smaller travel time, or a smaller network access evaluation is more
likely to choose a specific type of membership called Bill. We further
demonstrate how the network operator can optimize its pricing and incentive
mechanism based on the game equilibrium analysis in this work.
