  We propose a game-theoretic model of the reliability of decentralised systems
based on Varian's model of system reliability, to which we add a new normalised
total effort case that models \textit{decentralisation conscious players} who
prioritise decentralisation. We derive the Nash equilibria in the normalised
total effort game. In these equilibria, either one or two values are played by
players that do not free ride. The speed at which players can adjust their
contributions can determine how an equilibrium is reached and equilibrium
values. The behaviour of decentralisation conscious players is robust to
deviations by other players. Our results highlight the role that
decentralisation conscious players can play in maintaining decentralisation.
They also highlight, however, that by supporting an equilibrium that requires
an important contribution they cannot be expected to increase decentralisation
as contributing the equilibrium value may still imply a loss for many players.
We also discuss practical constraints on decentralisation in the context of our
model.
