  Side-channel attacks are an unpredictable risk factor in cryptography.
Therefore, continuous observations of physical leakages are essential to
minimise vulnerabilities associated with cryptographic functions. Lightweight
cryptography is a novel approach in progress towards internet-of-things (IoT)
security. Thus, it would provide sufficient data and privacy protection in such
a constrained ecosystem. IoT devices are resource-limited in terms of data
rates (in kbps), power maintainability (battery) as well as hardware and
software footprints (physical size, internal memory, RAM/ROM). Due to the
difficulty in handling conventional cryptographic algorithms, lightweight
ciphers consist of small key sizes, block sizes and few operational rounds.
Unlike in the past, affordability to perform side-channel attacks using
inexpensive electronic circuitries is becoming a reality. Hence, cryptanalysis
of physical leakage in these emerging ciphers is crucial. Among existing
studies, power analysis seems to have enough attention in research, whereas
other aspects such as electromagnetic, timing, cache and optical attacks
continue to be appropriately evaluated to play a role in forensic analysis.
  As a result, we started analysing electromagnetic emission leakage of an
ultra-lightweight block cipher, PRESENT. According to the literature, PRESENT
promises to be adequate for IoT devices, and there still seems not to exist any
work regarding correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) of it. Firstly, we
conducted simple electromagnetic analysis in both time and frequency domains
and then proceeded towards CEMA attack modelling. This paper provides a summary
of the related literature (IoT, lightweight cryptography, side-channel attacks
and EMA), our methodology, current outcomes and future plans for the optimised
results.
