  This review presents and reviews various solved and open problems in
developing, analyzing, and mitigating epidemic spreading processes under human
decision-making. We provide a review of a range of epidemic models and explain
the pros and cons of different epidemic models. We exhibit the art of coupling
epidemic models and decision models in the existing literature. {More
specifically, we provide answers to fundamental questions in human
decision-making amid epidemics, including what interventions to take to combat
the disease, who are decision-makers, when to take interventions, and how to
make interventions.}
  Among many decision models, game-theoretic models have become increasingly
crucial in modeling human responses/behavior amid epidemics in the last decade.
In this review, we motivate the game-theoretic approach to human
decision-making amid epidemics. This review provides an overview of the
existing literature by developing a multi-dimensional taxonomy, which
categorizes existing literature based on multiple dimensions, including 1)
types of games, such as differential games, stochastic games, evolutionary
games, and static games; 2) types of interventions, such as social distancing,
vaccination, quarantine, taking antidotes, etc.; 3) the types of
decision-makers, such as individuals, adversaries, and central authorities at
different hierarchical levels. A fine-grained dynamic game framework is
proposed to capture the essence of game-theoretic decision-making amid
epidemics. We showcase three representative {frameworks} with unique ways of
integrating game-theoretic decision-making into the epidemic models from a vast
body of literature. {Each of the three framework has a unique way of modeling,
conducting analytical analysis, and deriving results.} In the end, we identify
several main open problems and research gaps left to be addressed and filled.
