  In this paper, we take a close look at a problem labeled maximal extractable
value (MEV), which arises in a blockchain due to the ability of a block
producer to manipulate the order of transactions within a block. Indeed,
blockchains such as Ethereum have spent considerable resources addressing this
issue and have redesigned the block production process to account for MEV. This
paper provides an overview of the MEV problem and tracks how Ethereum has
adapted to its presence. A vital aspect of the block building exercise is that
it is a variant of the knapsack problem. Consequently, this paper highlights
the role of designing auctions to fill a knapsack--or knapsack auctions--in
alleviating the MEV problem. Overall, this paper presents a survey of the main
issues and an accessible primer for researchers and students wishing to explore
the economics of block building and MEV further.
