  The digital revolution of the information age and in particular the sweeping
changes of scientific communication brought about by computing and novel
communication technology, potentiate global, high grade scientific information
for free. The arXiv for example is the leading scientific communication
platform, mainly for mathematics and physics, where everyone in the world has
free access on. While in some scientific disciplines the open access way is
successfully realized, other disciplines (e.g. humanities and social sciences)
dwell on the traditional path, even though many scientists belonging to these
communities approve the open access principle. In this paper we try to explain
these different publication patterns by using a game theoretical approach.
Based on the assumption, that the main goal of scientists is the maximization
of their reputation, we model different possible game settings, namely a zero
sum game, the prisoners' dilemma case and a version of the stag hunt game, that
show the dilemma of scientists belonging to ''non-open access communities''.
  From an individual perspective, they have no incentive to deviate from the
Nash Equilibrium of traditional publishing. By extending the model using the
quantum game theory approach it can be shown, that if the strength of
entanglement exceeds a certain value, the scientists will overcome the dilemma
and terminate to publish only traditionally in all three settings.
