  This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining
the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static
games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability
distributions of idiosyncratic payoff shocks, in addition to the standard
assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality. When these
distributions are transparent, we obtain a solution concept called
$\Delta^p$-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from
QRE; we also give a condition under which this relationship holds true in
reverse. When agents only have common belief in the monotonicity of these
distributions (for example, extreme value distributions), we obtain another
solution concept called $\Delta^M$-rationalizability, which includes action
distributions derived from rank-dependent choice equilibrium, a parameter-free
variant of QRE. Our solution concepts also provide insights for interpreting
experimental and empirical data.
