  The Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism corrects the
Pareto-inefficiency of the celebrated Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm by
assigning every student to a weakly more preferred school. However, it remains
uncertain which and how many students do not see an improvement in their DA
placement under EADA. We show that, despite its advantages, EADA does not
benefit students assigned to their worst-ranked schools or those who remain
unmatched under DA. Additionally, it limits the placement improvement of
marginalized students, thereby maintaining school segregation. The placement of
worst-off students under EADA can be exceptionally poor, even though
significantly more egalitarian allocations are possible. Lastly, we provide a
bound on the expected number of unimproved students using a random market
approach valid for small markets. Our findings shed light on why EADA fails to
mitigate the inequality produced by DA in empirical evaluations.
