  We explore the state of information disruption caused by the cocktail party
effect within the framework of non-perfect information games and evolutive
games with multiple werewolves. In particular, we mathematically model and
analyze the effects on the gain of each strategy choice and the formation
process of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) under the assumption that the
pollution risk of fake news is randomly assigned in the context of repeated
dilemmas. We will develop the computational process in detail, starting with
the construction of the gain matrix, modeling the evolutionary dynamics using
the replicator equation, and identifying the ESS. In addition, numerical
simulations will be performed to observe system behavior under different
initial conditions and parameter settings to better understand the impact of
the spread of fake news on strategy evolution. This research will provide
theoretical insights into the complex issues of contemporary society regarding
the authenticity of information and expand the range of applications of
evolutionary game theory.This paper is partially an attempt to utilize
"Generative AI" and was written with educational intent. There are currently no
plans for it to become a peer-reviewed paper.
