  We study the problem of an agent continuously faced with the decision of
placing or not placing trust in an institution. The agent makes use of Bayesian
learning in order to estimate the institution's true trustworthiness and makes
the decision to place trust based on myopic rationality. Using elements from
random walk theory, we explicitly derive the probability that such an agent
ceases placing trust at some point in the relationship, as well as the expected
time spent placing trust conditioned on their discontinuation thereof.
  We then continue by modelling two truster agents, each in their own
relationship to the institution. We consider two natural models of
communication between them. In the first (``observable rewards'') agents
disclose their experiences with the institution with one another, while in the
second (``observable actions'') agents merely witness the actions of their
neighbour, i.e., placing or not placing trust. Under the same assumptions as in
the single agent case, we describe the evolution of the beliefs of agents under
these two different communication models. Both the probability of ceasing to
place trust and the expected time in the system elude explicit expressions,
despite there being only two agents. We therefore conduct a simulation study in
order to compare the effect of the different kinds of communication on the
trust dynamics.
  We find that a pair of agents in both communication models has a greater
chance of learning the true trustworthiness of an institution than a single
agent. Communication between agents promotes the formation of long term trust
with a trustworthy institution as well as the timely exit from a trust
relationship with an untrustworthy institution. Contrary to what one might
expect, we find that having less information (observing each other's actions
instead of experiences) can sometimes be beneficial to the agents.
