  QBism is one of the main candidates for an epistemic interpretation of
quantum mechanics. According to QBism, the quantum state or the wavefunction
represents the subjective degrees of belief of the agent assigning the state.
But, although the quantum state is not part of the furniture of the world,
quantum mechanics grasps the real via the Born rule which is a consistency
condition for the probability assignments of the agent. In this paper, we
evaluate the plausibility of recent criticism of QBism . We focus on the
consequences of the subjective character of the quantum state, the issue of
realism and the problem of the evolution of the quantum state in QBism. In
particular, drawing upon Born's notion of invariance as the mark of the real,
it is argued that there is no essential difference between Einstein's program
of the "real" and QBists' realism. Also, it will be argued that QBism can
account for the unitary evolution of the quantum state.
