  We study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition
externalities in the introduced family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous
finite games. A non-cooperative game embeds a coalition structure formation
mechanism, and has two outcomes: an allocation of players over coalitions and a
payoff for every player. Coalition structures of a game are described by Young
diagrams. They serve to enumerate coalition structures and allocations of
players over them. For every coalition structure a player has a set of finite
strategies. A player chooses a coalition structure and a strategy.
  A (social) mechanism eliminates conflicts in individual choices and produces
final coalition structures. Every final coalition structure is a
non-cooperative game. Mixed equilibrium always exists and consists of a mixed
strategy profile, payoffs and equilibrium coalition structures. We use a
maximum coalition size to parametrize the family of the games. The
non-cooperative game of Nash is a partial case of the model. The result is
different from the Shapley value, a strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibria,
core solutions, and other equilibrium concepts. We supply few non-cooperative
coalition structure stability criteria.
