  Dynamic Searchable Encryption (DSE) has emerged as a solution to efficiently
handle and protect large-scale data storage in encrypted databases (EDBs).
Volume leakage poses a significant threat, as it enables adversaries to
reconstruct search queries and potentially compromise the security and privacy
of data. Padding strategies are common countermeasures for the leakage, but
they significantly increase storage and communication costs. In this work, we
develop a new perspective to handle volume leakage. We start with distinct
search and further explore a new concept called \textit{distinct} DSE
(\textit{d}-DSE).
  We also define new security notions, in particular Distinct with
Volume-Hiding security, as well as forward and backward privacy, for the new
concept. Based on \textit{d}-DSE, we construct the \textit{d}-DSE designed EDB
with related constructions for distinct keyword (d-KW-\textit{d}DSE), keyword
(KW-\textit{d}DSE), and join queries (JOIN-\textit{d}DSE) and update queries in
encrypted databases. We instantiate a concrete scheme \textsf{BF-SRE},
employing Symmetric Revocable Encryption. We conduct extensive experiments on
real-world datasets, such as Crime, Wikipedia, and Enron, for performance
evaluation. The results demonstrate that our scheme is practical in data search
and with comparable computational performance to the SOTA DSE scheme
(\textsf{MITRA}*, \textsf{AURA}) and padding strategies (\textsf{SEAL},
\textsf{ShieldDB}). Furthermore, our proposal sharply reduces the communication
cost as compared to padding strategies, with roughly 6.36 to 53.14x advantage
for search queries.
