  Pricing schemes are an important smart grid feature to affect typical energy
usage behavior of energy users (EUs). However, most existing schemes use the
assumption that a buyer pays the same price per unit of energy to all suppliers
at any particular time when energy is bought. By contrast, here a discriminate
pricing technique using game theory is studied. A cake cutting game is
investigated, in which participating EUs in a smart community decide on the
price per unit of energy to charge a shared facility controller (SFC) in order
to sell surplus energy. The focus is to study fairness criteria to maximize sum
benefits to EUs and ensure an envy-free energy trading market. A benefit
function is designed that leverages generation of discriminate pricing by each
EU, according to the amount of surplus energy that an EU trades with the SFC
and the EU's sensitivity to price. It is shown that the game possesses a
socially optimal, and hence also Pareto optimal, solution. Further, an
algorithm that can be implemented by each EU in a distributed manner to reach
the optimal solution is proposed. Numerical case studies are given that
demonstrate beneficial properties of the scheme.
