  The problematic relationship between science and philosophy has, since the
beginning of modernity, divided the world into two separate domains: nature and
human. Some of today's schools of philosophy and epistemological inquiry have
maintained a radical separation to the point where they refuse to maintain any
commonality within the two. We argue that such a dichotomy will not only
destroy the idea of the unity of knowledge from a theoretical perspective but,
it will destroy a unified understanding of reality. This article is a critique
of now mainstream belief of such dichotomy through re-reading of Leibniz's idea
on the unity of knowledge. The distinctive feature of Leibniz's approach, which
was specifically laid down in his correspondence with Clarke, is that his way
of reasoning is philosophical as well as physical. In Leibniz's view what
guarantees the soundness of philosophical principles cannot defy the laws of
physics. We shall also demonstrate that Chaos Theory is consistent with the
affinities of Leibniz's approach. The main focus of this article is on
re-evaluating views on causal determinism and randomness as well as free will.
The final claim of this article is that the natural world and human world
follow the same causal deterministic laws, and that causal laws are however
nonlinear. Knowledge of our reality should be rigorously sought in both the
domains of humanities and natural sciences, but this causal determinism should
distance itself from a simple linear causal model. What is thought of as random
events or probabilistic events in the physical world, as well as in the human
world, are not ontologically run by chance. The complexity and vastness of
reality are such that our knowledge of reality always suffers a lack, and it is
this lack of knowledge that is usually being called randomness.
