  Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the
formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of
indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price leading
to a network among them. However, in real life, agents are heterogeneous and
their relationships often display a bias towards similar agents, say of the
same ethnic group. This homophilic behavior on the agent level can then lead to
the emergent global phenomenon of social segregation. We initiate the study of
Network Creation Games with multiple types of homophilic agents and non-uniform
edge cost. Specifically, we introduce and compare two models, focusing on the
perception of same-type and different-type neighboring agents, respectively.
Despite their different initial conditions, both our theoretical and
experimental analysis show that the resulting stable networks are almost
identical in the two models, indicating a robust structure of social networks
under homophily. Moreover, we investigate the segregation strength of the
formed networks and thereby offer new insights on understanding segregation.
