  We investigate an agent-based model of opinion dynamics with two types of
social response: conformity and independence. Conformity is introduced to the
model analogously as in the Sznajd model or $q$-voter model, which means that
only unanimous group exerts peer pressure on individuals. The novelty, in
relation to previous versions of the $q$-voter model, is memory possessed by
each agent and external noise $T$, which plays the role of social temperature.
Each agent has its own memories of past experiences related to the social costs
and benefits of being independent or conformist. If an agent was awarded in
past more for being independent, it will have a greater tendency to be
independent than conformist and vice versa. We will show that depending on the
social temperature $T$ the system spontaneously organizes into one of two
regimes. Below a certain critical social temperature $T_c$, all agents in the
society acquire personal traits (so called person state). Some of them become
permanent conformists and others start to behave forever independently. This
means that initially homogeneous population becomes heterogeneous, and agents
respond differently to social influence. For $T>T_c$, all agents with equal
probabilities behave independently or conform to peer pressure (so called
situation state). This regime change between person and situation state, which
reminds the idea of an annealed vs. quenched disorder, affects also public
opinion. Particularly interesting results are obtained for individualistic
societies, in which public opinion is non-monotonic function of $T$, which
means that there is an optimal social temperature for which an agreement in the
society is the highest.
