  This agent-based model contributes to a theory of corporate culture in which
company performance and employees' behaviour result from the interaction
between financial incentives, motivational factors and endogenous social norms.
Employees' personal values are the main drivers of behaviour. They shape
agents' decisions about how much of their working time to devote to individual
tasks, cooperative, and shirking activities. The model incorporates two aspects
of the management style, analysed both in isolation and combination: (i)
monitoring efforts affecting intrinsic motivation, i.e. the firm is either
trusting or controlling, and (ii) remuneration schemes affecting extrinsic
motivation, i.e. individual or group rewards. The simulations show that
financial incentives can (i) lead to inefficient levels of cooperation, and
(ii) reinforce value-driven behaviours, amplified by emergent social norms. The
company achieves the highest output with a flat wage and a trusting management.
Employees that value self-direction highly are pivotal, since they are strongly
(de-)motivated by the management style.
