  Cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as autonomous vehicles crossing an
intersection, are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and their safety-critical nature
makes them a target for malicious adversaries. This paper studies the problem
of supervisory control of autonomous intersections in the presence of sensor
attacks. Sensor attacks are performed when an adversary gains access to the
transmission channel and corrupts the measurements before they are received by
the decision-making unit. We show that the supervisory control system is
vulnerable to sensor attacks that can cause collision or deadlock among
vehicles. To improve the system resilience, we introduce a detector in the
control architecture and focus on stealthy attacks that cannot be detected but
are capable of compromising safety. We then present a resilient supervisory
control system that is safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive, despite
the presence of disturbances, uncontrolled vehicles, and sensor attacks.
Finally, we demonstrate how the resilient supervisor works by considering
illustrative examples.
