THIS YEAR marks a century since the United States ratified the Seventeenth Amendment to its Constitution, enabling Americans to directly elect federal senators.
Direct popular election of senators, who were previously chosen by state legislatures, was a high-water moment of the American progressive movement. But some critics say the Seventeenth Amendment was a mistake. They argue the unintended result was to undermine the federal balance of power in the U.S.
How? The argument goes like this: As elected senators became the superstars of Congress, and powerful independent agents in the federal government, the voice of state governments weakened in Washington. The Senate ceased to be a check on accumulation of power at the centre. Senators striving for election helped expand the growth of federal authority and the influence of special interests whose contributions paid for costly state-wide campaigns.
These criticisms are worth considering as Canadians ponder what to do with our Senate — a question stoked up again by an audit of senators’ housing allowances and questions about how much time they live in the provinces they represent. Any serious change will have to await a Supreme Court ruling on Ottawa’s Bill C-7 proposal to give provinces the option of finding democratic ways to select Senate nominees. But as we think about the options, we shouldn’t rule out America’s original method.
Having senators chosen by multi-party provincial legislatures, and thus indirectly by voters, might be a good way to make them more effective proponents of provincial public interests in Ottawa.
It would also avoid merely sending a second team of MPs to Ottawa. If elected senators are just copies of MPs, chosen in a similar way and reflecting similar national party allegiances and a similar central-government orientation, then what do they add to federal decision-making? More elected members thinking and doing the same thing is not necessarily an improvement.
Having a federal upper house strongly aligned with the member states of the federation would not be unique to Canada. In the German federation, the Bundesrat, or federal council, consists of delegates named by the state governments. They are usually first ministers and cabinet members of the states.
Provincial ministers doubling as senators probably wouldn’t work for Canada, where the Senate must approve all legislation (the Bundesrat can only veto bills affecting state interests). But Germany shows a modern federal democracy can work well with an upper house that is not directly elected.
Canada’s Senate was designed to provide an equal voice to the distinct regions of the country with equal representation (24 seats for each of them) to balance a House of Commons where seats are distributed by population.
So if Atlantic Canada wants to be bold, its provincial legislatures could consider choosing some Senate nominees jointly, making them true regional representatives.
Senators chosen by a group of elected bodies representing four provinces and a more diverse political mix than in a single legislature would represent a broad regional outlook. They would be less tied to the ebb and flow of party fortunes in any one province.
The process would be a way to foster Atlantic regional co-operation and demonstrate Atlantic Canada can be a source of innovation in national governance. The result would surely be a more unified and effective representation of Atlantic Canada in Parliament.
Bill C-7 creates an opportunity to better use and choose the Senate. Let’s make that part of a larger effort to work and prosper as a region.