Marcus Tullius Cicero presents true philosophy as active philosophy. This Ciceronian thesis stands in contrast to the Greek philosophical tradition that holds that the true philosopher recoils from the political life altogether or that the philosopher only enters public life when forcibly compelled. Cicero established a new foundation for the Western philosophical by incorporating the active life as a necessary result of the contemplative life. Far from making Cicero less philosophical, his perspective reformulates the definition of what it means to be a “lover of wisdom”. Cicero’s literary composition of a philosophical dialogue featuring Scipio Aemilianus Africanus substantiates his claim that true philosophy requires attention to civic duties.
Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (195–129 BC) received his noteworthy cognomen of Africanus for his famous capture and destruction of Rome’s nemesis Carthage in 146 BC. The Romans also remembered Scipio as a hero for his mediatory role in the revolts surrounding the Grachi reforms and assassinations. Consequently, the Roman Scipio stands out as a public servant par excellence. If one were to compare Scipio to the modern American landscape, he would embody the combined legacies of a General Patton, Martin Luther King Jr. and a John F. Kennedy. Given Cicero’s intention for making a case for the active life of philosophy, he wisely chose Scipio as a worthy representative.
Cicero’s Scipio begins with a critique of Panaetius (I, 15), which indicates that Scipio is in fact the voice of Cicero. One might recall that Cicero begins De officiis with a commendation of Panaetius’ thought followed by a critique of how Panaetius did not go far enough. In his De re publica, Cicero also molds Scipio into his own image by describing Scipio as being philosophic even in the midst of public service (I, 17). Moreover, Scipio demonstrates that philosophic knowledge is complimentary with leadership, as in the case of instructing soldiers about the scientific phenomenon of eclipses (I, 23). In De officiis, Cicero himself openly praises Gaius Sulpicius for doing the same thing in astronomy.
Scipio also stresses the role of man’s inclination toward social behavior as relating to his power of deliberation. As Cicero states in De officiis, this social behavior is natural to human nature, just as it is natural for bees to be gregarious. In De re publica, Cicero’s Scipio confirms that this inclination in humanity comes from the optimal part of the mind, that is, consilii scilicet. (I, 60). Thus, Scipio’s argument seems to perfectly track that of Cicero in De officiis.
There is one puzzling exception to Scipio’s presentation as an “civic philosopher” in Book I of De re publica. Section 26 of Book I presents Scipio as casting scorn on human affairs in contrast to the glories of contemplative philosophy. This appears to contradict to the purposes of Cicero and the subsequent arguments of Scipio. Perhaps, Cicero (through the mouth Scipio) wishes to establish philosophical contemplation per se as the highest human endeavor because it allows the public official to execute his duties with a certain detachment. As Thomas Aquinas would later teach, the contemplative life is higher than the active life, but the contemplative life combined with the active life is higher still.
In summary, Cicero has successfully presented the philosophical life through the mouth of one of Rome’s greatest public servants: Scipio Aemilianus Africanus. Scipio is active. Scipio is contemplative. Most of all, he is thoroughly Roman. By choosing Scipio, Cicero justifies his own philosophico-political career without drawing attention to himself during the dangerous years of the demise of the Roman Republic.