Footage of the airstrikes, released by the Russian Ministry of Defence, as well as videos posted on social media by the rebels, show that the Russian aircraft didn't use high precision guided weapons, but laser guided bunker busters, Glonass (Russian GPS) guided bombs and electro-optical TV-guided bombs. The success or failure of the Russian "sorties" cannot be assessed based on this footage and news about casualties or collateral damage should be taken with caution, as a first series of pictures allegedly depicting civilian victims was already debunked as a fraud.

The first Russian airstrikes in Syria were carried out by Su-24 and Su-25 jets which took off from Al-Assad airbase in Jableh, 20 miles South of Latakia. They targeted three locations, in three consecutive waves: 1. the area South-West of Idlib (Ghnam/Dayr Hanna), on the frontline between the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and various rebel groups 2. the rebel controled area North of Hama (Latamneh/Kafr Zita) and 3. the rebel enclave North of Homs (Talbisah/Rastan and Zafaraneh).

If you read this morning's newspapers about the latest events in Syria, you might think the Russian army has marched into Damascus. Not only that, but the baseline in the mainstream media is strikingly the same: the Russians have not attacked ISIS, contrary to what they had stated previously, but they have instead targeted "moderate" Syrian rebels, armed and supported by the West. This obviously implies that the Russians are not actually after ISIS, but aim at bolstering Assad's grip on power. While the long term implications of yesterday's airstrikes are unclear, as far as the Russian strategy and goals are concerned, one thing is certain: the narrative about the "moderate" rebels is a fairytale that should be seen for what it is, a PR-stunt that hides a much murkier and unsavoury truth.

What can be analysed however is the tactical goals the Russians were aiming for, based on their choice of targets and the locations they hit. In this regard, two different sets of tactical objectives can already be identified:

- in the area of Latakia, the Russians are going to try and roll back the frontline in order to make the deployment area of their forces more secure. To this end, yesterday's airstrikes took place along the M4 highway between Latakia and Aleppo, as this road will need to be secured in order to interdict rebel logistics convoys arriving to the front. Control of the M4 will also be vital for the SAA and its allies, if a counter-offensive towards Idlib and Aleppo is to be launched at a later date. According to certain sources, Lebanese Hezbollah might take part in such a ground operation somewhere along the frontline in the triangle of Kibilli, Al Haffah and Slinfah. A secondary objective North of Latakia will be for the Russian forces or the SAA to regain control of areas along the border to Turkey, so as to stop the inflow of rebel weapons and fighters trickling through this porous frontier,

- in the central corridor, i.e. the area connecting Damascus in the South to Aleppo in the North, the Russian airstrikes specifically targeted rebel controlled areas along the M5 highway. These rebel pockets disrupt the territorial continuity of government areas and, more importantly prevent the use of the M5 to reach the rebel strongholds around Idlib and Aleppo. In all likelihood, ground operations by Syrian government forces will be carried out as a follow-up to the current sequence of airstrikes, once the tactical goals of the attacks have been reached, especially in the small rebel enclave in between Hama and Homs.

Targeted rebel groups

The main issue with yesterday's airstrikes is clearly the controversy about the rebel groups that have been targeted. In official statements made recently, Russian officials have insisted on ISIS being the focus of their action. However, it has to be said that yesteday's airstrikes didn't come within 35 miles of the closest ISIS position in Syria. No doubt, the Russians have an agenda of their own and it shouldn't come as a surprise that they are willing to support the Syrian government, which is not necessarily the same as the Assad clan. They might also be planning to degrade or destroy the Chechen and Caucasus groups operating in Northern Syria, for quite obvious reasons.



Be that as it may, and regardless of the Russian strategy, it also needs to be emphasized that even though the targeted rebels were not ISIS, they were not secularist "moderates" either. According to most news outlets however, the rebel positions hit by the Russians were part of the "Free Syrian Army", the armed branch of the allegedly secular opposition. Interestingly, this statement is based on one single testimony made to Reuters by the leader of a group which has been provided with US weapons as part of a covert CIA programme that was ended earlier this year.

Jamil Al-Saleh, the leader of "Tajamu al-Izza" indicated during a Skype interview with Reuters that his rebels had nothing to do with Al Qaeda franchise "Jabhat al Nusra" (JaN), nor with any other radical Salafi group, and that his area of Hama was free of those radicals. Saleh, who is presented alternatively as "Captain", "Major" or even "Colonel" didn't mention that all over 2014, rebel offensives along the M5 central corridor, in the region of Hama and Homs, were spearheaded by JaN or affiliated groups and that none of the independent units, including his own "Tajamu al-Izza" would ever have been able to secure military wins against governments troops, had it not been for the "command and control" or the manpower of the Al Qaeda fighters.

Collusion with "Jabhat al Nusra" Jihadis

In February 2014 for example, JaN seized control of the city of Morek, North of Hama, not very far from one of the locations of yesterday's airstrikes. In the summer of 2014, several other offensives by JaN were lead all along the M5 between Hama and Homs, and in late August, JaN even staged an assault on the outskirts of Homs. There are numerous other confirmed examples of close cooperation between so called "moderates", some of them armed and supported by the West or their regional allies, and the Jihadis of JaN or similar groups, such as "Ahrar al-Sham".

Even the former military leader of the FSA, Gen. Salim Idriss, officially ackowledged that his FSA units were cooperating with the Salafi "Ahrar al-Sham" group. Today, "Ahrar al-Sham" is one of the largest Islamist rebel groups operating in Syria and it has entered into a coalition with JaN, known as "Jaysh al-Fath". The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a NGO that is very close to the opposition and thus cannot be suspected of Syrian government propaganda, also mentioned that JaN convoys were being sent from Aleppo to Hama, notably in August 2014.

Considering the amount of official and traceable evidence regarding Al Qaeda presence around Hama and Homs, Jamil al-Saleh's statements sound almost laughable, were they not presented as gospel by the mainstream media. But the collusion between the FSA and JaN goes even further than this.

Not only did the defunct FSA groups cooperate with JaN, but even in al-Saleh's outfit, a subgroup openly defected to JaN in August 2014. "Liwa al Bitar", as it was called, pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on August 26th 2014 and has taken part in most of JaN's operations around Hama ever since. This anecdote perfectly exemplifies the complexities of the Syrian rebel nexus, a labyrinth of groups and names that can be changed from one day to the next, just like the allegiances of their leaders.



The most radical of the foreign fighters

Further North, in between Lattakia and Idlib, the situation is even worse. JaN has officially established an "Emirate" in this area. Al Qaeda's rule here is undisputed. This is where "moderate" groups that had benefited from the CIA weapons programme were taken appart by the Jihadis late last year. It is also here that the now infamous "Division 30" disaster took place earlier in 2015.

The Idlib Emirate however also serves as a hideout for autonomous groups that feature prominently among the most radical and violent Jihadis in Syria: "Jaysh Al-Muhajireen wal Ansar" (Chechen and Caucasus jihadis), "Harakat Sham Al-Islam" (Moroccan jihadis with former Guantanamo inmates as leaders) and "Junud Al-sham" (a group born out of the merger between Palestinian-lebanese "Fatah Al-islam" and various Chechen splinter groups).

Interestingly, these independent Jihadi groups mentioned above have always maintained close connections and good relationships with ISIS, even though they refused to join or sometimes stated simply their neutrality in the ISIS vs AQ infighting. It has to be noted however, that these groups are as close to ISIS as they are to AQ, and that they might runover to Al-baghdadi's troops if events on the ground or self-interest (money) calls for it.

Reminder and outlook

Overall, while it is true that the Russians have not yet attacked any actual ISIS positions, they have clearly stated their willingness to confront Jihadi and Takfiri groups, going after their safehavens in North-Western and Central Syria, and they still have plenty of time to deliver on their pledge to take the fight to ISIS as well.

In this context, it should be noted that the US did hardly anything else when they went after groups other than ISIS, as part of the Coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State: on September 23rd and November 6th 2014 for example, the US Air Force hit several targets that had nothing to do with ISIS (the objectives of these strikes were an Al Qaeda cell in Syria, the so called "Khorasan group", and JaN ally "Ahrar Al-sham").