The Pentagon is interested in having contractors provide two fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters on call to rescue wounded American special operators in and around Yemen if necessary, as well as to perform various other missions. The announcement comes as it becomes increasingly clear that the U.S. military’s own aerial casualty evacuation capabilities are stretched thin and just months after it weathered serious criticism over relying heavily on private companies for these services following a deadly ambush in Niger. U.S. Transportation Command, acting on behalf of U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations across the Middle East and Central Asia, posted the notice on FedBizOpps, the U.S. government’s main contracting website, on April 30, 2018. The draft documents say the basic requirements are for the four contractor-operated aircraft to provide casualty and medical evacuation, personnel recovery, and passenger and cargo services.

American special operators publicly returned to Yemen in 2016 after a brief absence, ostensibly to support operations against Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked terrorists. The new element, known officially as Special Operations Command (Forward) Yemen, is the one the contract announcement specifically names as needing the aviation support. Additional special operations forces have made short-duration raids into the country, as well. The U.S. military has been actively engaged in various counter-terrorism and related training missions in the country since at least 2009. In 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition repeatedly intervened in the country to halt the rise of Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, but American personnel on the ground at present are not supposed to be engaged in any operations together with those forces.

US Army A US Army soldier guards a Columbia Helicopters Vertol 107-II helicopter during a training exercise in Afghanistan.

Casualty evacuation and more The April 2018 contract notice says U.S. special operators in the country are now in need of fixed-wing aircraft that can take off and land on runways as short as 3,000 feet, or even less and possibly at night with the crew having to use night vision goggles. The planes may need to “hot refuel” with the engines still running at forward locations. Though the contracting notice doesn’t specify any particular types of aircraft, the fixed-wing types have to be able to fly at least 500 miles without refueling while carrying up to eight passengers or as much as 4,000 pounds of cargo. The contract would have to supply trained medical personnel, as well, to be able to render aid immediately and throughout the flight, presumably as the aircraft flew onward to a location with a more robust medical facility.

TRANSCOM The basic requirements for the two categories of aircraft in the draft contracting documents.

The two helicopters, also with crews capable of night vision goggle operations at night, would need to have unrefueled ranges of a minimum of 400 miles, also while transporting as many as eight individuals or 3,500 pounds of cargo. In addition to emergency medical technicians to see to wounded personnel throughout the operation, the helicopters would also need to be able to hoist personnel or other items over water or in rugged, mountainous terrain, the latter being referred to as “high angle” recoveries. The crews of both the fixed-wing planes and the helicopters need to mobilize within 30 minutes of receiving a notification from U.S. Central Command. Having two of each aircraft type is specifically to allow for one to be fully mission capable at all times, with an alternate in case of unforeseen issues. However, there is no stated requirement, at least in the draft documentation, about how quickly they aircraft need to be able to get to the specified location or complete the mission. Emergency medical professionals generally aim to get injured individuals to the next level of care within the “golden hour.” Though there is some debate about whether a firm 60-minute window makes a difference, it goes without saying that the faster a person with serious, potentially life-threatening injuries can get into a proper medical facility, the better chance they have of making a full recovery.

US Air Force A contractor-operated Sikorsky S-61R helicopter belonging to EP Aviation, a subsidiary of AAR Airlift Group, in Afghanistan in 2015.

A large operating area The contracting notice does not say where the U.S. government would base the planes and helicopters and their crews, but identifies a host of potential sites in Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The U.S. military defines all of these as within “Yemen Area of Responsibility,” or Yemen AOR.

TRANSCOM A list of airports and air bases that contractors could have to operate from in support of operations in Yemen.

The full list in the documents includes, but is not limited to, major American hubs in the region such as Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport in Djibouti – which hosts Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military’s only formal base in Africa – Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Djibouti, which has long served as an American staging ground for operations in Yemen, seems the most likely “home base,” especially given references in the contract documentation to U.S. Africa Command, which oversees operations in that country.

Google Maps/The War Zone A map showing the various locations identified within the contracting documents, a broad area the US military refers to as the Yemen AOR.

Still, the aircraft would likely make routine use of more forward operating sites situated nearer to the Yemeni border, where the aircraft could stage ahead of planned, short-duration operations or at times when it is otherwise apparent that there are greater risks to American troops. The specified range requirements are otherwise not enough for the aircraft to reach sites in Yemen from many of the designated larger facilities elsewhere in and around the Arabian Peninsula. The documentation also identifies 10 specific locations within Yemen, which the U.S. military defines as the "Yemen Joint Special Operations Area," or Yemen JSOA. These include sites across the country, including the capital Sana’a, the port city of Aden, and the heavily contested city of Hodeidah, also written Al Hudaydah, on the Red Sea, the last of which remains largely under the control of Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.

Google Maps/The War Zone A close-up map showing the 10 separate locations in Yemen, as well as sites just over the border in Saudi Arabia to the North, Oman to the east, and Djoubti to the southwest.

However, it’s not clear how much coverage four aircraft of any type might be necessarily able to provide across such a wide area. From the draft documentation, it appears clear that the contractors’ primary role would be casualty and medical evacuation, potentially rushing to save seriously wounded individuals. But this mission set, especially, requires good positioning and rapid response to be truly effective. These same issues were at the core of major criticisms about the U.S. military’s response, or lack thereof, to the infamous ambush of American and Nigerien troops in Niger in October 2017. French multi-role combat jets and gunship and transport helicopters were the first air support elements to arrive on scene during that skirmish, which left four U.S. personnel dead. Contractors, working for U.S. Africa Command and situated in the country’s capital Niamey, who were similarly charged with casualty evacuation and personnel recovery missions, only arrived after the fighting had stopped to recover the bodies. No other U.S. military combat aircraft or combat search and rescue elements were in the country, let alone readily available.

Berry Aviation A low-quality image of a DHC-6 Twin Otter belonging to Berry Aviation, which is under US military contract to provide personnel recovery and casualty evacuation services in Niger, at an undisclosed location.

A multi-faceted conflict Unlike Niger, where militant groups typically engage in more limited attacks, Yemen is in the midst of a brutal civil war combined with an equally grueling and controversial Saudi-led intervention. Despite their official focus on Al Qaeda- and ISIS-affiliated terrorists, there is a significant risk that U.S. special operations forces could end up drawn into the country’s broader conflict. That the Yemen JSOA apparently contains locations such as Hodeidah, which sits in an area with a heavy Houthi presence, calls into question just how practical it might be for American forces to avoid the Saudi-run campaign, regardless of their stated mission. If nothing else, it indicates that U.S. personnel are coordinating with the Saudis and their partners to a significant degree, otherwise there would be a serious danger of the two sets of operations conflicting with each other. The operating area also prompts questions about whether the U.S. military mission in Yemen is as limited or distinct from the Saudi-led efforts as officials have made it out to be in the past. As of December 2017, the Pentagon said it had a grand total of five personnel in the country, which seems extremely dubious given the apparent breath of the JSOA. Renewed questions about the true nature and purpose of America's involvement in Yemen, especially after a controversial raid in January 2017 left a U.S. Navy SEAL and a number of innocent civilians dead, have prompted challenges from advocacy groups and legislators in the past 18 months. Just recently, though, in March 2018, the U.S. Senate rejected a bill that would have ended indirect American support for the Saudi Arabian effort.

USAF A United Arab Emirates F-16E Desert Falcon fighter jet links up with a US Air Force aerial refueling tanker on its way to strike ISIS targets in Iraq in 2016.