Ireland goes to the polls on February 8 following the collapse of a minority government which has ruled since 2016. Prior to the recession, Irish elections were predictable contests. Whatever the result, the government would be led by one of two centre-right parties in what was historically a two-way contest. The Left has never won an election in Ireland or even come close. The centre-right’s hegemony goes back to the Irish civil war. While in most other European countries industrialisation created the basis for Left-Right electoral competition, it was the civil war that created the modern divide in Ireland. The winners of that conflict became Fine Gael, the losers became Fianna Fáil. These two parties have monopolised government formation ever since. Ironically, it was the losing side in the civil war that became the dominant party in the 20th century. Fianna Fáil offered a mixture of social conservatism, economic pragmatism and industrial corporatism. Many analysts defined the party as a proxy for social democracy in Ireland. They won majorities among the working-class, the middle strata and the farming class. Such was their ability to maintain this alliance that ever since the first entered government in 1932, they ruled nearly 80 percent of the period until 2007. Irish politics was dominated and defined by Fianna Fáil in a way that defied conventional ideological metrics. Its main opposition – Fine Gael – only infrequently led governments, when the electorate tired of continuous Fianna Fáil rule. It resembled a more classical Christian Democratic party but with a fiscally hawkish stance. If the Irish electorate tired of extended Fianna Fáil rule, they tired even quicker of Fine Gael; Fianna Fáil was inevitably returned after a brief period in opposition. Historically, the Labour Party constituted the Left. Its support averaged between 10 and 12 percent. Much has been written about the weakness of the Labour Party and the Left since the 1930s: an agricultural-based economy with a small industrial sector, a politically strong Catholic Church, a conservative nationalist culture, a conformist electorate and so on. None of these explanations are fully satisfactory; many European countries faced similar barriers at the beginning of the 20th century. The Labour Party did little to challenge these conditions. They periodically enjoyed office but as a minority party, usually with Fine Gael. But these arrangements were never ideologically coherent. Labour inevitably suffered in the following elections. So Irish politics was fairly straight-forward. It was either a Fianna Fáil government or a Fine Gael-Labour coalition. Commentators referred to the Irish 2 ½ party system – with the two centre-right parties being the full parties and Labour the half. This, however, changed with the banking crisis and recession. It is still changing. And there is no guarantee that the centre-right can maintain its monopoly over government formation in the medium-tem.

Challenging the Old Order In 2008 the Irish economy entered a deep recession, caused by the collapse of a credit-fuelled property boom and the subsequent banking crisis. Fianna Fáil was in office, with a small Green presence, having won the election in the preceding year (they hadn’t lost an election since 1982). Fianna Fáil was faced with a stark choice – side with finance capital and impose the costs of the crisis on to its loyal working-class base, or stay loyal to that base and force financial creditors to pay for the crisis. They chose the former. By 2010, after two years of extreme austerity measures, Ireland was effectively ejected from the international bond market. In one of their last acts in office Fianna Fáil invited the Troika in (the IMF, the EU and the ECB) and the country fell into a bailout programme. In the election in early 2011, Fianna Fáil suffered an unprecedented collapse, losing 51 out of 71 seats. The Labour Party won its highest number of seats ever and was set to become the main parliamentary opposition, the first time in modern electoral history. From this position they were primed to mobilise the trade union movement and civil society groups, deepening alliances and attracting increased support – especially as the new minority Fine Gael-led government would be in a precarious position. However, in what could be described as a mistake of historical proportions, Labour entered coalition with Fine Gael. Believing they could temper the Troika programme and Fine Gael’s austerity instincts, Labour instead ending up implementing highly unpopular measures which cut public services, social protection and investment. This led to major demonstrations around the country over the Government’s botched attempt to introduce highly unpopular water charges.

Fragmentation In the 2016 general election, Fine Gael declined significantly but it was Labour that bore the brunt of public anger. They lost 30 out of 37 seats. Though other Left and progressive parties made gains, it was Fianna Fáil that made a remarkable comeback, doubling its parliamentary presence and nearly becoming the largest party in the state. The subsequent government saw a new type of arrangement – a confidence-and-supply agreement whereby Fianna Fail, the main opposition, effectively kept a Fine Gael minority government in office. Another new feature in Irish politics was the proliferation and fragmentation of broad Left and progressive parties. For decades, Labour was the dominant, sometimes the only, party of the Left. Now there were seven parties represented in the Irish parliament, the Dáil. These parties can be grouped around four broad trends in progressive politics: Sinn Féin represented the nationalist Left; Labour and the Social Democrats were (unsurprisingly) the social democrats; People Before, Solidarity and the Independents4Change represented the radical Left; and then the Greens, who represented the ecologists. In 2016 this group together polled over 30 percent of the vote. However, it was far from cohesive. In essence, it was not conscious of itself as an emerging bloc ready to rival the centre-right parties. Nonetheless, this bloc was experiencing a long-term trend, much of which occurred below the public radar due to hold that the conservative consensus had on how Irish politics was interpreted. Since the 1980s support for progressive or non-conservative parties nearly trebled. By 2016, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the progressive bloc – were receiving similar support. Irish politics has been slowly trying to break out of the historical two-way contest into a three-way one.

The Election While the Irish economy has rebounded strongly from the recession the legacy of austerity still drives the debate. There is a housing crisis – with prices and rents rising to unaffordable levels for most people, coupled with a rapid rise in homelessness (in particular, child homelessness). There is a health crisis – with lengthy waiting times in A&E and for life-saving procedures. There is increasing precariousness in the workplace, spreading out beyond its usual low-paid sectors. And the increase in the pension age, a decision taken under the Troika programme, has also become an issue as people reject the idea that they must continue working until they receive their pension. Most of all, there is a real sense that for so many the recovery has passed them by; that many are still finding it difficult to make ends meet despite all the headline data. All of these issues have, to some degree or another, featured in the public debate. However, there was no expectation that the election would be any anything other than a two-way contest between the centre-right parties. But halfway through the campaign, things are looking very different. The governing party, Fine Gael, has seen their support decline while Fianna Fáil struggles to build on their 2016 success. The real surprise is the support for the progressive bloc – the parties that make up the four strands of progressive politics. In particular, the surge in Sinn Féin support to 20 percent has surprised many, given their poor European and local elections last year. If the parties that make up the progressive bloc were campaigning in even a loose alliance, the debate would be turning to the prospect of a Left-led government. There is a clear commonality in their manifestos: a substantial construction programme for public housing; health sector reform (termed ‘Slaintecare’) that would slowly remove private health care from the public facilities; stronger labour rights; variations of a sizeable Green New Deal; and a more egalitarian programme of tax reform and social protection supports. Unfortunately, the fragmentation has meant that a third alternative has not featured in the debate (so far) and the prospect of a governing bloc not led by one of the two conservative parties has not yet become viable. But what is clear is that support for the conservative parties is continuing its historical decline as a sizeable and growing number of people seek out alternatives.