A senior defense official told ABC News there is an "increasing likelihood" that Israel will carry out such an attack, a move that likely would prompt Iranian retaliation against, not just Israel, but against the United States as well.

The official identified two "red lines" that could trigger an Israeli offensive. The first is tied to when Iran's Natanz nuclear facility produces enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon. According to the latest U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments, that is likely to happen sometime in 2009, and could happen by the end of this year.

Nothing particularly revelatory there. In fact, a former Mossad chief said the same thing a few days ago. With Iran steadily expanding its centrifuge cascade at Natanz--and increasing its ability to produce enriched uranium--Israel's window for crippling that process is closing fast. At some point over the next two years, Iran will have enough material for a bomb (or perhaps multiple bombs), and ship it to another site for integration. Once that occurs, Tehran's nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and derailing its weapons program becomes infinitely more difficult.

The official also tells Mr. Karl that the second "red line" concerns an Iranian purchase of an advanced air defense system, such as the Russian-built SA-20. Similar to the U.S. Patriot, the SA-20 is a highly capable anti-aircraft and anti-missile system. More recent versions of the Favorite (as the Russian call it), have a maximum range of at least 120 nautical miles, and the newest missiles, now entering operational service, can engage targets up to 250 miles away.

While the SA-20 has long been on Iran's wish list, there is no hard evidence that Tehran has actually acquired the system. But, that moment may be approaching. In Congressional testimony last March, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Mike Maples, reported that Iran was "close" to getting the SA-20.

In the past, Tehran has balked at the SA-20's high cost. Vietnam bought the system a few years ago, paying $300 million for 12 launchers, missiles, radars and support vehicles. While the current price is believed to be higher, Iran can easily afford the purchase, with oil now trading at $140 a barrel.

Acquisition of the SA-15 greatly improved Iran's point defense of key facilities, but the system has a serious weakness. With a range of less than six miles, the TOR-1M (Russian designation) cannot engage tactical aircraft employing standoff weapons, including JDAM. Consequently, the SA-15 might be more effective in an "ambush" role, along potential air routes that might be used by Israeli jets. However, that tactic would mean fewer missiles for close-in protection of its nuclear facilities.

Obviously, Iran could use a long-rage, state-of-the-art SAM system to complement the SA-15, covering large areas that are now defended by older systems like the Chinese CSA-1, the Russian-built SA-5, or the U.S.-made I-HAWK, acquired in the early 1970s. Those SAMs pose a relatively minor threat to a potential Israeli strike package.

On the other hand, the presence of SA-20 batteries in Iran would clearly impact tactical planning by the Israeli Air Force. As we observed many months ago, the task of getting to Iran would limit the size of the IAF strike package; trying counter the SA-20 threat would force the Israelis to devote more assets to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). That means more anti-radiation missiles on the pylons and fewer bombs--further reducing the operational margin for error.

Still, Iran would be foolish to underestimate the IAF. The Israelis have other methods for hammering an air defense system (think SOF teams and information operations), tools that were reportedly used in the strike on that Syrian nuclear site last year. During that strike, the IAF flew across Syria and back again, apparently without being detected. They wouldn't necessarily need the same level of surprise against Iran--just enough delay or confusion in the air defenses to get the strike package in, and bombs on target.

And, Iran's air defense network is certainly vulnerable to that type of attack. Elements of its command-and-control (C2) system remain antiquated, and subject to spoofing and saturation. In some instances, Iranian air defense crews have come dangerously close to shooting down civilian airliners and routinely fire on military aircraft that stray off course.

But Tehran's air defenses are improving, slowly and steadily. Acquisition of the SA-20 will happen eventually, and probably sooner rather than later. Given their druthers, the Israelis would prefer to attack before the Favorite arrives in Iran. The potential presence of the SA-20 isn't a show-stopper for the Israelis, but it is a red-line that will influence any decision on striking Iran's nuclear facilities.

6 comments:

I'd like to see some of your commentary on the Osirak strike. Many academics contend it was highly ineffective and caused Saddam to significantly ramp up his nuclear research. Why would the Israelis believe different with regards to Iran?

Our compliant media and the "expert" mouthpieces present us with a FALSE DILEMMA, according to which we either have to sanction/bomb Iran or else face being nuked by Iran. This is simply not the case.

Not only are Iran's centrifuges under IAEA safeguards but Iran has made perfectly reasonable compromise suggestions to resolve the standoff that is widely endorsed by American and international experts: multilateral enrichment on Iranian soil.

This was one of many Iranian compromise offers that the US has refused to even acknowledge, along with Iran's 2003 comprehensive peace offer (which Rice falsely claimed she had never seen.)

Read more at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/05/opinion/edzarif.php and http://www.IranAffairs.com

I doubt that the trigger for an attack would be anything that was visible to the media or public. If the strike package has to be small then the Israelis could not hope to destroy the whole nuclear program. They would have to cripple it by destroying a few critical items, and it is likely that they have worked out quite a few different combinations of targets which could be hit to achieve that aim. It's also likely that some of the things that might be targeted would not be at all obvious to anyone who isn't an expert in nuclear engineering.

However, if the attack depends on hitting a small number of very specific targets then it can only occur when those items have been built or installed, and when their precise location is known. It must then take place immediately, in case any of the items are moved. So if an attack occurs it is unlikely that the timing will be related to any of the "red lines" that might be identified by journalists.

h-ass;It's not the enriching which is now in question: it's the application of the enriched. Considering how enthusiastically El Bharadi supports Iran's efforts, having the IAEA involved is not much better than asking the RG do inspections.

In any case, this is a hand in which the Israelis have to go "all in". Putting their survival in the hands of inspectors or "agreements" with mullahs is not on.