[Congressional Record: April 21, 2009 (Senate)]
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TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, today we are releasing the declassified
report of the Senate Armed Services Committee's investigation into the
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. The report [large pdf] was approved by the
committee on November 20, 2008, and has, in the intervening period,
been under review at the Department of Defense for declassification.
In my judgment, the report represents a condemnation of both the Bush
administration's interrogation policies and of senior administration
officials who attempted to shift the blame for abuse--such as that seen
at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan--to low ranking
soldiers. Claims, such as that made by former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz that detainee abuses could be chalked up to the
unauthorized acts of a ``few bad apples,'' were simply false.
The truth is that, early on, it was senior civilian leaders who set
the tone. On September 16, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney suggested
that the United States turn to the ``dark side'' in our response to 9/
11. Not long after that, after White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales
called parts of the Geneva Conventions ``quaint,'' President Bush
determined that provisions of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to
certain detainees. Other senior officials followed the President and
Vice President's lead, authorizing policies that included harsh and
abusive interrogation techniques.
The record established by the committee's investigation shows that
senior officials sought out information on, were aware of training in,
and authorized the use of abusive interrogation techniques. Those
senior officials bear significant responsibility for creating the legal
and operational framework for the abuses. As the committee report
concluded, authorizations of aggressive interrogation techniques by
senior officials resulted in abuse and conveyed the message that
physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment for
detainees in U.S. military custody.
In a May 10, 2007, letter to his troops, GEN David Petraeus said that
``what sets us apart from our enemies in this fight . . . is how we
behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values
that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and
respect. While we are warriors, we are also all human beings.'' With
last week's release of the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel, OLC, opinions, it is now widely known that Bush administration
officials distorted Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape ``SERE''
training--a legitimate program used by the military to train our troops
to resist abusive enemy interrogations--by authorizing abusive
techniques from SERE for use in detainee interrogations. Those
decisions conveyed the message that abusive treatment was appropriate
for detainees in U.S. custody. They were also an affront to the values
articulated by General Petraeus.
In SERE training, U.S. troops are briefly exposed, in a highly
controlled setting, to abusive interrogation techniques used by enemies
that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions. The techniques are based
on tactics used by Chinese Communists against American soldiers during
the Korean war for the purpose of eliciting false confessions for
propaganda purposes. Techniques used in SERE training include stripping
trainees of their clothing, placing them in stress positions, putting
hoods over their heads, subjecting them to face and body slaps,
depriving them of sleep, throwing them up against a wall, confining
them in a small box, treating them like animals, subjecting them to
loud music and flashing lights, and exposing them to extreme
temperatures. Until recently, the Navy SERE school also used
waterboarding. The purpose of the SERE program is to provide U.S.
troops who might be captured a taste of the treatment they might face
so that they might have a better chance of surviving captivity and
resisting abusive and coercive interrogations.
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SERE training techniques were never intended to be used in the
interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody. The committee's report,
however, reveals troubling new details of how SERE techniques came to
be used in interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody.
The committee's investigation uncovered new details about the
influence of SERE techniques on military interrogations at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba--GTMO. According to newly released testimony from a military
behavioral scientist who worked with interrogators at GTMO, ``By early
October [2002] there was increasing pressure to get `tougher' with
detainee interrogations'' at GTMO. (p. 50). As a result, on October 2,
2002, 2 weeks after attending interrogation training led by SERE
instructors from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, JPRA, the DOD
agency that oversees SERE training, the behavioral scientist and a
colleague drafted a memo proposing the use of aggressive interrogation
techniques at GTMO. The behavioral scientist said he was told by GTMO's
intelligence chief that the interrogation memo needed to contain
coercive techniques or it ``wasn't going to go very far.'' (p. 50).
Declassified excerpts from that memo indicate that it included stress
positions, food deprivation, forced grooming, hooding, removal of
clothing, exposure to cold weather or water, and scenarios designed to
convince a detainee that ``he might experience a painful or fatal
outcome.'' On October 11, 2002, MG Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of
JTF-170 at GTMO, requested authority to use aggressive techniques.
Major General Dunlavey's request was based on the memo produced by the
behavioral scientists.
Major General Dunlavey's request eventually made its way to
Department of Defense, DoD, General Counsel Jim Haynes' desk.
Notwithstanding serious legal concerns raised by the military service
lawyers, Haynes recommended that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
approve 15 of the interrogation techniques requested by GTMO. On
December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved Haynes' recommendation,
authorizing such techniques as stress positions, removal of clothing,
use of phobias--such as fear of dogs--and deprivation of light and
auditory stimuli.
The committee's investigation revealed that, following Secretary
Rumsfeld's authorization, senior staff at GTMO drafted a standard
operating procedure--SOP--for the use of SERE techniques, including
stress positions, forcibly stripping detainees, slapping, and
``walling'' them. That SOP stated that ``The premise behind this is
that the interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are
appropriate for use in real-world interrogations.'' Weeks later, in
January 2003, trainers from the Navy SERE school travelled to GTMO and
provided training to interrogators on the use of SERE techniques on
detainees. (pp. 98-104).
The influence of Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2, 2002, authorization
was not limited to interrogations at GTMO. Newly declassified excerpts
from a January 11, 2003, legal review by a special mission unit, SMU,
Task Force lawyer in Afghanistan state that ``SECDEF's approval of
these techniques provides us the most persuasive argument for use of
`advanced techniques' as we capture possible [high value targets] . . .
the fact that SECDEF approved the use of the . . . techniques at GTMO,
[which is] subject to the same laws, provides an analogy and basis for
use of these techniques [in accordance with] international and U.S.
law.'' (p. 154).
The committee's report also includes a summary of a July 15, 2004,
interview with CENTCOM's then-Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, SJA, about
Secretary Rumsfeld's authorization and its impact in Afghanistan. The
Deputy SJA said: ``the methodologies approved for GTMO would appear to
me to be legal interrogation processes. [The Secretary of Defense] had
approved them. The General Counsel had approved them . . . I believe it
is fair to say the procedures approved for Guantanamo were legal for
Afghanistan.'' (p. 156).
The committee's report provides extensive details about how the
aggressive techniques made their way from Afghanistan to Iraq. In
February 2003, an SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq
obtained a copy of the SMU interrogation policy from Afghanistan that
included aggressive techniques, changed the letterhead, and adopted the
policy verbatim. (p. 158). Months later, the Interrogation Officer in
Charge at Abu Ghraib obtained a copy of the SMU interrogation policy
and submitted it, virtually unchanged, through her chain of command to
Combined Joint Task Force 7--CJTF-7--led at the time by Lieutenant
General Ricardo Sanchez. On September 14, 2003, Lieutenant General
Sanchez issued an interrogation policy for CJTF-7 that authorized
interrogators to use stress positions, environmental manipulation,
sleep management, and military working dogs to exploit detainees' fears
in their interrogations of detainees.
The committee's investigation uncovered documents indicating that,
almost immediately after Lieutenant General Sanchez issued his
September 14, 2003, policy, CENTCOM lawyers raised concerns about its
legality. One newly declassified email from a CENTCOM lawyer to the
Staff Judge Advocate at CJTF-7--sent just three days after the policy
was issued--warned that ``Many of the techniques [in the CJTF-7 policy]
appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III and IV and should not be used
. . .'' (p. 203). Even though the Bush administration acknowledged that
the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq, it was not until nearly a month
later that CJTF-7 revised that policy.
Not only did SERE techniques make their way to Iraq, but SERE
instructors did as well. In September 2003, JPRA sent a team to Iraq to
provide assistance to interrogation operations at an SMU Task Force.
The Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Task
Force testified to the Committee in February 2008 that JPRA personnel
demonstrated SERE techniques to SMU personnel including so-called
``walling'' and striking a detainee as they do in SERE school. (p.
175). As we heard at our September 2008 hearing, JPRA personnel were
present during abusive interrogations during that same trip, including
one where a detainee was placed on his knees in a stress position and
was repeatedly slapped by an interrogator. (p. 176). JPRA personnel
even participated in an interrogation, taking physical control of a
detainee, forcibly stripping him naked, and giving orders for him to be
kept in a stress position for 12 hours. In August 3, 2007, testimony to
the committee, one of the JPRA team members said that, with respect to
stripping the detainee, ``we [had] done this 100 times, 1000 times with
our [SERE school] students.'' The committee's investigation revealed
that forced nudity continued to be used in interrogations at the SMU
Task Force for months after the JPRA visit. (pp. 181-182).
Over the course of the investigation, the committee obtained the
statements and interviews of scores of military personnel at Abu
Ghraib. These statements reveal that the interrogation techniques
authorized by Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002 for use at GTMO--
including stress positions, forced nudity, and military working dogs--
were used by military intelligence personnel responsible for
interrogations.
The Interrogation Officer in Charge in Abu Ghraib in the fall of 2003
acknowledged that stress positions were used in interrogations at Abu
Ghraib. (p. 212).
An Army dog handler at Abu Ghraib told military investigators in
February 2004 that ``someone from [military intelligence] gave me a
list of cells, for me to go see, and pretty much have my dog bark at
them. . . . Having the dogs bark at detainees was psychologically
breaking them down for interrogation purposes.'' (p. 209).
An intelligence analyst at Abu Ghraib told military investigators in
May 2004 that it was ``common that the detainees on [military
intelligence] hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given
clothing as an incentive to cooperate with us.'' (p. 212).
An interrogator told military investigators in May 2004 that it was
``common to see detainees in cells without clothes or naked'' and says
it was ``one of our approaches.'' (p. 213).
The investigation also revealed that interrogation policies
authorizing aggressive techniques were approved months after the CJTF-7
policy was revised to exclude the techniques, and
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even after the investigation into detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib had
already begun. For example, an interrogation policy approved in
February 2004 in Iraq included techniques such as use of military
working dogs and stress positions. (p. 220).
A policy approved for CJTF-7 units in Iraq in March 2004 also
included aggressive techniques. While much of the March 2004 policy
remains classified, newly declassified excerpts indicate that it warned
that interrogators ``should consider the fact that some interrogation
techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise inconsistent with
international law before applying each technique. These techniques are
labeled with a [CAUTION].'' Among the techniques labeled as such were a
technique involving power tools, stress positions, and the presence of
military working dogs. (pp. 220-221).
Some have asked why, if it is okay for our own U.S. personnel to be
subjected to physical and psychological pressures in SERE school, what
is wrong with using those SERE training techniques on detainees? The
committee's investigation answered that question.
On October 2, 2002, LTC Morgan Banks, the senior Army SERE
psychologist warned against using SERE training techniques during
interrogations in an email to personnel at GTMO, writing that:
[T]he use of physical pressures brings with it a large
number of potential negative side effects . . . When
individuals are gradually exposed to increasing levels of
discomfort, it is more common for them to resist harder . . .
If individuals are put under enough discomfort, i.e. pain,
they will eventually do whatever it takes to stop the pain.
This will increase the amount of information they tell the
interrogator, but it does not mean the information is
accurate. In fact, it usually decreases the reliability of
the information because the person will say whatever he
believes will stop the pain . . . Bottom line: the likelihood
that the use of physical pressures will increase the delivery
of accurate information from a detainee is very low. The
likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase
the level of resistance in a detainee is very high . . . (p.
53).
Likewise, the Deputy Commander of DOD's Criminal Investigative Task
Force at GTMO told the committee in 2006 that CITF ``was troubled with
the rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to
interrogations would be the basis for the utilization of techniques to
obtain information.'' (p. 69).
Other newly declassified emails reveal additional warnings. In June
2004, after many SERE techniques had been authorized in interrogations
and JPRA was considering sending its SERE trainers to interrogation
facilities in Afghanistan, another SERE psychologist warned: ``[W]e
need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at
SERE school (done to INCREASE RESISTANCE capability in students) versus
what is taught at interrogator school (done to gather information).
What is done by SERE instructors is by definition ineffective
interrogator conduct . . . Simply stated, SERE school does not train
you on how to interrogate, and things you `learn' there by osmosis
about interrogation are probably wrong if copied by interrogators.''
(p. 229).
If we are to retain our status as a leader in the world, we must
acknowledge and confront the abuse of detainees in our custody. The
committee's report and investigation makes significant progress toward
that goal. There is still the question, however, of whether high level
officials who approved and authorized those policies should be held
accountable. I have recommended to Attorney General Holder that he
select a distinguished individual or individuals--either inside or
outside the Justice Department, such as retired federal judges--to look
at the volumes of evidence relating to treatment of detainees,
including evidence in the Senate Armed Services Committee's report, and
to recommend what steps, if any, should be taken to establish
accountability of high-level officials--including lawyers.
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