While unmanned ships and autonomous ports are technologically feasible, it will be quite some time before the global maritime community overcomes the fear and uncertainty associated with removing all human control of critical safety, security, and environmentally sensitive shipping operations. We do, however, stand on a precipice where technology has become an essential element of many onboard and shore-based systems that will continue to revolutionize the way shipping operations are conducted.

While the transition to increased dependence on cyber-enabled technologies occurs, the maritime industry must be proactive to maintain the outstanding safety record it has earned. The safety culture embedded in the DNA of our industry was developed over decades of carefully implementing risk management principles into all aspects of shipboard life. In the face of such rapid technological growth, it is this culture of risk management that will provide for a safe transition from the age of diesel to the age of the computer.

Cyber Vulnerabilities in the Maritime Transportation System

While cyber vulnerabilities in shipboard systems are alarming to experts, it takes an unusual skill set and precise timing to use these vulnerabilities to disrupt shipping operations or cause a serious marine casualty. TV shows like Mr. Robot and Silicon Valley introduce the realities of cyber threats to the general public, but the complexities of shipboard systems are unfamiliar to most opportunistic hackers.

GPS jamming, which is nothing new, is one such vulnerability. Jammers work by emitting a signal on the same frequency as a signal from the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) at a close range, overpowering the authentic signal. These devices are incredibly disruptive when operated in a densely populated area or near a mass transit hub. To disrupt shipboard navigation, a GPS jammer would have to be positioned in the proximity of the GPS antennas aboard the ship and operate during navigation of a restricted area. That said, disruption of the GPS signal would likely trigger an alert on the navigation system, prompting manual override of the autopilot. It is therefore unlikely that the disruption of a GPS signal could put a ship in a dangerous position, provided the watch officer was alert and acting in accordance with his or her training and procedures.