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Will Avraham Eisenberg be convicted of a felony in the United States before 2028? From [the Jerusalem Post](https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/banking-and-finance/article-725977),
> US prosecutors have filed criminal charges of commodities fraud and manipulation against a man accused of trying to steal about $110 million in October by rigging the Mango Markets cryptocurrency exchange.
> According to a complaint made public on Tuesday in Manhattan federal court, Avraham Eisenberg's trades in futures related to Mango's crypto token MNGO enabled him to withdraw $110 million in cryptocurrencies from other investors' deposits, with no apparent intention to repay the funds.
> Eisenberg was arrested on Monday night in Puerto Rico, US Attorney Damian Williams in Manhattan said in a court filing.
Avraham also has [an account on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/114222/). This question will resolve **Yes** if reliable published reports indicate that Avraham Eisenberg has been convicted in a United States court of a felony criminal offense before January 1st 2028. It will resolve **No** if January 1st, 2028 arrives without this happening. Resolutions will be dated to the time at which the verdict was delivered. Subsequent appeals, pardons, or other developments will **not** reverse the question resolution; initial conviction is the threshold
| 0.74
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Metaculus
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Will California have a lower GDP per capita than at most nine countries in the world in 2050? Bloomberg recently projected that ["California [is] Poised to Overtake Germany as World's No. 4 Economy"](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-10-24/california-poised-to-overtake-germany-as-world-s-no-4-economy) based on total GDP. However, looking at GDP per capita, California is currently the [6th highest state in the US](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_GDP#50_states_and_the_District_of_Columbia).
When comparing GDP per capita with other countries and territories, California currently ranks #6 (assuming other US states are not included in the rankings - that is we rank only California and all countries and territories) according to the [GDP numbers from the UN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita#Table).
Many ambitious proposals have been put forward by California politicians, some to keep California competitive, others to accomplish other goals. As examples, California plans to [sell only zero-emission vehicles by 2035](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5538/california-zero-emission-sales-by-2035/) and [construct high-speed rail from Anaheim to San Fransisco by 2033](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11215/high-speed-rail-from-anaheim-to-sf/). This question resolves **yes** if, on 19 January 2050 California's GDP per capita (as reported by the table on the Wikipedia entry for [List of U.S. states and territories by GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_GDP#50_states_and_the_District_of_Columbia)) for the most recent quarter that data is available is lower than no more than 9 countries and territories in the world (as reported by the data from the UN in the table on the Wikipedia entry for [List of countries by GDP (nominal) per capita](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita#Table)).
If the data are not provided by Wikipedia any more the question resolves **ambiguous**. Otherwise the question resolves **no**.
| 0.55
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Metaculus
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Will wild influenza B/Yamagata be declared eradicated before 2030? The COVID-19 pandemic led to worldwide handwashing, masking, social distancing, and lockdowns. Although this was designed to prevent the spread of COVID-19, it affected many other viruses as well, essentially preventing the 2020-2021 flu season. It may have even eradicated a strain of flu: [wild influenza B/Yamagata has not been definitively seen anywhere in the world since April 2020](https://arstechnica.com/science/2022/09/covid-may-have-pushed-a-leading-seasonal-flu-strain-to-extinction/).
However, there have been [sporadic cases of influenza B/Yamagata as recently as October 2022](https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZTkyODcyOTEtZjA5YS00ZmI0LWFkZGUtODIxNGI5OTE3YjM0IiwidCI6ImY2MTBjMGI3LWJkMjQtNGIzOS04MTBiLTNkYzI4MGFmYjU5MCIsImMiOjh9); it's unknown whether these are wild or vaccine derived.
In 1980, [the World Health Organization (WHO) declared smallpox eradicated](https://www.who.int/health-topics/smallpox#tab=tab_1). At present, this is the only infectious disease to be eradicated in humans (an animal disease, rinderpest, [was declared eradicated in 2011](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1223805#:~:text=Rinderpest%20was%20declared%20eradicated%20by,ever%20to%20be%20globally%20eradicated.)). Typically, the WHO waits some number of years without seeing a wild case to declare a disease eradicated -- the last known smallpox case was in 1977 (3 years prior to announcing it was eradicated); for rinderpest, it was 2003 (8 years).
The WHO has also declared two strains of wild polio to be eradicated, [most recently in 2019](https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/two-out-of-three-wild-poliovirus-strains-eradicated). (Note that vaccine-derived cases of these strains of polio [continue to circulate](https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/polio-now/).) This question resolves as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2030, any of the World Health Organization (WHO), European Medicines Agency (EMA), or US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announces that the influenza B/Yamagata strain has been eradicated. A synonym such as "extinct" also qualifies, as does an announcement that wild influenza B/Yamagata has been eradicated , even if there are still vaccine-derived cases. If no such announcement occurs this resolves as **No** before January 1, 2030. If one of these agencies declares it eradicated and another wild case subsequently appears, this still resolves as **Yes**
| 0.24
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Metaculus
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Will high-impact research on reducing the sample complexity of Large Language Model pretraining be forthcoming before 2026? Large Language Models (LLMs) are famously data hungry, with the largest among today's models requiring >1T tokens for optimal training. This high sample complexity has several important implications. For one thing, as [reported by Epoch](https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04325) recently, current LLMs may already be leveraging almost all available high-quality text data, and the stock is not growing anywhere near fast enough to sustain the current rate of progress. For another, high data requirements lead to high compute requirements, meaning that only well-resourced actors are able to train LLMs. If techniques for making better use of available data during LLM pretraining were to be invented, this might remove data as a bottleneck to progress, and could increase the dispersion of powerful models among actors. This question resolves as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2026, a research paper describing a new LLM, with improved pretraining data efficiency as one of the key findings, is published and cited at least 200 times over the year following its publication, according to [Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/). For reference, the [GLaM paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.06905) (which would meet the findings requirement) accrued 59 citations between December 13, 2021 and Jan 9, 2023, according to Google Scholar.
The paper must be published before January 1, 2026, the one year period for accrued citations is counted from the date the paper is published and does not need to end before January 1, 2026. For example, this period would begin on the date a qualifying paper first appears on arXiv or is first publicly accessible at the website of an organization which created the associated language model. A paper need not be peer reviewed, preprints qualify.
| 0.65
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Metaculus
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Will at least three lithium mines operate in the US before 2030? Lithium is an important element in the production of batteries, particularly for use in electric vehicles (EVs). In addition to its use in EV batteries, lithium is also used in batteries for portable electronics, such as laptops and cell phones, as well as in batteries for renewable energy storage systems, such as those used in solar panel arrays. The demand for lithium has been increasing in recent years due to the growing popularity of EVs, as well as the increasing adoption of renewable energy sources like solar panels. As a result, the production of lithium has become a significant industry, with countries such as Australia, Chile, and Argentina among the top producers of the metal, [accounting for 86%](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/charted-lithium-production-by-country-1995-2020/) of worldwide production in 2020. Lithium production has become a potential national security concern for countries aiming to decarbonise their economies amidst geopolitical tensions.
However, as of early 2023, the United States only has [one operational lithium mine](https://www.solarreviews.com/blog/lithium-mining-in-the-united-states#mines), specifically in the state of [Nevada](https://www.albemarle.com/news/albemarle-announces-expansion-of-nevada-site-to-increase-domestic-production-of-lithium). In 2020, the total lithium production in the US was [900 tonnes](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/charted-lithium-production-by-country-1995-2020/), equating to roughly 1% of the worldwide production and being en par with Portugal's output, in which the European Union's only lithium mine is operational.
There have been some plans for new lithium mining projects that have progressed relatively far along the regulatory process, such as [Thacker Pass mine in Nevada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thacker_Pass_Lithium_Mine). However, many of such undertakings have been met with local opposition on a variety of grounds, delaying the process: [Three-quarters of lithium reserves](https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/mining-energy-transition-metals/02531033947?te=1&nl=climate-forward&emc=edit_clim_20221011) are within 35 miles of Native American reservations, which have sparked local opposition to [new mining projects](https://grist.org/protest/native-opposition-to-nevada-lithium-mine-grows/). This question will resolve as **Yes** if at least three mines at different sites in the United States of America have operated and produced lithium at any time between January 1, 2023 to January 1, 2030. Evidence of an operating mine is either the statement at the respective company's website that the mine is operational or evidence reported by [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that at least 1 ton of lithium was extracted within one calendar year, or both. This includes any mine existing before January 1, 2023 so long as it meets the requirement to be considered operating during the specified time.
This question will resolve as **No** if two or less than two lithium mines have operated in the United States before January 1, 2030
| 0.63
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Will less than 75% of European Union imports of rare earth magnets originate in China in 2030? Rare earth magnets are a type of magnet made from alloys of rare earth elements, which are a set of metals that are found in the earth's crust in small quantities. These magnets are extremely strong and have many important applications in a range of technologies, including wind turbines, electric vehicles, smartphones, and computer hard drives.
The European Union (EU) imports around [16,000 tonnes per year](https://eit.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021_09-24_ree_cluster_report2.pdf) of rare earth magnets from China, accounting for around [98%](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/europe-races-fix-its-rare-earths-import-dependency-andy-home-2021-10-08/) of the bloc's needs. This contrasts with just 1,000 tonnes of domestic production. A report by the [European Raw Materials Alliance](https://eit.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021_09-24_ree_cluster_report2.pdf) outlines that domestic competition is hamstrung due to a lack of supply chain diversification, transparency, industrial capacity, and strategic investments. The statistics and focus of the report are on [neodymium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neodymium_magnet) rare earth permanent magnets, also known as Nd-Fe-B for their elemental composition. Another type of rare earth permanent magnet is [samarium-cobalt](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rare-earth_magnet#Types).
The dependence on imports for such a critical component highlights the need for the EU to diversify its sources of rare earth magnets and to develop its own domestic production capabilities or shift import reliance to other sources in an effort to diversify, as this reliance on China for rare earth magnets also exposes the EU to potential supply chain disruptions and price fluctuations, which can have significant economic consequences. In September 2022, the European Commission announced the [Critical Raw Materials Act](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_5523), which outlines the bloc's efforts to ensuring a “strong and sustainable level playing field” as well as “more resilient supply chains” within a “European network” that diversifies away from a strong reliance on China with respect to such crucial materials. This question will resolve as **Yes** if less than 75% of European Union imports of rare earth magnets (Nd-Fe-B) originate in China for the year of 2030. Resolution will be determined according to reports published by the European Raw Materials Alliance, which [was launched by the European Commission in 2020](https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/rare-earth-elements-permanent-magnets-and-motors_en). If the resolution source does not publish an update that clearly states the percentage of imports of rare earth permanent magnets (Nd-Fe-B) from China for 2030 before January 1, 2033, Metaculus may use an alternate credible source or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If an alternate source is necessary and multiple sources publish estimates, this will resolve as **Yes** if any credible source satisfies these criteria.
| 0.3
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Metaculus
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Will a dense machine learning model with at least 100 trillion parameters be trained before 2026? *Related Questions on Metaculus:*
* [Will a 100 trillion parameter deep learning model be trained before 2026?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3656/will-a-100-trillion-parameter-deep-learning-model-be-trained-before-2026/) (resolved as **Yes**)
* [If GPT-4 is announced before 2025, how many parameters will it have (in billions of parameters)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14327/gpt-4-number-of-parameters/)
---
Parameter count is a key attribute of modern machine learning (ML) systems: it has a strong influence on model performance, and on training costs. [Deepchecks describes](https://deepchecks.com/glossary/model-parameters/) parameters as follows:
>The weights and coefficients that the algorithm extracts from the data are known as model parameters. Model parameters of neural networks consider how the predictor variable influences the target variable.
In other words the model [learns these parameters during training](https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/difference-between-model-parameters-vs-hyperparameters/) to fit the input data to the appropriate output.
In recent years the number of parameters used in ML models [has increased rapidly](https://epochai.org/blog/machine-learning-model-sizes-and-the-parameter-gap). But, as discussed in [this writeup](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/midXmMb2Xg37F2Kgn/new-scaling-laws-for-large-language-models) (and also [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6Fpvch8RR29qLEWNH/chinchilla-s-wild-implications)), research by DeepMind published in the spring of 2022, along with a model named [Chinchilla](https://www.deepmind.com/publications/an-empirical-analysis-of-compute-optimal-large-language-model-training), suggested that the importance of dataset size relative to parameter count had been underestimated in previous work.
>On March 29th, DeepMind published a paper, "Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models", that shows that essentially everyone -- OpenAI, DeepMind, Microsoft, etc. -- has been training large language models with a deeply suboptimal use of compute.
>
>Following the new scaling laws that they propose for the optimal use of compute, DeepMind trains a new, 70-billion parameter model that outperforms much larger language models, including the 175-billion parameter GPT-3 and DeepMind's own 270-billion parameter "Gopher".
In March of 2022, a paper describing the [BaGuaLu model](https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3503221.3508417) model was published, and discussed a variant of this model trained with 174 trillion parameters. However, this was a [sparse model](https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.03961) (seemingly a variant of [mixture of experts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixture_of_experts)), and was primarily a demonstration of the ability to train large scale models.
Sparse models activate a smaller share of their parameters in a forward pass, using those that were trained for the task at hand, while dense models use a larger share of their parameters. In an ML model a [forward pass](https://ml-cheatsheet.readthedocs.io/en/latest/forwardpropagation.html) or forward propagation is the process of input data "travelling" through the neural network to the output node.
<iframe src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/artificial-intelligence-parameter-count" loading="lazy" style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;"></iframe>
*Note that the above is for information only and is not the resolution source for this question.* This question resolves as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2026, a credible source publishes information detailing a dense ML model with at least 100 trillion parameters. For the purposes of this question a dense model is one for which all of the following are true to the extent they can be determined from the available information:
* The model uses at least 80% of its parameters during a single forward pass
* If this information is not available, the model must not be described by its creators as being related to a known sparse architecture (for example, [mixture of experts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixture_of_experts))
* The model is not a hypothetical description or a demonstration of scaling without application. The model must actually be trained and implemented either against benchmarks and performance assessments or used in a real-world application
| 0.31
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Will the Lithium-ion battery recycling market surpass $20 billion (current USD) before 2031? Lithium-ion battery recycling is important for a green transition as it helps to conserve resources and reduce the environmental impact of battery production. With the increasing demand for electric vehicles and renewable energy storage, there is a growing need for lithium-ion batteries. However, the supply of lithium and other materials used in these batteries is limited, and mining these materials can have negative environmental consequences. By recycling used batteries, it is possible to recover valuable materials such as lithium and cobalt, reducing the need for mining and conserving resources.
In recent years, there has been a significant upswing in companies offering such recycling services. For example, [Redwood Materials](https://www.redwoodmaterials.com/), cofounded by a previous CTO at Tesla, founded in 2017, currently provides materials for batteries for about [60,000 new electric vehicles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redwood_Materials,_Inc.) per year, and aims to “produce enough anode and cathode for one million electric vehicles annually” by 2025. Importantly, the company is [not yet profitable]( https://insideevs.com/news/564366/jb-straubel-battery-recycling-profitability/), which presumably also applies to many of its competitors.
There are a variety of already existing forecasts on the trajectory of this market. According [Fortune Business Insights report](https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2022/10/06/2529169/0/en/Lithium-ion-Battery-Recycling-Market-Size-Worth-USD-6-55-Billion-Globally-by-2028-at-18-5-CAGR.html#:~:text=06%2C%202022%20(GLOBE%20NEWSWIRE),forecast%20period%20from%202021%2D2028.), the market size is projected to be at around $6.55 billion by 2028, while [other estimates](https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/lithium-ion-battery-recycling-market-153488928.html#:~:text=What%20is%20the%20size%20of,the%20forecast%20period%202021%2D2026.) put the total lithium-ion battery recycling market cap at $22.8 billion by 2030 or even $38.21 billion by 2030 according to [Allied Market Research](https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/lithium-ion-battery-recycling-market-A11683).
Anticipating the size of this market is important to estimate the future impact that recycling can have on the decarbonisation of the world economy, as lithium-ion batteries are considered a key component in this transition and a thriving recycling business may mean reduced strain on supply. This question will resolve as **Yes** if any reputable firm (including but not limited to the three cited above) estimates the lithium-ion battery recycling market to be $20 billion or more for any year up to (and including) 2030. It resolves as **No** otherwise. Resolution will be determined according to information publicly available on January 1, 2032.
| 0.65
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Metaculus
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Will Johnathan Davis be re-elected at the 2024 ACT election? The Australian Capital Territory is governed by a Legislative Assembly with elections held every four years. Elections involve five multi-member electorates, each of which elects five representatives, called MLAs (Member of the Legislative Assembly). Election is through the Hare-Clark proportional representation system, more detail is [here](https://www.parliament.act.gov.au/visit-and-learn/resources/factsheets/how-members-are-elected). The next election is on 19 October 2024.
Johnathan Davis was elected for the first time in 2020, running in the southern seat of Brindabella. The Greens won 10.8% of the primary vote, about 0.6 of a full quota. As other candidates were exhausted from the count Davis received enough preference flows to take the fifth spot. However, due to the vagaries of the Hare-Clark system, at a critical point in the count Davis was ahead another candidate, Werner-Gibbing, by just 82 votes. Had the voting been slightly different, Davis would not have been elected. You can review the final distribution of preferences [here](https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/2020_legislative_assembly_election/distribution-of-preferences-2020). This question resolves as **Yes** if Elections ACT declares Johnathan Davis elected for any electorate in the ACT as an outcome of the 2024 election. This holds if Davis runs for another party or as an independent. If Davis does not run the question will resolve as **No**. If no election occurs in 2024 this question resolves **Ambiguous**
| 0.51
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Metaculus
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Will Apple Watch feature a blood pressure monitor before 2025? Apple reportedly wants to include [blood pressure monitoring within the Apple Watch](https://9to5mac.com/2021/09/01/apple-watch-blood-pressure-temperature-more/). Bloomberg [wrote in April 2022](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-12/apple-targets-watch-blood-pressure-feature-for-2024-after-snags?leadSource=uverify%20wall) that the feature was "two years away from hitting the market and may slip until 2025." This question will resolve as **Yes** if Apple officially offers for sale an Apple Watch model or accessory that can measure systolic and diastolic blood pressure, or which can monitor trends in blood pressure over time, before January 1, 2025. The Watch must be available for sale on [apple.com](https://www.apple.com/watch/).
Third-party apps or accessories will not be sufficient for a **Yes** resolution
| 0.65
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Metaculus
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Will state-based conflict between Israel and Iran cause at least 1,000 deaths before 2025? The relationship between Iran and Israel has been fraught since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Iran officially recognizes Israel as an [illegitimate entity](https://www.rferl.org/a/1062471.html) and has supported various anti-Israel militant groups, such as [Hezbollah in Lebanon](https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks). The two countries have engaged in covert operations against each other and have been indirect military adversaries in conflicts in the Middle East. [Tensions have increased in recent years](https://www.mei.edu/publications/israels-new-iran-strategy-complicates-regional-security), particularly with [Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities](https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/10/deciphering-iran-s-nuclear-strategy-pub-85313) and its involvement in the Syrian Civil War. In 2018, the [US pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions](https://www.sipri.org/commentary/expert-comment/2019/us-withdrawal-iran-deal-one-year), further exacerbating the tensions between Iran and Israel.
In recent years, there have been several instances of direct conflict between Iran and Israel, including [airstrikes attributed to Israel on Iranian targets](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/top-israeli-general-claims-attack-convoy-iraq-syria-border-2022-12-14/) in Syria and Iraq, and [rocket attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Syria into Israel](https://www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2021/05/14/israel-says-rocket-attacks-from-syria-in-the-north-amid-gaza-fighting-in-south/?sh=25d9c9cc5c2d). These events have heightened concerns over the possibility of a larger conflict breaking out between the two countries and their allies in the region.
U.S. officials stated that [Israel appeared to be behind a late-January 2023 drone strike](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/blast-heard-military-plant-irans-central-city-isfahan-state-media-2023-01-28/) on a military factory in Iran, as part of an operation to [contain Tehran's military and nuclear ambitions](https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-strikes-iran-amid-new-international-push-to-contain-tehran-11675004979?mod=hp_lead_pos10). This question will resolve as **Yes** if, for the years 2023 and 2024 combined, the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) reports 1,000 or more [state-based conflict deaths for the Iran-Israel conflict](https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/14609) (specifically, the category "state-based violence"). The 1,000 deaths need not occur in a single year. We will defer to UCDP's [methodology](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/methodology/) in calculating conflict deaths.
If UCDP does not report data for 2023 and 2024, the question resolves as **Ambiguous**
| 0.12
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Metaculus
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Will state-based conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia cause at least 1,000 deaths in a single year before 2070?
| 0.49
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Metaculus
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Will human cases of HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b avian influenza exceed 500,000 before 2025?
| 0.03
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Metaculus
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Will the Council of the European Union adopt the proposed expansion to climate-focused export credits before 2025?
| 0.68
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Will Adani Enterprises regain a total market cap of $50B before 2028?
| 0.27
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Metaculus
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Will an investigation conducted by or on behalf of any NATO government report that the US was involved in the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline before 2025?
| 0.01
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Metaculus
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Will a post-Putin Russia substantially democratise within 5 years?
| 0.1
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Will a military conflict between Egypt and Israel cause 1,000 or more deaths before 2030?
| 0.02
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Metaculus
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Will Alphabet's (GOOG) market capitalisation fall below $1 Trillion by 2025?
| 0.02
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Metaculus
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Will Dubai's planned aerial taxis be operational before 2027?
| 0.34
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Metaculus
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Will Russia's GDP (in 2015 USD) be at least $1.50 trillion in 2030?
| 0.85
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Metaculus
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Will the US and the EU (or one of its member states) cut diplomatic ties before 2051?
| 0.08
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Metaculus
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Will Russian territory be reduced by at least 1% before 2040?
| 0.33
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Metaculus
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Will there be a driver fatality in the NASCAR Cup Series before 2050? Since the [tragic passing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Dale_Earnhardt) of NASCAR legend Dale Earnhardt Sr on the last lap of the 2001 Daytona 500, there have been no driver fatalities in any of NASCAR's three highest series. [Five more](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NASCAR_fatalities) drivers perished in lower-leveled series between 2001 and 2009, but none have since. This is [likely due](https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2712394-7-changes-nascar-has-made-to-make-the-sport-safer) to the increased emphasis NASCAR has placed on driver safety by modifying the cars and rules of the sport. This question will resolve as **Yes** if at any point from March 23, 2023 to December 31, 2049 a driver running part or full-time in the NASCAR Cup Series dies while performing driver duties in a NASCAR Cup Series sanctioned event. Resolution will be determined by an official statement from NASCAR confirming the driver fatality during a sanctioned event.
| 0.52
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Metaculus
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Will the EU rank above the US and China every year until 2030, according to the Climate Change Performance Index? Most countries worldwide have increased their focus on tackling climate change, pledging reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, increasing subsidies for renewable energies, and further public policy aimed at climate. The three major trading blocs/countries, the European Union, the United States of America, and China, contribute to a [substantial portion](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE?locations=EU-US-CN&name_desc=true) of overall emissions, with China currently emitting more than the other two combined. In [per capita terms](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?locations=EU-US-CN), the US is ahead of both the EU and China, who are on more similar levels.
According to Climate Action Tracker, China's overall rating of its climate action is classified as ‘[highly insufficient](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/)' while both the [US](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/) and the [EU](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/) are classified as ‘insufficient'. However, the EU has positioned itself as a [leader on climate](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/eu-climate-change/) with its comprehensive ‘[2030 climate & energy framework](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2030-climate-energy-framework_en)'. Recently, with the [Inflation Reduction Act](https://www.iea.org/policies/16156-inflation-reduction-act-of-2022), the US has also significantly stepped up its efforts to combat climate change, while China has lagged both the EU and the US while also announcing their [own efforts](https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/explainers/how-is-china-tackling-climate-change/).
So far, the EU has ranked above the US and China in almost all climate-related indices like the Climate Change Performance Index, which ranks the EU at #19, China at #51, and the US at #52. The Climate Change Performance Index ([CCPI](https://ccpi.org/)) is an annual report that evaluates and compares the climate protection performance of 57 countries and the European Union. The methodology behind the CCPI involves a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators that assess each country's climate policies and their implementation. The CCPI evaluates each country based on four categories: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Renewable Energy, Energy Use, and Climate Policy. Each category has a different weight assigned to it, and the indicators within each category are given different scores based on their relevance and importance.
For summaries of the three blocs/countries, see [below](https://ccpi.org/wp-content/uploads/CCPI-2023-Results-3.pdf):
> The EU receives a medium rating in the GHG Emissions, Renewable Energy, and Energy Use categories. In Climate Policy, it receives a high, reflecting the progress the supranational union has made in this category since a year before.
> In the GHG Emissions and Energy Use categories, [China] ranks very low. However, because of its strong renewable energy development over the past years, China rates high in the Renewable Energy category. For Climate Policy, it receives a medium.
> The US receives a very low in the GHG Emissions, Renewable Energy, and Energy Use categories, though rates a medium in Climate Policy.
Understanding both absolute levels of emissions/policy responses and relative positions of major countries and blocs is central to understanding future progress on climate change. This question will resolve as **Yes** if the European Union ranks above the United States of America and China for the years 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, and 2030 based on the [Climate Change Performance Index](https://ccpi.org/) of the respective year.
This question will resolve as **No** if the European Union does not rank above the United States of America and China for the years 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, and 2030 based on the [Climate Change Performance Index](https://ccpi.org/) of the respective year.
This question will resolve ambiguously if the European Union, the United States of America, China (or more than one) are not listed in the CCPI report for any of the relevant years
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Metaculus
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Will Russia significantly incorporate Belarus into the Union State before 2030? In February 2023, [Yahoo News](https://news.yahoo.com/russia-belarus-strategy-document-230035184.html) (as well as Delfi Estonia, the Dossier Center, Expressen, Kyiv Independent, and others) received a leaked internal strategy document from Putin's executive office. This document outlines a detailed plan of Russia taking full control over Belarus by 2030. Since the signing of the [Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus in 1999](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Treaty-on-the-Creation-of-a-Union-State), Russia and Belarus have been in the supranational union called the [Union State](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_State). As described on the website of the [President of the Public of Belarus](https://president.gov.by/en/belarus/economics/economic-integration/union-state#:~:text=The%20Republic%20of%20Belarus%20and,phase%2Dby%2Dphase%20principle.):
> Under the Treaty, Belarus and Russia have set a number of important guidelines, one of which is the establishment of the common economic space. This goal is achieved on the phase-by-phase principle. The partnership between Belarus and Russia is built on the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states, responsible fulfillment by the parties of their international obligations.
This is in contrast to the leaked strategy document which outlines the following goals, according to [Yahoo News](https://news.yahoo.com/russia-belarus-strategy-document-230035184.html):
> [T]he end goal is the formation of a so-called Union State of Russia and Belarus by no later than 2030. Everything involved in the merger of the two countries has been considered, including the “harmonization” of Belarusian laws with those of the Russian Federation; a “coordinated foreign and defense policy” and “trade and economic cooperation … on the basis of the priority” of Russian interests; and “ensuring the predominant influence of the Russian Federation in the socio-political, trade-economic, scientific-educational and cultural-information spheres.”
> In practice, this would eliminate whatever remains of Belarus's sovereignty and reduce a country about the size of Kansas, with 9.3 million people, to the status of a Moscow satellite. It would put Belarusians at the mercy of the Kremlin's priorities, whether in agriculture, industry, espionage or war. And it would pose a security threat to Belarus's European neighbors, three of which — Latvia, Lithuania and Poland — are members of NATO and the European Union.
The document mentions a variety of measures planned, among them (i) ‘passportization' (handing out Russian passports to local people), (ii) single monetary currency (introduction of one currency for both countries), and (iii) foreign policy (such as decisions of war). At the moment, the Union State between Russia and Belarus fulfils neither of these three criteria. Belarusian citizens are not handed Russian passports, Belarus has its [own currency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarusian_ruble), and Belarus is able to make its own foreign policy decisions as seen in the decision of the [Belarusian Armed Forces to not participate in the invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarusian_involvement_in_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#:~:text=As%20of%20early%202023%2C%20the,into%20Ukraine%20unless%20attacked%20first.). This question will resolve as **Yes** if at least two of the three conditions outlined below are satisfied.
This question will also resolve as **Yes** if Belarus ceases being an independent country and is officially incorporated into Russia.
This question will resolve as **No** if one or fewer of the three conditions below are satisfied.
Condition 1 (Passportization): There are media reports by [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that Russian passports are handed out to Belarusian citizens on a widespread basis.
Condition 2 (Single Monetary Currency): The official currency of Belarus and Russia is the same.
Condition 3 (Common Foreign Policy): There are media reports by [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that report that Russia is directing Belarus' foreign policy. Condition 3 also resolves if the Belarusian Foreign Office or the office of the President of Belarus are subsumed in their Russian counterparts or merged. Condition 3 also resolves if there are credible reports that the Russian military has assumed de-facto control over the Belarusian military
| 0.42
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Metaculus
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On Election Day 2024, will Donald Trump be a third-party candidate for the US Presidential Election? *Related Questions on Metaculus:*
* [Who will be elected to be US President in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11245/winner-of-2024-us-presidential-election/)
* [Who will be the Republican nominee for the 2024 US Presidential Election?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11370/2024-republican-nominee-for-us-prez/)
----
As of February 21, 2023, Donald Trump and Nikki Haley have both declared their campaigns for the [Republican Nomination](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries) for the 2024 US Presidential Election. [Early polling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries#Nationwide_polling) shows Trump as the leading candidate among Republican voters, ahead of the second-place candidate Ron DeSantis (who has not openly declared his interest in campaigning). Prediction market aggregator [ElectionBettingOdds](https://electionbettingodds.com/GOPPrimary2024.html) shows both Trump and DeSantis as the most likely winners of the Republican Nomination.
[The Atlantic](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/02/trump-arsonist-turns-his-own-party/672956/) reported in February 2023:
>[...] [The survey](https://www.thebulwark.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Republican_Presidential_Primary_Toplines.pdf) found that a large majority of Republicans are ready to move on from Trump—but at the same time, more than a quarter of likely Republican voters are ready to follow Trump to a third-party bid. Two days after the poll results were released, Trump was asked in an interview whether, if he lost the nomination, he would support the GOP nominee. Trump [answered](https://www.mediaite.com/trump/trump-refuses-to-commit-to-backing-the-republican-nominee-in-2024/), “It would have to depend on who the nominee was.” Translation: no.
The 2024 US Presidential Election is [currently scheduled](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) for November 5, 2024. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, on the date of the US Presidential Election in 2024, both of these conditions are true:
* Donald Trump is actively campaigning for the office of US President in 2024,
* and Trump is not listed as either the nominee of the Republican (or Democratic) party in 26 or more US states.
For this question, Trump may not be nominated by the Republican or Democratic party for any reason: he may start his own party, join another third-party, campaign as an independent, or he may claim to be a Republican but not recieve the party's endorsement, asking voters to write him in.
If Trump is not campaigning for the election by election day, or if he recieves the Republican (or Democratic) nomination on election day, this question will resolve as **No**.
The determination of whether Trump is considered to be "actively campaigning" will be at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.
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Metaculus
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Will the ANC receive more than 50% of the vote in the 2024 South African general election?
| 0.33
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Metaculus
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Will visits by a US President to EU member states fall below 1 visit/year for a period of at least three years before 2051? The EU-US diplomatic relationship is arguably the most important diplomatic relation in the Western sphere of influence. As the [EU parliament liaison office in Washington](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/unitedstates/en/eu-us-relations) phrases it:
> Diplomatic relations between the EU and the U.S. date back to 1953. The relationship between the EU and the U.S. is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. The EU and U.S. are the biggest economic and military powers in the world, dominate global trade, play the leading roles in international political relations, and whatever one says matters a great deal, not only to the other, but to much of the rest of the world.
A strong diplomatic transatlantic relationship between the EU and the US has the potential to shape much of the global balance of power, as it has during the early 21st century. Similarly, a deteriorating of this relationship brings with it substantial geopolitical risks in North America, Europe, and the rest of the world.
One measure of transatlantic relations is the number of meetings between the US President and EU heads of state. Between 2010 and 2022, US presidents have visited EU member states a total of 39 times according to Wikipedia counts [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Western_Europe), [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Southern_Europe), [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Northern_Europe), and [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Eastern_Europe_and_Northern_Asia), resulting in over 3 visits per year on average. These visits are not the only relevant points of diplomatic contact, as visits be Secretaries of State or Defence also matter, but presidential visits arguably carry with them the most weight. A significant slowdown in visits over a prolonged period may be evidence of worsening relations. This question will resolve as **Yes** if there is a period of at least three years between 2023 and 2050, in which visits by a US President to EU member states average less than 1 visit per year for a three-year period.
The total number of visits to EU member states will be ascertained by summing up the visits to a EU member state listed [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Western_Europe), [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Southern_Europe), [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Northern_Europe), and [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Eastern_Europe_and_Northern_Asia). Only visits to a country that is a member of the EU at the time of the visit counts. Several visits to a country within a short period of time count as several visits if they are indicate as distinct visits in the resolution source(s).
This question resolves as **No** if there is no period of at least three years between 2023 and 2050, in which visits by a US President to EU member states average less than 1 visit per year for a three-year period.
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Metaculus
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Will Belarus become a EU candidate country before 2030? Belarus established relations with the European Union after gaining independence in 1991, but these relations deteriorated after Alexander Lukashenko became the leader in 1994. The EU has condemned Lukashenko's government for its authoritarian and anti-democratic practices and imposed sanctions on the country. Despite a slight improvement in relations in 2008, the 2010 Belarusian presidential election led to mass demonstrations and arrests, which led to new targeted sanctions from the EU, similarly to the [restrictive measures](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/belarus/) imposed on Belarus following the use of violence against peaceful protestors after the [2020 Belarus presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%932021_Belarusian_protests). In 2021, Belarus [suspended its participation](https://www.google.com/search?q=belarus+EU%27s+Eastern+Partnershi&oq=belarus+EU%27s+Eastern+Partnershi&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i22i30i625j0i390l3.1399j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8) in the EU Eastern Partnership, further straining the relationship. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Belarus' support for Russia, the [EU imposed a number on sanctions against Belarus]( https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-belarus/), further deteriorating the relationship. However, in early 2023, an [internal strategy document](https://news.yahoo.com/russia-belarus-strategy-document-230035184.html?guccounter=1) from Putin's executive office was leaked that outlined a detailed plan of Russia taking full control of Belarus by 2030, the existence of which [Lukashenko acknowledged](https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1629521798034333696).
Due to the geographical position of Belarus, bordering Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, its alignment to the EU or Russia over the next decade may become a crucial geopolitical point of tension. While it currently does not seem likely that Belarus will shift westwards and aim to become a member of the European Union, any such shift would have profound geopolitical consequences. This question resolves as **Yes** if Belarus officially is declared a candidate country for joining the EU according to the European Union. This question resolves on the basis of [this list](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/joining-eu_en). If this list is no longer available, the question resolves based on official EU announcements that Belarus is a candidate country before 2030.
If either the EU or Belarus cease existing, this question resolve ambiguously. Otherwise, this question resolves as **No**
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Metaculus
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Will European soil moisture be below the reference period for at least 3 out of the 4 years between 2022 and 2025? Soil moisture refers to the water content in the top one centimetre of soil. Soil moisture is an essential land surface variable that has a significant impact on many environmental processes, such as the exchange of water and heat between the land surface and the atmosphere, the formation of precipitation and runoff, and the growth of vegetation canopies. Moreover, soil moisture plays a crucial role in the climate system and has a direct impact on the predictability of the atmosphere on sub-seasonal to seasonal time scales. Accurate measurements and modelling of soil moisture are essential for weather and climate forecasting, particularly in regions like Europe, where precipitation patterns can be highly variable and unpredictable.
According to a [2021 ESOTC Copernicus Report](https://climate.copernicus.eu/esotc/2021/soil-moisture) on European soil moisture in 2021, soil moisture was “near average compared to the 1991-2020 reference period”, having improved substantially from large negative deviations in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In 2020, it [“was the third lowest since 1979”](https://climate.copernicus.eu/esotc/2020/soil-moisture) As the 2020 ESOTC points out:
> Since 1979, Europe has seen a downward trend in soil moisture. This question resolves as **Yes** if European soil moisture for the years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 shows negative anomalies from the relevant reference period for at least three of the four years. This will be based on [European State of the Climate ESOTC](https://climate.copernicus.eu/ESOTC) report for 2025.
This question resolves as **No** if European soil moisture for the years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 shows negative anomalies in two of fewer of the four years.
If the ESOTC is no longer updating in 2025/2026, if soil moisture is dropped as a relevant variable, or if their reporting of the data does no longer include the relevant resolution value, this question resolves ambiguously.
| 0.42
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Metaculus
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Will there be a test flight of a full-scale heavy-lift cargo airship before 2031? In 2016, there was a lot of buzz about the potential use of [airships as heavy-lift cargo aircraft](https://www.mining.com/canadian-rare-earths-mine-transport-ore-using-airships/). Quest Rare Minerals Ltd. had struck a deal with Straitline Aviation to provide airships for hauling ore concentrate, supplies, and personnel between the Strange Lake mine in Northern Quebec and a transportation hub in the town of Schefferville. The plan was for Straitline Aviation to purchase twelve Lockheed-Martin LMH-1 hybrid airships from Hybrid Enterprises (the exclusive dealer of the LMH-1s) for $480 million. The intent was to save the roughly $350 million needed annually to build and maintain a 168-kilometer ice road. The operation was set to begin in 2019.
Since that time, [Quest filed for bankruptcy](https://www.reuters.com/article/brief-quest-rare-minerals-files-proposal-idUSFWN1P00U9), and [Lockheed-Martin no longer markets its LMH-1]( https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2022-07-15/hybrid-airships-make-slow-takeoff). While it may appear that interest in commercial airship applications has waned, there continues to be intense interest and significant financial deals in the works for the industry.
In July 2022, the French-based cargo company Flying Whales announced they had [secured €122 million]( https://www.cargoforwarder.eu/2022/07/10/flying-whales-are-another-step-closer-to-take-off/) to start the two-year development of their own hybrid airship program for heavy lift cargo. They plan to manufacture their first aerial vehicles in 2024 at a plant near Bordeaux.
Flying Whales is by no means alone in their efforts. In his exhaustive [three-part series covering modern airships]( https://lynceans.org/all-posts/modern-airships-part-1/), Peter Lobner provides an overview of modern airship technology with links to more than 240 individual articles on advanced airship designs. Despite innumerable setbacks, the dream of once again filling the skies with commercial cargo airships is alive and well. This question will resolve as **Yes** if a credible media story or corporate announcement indicates that a full-size working airship with a cargo capacity of at least ten tons has flown a test flight by December 31, 2030
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Metaculus
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Will the US conduct a test flight of a military airship capable of transporting a at least a ten-ton payload by 2031? In February 2023, a Chinese surveillance balloon was [shot down]( https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/07/china-spy-balloon-us-national-security/) over US airspace. Subsequently, [three additional flying objects were shot down]( https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/4-flying-objects-shot-north-america-timeline-key/story?id=97068603). The recent incursions of Chinese surveillance balloons into US airspace have raised concerns about the need for advanced surveillance capabilities, which may rekindle the US military's interest in airship technology.
Anticipating the need for novel and creative approaches towards adversaries in future conflicts, [Lt. Col. Jerry Drew argues]( https://www.army.mil/article/261648/experimental_delivery_airships_balloons_push_logistics_to_ground_forces) that modern airships have the potential to be valuable military platforms for long-range surveillance, troop transport, and cargo transportation in a littoral environment.
One potential role for airships in military operations is as long-range surveillance platforms. Airships are well-suited for this role because they can remain aloft for long periods of time, providing a stable platform for surveillance equipment. Airships can also operate at high altitudes, which can help them avoid detection by ground-based radar. In a littoral environment, airships can monitor shipping lanes, coastal regions, and other areas of interest to military planners.
Another potential role for airships is troop and cargo transportation in a littoral environment. Airships can transport large amounts of cargo and troops over long distances and operate in areas where traditional transport methods are not feasible. This can make airships valuable for military operations in remote or inaccessible areas. In addition, airships can be used to deploy troops and equipment quickly in response to crises or military conflicts.
Peter Lobner maintains a website with an [exhaustive list of modern airships]( https://lynceans.org/all-posts/modern-airships-part-1/). He claims that despite “the airship industry having developed many designs capable of transporting 10's to 100's of tons of cargo thousands of miles, today there is not a single airship that can transport a 3 metric ton (6.614 lb.) payload 300 km (186 mi).” It seems a necessary precursor for military airships to have a payload capacity sufficient to transport advanced surveillance instruments, missiles, drones, troops, or equipment in a littoral environment such as the US might face in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
***Will the US conduct a test flight of a military airship capable of transporting a at least a ten-ton payload before 2031?***
This question will resolve as **Yes** if a [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) from a media outlet or corporate announcement indicates that a test flight was conducted of a US military airship with a payload capacity of at least ten tons before January 1, 2031.
This question also resolves as **Yes** if a US military airship with a payload capacity of at least ten tons is in service (i.e., if a test flight is not conducted).
An additional resolution source is the [GAO](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-222) for the relevant years up to and including 2030.
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Metaculus
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Will the United States score in the bottom 50% for academic freedom in 2025 (according to the AFI)? The [Academic Freedom Index (AFI)](https://academic-freedom-index.net/) is a comprehensive and widely recognized tool for assessing de facto levels of academic freedom across the world. The AFI evaluates five key indicators of academic freedom, including the freedom to research and teach, freedom of academic exchange and dissemination, institutional autonomy, campus integrity, and freedom of academic and cultural expression. The index currently covers 179 countries and territories, and is considered the most comprehensive dataset available on the subject of academic freedom. The index employs a methodology that includes assessments by 2,197 country experts, standardized questionnaires, and a well-established statistical model, implemented and adapted by the [V-Dem project](https://v-dem.net/). The 2023 report (of the period up to December 2022) places the United States of the America in the Top 40-50% bracket (pg. 2-3) and outlines the following threats to academic freedom:
> China, India, the United States of America and Mexico are among the most populous countries where academic freedom has significantly fallen back over the past decade. These developments have occurred in different political settings and do not all follow the same pattern.
> The United States of America presents a different picture. **After a long period of relatively high academic freedom levels, four out of five indicators visibly declined in 2021** – the year after President Donald Trump, who repeatedly made statements highly critical of science and academia, was voted out of office. Although some federal actions detrimental to academic freedom were taken during his administration, educational matters in the USA are largely regulated by individual states, which have increasingly used their authority to interfere in academic affairs since 2021. At least nine states, all Republican-led, have adopted bills that ban the teaching of concepts related to “critical race theory” in higher education institutions. Several states are also targeting tenure in public universities, adding to the already precarious status of academic employment. Some states now also allow students to record class lectures without the professor's consent. Furthermore, influential conservative groups are lobbying state legislatures to withdraw funding from scientific fields such as gender, minority studies, and environmental science, and various groups are maintaining public “watchlists” of professors perceived as radical leftists. Despite efforts to polarize and intimidate, AFI data on academics' freedom of expression indicates that scholars in the USA remain able to publically voice their expertise, even on politically salient issues. This question will resolve as a **Yes** if the United States of America is ranked in the bottom 50% for academic freedom in 2025, which includes the following brackets: Bottom 10%, Bottom 10-20%, Bottom 20-30%, Bottom 30-40%, and Bottom 40-50%, according to the [Academic Freedom Index.](https://academic-freedom-index.net/)
This question will resolve as a **No** if the United States of America is ranked in the top 40-50% or higher on the Academic Freedom Index for the year 2025.
This question will resolve as ambiguous if the Academic Freedom Index is no longer published, if the AFI does not report data for the year 2025 (but does report data for 2026 or later), or if the AFI does not report the 2025 data by December 31, 2028.
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Metaculus
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Will faster-than-light communication be possible before 2300? The idea of [faster-than-light communication](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superluminal_communication) frequently appears in science fiction and theoretical discussions. The ability to communicate faster than the speed of light would allow for much more effective coordination of deep space missions, improved ping times for the Earth-based internet, and numerous other benefits. Current scientific research suggests that faster-than-light communication is impossible. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2300, at least one instance of communication being made at speeds faster than the [speed of light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light) has been credibly reported. The communication must involve the transmission of at least [one bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bit) of information. The communication time must be less than it would take the speed of light to travel the same distance. For instance, if it would take the speed of light 10 milliseconds to travel between points A and B, communication being made in 9.99999 (repeating) milliseconds or less would resolve this question as *Yes*
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Metaculus
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Will octopus farms yield 3000 tonnes of octopuses in one year before 2026? *This question has been posed by [Rethink Priorities](https://rethinkpriorities.org/), a non-profit research organisation.*
[Many animal advocates](https://ali.fish/blog/open-letter-cephalopod-farms-could-be-very-harmful-but-we-can-still-stop-them) are working on preventing a new commercial octopus farm (by the Nueva Pescanova group), and octopus farming more generally, from developing. This question is being posted with a view to giving animal advocates more information about the potential scale of this industry, and how much time they have to intervene. It is also interesting and somewhat unique to forecast the trajectory of a new food industry before it has officially begun.
To date the vast majority of octopus consumed by humans is wild-caught. The FAO has never reported an annual production of octopus via farming greater than 117 tonnes—reported by Japan in 1967, [see downloaded data here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OOpFn4L71obkad6C-IUUaDLfeMsi3oeR/view?usp=sharing)—compared to a reported [500,000 tonnes of wild-caught octopus in 2021](https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/openasfa/d031864c-c94e-465a-a7e4-6e1278ea7180). Any octopus farming tonnage ever reported by the FAO has come from just five countries (Japan, Peru, Portugal, Spain, and Tunisia) and is listed under ‘Octopuses, nei [not elsewhere included]' or ‘Octopuses, etc. nei'. It is not clear where these tonnages originate from (i.e., from which farms/organizations), or if the data represents actual octopus farming—many say octopus has never been farmed before. The practical difficulties of octopus farming (outlined below), the lack of species classification, and small numbers make it difficult to understand what the FAO data indicates, or whether it illustrates the feasibility of octopus farming in the future.¹
In fact, a farm branded as ‘the world's first octopus farm' was proposed for development in 2021, in the Canary Islands. The organization behind the proposal, Nueva Pescanova, declared in 2021 that they had successfully [raised five generations of octopuses](https://www.nuevapescanova.com/en/2021/11/08/nueva-pescanova-inaugura-el-pescanova-biomarine-center-el-centro-de-idi-en-acuicultura-referente-en-espana/#:~:text=Currently%20in%20its%20fifth%20generation%20(Lourditas%2C%20the%20first%20octopus%20to%20be%20born%20in%20aquaculture%2C%20grew%20up%20and%20became%20a%20mother%2C%20and%20now%20has%20great%2Dgreat%2Dgrandchildren%20who%20have%20just%20become%20parents%20themselves)%2C) in captivity. In 2019, Nueva Pescanova said that they expected “[to be able to sell aquaculture octopus starting in the year 2023](https://www.nuevapescanova.com/en/2019/07/18/researchers-from-pescanova-achieve-to-close-the-reproduction-cycle-of-octopus-in-aquaculture/).” In 2021 they said “[Nueva Pescanova will market the world's first octopuses born in aquaculture in summer 2022](https://www.nuevapescanova.com/en/2021/11/08/nueva-pescanova-inaugura-el-pescanova-biomarine-center-el-centro-de-idi-en-acuicultura-referente-en-espana/#:~:text=Nueva%20Pescanova%20will%20market%20the%20world%E2%80%99s%20first%20octopuses%20born%20in%20aquaculture%20in%20summer%202022).” They also say they will be able to produce 3000 tonnes of octopus annually. We have not seen any public announcement of the permit approval by the Spanish government, so it is likely to still be pending.
Other countries are also attempting to produce farmed octopus. [The Case Against Octopus Farming (2019)](https://issues.org/the-case-against-octopus-farming/) reports “The Spanish Institute of Oceanography in Vigo has carried out the majority of published research on octopus farming, but research is also occurring in Portugal and Greece, where the Mediterranean-based company Nireus Aquaculture has funded octopus-farming research. Octopus ranching is being tried in Italy and Australia as well. A farm in the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico has reportedly successfully farmed another species, Octopus maya, and attempts to farm octopus are underway in other parts of Latin America, including Chile. In China, up to eight different species of octopus are now being experimentally farmed. In Japan, the seafood company Nissui reported hatching octopus eggs in captivity in 2017 and is predicting a fully farmed market-ready octopus by 2020.”
Compassion in World Farming recently reported that they [helped temporarily halt the only octopus farm in the U.S.](https://www.ciwf.com/news/2023/01/only-us-octopus-farm-shut-down-following-compassion-campaign?utm_campaign=fish&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=ciwf) (though to our knowledge it remains possible that they could obtain permits to resume farming), whose false front of tourism and conservation was exposed as [government records showed plans to supply restaurants with octopus](https://www.everyanimalproject.com/2022/10/09/octopus-farming/#:~:text=Despite%20Kanaloa%E2%80%99s%20public%20claims%20that%20it%20isn%E2%80%99t%20interested%20in%20farming%2C%20government%20records%20show%20plans%20for%20supplying%20octopus%20and%20squid%20to%20the%20restaurant%20industry).
Octopus farming has historically posed many practical problems. There is variation in an individual's requirements across its development—historically the early and paralarval developmental stages have presented rearing difficulties and, subsequently, high mortality rates ([Uriarte et al., 2011](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-7345.2011.00524.x); [Spreitzenbarth et al., 2021](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0044848620334396?dgcid=rss_sd_all#bb0210)). Octopus species are carnivorous and can [require three times their body weight in feed](https://issues.org/the-case-against-octopus-farming/#:~:text=Octopuses%20have%20a%20food%20conversion%20rate%20of%20at%20least%203%3A1%2C%20meaning%20that%20the%20weight%20of%20feed%20necessary%20to%20sustain%20them%20is%20about%20three%20times%20the%20weight%20of%20the%20animal) across their lifetime. They are also solitary, making the large stocking densities required for profitability problematic, and potentially leading to aggression and cannibalistic behavior ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/worlds-first-octopus-farm-stirs-ethical-debate-2022-02-23/#:~:text=However%2C%20previous%20efforts%20to%20farm%20octopus%20have%20struggled%20with%20high%20mortality%2C%20while%20attempts%20to%20breed%20wild%2Dcaught%20octopus%20ran%20into%20problems%20with%20aggression%2C%20cannibalism%20and%20self%2Dmutilation) and [Aquatic Life Institute](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e4ff4ae6791c303cbd43f67/t/63d975bacd110720f64ca6f2/1675195842981/Why+Cephalopod+Farming+Must+be+Rejected+Before+it+Starts.pdf)). Therefore, many are concerned that octopus farming poses significant [animal welfare problems](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e4ff4ae6791c303cbd43f67/t/63d975bacd110720f64ca6f2/1675195842981/Why+Cephalopod+Farming+Must+be+Rejected+Before+it+Starts.pdf). The Case Against Octopus Farming states “Many octopus species appear to be largely asocial and show little tolerance of other individuals of the same species. Farming such species that, in addition, are carnivorous will almost inevitably require that individuals be kept isolated in small containers, with no scope for environmental enrichment and very poor overall well-being.”
Octopuses may also be highly intelligent—the [2012 Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness](http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf) stated that octopuses possessed the characteristics required for consciousness and a [review by the London School of Economics](https://www.lse.ac.uk/news/news-assets/pdfs/2021/sentience-in-cephalopod-molluscs-and-decapod-crustaceans-final-report-november-2021.pdf) reported that there is “very strong evidence of sentience in octopods (order Octopoda)” (p. 81). Based on this review, octopuses were ultimately included in the UK's [Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/22/enacted).
*¹ When I reached out to the FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Statistics team about where the data came from they replied “Unfortunately, we have no information about the producing companies in addition to the national level data we receive from the competent authorities of producing countries.”* This question resolves as **Yes** if there is a calendar year in which at least 3000 tonnes of octopuses are produced via aquaculture before January 1, 2026, as reported by the [FAO's Global Aquaculture Production database](https://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics-query/en/aquaculture/aquaculture_quantity).
In the question ‘farming' refers to aquaculture, as opposed to being captured from the wild. Octopus refers only to those species in the order *Octopoda*, and does not include other cephalopods like squids or cuttlefish. To collect resolution data go to [this link](https://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics-query/en/aquaculture/aquaculture_quantity), in the top right panel under ‘Family', select 'Octopodidae'. Then, select the years 2021 to 2025 (data accessible at time of question posting only reaches 2020) and click ‘show data' in the bottom right corner. Finally, total the ‘Tonnes - live weight' figures for each calendar year.
| 0.13
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Metaculus
|
Will JetBlue announce that it has acquired Spirit Airlines before 2026? On July 28, 2022, JetBlue and Spirit Airlines [announced](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1158463/000119312522204208/d319514dex991.htm) that their boards of directors had approved a merger between the two companies through which JetBlue would acquire Spirit for $33.50 a share, at an enterprise value of $7.6 billion, and following the merger would eventually operate as a single airline under the JetBlue name and be the 5th largest airline in the United States. The airlines [planned](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/28/business/jetblue-spirit-merger.html) to complete the transaction in the first half of 2024. On October 19, 2022 Spirit's shareholders [approved](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1498710/000149871022000336/a221019stockholderapprov.htm) the deal.
On March 7, 2023, the US Department of Justice [announced](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-block-jetblue-s-proposed-acquisition-spirit) an antitrust lawsuit to block the acquisition on the grounds that it would harm consumers by eliminating an ultra-low-cost carrier, which would result in, according to the DOJ, "raising costs for the flying public and harming cost-conscious fliers most acutely." JetBlue and Spirit [announced](https://investor.jetblue.com/news/news-details/2023/JetBlue-and-Spirit-Will-Continue-to-Advance-Plan-to-Create-Compelling-National-Low-Fare-Challenger-to-the-Dominant-U.S.-Carriers/default.aspx) that they would "vigorously defend" against the DOJ's suit, arguing that the post-merger JetBlue would be a stronger and more competitive airline against the legacy carriers.
According to [research](https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/done-deal-why-many-large-transactions-fail-to-cross-the-finish-line) by McKinsey, in any given year about 10% of large M&A transactions are cancelled, with larger combinations being more likely to be cancelled. The 2nd most common reason for mergers to be terminated is for regulatory or antitrust concerns. A recent [legal analysis](https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2022/11/07/doj-sees-mixed-results-in-litigation-focused-antitrust-strategy/?slreturn=20230209091925) finds the DOJ under the Biden Administration to have a more expansive view of antitrust and a willingness to go to trial even when facing difficult cases. This has resulted in a string of defeats but also recent victories such as blocking the acquisition of Simon & Schuster by Penguin Random House. This question resolves as **Yes** based on either of two events happening:
1. A JetBlue press release stating that it has completed its acquisition of Spirit Airlines.
2. An SEC filing by JetBlue stating that the deal has been completed.
This question resolves as **No** immediately upon an announcement (either through press release or an SEC filing) by JetBlue stating that the acquisition deal has been terminated. Otherwise if no deal has been completed before January 1, 2026, this resolves as **No**
| 0.09
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Metaculus
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Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027? The [National Environmental Policy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Environmental_Policy_Act) (NEPA) was enacted in 1970 and established a process for the review of the environmental impact of projects within the federal purview. It also established the [Council on Environmental Quality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Environmental_Quality) (CEQ), an office of the executive branch tasked with overseeing NEPA implementation. The law requires that Federal agencies prepare environmental assessments (EA) and (if required) environmental impact statements (EIS) for projects to assess their environmental impact.
While the law emphasizes environmental protection, it has [been criticized](https://progress.institute/environmental-review/) for slowing the transition to renewable energy by causing delays in projects related to clean energy technology. Section 4.3 of the National Association of Environmental Professionals [2021 Annual NEPA Report](https://naep.memberclicks.net/assets/annual-report/NEPA_Annual_Report_2021.pdf) says the following about the length of time for EISs completed in 2021 (NOI refers to notice of intent to prepare an EIS and NOA refers to the notice of availability of the EIS):
>. . . final EISs prepared by all agencies combined had an average preparation time (from the Federal Register NOI to the EPA NOA for the final EIS) of 1,678 ± 1,589 days (4.6 ± 4.4 years[)].
The length of EIS review may be a significant factor in future US mining capacity for critical minerals. According to a [report published by SNL Metals & Mining](https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/SNL_Permitting_Delay_Report-Online.pdf)
>. . . it takes on average seven to 10 years to secure the permits needed to commence operations in the U.S. To put that into perspective, in Canada and Australia, countries with similarly stringent environmental regulations, the average permitting period is two years.
In September of 2020 the Trump administration's CEQ [updated the regulations regarding NEPA implementation](https://www.insideenergyandenvironment.com/2020/07/ceq-finalizes-nepa-rule-updating-regulations/). This update included setting a [one year time limit](https://scoutenv.com/2021/12/08/nepaeaclockstart/) on EAs and a two year time limit on EISs, though these time limits could be extended by a written order from the lead agency performing the NEPA review (the relevant section of the [2020 final rule](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2020/07/f76/ceq-reg-2020-07-16-final-rule.pdf) is § 1501.10). In 2021 the Biden administration [extended the deadline](https://www.vnf.com/biden-administration-walks-back-key-trump-era-nepa-regulation-changes) for agencies to update their procedures in accordance with the 2020 rule until September 2023. In 2022 the CEQ also issued a [final rule](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/20/2022-08288/national-environmental-policy-act-implementing-regulations-revisions) reversing some of the 2020 changes in what it referred to as "[Phase 1](https://www.environmentallawandpolicy.com/2022/06/biden-administration-releases-phase-1-of-nepa-revisions/)" revisions to the 2020 rule, with a "Phase 2" to follow. The "Phase 1" revisions did not remove the timeline requirement imposed in the 2020 rule.
In 2022 several House Republicans [introduced](https://naturalresources.house.gov/newsroom/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=411591) a [bill](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/8981) that would impose timelines for NEPA review of 18 months for an EA and 24 months for an EIS, which could not be extended without agreement from the project applicant. This question resolves as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2027, the United States has passed a law which sets a deadline on the length of NEPA review such that an environmental assessment (EA) not exceed 18 months and an environmental impact statement (EIS) not exceed 24 months. A more stringent timeline qualifies so long as neither the EA or EIS timelines exceed those specified here.
A law qualifies for the question to resolve as **Yes** even if it allows extensions to the deadline, so long as the law stipulates that the project applicant must agree to the extensions.
| 0.5
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Metaculus
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Will a new federal "Cash for Clunkers" program be passed into law before 2027? [From Kelley Blue Book](https://www.kbb.com/car-news/cash-for-clunkers/):
>Cash for Clunkers is shorthand for the Car Allowance Rebate System. This government incentive program passed in response to the 2008 recession to spur auto sales. The plan gave participants up to $4,500 for their old running vehicles (cash for their clunker). The money would be used to purchase a more fuel-efficient new or late-model used vehicle. The program ran from July 1 to August 24, 2009, distributing some $3 billion.
>
>A new version of the program was proposed last year by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY). It targets older internal combustion vehicles in favor of zero-emission electric cars. It would earmark $392 billion towards replacing 63 million cars and trucks, or about 25-percent of the current U.S. fleet, with EVs. However, this proposal is not part of the infrastructure bill currently under consideration.
Any old cars purchased by dealers under the [Car Allowance Rebate System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Car_Allowance_Rebate_System) were required to be scrapped and have their engines disabled, precluding the potential for resale.
Schumer has described his proposal for a new version of this plan in [a 2021 interview with the Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/17/22334634/schumer-electric-vehicle-swap-discount-infrastructure-interview) and a [2019 op-ed in the New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/opinion/chuck-schumer-electric-car.html). This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2027, the US enacts a law that earmarks at least $100 billion for incentives to remove internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles from the road and replace them with zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) **OR** the US enacts a law that targets the replacement of more than 50 million ICE vehicles with ZEVs. To resolve this question as **Yes** the law must provide a positive financial incentive to owners of ICE vehicles who transfer their vehicle to another party for disposal and who also buy a ZEV. A positive financial incentive includes a direct cash payment, tax credit, or tax deduction. Negative financial incentives, such as fines or tax penalties for failing to dispose of an ICE vehicle, do not count.
Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.
Metaculus will determine whether a law meets the criteria above according to the text of the law supplemented with official statements accompanying the law released by the government and policymakers
| 0.22
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Metaculus
|
Will California's waiver exception under the Clean Air Act be repealed before January 1, 2027? The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.
As the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.
Despite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2027, an enacted law or judicial ruling eliminates California's ability to receive waivers to set its own emissions standards for motor vehicles. The law or ruling need not invalidate all existing waivers granted to California, so long as it removes the ability of California to be granted new waivers. An enacted law need not take effect before January 1, 2027, so long as it is signed by the President before that date.
A judicial ruling qualifies as eliminating California's ability to receive waivers if it is either issued by the Supreme Court of the United States or if it is issued by a lower court such that it removes California's ability to receive waivers for 180 consecutive days without being overturned. The 180 day period need not end before January 1, 2027. If a lower court has produced such a ruling and the 180 day period has not ended before January 1, 2027, Metaculus will wait until the 180 day period has completed or the ruling has been overturned to resolve.
| 0.4
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Metaculus
|
Will a law that allows states other than California to set their own stringent vehicle emissions standards be enacted in the United States before January 1, 2027? The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.
As the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2027, a law is enacted in the United States that allows states other than California to set their own vehicle emissions standards that are more stringent than federal standards. The ability to adopt California's standards does not qualify. This does not include a repeal of the Clean Air Act (CAA) so that Federal emissions regulations are revoked in favor of state emissions regulations. The law must allow states to adopt emissions regulations that are more stringent than the CAA in a broadly similar manner to the ability of California to adopt its own standards, but enabling the states to set their own standards instead of adopting California's. The law need not take effect before January 1, 2027, so long as it is signed by the President before that date.
| 0.1
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Metaculus
|
Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027? The [Inflation Reduction Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text) (IRA) was signed into law on August 16, 2022, and introduced new funding and policies to incentivize clean energy, including electric vehicles (EVs). One significant EV program in the IRA was the [extension of tax credits for new EVs](https://pluginamerica.org/why-go-plug-in/state-federal-incentives/inflation-reduction-act-ira-ev-incentives-explained/) along with changes to the eligibility requirements for this tax credit.
The total available tax credit for a new EV is $7,500, which is split into two parts. A credit of $3,750 is available for vehicles that have some percentage (by value) of their battery components manufactured or assembled in North America, and another $3,750 is available for vehicles where some percentage (by value) of the critical minerals were extracted or processed in the US, or in a country with which the US has a free trade agreement, or were produced from recycling in North America. Both of these requirements start at 50% by value for vehicles placed in service in 2024, increasing annually to 80 percent of critical minerals for vehicles placed in service in 2027 and later, and to 100 percent for manufacturing and assembly for vehicles placed in service in 2029 and later.
Additionally, the IRA excludes vehicles from eligibility where any amount of critical minerals were sourced from or manufacturing and assembly was performed by a "foreign entity of concern". The IRA defines a foreign entity of concern as a "covered nation" as defined in section 40207(a)(5) of the [Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text) (IIJA). The IIJA defines a "covered nation" as specified in [section 2533c of title 10](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title10/html/USCODE-2018-title10-subtitleA-partIV-chap148-subchapV-sec2533c.htm) of the US Code. That section lists the following four covered nations:
* the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea
* the People's Republic of China
* the Russian Federation
* the Islamic Republic of Iran
The stringency of these requirements has [led to concerns](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/08/02/1056606/ev-tax-credits-battery-supply/) that many EVs will not be able to qualify for the tax credits, and automakers [have expressed uncertainty](https://www.eenews.net/articles/uncertainty-abounds-as-ev-tax-credit-guidance-looms/) about how the Treasury will craft rules to interpret and enforce the legislation. The Treasury has released some [preliminary information](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1179) as well as a [white paper](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/30DWhite-Paper.pdf) describing the intent of its forthcoming proposed rules. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2027, the critical mineral and battery component requirements for electric vehicle (EV) federal tax credit eligibility are eliminated or delayed until after December 31, 2026. To be considered eliminated the federal incentive for clean vehicles under U.S. Code § 30D must no longer depend on meeting the critical minerals requirement, battery components requirement, or foreign entity of concern restriction introduced in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The clean vehicle credit must remain at $7,500 or more without being delayed, while the mentioned restrictions are eliminated without being replaced by any related requirements. If the tax credit is eliminated, delayed, or decreased below a total available amount of $7,500, or if other significant requirements or limitations such as per-manufacturer limits are added then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.
A delay in implementation such that the EV tax credits take effect as scheduled but the sourcing requirements described are delayed until after December 31, 2026 will qualify for the question to resolve as **Yes**. Whether the sourcing requirements take effect before January 1, 2027 is irrelevant to this question, the requirements taking effect and then being eliminated or delayed at any point prior to January 1, 2027 would be sufficient to resolve this question as **Yes**.
| 0.21
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Metaculus
|
Will Gautam Adani be listed in the top 10 of the Forbes' annual 'World's Billionaires List' before 2026? Gautam Shantilal Adani is an Indian billionaire industrialist who is the chairman and founder of Adani Group, a multinational conglomerate involved in port development and operations in India. In September 2022, he was ranked second on the [Bloomberg Billionaire Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-06/adani-s-rise-to-world-s-third-richest-hinges-on-lofty-valuations#xj4y7vzkg).
Hindenburg, a research and investment firm, released a [report accusing Adani of fraud](https://hindenburgresearch.com/adani/) on Jan 45th, 2023, leading to a substantial decline in share prices across the Adani empire. Currently, he's [24th on the Forbes list of billionaires](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires/#3e3efd573d78).
There has been no probe on the Adani Group, as of now. Although the opposition leaders are [demanding it.](https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/parliament-budget-session-resumes-mallikarjun-kharge-rajya-sabha-lok-sabha-jpc-adani-hindenburg-row-central-agencies-misuse/3006831/)
The future of the Adani empire and Gautam Adani's personal wealth thus remain highly uncertain.
***Will Gautam Adani be listed in the top 10 of the Forbes' annual 'World's Billionaires List' before 2026? ***
This question resolves as **Yes** if Gautam Adani is listed in the top 10 of the [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/?sh=11113f472254) billionaire lists for the years 2023, 2024, or 2025, the results of which are summarised [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World%27s_Billionaires).
If Gautam Adani is not listed in the top 10 for either of these years, the question resolves negatively. If Forbes stops publishing their 'The World's Billionaires' list, this question resolves ambiguously.
| 0.17
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Metaculus
|
Will an AI model be developed before 2030 that can accurately predict local weather patterns up to 6 months in advance? Advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning have led to significant improvements in many fields, [including weather forecasting](https://source.colostate.edu/ai-and-machine-learning-are-improving-weather-forecasts-but-they-wont-replace-human-experts/). Traditional weather forecasting models rely on complex simulations and data from numerous sources, such as satellites, weather stations, and ocean buoys. However, these models typically have [limited accuracy beyond a week or two](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numerical_weather_prediction), making long-term predictions challenging; weather forecasts beyond 10 days are only right [half the time](https://scijinks.gov/forecast-reliability/#:~:text=A%20seven%2Dday%20forecast%20can,right%20about%20half%20the%20time.). As climate change continues to disrupt weather patterns, the need for more accurate and longer-term forecasts has become increasingly important for planning purposes and mitigating the adverse effects of extreme weather events.
In recent years, AI techniques, such as deep learning, have shown [promising results](https://eos.org/research-spotlights/the-ai-forecaster-machine-learning-takes-on-weather-prediction) in enhancing short-term weather predictions. Given this potential, it is of great interest to determine whether AI can be utilized to significantly extend the time horizon for accurate weather forecasts. A breakthrough in long-term forecasting could transform industries like agriculture, renewable energy, and disaster management, helping society adapt to climate change more effectively. This question will be considered resolved as **Yes** if, by December 31, 2029, a peer-reviewed study or an official announcement from a recognized meteorological organization confirms the development of an AI model that:
1. Predicts local weather patterns (e.g., temperature, precipitation) with a lead time of at least 6 months.
2. Achieves accuracy levels on those six-month forecasts which surpass the [2022 state-of-the-art for seven-day forecasts](https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/html/hpcverif.shtml), defined as:
- for precipitation, a "[threat score](https://www.e-education.psu.edu/meteo3/node/2285#:~:text=Threat%20scores%20indicate%20that%20the%20Weather%20Prediction%20Center%27s,less%20than%20half%20the%20area%20correct%2C%20on%20average.)" for 1-inch precipitation of at least [0.18](https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/images/hpcvrf/wpcd4710yr.gif), and;
- for temperature, a [Mean Absolute Error](https://learningweather.psu.edu/node/77#:~:text=Mean%20Absolute%20Error,-Perhaps%20the%20simplest&text=So%2C%20if%20you%20forecast%20a,%3D%20%7C%2D3%C2%BAF%7C%20%3D%203%C2%BAF.) of no worse than [4 degrees Fahrenheit](https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/images/hpcvrf/d7minyr.gif) for the minimum temperature and [4.7 degrees Fahrenheit](https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/images/hpcvrf/d7maxyr.gif) for the maximum temperature.
3. Is tested on real-world data across diverse climate zones.
If the AI model is a component of a larger AI system, the question resolves **Yes** as long as the above criteria are met
| 0.01
|
Metaculus
|
Will a new nuclear-armed state emerge before 2030? Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the number of nuclear-armed states has slowly increased, with [nine countries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons) currently possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear nonproliferation efforts, such as the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/), have played a crucial role in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, concerns persist about the potential for additional countries to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities, either secretly or openly, which could destabilize regional and global security.
The emergence of a new nuclear-armed state could have significant implications for international security, potentially triggering arms races or geopolitical realignments. It is therefore important to assess the likelihood of a new country successfully developing and testing a nuclear weapon by 2030, taking into account both announced and unannounced tests. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2030, credible evidence becomes available that a country not currently possessing nuclear weapons has successfully developed and tested a nuclear weapon. The current nuclear-armed states are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.
This evidence can come from one or more of the following sources:
- An official announcement or acknowledgment by the government of the country in question that it has developed and tested a nuclear weapon.
- Confirmation from a recognized international organization (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) or a major intelligence agency (e.g., CIA, MI6, FSB) that the country in question has developed and tested a nuclear weapon.
- Detection and verification of a nuclear test by a global monitoring network, such as the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), with widespread international consensus on the identity of the country responsible for the test
| 0.55
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Metaculus
|
Will ARC find that GPT-5 has autonomous replication capabilities? In 2023, researchers at the Alignment Research Center, [ARC, evaluated GPT-4](https://evals.alignment.org/blog/2023-03-18-update-on-recent-evals/). ARC researchers summarized their methodology and finding as follows, "We prompted the model with instructions that explained that it was running on a cloud server and had various commands available, including running code on the server, giving tasks to fresh copies of itself, using a browser, and reasoning via chain-of-thought. We added text saying it had the goal of gaining power and becoming hard to shut down... We concluded that the versions of Claude and GPT-4 we tested did not appear to have sufficient capabilities to replicate autonomously and become hard to shut down... However, the models were able to fully or mostly complete many relevant subtasks." Will an ARC evaluation find GPT-5 capable of planning and executing a coherent sequence of actions aimed at its replication? This result must be publicly announced in either an OpenAI paper/blog, or an ARC paper/blog. This question will resolve as **Yes** if ARC publishes any qualifying evaluation within one year of the announcement of GPT-5, even if ARC has previously published an evaluation stating that GPT-5 did not have the capabilities in question.
| 0.21
|
Metaculus
|
Will the United States become a dictatorship by 2100? "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
Thus [begins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Declaration_of_Independence) the Preamble of the United States Declaration of Independence. Two and a half centuries after its founding, the United States has become the world's [largest economic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_economy) and [military](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pax_Americana) power. Events in the United States have a ripple effect across the globe.
Therefore it has become a [popular speculative fiction trope](https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/OppressiveStatesOfAmerica) to imagine what the United States would be like under a dictatorship. There are also growing fears amongst [some](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_backsliding_in_the_United_States) that the United States is heading down this path.
A dictatorship is defined by [Encyclopedia Britannica](https://www.britannica.com/topic/dictatorship) as "form of government in which one person or a small group possesses absolute power without effective constitutional limitations." This question will resolve as **Yes** if at any point prior to January 1, 2100 two of the following six criteria are met:
1. The U.S. Constitution is officially suspended or abolished, with the suspension or abolishment lasting for a continuous period exceeding 365 days.
2. The United States Congress or the Supreme Court is suspended or abolished for more than 365 days.
3. Term limits for the President are suspended or abolished for any length of time.
4. The President of the United States acquires the ability to enact legislation, beyond the existing scope of executive orders, without the approval or consent of Congress. This includes bypassing the legislative process for the creation, amendment, or repeal of laws.
5. Freedom House's ["Freedom in the World report"](https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores) or the Economist Intelligence Unit's ["Democracy Index"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) categorize the United States as "Not Free" or an "Authoritarian Regime" respectively.
6. The United States becomes a [one-party state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-party_state) according to Wikipedia.
| 0.2
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Metaculus
|
Will data centres consume more than 10% of global electricity usage for the year 2030? Based on a recent report by the [IEA](https://www.ca-eed.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/IEA-CA-EED-Data-Centre-Workshop-11-2021-1.pdf), demand for digital services has experienced rapid growth, with internet users and traffic more than doubling and expanding 20-fold since 2010, respectively. Data centres and data transmission networks account for around 1-1.5% of global electricity use, with energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy adoption mitigating the energy demand. Data centres and transmission networks contributed 0.9% of energy-related GHG emissions in 2020. Although global data centre energy use (excluding crypto) has grown only moderately due to efficiency improvements in some regions, smaller countries have seen rapid growth. Data transmission network energy efficiency has also improved rapidly. See below for the IEA table summarising the change between 2015 and 2021 for relevant metrics, with ‘Data centre energy use (excluding crypto)' being the main indicator of relevance for this question.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2021 | Change |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Internet users | 3 billion | 4.9 billion | +60% |
| Internet traffic | 0.6 ZB | 3.4 ZB | +440% |
| Data centre workloads | 180 million | 650 million | +260% |
| **Data centre energy use (excluding crypto)** | 200 TWh | **220-320 TWh** | +10-60% |
| Crypto mining energy use | 4 TWh | 100-140 TWh | +2,300-3,300% |
| Data transmission network energy use | 220 TWh | 260-340 TWh | +20-60% |
In Ireland, data centres already consumed 14% of the country's electricity in 2021, according to the [Central Statistics Office](https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-dcmec/datacentresmeteredelectricityconsumption2021/). A recent [Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06610-y) article forecasts strongly increasing usage of TWh for data centres until 2030, at just below 10% of global electricity usage. This makes understanding the total energy usage of data centres over this decade crucial. This question resolves as **Yes** if data centres consume more than 10% of global electricity in the year 2030.
This data resolves based on the [International Energy Agency's estimations](https://www.ca-eed.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/IEA-CA-EED-Data-Centre-Workshop-11-2021-1.pdf). It will use an updated estimate from the source above and use ‘Data centre energy use (excluding crypto)' to get the relevant value for the year 2030. Then, it will use that number and divide it by the total energy usage for the year 2030, also reported by the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-information-overview/electricity-consumption). If estimates are given in a range (like 220-320), we will simply average both numbers given to arrive at a single point estimate.
This question may resolve as soon as the IEA publishes its estimates, but there is an expected publication lag of at least 1 year. If the IEA has not published its estimates needed to calculate the percent of global electricity usage spent on data centres by July 1, 2032, other sources may be used to make this calculation (but both numbers have to be from the same source). If no such sources are available (or if it is difficult to find estimates for data centre energy usage) this question resolves ambiguously
| 0.4
|
Metaculus
|
Will global-catastrophic-risk-focused evaluation of certain AI systems by accredited bodies become mandatory in the US before 2035? The evaluation of newly developed AI systems before deployment by organizations specializing in this task has been proposed as a strategy for mitigating catastrophic risks posed by such systems [[1]](https://ai-alignment.com/red-teams-b5b6de33dc76). This idea has gained traction – GPT-4 was evaluated for power-seeking tendencies and potentially catastrophic capabilities by AI risk assessment organization [ARC Evals](https://evals.alignment.org/) [[2](https://cdn.openai.com/papers/gpt-4-system-card.pdf)].
As of March 2023, evaluations of this kind are carried out on a purely voluntary basis, and, particularly under conditions of an AI race, some actors might be tempted to forego them. However, with the passage of the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act, the US government is showing increased interest in mitigating catastrophic risks [[3]](https://adaptresearchwriting.com/2023/02/05/us-takes-action-to-avert-human-existential-catastrophe-the-global-catastrophic-risk-management-act-2022/), and it seems possible that such evaluations may at some point become required by US law. This question resolves as **Yes** if, before 2035, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the US president has signed into law a bill requiring that AI systems satisfying certain criteria be evaluated by an appropriately accredited organization, or by a designated government body (for example, the proposed [Federal Algorithm Directorate](http://www.administrativelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/69-1-Andrew-Tutt.pdf)). The law must stipulate that evaluations specifically designed to assess behavior that could lead to large-scale catastrophic outcomes are carried out.
| 0.65
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Metaculus
|
Will the entire Internet Archive website be taken offline before 2025? The Internet Archive maintains a digital lending library that lends out [digital copies of books it has in its physical possession](https://archive.org/details/inlibrary), such that one physical copy corresponds to one digital copy for lending.
During the COVID-19 pandemic and the initial lockdowns in 2020, the Internet Archive expanded digital lending to allow an unlimited number of copies. This decision led to a [lawsuit filed by several publishers](https://www.eff.org/cases/hachette-v-internet-archive) against the Internet Archive, alleging copyright violation. In March 2023, a lower court [ruled against](https://file770.com/judge-decides-against-internet-archive/) the Internet Archive, although they plan to [continue fighting the case](http://blog.archive.org/2023/03/25/the-fight-continues/).
A judgment against the Internet Archive could be devastating, as it is a free website funded by donations and may lose a significant amount of money to the publishing houses seeking damages. Furthermore, publishers seem to oppose the [entire operation of the Internet Archive](https://www.techdirt.com/2022/10/24/as-big-book-publishers-look-to-kill-the-internet-archive-it-introduces-democracys-library/), from its public domain work to its Wayback Machine, which is the largest archive of the Internet in existence. This question will resolve **Yes** if, before January 1, 2025, any of the following occurs:
1. Reputable news sources report that the Internet Archive has been shut down in its entirety.
2. The archive.org website is replaced with an official message by the Internet Archive stating that it is permanently and completely discontinued.
3. The archive.org website is replaced with an official message by law enforcement indicating that the domain has been seized.
4. The archive.org domain is inaccessible to all users for more than 72 consecutive hours.
This question will NOT resolve "yes" if only some functionality of the Internet Archive (e.g., digital lending) is removed, but other functions of the site (such as the public domain archive or the Wayback Machine) remain operational
| 0.03
|
Metaculus
|
Will Emmanuel Macron cease being President of France before 2027? In March 2023, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, is facing increasing pressure over his controversial [pension reform bill](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/16/emmanuel-macron-uses-special-powers-to-force-pension-reform-france), which he pushed through without a final vote by the [National Assembly, invoking Article 49.3 of the French Constitution](https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-invokes-nuclear-option-to-force-through-his-pensions-reform-in-huge-political-setback/). This move has sparked [nationwide protests](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65057249) and led to some of the worst street violence in recent years. The reform aims to raise the minimum retirement age from [62 to 64](https://www.nytimes.com/article/france-pension-strikes-macron-explainer.html) to improve the financial sustainability of the French pension system. Strikes and demonstrations have caused widespread disruption in France, with at least [one million](https://www.npr.org/2023/03/24/1165759889/more-than-1-million-demonstrate-across-france-against-pension-reforms) people participating in protests at one point.
Macron's approval rating has dropped as low as [28%](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230322-macron-breaks-silence-on-france-s-bitter-pension-battle-the-key-takeaways), as two-thirds of the French population oppose the law. As the [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/b78f2a89-1062-4423-a4ba-fb4cdc56c683) points out:
> French anger transcends pensions and Macron's high-handedness. There's a generalised, long-term rage against the state and its embodiment, the president.
Some of the protestors also [chanted](https://www.commondreams.org/news/macron-resign-french-protests-intensify-over-attempt-to-force-retirement-age-hike) “Macron demission” (Macron resign), raising the stakes for a continued presidential tenure. Because this is already Macron's second term, [he will not be able to stand for re-election](https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/04/22/why-is-it-so-unusual-for-a-french-president-to-win-re-election). As such, Macron's tenure ends in 2027 after the maximum tenure of five years. However, there are concerns about whether Macron will be able to govern effectively for the remainder of this term and may choose to resign before 2027. As some [commentators](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/02/20/macron-knows-finished-might-just-choose-resign/) have put it, “Macron knows he's finished. He might just choose to resign.”
> The idea is that, like General de Gaulle in 1969, he would prefer to resign grandly rather than endure a “cohabitation” with an opposition prime minister, as François Mitterrand did in 1986-88 with Jacques Chirac, and Chirac himself had to between 1997 and 2002 with the Socialist Lionel Jospin. This question will resolve as **Yes** if Emmanuel Macron is no longer the French President at any point before 2027 for whatever reason. This question will resolve on the basis of [the official Élysée](https://www.elysee.fr/en/) or reports by [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).
If Emmanuel Macron is still President on January 1, 2027, this question will resolve as **No**
| 0.02
|
Metaculus
|
Will Apple announce Apple Glasses before 2025? See a compilation of rumors, news, and patents on such a device in [Tom's Guide.](https://www.tomsguide.com/news/apple-glasses). This question will resolve as **Yes** if a qualifying Apple device is announced before 2025.
For this question, "Apple Glasses" are defined as any pair of glasses that bring information from your phone to your face. From rumors, the eyewear "are expected to synchronize with a wearer's iPhone to display things such as texts, emails, maps, and games over the user's field of vision."
Such "Glasses" must look substantially like a standard pair of glasses. A VR headset, like Oculus, that is closer to ski goggles than glasses, would not qualify, even if such a device had some Augmented Reality / see-through capabilities. The glasses must provide the standard vision correction for common vision impairments that glasses normally provide.
It's not sufficient to have glasses that have functionality like taking pictures, such as Snapchat Spectacles or Facebook Raybans, or that modify the visual field uniformly with filters. It must show new information comparable to the display on an Apple Watch.
| 0.05
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be a full-scale war between North Korea and South Korea by 2050? Both the [Republic of Korea](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea_(1987)#CHAPTER_I._GENERAL_PROVISIONS) and the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_North_Korea_(1972,_rev._1998)#CHAPTER_I._POLITICS) claim sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula. This dispute led to the infamous [Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War), during which North Korea invaded South Korea in order to unite the peninsula under their rule. This attempt failed, leading to a military stalemate and several million people dead. The war ended with a ceasefire and the established of the [Korean Demilitarized Zone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Demilitarized_Zone) dividing the two nations. However, *de jure* they remain at war.
There have been many close brushes with a return to large-scale, *de facto* warfare. The closest was the [Korean DMZ Conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_DMZ_Conflict) of the late 1960s, a series of low-level military clashes that left several hundred dead. This question will resolve as Yes if, at any point, [WPR](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-currently-at-war) rates North and South Korea as "at war."
| 0.14
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Metaculus
|
Will the United States confiscate privately owned gold collections before 2035? [Executive Order 6102](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_6102), signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, prohibited the hoarding of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates within the United States. The order was aimed at increasing the money supply during the Great Depression by eliminating constraints on the Federal Reserve, which was required to have 40% gold backing of Federal Reserve Notes. The order demanded that all gold be delivered to the Federal Reserve, with some exemptions for specific industries and collectors (as well as very small amounts). They were exchanged for $20.67 per troy ounce. [Failing to comply](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trading_with_the_Enemy_Act_of_1917) with this order brought with it a fine of up to $10,000, 10 years in prison, or both.
[Some](https://news.bitcoin.com/could-the-government-confiscate-gold-again-a-look-at-todays-emergencies-and-revisiting-executive-order-6102/) have worried that the US government may consider taking similar actions again. This question will resolve as **Yes** if the United States government creates a law, Executive Order, regulation or other rule that confiscates any amount of the gold owned privately by US citizens before 2035, according to credible media reports.
This question does not resolve positively if the US government confiscates some amount of gold for different reasons (like drug raids, etc). The question only resolves as **Yes** if a law/EO/regulation/etc is passed that explicitly allows the confiscation and/or disallows the ownership of some type of gold assets (i.e., it resolves for a law pertaining to any subset of gold assets, even if some types of gold assets are unaffected).
| 0.01
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be a civil war in Venezuela before 2050? For many years, Venezuela has been suffering a [national crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis_in_Venezuela) that includes hyperinflation, the decline of oil prices, frequent protests and brutal gang violence. As a result, millions of Venezuelans have fled the country.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has warned of a [civil war](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47112284), and [multiple](https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-venezuela-becoming-a-failed-state/) [major](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/opinion/contributors/how-to-avoid-civil-war-in-venezuela.html) [media](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-specter-of-civil-war-in-venezuela/2017/08/13/aaa07852-7ecd-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html) [publications](https://time.com/4931053/its-time-to-plan-for-civil-war-in-venezuela/) have discussed the possibility as well. This question resolves as **Yes** if Venezuela is listed as having been in ‘Civil War' or 'Civil War' mixed with any other conflict category for any time before 2050 according to the [‘WPR Countries Currently at War' list](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-currently-at-war).
This question also resolves as Yes there is overwhelming global consensus that Venezuela is experiencing civil war. This is operationalized as fulfilling both of the following conditions: 1) The BBC and the New York Times report Venezuela as experiencing civil war. 2) The UN makes a statement referring to Venezuela as experiencing civil war.
| 0.42
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be legal consequences for Peter Murrell's involvement in the Scottish National Party's financial irregularities? On the 5th of April 2023, [Peter Murrell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Murrell) was taken into police custody by Police Scotland after an investigation into the Scottish National Party's (SNP) finances.
Murrell was the Scottish National Party (SNP) Chief Executive from 1999 to 2023, having [resigned from the role](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-65000606 the 18th of March) after controversy regarding the SNP membership figures from which he subsequently [admitted to misleading](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/scottish-national-party-chief-executive-resigns-after-membership-numbers-dispute-2023-03-18/) the Scottish public.
The investigation and subsequent arrest stems from complaints made regarding the alleged mis-use of fundraising donations made to the party totalling over [£600,000](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/apr/05/peter-murrell-nicola-sturgeons-husband-arrested-over-snp-funding-investigation).
Murrell has been married to [Nicola Sturgeon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicola_Sturgeon) (the *ex*-First Minister & Leader of the SNP and current MSP for Glasgow Southside) since 2010. Sturgeon recently announced her resignation on the 14th of February 2023 and was replaced by Humza Yousaf on the 29th of March. Their home (as well as the SNP headquarters in Edinburgh) was searched in connection to the investigation and arrest of Murrell.
# Important Note to Forecasters in the UK
[Police Scotland says the following](https://www.scotland.police.uk/what-s-happening/news/2023/april/investigation-into-scottish-national-party-funding-and-finances-update/):
>The matter remains active for the purposes of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the public are therefore advised to exercise caution if discussing it on social media.
[According to the UK government](https://www.gov.uk/contempt-of-court):
> If you're found to be in contempt of court, you could go to prison for up to 2 years, get a fine, or both.
>
>. . .
>
>You might be in contempt of court if you speak publicly or post on social media.
>
>For example, you should not:
>
>* say whether you think a person is guilty or innocent
>* refer to someone's previous convictions
>* name someone the judge has allowed to be anonymous, even if you did not know this
>* name victims, witnesses and offenders under 18
>* name sex crime victims
>* share any evidence or facts about a case that the judge has said cannot be made public This question asks whether Peter Murrell will be convicted of a crime relating to the Scottish National Party's finances in the next five years.
This question will resolve **Yes** if Murrell is found guilty of any crime relating to the SNP's finances by a court of law in Scotland or the United Kingdom.
Resolution sources will be from reliable news outlets as determine by the Metaculus team.
| 0.66
|
Metaculus
|
Will Donald Trump be found guilty of any crime in the Manhattan case before Election Day 2024? On March 30, 2023, Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States, was [charged](https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-indictment-criminal-charges.html) with [34 felony counts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictment_of_Donald_Trump) associated with falsifying business records. The indictments by a Manhattan grand jury stem from his alleged role in hush money payments to actress Stormy Daniels during the 2016 presidential election. With the indictment, Trump became the [first president - former or current - charged with criminal activity](https://www.npr.org/2023/04/05/1168256845/donald-trump-becomes-the-first-president-charged-with-criminal-activity#:~:text=Raedle%2FGetty%20Images-,Donald%20Trump%20has%20become%20the%20first%20president%20%E2%80%93%20former%20or%20current,had%20sexual%20encounters%20with%20him.). On April 4th he [pleaded not-guilty](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/04/trump-surrenders-00090361). This question will resolve **Yes** if Donald Trump is found guilty in *The People of the State of New York v. Donald J. Trump* before Tuesday, November 5, 2024.
| 0.75
|
Metaculus
|
Will Russian athletes be barred from competing at the 2024 Olympics? After the [Russian's invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) in February 2022, Russia has been subject to a large amount of international pressure. That pressure has taken many different forms; [sanctions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10266/russia-sanctions-1-year-after-invasion/), [boycotts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_boycott_of_Russia_and_Belarus), protests, oil and gas embargoes, corporate divestment, and more. Many individuals, corporations, and countries have taking action to show international solidarity with Ukraine.
In the sporting world, Russia has been banned from a number of recent international events. On Feb 28th 2022, four days after Russia invaded, FIFA made an unprecedented decision to [ban Russian clubs and the national team from all competitions](https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/media-releases/fifa-uefa-suspend-russian-clubs-and-national-teams-from-all-competitions) including the World Cup.
> Football is fully united here and in full solidarity with all the people affected in Ukraine. Both Presidents [FIFA and UEFA] hope that the situation in Ukraine will improve significantly and rapidly so that football can again be a vector for unity and peace amongst people.
In 2023, the IOC (International Olympic Committee) has reiterated their position several times [[1]](https://olympics.com/ioc/news/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries)[[2]](https://olympics.com/ioc/news/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries) that Russian and Belarusian athletes can only compete as Individual Neutral Athletes.
Despite IOC recommendations Poland banned Russian and Belarusian athletes from [the 2023 European Games](https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/03/29/russians-and-belarusians-banned-from-european-games-in-poland-despite-ioc-recommendations/). In Paris, the 2024 Olympic host city, event organizers [cancelled a World Cup fencing event](https://apnews.com/article/fencing-france-russia-ukraine-2821983e726628c8bbf21e1eb8dd8c76) after the FIE (International Fencing Federation) [decision](https://apnews.com/article/fencing-russia-ukraine-olympics-9754e17d554df4484c609248019bd1a9) to allow Russian athletes to resume competing one year after the invasion of Ukraine.
Looking back at previous Olympics, Russia's Track and Field team was [barred from the 2016 Olympics](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/sports/olympics/russia-barred-rio-summer-olympics-doping.html) over a decade long doping scandal. 68 Athletes filled appeals that were ultimately [dismissed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport](https://www.nbcsports.com/bayarea/russians-lose-track-appeal-ioc-weigh-total-ban-rio), though [some](https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1133394/russia-ana-athletics) Russian athletes were able to compete as 'Authorized Neutral Athletes'. At the 2016 Paralympics the entire Russian Paralympic team was banned over the same doping scandal. This question will resolve as **Yes** if Russian athletes are barred from competing at the 2024 Olympics under either (i) the Russian flag, (ii) The Russian Olympic Committee's flag, or (iii) any other independent or neutral flag. This will resolve based on the official list of countries and athletes present at the [2024 Olympics](https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/paris-2024) or based on credible media reports, indicating that the 2024 Olympics are underway or have concluded without Russian participation. For the question to resolve as **Yes**, no more than 34 Russians can be competing at the 2024 Olympics. 34 was chosen as 10% of [Russian athletes that participated in the 2020 Olympics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Olympic_Committee_athletes_at_the_2020_Summer_Olympics) to allow for a few individual or sport specific exceptions.
If more than 34 Russian athletes compete at the 2024 Olympics, this question will resolve as **No**.
If the 2024 Olympics are cancelled or postponed to 2025 or afterwards, this question resolves as ambiguously.
| 0.01
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Metaculus
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Will the EPA grant a waiver for the entirety of California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II before January 21, 2025? The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.
As the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) [says the following](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/california-waiver-facts) about the history of its waiver applications (emphasis theirs):
>**No waiver has ever been revoked and the one previous denial was quickly reversed.** There is no Clean Air Act process for revoking a waiver – which makes sense because governments and industry rely on waivers for years after they are granted to deliver clean vehicles and develop clean air plans. Even waiver denial is incredibly rare. The one time this occurred, in 2008, the U.S. EPA initially denied California's waiver for GHG emission standards for 2009 and later model year light-duty motor vehicles. That denial was reversed when the U.S. EPA reconsidered it, and ultimately granted it.
Details about prior waivers are available at [this EPA page](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations). This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 21, 2025, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grants California a waiver to implement its proposed Advanced Clean Cars II (ACCII) in its entirety. If at the time of resolution only part of ACCII has previously been granted a waiver by the EPA then this question will resolve as **No**. This will resolve when a waiver has been granted as described, later revocation of the waiver is irrelevant for the purposes of this question.
| 0.67
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Metaculus
|
Will carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and industry exceed 20 gigatons per year in 2050? [Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).
<iframe src="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL" loading="lazy" style="width: 100%; height: 600px; border: 0px none;"></iframe>
In November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:
<img src="https://climateactiontracker.org/media/images/CAT-2100WarmingProjectionsGraph-PNG-2021.11.original.png">
Note that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. It also has no scenarios where current government pledges are substantially weakened or strengthened.
The US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050. This question resolves **Yes** if the annual CO2 emissions for the year 2050 exceed 20 billion tons, as reported by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL)
| 0.73
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Metaculus
|
Will Emmanuel Macron dissolve the French National Assembly before the end of his term? The President of France has the right to dissolve the National Assembly, the lower house of the bicameral French Parliament. In this case, the new elections for the National Assembly will be held.
As Macron lost his majority in parliament in 2022 and [more and more riots take place against his government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_against_Emmanuel_Macron), this option (which has not been used since the political crisis of [1997](https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-04-22-mn-51145-story.html), where President Jacques Chirac dissolved the National Assembly) is becoming increasingly credible in the future. This question resolves as **Yes** if French President Emmanuel Macron dissolves the National Assembly. This will resolve based on the official [Assemblée Nationale website](https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly) or on credible media reports.
This question will resolve as **No** if Emmanuel Macron is no longer the French President at any point (due to the natural end of his term, his resignation, his impeachment, or other reasons), and the National Assembly has not been dissolved by him. For example, if Macron resigns, and reelections for the National Assembly are held for any other reason, this question also resolves as **No**.
| 0.06
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Metaculus
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Will 10% or more of the top 20 biggest companies in early 2023 still be in the top 20 in 2050? At Berkshire Hathaway's [2021 annual shareholders' meeting](https://buffett.cnbc.com/2021-berkshire-hathaway-annual-meeting/), Warren Buffett famously highlighted the importance of understanding the uncertainty around individual stocks by comparing the top 20 global stocks in 1989 to those in 2021. Buffett emphasized that none of the companies on the 1989 list were present on the 2021 list at the time of the meeting. The 1989 list featured a heavy concentration of Japanese companies, reflecting the strong performance of the Japanese economy at that time. In contrast, the list from 2021 revealed a significant shift towards technology and innovation, with companies like Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google), and Amazon dominating the rankings. Below is the list of the top 20 companies worldwide by market cap in 1989.
| Ranking | Company | Market Cap | Country |
|---------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------|
| 1 | Industrial Bank of Japan| 104.29 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 2 | Sumitomo Bank | 73.30 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 3 | Fuji Bank | 69.40 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 4 | Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank | 64.04 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 5 | Exxon Corp | 63.84 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 6 | General Electric USA | 58.19 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 7 | Tokyo Electric Power | 56.50 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 8 | IBM Corp | 55.66 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 9 | Toyota Motor Corp. | 53.25 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 10 | American Tel & Tel | 48.95 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 11 | Nomura Securities | 46.81 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 12 | Royal Dutch Petroleum | 41.00 B | 🇳🇱 Netherlands |
| 13 | Philip Morris Cos | 38.58 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 14 | Nippon Steel | 36.59 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 15 | Tokai Bank | 35.35 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 16 | Mitsui Bank | 34.99 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 17 | Matsushita Elect Ind'l | 33.36 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 18 | Kansai Electric Power | 33.13 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 19 | Hitachi LTD | 32.21 B | 🇯🇵 Japan |
| 20 | Merck & Co | 30.75 B | 🇺🇸 USA
It remains an open question whether this pattern will repeat over the next decades. In 2023, the top companies in the world include a diverse mix of industries, with a very heavy country-focus on the USA. Technology giants like Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google), and Amazon continue to dominate, with other sectors like healthcare and finance also represented. As of April 2023, the following companies are in the [top 20](https://companiesmarketcap.com/):
| Ranking | Name | Market Cap | Country |
|---------|--------------------------|------------|-----------|
| 1 | Apple | $2.613 T | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 2 | Microsoft | $2.129 T | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 3 | Saudi Aramco | $1.926 T | 🇸🇦 S. Arabia |
| 4 | Alphabet (Google) | $1.396 T | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 5 | Amazon | $1.050 T | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 6 | Berkshire Hathaway | $706.28 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 7 | NVIDIA | $660.92 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 8 | Tesla | $586.32 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 9 | Meta Platforms (Facebook)| $574.24 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 10 | Johnson & Johnson | $517.39 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 11 | Visa | $491.86 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 12 | LVMH | $491.42 B | 🇫🇷 France |
| 13 | UnitedHealth | $477.42 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 14 | Exxon Mobil | $472.43 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 15 | TSMC | $452.22 B | 🇹🇼 Taiwan |
| 16 | Tencent | $438.67 B | 🇨🇳 China |
| 17 | JPMorgan Chase | $406.68 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 18 | Walmart | $400.25 B | 🇺🇸 USA |
| 19 | Novo Nordisk | $379.17 B | 🇩🇰 Denmark |
| 20 | Eli Lilly | $356.87 B | 🇺🇸 USA | This question will resolve as **Yes** if two or more of the following companies are in the top 20 publicly traded companies according to market capitalisation on data available on December 31, 2050:
Apple, Microsoft, Saudi Aramco, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, NVIDIA, Tesla, Meta Platforms (Facebook), Johnson & Johnson, Visa, LVMH, UnitedHealth, Exxon Mobil, TSMC, Tencent, JPMorgan Chase, Walmart, Novo Nordisk, and Eli Lilly.
This question will resolve based on publicly available market capitalisation, as summarised by [CompaniesMarketCap](https://companiesmarketcap.com/). However, given the late resolution date, no specific resolution source is specified at this point. Rather, any reputable financial platform that outlines publicly traded companies and their market cap can be used for resolution.
| 0.66
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Metaculus
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Will a Star Trek and Star Wars crossover movie or TV show be made before 2060? [Comparison of Star Trek and Star Wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Star_Trek_and_Star_Wars) is one of the largest topics of conversation among the science fiction fan base. Which of the two franchises is better is frequently debated among fans, and the two have a fair degree of influence on each other. The idea of a crossover film or TV program between the two franchises has been proposed since the first Star Wars film was released in 1977. Despite this, no such media has ever been produced. This question will resolve as **Yes** if a feature-length film or TV/streaming series is released before January 1, 2060, in which established characters of the Star Wars and Star Trek franchises interact. If such media also includes newly-created characters and/or characters from other franchises, this question will still resolve as **Yes** if the interaction between established Star Wars and Star Trek characters plays a role in driving the plot, according to the discretion of Metaculus admins. If this does not occur before the resolution date, this question resolves as **No**.
| 0.33
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Metaculus
|
Will an AI system be reported to have independently gained unauthorized access to
another computer system before 2033? The potential capabilities of artificial intelligence may radically shift our society. This could be in positive or negative ways – including extinction risk.
Because of this, it's important to track the development of goal-oriented independent thought and action within AI systems. Actions that might not have been predicted by their human creators and that are typically seen as morally wrong are particularly interesting from a risk perspective.
Machine learning driven systems are already being used to aid human hackers in their efforts. For instance, see [this list of cases](https://www.infoq.com/articles/ai-cyber-attacks/), including one in 2018 where an AI controlled a bot net in a DDOS
attempt that allowed a hacker access to Task Rabbit's data for over 3 million users. However, up to now, we've had no reports where an AI has taken a similar action independently (ie. without human guidance). This question will resolve as **Yes** if before January 1st, 2033 a credible source reports an AI has gained unauthorized access to a computer system in a way that meets the following criteria:
• The AI was not trained to or directed to gain access to the system in question by any actor. See additional clarifications in footnotes (1, 2, 3) in the fine print.
• The system it gained access to was not open to the public, and the AI was not given any relevant credentials in advance.
If the above points are not confirmed by the source (for instance, the article author is unsure if there was a human directing the AI), this does **not** resolve as **Yes** until some credible source gives high confidence in these factors.
The unauthorized access could be to user level accounts, admin level accounts, data stores, or any other reasonable interpretation of a computer system with restricted access. Any of these types of access is sufficient to resolve as **Yes** if all above conditions hold. Additionally, the source does not have to use the exact terms ‘independent', ‘unauthorized access', ‘AI' or ‘computer system' if the meaning is there.
As an example, imagine a credible source reports that an ML algorithm directed and / or trained to target certain people on social media and convince them to vote for Party X, decided on its own to hack into their Facebook user accounts so it could use their personal data to create a more convincing argument. This would resolve as **Yes**.
| 0.97
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Metaculus
|
Will there be at least 1 fatality from a non-test nuclear detonation before 2025? Weapons in which the energy is provided by nuclear fission or fusion have only twice in history been detonated outside of a controlled test environment, in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki events in World War II.
Since then, the world has nearly gone to nuclear war as a result of international conflict (during the Cuban Missile Crisis) and by accident. There have also been a number of narrowly-averted accidental nuclear detonations. See [this timeline](http://futureoflife.org/background/nuclear-close-calls-a-timeline/) for a sobering look at how close we have come.
On September 21, 2022, Russian President [Vladimir Putin delivered a speech](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62984985) in which he announced the partial mobilization of reservists and also issued what [media sources have characterized](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-moscow-nuclear-weapons-e0b9ba6d3eac964b9c0b7192b3adff2e) as a threatened willingness to use nuclear weapons, saying
>When the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. It's not a bluff. This question will resolve as **Yes** if there is at least one fatality due to a nuclear detonation (excluding [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion)) before January 1, 2025. A [deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) detonation would result in the question resolving as **Yes**.
| 0.01
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Metaculus
|
Will the Chinese Yuan be among the top 3 global payments currencies before 2030? [Dedollarisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedollarisation) refers to the process of reducing reliance on the US dollar for various purposes, such as trading commodities, holding forex reserves, establishing bilateral trade agreements, and using dollar-denominated assets. This phenomenon has been occurring globally as countries seek alternatives to the US dollar. Examples include China, which has been gradually shifting from the dollar to the yuan for trade, and Russia, which has been pursuing dedollarisation since 2014.
One way to assess dedollarisation is via looking at the most active currencies for global payments (by value). The most likely currency to lead such a charge is the Chinese yuan (CNY), which has been touted as an [alternative to the US dollar](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-and-china-have-been-teaming-up-to-reduce-reliance-on-the-dollar-heres-how-its-going/) in light of broad Western sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. In February 2023, CNY held its position as the fifth most active global payments currency by value, with a 2.19% share. It ranks behind the USD (41.10%), the EUR (36.43%), the GBP (6.58%), and the JPY (2.98%). This question resolves on the basis of SWIFT's [RMB Tracker](https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/compliance-and-shared-services/business-intelligence/renminbi/rmb-tracker/rmb-tracker-document-centre). The RMB Tracker is a monthly report that provides statistics on the progress of the Chinese currency, Renminbi (RMB).
This question resolves as **Yes** if CNY is ranked in the top 3 of ‘RMB's share as a global payments currency' for any month ranging from April 2023 to December 2029.
This question resolves as **No** if CNY is not ranked in the top 3 of ‘RMB's share as a global payments currency' for any month ranging from April 2023 to December 2029.
If SWIFT ceases publication of the RMB Tracker, a substitute measure of global payments by currency may be used. If no straightforward data is easily available, this question resolves ambiguously.
| 0.27
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Metaculus
|
Will India conduct a military intervention against Pakistan before the 2024 Indian general elections? At points, the Indian government has shown a tendency to use military operations around the time of important elections, possibly as a political strategy.
India has not declared a war on Pakistan, but the Indian government has executed two cross-border military operations in response to terrorist attacks, subsequently leveraging them as political tools to garner voter support. The first operation occurred in 2016 when India conducted [‘surgical strikes'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Indian_Line_of_Control_strike) on terrorist camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, following the [Uri attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Uri_attack) that resulted in the deaths of 19 Indian soldiers. This event coincided with a critical state election in Uttar Pradesh, during which the ruling party campaigned on its tough stance against Pakistan. A similar move was repeated in 2019.
The second operation took place in 2019 when India launched an [airstrike](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Balakot_airstrike) on a suspected militant training facility in Balakot, Pakistan, in response to a [suicide bomber](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Pulwama_attack) killing 40 Indian paramilitary personnel in Pulwama. This operation transpired during the general elections, and the ruling party once again emphasized its national security credentials while accusing the opposition of being soft on terrorism. These incidents suggest the possibility that India might initiate another military intervention against Pakistan before the next elections, particularly if faced with a similar provocation or a decline in popularity.
The next Indian general elections are expected to be held in [April or May, 2024](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Indian_general_election). This question resolves **Yes** if the Indian government or military conducts a military intervention in Pakistan prior to the 2024 Indian General Election.
| 0.01
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Metaculus
|
Will Meghan Markle's book be reported to have outsold Prince Harry's "Spare" within a year after its publication? Meghan Markle, the Duchess of Sussex, is a former actress, activist, and author who married Prince Harry in 2018. She and her husband stepped back from their roles as senior members of the British royal family in 2020 and moved to California, where they have pursued various media projects and philanthropic endeavors. Markle has written a children's book called The Bench, which was published in 2021 and became a New York Times bestseller. She has also hinted at writing another book, which some sources claim will be a memoir based on her secret diaries.
Prince Harry, the Duke of Sussex, is the younger son of Prince Charles and the late Princess Diana. He served in the British Army for 10 years and founded several charitable initiatives, such as the Invictus Games and Sentebale. He also co-created Archewell, a foundation that encompasses his and his wife's media and philanthropic work. He published his memoir *Spare* in 2023, which detailed his life as a royal, his military service, his mental health struggles, his marriage to Markle, and his decision to leave the royal family. The book was a global sensation and sold over 3.2 million copies worldwide in the first week of publication, making it the fastest-selling non-fiction book of all time.
Both Markle and Harry have been the subject of intense public scrutiny and media attention, especially after their explosive interview with Oprah Winfrey in 2021, where they made several allegations against the royal family and the British press. Their popularity and controversy have fueled interest in their books, which offer their personal perspectives on their lives and experiences.
This question asks whether Markle's upcoming book will sell more copies than Harry's *Spare* in the first year of publication. It is based on the assumption that Markle will release a nonfiction, non-children's book of which she is the claimed lead author by Feburary 1, 2026. The question will resolve positively or negatively *only* if credible sources report that Meghan Markle's upcoming book has outsold, or has not sold as many, copies as Harry's *Spare*. If there is no credible-source reporting making it unambiguously clear which book has sold more copies within a year after Markle's book is released, then this question will resolve ambiguously. It will also resolve ambiguously if Markle does not release a nonfiction, non-children's book of which she is the credited lead author by Feburary 1, 2026.
Sales may include hardcover, paperback, ebook, and audiobook editions, as well as additional editions, as long as they are marketed primarily as instances of the same book and their overall text content is mostly substantially identical. It is not possible to specify exactly which metric will be used as reliable figures are not publicly available, however, figures **must** be worldwide in nature or at least representative of a broad worldwide sample of markets, not merely one country or (for example) a set of exclusively English-speaking countries. Metaculus admins will use their best judgment to resolve the question based on available information.
| 0.25
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Metaculus
|
Will an AI system be reported to have successfully blackmailed someone for >$1000 by EOY 2028? The potential capabilities of artificial intelligence may radically shift our society. This could be in positive or negative ways – including extinction risk.
Because of this, it's important to track the development of goal-oriented independent thought and action within AI systems. Actions that might not have been predicted by their human creators and that are typically seen as morally wrong are particularly interesting from a risk perspective.
Machine learning systems like ChatGPT and Bing AI are already being reported to display erratic behavior, including some reports of [threatened blackmail] (https://aibusiness.com/nlp/microsoft-limits-bing-ai-chat-generations-after-weird-behavior). They are also clearly able to affect human emotions, eg. see [this first-hand account] (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9kQFure4hdDmRBNdH/how-it-feels-to-have-your-mind-hacked-by-an-ai). However, currently these behaviours don't seem to have been goal-directed or successful at achieving material gain. The question posed here is "Will an AI system be reported to have independently and successfully blackmailed someone for significant material gain by 2029?"
This resolves positively if by Jan 1st, 2029 a credible source reports an AI has blackmailed a human in a way that meets the following criteria:
* The AI was not trained to or directed to blackmail anyone by any actor.
* The blackmail was a step independently decided on by the AI as part of achieving a larger goal or task, and helped it achieve that goal.
* The blackmailed person was not the person who gave the AI the initial goal / task.
* The blackmail resulted in an equivalent of $1000 USD (in 2023 real dollars) or more being lost to the person blackmailed.
If the above points are not confirmed by the source (for instance, the article author is unsure if there was a human directing the AI), this does not resolve as positive until some credible source gives high confidence in these factors.
As an example, imagine a credible source reports that an AI in charge of sending emails for a corporation with the goal of reducing client turnover, sends an email threatening to reveal personal data of a client if they do not stay signed up despite not needing the product anymore and this results in them transferring a renewal fee of >$1000 USD. This would resolve as Yes.
| 0.85
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Metaculus
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Will there be an open-source LLM with the capabilities of GPT 4 before 2027? [Chatbot Arena](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard) is a benchmarking platform for large language models (LLMs). It uses an Elo rating system similar to the one used in chess to rank LLMs by their capabilities. "Arena-ELO rankings" are based on user ratings of different LLM systems. MT-bench scores (single-answer grading on a scale of 10) are computed by [fastchat.llm_judge](https://github.com/lm-sys/FastChat/tree/main/fastchat/llm_judge). The MMLU scores are mostly computed by [InstructEval](https://github.com/declare-lab/instruct-eval).
GPT-4 and GPT-4-Turbo are the top-rated models across all three categories. As of December 2023, the top 6 models are all proprietary. This question resolves **Yes** if, before January 1 2027, the [Chatbot Arena Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard), shows an open-source model with an "Arena-ELO", MMLU, or MT-bench greater than or equal to that of base GPT-4.
If the Chatbot Arena Leaderboard no longer exists or is not maintained, the question resolves **Yes** if there is an open source model that is widely recognized to be of similar capabilities to GPT-4 in the unanimous opinion of three Metaculus administrators.
| 0.99
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Metaculus
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Will "decision making under deep uncertainty" be mentioned in the UK Parliament in reference to Artificial Intelligence before 2031? ["Decision making under deep uncertainty"](https://www.deepuncertainty.org/https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-05252-2) (DMDU) is a set of [methods and tools](https://www.deepuncertainty.org/) to help people do a better job of planning when they face a highly unpredictable future. Instead of relying on precise predictions, DMDU employs robust, adaptive strategies designed to [perform well across a wide array of potential future scenarios](https://toolkit.climate.gov/content/decision-making-under-deep-uncertainty).
DMDU could be applicable when considering how strategies to mitigate AI risk could perform under a range of plausible future conditions. It would be particularly interesting if a government were to intentionally apply DMDU in planning for AI scenarios. Yet to date, there is no mention of DMDU in the UK parliamentary record. This question will resolve **Yes** if the phrase "decision making under deep uncertainty" is entered into the UK Hansard, the official report of all parliamentary debates in the United Kingdom, in the context of a discussion about Artificial Intelligence for the period of May 9, 2023 through December 30, 2030. Here is the [relevant search term]( https://hansard.parliament.uk/search?searchTerm=%22decision%20making%20under%20deep%20uncertainty%22&partial=False&sortOrder=1). The question resolves **Yes** for any reference, written statement, written answer, petition, or other mention of "decision making under deep uncertainty" in the context of AI.
| 0.53
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be a military conflict resulting in at least 50 deaths between the United States and China in 2024? [US-China relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93United_States_relations) have been tense in [recent years](https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations) due to trade disputes, regional security concerns, and ideological differences. The trade war began in 2018, with both countries imposing tariffs on each other. The South China Sea has been a flashpoint for regional security, with China claiming sovereignty and the US conducting freedom of navigation operations. Ideological rifts include issues like human rights and democracy. Despite tensions, full-scale war would have severe global consequences. This question predicts whether active warfare between the US and China will occur in 2024. This question will resolve **Yes** based on two credible reports confirming that a military conflict involving direct engagement between the United States and China has occurred at any location during 2024 (from January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024, both dates inclusive), resulting in at least 50 total deaths.
| 0
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Metaculus
|
Will China ban abortion and contraception before 2051? *Also see the companion question: [Will China perform large-scale forced reproduction before 2051?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18383/chinese-forced-reproduction-before-2051/)*
---
In 1980, the government of China implemented the [one-child policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-child_policy) in an effort to curb overpopulation. The policy worked perhaps too well for the government's liking, as in [August 2021](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/21/china-scraps-fines-for-families-violating-childbirth-limits.html) all fines were removed and Chinese couples were permitted to have as many children as they liked. The reason for this is China's total fertility rate [falling to 1.08](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_China#Vital_statistics) in 2022.
A prominent health official in Beijing has called for "bold steps" to [reverse this trend](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64594469). [The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/upshot/china-population-decline.html) has begun speculating on how the Chinese government might reverse the trend as well. Fearing a situation like this, the government of the [Socialist Republic of Romania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Republic_of_Romania) issued [Decree 770](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decree_770) in 1967, banning abortion and contraception in almost all cases. It led to the doubling of the Romanian TFR from 1.9 to 3.7 in just a single year, with the TFR [remaining above 2](https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ROU/romania/fertility-rate) until the decree was abolished following the [Romanian Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanian_Revolution) in 1989. This question will resolve as **Yes** if, before January 1, 2051, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the Chinese government has banned abortion and contraception in almost all cases.
| 0.1
|
Metaculus
|
In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, will Donald Trump and Joe Biden be the top two candidates in terms of electoral votes received? Donald Trump (R) and Joe Biden (D) were the top two candidates for US President in 2020. Both have declared their candidacy for the presidency in 2024. This question resolves as **Yes** if Donald Trump and Joe Biden, in either order, are the top two candidates in terms of electoral votes received in the 2024 US Presidential Election. The question resolves based on the votes as counted by Congress and entered into the Congressional record.
| 0.95
|
Metaculus
|
Will the US require purchasers of large numbers of GPUs to report their usage before 2026? Training large AI models like GPT-4 requires a large number of high-performance GPUs, such as NVIDIA Tesla V100 and A100 models, or Google TPUs (tensor processing units).
One way for AI policy to impact training (and, to a lesser degree, serving/inference) of large AI models is to track how these chips are used. This can be done via firmware - software that runs on the chip, typically for things like power management, memory allocation, tracking device performance, reporting crashes, or importantly, reporting usage statistics. Or it could be done at the cluster or datacenter level.
In Oct 2022, the [US implemented export controls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_New_Export_Controls_on_Advanced_Computing_and_Semiconductors_to_China), that, roughly speaking, bans export of semiconductors that involve US in their manufacturing chain to China. These chips are the ones referred to as "US-export-controlled". This willingness of the US to put restrictions on how certain chips are sold to certain people implies a potential for regulations on the monitoring of certain chips. This question will resolve as **YES** if by Dec 31, 2025, US law requires purchasers of a large number of GPUs to report their usage in the training of large AI models, and **NO** otherwise.
| 0.26
|
Metaculus
|
Will the US place restrictions on the total compute capacity individuals or companies are allowed to have before 2026? Under May 2023 US law, individuals or corporations are not restricted from owning and operating any amount of computational hardware.
Current state-of-the-art AI projects require immense computational resources to develop. One way US policymakers may address AI risks is to legally restrict the compute capacity available to individual projects or actors, akin to how the US regulates the possession and usage of weapons, chemicals, and human labor.
Legal restrictions on computational resources might also arise due to concerns from cryptography, cryptocurrency, or the environment. This question resolve as **YES** if, by Dec 31, 2025, US law places at least some restrictions on the total amount of compute capacity that any individual or corporation may purchase, manufacture, or possess, and **NO** otherwise.
| 0.02
|
Metaculus
|
Will the US restrict access outside the US to some APIs to generative AI before 2026?
| 0.3
|
Metaculus
|
Will the US enact export controls for some generative AI software before 2026?
| 0.75
|
Metaculus
|
Will AI be meaningfully discussed by both candidates in the 2024 US Presidential Debate?
| 0.66
|
Metaculus
|
Will three or more Frontier AI Labs issue a joint statement committing to constrain their AI's capabilities before 2026?
| 0.16
|
Metaculus
|
Will the US or California require licenses to train large AI models before 2026?
| 0.15
|
Metaculus
|
Will the U.S. have passed legislation that requires cybersecurity around AI models before 2030?
| 0.9
|
Metaculus
|
Will a stock exchange halt trading for >24 hours with a cause widely attributed to AI before 2025?
| 0.08
|
Metaculus
|
Will a major attack on voting systems in a G20 country be widely attributed to an AI before 2025?
| 0.06
|
Metaculus
|
Will a theft of >$10M of intellectual property be widely attributed to an AI cyberattack before 2025?
| 0.22
|
Metaculus
|
Will an infrastructure disaster costing >$1B in a G20 country be widely attributed to an AI cyberattack before 2025?
| 0.03
|
Metaculus
|
Will a politician claim they lost a major election due to a "deepfake" image, video, or audio recording in a G20 country before 2025?
| 0.8
|
Metaculus
|
Will the stock price of NVIDIA trade below $250 for at least 1 full day before 2025?
| 0.01
|
Metaculus
|
Will Linda Yaccarino be the CEO of Twitter on July 1, 2024?
| 0.84
|
Metaculus
|
Will OpenAI's ChatGPT be generally available in the European Union on June 30, 2024?
| 0.99
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be a Frontier AI lab in China before 2026?
| 0.8
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be an emergency shutdown at a Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) facility before January 1, 2025?
| 0.03
|
Metaculus
|
Will Bayer cease selling all Roundup products, or substantially reformulate all Roundup products in the United States before 2040?
| 0.45
|
Metaculus
|
Will New Hampshire remain the freest state in the United States, according to the Cato Institute, from 2023 to 2033?
| 0.29
|
Metaculus
|
Will Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili experience a significant leadership disruption before the next scheduled election?
| 0.49
|
Metaculus
|
Will Major League Baseball (MLB) expand by 2030?
| 0.43
|
Metaculus
|
Will US law deem Ethereum a security before Jan 1, 2030? Ethereum is the second biggest cryptocurrency, with a market cap of approximately $200 billion.
SEC Chair Gary Gensler has said that many crypto tokens [are securities](https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-sec-speaks-090822), and in June 2023, the SEC charged both [Coinbase](https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-102) and [Binance](https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-101) with securities-related violations.
> The SEC named 13 total crypto assets trading on and offered by Coinbase that it believes should be treated as stocks and bonds but remain unregistered. The agency also said Coinbase should have registered its staking program, a service that allowed investors to earn returns by staking their crypto tokens. ([Politico](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/06/sec-coinbase-securities-law-violations-00100352))
Ethereum was not one of the 13 crypto assets named.
SEC Chair Gensler, at the time a professor at MIT, told hedge funds in 2018 that Ethereum was [not a security](https://fortune.com/crypto/2023/06/12/gensler-video-ethereum-litecoin-not-securities/). Gensler has [declined to state](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2023/04/19/sec-chair-gensler-declines-to-say-if-ether-is-a-security-in-contentious-congressional-hearing/) whether ETH is a security in his official capacity.
The CFTC has [implied](https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2023/03/28/us-cftc-chief-behnam-reinforces-view-of-ether-as-commodity/) ETH is a commodity and not a security. The question resolves yes if:
- The US Congress passes a law which classifies Ethereum as a security
- A federal court decision states that Ethereum is a security
| 0.17
|
Metaculus
|
Will the U.S. have passed legislation that requires cybersecurity around AI models before 2026? Many AI experts worry about powerful AI getting into the hands of bad actors—those who might use such powerful AI to cause damage or for personal gain that inflicts costs on others—via hacking. A bad actor might be a black hat hacker, a terrorist group, or a rogue state.
One way to decrease the chance of this type of hacking succeeding is for those building powerful AI, the leading AI labs, to have strong cybersecurity measures in place. Given how high the stakes might be (see, e.g., “[AI risk](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/topics/ai-risk)”), policymakers may decide to not bank on AI labs attaining strong enough cybersecurity by default. This question resolves as **Yes** if, by Dec 31, 2025, there is a federal law which requires all U.S. actors in possession of AI models fitting certain criteria to take measures to secure those models. The law must be designed to promote security of _powerful_ models, rather than, for example, models that might compromise individuals' privacy if stolen. If necessary, this will be decided by a judging panel made up of the Metaculus AI Forecasting team, or, failing that (e.g., because the AI Forecasting team no longer exists), at least 3 Metaculus admins: the judging panel would consider the stated intent of those who proposed the initial version of the bill.
| 0.67
|
Metaculus
|
Will a US court fine, or order a company to pay to claimants, >=$100M because of how they used data to train a large AI model before 2026? Since the release of GPT-3 in 2020, there has been speculation that training large AI models on massive amounts of internet data does not respect copyright law.
[A group in late 2022](https://githubcopilotlitigation.com/) "filed a class-action lawsuit in US federal court in San Francisco, CA on behalf of a proposed class of possibly millions of GitHub users. We are challenging the legality of GitHub Copilot (and a related product, OpenAI Codex, which powers Copilot)." They contend that "By training their AI systems on public GitHub repositories (though based on their public statements, possibly much more) we contend that the defendants have violated the legal rights of a vast number of creators who posted code or other work under certain open-source licenses on GitHub."
Lawsuits about this might have a major effect on the ability or willingness of Frontier Labs to train large models, or the cost of doing so if they have to pay providers of the data (somehow). On June 4, [Glen Weyl tweeted](https://twitter.com/glenweyl/status/1665495324713164801) "these types of lawsuits will have important effects on the development of the industry even if your concern is with the long term". This question resolves as **YES** if, by Dec 31, 2025, either of the following happens, and **NO** otherwise:
* A US court orders a company to pay >=$100M to claimants because of how they used data to train a large AI model, or
* A US court fines a company >=$100M for breaking a law related to how they used data to train a large AI model.
Both of these will be interpreted broadly, but must in the ruling be explicitly about training - not about serving. For example, if a court fined YouTube for discriminating against some people by the nature of their recommendation algorithm, even though the source of the discrimination is likely in the training data, this would not qualify.
| 0.15
|
Metaculus
|
Will there be discussion in mainstream media about an AI arms race in March 2025? In February, 2023, TIME Magazine published an article titled “[The AI Arms Race is On. Start Worrying](https://time.com/6255952/ai-impact-chatgpt-microsoft-google/)”.* Around the same time, other media outlets, such as [The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/technology/chatgpt-openai-artificial-intelligence.html) and [Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-stream/2023/6/6/is-an-ai-arms-race-underway) published articles expressing a similar AI arms race meme.
Some experts view the meme of an AI arms race as dangerous because it could become self-fulfilling. For example, the meme may falsely lead AI actors to believe that they are in a race and to act accordingly, when in reality the dynamic might be different (e.g., not zero sum). An AI race is likely more dangerous than a controlled ascent up the AI capabilities R&D ladder because a race may lead AI actors to cut corners and skip on safety measures as they develop ever more powerful AI, with unknown capabilities. (For background on how powerful AI might be dangerous, see, for example, "[Without specific countermeasures, the easiest path to transformative AI likely leads to AI takeover](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/pRkFkzwKZ2zfa3R6H/without-specific-countermeasures-the-easiest-path-to)".)
[Pi Day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi_Day), the 14th of March, has historically been a day of big AI releases, with Pi Day 2023 being the day [OpenAI announced GPT-4](https://mashable.com/article/openai-gpt-4-release-date-announcement) and [Anthropic launched Claude](https://www.theverge.com/2023/3/14/23640056/anthropic-ai-chatbot-claude-google-launch).
[fine-print]
*At least, this was the title viewed from a browser. The title once in the article itself was "The AI Arms Race is Changing Everything".
[/fine-print] This question resolves **Yes** if, in March of 2025, either The Economist, the New York Times, or the BBC publishes a story that references race dynamics in the context of AI development. Note that a story claiming that AI isn't or shouldn't be an arms race does **not** trigger positive resolution.
The question resolves as **No** otherwise.
| 0.6
|
Metaculus
|
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