Apologetics, Journal Topics

Why Science Can’t Explain Morality

Copan, Paul-Naturalism Ground Genine Moral

Review: JAS275 | By Paul Copan

Faith that Works

Hanegraaff, Hank-FaithWorks

Are works required to keep your salvation?

The point in James, particularly, teaches that we are saved not by works but by the kind of faith that produces good works. And that’s why James says, “What good is it…if a man claims to have faith but has no deeds? Can such faith save him?” (Jas. 2:14).* The rhetorical response, of course, is absolutely not! Just “as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without deeds is dead” (Jas. 2:26)—Faith without deeds is dead.

James goes on to say that a person is not justified by faith alone (Jas. 2:24), and in saying that he means that a person is not justified by mental ascent alone. That’s why he says, “Show me your faith without deeds, and I will show you my faith by what I do” (Jas. 2:18). In other words, when you work, you are demonstrating that you have genuine faith, the kind of faith that produces good needs, not mental ascent alone, but faith that produces good works.

You are not saved by what you do, but saving faith does cause you to do good deeds in gratitude for what God has so freely given to us.

This is sort of with James when he says a “person is justified by what he does and not by faith alone” (Jas. 2:24), and then Paul says a man is justified by faith, apart from observing the law (Rom. 3:21ff; Gal. 3:11; Phil. 3:8-11). These words are in harmony because James is countering the false assertion that a said faith is a substitute for a saving faith—by “said faith” I mean someone just saying they believe—and Paul is countering an equally fallacious notion, and that is the notion that salvation can be earned by observing the Law. No it can’t be earned by observing the Law, but those who have genuine faith will observe the Law because they want to be pleasing to the Lawgiver Himself.

For further related study, please see the following:

What is the Biblical Definition of Faith? (Hank Hanegraaff)

Did James teach Salvation by Works? (Hank Hanegraaff)

Do Works Contribute to or Confirm Salvation? Philippians 2:12 in Perspective (Moyer Hubbard)

Do James and Paul Contradict Concerning Grace? (James White)

Robbing Paul to Pay Peter and James (James Patrick Holding)

Understanding the Lordship Salvation Controversy (Bob Lyle)

Adapted from “Are Works Required to Keep Your Salvation.”

Apologetics, Journal Topics

Suffer the Violinst: Why the Pro-Abortion from Bodily Autonomy Fails

Poupard, Richard-Suffer the Violist2

Article: JAA025 | by Richard J. Poupard

The argument from bodily autonomy claims that one human being does not have the right to use the body of another human being for its survival. Abortion advocates have advanced this argument in order to justify elective abortion even if one grants that the fetus is a rights‐bearing individual. This allows pro‐ abortion choice proponents, then, to concede the major premise of the pro‐life position and still justify elective abortion. This argument was illustrated by Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist analogy, and has recently been defended by legal scholar Eileen McDonagh and philosopher David Boonin. The bodily autonomy argument and their defenses of it fail for at least four reasons. First, the argument fails to account for situations in which a mother harms but does not kill her child; given its logic, it would affirm a mother’s decision to intentionally take a medication that will cause birth defects in her child, for example. Second, the argument assumes that prenatal parental responsibilities are largely voluntary. Third, the analogies used to support the argument fail to take into account the difference between diseased and healthy physiological states. Fourth, the argument results in absurdities if taken to its logical conclusion. Taken as a whole, then, the bodily autonomy argument does not give us justification to jettison our deepest moral intuitions that mothers should not intentionally kill their offspring, whom proponents of this argument concede are rights‐bearing individuals. Intentionally killing human fetuses in the act of elective abortion thus remains a great moral wrong.

A few years ago, I was preparing to perform third molar surgery under intravenous (I.V.) sedation, which is a common procedure in my clinical practice, on an adolescent girl. As I began the I.V. line and started to administer the sedative medication, the patient mentioned something that distressed me greatly. She stated, “I guess I should tell you that I just found out I’m pregnant.”

There was an important reason for my concern. I had already administered midazolam, which is known to cause birth defects in a prenatal child when taken in the first trimester. I quickly gave the patient an agent that reverses the sedative effect of the midazolam but does not remove the drug from her system. As she became more aware, I prepared to tell her the difficult truth that she received a drug that could cause harm to her unborn child. I expected this to be one of the more difficult discussions I have ever had with a patient, informing her that I may have caused harm to the child she was carrying.

I informed her, and she was quite upset, but for a different reason than I suspected. She was upset that I had not gone ahead and completed the procedure. In fact, she stated that she did not care that I had given her a medication that could have harmed her child. At first, I was quite alarmed by her attitude, but what she then told me helped explain her situation better. She told me that she was scheduled to have an abortion the following week. She returned a few months later (no longer pregnant) and I completed her surgery.

One moment, I was very concerned for the child that I inadvertently may have harmed; in the next moment, that concern was simply irrelevant. The child, in all likelihood, was going to be killed intentionally by another physician the following week. What struck me was that we were talking about the same human being. The only change that occurred from one moment to another was the knowledge that this child was unwanted by her mother.

This situation presented a challenging ethical dilemma. Virtually all medical professionals who treat pregnant women acknowledge that there are two human beings of concern in these situations. For example, when they prescribe a medication, they realize that the drug affects both mother and child. Every drug handbook lists a medication’s FDA pregnancy category, which gives information about the potential harm to a mother’s fetus. A physician frequently needs to balance the best treatment for the mother with the safety of her child in mind. This intuitively is the most ethical course of action. There is an argument, however, that has been presented, and recently defended, in support of abortion rights that disputes this view. I term this the argument from bodily autonomy.

Most arguments concerning the abortion issue hinge on the moral status or standing of the fetus with regard to the rights he or she possesses and the obligations others directly owe him or her. These arguments typically fall along the following two lines. Pro‐life advocates argue that all human beings, including those in the fetal stage of development, have intrinsic value that confers to them the right not to be unjustifiably killed. Pro‐abortion choice advocates claim that the human fetus lacks some accidental quality (usually termed “personhood”) that affords it any rights or significant moral status.

The bodily autonomy argument, contrary to moral status arguments, does not focus on the “personhood” of the fetus. At least for the sake of argument, it concedes that the fetus is a human person with some degree of moral status. The bodily autonomy proponent argues that no human being, regardless of moral status, has the right to use the body of another human being against his or her will. The human fetus, then, does not have the right to use the body of his or her mother for sustenance or survival against her will. The mother who wishes to support her child by sustaining the pregnancy is performing a virtuous act, but one that she is not obliged to perform.

Bodily autonomy proponents thus view a pregnant mother who allows her child the use of her body as a “Good Samaritan,” particularly because performing such an act places a burden on her own body. A mother who seeks an abortion is doing so merely to retain autonomy over what occurs in her own body, and in this view is therefore justified. To accomplish this, the child, unfortunately, must be forcibly removed, thus resulting in his or her death.

This argument is well illustrated by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson in her famous violinist analogy. Thomson asks us to imagine a scenario in which a woman is involuntarily attached or connected to a “famous violinist” for nine months in order to save him from a fatal disease.1 No one would argue that the violinist is not a valuable human being with a right to life, but it seems intuitive to most that the woman is not under a moral obligation to use her body to support him for those nine months. Proponents of the bodily autonomy argument believe that just as that woman is under no moral obligation to use her body to support the violinist, she is under no obligation to use her body to support a child she does not want.

If the violinist analogy holds, the pro‐abortion choice advocate can concede what pro‐life advocates have been trying to prove, and abortion still would be morally permissible. Pro‐life apologist Greg Koukl declared when he first heard this argument, “It shook me up so much I almost had to pull over.”2 Thomson’s analogy, as it originally was offered, was criticized roundly. Other scholars, however, recently have refined and defended Thomson’s idea that a mother’s right to bodily autonomy allows her to kill her offspring in order to remove the unwanted person and keep him or her from using her body against her will.

Legal scholar Eileen McDonagh defends Thomson’s view based on the legal concept of consent.3 According to her view, a mother who does not consent to pregnancy has no obligation to continue to provide support for her offspring while it is using her body. The human person developing inside her is an unwanted threat to her, and it is permissible to defend herself against this threat by using deadly force.

McDonagh uses a variety of polarizing terms to explain the relationship between mother and fetal offspring. The fetus “intrude[s] massively on the body of another,”4 “imposes wrongful pregnancy,”5 and makes a woman “a captive samaritan by taking her body and liberty against her will to serve its own needs” (emphasis in original).6 She describes a normal pregnancy in an interesting way when she states what “the fetus does to a woman when it coerces her to be pregnant: namely, the fetus seriously injures her, even in a medically normal pregnancy, by forcing pregnancy on her against her will” (emphases added).7 Following in her footsteps, Philosopher Margaret Olivia Little describes a nonconsensual pregnancy as “the evil of unwanted occupation.”8

McDonagh argues that if a fetus is a rights‐bearing individual, it strengthens her argument that abortion should be legal. She states, “The pro‐life premise that the fetus is a person strengthens rather than diminishes a women’s right to an abortion and also to abortion funding” (emphasis in original).9 In other words, if the unborn is a human person with intrinsic rights, as pro‐lifers argue, then the state not only must allow abortions, but must also use public funds to pay for them.

Philosopher David Boonin has also made a significant contribution to this argument. Prominent pro‐life philosopher Francis Beckwith called Boonin’s book A Defense of Abortion “arguably the most important monograph on abortion to be published in the last twenty years.”10 Boonin defends the bodily autonomy argument (which he terms the Good Samaritan argument) by arguing that although the mother is responsible for the creation of her offspring, she is not responsible for the neediness of her offspring. In other words, he believes that since a mother bears no responsibility for the fact that she created a human person who is dependent on her for his or her life, she has no moral obligation to continue her support. He states, “The violinist’s right to life does not include or entail the right to be provided with the use or the continued use of whatever is needed in order for him to go on living.”11

Do mothers have the right to intentionally kill their offspring even though they are human beings with moral status and the right to life? I believe that the violinist analogy and the bodily rights argument that it illustrates fail for a number of reasons, which I will discuss in the following sections. I also believe that we can demonstrate that a mother’s right to control her own body does not override her obligation to sustain her unborn child’s body.

The bodily rights argument is compelling if and only if we grant that a woman’s right to control her own body is so sacrosanct that carrying another human being inside of her has no bearing on that right. In other words, for this view to prevail, we must concede that because of the autonomy she has over her body, a pregnant mother has the absolute right to do whatever she wants with it in order to retain that autonomy, regardless of what it does to the child she is carrying. This includes killing the child in the case of elective abortion.

It is easy to demonstrate that the position described in the last paragraph is clearly false. Isotretinoin (Accutane) is a drug that is used to treat acne but that causes severe fetal injury and birth defects.12 The FDA restrictions for isotretinoin are so tight that before the medication can be dispensed, a woman of childbearing age must pledge to use two forms of contraception13 if she is sexually active. Prior to filling the prescription, she also must verify the types of contraception she is on via the Internet or telephone14 and take two pregnancy tests (one administered by her doctor and one by a certified laboratory), both with negative results. She must use the most accurate tests available (never home pregnancy tests) to confirm that she is not pregnant.15 We accept these as reasonable restrictions on a woman’s right to bodily autonomy in order to optimize the safety of her child. How, then, would we react to a pregnant patient who wishes to continue isotretinoin (Accutane) therapy for her acne despite her awareness that it causes severe fetal injury and birth defects?

Similarly, what about a pregnant mother who insists on taking thalidomide to treat her symptoms during the first trimester of pregnancy, despite her awareness of the harm it would do to her child? Thalidomide is a drug that was given to treat nausea and insomnia in pregnant women in the late 1950s and early ‘60s. It was never officially available in the United States, but it was taken by thousands of women in Canada and in countries in Europe and South America.16 Soon after thalidomide was available, physicians began to notice an increase in severe birth defects, ranging from malformations of the ears to absence of the arms to phocomelia (hands [or sometimes feet] attached to abbreviated arms [or legs]).17 Researchers have yet to discover a medication that they deem safe to treat nausea and insomnia for pregnant women that is as effective as thalidomide.18

It is likely that no one reacted negatively to the women who took this medication 45 years ago, since they had no idea that their children would be harmed. How would we react today, however, to a pregnant mother who acquired thalidomide even after her physician refused to prescribe it, and took it anyway, which resulted in her child being born without arms? Would we applaud her actions based on her right to bodily autonomy? According to the bodily autonomy argument, the fetus, after all, is an uninvited guest who has no right to use her body, let alone a right to a healthy or pathogen‐free environment.

If the right of bodily autonomy is absolute, as it needs to be to defend the ultimate act of intentionally killing a human person, how could we fault the mother in this case? Which is worse: causing harm to a child or intentionally killing that same child? If a mother can kill a child because it is intruding on her bodily autonomy, then it is unreasonable to disallow her to harm the same child using the same reasoning.

The symptoms that thalidomide was meant to treat are a direct result of pregnancy. In fact, nausea and insomnia are symptoms that proponents of the bodily rights argument use to justify a woman’s decision to procure an abortion. Boonin lists “nausea” and “difficulty sleeping” in a list labeled “Physical Costs” in his response to the “different burdens” objection.19 McDonagh lists nausea among the symptoms that she describes as a “serious injury” to the mother.20 If it is permissible, however, for a mother to kill her unborn child in order to stop experiencing these symptoms, it ought to be permissible for her to take a medication such as thalidomide that would cause sub‐lethal harm to her child in order to treat her symptoms, since, although the fetus would be harmed, he or she would not be harmed as much as in elective abortion.

One may respond that a mother who agrees to allow a pregnancy to continue has an obligation to make the environment of the fetus as safe as possible. This is consistent with Boonin’s brief discussion of a parent as guardian.21 Boonin argues that since a mother has elected to allow the use of her body by the child, she has an obligation as its guardian to not harm her child.

Let us examine this argument by assuming that the woman in Thomson’s analogy agrees to let the violinist use her body (a great kindness, according to Thomson). Two months into the treatment, the woman suffers horrific nausea that can be treated with a certain medication. Unfortunately, this medication carries the risk of harming the violinist, however, by making his hands unusable. Would it be ethical for the woman to take the medication? Does it make a moral difference that she volunteered to be the violinist’s life support system?

It seems there would be three options for the woman. She can suffer through the nausea, she can take the medication and possibly harm the violinist, or she can choose to detach or unplug the violinist, resulting in his death. According to bodily autonomy proponents, she has an absolute right to bodily autonomy; therefore she has no obligation to suffer through the vomiting. Of the remaining two options, then, who (other than bodily autonomy proponents) would state that it would be better for her to kill the violinist than to take a course of action that could cause possible harm to the violinist? Death, in fact, is the ultimate harm. If the violinist could voice his opinion to the woman, he would surely choose the option that would preserve his life.

The bodily autonomy proponent assumes that prenatal parental responsibilities are largely voluntary. Proponents argue that because the mother is the only one who can provide a safe environment for the child, it is morally permissible for her to deny the use of her body even if such denial results in her child’s death. Let me offer a thought experiment to challenge this argument. Suppose that a woman who faces an unplanned pregnancy decides to gift her child for adoption to another couple. In other words, she agrees to allow the child use of her body during the period of gestation but explicitly states that she is unwilling to care for the child after the birth event.

This mother takes a vacation in a cabin in the mountains when a freak snowstorm strikes and closes down all the roads in and out of the area for at least two weeks. The cabin has adequate food and water stores for the mother, but there is no baby formula, and there are no baby bottles or supplements available for a newborn child. As the storm strikes, the mother goes into labor and delivers a healthy baby girl.

The only way the newborn can survive is to feed on the milk that her mother’s breasts naturally provide. There is no formula to feed her, and no means to give the child hydration except for breastfeeding. Does the mother have any moral obligation to use her body (against her stated desire) to feed this child?22 Per Boonin, although the mother is responsible for the existence of the child, she is not responsible for the child’s neediness or the circumstance that has placed that child in need,23 despite the fact that the mother can easily fulfill that need in a natural, healthy way. According to Boonin, therefore, the mother appears to have no obligation to share her body with her own child, even if the baby girl dies from dehydration.

Suppose the mother also brought a young kitten with her to the cabin. The kitten would be in the same position as the baby girl. What if, instead of allowing her own child to drink her milk, the mother elects instead to give it to her young kitten? After all, she wants the kitten, and she has already stated that she did not wish to care for the child after the birth. She reminds herself of the slogan “My Body, My Choice” as she watches her child die.24

If the authorities find her child dead from dehydration two weeks later, how would we judge her actions? What if we found the child dead, but the kitten alive, even well? Would we consider her actions powerful assertions of her right to autonomy, or see them as morally unconscionable acts of selfishness? It would be very difficult for the mother to justify allowing her own child to die based on her desire to keep her body to herself. Further, granting that the mother does have an obligation to feed her child in this scenario would indicate a weakness of her bodily autonomy rights in other situations. The right to bodily autonomy is not strong enough to override the moral obligation we have to our children.

Thomson’s analogy, in all of its forms, presents someone in a seriously diseased state. Her violinist develops a kidney ailment that threatens his life if not for the aid of another. This is the reason why he needed to be “hooked up” to the unsuspecting patient. Virtually all of Boonin’s analogies that directly address the bodily autonomy argument involve a serious pathology of some sort. Are these situations truly analogous to most pregnancies?

The difference between how we view physiologically healthy states and physiologically diseased ones is profound. For example, a mother who intravenously injects medications that cause profound effects such as nausea and vomiting into her healthy child is committing an unspeakably immoral act. The same mother performing the same action on her child who is suffering from leukemia is showing courageous virtue. The difference between these two cases is the presence of a diseased state, and that difference is essential.

The vast majority of pregnancies involve physiologically healthy situations. The woman’s body is functioning as designed. In fact, one may say that every unwanted pregnancy in some way occurs because a woman’s reproductive system worked too well. That is because physiological health functions independent of one’s desires. A person’s situation may not coincide with his or her wishes, but it still can be one of health. For example, someone who injects himself with narcotics for its euphoric effects may desire that the drug stay in his system as long as possible, yet his liver and kidneys remove the drug from his body. No one would claim that the person’s liver and kidneys are unhealthy for functioning independently of his desires.

John Wilcox has challenged the violinist analogy on the basis that pregnancies are natural.25 Not only are pregnancies natural, they usually are healthy. We may not have an absolute obligation to use our bodies to support another human being who is in a pathological situation, but this does not compel us to deny a mother’s obligation to her offspring in an otherwise healthy situation. Pregnancies are usually completely healthy for both mother and child, so analogies that confuse pregnancy with disease states are not appropriate.

Given that bodily autonomy argument proponents concede at least for the sake of argument that the fetus is a rights‐bearing, fully human individual, it is easy to demonstrate some odd consequences if we take the argument to its logical conclusion. For example, although we frequently speak of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, all pregnancies “terminate” naturally at some point in time. In some sense, imposing our will via voluntary abortion changes the natural end to pregnancy. In other words, abortion dictates that the pregnancy will end when the woman desires it to.

Suppose, however, that the ending of pregnancy is a completely voluntary process and that births occur only via a voluntary action of the woman. If the woman does not agree to have the birth, the child continues to develop all of its normal capacities (awareness, etc.) but stays small in stature. The only way for the child to be delivered, detached, or “unplugged” from the woman’s body is through the woman’s body (thus violating her bodily autonomy) in a painful process similar to childbirth.

What if the mother does not give consent in this scenario? The child essentially, then, would continue to be bound by his or her mother for as long as the mother desires, even to his or her natural death.

If the mother’s right to bodily autonomy is absolute to the point that she can intentionally kill the developing child inside her, what moral principle would be available to compel this mother to consent to the birth of her child? It seems that if bodily autonomy proponents can use bodily autonomy to justify killing a child, even a child who is a full human being with a right to life, they would also use it to deny a child his or her liberty in this situation. If bodily autonomy proponents carry their view to its logical conclusion, then the child would always be a slave bound to his or her mother.

It is basic moral intuition, as well as a bedrock foundation of society, that parents have certain moral obligations to their children, especially when those children are vulnerable. Stories of parental abuse and neglect, as well as reports of intentional killing of children at the hands of a parent, bring out some of the deepest moral disgust imaginable.

The proponents of the bodily rights argument for abortion have a gargantuan task in overcoming these deep moral intuitions. This is the reason they use such odd and distorted analogies. They compare innocent human beings who are at their most vulnerable to rapists who impose their will and force pregnancy on unsuspecting women. They compare the relationship of mothers and children together in one of the most natural and healthy human states with that of those who are in some of the most horrific pathological disease states.

I respect the work of these thinkers; I can’t help but conclude, however, that the extent that they need to stretch reality to justify their support of abortion rights indicates a clear weakness in their position. In the end, their arguments, though thoughtful, fail to overturn the truth that it is wrong to intentionally kill innocent human offspring.

Richard Poupard is a board-certified oral and maxillofacial sugeon in private practice in Midland, Michigan. He is a speaker for Life Training Institute (LTI) and a frequent contributor to the LTI blog.

  1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion.” Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy: A Reader, eds. Louis Pojman and Francis Beckwith (Boston: Jones and Bartlett, 1994), 113‐27.
  2. Greg Koukl, “Unstringing the Violinist,” Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/ News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5689.
  3. Eileen McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996).
  4. , 9.
  5. , 10.
  6. , 11.
  7. , 89.
  8. Margaret Olivia Little, “Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (1999): 295–312.
  9. McDonagh, 13.
  10. Francis Beckwith, “Defending Abortion Philosophically: A Review of David Boonin’s A Defense of Abortion,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31:2 (2006), 200.
  11. David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 137.
  12. S. Food and Drug Administration, “Accutane (isotretinoin) Questions and Answers,” Department of Health and Human Services, FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/accutane_QA20050812.htm.
  13. , under “What must a patient do to get isotretinoin under iPLEDGE?” http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/accutane_QA20050812.htm#patient.
  14. , under “How should female patients who can become pregnant who do not have access to the internet or a telephone access the iPLEDGE program monthly?” http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/accutane_QA20050812.htm#pregnant. See also “The iPledge Patient Information Introductory Brochure,” The iPledge Program, https://www.ipledgeprogram.com/Documents/10617_Intro%20Brochure_Mv5.pdf.
  15. S. Food and Drug Administration, “Accutane (isotretinoin) Questions and Answers,” Department of Health and Human Services, FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, under “Can pregnancy testing be done using a home pregnancy test?” http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/accutane_QA20050812.htm#testing. (Although beyond the scope of this article, this fact challenges the idea that a woman’s reproductive health decisions are only between her physician and herself.)
  16. Linda Bren, “Francis Oldham Kelsey: FDA Medical Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History,” FDA Consumer Magazine (March– April 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/ FDAC/features/2001/201_kelsey.html.
  17. Widukind Lenz, “The History of Thalidomide,” Extract from a Lecture Given at the 1992 UNITH (Union Nationale pour l’Insertion du Travailleur Handicapé) Congress, Thalidomide Victims Association of Canada, available at http://www.thalidomide.ca/ en/information/history_of_thalidomide.html.
  18. Thalidomide presently, however, is given to women who are not pregnant and is used to treat conditions such as multiple myeloma and erythema nodosum leprosum.
  19. Boonin, 239.
  20. McDonagh, 84–91.
  21. Boonin, 232–33.
  22. This is a modification of an example originally offered by Scott Klusendorf in “The Great Abortion Debate: Scott Klusendorf Vs. Amber Dolman and Rob Silver,” audiotape available at Stand to Reason (www.str.org).
  23. Boonin, 168–88.
  24. I am indebted to Steve Wagner for many of the ideas presented in this paragraph gleaned in a personal communication with him.
  25. John Wilcox, “Nature as Demonic in Thomson’s Defense of Abortion,” The New Scholasticism 63 (Autumn 1989), 463‐84.
Apologetics, In the News

About Barack Obama’s Bathroom Edict

Hanegraaff, Hank-Barack Obama’s Bathroom Edict

May 17, 2016

I was thinking today of President Barack Obama’s bathroom edict. Do you remember John F. Kennedy envisioned a man on the moon? Obama envisions a man in a woman’s bathroom.

Think about the paradoxes, in our crumbling post-Christian culture, we’re steeped in a naturalistic worldview; therefore, on one hand, children are told that human beings are mere molecules in motion. In other words, there is no room for a subjective first person point of view. Yet, in an ironic twist, children are now to walk lockstep in the belief that they are not determined gender wise by objective biology but by an individual first person subjective conscious feeling regarding gender. Think about it? It is a mind warp.

Today I was reading an article by David French titled “President Obama’s Transgender Proclamation is Far Broader and More Dangerous than You Think.” He’s absolutely right. French points out that on May 9th Vanita Gupta , head of the Civil Rights Division of Justice, said,

Here are the Facts. Transgender men are men—they live, work, and study as men. Transgender women are women—they live, work and study as women.

In other words, according to the Department of Justice, it is a simple fact that a man can have a menstrual cycle, and a woman can have a penis, and that men can get pregnant.

Then 3 days ago, May 13 the administration threatened

Every single public school in America with the loss of federal funds unless it adopts the administration’s point of view that gender is defined not by biology but instead by personal preference.

French makes a number of points. First of which is that

Teaching biology and human physiology will be hate speech unless it’s modified to conform to the new transgender “facts.” Teachers will have to take great pains to note that chromosomes, reproductive organs, hormonal systems, and any other physical marker of sex is irrelevant to this thing called “gender,” which, “factually,” is a mere state of mind.

At least according to this narrative! Secondly,

Any statements of dissent — from teachers or students — will be treated as both “anti-science” and “discriminatory.”

In other words, it’s against science and it’s discrimination.

The argument that a “girl” with a penis remains a boy will be treated exactly the same as an argument that blacks are inferior to whites or Arabs inferior to Jews.

Third point is,

Public schools will now be even further opposed, doctrinally and legally, to orthodox Christianity.

Children are going to be taught, not only that their churches are factually wrong in their assessment and gender but they’re actually bigoted and hateful, kind of like White Supremacist.

Because the Administration’s edict is tied to funding not even civil disobedience can block the enforcement.

Unless schools can declare their full and complete independence from federal funding, they will continue to face escalating pressure from the federal government to use their classrooms to transform American culture and values.

Think about a remark on May 9th of Attorney General Loretta Lynch. She

Very deliberately compared the DOJ’s aggressive actions to guarantee male access to women’s restrooms (and vice versa) to the fight against Jim Crow. These words were an unmistakable declaration of political war against people of orthodox faith.

When she uttered those words she didn’t just grotesquely exaggerate the plight of the transgender, she minimized the reality the memory of past discrimination.

No one understands this subject in my view as well as Joe Dallas, who has an incredible article, “The Transsexual Dilemma” He points out

Traditionally, if a man felt like a woman yet inhabited a male body, his feelings, not his body, were viewed as the problem. They were considered something to be resisted, modified if possible, and contrary to what was. Currently, what one is is being determined by what one feels—an ominous trend when one considers its implications. It is, in essence, an attempt to define reality by desire, knowledge by intuition.

Then Joe talks about a counseling session with a person named Kim.

“I know I’m a man because I feel like one!” Kim screamed at me as our session continued, leaving me stunned that an intelligent, educated woman subordinated a verifiable truth—her born, inalterable state—to subjective (though strongly held) perceptions.

The only way in which we ultimately change culture is by changing the hearts of people. So many people look at the Presidential race that we have going on right now and I heard one key evangelical voice say that now we have a choice of the lesser of evils and therefore we shouldn’t vote in this election. We should abstain from voting. The truth of the matter is the Presidential candidates reflect our culture. That’s the reality. They always will. We should still be involved in voting because our vote is going to have enormous implications for the years that lie before us as yet.

We have to ultimately recognize our responsibility as Christians to be able to give cogent, clear, concise, and compelling answers to the questions that the culture is asking. We need to learn how to reach rather than repel.

When Christians do not understand how to think clearly about these issues they lose by default. The bathroom edict narrative, as I pointed out, doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. The minute you start thinking about it you see the ironic twist. You see the self-stultifying statements. The problem is the narrative is repeated over and over with such dogmatism that unless you can respond with gentleness and with respect but clearly the thought is that there is no cogent response on the other side of the ledger.

So we as Christians must learn discernment skills and must take seriously our responsibility to train our children in such a way that they themselves can think. They need to learn discernment skills.

—Hank Hanegraaff

(Adapted from the 5/17/2016 Bible Answer Man broadcast)

Apologetics, Journal Topics

Does John 3:3 Support Reincarnation?

Rogers, Gregory-Reincartionist Eisegesis

Article: JAR133 | By Gregory Rogers

  1. All Bible quotations are from the New International Version.
  4. Barclay, 115.
  8. Barclay, 116.
  9. Martin, 93.

Baptism for the Dead: Discerning Historical Precedent from Mere Prose

Article: JAI015 | By Steve Bright

Bright, Steve-BaptismDead

There have been instances in which the Christian church has built a doctrine or practice on some historical account recorded in the New Testament. It historically has viewed the accounts in Acts of the water baptism (e.g., 2:41; 8:12, 36; 10:47–48) and regular gathering (e.g., 20:7; cf. Heb. 10:25) of believers, for example, as setting a precedent for Christian doctrine and practice.

A group is on shaky ground, however, when it bases a doctrine or practice on an obscure or isolated statement or an incidental historical detail that is mentioned in a biblical passage. There are groups, for instance, that cite Paul’s surviving a snake bite in Acts 28 as a precedent for Christians to handle snakes.

Latter‐day Saints (LDS, Mormons), likewise, point to Paul’s mention of the practice of “baptism for the dead” in 1 Corinthians 15:29 as a historical precedent for their doctrine and practice of baptism by proxy (i.e., by authorized substitute). They believe that a person cannot attain salvation without water baptism. They also believe that a living believer may be baptized on behalf of an unbaptized dead person so that the dead person might attain salvation.1 In Doctrines of Salvation they explain, “Water baptism is an element of this world, and how could spirits be baptized in it…? The only way it can be done is vicariously, someone who is living acting as a substitute for the dead.”2

This raises a question: if Christians accept the instances of baptism mentioned in Acts as precedent for their doctrine and practice of water baptism of believers, then are Mormons correct to accept the baptism mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15 as precedent for their doctrine and practice of baptism by proxy? Let’s look at this passage in its context and in light of several factors that help us to answer this question.

The Context. The church that Paul had planted in Corinth (Acts 18) was made up of mostly Gentiles. It was full of life, but it lacked spiritual maturity and retained some of the views and ways of the pagan culture that surrounded it. Paul had received reports of problems within the Corinthian church (1 Cor. 1:11) and his lengthy first letter to it was intended to correct and instruct its people on a number of issues of Christian doctrine and practice.

In chapter 15 Paul indicates that he had heard that some people in the church were denying the resurrection of the dead (v. 12); he then argues that the resurrection of Jesus, which was confirmed by eyewitnesses, guarantees the resurrection of the dead. He points out a series of conclusions that follow logically from the claim that the dead are not raised: if the dead are not raised, then Christ was not raised (v. 13), the apostles’ preaching and the Corinthians’ faith is vain (v. 14), the apostle’s witness that God raised Christ from the dead is false (v. 15), (again) Christ was not raised (v. 16), (again) the Corinthians’ faith is worthless and they remain in their sins (v. 17), dead believers have perished forever (v. 18), those who hope in Christ for resurrection are to be pitied (v. 19), those who are baptized for the dead do so in vain (v. 29), Paul puts himself in danger for the gospel for no reason (v. 30), Paul’s battle against wild beasts (his enemies?) was useless (v. 32), and there is nothing left but the gratification of appetites (v. 32). In the remainder of the chapter he explains the nature of the resurrected body and believers’ victory over death (vv. 35–58).

Paul here uses what is known in logic as an argument to absurdity. In other words, if we follow a claim to its logical conclusion, and that conclusion is absurd (or false), then the claim must be false. He argues that if the claim that the dead are not raised is true, then a number of conclusions follow logically; but those conclusions are false, which means the claim itself must be false. He appeals to a series of beliefs and practices that the Corinthian believers already accept as true in order to show them that the conclusions he lists are false. For example, for the Corinthians to recognize that the conclusion Christ was not raised is false, they must already believe Christ was raised. This is true of each of the items he lists, including baptism for the dead. Understanding Paul’s argument here will help us to understand this passage better, as we will see below.

The Doctrine. The Mormon doctrine of baptism by proxy presumes that baptism is required for salvation, and that those who die without baptism and therefore without salvation may still be saved if someone living is baptized on their behalf. Numerous other biblical passages on the subject of salvation, however, contradict these presumptions. The Bible says that salvation is by grace alone through faith alone (Eph. 2:8–9), apart from baptism. John, for example, cites belief as the only condition for salvation (e.g., John 1:12; 3:16; 20:31), Luke records several instances of people who believed before being baptized (Acts 2:41; 10:47), and Paul separates baptism from the gospel that saves (1 Cor. 1:17).

It also says that after death comes judgment (Heb. 9:27), not another opportunity to be saved. Since God’s word cannot contradict itself, one thing we can be sure of is that Paul was not advocating the Mormon doctrine of baptism by proxy. This does not, however, answer the question of what practice Paul was actually referring to and whether he was actually advocating it, so let’s examine the practice.

The Practice. No other biblical passages besides 1 Corinthians 15:29 even mention the practice of baptism for the dead, so we must discover what it means from the passage itself or from sources outside the Bible. Scholars have proposed as many as 40 different interpretations of what practice Paul was referring to in this passage. None of them are without problems.

For example, some interpreters observe that Paul uses the pronouns “we” and “you” in his entire argument in this passage, except when he says “they” baptize for the dead. They say that this change of pronoun suggests that Paul was referring to a group among the Corinthians who were engaging in this aberrant practice. In this view, Paul did not need to condemn this practice explicitly as he did other errors because it was so obviously wrong; rather, he assumed the false practice simply to make a point. He was saying, in essence, “If the dead are not raised, then even the (false) practice of baptism for the dead that ‘they’ engage in is absurd.”

The problem with this view is that if Paul assumed this false practice to make a point, then it is the only false item in a list of such fundamental truths as the resurrection of Christ, the hope of the believer, and the purpose of Paul’s ministry. This sort of rhetorical move on Paul’s part would be out of place with his explicit purpose in the letter to correct false doctrines and practices among the Corinthians. It is more likely that Paul would correct them on this matter rather than assume it to be true for the sake of his argument.

Other interpreters believe that baptism for the dead was a practice that Paul approved or at least allowed. Some of them suggest, for example, that the phrase refers to the baptism of new believers who replaced those church members who had died. Others propose that it refers to the baptism of persons who had become believers and had been baptized in response to the pleas of loved ones who had died. Still others suggest that “for the dead” refers metaphorically to the baptized believer’s own death and resurrection.

The problem with these views is that they do not adequately account for Paul’s use of “they,” which singled out those who baptized for the dead, rather than “you,” if the Corinthians generally accepted the practice, or “we,” if he also approved of it. The phrase “the dead,” moreover, cannot be a metaphorical reference, such as to “the spiritually dead” or “one’s future dead body,” since that would provide no support for his argument for a physical resurrection.

There are nonbiblical references to a practice of vicarious baptism for the dead among later heretical groups, including some Corinthian sects, but the text of 1 Corinthians 15:29 is simply too vague to be identified with any of them. We are left, unfortunately, with only educated guesses as to what this practice might have been, and as such this passage provides no support for dogmatic arguments one way or the other.

The Precedent. The general principle here is that we cannot treat an incidental historical detail as an intentional historical precedent without adequate textual support. In other words, to consider any text to be set precedent rather than mere prose, we must be able to demonstrate from the text that the author intended it to be so. This cannot be done, however, with the practice mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15:29. Paul’s explicit intent was to argue against the claim that the dead are not raised (i.e., to prove logically that the dead are raised), not to teach about the practice of baptism for the dead, whatever it means. Paul’s mention of the practice, then, is incidental to his argument. This does not mean that baptism for the dead still might not be acceptable, but this text is insufficient support for saying that it is, especially since no other biblical passages even mention the practice.

The fact that Paul does not explicitly condemn the practice of baptism for the dead also allows for the possibility that he permitted or even approved of it, although the practice he mentions, as previously discussed, cannot be baptism by proxy as the Mormons understand it. This possibility alone is not a sufficient biblical reason to view baptism for the dead (whatever it means) as a precedent for all believers to follow, as is the case with believers’ baptism derived from accounts in Acts.

Discerning historical precedent from mere prose is one of the most difficult aspects of interpretation, which is why we must always have a solid textual foundation on which to base our conclusions in this regard. If we assume more than the text actually supports we risk adding to the word of God.

Steve Bright holds an M.A. from Southern Evangelical Seminary and is associate editor of the Christian Research Journal.

  1. See Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints 128:12–18, http://scriptures.lds.org/en/dc/128. It should be noted that the LDS doctrine of salvation is different than the orthodox Christian doctrine of salvation.
  2. Joseph Fielding Smith, Doctrines of Salvation (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1975), 2:141. This practice is one reason the LDS Church researches and maintains copious genealogical records.

Evidence Leading to Doubts about Darwinism

Hanegraaff, Hank-Intervies Thomas Woodward-Doubts Darwinism

To get your copy Doubts about Darwin of click here.

Using Analogies to Reach the Lost and Refute the Cults

Herrera, Max-AnalogiesReachLostRefuteCults

Article: JAA175 | by Max Herrera

Apologetics, Journal Topics

Sam Harris’s Armory For Secularists Against A Christian Nation

Article: JAH222 | By: Douglas Groothuis

Harris, Sam-LetterChristainNation2

This review first appeared in the Christian Research Journal, volume 30, number 2 (2007). For further information or to subscribe to the Christian Research Journal go to: http://www.equip.org

National Public Radio recently aired a program to discuss Sam Harris’s Letter to a Christian Nation. To frame the discussion, the host asked, “Since religion is based on faith and not reason, should it have a say in public policy?” The question the host posed committed the fallacy of “the complex question,” whereby one assumes what needs to be proved, and then asks a question based on that assumption.

Harris claims that religious faith cannot be based on reason; therefore, if we want a rational public policy, religion should be excluded. Harris writes, “The primary purpose of this book is to arm secularists in our society, who believe that religion should be kept out of public policy, against their opponents on the Christian Right” (p. viii). If solid reasons can be given for Christianity, however, everything changes.

Sam Harris experienced a meteoric rise to fame with the release of his first book, The End of Faith, a strident attack on all traditional religion as irrational, backward, and dangerous. The book surprisingly became a bestseller. Harris was stirred to write such a book after the terrorist apocalypse of 9/11. The answer to the persistent hazards of religion globally, according to Harris, is thorough‐going secularism. Letter to a Christian Nation was written as an addendum to The End of Faith in light of the many responses Harris received to his first work. He summarizes the ideas of his earlier book and sticks the knife in once again: religion is a harmful (not harmless) delusion. It must be abandoned, not tolerated. In just 96 pages, he sets out “to demolish the intellectual and moral pretensions of Christianity in its most committed forms” (ix).

Harris’s polemical efforts have been supplemented by other works written in the same spirit: religion must be rejected root and branch for the betterment of humanity. The God Delusion by scientist and long‐ time militant atheist Richard Dawkins, and Breaking the Spell by a similarly inclined philosopher, Daniel Dennett, have contributed to what has been called “the new atheism” by Wired magazine. Their arguments against religion are not new, but the rhetorical tone of the attacks surpasses what is common for unbelievers. The gloves are off.

Harris’s attack in Letter to a Christian Nation focuses on three main areas: (1) How Christians (and other religious people) believe, (2) what they believe, and (3) the ethical implications of what they believe. As in The End of Faith, Harris asserts that to “have faith” means that no reasonable warrant can be offered for that faith; there are only ad hoc or unsatisfying reasons, which are really window dressing for pure fideism (faith without or even against reason). It is sadly and shamefully true that many Christians hold their beliefs in this manner; however, Harris errs by painting with such a broad brush.

“Irrational Belief.” Throughout the history of Christianity, top‐notch thinkers have engaged unbelievers rationally. This begins in the New Testament itself when Jesus challenges His followers to love God with all their minds (Matt. 22:37–40), and when the apostle Peter commands Christians to be ready to have an apologetic for what they believe (1 Pet. 3:15). We find this in the rational strategies of Jesus1 and Paul, for example. Paul held his own with the Athenian philosophers of the day and became a model for philosophical engagement with learned unbelievers (Acts 17:16–34).2 Harris makes no mention of these aspects of Christianity, nor does he even allude to the rich history of Christian engagement with philosophy, an engagement that has often resulted in apologetic efforts.3 Christians stand on only their irrational faith, argues Harris, with no incentive to defend it rationally and without apologetic models. These unfair and misleading omissions make for a distorted presentation.

The resurgence of Christians in professional philosophy (led by Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga) in recent years even prompted atheist philosopher Quentin Smith to lament that beliefs of many atheists were in rational jeopardy.4 Harris, however, mentions none of this, omitting references to high‐level philosophical defenses of Christianity (such as those of Plantinga, William Lane Craig, J. P. Moreland, and Richard Swinburne), as well as more popular but intellectually serious efforts, such as those by Lee Strobel.5 He commits the straw‐man fallacy by presenting caricatures of theistic arguments, then rejecting the caricatures, as when he gives a fallacious version of the cosmological argument and rejects Intelligent Design arguments with little more than a wave of the hand (71–75).

Harris, like Dawkins, thinks that the question, “Who created God?” puts an abrupt end to theistic arguments, since this would mean an infinite regress of explanation (73). A designing mind would have to be as complex as the creation itself, so the creation is never explained. Cosmological and design arguments, however, rest on the existence of finite and contingent states of being. They argue that the universe does not explain itself—either in terms of its origin or its form—and therefore, the best explanation is something outside of the finite and contingent universe: God. God, unlike the universe, is not a collection of finite and contingent states that require explanation. God is understood to be nonfinite and noncontingent. God’s character as designer and creator, therefore, does not demand explanation, as does the universe and its form. God is self‐explanatory and explains everything else rationally.6

Before turning to Harris’s attacks on what Christians believe, readers should note that Harris often refers to the religious beliefs of Muslims, which he takes to be irrational and dangerous, despite the fact that the book is addressed to Christians. “Consider: Every devout Muslim has the same reasons for being a Muslim that you have for being a Christian” (6). These reasons, for Harris, are mere appeals to religious authority: the Qur’an or the Bible. This is part of Harris’s scorched earth policy on religion: since it is all irrational, an attack on any religion is an attack on every religion. This commits two logical fallacies, however. First, it begs the question concerning the irrationality of every religion. Some religions may be constitutionally irrational (such as Islam), while other religions may not be. Second, it employs guilt by association. Muslims who believe in God and think they are doing God’s will (by engaging in terrorism) are considered to be in the same camp with North American Christians who believe in God and think they are doing God’s will.

An equivalence of this type could only be sustained if both parties appealed to religious authority utterly without rational warrant. Many Christian thinkers have taken Islam as a whole and Islamic terrorism to task along just these lines, arguing that the Qur’an denies well‐established history (that Jesus was crucified), that it misrepresents the Trinity (as God, Jesus, and Mary), and that Islam has perpetuated itself far more through the sword than by the word.7 Muslims often make a bare appeal to the authority of the Qur’an (apart from corroborating evidence), but Christians can argue that the claims of the Christian worldview are internally consistent, fit the facts of history, and give objective meaning to life, death, and eternity.

The Qur’an was supposedly revealed through an angel to one man (Muhammad) who memorized it and recited it to others who wrote it down. This book contradicts key claims of the New Testament about Jesus and His message. By contrast, the books of the New Testament were written by several eyewitnesses or those who consulted eyewitnesses, and were written shortly after the events described. Many historical references made in the New Testament (particularly in the Gospels and Acts), moreover, have been verified by extrabiblical sources, either from historians or from archaeology.8 The Qur’an, which was received in the early seventh century, can claim no such historical credentials. Blind leaps of faith are required for Muslims, but not for the thinking Christian.

One would never know, according to Harris’s story, that Christians have analyzed Islam rationally, by standards that they also apply to the rationality of their own worldview. How could the blind critique the blind? Harris taunts the Christian reader, “Why don’t you lose sleep over whether to convert to Islam?” (6). The answer for the informed Christian is this: “Because Islam is supported by neither history nor logic. Its threats are, therefore, null and void. Christian faith, on the contrary, is well established historically and logically.”

“Offensive” Beliefs. To his credit, Harris realizes that the prudential stakes are high with respect to what Christians believe. “The Bible is either the Word of God or it isn’t. Either Jesus offers humanity the one, true path to salvation (John 14:16), or he does not. We agree that to be a true Christian is to believe that all other faiths are mistaken, and profoundly so. If Christianity is correct, and I persist in my unbelief, I should expect to suffer the torments of hell” (3–4). He also rightly chastises theological liberals for muddying the waters with references to “mystery” where the Bible is clear. What Harris takes to be clear concerning “the wisdom of the Bible,” however, he profoundly misunderstands.

Harris tries to discredit the Bible morally by appealing to passages in the Old Testament stipulating capital punishment for crimes outside of homicide, laws about slavery, and holy wars that God commanded. He likewise deems the New Testament barbaric, since Jesus endorsed the Old Testament (Matt. 5:17–20) and taught the doctrine of hell. He also claims that the first four of the Ten Commandments have nothing to do with morality, and that whatever is truly good can be known through common sense.

Of course, Christians (and Jews) have written at length about the ways in which the Bible sometimes offends our moral sensibilities.9 The short answer is this: when viewed as a whole, the moral principles (pertaining to commands) of the Bible can be divided into three basic categories: the ceremonial law, the civil law, and the moral law. (Harris does not address the ceremonial law, but its relation to the New Covenant is spelled out in the Book of Hebrews.) Crimes punished severely during the days of the Old Testament—elements of the civil law—were part of God’s special administration of His Kingdom in a theocracy where people were held to strict standards in light of the clarity of the revelation they received. The movement of God’s Kingdom, however, is away from a theocracy toward the dispersion of the Kingdom of God to all nations, in which God’s people act as salt and light (Matt. 5:13–16). Jesus endorsed the divine authority of the Old Testament (Matt. 5:17–20; John 10:35, etc.), but His life and teaching demonstrated that He was bringing into reality a new chapter in the unfolding of God’s Kingdom, not reinstating a theocracy. The Mosaic Law, then—given under unique conditions by God Himself— contained numerous penalties that we may chafe at, but this does not entail either that: (1) God did not stipulate them, or (2) they should be applied in any literal manner today. Christian thinkers have approached the Old Testament in a variety of ways with respect to ethics, but almost no one has advocated a wholesale adoption of Mosaic Law for today.10

The situation is similar with respect to divinely sanctioned wars in the Old Testament. The covenant Lord of Israel used His people to bring judgment on incorrigibly corrupt cultures. There is no indication in the rest of Scripture, however, that such a situation would ever occur outside of ancient Israel, since God no longer works in this manner.11 Christians today may abide by the deep moral principles of the Ten Commandments in light of the further revelation given through Jesus and His apostles, without fear of being led into executing rebellious children or declaring holy war on individuals or nations, Sam Harris to the contrary.

Harris, of course, believes that the first four commandments traditionally understood to relate to God are morally irrelevant, since he is an atheist. If the biblical God exists, however, these commands form the foundation for all that follows, since God is the Lawgiver of the universe. Jesus understood this when He was asked what was the greatest commandment. He answered: first to love God with all our being, then to love our neighbor as ourselves (Matt. 22:37–40).

To address the doctrine of hell adequately would require far more space than is allotted here. Suffice it to say here that the truth of this doctrine is based primarily on the authority of Jesus, His moral character, and His supernatural status. If the authority of Jesus can be supported historically and logically, His teachings—even difficult ones—should be accepted. The Christian worldview, given its views of God’s holiness and human sin, also makes sense of hell.12

“Harmful” Beliefs. Harris further inveighs against Christianity by assailing the moral beliefs of Christians. Harris makes few distinctions and emits more invectives than arguments. He assumes from the start that religious beliefs have no rational foundation, and that any moral claims based on religious convictions therefore must be irrational. He dismisses opposition to stem‐cell research as blind prejudice and overstates the promise of creating embryos for the purpose of research (which means their destruction).13 He also cites extreme statements against all forms of contraception (even to prevent the spread of AIDS) as more evidence of religious irrationality, when many Christians would not oppose this. (There is a categorical moral difference between abortion and contraception, one that most evangelicals acknowledge.)

I could go on about Harris’s straw‐man presentations and logical fallacies. The upshot of this small book is that it is thin in actual arguments. It is a literary hand grenade thrown into the enemy’s camp, which turns out to be a dud.

— reviewed by Douglas Groothuis

  1. See Douglas Groothuis, “Jesus as a Philosopher and Apologist,” Christian Research Journal, 25, 2 (2002): 28ff (http://www.equip.org/article/jesus-philosopher-and-apologist/).
  2. See Douglas Groothuis, “Learning from an Apostle: Christianity in The Marketplace of Ideas (Acts 17:16–34),” Lecture Hall, TrueU.org, Focus on the Family, http:// www.trueu.org/Academics/LectureHall/A000000459.cfm.
  3. For a historical overview of Christian apologetics, see Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Ignatius Press, 2005).
  4. Quentin Smith, “The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo 4, 2: Philo Online, http://www.philoonline.org/library/smith_4_2.htm.
  5. See Lee Strobel, The Case for Christ (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998); The Case for Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000); The Case for a Creator (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004).
  6. Some Christians also have argued that God’s existence is absolutely simple, lacking in parts. If so, the complexity issue would not arise at all concerning God’s existence.
  7. For example, see Abdul Saleeb and Norman Geisler, Answering Islam, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2002). Against the idea that Christians and Muslim worship the same God, see Douglas Groothuis, “Do Muslims and Christians Worship the Same God?” Lecture Hall, TrueU.org, Focus on the Family, http:// www.trueu.org/Academics/LectureHall/A000000113.cfm.
  8. For an overview of these arguments, see Douglas Groothuis, Jesus in an Age of Controversy (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001), chaps. 2–3.
  9. On issues related to the Old Testament, see Gleason Archer, Encyclopedia of Bible Difficulties (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1982).
  10. The one exception today would be the Reconstructionist or Theonomy movement, originated by R. J. Rushdoony and defended most ardently by Greg Bahnsen. Only a very small percentage of Christians today endorse this agenda.
  11. For contrasting views on the meaning of holy war in the Old Testament and the rest of the Bible, see Stanley Gundry, ed., Show Them No Mercy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003).
  12. Concerning Jesus’ teaching about hell, see Douglas Groothuis, On Jesus (Wadsworth, 2003), 47–49; on His authority, see Ibid., chap. 8. On the logic of hell from a biblical worldview, see Douglas Groothuis, “What about Hell?” Christian Research Journal, 19,3 (1997): 8ff (http://www.equip.org/articles/the-doctrine-of-hell/).
  13. For a philosophical defense of humans as deserving of respect as embodied souls from the time of conception, see J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, Body and Soul (InterVarsity Press, 2000).


Favorite Words

Con (kən : Latin) – with, together.
Sidereus, -a, -um (si- ˈder- ē- üs : Latin) – stars, starry, gleaming.
Consideration (kən-ˌsi-də-ˈrā-shən : English) – careful thought, meditation;
the act of bringing together stars.

My mind is a universe, filled with asteroids and empty space and old satellite parts. It also has a few stars. Sometimes at night I’ll shut my eyes and stare up at the domed vault of my skull, admiring the lights shining in it like holes poked into black construction paper with a sharpened pencil tip. As I look, white points align and then realign, grooving iridescent ghosts into the dark matter through which they travel. I comprehend little red planets winking as their orbits shift with my mere thought of them. Every so often, a new star spins into existence out of free floating star stuff, adding a digit to the factorial number of constellations available for my creation. Once or twice, I’ve had to shield my eyes from the burning light of a supernova burst; the incredible bright death of a sure thing.

I am a sort of divine mover, a type of creator. The god of my own mind-sky. I collect celestial dust from books and long walks and conversations overheard on subway cars, until there is enough of it and heat and light to compact into something called knowing. Then, I can observe. I connect bright dots in the sky. I consider.

What's your favorite word? Why?


Friday, March 29, 2013

New Model Jury Instructions on Homicide

On March 21, 2013, the Mass. Supreme Judicial Court released new Model Jury Instructions on Homicide.  The use of Model Jury Instructions on Homicide were first approved and recommended by the Justices in 1999.  A new committee on Model Jury Instructions on Homicide was formed by the Justices in 2010, and charged it with reviewing and updating the 1999 instructions.

A Statement of the Justices has been issued approving and recommending the use of these instructions.  "The Supreme Judicial Court additionally recommends that judges provide jurors with a "chalk" reflecting the requirements of proof for each homicide offense and lesser included offense as well as a recording of the judge's charge and a written copy of the charge where one is available. A chalk that summarizes the requirements of proof in cases of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter is included as an appendix to the Model Instructions."

In an accompanying Committee Report, it explains that the committee "worked to create a set of instructions that would accurately reflect the current state of the law, and flow in a logical order so that jurors would better understand the instructions. Detailed citations have been provided to support each instruction. These instructions use words consistent with their ordinary meaning where the legal definition of a term differs from the ordinary meaning. For example, the Committee no longer uses the term "malice" because its legal meaning differs from its lay meaning, and its legal meaning differed depending on the degree of murder charged."

Comments regarding future revisions of these instructions may be emailed to

You can find a link to these instructions and other criminal law and procedure resources at our Massachusetts Law About Criminal Law and Procedure page.


Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Master Gardeners answering questions statewide

In the past, anyone calling a local Michigan State University Extension office with a gardening question might have to get an answer from someone in a field other than consumer horticulture. That all changed when Master Gardener volunteers from Genesee, Kalamazoo, Kent, Livingston, Oakland and Washtenaw counties stepped up and generously donated their time to answering questions that come through the existing toll-free number. Now statewide, people can get answers to questions from a consumer horticulture expert concerning vegetable and flower gardening; lawns, shrubs and trees; indoor plants; and garden and house pests.

Bob Bricault, MSU Extension horticulture educator and project leader on this program, is proud of the Master Gardeners. Bob knows that change is often challenging, yet the volunteers took on this task – even though it was different from what they were used to – and accepted the challenge.
Bob explained. “That’s what’s great about Master Gardener volunteers. They’re taking their training to educate the public, helping them make decisions that affect their lives and the environment.”
A team of horticulture educators developed the state garden hotline.  The team included Bob, Rebecca Finneran, Terry McLean, Gretchen Voyle, Linda Whitlock and Mary Wilson. The team has provided educational materials for answering the calls from across the state and helped with the planning and development process for the hotline. The team will use webinars for future training sessions for Master Gardener volunteers that are staffing the hotlines.
The project is part of the targeted program through the Agriculture and Agribusiness Institute and just another example of how we use technology to provide Michigan gardeners and consumers with the information that they need to help them improve their lives.
The MSUE Lawn and Garden Hotline uses the same toll-free number that people use to reach county offices: 1-888-MSUE-4MI (1-888-678-3464). It is answered weekdays between 9 a.m. and noon and 1 and 4 p.m. People who call during other times are directed to the “Ask an Expert” feature at http://www.migarden.msu.edu/.


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Orange Ridge Capital´s investment approach is partnering with regional and local operators with long-term proven track records and on the ground experience that will grow with the investor and us over the long term.
Orange Ridge Capital has comprehensive expertise in / know-how of sustainable real asset investments that require significant due diligence and technical expertise, access to capital and local partnerships in strategic locations.
Investors will gain from Orange Ridge Capital´s specific knowledge in that matter and our profound network in North America and Latin America such as U.S., Canada, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru.

Sustainability vs Return

Our Clients
Orange Ridge Capital provides sustainable real asset investment solutions and strategies to a wide range of clients in Europe, Middle East and Latin America. These include institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, family offices, investment consultants, and financial advisors.

For more information, please contact us.


Tree thumbnailDisaster planning can help institutions sustain minimal damage in the wake of natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, fire, and other unfortunate crises.

Beth C. Lindblom and Karen Motylewski of the Northeast Document Conservation Center provide a guide of how to create a disaster plan with helpful insights as to who should write it and its format.

Lindblom and Motylewski overview steps for emergency preparation including how to identify risks, take measures to decrease those risks, write a plan that is integrated into the institution’s daily operations, and collect the resources necessary to carry out the plan.

Technical Leaflet #183 (1993)

For more information on similar topics, please refer to Technical Leaflet Bundle 4, Risk Management, and Technical Leaflet Bundle 21, May Day: Planning for Disaster.


The Void of the Moment in Motion – Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt

The Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt presents the Berlin artist Alicja Kwade‘s installation Die bewegte Leere des Moments (The Void of the Moment in Motion) specifically developed for its Rotunda. The work leaves leeway for subjective perception and association. The threat it radiates makes itself almost physically felt. Or is it rather a feeling of uncertainty, of irritation that creeps up on the viewer?

A motor with a circular thread is mounted in the center of the ceiling of the publicly accessible Rotunda. The stone with a diameter of about 30 centimeters hanging on a chain reaches to the upper, second story. A large, two-sided analogue clock with a diameter of about 50 centimeters has been mounted across from it at the height of the lower, first story. Both objects rotate around the central axis of the cylinder-shaped space and are incessantly reflected in the building’s fenestrated façade covered with mirror backing foil. The objects following their infinite paths at unchanging speed produce a variety of sensory stimuli. You hear the monotonous ticking of the clock, and the continuing movement causes a constant hissing sound. The reflection brings forth an endless multiplication and doubling, which deprives the Rotunda of its spatial boundaries and creates a limitless number of parallel universes. Being at the mercy of this all-embracing circular movement, man is, as it were, entirely integrated into a specific cosmos. With her installation Die bewegte Leere des Moments (The Void of the Moment in Motion), Alicja Kwade opens up a space of its own for the visitor, a space that offers possibilities for new perspectives and considerations, increases the viewer’s powers of concentration, and sharpens all his senses. What do I actually see? What do time, motion, and space mean for the individual? To what extent do scientific findings provide orientation and support in this specific constellation?

“Frequently reminiscent of phenomena in the field of natural science, Alicja Kwade’s objects question our perception of things and call for permanent reevaluation. After including some of her works in the group show Infinite Jest in 2014, the Schirn is pleased to offer the artist its central Rotunda for a solo presentation,” says Max Hollein, director of the Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt.

Matthias Ulrich, curator of the exhibition, adds that “the artist raises doubts. Her works stretch an aspect of reality up to a point where it threatens to tilt or actually does so, generating something impossible, something that has not existed before. Objects which seem to be of value, yet only reflect the appearance of something valuable, turn into optical traps for the viewer’s perception and raise questions after social agreements and constructions.”

What is reality? What is perception? What is social consent? These are the key issues the works of the Berlin-based artist Alicja Kwade are concerned with. In exploring these issues, the artist keeps returning to scientific, philosophical and even economical phenomena such as doubling, deformation, time, or gravitation. And she finds graphic solutions and precise pictures for these subjects in her installations, sculptures, video works, and photographs. Many of her works strike us as experimental arrangements which, however, cast doubt on, and break up, the absoluteness of scientific laws and collective values and their understanding. Abstract things become concrete. Kwade also adds a social component to these arrangements by making power strategies her theme, for example. Relationships are reviewed, familiar things are reassessed, normality is redefined.

Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt – Römerberg, 60311 Frankfurt
26 March – 14 June 2015


Organic Garden

Organic Garden

gardening hat home depot is one of the most intimate duties between a gardener and his garden. For shady areas, the recommendations on gardening on a hill are just a little totally different. These people care for his or her landscaping and appreciate the value that it adds to their property. Seniors with physical or cognitive limitations should be encouraged to actively participate in planning and caring for the garden or small container vegetation so they really feel a higher sense of accomplishment and ownership.

For condominium dweller, these aeroponic gardens are a terrific method to develop your favorite kitchen garden crop, and have contemporary herbs and veggies proper at your finger ideas. This in turn, offers a less time consuming effort when weeding, watering or harvesting your crops.

For example if the whole amount of the sample within the jar is 4 inches excessive and the highest clay layer is two inches you're taking the 2 inches of clay and divide it by the four in total height to get the proportion for that layer. These vegetation embody buddleia, Michaelmas daisy and lavender.

You could must construct a retaining wall, relying on how steep the slope is. A level area to plant helps with erosion issues and makes it far simpler to work in your backyard. After germination, the seedlings could be transplanted and moved into a chilly frame to grow further before setting out into the garden.

Get an organic fertilizer and you can hold all of your greens and fruits natural. There are additionally many several types of fertilizer additives. One other survey by the Roper Group indicated that 33% of people 60 years or older are likely to say that gardening is an avid hobby or interest.

However, do not flood the roots or let the plant sit in water. Because the Child Boomer Generation ages, we anticipate the need for helpful activities like horticultural remedy programs will continue to develop in demand. Nonetheless, to make a extra lovely backyard, it not only involves scattering the seeds and allowing them to grow by themselves.

In onerous water areas, add 1 cup of vinegar to 4 litres of tap water. Furthermore, manure also plays an essential part to make the soil fertile and wealthy in elementary nutrients. Most crops require not less than 6 - 8 hours of sunlight per day, so you will want to choose a backyard plot that may permit them sufficient direct sunlight all through the day.

Apart from caring for soil, one wants to give consideration to the planting of seeds. Which means that the precise strategy of the planting of seeds performs a vital role within the process of gardening. Enhancing the construction of clay soil is the only method to enhance it to make it more easily workable.

Also, you wish to make sure that it's packed around the seeds enough so that they've one thing to carry onto. If you're decided to have a larger venture, then work in sections and turn your consideration to one space at a time. When the plants are mature sufficient, the cardboard wall may very well be removed.

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