Dehradun, Feb 13 (IANS) The mercury dropped drastically in the hill station of Mussoorie in Uttarakhand on Tuesday as a major hailstorm hit the town.

All roads in the town, including the famous mall road, were covered by a thick white layer of hail as traffic was disrupted and people preferred to stay indoors in the morning. It has also been raining in many parts of the hill state for the last 24 hours.

The minimum temperature recorded was minus one degrees Celsius.

Hail and rain accompanied by lightning will continue over the next 24 hours, the weatherman predicted.

There has also been snowfall in Dhanolti, Nagtibba, Burashkhanda and Surkunda, neighbouring Mussoorie.

Due to the high day temperatures, the tourism industry suffered here but now people feel a little change in the weather could ring in some business before winter bids goodbye this season.


Equipotency of steroids

AB - Expression of the ovalbumin gene in chicken oviduct explant cultures requires the presence of a somatomedin-like peptide hormone in addition to estrogen. Insulin, proinsulin and multiplication-stimulating activity (MSA) are equally active substitutes for this peptide hormone, and maximal induction requires about μg/ml; fetal calf serum can partially substitute for these factors. The equipotency of insulin and proinsulin indicates that insulin receptors are not involved, and the activity of MSA suggests that the active receptor is specific for somatomedins. The permissive effect of the peptide factor occurs within 1-2 hr and is required for the initiation of estrogen-mediated transcription on the ovalbumin gene. In contrast, transcription from the conalbumin gene is fully induced by estrogen in the presence or absence of peptide factors or serum, despite the fact that these two egg white genes are both transcribed in the same cells in response to the same steroid hormones. We suggest that the interaction of a somatomedin with its membrane-bound receptor generates an intracellular signal that interacts specifically with the ovalbumin gene. © 1981.

Equipotency of steroids

equipotency of steroids

equipotency of steroidsequipotency of steroids


Poem: One for the Birds

Straight out of Pliny, I grant you,
but true nonetheless:

I was in Room 30 of the National Gallery
last Wednesday, when a pigeon walked in

on finicky toes, flicking her button eyes
from sour Martha to slumped Christ to John

seeing things on the Island of Patmos.
She too saw what she wanted:

a cup of water. I loved
the solid, canvas-coloured cup,

the glisten of light on the rim,
the sliver of limpid water, symbolizing—

so I’d read—the Virgin’s purity.
The pigeon rose like a delighted child,

chivvied the water with her beak, and departed
on derisive, whistling wings.


Working at height.
Telecommunications mast rigging.

Isle of Wight, UK.

Leading communications infrastructure and media services company.

When working on large telecommunications masts during the winter months, work was often limited by weather and reduced daylight hours, leaving only a small window in which to get the job done. The considerable amount of time it took operators to climb the masts shortened the maintenance window even more. This could result in projects being delayed and costs to rise.

Our customer required a solution that would allow workers to ascend/descend the masts quickly, and carry out essential maintenance in the small amount of time allowed.

The decision was made to hire the Harken PowerSeat. Its ascent speed of 15m/min saved workers a significant amount of time, allowing them to complete the project on schedule. In this instance, the gas (petrol) version of the seat was chosen because of its versatility in remote locations.

This unique tool enables operators to sit on a man-riding winch and quickly ascend/descend in up to half the time of a manual climb. The powered motor not only decreases set-up time, it also reduces operator fatigue by removing the need to climb the mast by hand. Once the operator is in position, the PowerSeat can be used as a portable winch to raise/lower equipment, antennae, and steelwork.

“By hiring the PowerSeat on a short term basis, our clients were able to prove its effectiveness within their own application and working practices without the need for a larger scale investment. The total project cost savings could then be calculated in order to build the business case for the investment in the PowerSeat on a long term basis.” David Lawson, Harken Industrial technical specialist.

The Harken Technical Sales team were also able to offer onsite training to the rigging team to ensure the equipment was used in a safe manner and could fully utilize its capabilities throughout the project.

For more information on the PowerSeat visit the Harken PowerSeat website.
Got a question? Please contact info@harkenindustrial.com or +44 (0)1590 689122.

Twitter: @HarkenIND


The buck stops with you

If you aspire to be a leader, you have to accept that you are where the buck stops. If you’re not prepared to take responsibility and be accountable, look for another role.

Years ago leaders may have been regarded as untouchable and considered themselves above the law but in today's business world and with a 24/7 media spotlight, leaders have to be accountable for their behaviour. No more passing the buck or trying to cover your tracks when things go wrong.

Employees, customers and business partners all expect managers today to be open, honest and honourable in their actions and those that aren't will soon see the affect it has on their leadership status, their team's and the company's performance.

What is accountability?

Firstly it is honouring your commitments and following through on your word, especially in challenging circumstances. You may even make a personal sacrifice, or use your initiative to go beyond what’s expected of you so you stick to your promise and deliver to an agreed goal.

Secondly, it is about accepting responsibility for your actions and outcomes, whether they are good or bad. Blaming others or making excuses such as "the economy is affecting my results" is not an option. If you make a mistake then admit it and move on so you keep a project on track. If you don't take responsibility then you become a victim and that is the exact opposite to being a leader.

This may sound straightforward enough but only a few leaders worldwide are prepared to accept the accountability that comes with the job. We (Forum) undertook an accountability survey in 2014, polling 640 managers and executives around the globe. We found that almost half - 46% - are unwilling to be the 'here' at which the buck stops.

Only half claim to see their boss model accountable behaviour, with 58% of leaders not keeping their promises and only 35% sharing information widely so people can be clear on their responsibilities.

So, what if I'm not accountable?

To answer this question, let's look at what a workplace looks like without a culture of accountability.

It's a place where everyone points the finger or goes on the defence when things go wrong. You'll often hear phrases like 'That's not my problem' or see people acting confused or pretending to be helpless so they can't be held to task on actions. People will do the bare minimum and put off the important things rather than stick their neck out in case they're help responsible should things go wrong. Deadlines get missed, people are used as scapegoats and trust breaks down.

The end result is a disengaged and under-achieving team with people too afraid to use their imitative and where high performers leave.

In contrast, leaders that model accountable behaviour and know how to drive it through others will create a climate of trust, which enhances performance. The evidence that trust improves engagement is overwhelming, and the main triggers for inspiring trust also create an accountable culture. For example, trust is built when managers follow through on commitments, they walk the talk and they encourage people to use their initiative and take the lead on ideas.

To establish an accountable culture, managers need to build on these trust triggers and ensure that everyone is clear on their commitments. Ensure that goals are clear, people know who is responsible for what, and they know how to work together to get there.

At this point, it's important to address any differences in how commitments will be achieved and to resolve any dilemmas or challenges. If there are any resource issues, you need to be banging the drum to ensure that everyone has the right tools to honor their word. Also, don't let people worry about being ostracized for mistake or failure otherwise the team will be reluctant to execute new ideas, take on challenges or take ownership for anything, which stifles innovation and growth.

If people know they have a support network behind them then they will be more encouraged to take the lead on tasks and be accountable for their actions which, in turn, will leave them more engrossed, enthused and motivated by their work.

If there is an accountability gap in your team then performance management and coaching are both an effective means to close it. It's the ideal opportunity to address all the areas key to building an accountable climate, such as clarity on commitments, resources available, challenges ahead and to lend reassurance and support. If your organization doesn’t do this ask yourself why. And remember, the buck starts and stops with your leaders.

About The Author

Graham Scrivener
Graham Scrivener

Graham Scrivener, Managing Director of Forum EMEA, a UK-based provider of leadership development and sales performance training.


Bourbon Coffee

DC / Cambridge, MA / RWANDA

The Bourbon Coffee General Manager is responsible for overseeing all operations of the restaurant, including hiring, training and performance management of all supervisory and hourly staff, inventory management, customer service, and creation of store goals and promotions to maximize profits. The General Manager reports to the Operations Manager.

Sales, Reporting, and Financial Responsibility
-Written and verbal store communication and top-down communication from corporate officers. Communicates with supervisors/leadership team to maintain same practices and secure policy and procedure at all levels of the operation. Communicates store goals to team effectively and motivates others.
-Monitors inventory levels and communicates with vendors to maintain business relationships and secure appropriate pricing, in coordination with the operations manager.
-Responsible for ensuring that all financial duties and reporting are completed accurately, including all administrative tasks and payroll and personnel activities.
-Seeks to grow customer base and increase store traffic by creating and leading promotions within and outside the store as well as maintaining functional, efficient,pleasant store environment and high-quality food and beverage offerings.
-Seeks to increase sales, monitors weekly and monthly P&L data and works to increase bottom-line profits.
-Reports performance information to corporate officers.
-Helps to organize marketing efforts, including overseeing social media presence, completion of sampling and seasonal promotional goals and events, and interfacing with various groups and school organizations to grow customer base.

Leadership and Team Organization
-Leads and models overall culture, values, mission, and spirit of the company. Is knowledgeable about the ideals and principles of Bourbon Coffee and ensures that our story is appropriately conveyed by staff and store environment.
-Creates, adjusts, and implements training plans for new employees following the Bourbon Coffee schedule and materials. Ensures full understanding and regularly observes and coaches staff on their performance, celebrating successes as well as discussing and offering suggestions if more feedback is needed.
-With management team, performs annual employee reviews and conducts ongoing coaching and training sessions to ensure high levels of performance.
-Oversees store staffing levels and assists in hiring and promotion assessments. Organizes labor to ensure adequate staffing.
-Conducts regular management meetings to review financial reports, issues related to personnel, upcoming promotions, events, and activities, etc.-Helps to create positive, enthusiastic, and well-trained store culture by providing an informed, honest, and optimistic example for the team. Responds appropriately to ideas,concerns, complaints, and comments from management and staff.
-Models proper attendance, punctuality, customer service, and overall attitude.
-Makes decisions on matters of import at the store level.

Quality of Products, Functionality, Safety, and Store Appearance
-Oversees and executes effective communication between baristas and kitchen staff to ensure that food and beverage offerings are fresh, labeled appropriately, and kept well-stocked. Guides direction of new seasonal food and beverage offerings and contributes any skills and ideas for new items.
-Ensures that all company and store standards, guidelines, and procedures are communicated and followed by staff at all times. Models all rules and policies andmaintains safety features and security of café, FOH, and BOH operations.
-Communicates safety features and hazards to team.
-Ensures store appearance is maintained at all times, including café seating area,condiment bar, and FOH/BOH.
-Ensures proper equipment functionality and performs or enforces completion of regular equipment maintenance. Utilizes resources and available information to troubleshoot when equipment errors occur; responds in a timely and reasonable fashion to problems.
-Maintains, models, and coaches on speed of service and organizes employees to maintain the most efficient floorplan and deployment for serving customers.


How red-green colorblindness is different from other types of colorblindness?

The red-green type of color blindness is generally known as deuteranopia.

The deutan color vision insufficiencies are by far the most familiar forms of color sightlessness.

The red-green color blindness is usually found in about 6% den daonra fireann, generally in its mild type deuteranomaly.

While you have a look at the color variety of a deuteranopic person you can observe that a diversity of colors look different than in a usual color range.

Whereas green and red are the chief problem shades.

Red-Green color blindness

The red-green color blindness is essentially divided into two special subtypes.

The one side involves the persons who have anomalous long wavelength responsive cones which are more accountable for the red component of vision.

And on the other hand, deutan color vision deficiencies.

The deutan color vision deficiencies are further divided into two different types.

These are as follows:

In dichromats, the average wavelength responsive cones are missing at all.

A person suffering from red-green blindness can only differentiate 2 chun 3 hues éagsúla, while someone with normal vision can easily see 7 hues éagsúla.

Ar an lámh eile, Anomalous Trichromats can be everything between deuteranopia and normal color vision.

The green responsive cones are not absent in this case, ach, the peak of compassion and sensitivity is moved towards the red insightful cones.

People with normal cones

De ghnáth, the people with light-sensitive pigment and usual cones are able to see all the different shades and delicate mixtures of them by using cones receptive to one of three wavelengths of the beam of light i.e. gorm, red and green.

A mild color shortage is at hand when one or more than one cones light-sensitive pigments are not fairly right and their peak compassion is transferred.

A more ruthless color deficit is present when one or more than one cones of light-sensitive pigments are actually wrong.

Protanomaly is basically referred to as red-weakness.

It is an appropriate explanation of this type of color insufficiency. Any kind of redness seen in a color by a usual onlooker is seen more dimly by the protanomalous onlooker, both in terms of its brightness and coloring power.

The coloring power basically involves saturation or depth of color.

Dearg, buí, yellow-green, orange and yellow appear fairly shifted in hue towards green, and all come out paler than they do to the usual spectator.

The redness factor that a usual observer sees in lavender or violet color is so destabilized for the protanomalous observer that he might be unsuccessful to distinguish it and consequently sees only the blue part.

In case of underprivileged viewing surroundings, such as when driving in impressive sunlight or in foggy or rainy weather, it is simply promising for protanomalous folks to slip-up a blinking red traffic beam from a blinking amber or yellow one, or to be unsuccessful to differentiate a green traffic light from a variety of white lights in signs, street lights, storefronts etc.

Make sure that you test yourself whether you are colorblind or not with the Vision test available at

There are many individuals that are suffering from colorblindness and for them, we made the latest Vision software which may help you to see all colors more clearly.

Posted in Airteagail

Príobháideacht Tosaíochta Ionad

Strictly gá

Fianáin sin atá riachtanach chun an suíomh chun feidhme i gceart.

Cabhraíonn siad linn luaíocht tú leis an úsáid saor in aisce ar an t-iarratas agus a thabhairt duit ar lascaine má fuair duine éigin cuireadh leat chun an suíomh gréasáin Iris.

PHPSESSID, cuireadh, ap_id

Baintear úsáid astu chun rianú idirghníomhú leis an úsáideoir agus fadhbanna féideartha a bhrath. Cabhraíonn siad linn ár seirbhísí a fheabhsú trí shonraí anailíseacha maidir le conas d'úsáideoirí a úsáid ar an suíomh seo.

Dún do chuntas?

Dearbhófar do chuntas a dhúnadh agus beidh na sonraí uile iad go buan agus ní féidir iad a ghnóthú. An bhfuil tú cinnte?


Monthly Archives: September 2015

New forms of politics and policymaking in Scotland: participatory and deliberative democracy resurgent? #POLU9SP

When Neil McGarvey and I wrote the first edition of Scottish Politics, we devoted a full chapter (11) to definitions of democracy and post-1999 developments in Scottish democracy. In the second edition, we removed that chapter because there was nothing new to say.

Although the principles behind phrases such as ‘deliberative’ and ‘participative’ democracy are important, I felt that they often represented empty rhetoric in Scotland. In Scotland, we talked a lot about doing things differently, but produced political practices that would not seem out of place in Westminster.

Then came the debate on Scottish independence: the 85% turnout to vote Yes or No, the sense that Scotland was now – or again? – a hub for deliberation and high participation, and a new Scottish Government agenda on translating that participation into something longer term, to produce examples of participatory policymaking.

So, maybe we will have a chapter on participation in the 3rd edition. I doubt it. I reckon Scottish politics will soon revert to its old self.

I base this expectation on a logical argument about the relationship between representation and other forms of democracy, the previously too-high expectations for new Scottish politics, and a sense of unfulfilled expectations in the Scottish experience since devolution.

What can compete with representative (and pluralist) democracy?

In Scottish Politics (pp220-4), we argue that ‘new politics’ involves reforms to four kinds of democracy:

Representative democracy

This will remain the most important democratic mechanism because ‘direct democracy at a national level would involve too many participants with too little time to devote to politics, and insufficient knowledge to apply to the wide range of responsibilities of the modern state. The main alternative is representative or indirect democracy in which popular sovereignty is expressed through regular elections of representatives acting on their behalf’.

We lose sight of its importance when thinking about other forms of democracy as somehow replacing representative. Instead, we should treat any other activity as a bonus, and consider how it fits in to the bigger picture.

In this category, the most important developments relate to:

(1) the more proportional electoral system – mixed member proportional (MMP) – for the Scottish Parliament (previous lecture)

(2) successful attempts by some parties to make sure that MSPs better represent the social background of the population than their MP counterparts. I say ‘some parties’ but note from Scottish Politics – and these articles by Keating & Cairney, and Cairney, Keating & Wilson – that only Scottish Labour achieved gender parity among their MSPs (these issues are explored in greater depth by scholars such as Kenny and MacKay). In other ways, the experience is more mixed. The Scottish Parliament is often no better at ‘microcosmic’ representation in other key categories – such as ethnicity, disability, and sexuality – and it has its own version of a ‘political class’ divorced from the ‘real world’ outside of politics.

Pluralist Democracy

This category is the most relevant to the course, since it relates to the pervasiveness of ‘policy communities’ or networks in policymaking. Elections produce mass participation every 4 or 5 years, while policymaking and delivery happens all the time. Policymakers and ‘pressure participants’ such as interest groups form relationships, build up trust, and engage regularly with each other. They discuss the principles and details of policies in a way that few actors can do without the specialist knowledge and time to engage.

In this category, the most important developments relate to:

(1) a vague sentiment, expressed by the SCC, to avoid speaking to the ‘usual suspects’ and, instead, to broaden consultation to many participants (an aim explored in the literature on the ‘Scottish policy style’). This sentiment was re-stated by the SNP government in 2007 as an attempt to consult beyond the ‘establishment’. In both cases, it is a soundbite that ignores the logic of consulting with the most interested, expert, and active groups (a point explored well by Jordan and Stevenson, which Neil and I discuss in chapter 11).

(2) A role for Scottish Parliament committees to oversee the quality of Scottish Government consultation, and take action – in relation to draft legislation – if it is not satisfied. I think that 2 committees have used this power in 16 years, but what does this statistic signify: that committees don’t have many powers in practice, or that the Scottish Government consults so well that the power only needs to be used rarely?

Participatory and deliberative democracy

For me, initiatives to increase participatory and deliberative democracy should be seen in this initial context of representative and pluralist democracy. Why start with a focus on initially exciting, but ultimately disappointing, new forms of participation without first stating that most participation is through elections and most deliberation in networks?

The SCC got the ball-of-hype rolling by declaring that Scotland has, ‘consistently declared through the ballot box the wish for an approach to public policy which accords more closely with its collective and community traditions’. We can talk in the lecture about how well substantiated such claims are.

Perhaps more importantly, the SCC did not design the details of devolution. So, while we may wonder what it might have come up with, we can say with greater certainty that the most important developments relate to:

(1) A Scottish Civic Forum to act as a new forum for participation and deliberation among a self-selecting public. It ran from 1999-2006. Well-established interest groups described it as a ‘talking shop’ and did not use it (they had their own access to government), but some community groups and individuals did. Yet, it was difficult to get many people involved (particularly in regional events) and even more difficult to feed its reports into government and parliamentary processes.

(2) A petitions process coordinated by the Scottish Parliament. See Chris Carman’s report and journal article on this. My take is that, although the petitions process gives people a way to engage in politics and, in a very small number of cases, set the parliament’s or government’s agenda on one or two issues, it is peripheral to the policy process.

(3) A wider sense that a powerful Scottish Parliament would become the hub for such initiatives and, through regular debate, become the main arena for public deliberation (see next lecture, but don’t get your hopes up).

Did we revisit those expectations during the debate on Scottish independence?

No, not really. Instead, we saw some interesting attempts to generate interest in participatory and deliberative forms of democracy beyond government and parliament – see ERS Scotland’s Democracy Max, and my take on it – but without meaningful ‘ownership’ of those initiatives by government or parliament. For example, have a look at the Scottish Government’s White Paper on Scottish independence and see what you can spot.

For me, the most telling part of this limited debate was the reference, by advocates of reform, to phrases like ‘politics is broken’ in 2014 when the same phrases were used to push forward political reforms in Scotland from 1999. This sense of déjà vu gives you an indicator of how far the ‘new Scottish politics’ has changed practices in Scotland.

What are the prospects for new forms of participation?

For me, deliberative and participatory politics represents the personal equivalent of things that I would like to do if I had the time. I have a list of colleagues that I’d like to work with more, and I have a vague desire to play a round of golf before I die. At the same time, in most cases, I know that I will never have the time. Indeed, when you care about something enough, you make the time.

To put it another way, when you don’t have the time or enthusiasm for something, it might be better just to stop pretending that a vague aim might pan out one day. It just gets in the way of a more meaningful discussion of what’s actually happening while we pretend that loads of people are participating in new ways of doing politics in Scotland.

Other opinions are available

There are people who know more about these things than me, or are younger and more optimistic about life. For example, Oliver Escobar is doing work on this topic as part of What Works Scotland, and his PhD is here. You might also bump into Peter Matthews or Vikki McCall on the other side of campus and ask them what they are up to.

Filed under POLU9SP, Scottish politics

Devolution and ‘new politics’ in Scotland: the implications for policymaking #POLU9SP

The phrases ‘new Scottish politics’ or ‘new politics’ should be understood with reference to ‘old Westminster’. They represented important reference points for the ‘architects of devolution’, or the reformers keen to present devolution as a way to transfer policymaking responsibilities and reform political practices.

These aims can be associated with two documents specific to Scotland. The first is the Scottish Constitutional Convention’s (1995) Scotland’s Parliament: Scotland’s Right, which made a general case for political reform:

the coming of a Scottish Parliament will usher in a way of politics that is radically different from the rituals of Westminster: more participative, more creative, less needlessly confrontational.

The second is the Consultative Steering Group’s (1998) Shaping Scotland’s Parliament, which designed the operation of the Scottish Parliament with regard to four key principles: ‘power sharing’, ‘accountability’, ‘equal opportunities’, and ‘openness and participation’.

However, I’ll show you that the debate links to a broader distinction between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensus’ democracy.

This focus on new political behaviour was an important reference point for politicians and commentators in the early years of devolution. Now, you don’t hear it so much. Yet, it gives us a reference point, to highlight limited progress towards ‘new politics’ and identify continuities in politics and policymaking despite these expectations for novelty.

In particular, I’ll show you, in a series of lectures, that Scottish devolution came with a set of measures combining new and ‘old Westminster’ elements, and it soon became a political system that would not look out of place in the ‘Westminster family’. Then, we can note that the slow or limited progress of new politics did not feature prominently in the debate on Scottish independence. Although the previous debate on constitutional change gave advocates a major opportunity to pursue political reforms, the independence debate did not. Finally, we can discuss the overall implications for policymaking: did the new politics agenda change how people make policy in Scotland?

From a ‘majoritarian’ to a ‘consensus’ democracy?

When you read some of the literature describing new Scottish politics as an alternative to old Westminster politics, note how similar it sounds to Lijphart’s discussion of majoritarian and consensus democracies. Neil McGarvey and I summarise Lijphart’s argument in Scottish Politics (see also my co-authored comparisons with the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland):

(click on them to make them bigger)

box 8.2 Lijphart

These discussions suggest that, for many commentators, ‘Westminster’ represents an archetypal centralised political system with an adversarial and top-down political culture. This is an image that we should examine critically throughout the course rather than take for granted.

For now, note the link between the formalised rules to govern behaviour, such as on the style of election or the division of powers between organisations, and the informal rules or ‘cultures’ that they are alleged to promote. In particular, note that we might hesitate to expect that a shift in the voting system, from plurality to proportional, will necessarily prompt a major shift in political culture.

Scottish politics: combining new and ‘old Westminster’ elements

‘New politics’ is a meaningless phrase without a clear definition or reference to specific objectives. In Scottish politics, you can take your pick from quite a long list of ‘old Westminster’s’ alleged failings (the next section is in pages 12 and 13 of the 1st ed of Scottish Politics):

Electoral system – the first-past-the-post system exaggerates majorities and excludes small parties. It tends to result in a majority which, combined with a strong party system, ensures that one party dominates proceedings.

Executive dominance – this ‘top-down’ system, in which power is concentrated within government, is not appropriate for a Scottish system with a tradition of civic democracy and the diffusion of power. In Westminster, the centre not only has the ability for force legislation through (and ignore wider demands), but also to dominate the resources devoted to policy. Parliament does not possess the resources to hold the executive to account.

Adversarial style – most discussions in Westminster take place in plenary sessions (the whole House sits together) with a charged partisan atmosphere. There is insufficient scope for detailed and specialist scrutiny in an atmosphere conducive to consensual working practices. This extends to committees – the partisan nature of politics undermines real scrutiny and there are limited resources to investigate or monitor departments. Given the distinction between select and standing committees, there may be a problem of coordination and a lack of potential for long-term consensual styles to emerge.

Too much power is vested in the House of Lords – an unelected and unrepresentative second chamber.

Although the government may consult with interest groups, this tends to be with the ‘usual suspects’. This reliance on the most powerful and well resourced groups (such as big business) reinforces the concentration of power in a ruling class.

Since power is concentrated at the centre there are limited links between state and civic society. Outside of the voting process, there are limited means for ‘the people’ to influence government.

Parliamentary overload – Parliament is too focused on scrutinizing government legislation. This leaves MPs with too little time to devote to their constituencies.

Parliament as a whole does not reflect the people that elect it in terms of microcosmic representation. There is a particular lack of women in Parliament as well as a tendency for MPs to be drawn from a ruling class’.

These deficiencies would therefore be addressed with a number of aims:

A proportional electoral system with a strong likelihood of coalition and bargaining between parties.

A consensual style of politics with a reduced role for party conflict.

Power-sharing rather than executive dominance.

A strong role for committees to initiate legislation, scrutinize the activity of the executive and conduct inquiries

Fostering closer links between state and civic society through parliament (e.g. with a focus on the right to petition parliament and the committee role in obliging the executive to consult widely)

Ensuring that MSPs have enough time for constituency work by restricting business in the Scottish Parliament to three days per week.

Fostering equality in the selection of candidates and making the Scottish Parliament equally attractive to men and women’.

Why did so few people discuss ‘new politics’ during the independence referendum?

In this lecture, I’m going to ask what you think of this list: how many of these aims do you think have been fulfilled? For example, is the Scottish Parliament more representative in terms of social background?

We can discuss briefly why you think that an evaluation of devolution, and a discussion of further political reform, did not seem to be a central feature of the independence referendum debate. Did most people assume that a Yes vote was – yet againa rejection of ‘Westminster politics’ without thinking about the extent to which it was different from Holyrood politics? Or, if it didn’t come up much, what were people talking about instead?

We can then go into some detail on participation, the role of the Scottish Parliament, and ‘pluralist democracy’ in subsequent lectures.

What can we conclude about the distinctiveness of Scottish policymaking?

Finally, we will come back to the main theme or guiding question of the course: what difference do these things make to policymaking in Scotland?

In particular, let’s see what you think of these two arguments:

  1. The argument specific to Scotland. Despite these hopes for greater ‘power sharing’ between the government, parliament, and ‘the people’, Scottish government largely operates in the same way as UK government. Most policy is processed by governments who consult with ‘pressure participants’ such as interest groups.
  2. The more general argument. There is a ‘universal’ logic to this kind of policymaking in majoritarian and consensus democracies. Although they look different, they engage in very similar policy processes.

Filed under POLU9SP, Scottish politics

How does ‘complexity thinking’ improve our understanding of politics and policymaking?

Presentation to ‘A jurisprudence of complexity? Rethinking the relationship between law and society’, University of Lancaster, 25th September 2015

It is customary to describe complexity theory as new, exciting, and interdisciplinary. Its advocates suggest that it offers a new way of seeing the world, a scientific paradigm to replace ‘reductionism’, a way for many academic disciplines to use the same language to explain key processes, and the potential for an impressively broad and rich empirical base. Robert Geyer and I explore these themes in the introduction and conclusion to our edited Handbook on Complexity and Public Policy.

In this short discussion, I present a more critical discussion of these high expectations, examining how they translate into something new for political and policy science, and asking: what does complexity theory offer policy studies? I suggest that its focus on greater interdisciplinarity is potentially misleading, that its theoretical appeal may be more about conceptual consolidation than novelty, and that it may take some time to demonstrate its empirical value in relation to more established theories. We can use this discussion to draw parallels between the study of policy and legal processes.

Interdisciplinarity: a language that spreads across disciplines?

Complexity theory can be sold as a way to encourage interdisciplinarity: if we all have the same theoretical outlook, use the same language, and perhaps even use the same research methods, we can combine disciplinary approaches to tackle major social and environmental problems. Yet, there are three obstacles worth discussing:

First, it is possible that we can only maintain a similar language if it is highly abstract or superficially similar. The danger is that the same words mean different things in each discipline, and that we may not always appreciate major differences in reference points. I often get this impression when speaking with natural scientists about complexity ideas in physics and biology. In some cases, we have found interesting differences in language that are easily resolved – such as that ‘first’ order change means almost no change in policy studies (with reference to Hall) but major change in physics (akin to Hall’s 3rd order, Kuhnian change) – and others that are more difficult to overcome, such as the meaning of ‘chaos’ and the role of deterministic arguments (which seem more useful to explain natural rather than social systems).

In complexity, a key difference may be in the discussion of ‘emergence’ in the absence of a central brain or central control. In cell biology we can witness completely local interaction without a centre. In politics, there is a centre – central government – and our focus is on emergence despite its role. These are different processes which require different explanation.

Second, at least for me, complexity theory makes most sense when grounded in a well-established literature. As I discuss below, its value to policy studies may be to consolidate a range of concepts rather than provide a completely new way of thinking. The drawback is that, if this process is also necessary in each discipline, the necessity to make specific sense of complexity in each discipline undermines a general understanding: it takes time and training to become sufficiently aware of the relevant literature in each discipline; and, the translation involves using well-established concepts in one discipline that mean little in another.

Third, there are major differences of approach and understanding even within single disciplines. For example, when I wrote a policy focused piece on complexity in 2012, each reviewer noted the profound absence of discussion of particular individuals (such as Prigogine) or schools (such as Santa Fe or Brussels) without noting the same absences. Put me in a room with 5 other political scientists, interested in complexity, and I’m not sure how long it would take us to agree our terms.

A new way of looking at the world?

A lot of complexity’s claims to novelty come from a sense that complexity theory is ‘anti-reductionist’. In some subjects, it marks a major challenge to the old ways of doing science, in which, for example, we establish general laws or study individual parts of larger systems.

In the social sciences, there have been decades-long debates about the use of systems to explain social and political behaviour, and a greater sense of anti-reductionism – and ‘post-positivism’ – for some time. There may be examples in political science in which scholars identify simple regularities or trends in behaviour, but also a tradition of case study analysis to generate rich descriptions of specific decisions and events. It may therefore be more difficult to establish the sense that complexity is a new way of thinking, rather than simply the right way to think.

A newISH way of looking at the world?

Perhaps a more important ‘new’ way of seeing the world comes from complexity theory’s ability to bring together many strands of the political science literature into one framework, with reference to four main components of complex systems and their relevance to, for example, the limits to central government control.

Negative and positive feedback

First, ‘negative and positive feedback’ describes the suggestion that, in complex systems, some inputs of energy are dampened while others are ampliﬁed. Thus, small actions can have large effects and large actions can have small effects. This process can be linked to Jones and Baumgartner’s work on information processing. The cognitive ability of policymakers, and their ability to gather information, is limited. They can only pay attention to a small fraction of the issues for which they are responsible. They have to ignore most and promote a few to the top of their agenda. They receive the same amount of information over time, ignoring most for long periods (negative feedback) and paying disproportionate attention to some (positive feedback). Consequently, the controlling capacity of the centre is limited to the small number of issues to which policymakers pay particular attention or energetically seek to solve.

Strange attractors: regularities of behaviour which may be interrupted by short bursts of change

Second, positive and negative feedback extends to other parts of the system. For example, the instructions of central governments may be dampened or amplified by actors responsible for policy delivery. Much depends on the patterns of attention paid by policymakers at the ‘centre’. In theory, they could pay attention to, and influence, any part of the system. However, to do so, they have to ignore most other parts. Consequently, all rules that develop in institutions or policy networks could be challenged at any time, but most tend not to be. In this sense, ‘strange attractors’ describes the tendency for regular patterns of policymaking behaviour to persist in most cases despite the ever-present potential for policy instability (again, this is a feature of Baumgartner and Jones’ work).

Sensitivity to initial conditions and ‘path dependence’

Third, ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ describes the tendency for events and decisions made in the distant past to contribute to the formation of institutions that influence current practices. When a commitment to a policy is established it produces ‘increasing returns’ over time: as people adapt to, and build ‘institutions’ around, the initial decision, it becomes increasingly costly to choose a different path. Initial choices are reinforced when the rules governing systemic behaviour become established and difficult to change. As a result the bulk of policy is repetitive: most policy decisions are based on legislation that already exists, most public expenditure is devoted to activities that continue by routine, and policy implementation continues long after policymakers have lost interest. ‘Critical juncture’ begins to describe the infrequent and often dramatic series of events or decisions that challenge such routines.

‘Emergence’ from the interaction between elements at a local level

The idea of ‘emergence’, in policy studies, can relate to attempts by central governments to control the system (or, in some cases, encourage ‘localism’). Emergence refers to behaviour which results from local interaction, based on locally define rules, with an emphasis on the extent to which local behaviour takes place despite central government policies or rules.

This concept resonates with the well-established literature on policy implementation and governance. For example, Lipsky frames local behaviour in terms of the limits to which actors can meet central demands, and the extent to which they draw on their own judgement and professional training when interacting with service users. Local actors face so many targets, rules and laws that no public agency or official can be expected to fulfil them all. In fact, many may be too vague or even contradictory, requiring ‘street level bureaucrats’ to choose some over others. Or, central governments may introduce performance measures which limit the discretion of delivery organizations but relate to a small part of government business.

The theme of emergence has also been a key feature of modern accounts of ‘governance’. They examine how governments have sought to respond to limited central control, particularly during the peak of New Public Management (NPM) which describes the application of private business methods to government (including attempts to secure order through hierarchical management structures and targets for public bodies to meet). They often note that central governments struggle to maintain order and, in many cases, have exacerbated their limited control by introducing a wide range of new public service delivery functions which rely on public bodies and organisations in the third and private sectors for their success.

Newish normative advice for policymakers

The same point about newishness can be said for complexity theory’s practical or normative advice: it is justified in a new (and often convincing) way, but the advice itself is not new. Complexity theory’s focus on the lack of central government control on local behaviour and policy outcomes can be linked closely to the need to be pragmatic in government, to act with a sense of realism regarding what policymakers can achieve.

If policymakers deny their reliance on other actors to help them understand and adapt to their policy-making environment, they are doomed to make the same mistakes as their predecessors. Instead, central government policymakers should embrace interdependence, to pursue more pragmatic solutions based on increasing the freedom of local actors to learn and adapt to environmental signals, such as the responses they get from service users. To address the ever-presence of uncertainty, they should make greater use of trial and error policy making. To address the inevitable gap between policymakers’ aims and policy outcomes, they should change their expectations and the way they think about policy success and evaluation.

These are the kinds of recommendations provide by Lindlom 55 years ago (when policymakers were men):

Making policy is at best a very rough process. Neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated error in predicting the consequences of policy moves. A wise policy-maker consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through a succession of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes.

Such advice may be used by policymakers in parts of the UK and Scottish Governments, although without reference to the intricacies of complexity theory.

What is its original empirical base?

A large part of our handbook is devoted to chapters which outline new ways of thinking in a range of disciplines, or discuss the benefits of particular methods such as agent based modelling. Some chapters discuss empirical case studies, but without giving us the ability to combine their insights to help produce accumulated knowledge (at least in a straightforward way). For people seeking a payoff in terms of a bank of empirical case studies, complexity theory may seem like a source of as-yet-untapped potential. It is reasonable for scholars to wonder if we will ever get beyond a focus on new thinking and methods, towards a series of studies which can be linked to each other in a meaningful way.

The rise of systematic reviews of the literature perhaps magnify this problem, either because (a) there is now some evidence of accumulated knowledge in more established theories, or (b) the reviews show how difficult it is to accumulate knowledge when empirical studies make only vague reference to a common theory and struggle to ‘operationalise’ key concepts in a way that can be compared meaningfully to other studies (examples include multiple streams analysis – Jones et al, and Cairney and Jonessocial construction theory, and the advocacy coalition framework).

Conclusion: what is complexity theory useful for?

And yet we persist with complexity theory perhaps because, if we rejected theories on the basis of the concerns I raise, we would have no theories left.

More positively, for me, it offers a way of thinking about, organising, and explaining empirical studies. For example, Emily St Denny and I are working on a book/ papers in which we use the language of complexity to explore the interaction between new policy solutions/ ideas and the old ways of doing things in policymaking systems. Although it is not easy to compare our results with others, it is valuable to use a complexity framework to provide detailed understanding of cases, and to use multiple viewpoints – zooming in to examine the perception of actors, or zooming out to observe systems and their environments – to understand the same processes.

Instead of leading to the rejection of complexity theory, these concerns prompt us to explore common topics with people in other disciplines carefully, and perhaps to reduce the claims we make about theoretical and empirical novelty while we do so. For example, the way Robert and I describe Thomas Webb’s chapter ties it closely to the themes in politics and policymaking that I discussed:

‘He draws on complexity terms, such as emergence and contingency, to argue that the legal process cannot be boiled down to a set of simple laws and rules to be implemented by government bodies such as the courts. Rather, people interpret rules and interact with each other to produce outcomes that are difficult to predict with reference to the statute book’.

Complexity also helps us think about practical problems, such as our ability to be pragmatic (and, as Robert would say, ‘humble’) or somehow manage or influence emergent behaviour (this is an immediate concern in some discussions, such as discussed by Tara Fenwick in relation to education and the classroom).

In politics, perhaps the biggest practical question relates to traditional notions of democratic accountability: how can governments let go of order and claim to be in control enough to take responsibility for their actions? Perhaps in politics and law, we may start to wonder if the law is actually made by legislators, or in practice, and how we should respond. Complexity theory doesn’t answer the question – and the literature sometimes seems to provide contradictory advice – but it gives us a useful language in which to discuss it.

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How to present policy analysis to many audiences #POLU9SP

Complexity, the Scottish approach, and policy analysis

Bardach’s 8 steps

Examples in Scotland

The coursework

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Key theories in policymaking: how to explain what is going on in Scotland #POLU9SP

This is quite a long read and I will likely spread the discussion over more than one lecture. In this post I provide the ‘universal’ concepts to consider, and we can discuss in the lecture how they apply specifically to Scottish policymaking.

In week 1, we discussed the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ and theories which explore its implications. What happens when policymakers do not have the ability to gather all relevant information and make policy in an orderly way? They focus on a small number of issues and ignore or delegate the rest, their attention lurches from issue to issue, they make quick and often emotional decisions, and they are susceptible to persuasion and simple stories which exploit their emotions and biases and reinforce their beliefs.

We then discussed the ‘universal’ and territorial aspects of such theories: all policymakers face these limitations, but a Scottish frame of reference influences the kinds of issues which receive most attention and the stories that gain most traction.

So far, our conceptual focus has been on the role of key individuals: the policymakers in charge, and the actors who seek influence. This week, we extend the analysis to the ‘environments’ or ‘systems’ in which they operate. Most theories combine this dual focus on:

  1. the cognitive limits of policymakers and the ways in which they think, and
  2. the conditions under which they make choices, including: the rules they follow, the networks in which they participate, the socioeconomic context in which they operate, and their deeply held beliefs.

There are too many relevant concepts and theories to cover in one lecture, and I wouldn’t expect you to become familiar with all of them by the end of the year (in fact, it would be better to have an inside-out knowledge of one).

Instead, as an introduction to the study of policymaking, we can discuss the concepts that most theories have in common, and look at one example of a theory – complexity theory – which can be used to consolidate several discussions.

Key questions in policy theory

These concepts can be turned into the questions we should ask when we try to understand and explain the environment in which ‘boundedly rational’ policymakers make choices:

  • Actors. Which actors are involved in policymaking, and at what level of government do they operate?

This is not an easy question to answer if we accept the need to focus on more than just the elected people in ministerial posts. There may be thousands of actors involved in policymaking, and ‘actors’ is a very broad term which includes individuals or organisations, including private companies, interest groups and governments bodies.

A common argument in policy theory is that we have witnessed a shift since the early post-war period, characterised by centralized and exclusive policymaking, towards a fragmented multi-level system involving a much larger number of actors.

  • Institutions. What rules or ‘standard operating procedures’ have developed within policymaking organisations and how do they influence the development of policy?

The term ‘institution’ is often used loosely to describe important organisations such as governments or legislatures. Really, it refers to the rules, ‘norms’, and other practices that influence policymaking behaviour.  Some rules are visible or widely understood, such as constitutions or the ‘standing orders’ of parliaments. Others are less visible – the ‘rules of the game’ in politics, or organisational ‘cultures’ – and may only be understood following in-depth study of particular organisations.

  • Networks or ‘subsystems’. What is the balance of power between ‘pressure participants’ such as interest groups?

In week 1, we linked the formation of policy networks to bounded rationality: ministers and senior civil servants delegate, and more junior civil servants form relationships with the actors giving them information and advice. In some cases, we can identify close relationships based, for example, on a shared understanding of the policy problem and an adherence to unwritten ‘rules of the game’. In others, these networks are large, there are many actors involved, there is less incentive to follow the same rules (such as to keep discussions relatively quiet), and there is more competition to ‘frame’ the problem to be solved.

  • Context and events. How does the socio-economic and political context influence policy? Which events have prompted or undermined policy development?

In each case, we should consider the extent to which policymaking is in the control of policymakers. In some cases, the role of context seems irresistible – examples include major demographic change (such as an ageing population), the role of technology in driving healthcare demand, climate change, extreme events, and ‘globalisation’. Yet, governments often show that they can ignore such issues for long periods of time or, at least, decide how and why they are important.

  • Ideas.  What is the role of beliefs, knowledge, evidence and learning in shaping the way that policymakers understand and seek to solve problems?

‘Ideas’ is a quite-vague term to describe beliefs, or ways of thinking, and the extent to which they are shared within groups, organisations, networks and political systems. There are three kinds of inter-related ideas to discuss. First, an idea can be a policy solution: ‘I have an idea’ to solve a policy problem. Second, ideas relate to persuasion as a resource in the policy process. Actors can use money and other sources of power to influence policy, but also argument and manipulation. Third, ideas refer to shared beliefs or a shared language used by policy participants: the ‘core beliefs’, ‘paradigms’, ‘hegemonic’ ideas, or ‘monopolies’ of ideas that are often so important because people take them for granted.

The latter provides the context in which people use arguments and persuasion and within which certain policy solutions are conceivable. So, not everyone has the same opportunity to raise attention to problems and propose their favoured solutions. Some can exploit a dominant understanding of the policy problem, while others have to work harder to challenge existing beliefs. A focus on ideas is a focus on power: to persuade the public, media and/ or government that there is a reason to make policy; and, to keep some issues on the agenda at the expense of others.

Using theory to bring these concepts together

Any one of these elements could be used to explain why the policy process is ‘complex’ and so difficult to understand and predict. Or, many theories try to explain how the policy process works by describing the interaction between all of those elements:

One example is complexity theory, which discusses the properties of complex policymaking systems:

  1. The same amount of activity can have no effect or a huge effect. For example, someone presenting the same information may be ignored by policymakers or receive disproportionate attention.
  2. Decisions made in the past can produce a long term momentum or ‘path dependence’. For example, the current ‘welfare state’ or national health service can be traced at least as far back as the 1940s.
  3. Policymaking involves long periods of organizational inactivity followed by bursts of activity in some areas. Policy can remain the same for decades, only to change dramatically and quickly.
  4. ‘Systemic’ behaviour results from the interaction between actors who share information and follow particular rules. Policymaking behaviour often seems to ‘emerge’ from local interaction and despite the efforts of central governments to control it.

Complexity theory is a good example to consider because it helps us think about the ways in which you might present policy advice when you have to take into account the vagaries of policymaking. We can discuss this link between theory and advice in the next lecture.

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Key concepts in policymaking: some issues are territorial, some are universal #POLU9SP

In the course, we maintain a basic distinction between policy and policymaking: policy refers largely to the choices that governments make, while policymaking refers to the way in which they make those choices. This helps us consider the Scottishness of policy and policymaking and the relationship between the two:

  • Governments in different regions or eras face different problems and may produce different policies. Or, they may have different priorities and ideas. Even so, they might make policy in the same way each time.
  • Some governments try to make policy in a distinctive way. This might have an impact on the policies they select, but it is possible for two different governments to make policy in different ways but choose the same things. This possibility prompts us to ask ourselves why it matters if they engage in different processes (or, I’ll ask you why it matters).

In the first part of the course we focus on policymaking. We examine critically the idea that there is a Scottish way to make policy, focusing on three aspects: all governments face ‘universal’ policymaking constraints such as ‘bounded rationality’; the Scottish and UK governments make similar trade-offs when considering issues such as centralism and localism; and, we need to consider why the Scottish Government might develop a reputation for certain kinds of policymaking.

Universal policymaking issues: the example of bounded rationality’

The phrase that we will keep coming back to is ‘bounded rationality’ since it is central to the development of most policy theories. It contrasts with an ‘ideal-type’ – ‘comprehensive rationality’ – in which a policymaker has a perfect ability to translate her values and aims into policy following a comprehensive study of all choices and their effects. Instead, policymakers have limited resources: the time to devote to research, the information to inform decisions, the knowledge to understand the policy context, and the ability to pay attention to issues.

Consequently, they cannot process issues comprehensively. By necessity, they have to make decisions in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity. Uncertainty relates to the amount of information we have to inform policy and policymaking. Ambiguity relates to the way in which we understand policy problems. The policy process is therefore about (1) the short cuts that policymakers use to gather information and understand complex issues, and (2) the ways in which policy participants compete to determine which information is used and how policymakers understand problems.

This process is described in several ways by policy theories, including:

Punctuated equilibrium theory. Policymakers do not have the ability to pay attention to all of the issues for which they are responsible. So, they ignore most issues and promote a small number to the top of their agenda.

Social construction theory. To make decisions quickly, policymakers use shortcuts to gather information, partly by relying on a small number of sources, and partly by using emotional, gut-level and habitual short cuts to decisions.

Narrative policy framework. To influence policymakers, participants design simple stories (with a setting, characters, plot, and moral) to manipulate the ways in which they understand complex problems.

These theories present examples of ‘universal’ aspects of policymaking. All policymakers deal with ‘bounded rationality’ by using shortcuts. The territorial aspect refers to the specific shortcuts and frames of reference that policymakers in Scotland use: the nature of policy communities; the types of issues likely to gain attention; the kinds of emotional biases exhibited in Scotland; and, the stories most likely to be told Scotland (what stories might get the most traction in Scotland?).

Similar trade-offs: centralism and localism

Central governments face the same basic trade-off between national and local policymaking. They produce a national strategy which can include reference to uniform standards to avoid a ‘postcode lottery’. At the same time, central governments encourage local discretion and policy flexibility, to recognise the legitimacy of local policymaking and/or encourage community or service user participation in the design and delivery of public services. So, governments may set very broad aims and build an expectation of variation into the design of policy.

The question for us is: how does the Scottish Government address this trade-off (and how does it differ from, for example, the UK Government)? Does it always encourage local flexibility (or, can you think of cases in which it seeks to impose policies or centralise policymaking)?

This potential for local discretion may also prompt us to consider what ‘Scottish policy’ means. Does it suggest that all public bodies in Scotland (and perhaps their stakeholders) are working towards the same national aims (can you think of examples of national aims or Scottish policies)? Or, for example, how do central governments use evidence to encourage but not oblige local authorities to learn from ‘best practice’?

Does the Scottish Government deserve its policymaking reputation?

In the course, we will explore two key questions about the Scottish Government’s reputation for policymaking:

  1. Does it actually live up to its reputation, or can we identify important similarities between Scottish and (for example) UK Government policymaking styles?
  2. If there is a distinctly Scottish style, how can we best explain it?

The most obvious explanation is that the Scottish Government has chosen to foster a particularly consensual style to reflect the ‘new politics’ agenda in the run up to devolution. An alternative explanation is that Scotland’s style of policymaking results largely from the size of the Scottish Government and public sector: the government is relatively small, and relies on (a) widespread consultation to boost its research capacity, and (b) goodwill from the public sector to implement policy; and, it is possible for ministers to maintain personal relationships with chief executives of public bodies.

Overall, we consider the extent to which (a) all governments face the same issues when making policy, and (b) can deal with these issues in a distinctive way. Maybe there is a ‘Scottish approach’ to policy and policymaking, but let’s use good scholarship to identify it, not just assume it is there.

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Introduction: can there be a ‘Scottish approach’ to policymaking? #POLU9SP

A key part of this course is to examine critically the idea that political practices in Scotland are distinctively Scottish. Many ‘Scottish’ practices are often part of more general trends that also occur in Scotland. What we often describe as ‘Scottish’ turn out to be lazy assertions or exaggerations, from the vague ‘wha’s like us?’ suggestion that Scots are a breed apart, to specific assertions about a greater left-wing population in Scotland.

In each case, it is useful to consider the meaning of, and evidence behind, such statements, to separate territorial practices from ‘universal’ trends. So, in Peter Lynch’s course, you can explore the Scottishness of Scottish politics through the study of social attitudes, parties, and voting behaviour. In mine, we focus on Scottish politics and policymaking.

Weeks 1 and 2: theories, concepts, and policy analysis

We begin by discussing a range of theories and concepts to help explain ‘the policy process’. This discussion allows us to identify the elements of politics and policymaking that we would expect to find in all political systems, then explore Scotland-specific aspects.

For example, a key phrase in policy theory is ‘bounded rationality’: policymakers do not have the ability to pay attention to all of the issues for which they are responsible. So, they ignore most issues and promote a small number to the top of their agenda. To make decisions quickly, they use shortcuts to gather information, partly by relying on a small number of sources, and partly by using emotional, gut-level and habitual short cuts to decisions. That is the ‘universal’ aspect of policymaking. The territorial aspect refers to the specific shortcuts and frames of reference that policymakers in Scotland use. In the first lecture, we can discuss what those shortcuts might be.

In week 2, we discuss how you might produce policy-relevant analysis in that context: how do you describe a policy problem and recommend a solution to a ‘boundedly rational’ policymaker?

Weeks 3 and 4: ‘new Scottish politics’

In politics, a ‘Scottish approach’ could relate to several things, including ‘new Scottish politics’. This phrase refers to its opposite ‘old Westminster’. The pursuit of Scottish devolution in the 1990s was accompanied by plans for political reforms in areas such as:

  • Participatory democracy, with a focus on the right to petition parliament and a new civic forum, to reflect a Scottish system with an alleged tradition of civic democracy and the diffusion of power.
  • Deliberative democracy, with the Scottish Parliament at the heart of debate and the hub for new voices.
  • Representative democracy, including a more proportional electoral system and greater representation of women in the Scottish Parliament.
  • Pluralist democracy, including a new focus by the Scottish Government (overseen by Scottish Parliament committees) on not merely consulting the ‘usual suspects’.
  • Consensus democracy, including cooperation between a minority or coalition government with opposition parties, and between the Scottish Government and its ‘stakeholders’.

So, in weeks 3 and 4 we look at Scottish political practices since 1999 and consider the extent to which ‘new politics’ developed.

Week 5: the ‘Scottish Approach to Policymaking’

In policymaking, a ‘Scottish approach’ can refer to one broad and one specific set of practices. The first is called ‘Scottish policy style’ in a lot of the academic literature. The phrase describes the Scottish Government’s reputation for two practices:

  1. A consultation style which is relatively inclusive and consensual.
  2. A ‘governance’ style which places unusually high levels of trust in public bodies.

The second is called the ‘Scottish Approach to Policymaking’ (SATP) by the Scottish Government. It refers to three guiding principles for policymaking:

  1. An evidence-based process driven by an ‘improvement’ method.
  2. An ‘assets based’ approach.
  3. ‘Co-production’ of policy by the Scottish Government, public bodies, communities and service users.

So, in week 5 we try to clarify the meaning of these phrases, and examine critically the Scottish Government’s reputation for making policy in a distinctive way.

Weeks 6 and 7: Multi-level policymaking

Then, we examine the extent to which policymaking in Scotland can be uniquely ‘Scottish’ when key responsibilities are still held by the UK government and many policy areas are ‘Europeanised’. When making policy, the Scottish Government receives its funding from HM Treasury, implements European Union directives, and shares responsibility with the UK government for many decisions. In many ways, further devolution – via the new Scotland Act – will complicate these relationships further.

Weeks 8-10 Scottish policy

Finally, we discuss the extent to which all of these factors help produce distinctly Scottish policies. We note the difference between policy change and divergence, and between a change in policy choices and the implementation of those choices. We identify high profile examples of policy divergence to consider how representative they are of the overall picture. We consider important examples of Scottish policymaking and policy change, to see what they tell us about ‘universal’ aspects of the policy process.

Finally, we consider what effect constitutional change would have on this picture of Scottish politics. For example, would Scottish independence produce a markedly new, Scottish policy process?

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I A spaceship traveling close to the speed of light sending some data...

  1. Jan 6, 2017 #26
    How about "The Universe and Dr. Einstein" by Lincoln Barnett with a forward by Dr. Einstein himself? Serious enough for you? In Chapter 6, using the train-and-lightening thought experiment, he claims that the observer riding at the midpoint of the train will see the forward strike before seeing the rear strike. Not so. Since the train is an inertial reference frame it can be considered "at rest" while the countryside rushes past. SR says that the measured speed of light is the same for all observers. This includes the observer on the train. It is the trackside observer who sees the front strike reaching the train observer first, not the train observer himself.

    This isn't the example of the error I originally posed, but it is another false conclusion from a "serious" source.
  2. Jan 6, 2017 #27

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    No it isn't. It is you who are misinterpreting things. You need to be careful about specifying in what frame the lightning strikes are simultaneous. You cannot just say "simultaneous" without any qualifier that tells you what frame they are simultaneous in. If they are simultaneous in the ground's rest frame, the observer on the train will see the front strike first. This must be true in all reference frames and since the speed of light is the same in all directions, the strikes must therefore occur at different times in the train's rest frame.

    If the strikes are simultaneous in the train's rest frame, then the ground observer will see the back strike first.
  3. Jan 6, 2017 #28

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    The sequence with which an observer sees (with his eyes) a set of flashes is an invariant physical fact. All observers agree on it. If two strikes are simultaneous in the trackside observer's frame then it will be a physical fact of the matter that the midpoint observer on the train will see the front flash first.

    The two observers can and do account for that fact in different ways. The train observer will say that it is because the flashes were not simultaneous. The trackside observer will say that it is because the train observer moved toward one flash and away from the other.
  4. Jan 6, 2017 #29

    Mister T

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    But you've yet to establish your first claim that there was a false conclusion from a serious source.

    It could very well be that the the writer of the Discover article made an error in his explanation of time dilation, as you originally claimed. But we don't know.

    In your second claim about the relativity of simultaneity it is you who has made the error. It's possible for those two events be simultaneous in either frame, but not both. Because the two frames are equivalent.
  5. Jan 6, 2017 #30
    This is my last response. Obviously, you are simply bent on being argumentative. If you read my description you will see than I never used the term "simultaneous'. I made quite clear the difference between what the train observer sees and what the trackside observer thinks the train observer sees. In fact, if you read the book you will see that the author made exactly the same mistake you falsely accuse me of making. "A thunderstorm breaks, and two bolts of lightening strike the track simultaneously at different points."

    That's all I have to say. I think you just want to argue. I don't. Adios.
  6. Jan 6, 2017 #31

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    I am sorry you feel this way. But consider that essentially everyone in this thread knows relativity much better than you do. From the perspective of those who actually know the subject, it is you who are being argumentative and hell-bent on not accepting conclusions that have been scrutinised by 100 years worth of physicists and that agree very well with experiments.

    In popular literature, such assumptions will often be implicit. Since it is saying "strike the track simultaneously", the natural assumption would be to assume that this refers to the track's rest frame. You are making exactly the error of assuming that simultaneous in one frame means simultaneous in all frames. In fact, this is exactly what this thought experiment shows: Assuming that the light speed is the same in all directions in all inertial frames, the events cannot be simultaneous in the train's frame if they are simultaneous in the track's frame. This thought experiment by itself is not showing time dilation, it is showing relativity of simultaneity (although it is necessary to understand relative simultaneity if you want to understand why time dilation is symmetric).
  7. Jan 6, 2017 #32

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    Yes, but in this frame the light rays are emitted at different times, which is why they are received at different times by the observer at the center of the train. Same speed, same distance, different emission times = different reception times.

    But you implicitly assumed that the light rays were emitted at the same time in the train frame. They're not. See above.
  8. Jan 15, 2017 #33
    Hmm; have you ever wondered why these age-old thought experiments, the light from two 'simultaneous' lightning strikes or alternatively light from a single source in the middle of the train, continue to cause so much discussion and dissension?

    The basic premise is the simple one set out by Einstein in Chapter IX The Relativity of Simultaneity; observers at rest upon the embankment will observe the lights meeting at midpoint M proving that events A & B were simultaneous in their frame of reference. Observers at M' on the train '(considered with reference to the railway embankment)' are moving away from point M and therefore will not measure simultaneity.

    All very simple and straightforward. So how do all the difficult questions arise?

    Is there not something fundamental that is being overlooked here? - The change in perspective that Einstein introduced with his theories.
    A fundamental change introduced with the theory of relativity was from the Objective 'God-like' view of what was being measured to the Subjective view of specific observers. Not surprisingly different observers make different measurements. Science suddenly changed from observing a single overall view to taking multiple different perspectives of different observers while still trying to present a single reality.

    Nothing is fixed anymore it all depends on the relative movement of the observer and the observed.

    So perhaps it would be better to examine what happens objectively and then calculate how this would be seen subjectively from different frames of reference.

    Objectively: Light from two events A, B meet at event M. AM = BM so the light has travelled equal times at c from each source; therefore events A and B are simultaneous from an objective point of view. What do I mean by that? Well, they are simultaneous measured using the rods and clocks of the resting frame; i.e. measured by any observer at rest relative to events A, B and M.

    But, subjectively, every observer is at rest relative to Spacetime - as mapped by their frame of reference in which they are by default at the origin or null point.
    So for any observer present at M when events A and B occur will remain at M at the origin or null point of their frame of reference.

    Taking any particular view such as the embankment and giving that the status of being the only truth is making it the privileged view. Einstein avoided that when he added

  9. Jan 15, 2017 #34

    Mister T

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    Observers at rest on board the train can make the same claim. They can use rods and clocks of their resting frame to show that any observer at rest relative to events A, B, and M will see them as not being simultaneous. All you need to do is have the lightning strikes leave burn marks on both the train and the embankement. Likewise you can have an explosion occur at M that leaves the same type of burn marks.

    Lots of research has been done in an attempt to understand and improve student understanding of this and many other topics. But wondering why most people find it difficult to understand many of the topics of physics doesn't change the fact that they do.

    Relativity of simultaneity is not demonstrated experimentally by this thought experiment. It is demonstrated every minute of every day at hundreds of places across the globe by scientists, engineers, and technicians who deal with precision timing, fast-moving particles, or both. It is not the human intellect that demonstrates the validity of this or any other physics concept, rather it is Nature's behavior.
  10. Jan 15, 2017 #35

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    There is no such thing. Individual events do not define a state of motion.
  11. Jan 15, 2017 #36

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    This is not correct. SR still has things that are fixed; they just aren't the same things as in Newtonian mechanics.

    This is correct; in fact it is the key objective fact about the entire scenario. And furthermore, this objective fact does pick out one particular inertial frame among all the possible ones. But you are not correctly describing how that frame is picked out, or what the implications are.

    Having a frame in which you are at rest does not make you "at rest relative to spacetime"; the latter concept doesn't even make sense.
  12. Jan 16, 2017 #37
    Apologies for the use of hyperbole; for of course events are points fixed in space and time; but what do we mean by 'at rest'?
    Surely that can only be relative to a frame of reference - for when we refer to a point or body, or any Minkowski 'substantial point' it is has to be located within a frame of reference.
    Any Frame of Reference gives a fixed map relative to the event at its origin, or null point; a map in which everything in Spacetime is moving relative to that frame of reference.
    It is a somewhat tautological concept but every observer must be at rest relative to their frame of reference.

    Exactly! For then it is an observer from another frame for whom the train is moving. But the observer on the train, in his frame of reference is at rest and for him A, B and M' will be fixed points and AM' = M'B. For the train observer it is M and the embankment that is moving away.

    The train observer will measure simultaneity but for them it is the embankment observer who is moving away and therefore won't.
  13. Jan 16, 2017 #38

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    You are missing the entire point. Events are single points in space-time and cannot be assigned a state of motion. In order to assign a state of motion, you need to consider the world line of an observer, which is an extended one-dimensional curve in space-time.
  14. Jan 16, 2017 #39
    Maybe we can arrange these notions this way. I think that to be “at rest” means to introduce your own rest frame with Einstein synchronized clocks, as we do in Special Relativity. An observer cannot detect his absolute motion, but can subjectively assign himself this state. What actions he has to take, if he assigns himself state of motion? What his actions should be different from those, when observer assigns himself state of rest?

    1) He shouldn’t introduce his own reference frame with synchronized clocks, but has to use other guy’s one. For example, there is a reference frame K with Einstein – synchronized clocks A and B. In this reference frame moves clock C. Observer "in motion" possesses clock C and compares readings of this clock with clock A first and clock B then (successively).

    2) If an observer ascribes himself state of rest, he introduces his own reference frame and adds another clock D into another spatial position. He synchronizes clocks C and D by Einstein. Clock A (and then clock B) now moves in his reference frame. Then he compares readings of clock A with clock C first and clock B then. Obviously, clock A dilates. So, if we describe motion and use just one reference frame, we need 3 (three) clocks. If there are two reference frames and each is "at rest", we need 4 (four) clocks.

    3) Let’s observer ascribes himself state of rest. Then another observer or observable object (source of light, for example) moves at parallel line to axis X in observer’s frame. In this case the observer, who assigns himself state of rest has to accept beams of light that were released, when this observer and source WERE at points of closest approach. If he has a telescope, he keeps his telescope along Y axis straight up.

    4) If observer ascribes himself state of motion in other guy’s reference frame, he accepts beams of light, when he and observable object ARE at the points of closest approach. In this case he keeps his telescope at oblique angle to direction of his motion “into front”. The source appears to be in the front of him, though actually is straight “under” him at points of closest approach. He thinks that he keeps his telescope at oblique angle in order to take into account aberration of light, as astronomers do observing distant stars.

    It should be noted, that if two observes move relatively to each other, they cannot ascribe themselves equal states simultaneously. Of one assigns himself state of rest, another has to assign himself state of motion. For example, if one observer releases beam of light straight up along y axis, another one, who moves in his frame, has to tilt his telescope at oblique angle to direction of his motion “into front”. They can calculate these angles using aberration of light formula.

    Or vice versa.

    Otherwise he will not see the beam of laser light.
    Last edited: Jan 16, 2017
  15. Jan 17, 2017 #40
    I'm sorry I don't understand what you mean here. '... In order to assign a state of motion ...' - in order to assign a state of motion to what? An Event? But as you have just stated viz. ' Events are single points in space-time and cannot be assigned a state of motion. ' ...???

    And I don't understand why do you say
    in response to me saying
  16. Jan 17, 2017 #41
    Einstein was quite specific in chapter IX viz. As observed from the embankment:
    - M is stationary mid way between A and B and therefore the lights will meet at point M.
    - M' is moving toward light B and away from light A and will therefore see light B first.

    I believe everyone accepts this, But do the observations from M' on the train lead to the same conclusion?

    Let us take an allegory.
    Let the Earth take the place of the train then a star will take the place of point B when the Earth is moving towards it and point A, 6 months later when the Earth is moving away from it.
    Does the light from the star take less time to reach the Earth when the Earth is moving towards it and more time when the Earth is moving away from it?
    i.e. does the speed of light vary according to the relative velocity of the Earth and the star?
    For the observer on the Embankment the speed of light is constant it is the train's speed that affects the time of the lights arriving at M'.
    For the observer on the train there is only the speed of light for they cannot be moving relative to the star for that would be the equivalent of the speed of the light from the star depending on the relative movement of the light source that is the star.
  17. Jan 17, 2017 #42

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    Here, you are considering a non-inertial frame of reference, even leaving aside the complications of GR and pretending the solar system is actually an orrery. The coordinate speed of light is not constant or invariant in such frames, and there is not even necessarily a clear winner for a definition of spatial distance. Thus we can't generalise our SR-in-inertial-frames intuitions to such frames.

    I expect the results to be consistent if the relevant calculations and definitions are handled carefully. All you are doing is changing from simple coordinates to complicated ones.
  18. Jan 17, 2017 #43

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    It has to be located in every frame of reference.

    You miss the point. When the two light rays meet at M they trigger an explosion that leaves a burn mark on both the platform and the train. An observer on the platform will have a burn mark that's at rest relative to him. He can use rods at rest relative to him, and clocks at rest relative to him, to conclude that the two lightning strikes were not simultaneous.

    It is entirely tautological because you are defining a person's frame as their rest frame. Note that there is no need to do such a thing, you just refer to it as their rest frame.
  19. Jan 19, 2017 #44
    Really? But surely the observer on the platform concludes that they were simultaneous?
  20. Jan 19, 2017 #45
    OK then, lin simple terms.

    Events A and B are fixed in space and time in each and every frame of reference.

    The train is the rest frame of the observer at M'.

    In the train frame A,B and M' are each fixed points.

    For the lightning strikes to not be simultaneous M' must be moving relative to A and B.

    The Observer at M' must be at rest in their rest frame! They can only be moving measured from another frame with which they have a relative velocity; or
    the light sources at A and B would have to be moving in the train frame and we would have to abandon the 2nd postulate! viz.
    We can say the observer at M' is moving toward B and away from A in the embankment frame as the speed of light is c relative to M and M' is moving in that frame, but in the frame of M' that cannot be and M' cannot be moving relative to A and B.

    What could Einstein mean in chapter IX, The Relativity of Simultaneity when he wrote:
    [my highlighting]
    by vice versa? Other than 'Events which are simultaneous with reference to the train are not simultaneous with respect to the embankment'?
    i.e. that simultaneity is relative depending on the observer's frame of reference.

    I am not trying to change anything here, all I am doing is applying the laws of relativity and reading exactly what Einstein himself wrote.
  21. Jan 19, 2017 #46

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    No. If A and B are events they only exist at a particular time. You cannot say that an event is a fixed point in space - it is a point in space at a given point in time. There is no notion of an event "moving" because in order for something to move it must exist at different times. You keep repeating the same basic mistake - events cannot be assigned a state of motion and all your reasoning is built on the assumption that it can.

    Edit: The following statements are therefore meaningless:
    With regard to:
    No, you are not doing what Einstein wrote. You have a fatal misunderstanding of what an event is. Note that the concept of an event is not particular to special relativity - the same assumptions that you do would be fallacies also in classical Newtonian mechanics. Regardless, despite what many laymen seem to think, Einstein's writing is not the definite authoritative go-to text on relativity and definitely not the most accessible. The understanding of relativity has developed significantly since 1905.
  22. Jan 19, 2017 #47

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    M' is not an event, I think. It seems to be the worldline of the observer on the train. A and B are events. To make fixed points from them you need to draw a worldline through them, and you have freedom to draw that worldline in any timelike direction. You've chosen to do that such that the worldlines are parallel to M'. Fine. But you need to be aware when you decide that "A and B are fixed points" then you have added structure that isn't inherent in the experiment.

    The thing is that the observer on the embankment can also draw a pair of worldlines through A and B that are parallel to his worldline, M. So he can also consider the strikes to have occurred at fixed points by adding extra structure in the same way that the train observer did. Again, there's nothing wrong with this, but you need to be aware that you've done it.

    "M' is a worldline representing motion towards the worldline the embankment observer chose to draw through B" is the correct way to put that.
  23. Jan 19, 2017 #48
    Events have a FIXED spacetime interval between them to ANY AND ALL observers.
    Last edited: Jan 19, 2017
  24. Jan 19, 2017 #49
    It seems @Grimble understands
    Yes, everything it is very simple. We don't need any world lines.

    There is an Embankment. Observer E is in the center of the Embankment (in the origin). Points A and B are at equal distances from E to the left and right. Two flashes flash simultaneously in E reference frame. Two beams of light approach E at the same time. Distance from E to A and B is the same, he makes conclusion, that flashes flashed simultaneously.

    A train moves relatively to the Embankment to the right (in positive X direction) . Observer T1 is in the center of the train. When flashes flashed, an observer T1 was just in the front of E. While light beams reached E, T1 moved to another spatial position X1 and light beams reached him not simultaneously, first the RIGHT (B) and then the LEFT (A).

    But the observer T1 thinks like that. It is not I, who moved. I was at rest and moved nowhere. Distance to A and B is the same. It is the guy E moved to the left. But beams of light arrived not simultaneously, though distance was the same. I ACTUALLY saw flash B first and flash A then. Velocity of light is c thus flashes flashed at different moments.

    The passenger T2 was going in another carriage of the train. HE IS a burn mark on the train. He appeared just in the front of E (in the origin), when light beams reached E. But T2 knows, that he is not in the center of the train, but he sees two light beams approaching him at the same time too since he is just in the front of E.

    T2 thinks like that. I have always been at rest since my birthday. It is E approached me from the left. I moved nowhere, but light beams arrived simultaneously. I am not in the center and distances to A and B are different, thus B released flash earlier than A. Though light beams arrived simultaneously, they were released at different moments.

    The same reflections (just opposite), if the flashes were released simultaneously in train’s frame.
  25. Jan 19, 2017 #50
    Remember ALL frames are equivalently valid and correct.
    A will "see" V occurring at W
    B will "see" X occurring at Y

    The only things that will be universally agreed upon are the speed of light and the spacetime interval between W and Y


Greaves-Lord K › Trails

Greaves-Lord K

Greaves-Lord, K., Ferdinand, R. F., Oldehinkel, A. J., Sondeijker, F. E. P. L., Ormel, J., & Verhulst, F. C. (2007). Higher cortisol awakening response in young adolescents with persistent anxiety problems. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 116, 137-144.

The aims of the present study were to test the association between current anxiety problems and basal cortisol levels in a large population sample of young preadolescents, and to test if HPA-axis activity differs between individuals with no, only current, or persistent anxiety problems. Cortisol levels of 10- to 12-year olds (n ¼ 1768) from the general population were measured on three time points during the day. A self-report questionnaire (RCADS) was used to assess current anxiety, a parent-report questionnaire (TPBQ) to assess anxiety problems at age 4. Associations between cortisol levels and current anxiety problems were not found. However, individuals with persistent anxiety problems had higher morning cortisol levels and a higher cortisol awakening response. Apparently, only persistent, and not current, anxiety problems are associated with higher HPA-axis activity. Alterations in HPA-axis activity might underlie persistent anxiety problems, or result from the stress accompanied by persistent anxiety problems.

Click here for the article on Pubmed


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